Treatise: On the Last End of Human Acts or On Beatitude

9. Notion of End. - End etymologically signifies any terminus whatever, and thus death is called the end of life; but in the strict sense it designates that which finishes or terminates a tendency or action, upon the obtaining of which the agent ceases to act and rests from acting. But because a rational being directs itself to a terminus which it knows as good, therefore the end is also the cause which impels to acting, insofar as it excites desire or appetite for itself and thus allures the efficient cause to acting: "the end," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, "although it is last (or the terminus) in execution, nevertheless is first (or the principle) in the intention of the agent, and in this way has the nature of a cause"; indeed, it is the first of all causes. Hence it is defined: that to which or on account of which, that is, for the sake of which, something is done.

In the end there can be considered: a) the thing which we desire to obtain (the end which, or objective end); b) its attainment, or the action by which possession of it is obtained (the end by which, or formal end); c) the person for whom possession of the thing is desired (the end for whom, or subjective end). These three, however, are not distinct and separate ends in the concrete, but elements integrating one total end: for we do not desire a thing except as to be possessed by someone.

10. Division of End. - The end is distinguished:

1. By reason of the subject: the end of the work, or intrinsic end, to which the work is ordered from its nature, which is identified with the object, as the relief of misery with respect to almsgiving; and the end of the one acting, to which the one acting orders the work, or which he intends. This is sometimes the same as the end of the work, sometimes diverse; and then, in relation to the object and the end of the work, it is extrinsic and accidental, whether it too is intended along with the former and is joined to the former, as if someone wills almsgiving on account of mercy and the glory of God, or whether, with the former neglected, it alone is intended and directs the act, as almsgiving given solely for fornication.

2. By reason of the terminus, the end is ultimate or intermediate. The former is that which is intended on account of itself and in which one rests, whether it is simply and absolutely ultimate, that is, in every genus of action and with respect to the whole of life, or is ultimate in a certain respect, that is, in some series of actions, as health or victory in the operations of medicine or war. But if it is referred to a further end, it becomes intermediate: this is intended on account of another end to which it is referred, as the relief of a poor man to the honor of God. But the intermediate and proximate end, and the ultimate and remote end, must not be confused: an end is proximate if it is intended immediately, with no other end interposed; remote, if it is intended by the will but through another end. Hence the ultimate end can be proximate or immediately intended, as happens in an act of charity.

3. By reason of causality or influence, the end (especially of the one acting) is total or adequate if the one acting acts on account of it alone, for example almsgiving on account of mercy; or partial or inadequate if he acts at the same time on account of another, for example on account of mercy and vain glory. Partial ends either a) are equally principal if they exercise equal influence collaterally and move concomitantly to acting, so that each would suffice for placing the act, as to go to a city for business and for an extraordinary spectacle; or b) one is primary, or moving, and the other secondary, or impelling, according as the one acting is moved to acting per se, first, and principally, as a priest about to celebrate Mass on account of the worship of God, or less principally, consecutively and subordinately, and with another presupposed, even if otherwise he would not act, for example a priest at the same time celebrating on account of a stipend, who would not celebrate without the stipend.

4. By reason of effect, the end is called effected or produced, or obtained, according as it is made and produced by the operation of the agent, as health by the operation of the physician, or is obtained by the operation of the agent but is not produced, since, on the contrary, it is effected by the intervention of another, as the prize of a contest. These ends do not differ according to final causality, for each moves insofar as it is in intention, but according to being, because one exists before the operation, although it is not yet obtained, and is called antecedent; the other exists after the operation by which it is effected, and is called consequent.

11. Notion and Division of Good.

That to which a being tends as to a terminus cannot be anything except that which is suitable to it; likewise nothing can move someone to acting except what is known as apt to perfect him and seems suitable to him, whether it is truly suitable or according to appearance. Hence end and good are the same in reality, although they are distinguished in concept.

1. "The notion of good consists in this, that something is perfective of another by way of end." Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate 3, a. 2. "The end is that in which the appetite of the agent rests... But it belongs to the notion of good that it terminates appetite, for good is what all things desire. Therefore every action and movement is for the sake of good." Contra Gentiles III, 3.

By reason of perfection, good is supreme or perfect, which fully perfects nature and is the absolutely ultimate end; and imperfect or participated, which perfects in some respect.

But by reason of appetibility it is threefold: a) honorable or rational, which is appetible in itself and for its own sake to a rational nature and is suitable to it: this is always a true good; b) useful, which is appetible for the sake of another, insofar as it serves another, or helps toward attaining another, for example medicine toward health; c) delightful, which is appetible insofar as it quiets appetite by the enjoyment of itself; this can be an apparent and false good if it is dishonorable, for we can also be delighted in dishonorable things.

2. It is an analogical division, for I, q. 5, a. 6, ad 3: "Good is not divided into these three as something univocal predicated equally of them; but as something analogical, which is predicated according to prior and posterior. For it is predicated first of the honorable; secondarily of the delightful; thirdly of the useful."

These three are diverse but not opposed, so that they can be found together: thus the exercise of virtue is honorable in itself, useful for salvation, and procures delight.

12. What We Suppose from Dogmatic Theology. - Besides the notions handed down, from real philosophy and dogmatic theology we suppose as known:

1. That God, in the production of the universe of things, necessarily intended as the end of the one acting His own intrinsic goodness, not as to be increased, but as to be communicated and manifested; and therefore God Himself is the first final cause, or the absolutely ultimate external end for whom, of the whole universe and of all creatures. Hence Prov. XVI, 4: The Lord has wrought all things for Himself (Rom. XI, 36; Apoc. I, 8; XXI, 6; XXII, 13; Hebr. II, 10). It is of faith from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 1.

1. Cf. St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1 and 2.

2. That God also intended the end of the work, fixed for the creatures themselves, and that this is His external glory, namely, the manifestation and glorification of His perfection by creatures. This is the primary end which of all creatures (Ps. XVIII, 2; Is. VI, 3; XLIII, 7; Eccli. XVII, 7). It is of faith from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 1, canon 5.

3. That all creatures procure this glory of God in their own proper way conformably to their nature; specifically, irrational creatures procure only objective glory, which consists in the representation and manifestation of the perfection of God which they participate; rational creatures also procure formal glory, by acknowledging, praising, and loving the divine perfection.

4. That from His positive will and gratuitous goodness God has destined us to His supernatural glory, which is procured through habitual grace and infused virtues here on earth and through the intuitive vision of God Himself in heaven (I Cor. II, 6-12 and XIII, 12; I John III, 2). It is of faith from the Council of Vienne, articles 4 and 5, and from Benedict XII, the constitution Benedictus Deus, and from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2.

5. That God has furthermore given to individual creatures an end proper and internal to them, proportioned to their nature, which is the perfection itself or good of creatures. When they attain it, by that very fact they concur, as parts of the universe, toward the universal end of the whole created order and thus toward the glory of God. To the rational creature God gave as proper end happiness. This is the secondary end which, subordinated to the primary end (Gen. I, 27 sq.; Wis. XI, 24-25; XII, 13; Ps. VIII, 5). It is of faith from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2, and from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 1.

6. That man, unlike other beings which are moved and led into an end, properly and formally acts for the sake of an end, that is, by knowing the end as such and by freely moving and leading himself to it by the will (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 2).

13. Object of the Treatise.

In the present treatment we do not inquire concerning the primary end of the universe, which man has in common with other creatures, but concerning the secondary end which is proper to man, namely, concerning his beatitude: for from the fact that he was created for the vision and glory of God, it is not yet affirmed that the beatitude of man consists in this. And this end can be considered in two ways: 1) externally and passively, insofar as from the intention of the Creator it has been fixed for man, and this aspect is ontological and therefore metaphysical and dogmatic; 2) internally and actively, insofar as man is inclined to the end and ought to intend it by his own will and is morally obligated to this; and therefore insofar as the end is the source and root and, as it were, the norm of human actions, and this aspect is psychological and moral. And in this sense we inquire concerning the end or beatitude of man. Furthermore, it can be considered in two ways: a) formally and in the abstract, according to the very notion of ultimate end (what it is); b) materially and in the concrete, according to the very thing which is the ultimate end (in what it is). Now we inquire not only concerning the end in the abstract, but especially in what it consists in the concrete.

14. Division of the Treatise. - The treatise is divided into five questions:

1. On the ultimate end of man in common and beatitude in the abstract (that it is);

2. On objective beatitude (in what it is);

3. On formal beatitude (what it is);

4. On the qualities or dowries of beatitude (what things are required for it);

5. On the mode of attaining beatitude (how it can be obtained).