Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article IV. On the Promulgation and Acceptance of Law
200. Notion. The promulgation of a law is its authentic manifestation made by the legislator. Promulgation is distinguished both from the divulgation and from the notice of the law. For promulgation is the public announcement of a law made by command of the legislator with some solemnity according to received usage; but divulgation is the declaration of the promulgation itself made by trustworthy private persons.87 But notice or knowledge of the law is something subjective, namely, although the law has been sufficiently promulgated and indeed even divulged, nevertheless it can be unknown by some subjects. It is plain of itself that divulgation is not required for inducing the obligation of a law; on the contrary, knowledge of the law is required in order that the law oblige in second act, or that its transgression be formally sinful. But it is asked whether even promulgation is necessary for inducing the obligation of law.
87 Cf. Billuart, De leg. diss. 3, a. 2.
201. Necessity of promulgation. Although promulgation more truly does not pertain to the very essence of law, as was said above,88 nevertheless no human law actually obliges before it has been authentically promulgated. For it would be true tyranny if a human legislator wished to urge the observance of some law before subjects could even arrive at authentic notice of the law. But authentic notice of a law cannot be had without authentic promulgation. Whence it is said in the Decretals:89 "It is not necessary, when a constitution is solemnly issued or publicly promulgated, to inculcate knowledge of it into the ears of each one by a special mandate or letters; but this alone suffices, that he who knows it to have been solemnly issued or publicly promulgated is held to its observance." - By these words is indicated not only the necessity of promulgation, but also when sufficient promulgation is judged to be present. For it is not necessary for sufficient promulgation that the law be manifested to each subject individually or actually be known, but it is required and suffices that each subject can (morally speaking) have knowledge of the law.
88 n. 143 note.
89 c. 1, X, 1, 5; cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 8, § 1.
202. Mode of promulgation. a) The mode of promulgation for civil laws neither was nor is the same in all regions. Today civil laws are usually promulgated in some so-called official gazette.
b) Laws of the Supreme Pontiff formerly were affixed to the doors of Basilicas, or "at the entrance of Campo de' Fiori,"90 and thus were sometimes presumed to have been sufficiently promulgated. Sometimes they were also transmitted to individual bishops or other ecclesiastical superiors. But now these pontifical laws are promulgated by publication in the official commentary of the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, unless in particular cases another mode of promulgating has been prescribed; and they exert their force only when three months have been completed from the day which is placed on the number of the Acta, unless from the nature of the matter (for example, a declaration of divine right) they bind immediately, or in the law itself a shorter or longer vacancy has been specially and expressly established.91 Hence, for example, if the periodical of the Acta Apostolicae Sedis was issued on January 1, all laws published in it ordinarily do not oblige except from April 1 beginning, although perhaps they were made before January 1.
c) Episcopal laws begin to oblige immediately from promulgation, unless something else is provided in them; but the mode of promulgation is determined by the bishop himself.92 According to the practice now commonly in force, episcopal laws are usually promulgated by so-called pastoral letters or in the official diocesan periodical gazette. - As to the laws of other prelates, particular statutes must be attended to.
90 Cf. our Man. iur. can. q. 19: "in acie campi Florae," that is, "at the entrance of the flower market."
91 Cod. iur. can. c. 9. Concerning the computation of time see c. 34, § 3.
92 Cod. iur. can. c. 335, § 2.
203. Acceptance a) on the part of the people is not necessary in order that human laws induce obligation. This indeed is plain of itself for ecclesiastical laws, because the legislative power of the Church by no means depends upon the people, but upon Christ himself. The same also holds for civil law, at least if these laws are just and if the so-called plebiscite is not required, as still sometimes comes into use in Switzerland. But the reason is that otherwise all authority of laws would collapse and the subversion of the social order would follow. Hence Alexander VII condemned proposition 28: "The people do not sin, even if without any cause they do not receive a law promulgated by the prince."93 - It is plain of itself that the people neither ought nor can accept human laws which injure natural or positive-divine right, for example, laws which persecute the Church. For it is necessary to obey God rather than men; and therefore against unjust laws of this kind the so-called passive resistance must be opposed, as was already said above in n. 181. But even when other laws are promulgated which to the sounder part of the people seem not suitable to the circumstances of affairs, appeal can be made to the legislator, and meanwhile the obligation of the law is suspended from the presumed consent of the legislator.
b) Laws of the Supreme Pontiff do not even depend on acceptance by the bishops; for the Pope has supremacy not only of honor, but also of jurisdiction in the whole Church. Nevertheless, if at some time a bishop reasonably thinks that in his diocese, on account of singular circumstances existing there, some new pontifical law would cause true harm, he can for a time refrain from publication of that law; then, however, he must as quickly as possible seek an authentic explanation in the Roman Curia. "Nor," as Benedict XIV says,94 "have the Roman Pontiffs ever refused to lend an ear to the reasons of inferiors; and as often as they recognized these to be sufficiently valid, they by no means refused to exempt some provinces or dioceses from the law of their general Constitutions, as to that kind of discipline concerning which we now treat." - Since any good bishop having union with the Apostolic See is not to be presumed a disobedient son of the Church, the priests and faithful of the diocese are excused from the observance of some new pontifical law which the bishop has not yet published in his diocese. This indeed can especially have a place in liturgical law; for example, in some places songs are still sung in the vernacular language during Mass or sacramental Benediction, although this is prohibited by common law.
93 Billuart discusses the acceptance of law broadly and well (diss. 3, a. 3). Cf. also St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 138.
94 De syn. dioec. l. 9, c. 8, n. 3.
204. c) Finally, no ecclesiastical laws (neither pontifical nor episcopal) need acceptance on the part of the civil government. For the Church is a perfect society, autonomous and altogether independent from civil government. Whence the Vatican Council95 strenuously declared: "We condemn and reprobate the opinions of those who say that this communication of the supreme head with pastors and flocks can licitly be impeded, or who render the same subject to secular power, so that they contend that those things which are established by the Apostolic See, or by its authority, for the governance of the Church have no force and value unless they are confirmed by the approval of secular power." Therefore the "royal approval" is required neither for promulgation nor for acceptance of an ecclesiastical law. But sometimes in Concordats entered into with civil governments the Church has conceded to the power of the republic some right of intervening even in ecclesiastical matters, for example, in the election of bishops, in the administration of ecclesiastical goods, etc.
95 Sess. 4, c. 3 (Denz. n. 1829). Cf. Pius IX, encyclical Quanta cura of December 8, 1864; prop. 28 of the Syllabus: "It is not lawful for bishops, without the permission of the government, even to promulgate the apostolic letters themselves" (Denz. n. 1728).