Tract VI. On Virtues In General

Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. theol. 1, 2, q. 49-70; Quaest. disp. de virtut. in communi; John of St. Thomas, Curs. theol. disput. XIII; E. Muller, Theol. mor. lib. I, tract. 4, cap. 2, sect. 2; Lud. Barre, Tract. de virtut. (Paris 1886); Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de virtut. in communi; Fr. X. Mutz, Christl. Aszetik; Gopfert, Moraltheol. I, § 42 sq.

437. Preliminary note. After we have treated human acts and the rules determining their morality, namely law and conscience, we must now treat the principles of human acts. Such principles are of two kinds:

1. Intrinsic principles, namely the human powers furnished with habits.

2. Extrinsic principles, namely all extrinsic causes which move man to acting, that is, the devil, the world, God. Although the world and the devil are able vehemently to allure man to voluntary acts, nevertheless they cannot infallibly induce him. For even under a most vehement temptation man remains free and is able to refuse consent. Indeed, if a man's reason is disturbed, or if under the influence of exterior violence an act of man is extorted, the extrinsic cause obtains its effect, but such an act is now not human. Hence the Angelic Doctor most truly says: "That his [namely man's] voluntary motion should be from some extrinsic principle which is not the cause of the will, is impossible."¹ But since God alone is the cause of the will, he alone is able sufficiently and infallibly to move man to any acts whatsoever of the will, with human liberty unharmed. God does not move man to evil acts, or to sin, because he himself has hatred for sin; but he moves him to good acts by bestowing manifold graces. Therefore divine grace is the principal extrinsic cause of good acts. - According to the usage of schools today, grace is commonly treated rather in Dogmatic theology than in Moral theology, perhaps both because the tract on grace is intimately connected with the tract on predestination, which certainly pertains to Dogmatic theology, and because the Church has defined several dogmas about grace against heretics, for example against the Pelagians, Lutherans, Calvinists, Jansenists, etc. These dogmas are commonly explained more broadly in dogmatic theology. Following this usage of the schools, we leave the complete tract on grace to dogmatic theology, and above at n. 136 we touched on only a few points concerning this matter.

The intrinsic principles of human acts are the powers of the soul insofar as they have been perfected, or at least inclined, by habits. These powers are the intellect, the will, the sensitive appetite, etc.; all of these are treated in psychology, and St. Thomas treated them in the Summa theol. 1, q. 79 sqq. Therefore, with the doctrine concerning the powers presupposed, it remains that we treat habits, which perfect the powers. But habits are either good, namely virtues, or evil, namely vices. Since according to the common adage, "Contraries have the same account," vices, as being contrary to virtues, are easily judged from the virtues themselves once known; at the same time, under the guidance of the Angelic Doctor, we shall treat virtues and the vices opposed to them. First, therefore, virtues in general must be treated; then the individual virtues and the opposed vices.

The tract on virtues in general is divided into three chapters: 1. on the nature of virtue; 2. on acquired moral virtues and their properties; 3. on infused virtues and their properties. Yet in a preliminary chapter habits in general are treated very briefly, because the nature of virtue cannot be perfectly known unless one first knows what a habit is.

¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 9, a. 6.