Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article I. On the Nature and Division of Morality
99. Nature of morality. In every human act a twofold being can be distinguished: physical and moral. The physical being of a human act is its physical entity; for example, in the killing of a man, the physical being of this act includes both the physical powers which caused the killing and the physical effect itself of the killing. The moral being1 of a human act is that essential property which renders the physical act either good or licit, or evil or illicit. Thus in the example brought forward of killing, the physical action receives a diverse moral being according as it was done justly by legitimate authority or unjustly by anyone whatever. Almost all admit that the moral being of a human act adds something to the physical being, but there is not one opinion as to what this is.
The morality of human actions can be defined: the transcendental relation of a human act to the norm of morality. The act which is conformable to this rule is right or licit or good; but the act which is disconformable is illicit or evil. Therefore it is necessary that there exist some rule according to which all human acts must be measured and regulated. For just as in physical things the straightness or obliquity or curvature of some object is known if it is compared with a straight rule, so in moral matters a human act is judged right or perverse according as it agrees or disagrees with the rule of morals.
1 Moral being is predicated principally of human acts. But by analogy of attribution many other things are called moral insofar as they have an order to human acts. Thus we speak of a moral cause, which produces acts not physically but morally, that is, by counseling, commanding, etc.; of a moral law, which directs human acts; of moral virtues, which facilitate human acts; of a moral object, which is reached by a human act; of moral science, which hands down conclusions deduced from moral principles; of moral obligation, which binds us according to human custom; of moral certitude, which indeed is not perfect certitude, but sufficient, with attention to human customs.
100. False opinions concerning the norm of morality. We cannot in our Manual bring forward all the false opinions concerning the norm of morality; for they are almost innumerable. For a fuller doctrine the authors treating of Ethics or Apologetics are to be consulted. Concerning the essence or ultimate norm of morality several non-Catholic and even Catholic authors have erred and do err. Among the errors of non-Catholic authors these seem to be the principal ones: 1. utilitarianism; 2. rationalism; 3. subjectivism.
101. 1. Utilitarianism (also called hedonism from the word ἡδονή, or eudaemonism from the word εὐδαιμονία) places the ultimate norm of morality in terrestrial happiness to be attained, so that those actions are to be called good which, considered both in themselves and in their effects, bring more pleasure than pain. The supreme rule of this system is: Pleasure is to be sought, pain is to be fled. A twofold utilitarianism is distinguished: one individual, the other social. The former intends the happiness of the individual man; but the latter the happiness of human society. The principal patrons of individual utilitarianism were a) among the ancients: Aristippus the Cyrenaic, Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius; b) among the more modern: Helvetius, de la Mettrie, Diderot, Feuerbach.2 - R. Cumberland, Fr. Bacon, Aug. Comte, Stuart Mill, J. Bentham, and others defended social utilitarianism. Yet it is not so certainly established concerning some of the cited authors what utilitarianism they taught, whether individual or social. This holds especially concerning J. Bentham, who is held by some as a patron of individual utilitarianism, but by others as a defender of social utilitarianism. The fundamental principle of this author is: A man must with all his powers in his life procure for himself the "Maximization of pleasure and Minimization of pain," that is, he must take care that pleasure become as great as possible and pain as little as possible, and therefore he must weigh the delectations and pains (according to intensity, duration, extension, purity, and fecundity) which any act will produce. Acts which will produce more pleasure are good; but those which will cause more pain are evil.3
2 Cf. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. 8, II, n. 93 sqq., and V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie I 5, 266 sqq., who explain and refute these systems more broadly.
3 Jerem. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). L. Carrau describes utilitarianism with great erudition in La morale utilitaire, Paris 1874; his opinion concerning Bentham is found on pp. 167-217.
102. 2. Rationalism teaches that the supreme norm of morality is to live according to reason without any respect to happiness. The Stoics favored this rationalism, thinking that the highest good is to do virtue for its own sake, or to lead a life concordant with itself.4 The true sage follows this rule in his whole life: "Endure, abstain." Endure all inconveniences with an untroubled mind; abstain from all joys; be as if impassible, so that you can be disturbed by no influence of pain or pleasure.5 Th. Reid (1710-1796) and especially Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) followed this Stoicism in some measure; Kant taught that the good is to be fulfilled, not because it brings us some utility, but because it is our duty. Hence law does not command in a conditioned way (if you wish to be happy, do this), but in an absolute and categorical way, namely, do this. Hence arose the celebrated "Kantian categorical imperative."
4 The principle of Stoicism was: ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, which principle indeed is not explained in the same way by diverse authors (cf. Cathrein, l. c. 226).
5 The words of Horace (Od. 3, 3, 8) seem to have been said of the Stoic: "If the shattered world should fall upon him, its ruins will strike him fearless."
103. 3. Subjectivism (which not without merit is also called moral skepticism) today is widely raging among non-Catholics. Already the ancient Greek philosopher Theodorus the Cyrenaic said that nothing is good or evil from its own nature, and therefore that even adultery itself and theft can sometimes be good acts.6 In the sixteenth century Montaigne (1533-1592), whom Th. Hobbes (1588-1679) followed, denied the existence of any objective and constant norm for the moral acts of man. In our times R. v. Jhering,7 Fr. Paulsen,8 Fr. Jodl,9 Ed. Westermarck,10 and many others teach the same. In an altogether crude way M. Stirner and Fr. Nietzsche logically led this subjectivism all the way to true moral nihilism, Nietzsche prating that all morality is an arrogant falsification and that the aristocratic man is outside the limits of good and evil. Subjectivism, which denies every objective constant and invariable norm of morality and asserts that subjective judgment, or rather sentiment (subjektives Gefühl, sentiment subjectif, moral sense), is the sole norm of morality, logically leads to the absurdities defended by Nietzsche and destroys the whole social order, which surely cannot be preserved without constant objective norms.11
After the false opinions of non-Catholics concerning the norm of morality have been briefly stated, there remain to be brought forward the less correct opinions of Catholic authors:
6 Diogen. Laert. 9, 61, 101: "Nothing therefore is good or bad by nature."
7 Jhering (Idealistische und positivistische Ethik [1882] 222) says: "There is no action which would be evil in itself. The distinction between good and evil does not lie in things in themselves, but first results from the relation of things and actions to the ends of men."
8 Paulsen (System der Ethik I, 19) says: "As an Englishman is other than a Chinese or a Black man, and also wishes and ought to be other, so for each among them there also holds another morality." Yet in other places the same author seems to admit an objective stable moral norm (cf. Cathrein, l. c. 263).
9 Religion, Moral und Schule (1892) 9.
10 Ursprung und Entwicklung der Moralbegriffe I, c. 1; cf. also ibid. pp. 13-14.
11 Cathrein, l. c. 168-179, excellently refutes this error.
104. 1. Moral positivism teaches that the ultimate norm of morality is the free divine will, which could have freely established a morality altogether diverse from that which now exists; indeed, that it can still freely change the existing morality. This opinion today is obsolete and has already been refuted by St. Thomas.12 For there are certain actions intrinsically evil, and indeed independently of the divine will, for example, to blaspheme, to kill an innocent person, to perjure oneself, etc.; nor can God render these licit.
2. Other Catholic authors, admitting indeed that the norm of morality is something objective, immutable, pertaining to the supernatural end of man, have investigated more intimately what precisely that is which first and of itself renders human acts moral. They have gone into diverse opinions, of which the principal ones are the following:
12 Summa c. gent. 3, 129. Guill. Occam (In 2 sent. q. 19 ad 3 and 4), John Gerson (De vita spir. lect. 1, coroll. 10 and 11), and Descartes (Meditationes de prima philos. resp. 6, 6) are said to have proposed this moral positivism.
105. a) Morality consists in a merely extrinsic denomination, or it is a pure being of reason. For an act is called moral because it is referred either to law or to the rational nature of man. Thus especially Vasquez.13 Mastrius and de Coninck are also said to have taught the same.14 This opinion is certainly false. For some species of morality is moral goodness. But moral goodness is certainly not a pure extrinsic denomination and a being of reason, since by morally good acts we merit eternal life. But it is not consonant with reason to assert that we merit eternal life by some being of reason.15
13 In I-II, disp. 73, c. 9, n. 42 sqq.; disp. 95, c. 10.
14 In Frins, De act. hum. II, n. 9.
15 Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 1, where this whole question concerning the essence of morality is discussed clearly and briefly.
106. b) Morality consists in the liberty of the act. Thus Durandus,16 Scotus,17 Tanner,18 and perhaps also Suarez.19 But this opinion likewise is not to be admitted, because liberty is indeed required for morality, since no act is moral which is not free;20 nevertheless morality does not consist formally in liberty. For being free pertains to the physical order; for by it free beings are distinguished from non-free agents. Moreover, even if the moral order, and consequently morality itself, did not exist, nevertheless liberty would still remain in the actions of man.21
16 2, dist. 38, q. 1 and 3; cf. also 3, dist. 23, q. 3.
17 In Sent. lib. 2, dist. 40, q. un., § "De secundo dico." - Moreover, it is not so established what the accurate opinion of Scotus is. Cf. Frins, l. c.
18 In I-II, disp. 2, dub. 2, n. 36.
19 Thus at least Frins thinks, l. c. n. 6, citing seven diverse places in the works of Suarez for this opinion. Frins himself (l. c. n. 22) also thinks that the liberty of the act is not only presuppositively, but formally and constitutively the essence of morality.
20 The scholastics dispute much whether and what liberty is required for a human and moral act. The controversy is chiefly concerned with the act of beatific vision, which is not free, but necessary. Some wish this act, as lacking liberty, not to be human or moral; but deservedly, says Billuart (l. c. diss. 1, a. 2): "Beatific love is intimately and inseparably joined to the rule (of reason), and therefore is human and moral in a more eminent way and with imperfections removed."
21 Cf. Salmant., Curs. theol. mor. tract. 20, c. 1, punct. 3.
107. c) Morality consists in the advertence of reason to the honesty of the object. Thus Syl. Maurus,22 Scheeben,23 and a few others, who think that even the very act of beatific love, since, although necessary, it is nevertheless perfectly rational, that is, plainly conformable to the dictate of right reason, is perfectly and properly moral. This opinion indeed does not seem absolutely false, but incomplete; for for the true morality of an act there is required not only advertence of reason to the honesty of the act, but also the intervention of the will. Besides, the essence of morality cannot arise solely from human reason and will, but also from relation to the objective norm of morality, and indeed to the divine norm.
There are still several opinions concerning the essence of morality, which it would be long to bring forward here, and which are of small or no utility for practice.24
22 Opus theol. II, lib. 5, q. 22, n. 7.
23 Handb. der kath. Dogmatik I, lib. 2, n. 594 sqq.
24 Cf. Frins, l. c. n. 4-10. L. Lehu, Philos. mor. et soc. (Paris 1914) n. 145 sqq., treats with great erudition the diverse ways of speaking in this matter.
108. The true opinion concerning the essence and norm of morality. Morality consists formally in a tendency (or transcendental relation) to the object, insofar as that object precisely falls under the rules of morals. But the rules of morals are the eternal law and all things which are derived from the eternal law, such as all other just laws and conscience. Almost all Thomists explain the essence of morality in this way, for example, John of St. Thomas,25 Gonet,26 the Salmanticenses,27 Billuart.28 The reason for this opinion is that an act is formally constituted by its tendency to its object; for the whole account of an act is its object. This indeed is admitted by all in the physical order and is plain of itself; thus, for example, the act of vision is formally constituted by its tendency to the object seen. Therefore, by parity, a moral act is essentially constituted by its tendency toward a moral object. But an object is moral insofar as it is subjected to the rules or norms of morals.
1. The supreme objective norm of morality is the eternal law, or the reason of divine wisdom, insofar as it is directive of all human actions. For man is bound by all his acts to tend to the ultimate end, which is God, as was proved above. Therefore all human acts must have a right order to this ultimate end, or, as the Angelic Doctor says, "the rectitude of the will is through due order to the ultimate end."29 If they have that order, they are morally good; otherwise they are morally evil. But since that order has been established by the eternal law, it is rightly said: The morality of human acts consists formally in conformity or difformity with the eternal law. The matter is explained by an example. An act of theft is morally evil. Why? Because God has prohibited it. - Why has God prohibited it? Because through theft the social order is disturbed and thus the glory of God is injured. But if the glory of God is injured by man, the eternal law is also injured, and man will not attain his ultimate end.
2. The proximate objective norm of morality is human reason, that is, the dictate of right reason, not indeed of itself, but insofar as it is a participation of the eternal law.30 For reason is the first principle of human and moral acts. But reason judges concerning the conformity of an act with the eternal law. Hence the Angelic Doctor,31 speaking of the twofold species of morality, says: "Good, insofar as it is according to reason, and evil, insofar as it is beside reason, diversify the species of morals." Elsewhere the same holy Doctor says:32 "Good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason, it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will." The proposed doctrine can be clarified by the example of the shining moon and sun. For just as the full moon does not shine, but reflects the light of the sun, so the dictate of right reason is not the norm of morality except insofar as it reflects the eternal law. - Up to this point the discussion has been concerning the objective morality of human acts.
3. The subjective norm of morality is conscience. Therefore a man must conform his actions to conscience commanding or prohibiting; otherwise he acts badly, as will be said more broadly below, n. 307. The eternal law is inscribed in our hearts (in conscience) either directly by God himself, the author of our rational nature, or by means of just positive laws. Therefore it can be said briefly: The eternal law is the ultimate objective norm, but conscience is the proximate subjective norm of the morality of human acts.33
25 Cursus theol. in I-II, q. 21, disp. 8, a. 1, n. 23.
26 Clypeus in I-II, disp. 1, n. 18.
27 L. c. punct. 1.
28 L. c. diss. 4, a. 1.
29 S. theol. I-II, q. 4, a. 4.
30 Ibid. q. 19, a. 4. "In all ordered causes an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, because the second cause acts only in virtue of the first cause. But that human reason is the rule of the human will, by which its goodness is measured, it has from the eternal law, which is the divine reason." Hence proposition (3) of the Syllabus of Pius IX was condemned: "Human reason, with no regard whatever had to God, is the sole arbiter of true and false, good and evil" (Denz. n. 1703).
31 S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 5 ad 1.
32 Ibid. q. 19, a. 1 ad 3.
33 "The rule of the human will is twofold: one proximate and homogeneous, namely, human reason itself; but the other is the first rule, namely, the eternal law, which is as it were the reason of God" (ibid. q. 71, a. 6; cf. q. 19, a. 4).
109. Divisions or species of morality. Three species of morality are assigned, namely, goodness, malice, and moral indifference. Moral goodness is nothing other than the tendency or real transcendental order of a human act to an object conformable with the eternal law. Moral malice is a tendency to an object dissonant from the rules of morals, or according to other authors: it is the privation of consonance and rectitude. As to these two species of morality, there is almost no difficulty, since they are both understood easily enough and admitted by all Catholics. For certainly there are morally good acts, such as to love God, to render justice to each one, etc., and morally evil acts, such as to lie, to blaspheme, etc. But as to the third species of morality, namely, indifference, authors do not agree. Some teach that indifference is not properly a species of morality, but a negation of morality.34 But the more common and truer opinion teaches that indifference is a true but incomplete species of morality. It is indeed a true species, because there exist acts which, considered only according to their objects in themselves, are neither good nor evil, for example, to walk, to cut wood, etc.; but it is an incomplete species of morality, because in reality an indifferent act does not exist in the individual. There will be fuller discussion of this matter below in article 3; meanwhile it suffices to bring forward the words of St. Thomas,35 who says: "There are three differences of human acts; for certain acts are good from their genus... and with respect to these there is posited the act of law to prescribe or command. But certain acts are evil from their genus, such as vicious acts; and with respect to these law has to prohibit. But certain acts from their genus are indifferent acts; and with respect to these law has to permit." "If we speak of a moral act according to its species, then not every moral act is good or evil, but some act is indifferent."36
34 Thus Tanquerey, l. c. de actibus hum. n. 185, Bouquillon, Theol. fund. n. 348, and from the older authors the Salmanticenses, Gonet, and others.
35 S. theol. I-II, q. 92, a. 2.