Article II. On the Object of Human Law

181. Extension. The object of law is everything which the legislator is able to establish for the good of the community whose care he has. Therefore the object of law extends as far as that which is necessary for the good of the community. "Whatever, therefore, in human affairs is in any way sacred, whatever pertains to the salvation of souls or to the worship of God, whether it is such by its own nature, or again is understood to be such on account of the cause to which it is referred, all that is in the power and judgment of the Church." Thus Leo XIII.²⁵ By these wise words the matter or object of ecclesiastical law is circumscribed, which accordingly extends to all those things which touch the Christian religion and the salvation of souls either directly or indirectly. For this reason the Church can make laws, for example, concerning the administration and reception of the sacraments, concerning churches, oratories, ceremonies, benefices, concerning the whole religious and moral life of Christians, etc. But it is plain of itself that neither the Church nor any created power can command anything which is against the divine or natural law, because an inferior legislator cannot command anything which is against a higher law.

According to St. Thomas,²⁶ the object of human law must have three conditions, namely:

1) That it be congruent with religion, insofar, namely, as it is proportioned to positive divine law.

2) That it accord with discipline, insofar as it is proportioned to the law of nature.

Human laws which are opposed to the divine or natural law cannot licitly be observed. Hence, for example, against unjust laws made against religion or favoring dueling, the so-called passive resistance must be opposed; for it is necessary to obey God rather than men.

3) That it profit salvation, insofar as it is proportioned to human utility. To these three conditions all the others are reduced which, after Isidore of Seville, are accustomed by authors to be required for the object of human law, for example, that it be honorable, just, possible, useful to the community, fitting to place and time, etc.

Especially authors are accustomed here to ask whether human law can command a) internal acts; b) heroic acts.

²⁵ Const. Immortale Dei of November 1, 1885.

²⁶ S. theol. I-II, q. 95, a. 3. The Angelic Doctor in this place beautifully explains all the conditions of human law.

182. Internal acts are called those which are produced by the intellect and will; they are called merely internal if they remain in the intellect and will, so that either in no way, or only accidentally, they are joined with an external act; but they are called mixed internal, if indeed they are produced by the intellect and will, but are joined with an external act and are referred to it either from their own nature or from a certain moral law. Merely internal acts are, for example, meditation, a special intention, the application of a Mass; mixed internal acts are, for example, attention in vocal prayer, because attention is required from the very nature of prayer, since it is the elevation of the mind to God; contrition in confession, because from the moral law confession cannot truly exist without internal contrition.

1. It is established among all that human law (whether ecclesiastical or civil) can prescribe mixed internal acts. The reason is that human law can command truly human acts, and therefore all those things which are required for a truly human act, namely, knowledge and intention. For an external act which would be done without internal knowledge and intention would be called mechanical rather than human. Thus, for example, the Church commands worthy paschal communion, the fruitful reception of the sacrament of penance. Civil power, legitimately requiring an oath, can command the internal intention of truly swearing when externally the words of the oath are uttered.

2. It is likewise established among all that civil power cannot command merely internal acts, since these directly contribute little to the end of civil society, namely, to earthly welfare. Hence also civil power in fact is never accustomed to command merely internal acts, but only the external observance of laws.

183. 3. Theologians dispute very sharply whether the Church can command merely internal acts. St. Thomas²⁷ and the Roman Catechism²⁸ seem to deny it; Cajetan,²⁹ Suarez,³⁰ Schmalzgrueber,³¹ Billuart,³² Benedict XIV,³³ Tanquerey,³⁴ Aertnys-Damen,³⁵ Vermeersch^36a expressly deny it; St. Alphonsus³⁶ calls the denying opinion more probable. Sylvius,³⁷ Elbel,³⁸ Concina,³⁹ Holzmann,⁴⁰ Ballerini-Palmieri,⁴¹ Noldin,⁴² and especially Bouquillon⁴³ affirm it. - All the arguments of the denying opinion are reduced to the following words of St. Thomas:⁴⁴ "Man can make law concerning those things concerning which he can judge; but the judgment of man cannot be concerning interior motions, which are hidden, but only concerning exterior acts, which appear. And yet for the perfection of virtue it is required that man exist rightly in both acts; and therefore human law could not sufficiently restrain and order interior acts, but it was necessary that divine law supervene for this." - But the affirming opinion is supported chiefly by these arguments: a) The Church can command all those things which are necessary for obtaining her proper end. But now the end of the Church (namely, the salvation of souls) is in itself spiritual and internal. Therefore the Church can command even merely spiritual and internal acts. b) The Church in fact commands some merely internal acts, for example, mental prayer for clerics, examination of conscience, spiritual exercises,⁴⁵ the application of Mass by pastors on certain days; a confessor can in the sacramental forum impose pious meditation as a salutary penance; the Church commands an act of contrition for gaining a plenary indulgence. But it is wicked to say that the Church commands something which exceeds her competence.

For practice this controversy is not of so great utility. For when the Church requires an internal act for some work, as happens in gaining indulgences or in the parochial office, then certainly that internal act must be placed; whence without doubt a pastor would sin mortally if he did not apply Mass for the people on the prescribed days. But whether this grave obligation arises by force of ecclesiastical law (as the patrons of the affirming opinion will) or by force of contract (which the defenders of the denying opinion prefer), namely, of the parochial office freely accepted, matters little. Indeed the obligation incumbent upon pastors of sometimes applying Mass for the people committed to them arises from divine right itself,⁴⁶ but that this application must be made on all Sundays and feast days is determined by ecclesiastical right.

Authors today rather commonly concede that merely internal acts can be commanded in the following cases:

a) In the internal forum by a confessor. Hence a confessor can impose meditation to be made, as has already been said above.

b) When the Church determines or explains divine right. Such determinations or explanations of divine right are: the application of Mass imposed on certain days; the worthy reception of annual confession and paschal communion. Wherefore thesis 14 of the Jansenist errors was proscribed by Alexander VII: "He who makes a voluntarily null confession satisfies the precept of the Church."⁴⁷ And thesis 55 was condemned by Innocent XI: "The precept of annual communion is satisfied by a sacrilegious eating of the Lord."⁴⁸

c) When religious superiors give legitimate precepts to subjects bound by force of the vow of obedience. Therefore a religious superior can command a professed subject, for example, to make meditation, to perform spiritual exercises,⁴⁹ etc., unless, however, obedience from the constitutions of some order does not seem to extend so far.

²⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 91, a. 4; q. 100, a. 9; II-II, q. 104, a. 5. In this last place the Angelic Doctor says simply: "In those things which pertain to the interior motion of the will, man is not bound to obey man, but God alone."

²⁸ The words of the Roman Catechism somewhat favor the denying opinion (De nono et decimo praec. q. 4): "And in this divine and human laws differ, that the latter are content only with external things, but the former, since God looks upon the soul, require the pure and sincere chastity and integrity of the soul itself."

²⁹ Commentary on II-II, q. 11, a. 3.

³⁰ De leg. l. 4, c. 12. Suarez teaches that Christ indeed could have given to the Church the power of making laws concerning internal acts, but in fact did not give such power.

³¹ Commentary on the Decretals, de const., n. 21.

³² De leg. diss. 4, a. 1.

³³ De syn. dioec. l. 9, c. 4, n. 4.

³⁴ Synopsis Theol. mor., De leg. n. 288.

³⁵ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 142.

^36a Theol. mor. I, 254.

³⁶ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 100.

³⁷ Commentary on S. theol. I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

³⁸ Theol. mor., de leg. n. 332.

³⁹ De leg. hum. c. 2, n. 14.

⁴⁰ Theol. mor., de leg. n. 314.

⁴¹ Opus theol. I, de leg. n. 308.

⁴² De principiis n. 138.

⁴³ Theol. mor. fund. n. 114.

⁴⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 91, a. 4.

⁴⁵ Cod. iur. can. cc. 125, 126, 1001.

⁴⁶ Council of Trent, sess. 23, c. 1, on reform.

⁴⁷ Denz. n. 1114.

⁴⁸ Ibid., n. 1205.

⁴⁹ Cod. iur. can. c. 595. Cf. our Man. iur. can. q. 231 (2).

184. Heroic acts ordinarily cannot be commanded by human law, because they are too difficult, indeed impossible for the greater part of the people. But a law commanding things ordinarily too difficult or even impossible is not a good and useful law, and therefore ceases. Nevertheless heroic acts can be commanded in two cases, namely: 1. if the common good strictly requires it; 2. if someone has freely obliged himself even to heroic acts. Thus a leader in war makes a law that soldiers must perform guard duty even with certain danger of life. Thus the Church commands that a pastor, even with grave danger of infection, administer the necessary sacraments to a dying leper. - If someone has freely obliged himself to heroic acts, it is plain of itself that a superior can impose them upon him. Thus, for example, sisters who have freely made profession in some religious congregation instituted for serving the sick can be compelled to serve the infirm, even though from this they fall into certain danger of life.