Article V. On the Obligation of Human Law

205. Existence of Obligation. That a just human law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, induces an obligation (and sometimes a grave one) in conscience is certain. For God says: "Through me kings reign and makers of laws decree just things";⁹⁶ and: "He who despises you despises me."⁹⁷ St. Paul⁹⁸ also admonishes: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power except from God; and those which are, have been ordered by God. Therefore he who resists power resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves.... Therefore be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience." Bringing forward these texts of Sacred Scripture, the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide on June 23, 1830,⁹⁹ writes to the Apostolic Vicar of Siam: "That Christians are held to the observance of civil laws, even if these have been made by unbelieving princes, provided these are not opposed to the Christian religion and to the moral doctrine of the Gospel, there is no room for doubting." The Council of Trent¹⁰⁰ defined: "If anyone says that the baptized are free from all precepts of holy Church, ... so that they are not held to observe them unless they have wished of their own accord to submit themselves to them, let him be anathema."¹⁰¹ - The reason for this obligation is not only the positive ordinance of God, which is drawn from the texts alleged above, but also because otherwise anarchy, which assuredly is a monster worse than dog and serpent, cannot sufficiently be kept away from human society.

⁹⁶ Prov. 8:15.

⁹⁷ Luke 10:16.

⁹⁸ Rom. 13:1, 2, 5.

⁹⁹ Collectan. de Prop. Fid. n. 815.

¹⁰⁰ Sess. 7, can. 8, on baptism (Denz. n. 864).

¹⁰¹ Several heretics taught that no ecclesiastical law as such obliges in conscience, such as the Waldenses, Wycliffites, Luther (De captiv. Babylon., c. de bapt.), Calvin (Inst. l. 4, c. 10), and among Catholics Gerson, who dares to say: "The omission of canonical hours, the transgression of ecclesiastical fasts and generally of all statutes and rules and canons is never a mortal sin, except insofar as it is found discordant with the preceptive divine law; and thus insofar as some law has something admixed from the preceptive divine law, so far, and no further, is its transgression mortally vicious" (Tract. de vita spirituali animae, lect. 4, coroll. 4).

206. Quality of the obligation. The obligation of observing a law can be 1. grave or light; 2. direct or indirect. But what obligation is imposed in individual laws, whether grave or light, cannot be determined by a general rule; rather this depends both upon the circumstances of the matter and the end, and somewhat also upon the intention of the legislator, since he can command a matter grave of itself under light obligation. That the legislator can command under light obligation a matter grave of itself is taught by the opinion by far truer and more common.¹⁰² For every law is a certain bond, which ought not be stricter than is necessary. But now it happens that the legislator obtains the end of the law in a grave matter with a light bond. Therefore then he not only can, but must, command a grave matter under light obligation. For the grave obligation of a law, therefore, two things are required, namely, grave matter and the will of the legislator to oblige gravely. But the legislator cannot command a matter light from every side under grave obligation. For this would impose an intolerable burden upon subjects; and such a law would no longer be for the true utility of the community. - In practice it is licit to discern the measure of obligation:

a) From the very words of the law, which, if they command severely, indicate the gravity of the obligation. Thus, for example, the following formulas indicate grave obligation: we command under threat of divine judgment; we command in virtue of holy obedience, etc.

b) From the gravity of the penalty which the legislator threatens against transgressors. For a grave penalty cannot be inflicted for a light fault. Whence, for example, if some law is imposed under pain of excommunication or under deprivation of benefice, etc., an evident sign is had that this law obliges under grave obligation.

c) From the interpretation of doctors and from the practice of subjects. Thus, for example, doctors commonly teach that a priest celebrating Mass is held under mortal sin to pour some little drops of water into the wine to be consecrated; likewise they teach that it is a grave sin if someone before the reception of the Eucharist eats even the least bit of food.

¹⁰² Cf. S. theol. II-II, q. 105, a. 2; Gonet, Clypeus theol. thom. disp. 5, a. 3; Billuart, De leg. diss. 4, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 143.

207. Scholion. On Formal Contempt of Law. If someone transgresses any law whatever (even one obliging of itself only under light obligation) from formal contempt, he sins mortally.¹⁰³ But formal contempt is present if someone despises the legitimate authority itself and precisely from such contempt transgresses the law. The reason why formal contempt in the transgression of any just law is always a mortal sin is taken from the grave rebellion against legitimate authority, which is always included in formal contempt. But formal contempt is not present: a) if someone does not observe the law from another motive, for example, from passion, from weakness, etc.; b) if someone despises or makes little of the thing indeed commanded in itself, but not precisely as commanded; c) if someone despises the superior not as superior, but as a private person on account of his vileness, weakness, or other imperfections. In practice truly formal contempt happens rather rarely. Discussion will return to this matter below, II, n. 579.

¹⁰³ Cf. S. theol. II-II, q. 186, a. 9 ad 3; Sylvius, Commentary on I-II, q. 96, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, l. c., n. 142. "In any matter whatever, formal contempt of law or of the legislator ... is always a mortal sin."

208. Extension of the obligation of law. Law obliges:

1. To knowledge of itself. This is plain of itself. For how can a law rightly promulgated be rightly observed, if it is not known by the subjects? Whence it follows that every subject, according to his capacity and according to his office, must procure for himself sufficient knowledge of human laws. - Knowledge of ecclesiastical laws is necessary not only for prelates, but also in some way for all priests; and therefore Pope Celestine¹⁰⁴ already established: "Let it be permitted to none of the priests to be ignorant of the canons." And Daniel Concina¹⁰⁵ deservedly says: "Therefore knowledge of the canons is necessary for theologians and will be of great use, ... and if a theologian is ignorant of it, he will be unfit for his office." - Even simple faithful must know at least the more principal ecclesiastical and civil laws.

2. To employing the ordinary means which are proximately necessary for its observance. For he who is held to obtaining an end is also held to employ the means which are necessary for obtaining the end. But I say: a) to ordinary means. Therefore extraordinary means are not commanded, since their procurement is too burdensome. I say: b) which are proximately necessary; for remotely necessary means ordinarily are not commanded by human law. Whence, for example, the ecclesiastical law commanding the recitation of the Breviary also prescribes the ordinary means necessary for this recitation, for example, the book of the Breviary, the book of the Directory; but it does not prescribe that a cleric have two copies of the Breviary for this purpose, namely, that if by chance he lost one copy, he would still have another for the satisfaction of his obligation. - The obligation of employing means includes the obligation of avoiding impediments to fulfillment. Whence it is not licit without proportionate cause to do something which would impede the proximate fulfillment of the law; for example, it is not licit in the morning on Sunday to go hunting or walking in a way which would impede the hearing of Mass; it is not licit without proportionate cause on a fast day to do some extraordinary labor which would render fasting impossible. But for judging in practice when it is licit to place an impediment to the observance of human law, one must attend both to the gravity of the law and to the utility of the transgressor, and generally the rules given above in n. 57 concerning the indirectly voluntary must be observed.

Note. Above, at the beginning of this article, it was said that every just law produces some obligation in conscience, so that the transgressor of the law sins before God. Yet this obligation is not always direct, that is, by force of the law itself, but sometimes indirect, that is, by force of circumstances; namely, if there is question of a penal law, or an invalidating law, or a law founded on a false presumption. Concerning each of these laws one must treat specially.

¹⁰⁴ Decree of Gratian, c. 4, D. 38.

¹⁰⁵ Theol. christ. I, l. 1, diss. 3, c. 14.