Article VIII. On the Cessation of Law

234. Preliminary Note. Law can cease in two ways: a) as to the obligation alone in some case or in a few particular cases, so that the law itself remains whole and intact; b) as to the obligation and substance at the same time, so that now nothing of the law remains. Each mode of ceasing must be treated individually.

The obligation of the law in a particular case, the law itself remaining, can cease: a) because of ignorance of the subject; b) because of impotence of the subject; c) because of dispensation of the superior; d) because of a contrary privilege granted. Concerning excusing ignorance (not from the material, but only from the formal transgression of the law) it has already been said above in the treatise on human acts n. 45 sqq. It remains to speak 1. of impotence, 2. of dispensation, 3. of privileges.

The law itself, both as to obligation and as to substance, can cease from a threefold cause: a) by revocation made by a legitimate superior; b) by cessation of the total end; c) by contrary custom. Since very few things must be said about revocation of law, we comprehend at the same time the first and second cause of the cessation of the law itself, and thus the whole article is divided into five paragraphs, of which the first three pertain to the cessation of obligation and the following two to the cessation of the law itself, namely 1. concerning cessation of obligation because of impotence; 2. concerning cessation of obligation because of dispensation; 3. concerning cessation of obligation because of privilege; 4. concerning cessation of the law itself a) because of revocation; b) because of cessation of the total end; 5. concerning cessation of law because of contrary custom.