Chapter I. On the Notion of Temperance

643. Just as the virtue of fortitude moderates the irascible appetite, so the virtue of temperance orders the concupiscible appetite as its proximate subject. Temperance, as the name itself indicates, is a certain tempering or moderation. It is taken: 1. in the widest sense, for moderation effected by reason in every passion or action; and thus temperance is nothing other than the restraint necessary in every virtue; concerning this temperance we do not treat here; 2. in the strict sense, in which temperance can be defined: a virtue moderating the appetite concerning the pleasures of touch, that is, concerning the pleasures of foods and venereal things.

It is explained. The office and end of temperance is to moderate carnal pleasures according to right reason (whether natural or elevated by supernatural faith). Pleasures are manifold according to their diverse specific objects. Pleasure generally can be defined: the repose of the appetite in a good possessed. Now the goods or objects concerning which pleasure can exist are diverse. First, there are purely spiritual goods, such as knowledge, eternal beatitude, etc. Pleasure concerning these goods is called purely spiritual pleasure, or rather spiritual joy. Whence that pleasure which is produced by the mind is not to be called purely spiritual pleasure, as certain authors teach (for otherwise even pleasure concerning obscene thoughts would be purely spiritual pleasure, which certainly would be said incongruously); rather, it is pleasure concerning purely spiritual goods.

But all pleasures which concern a material object are material pleasures, and it matters little whether they follow from sensitive or intellectual apprehension. Hence the pleasures of an avaricious man concerning money possessed, of a murderer concerning homicide perpetrated, of an adulterer concerning lust committed, etc., are truly material pleasures, although they are in the rational appetite. These material pleasures can be subdivided into bodily and non-bodily pleasures. Non-bodily pleasures are those material pleasures which indeed concern a material object but are not felt in the body. Cf. the examples given above concerning the avaricious man, the murderer, and the adulterer.¹¹⁸² But bodily pleasures are felt in the body, and they are called sensitive or organic when they arise from the perception of an object suitable to the senses. Thus the ear is delighted by hearing a sweet melody, the eye by seeing beautiful colors, the sense of touch by touching soft things, and the sense of smell by smelling good odors. But these pleasures are called sensual or carnal if they arise from the physical and more intensive conjunction of a thing with the peculiar nerves of some organ, which is thereby vehemently moved. This pleasure is found in the use of food, drink, and venereal things; it is often most intense and subject to great disorders. When it concerns venereal things, it is properly called venereal pleasure (geschlechtliche Lust, délectation sexuelle [sexual pleasure]), concerning which below, n. 681.

From what has been said it is gathered that pleasures are of four kinds:

1. purely spiritual pleasures, namely, from an intellectual action and concerning a spiritual object;

2. non-bodily pleasures (spiritual in the broad sense), namely, from an intellectual action but concerning a bodily object;

3. sensitive pleasures, namely, from the sensitive perception of some suitable object;

4. sensual (carnal) pleasures, namely, those which arise from the intimate and physical conjunction of an object with the peculiar nerves of touch or taste and which take place in foods and venereal things. Venereal pleasures, however, arise not only from physical contact but often also from an obscene phantasm; for example, pollution can be produced from obscene reading.

¹¹⁸² Nevertheless, vices concerning non-bodily pleasures of this kind are sometimes called spiritual vices, because they are not properly and strictly carnal vices. Hence the Angelic Doctor calls avarice a spiritual vice (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 118, a. 6).

644. The object of temperance. Temperance taken in the broad sense moderates all pleasures, whether spiritual or material; but temperance in the strict sense concerns only the moderation of sensual pleasures.

The formal object quo, or motive, is right reason to be observed in these pleasures. Right reason is observed when these pleasures are ordered to the end prefixed by the Creator; this end is the preservation of individual life (through foods) and of the human species (through the act of generation). But when sensual pleasure is not intended as a means for facilitating these acts, but as an end principally willed, then a sinful inordination is always present, because it is never lawful to act from pleasure or delight alone.¹¹⁸³

To the point St. Thomas writes:¹¹⁸⁴ "Temperance concerns desires and pleasures, as fortitude concerns fears and acts of daring. Now fortitude concerns fears and acts of daring with respect to the greatest evils, by which nature itself is extinguished, which are the dangers of death. Whence similarly temperance ought to concern the desires for the greatest pleasures. And because pleasure follows a natural operation, certain pleasures are the more vehement insofar as they follow operations which are more natural. But the most natural operations in animals are those by which the nature of the individual is preserved through food and drink, and the nature of the species through the conjunction of male and female; and therefore temperance properly concerns the pleasures of foods and drinks and the pleasures of venereal things. Pleasures of this kind, however, follow the sense of touch. Whence it remains that temperance concerns the pleasures of touch."

Certainly at times other sensitive pleasures also influence carnal pleasures, as, for example, a beautiful woman seen can cause carnal movements in a lustful man, a good odor entices one to eat foods, etc.; and then temperance strictly so called must secondarily moderate these pleasures also.¹¹⁸⁵ From what has been said thus far it is gathered that temperance can be taken in a threefold sense:

1. in the widest sense, for moderation to be introduced into every action and passion;

2. in the broad sense, for the moderation of spiritual and sensitive pleasures;

3. in the strict sense, for the moderation of sensual pleasures, that is, in foods and venereal things. We speak only of temperance in the strict sense.

¹¹⁸³ Cf. above, concerning the end of human acts, I, n. 125.

¹¹⁸⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 141, a. 4.

¹¹⁸⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 141, a. 5.

645. Difference between natural and supernatural temperance. Temperance as a natural and acquired virtue, concerning which there has been discussion thus far, differs in species from temperance which is a supernaturally infused virtue. For supernaturally infused temperance has a higher end and a higher motive or formal object. Its end is eternal beatitude; its motive and formal object is faith, which dictates that all things are to be esteemed little in order to gain eternal life. To the point St. Thomas writes:¹¹⁸⁶ "The object of temperance is the good of pleasurable things in the desires of touch; the formal notion of this object is from reason, which establishes a mode in these desires; but the material element is that which is on the part of the desires. Now it is manifest that the mode which is imposed upon desires of this kind according to the rule of human reason is of one notion, and that which is imposed according to the divine rule is of another: for example, in the taking of foods, human reason establishes a mode so that it may not harm the health of the body nor impede the act of reason; but according to the rule of the divine law it is required that 'a man chastise his body and bring it into subjection' through abstinence from food and drink and other things of this kind. Whence it is manifest that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same reason holds concerning the other virtues. In another way habits are distinguished in species according to those things to which they are ordered, ... and in this way also the infused moral virtues differ in species, through which men are well disposed in order to this, that they are fellow citizens with the saints and domestics of God; and the other, acquired virtues, according to which man is well disposed in order to human affairs."

Therefore the rule of the natural virtue of temperance in the pleasures of foods is the health of man. Thus, for example, he sins against the natural virtue of temperance who so indulges the pleasures of taste that bodily health is thereby injured. The rule of natural temperance in the pleasures of the act of generation is the good of offspring, so that someone sins in this point when he does something which is contrary to right reason in the generation of offspring. But right reason dictates that the act of generation cannot be lawfully exercised except in legitimate marriage, because otherwise the education of the offspring would be endangered.¹¹⁸⁷ The rule of the supernatural virtue of temperance is the salvation of the soul; whence this supernatural virtue can sometimes command fasting, abstinence, and virginity for the salvation of the soul, although these may not be favorable to health.

¹¹⁸⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 4.

¹¹⁸⁷ Cf. below, where the malice of fornication will be discussed.