Chapter — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Chapter II. On charity toward ourselves
Preliminary note. After those things which have been said about charity toward God, a few things remain to be noted about charity toward ourselves; namely, about the obligation of loving ourselves with true charity, and about the opposed vices. A longer discussion about the so-called injuries against one's own body will return below in the treatise on justice, II, n. 112 sqq.
Here we are not speaking a) of love of self, insofar as it is an innate appetite of seeking one's own beatitude. For such an appetite is not a virtue, since it is necessary. For in every act man necessarily seeks his own beatitude; b) of natural love of self, by which a man freely seeks for himself some natural goods without a supernatural motive. For such love is indeed moral, but is not a theological virtue; c) of supernatural love of self of hope or concupiscence, by which man wishes supernatural beatitude for himself. For such love pertains to the virtue of hope, as was said above.
Therefore the discussion is about supernatural love of self of charity, by which a man loves himself on account of God and in God, insofar as he is a son of God.
566. 1. The obligation of loving ourselves with the love of charity is already manifestly supposed when we are commanded to love neighbor as ourselves.86 But the reason is that charity extends itself to all who are capable of eternal beatitude. Among these are also we ourselves. Therefore St. Thomas87 teaches: "We can speak about charity according to its proper notion, namely, insofar as it is principally friendship of man toward God, and consequently toward those things which are God's, among which also is the very man who has charity; and thus among the other things which he loves from charity as pertaining to God, he also loves himself from charity." - But because even our body is a sharer of beatitude, it also ought to be loved with the love of charity.88 Excellent indeed is this reason of the Angelic Doctor, and at the same time it is the only norm and rule in our love: we ought to love ourselves, i.e. soul and body, insofar as we belong to God. For this reason in loving ourselves we ought always to intend also the glory of God. Hence in seeking the good of the body, e.g. health, pleasure, life, etc., we ought to direct all these things (at least implicitly) to the glory of God; likewise goods of the soul, e.g. instruction, knowledge, honor, etc., are not to be loved and sought on account of themselves, but on account of God. But all things which turn us away from God must be held in hatred. Therefore man is bound to restrain disordered passions; he ought to inflict reasonable mortification upon the body, since after original sin it weighs down the soul and is always prone to rebel. But a Christian man is in no way bound to flee all pleasures, but can and ought to rejoice; he can enjoy earthly things according to right reason. Hence man not only can, but also ought, to take honest recreations to restore the powers of mind and body.
It is of great importance that every man have a true and ordered love toward himself. For deservedly St. Thomas89 says: "Disordered love of self is the cause of every sin"; and St. Augustine90 vividly says: "Two loves have made two cities: namely, the earthly city, love of self even to contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God even to contempt of self." - To love is to will true good to someone. Therefore he truly and ordinately loves himself who wills true good to himself. But the true good of man is that which renders the soul better and more similar to Christ. For Christ was the most perfect man, and He often admonishes us to follow His example. Therefore true and most perfect love of self consists in the imitation of Christ.
86 Matth. 22, 39.
87 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 4.
88 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 5 ad 2.
89 Ib. 1, 2, q. 77, a. 4.
90 De civ. Dei l. 14, c. 28.
567. Love of one's own body. From love of ourselves we are obliged to preserve our own life, health, and the integrity of the members, unless nevertheless the common good or even a contrary spiritual good requires otherwise. Thus, e.g., in war the common good requires that soldiers sacrifice their own health, and even life itself. On account of one's own spiritual good, someone can impose hard mortifications on himself, which harm health in some way; on account of the spiritual good of a parish the pastor of souls is bound to expose his life to danger.
The obligation of preserving life and health extends to ordinary means, but not (except rarely) to extraordinary means. For he who would not even wish to use ordinary means for his own preservation would thereby bring death upon himself, which certainly is not licit. Such ordinary means are, e.g., to call a physician during illness, to take sufficient and suitable nourishment, etc. But a man is not bound to use extraordinary means, even if he can, because such an obligation is not established, and because otherwise too grave a burden would be imposed. But which means are extraordinary must be discerned according to prudent judgment. As extraordinary means are held, e.g., a long journey into a healthier climate, a surgical operation very painful or burdensome, such as the amputation of both thighs. Today, however, on account of the great perfection of surgical art, ordinary operations, such as an operation of the appendix or of a hernia, are no longer considered extraordinary means. Yet sometimes someone is bound to use even extraordinary means, namely if his life is very necessary for the family or for the common good; e.g. a mother ought to use extraordinary means for preserving life if otherwise her children would remain orphans living in great distress.
568. 2. The sins opposed to charity toward oneself are all comprehended in hatred of self. Formally speaking, man indeed cannot have hatred toward himself, because in all his acts he necessarily seeks his own happiness and not his own evil.91 But in a broad sense, namely, of harm caused, Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers speak about hatred of self, e.g. "He who loves iniquity hates his own soul."92 "Those who commit sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul."93 Therefore hatred of self consists in diverse harms which man voluntarily inflicts upon himself, namely:
a) The gravest harm which man inflicts upon himself is mortal sin itself, by which he kills his soul and destroys true supernatural charity in himself; hence it is rightly said: "He who loves iniquity hates his own soul."94
b) Next, he sins against charity toward himself who without sufficient reason exposes himself to danger of soul or body. Likewise he who after a fall into mortal sin delays penance for a long time. For sin which is not soon destroyed by penance draws another by its own weight. But what is a long delay authors do not agree,95 nor can it be determined mathematically, since this depends on a man's proclivity to sinning.
c) He who commits suicide, or who rashly diminishes or ruins the health of the body, likewise sins against charity toward himself. But I say rashly diminishes, for on account of sufficient reasons, and especially on account of spiritual good, it is licit to undergo bodily austerities and to expose bodily health to danger, as was said.96
d) Disordered egoism, which in its actions chiefly seeks certain temporal utilities of its own, harms charity toward oneself; for charity does not seek the things that are its own.97
Scholion 1. On the manner of confessing sins committed against charity toward oneself. In confession it suffices to declare the acts committed against the salvation of soul or body, without its being necessary expressly to say that these acts were sins against charity toward oneself. The reason is that the confessor can judge sufficiently about these committed acts. Moreover, those sins often harm not only charity toward oneself, but also justice. For man is not the absolute master of his body, but only as it were a steward. If, therefore, he rashly harms his body, he harms justice owed to God and to the community.
91 Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 29, a. 4.
92 Ps. 10, 6.
93 Tob. 12, 10.
94 Ps. 10, 6.
95 Cf. St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 437, dub. 1.
96 Cf. below II, n. 112 sqq., on injuries against one's own body.
97 1 Cor. 13, 5.
569. Scholion 2. On the obligation of working. Work, taken in the strict moral sense, seems to be a free and burdensome exercise of human powers for obtaining some useful good (and not only something delightful). Therefore work, whether it is spiritual or bodily, is necessarily productive and gainful; and consequently unproductive operations, although they may be burdensome, such as some games commonly called "sport," are not work properly so called, because they primarily intend delight or glory. In a broader sense work is any human operation, whether it is exercised by body or by mind, e.g. mental and vocal prayer. - Productive work is certainly necessary for the human race, since it cannot exist without it. But for individual men work is indeed necessary in this sense, that it is not licit to spend one's whole life in idleness; yet it is not necessary for them at a determined time, unless:
a) otherwise they cannot licitly have suitable sustenance. But those who lawfully obtain suitable sustenance for themselves from elsewhere are not bound for this reason alone to work, as, e.g., religious leading a contemplative life;
b) otherwise idleness, from which many evils arise, cannot sufficiently be avoided. Yet this dangerous idleness can also be avoided in other ways;
c) otherwise evil passions cannot sufficiently be tamed. But evidently other means also exist for obtaining this end;
d) otherwise the good of society is not sufficiently promoted. Without any doubt a great social importance belongs to work, since it brings many goods to human society, but it can by no means be proved that each person must promote social good in this way.
e) Since, therefore, from none of the four reasons adduced is the complete necessity of productive work for each man established, and since moreover no clear positive divine98 or human precept of working can be brought forward, it follows a) that every man is not strictly obliged to labor; but from right love both of himself and of human society, reasonable work is to be most highly commended to everyone; b) that a work stoppage is not intrinsically evil, although it is to be avoided as far as possible.99
98 In several places of Sacred Scripture work is indeed greatly commended, but is not strictly commanded. Thus, e.g., St. Paul writes: "For if any man will not work, neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you who walk restlessly, working not at all, but curiously meddling. But to those who are of this sort we announce and beseech in the Lord Jesus Christ, that, working with silence, they eat their own bread" (2 Thess. 3, 10 sqq.).
99 Cf. below II, n. 309; S. theol. 2, 2, q. 187, a. 3.