Chapter II. On The Parts Of Justice

Preliminary Note. Diverse authors do not assign the parts of justice in a uniform way.¹³⁶ We prefer the mode indicated by St. Thomas. But the Angelic Doctor assigns¹³⁷ the subjective parts or species of justice; then the integral parts, i.e. acts and habits necessary for perfect justice; and finally the potential parts, i.e. virtues annexed to justice.

¹³⁶ Modern authors are accustomed to distinguish justice as threefold: legal, distributive, commutative. For justice orders man to others. But this order to others is threefold, namely of part to whole, of whole to part, of part to part. Now legal justice orders the parts to the whole, inclining the members of society to work for the common good of the republic; distributive justice orders the whole to the part, i.e. inclines the governor of the republic to distributing goods and burdens according to the merits and powers of each one; commutative justice orders the parts among themselves, inclining individual men to rendering to each his own right. - This division indeed is very easily understood, but already by Dominic Soto (De iust. et iure l. 3, q. 5, a. 1) it was attacked. For virtues are not properly distinguished according to the subjects which they order, but according to the formal objects into which they first and per se tend. Now the formal object into which justice first and per se tends is not threefold but twofold, namely either the common good (legal justice) or the private good (distributive and commutative justice). Whence Aristotle (Eth. l. 5, c. 2) and after him St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 7) more rightly and more profoundly employed a two-member division of justice, namely into general or legal justice, and particular justice. - Although distributive and commutative justice tend first and per se to the private good, remotely nevertheless they also procure the common good of the republic. Cathrein (Moralphil. I 359, ed. 5) defends a singular opinion, namely that legal justice does not pertain to the cardinal virtue of justice. Vermeersch (Quaest. de iust. n. 20 sqq.) deservedly rejects this opinion.

¹³⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 5 sqq., and q. 61, a. 1.