Chapter III. On The Subject Of Right Or Dominion

The subject of dominion is called he who is the master of some thing, or he to whom dominion belongs. It is clear of itself that to God the creator there belongs the most perfect dominion of all things. But it is asked what creature is the subject of dominion.

13. Principle. Only the rational creature can be the subject of dominion (but not the irrational creature, nor a fortiori the inanimate creature).

The reason is: a) Because only the rational creature is the image of God, since he has a spiritual soul endowed with intellect and will; but other creatures are nothing except a vestige of God. But that this is the cause of human dominion is drawn out, not obscurely, from the words of the Creator saying: "Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth."¹ For the Creator granted to man dominion over the fishes and beasts, that is, over the whole creature, because he is the image of God; or because he has intellect and will.

b) Because dominion is a moral faculty of disposing concerning some thing, as was said above, n. 3. Now no being except a rational one has a moral faculty, since this supposes intellect and will.

¹ Gen. 1:26.

14. Resolves. 1. Animals are not the subject of right, as was already said above, n. 1. Therefore if someone wantonly slaughters or cruelly treats animals, he wounds no right, nor does he even commit injustice. Nevertheless, cruelly to treat and harass animals (without sufficient reason) is sinful, both because it is opposed to right reason, and because man in such torture often seeks pleasure that is plainly perverse. And indeed man is held in all actions to act for an honorable end. Now cruelly to treat animals without sufficient reason evidently is not done for an honorable end. Therefore man sins by uselessly tormenting animals.² This sin indeed of itself is nothing except venial, since it is nothing except excess in an otherwise licit use;³ but by accident it becomes mortal, for example on account of sexual lust caused not rarely in the torturer (Sadism). If the torture of animals is done from an honorable end, as in vivisection scientifically and rationally performed, it is not a sin.

2. Even the insane and children before the use of reason are capable of dominion habitually; for they too have intellect and will, although they cannot actually use these powers. But the actual use of reason and will is by no means required for dominion; otherwise even those sleeping and the drunk would lose dominion. Hence St. Paul attributes to little children true dominion of an inheritance left behind in these words: "As long as the heir is a little child, he differs nothing from a slave, while [i.e. although] he is lord of all; but he is under tutors and guardians until the time prefixed by the father."⁴ Thus also modern civil laws establish.⁵ Since man even before birth (at least in the last months after conception) certainly possesses a rational soul, hence as to some things at least, already after conception he is capable of dominion, for example as to the capacity of receiving an inheritance.⁶

3. Not only physical persons can be the subject of dominion, but also moral or juridical persons; for they are usually formed from several physical persons. Ecclesiastical juridical persons are, for example, parishes, monasteries, etc.; but civil juridical persons are, for example, commercial associations legitimately instituted, such as banking institutions (commonly Bank). But what is required in order that some ecclesiastical or civil juridical person have all the rights of dominion is determined by ecclesiastical or civil law.

The subject of dominion is not rarely rather restricted in the exercise of his dominion by both civil and ecclesiastical law. It is long to treat all these matters, which pertain rather to jurists than to theologians. But since there are special difficulties concerning wives, sons of families, and ecclesiastics, according as these are the subject of dominion, moralist authors also are accustomed to treat each of all these matters individually. Several theologians also treat separately of the dominion of authors, but those things which were said above concerning dominion over the offspring of one's own intellect plainly suffice.

² Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gent. III, 112.

³ Thus also Gopfert, Moraltheol. II, n. 141; Noldin, De praeceptis n. 346.

⁴ Gal. 4:1 sq.

⁵ For example, Cod. civ. Germ. § 1; Cod. civ. Gall. a. 8.

⁶ Cf. Cod. civ. Germ. § 1923.