§ 1. On Simple Interpretation

Definition. Interpretation is the genuine explanation of a law, or in other words: the explanation of the will of the legislator or the exposition of the legal obligation.⁹ Therefore interpretation properly so called of itself establishes nothing new, but only manifests more clearly that which was already contained in the law. Hence extensive or restrictive interpretations (concerning which below) are rather modifications than interpretations of law.

⁹ "Interpretation of the content of the law" (Auslegung des Gesetzesinhaltes).

228. Divisions. Interpretation can be divided a) by reason of the author and b) by reason of its character.

a) By reason of the author there is distinguished:

1. Authentic or legal interpretation, which is given by the legislator himself, or his successor, or by him to whom the power of interpreting has been committed by them.¹⁰

2. Usual interpretation, which proceeds from custom legitimately introduced among the people. In this sense there is the well-worn adage: "Custom is the best interpreter of laws."¹¹ Later, indeed, discussion of custom will return, but already now it should be noted beforehand that no custom except one which is according to or besides the law can truly interpret the law; but a custom which is against the law no longer interprets, but abolishes the law. - Similar to usual interpretation is judicial interpretation, which is also called jurisprudence or the authority of things similarly judged.

3. Doctrinal interpretation, which is given by learned and God-fearing men.

b) By reason of character it is customary to distinguish:

1. Comprehensive or declaratory interpretation, which declares that which is really contained in the law that has been made; for example, the law concerning Mass in another's church had been made for all priests and churches; since nevertheless a doubt had arisen whether exempt regulars also were included in this law, the answer was given by comprehensive interpretation: regulars are included.

2. Extensive, or ampliative, interpretation, which extends the law that has been made more broadly than it had hitherto obliged.¹² Thus, for example, Pius X extended the excommunication against those "compelling clerics to a secular tribunal" even to private persons, thus declaring the sense of the bull Apostolicae Sedis.

3. Restrictive interpretation, which restricts the law that has been made more narrowly than it had hitherto been in force.¹³ Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition on 23 January 1886 had limited the same excommunication just cited, by restrictive interpretation, to legislators and other authorities.

¹⁰ Cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 17, § 1; c. 31, X, 5, 39: "Whence the law has proceeded, thence also interpretation should proceed." L. 12, Cod. 1, 14: "It belongs to him to interpret the law, to whom it belongs to establish it."

¹¹ L. 37, Dig. 1, 3; Cod. iur. can. c. 29.

¹² Cf. L. 195, Dig. 50, 16.

¹³ Cf. L. 3, § 1, Dig. 26, 1.

229. Principle. Authentic interpretation has the force of law and therefore obliges like the law itself; but usual and doctrinal interpretation, which, while the legislator himself is silent (who can easily object), is brought into practice, is to be admitted and observed.

The reason for the first part is obvious; for just as the legislator was able to establish a law, so he can authentically declare the established law. Concerning this matter the Code of Canon Law c. 17, §§ 2 and 3 establishes: "Authentic interpretation, presented in the manner of law, has the same force as the law itself; and if it only declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and has retroactive force; if it restricts or extends the law or explains a doubtful law, it is not retroactive and must be promulgated. - But when given in the manner of a judicial sentence or of a rescript in a particular matter, it does not have the force of law and binds only the persons and affects the things for which it was given." - The Supreme Pontiff can authentically declare not only the whole ecclesiastical law, but also divine and natural law. The reason is that the Supreme Pontiff, as Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of the power of ruling and directing the people to the supernatural end, which indeed cannot be obtained except by rightly understanding and observing natural and divine law. Hence the Pope has authentically interpreted the natural and divine law concerning divorce, namely that complete divorce is not licit on account of adultery, as that text of the Gospel at least seemed to suggest: "Whoever shall put away his wife except on account of fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery."¹⁴ - Conversely, the Supreme Pontiff declared that complete divorce of a ratified marriage is licit on account of solemn profession and on account of Pontifical dispensation.¹⁵ - Authentic interpretation of the Code of Canon Law was entrusted to a special Commission of Cardinals instituted by Benedict XV on 15 September 1917 (Act. Ap. Sed. IX 584). - A bishop can indeed authentically interpret diocesan laws, but not the laws of a provincial Council, unless this has been expressly committed to him.

The reason for the second part of the stated principle is both that custom according to law is the best interpreter of laws, and that learned and God-fearing men can very well perceive the true sense of the law; and their concordant opinion is of great weight, so that it would be unsuitable to think otherwise.

¹⁴ Matt. 19, 9.

¹⁵ Cf. below in the treatise on marriage III, n. 681.

230. The rules to be observed in doctrinal interpretation are chiefly five:

1. Laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in the text and context.¹⁶

This is plain of itself. Clear words of the law do not admit interpretation or conjecture of will; general words are to be understood generally; where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we distinguish; an indefinite expression is equivalent to a universal one. Since in ecclesiastical law, as in any science, there are found forms of speaking and writing alien to common use and known only to experts in law, commonly "technical terms," the signification of the words must be carefully considered.

2. If the words of the law are doubtful or obscure, recourse must be had to parallel places of the Code, if there are any, then to the proximate end of the law and circumstances, and to the mind of the legislator.¹⁷

The proximate end of the law is, as it were, its soul. Hence Sacred Scripture says:¹⁸ "The letter kills, but the spirit gives life." - The proximate end of the law and the mind of the legislator are known both from the explicit manifestation of the legislator and from the object, circumstances, and motive of the law.

3. It is fitting that burdens be restricted and favors enlarged.¹⁹

In other words: An odious law is to be interpreted strictly, but a favorable law broadly. But which law is odious and which is favorable cannot always be easily distinguished. As a good distinctive sign there is held: A law is odious when its immediate effect is a grave burden and rather bitter medicine than nourishment. Thus penal laws generally are held as odious, because their immediate effect is a grave burden; likewise censures are held as odious laws and therefore are of strict interpretation. A favorable law is that which contains a grace and establishes nothing against the strict right of a third party. Such a favorable law is, for example, the law of exemption of regulars, because it conduces not only to the good of regulars, but also to the good of the whole Church, and is not against the strict right of the bishop. It sometimes happens that a law which is favorable to one is odious to another, as, for example, many privileges are. Then the special statutes must be attended to.

4. In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed.²⁰

This rule is also customarily expressed thus: A doubtful law does not oblige. Concerning the sense, however, of this latter adage, discussion will return in the treatise on conscience. But the reason for this rule is that law is judged to be a binding of liberty. Moreover no doubtful, uncertain, and obscure moral binding ought to be admitted. Hence, for example, since it is not altogether clear that Socialists plotting against kingdom and priesthood fall under that censure: "Those giving their name to a masonic sect, or to other associations of the same kind which plot against the Church or legitimate civil powers ...," in practice Socialists do not incur this censure.

5. A later special law derogates from an earlier general law; but conversely a later general law does not derogate from an earlier special law, unless, however, this is specially and clearly established.²¹

The reason for the first part is that a special law is judged to be an exception from the common law. But the reason for the second part is that a common law is not judged to derogate from particular laws, since these are held as privileges and favors. Hence, for example, a special law given for the Seminaries of Italy derogates from common laws made concerning this matter; on the contrary, the general law concerning the interstices to be observed in the reception of Sacred Orders does not derogate from the privileges of several religious orders concerning this matter. But if the legislator by a general law wishes to abrogate particular laws, he is wont to use these or similar formulas: "All privileges and particular contrary laws whatsoever being abrogated, even those worthy of special mention."²²

¹⁶ Cod. iur. can. c. 18.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ 2 Cor. 3, 6.

¹⁹ Thus Rule of Law 15 in VI; cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 19.

²⁰ Thus Rule of Law 30 in VI.

²¹ Cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 22.

²² Joan. Crus O. Pr. treats more broadly of the interpretation of laws and privileges, De statu relig. et de privilegiis, Venice 1620, l. 2, c. 2.