Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 2. On The Indirect Voluntary Or Voluntary In The Cause
Preliminary note. The doctrine concerning the indirect voluntary or voluntary in the cause is of the greatest moment for practice and is, as it were, a key by which many and difficult cases must be solved, for example, concerning cooperation, scandal, the causing of damage, etc. But since these things come chiefly into use in evil effects which are indirectly voluntary, now for the sake of brevity we treat only of the evil indirectly voluntary. For if the indirectly voluntary is something good, then either a) it is joined with another good effect, and thus each effect remains good and the goodness of the whole is increased, or b) it is joined with another (principal) evil effect, and thus the whole, notwithstanding the secondary good effect, becomes evil according to the adage: Good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever. - Human actions, although they are singular, often have several effects; for they are after the manner of the motion of some wheel in an artful machine. If one wheel is moved, the others also receive an influx. Thus, for example, a father of a family laboring diligently procures for himself wages, honor among his fellow-citizens, love with his wife, internal peace, etc.; conversely, a father of a family getting drunk causes for himself material losses, quarrels in the family, scandal for his children, etc. Hence it is clearer than light how great is the moment of the doctrine concerning the morality of several effects following from one cause.
57. Principle. It is permitted to posit an action good or indifferent in itself, of which there is a twofold or multiple effect, namely, one or another good effect and one or another evil effect, if:
1. the good effect is immediate;
2. the end of the agent is honest;
3. there is a proportionately grave cause.44
The same principle can also be enunciated in this way:
Four conditions are required in order that the evil indirect voluntary be licit: 1. an action good in itself or at least indifferent; 2. the immediate effect good; 3. an honest end; 4. a proportionately grave cause.45
It is explained: 1. Before all else it is required that the action posited be good in itself or at least indifferent. Wherefore it is never permitted to perform actions evil in themselves, such as, for example, to lie, to blaspheme, to fornicate, etc., although the best effect is hoped for from them. The reason is that evils are not to be done that goods may come. - But for judging theoretically whether an action is good or indifferent in itself, one must first look to the end of the work or the moral object to which the action from its own nature and immediately is ordered. For acts, as the scholastics teach, are specified from the moral object. But I say moral object and not physical, because one and the same physical act perpetrated by diverse persons can have a diverse moral object, but not a diverse physical object. Thus, for example, to kill a man is an act whose physical object is the violent destruction of human life; this object indeed does not morally specify the human act, but can be either morally good, if, for example, the killing was done by a soldier in a just war, or morally evil, if, for example, a man is killed in an unjust manner. - For judging in practice whether some action is good or indifferent in itself, it helps to inspect whether the agent, absolutely speaking, has the right of positing this action and does not injure the right of another. Thus, for example, an innkeeper has the right of serving wine; an owner has the right of renting his house; and therefore these actions are good, although accidentally they are joined with the evil effect of drunkenness or prostitution.
44 Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. II-II, q. 64, a. 7.
45 Cf. Marc-Raus, Inst. mor. I, n. 315; Noldin, De principiis n. 83.
58. 2. Then it is required that the good effect be immediate, that is, that the evil effect not precede it, but follow it. This is plain from the text of St. Paul: "Let us not do evil things, that good things may come."46 For this reason it is not permitted to steal money from a very rich man in order to give alms to a poor man; it is not permitted to kill an infant in the mother's womb in order to save the mother's life; a girl pregnant from a crime cannot licitly procure an abortion in order to save her honor. Besides, this condition seems almost to coincide with the first. For if the first effect is morally evil, the action itself also, which produces this effect, is morally evil in itself. For an action is specified from the object or end of the work, as will be proved below. But the end of the work is that which the work first produces, or is the first effect of the action.
But if many authors teach that it suffices that the good effect be equally immediate as the evil effect, this seems to be impossible, at least in practice, because the immediate effect is the end of the work. But the end of the work is one and not twofold, just as the essential form of any one thing is one and not twofold. Nor is any example brought forward by those authors in which truly the good and evil effect are equally immediate. On the contrary, the good effect always precedes or is preceded. Hence the Angelic Doctor forcefully proclaims: "The same act in number, insofar as it once goes forth from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end, from which it has its species."47 Since these things are so, it seems better to me to express the second condition in this way, if it is to be expressed: it is required that the good effect follow per se and as if necessarily, but the evil effect only per accidens from such an action, namely, because of particular circumstances which occur to the agent against his will. Thus, for example, an innkeeper can for a grave reason sell wine to him who is now about to become drunk. Why? Because the effect which follows per se and necessarily from the sale of wine is licit commerce and honest profit; but that in these circumstances, which do not depend on the innkeeper, some evil follows, namely, the drunkenness of the drinker, this is altogether per accidens, nor is it necessarily joined with the sale of wine, although here and now that evil effect is infallibly produced.
46 Rom. 3:8.
47 S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3.
59. 3. Moreover it is required that the end of the agent be honest. For although a good end does not render evil means honest, nevertheless an evil end defiles all things, whatever means have at last been employed.48 Therefore the agent is bound to intend only a good end; but he can bear himself permissively toward the evil effect foreseen. For example, a confessor hearing most shameful sins in the confessional feels grave temptations and dishonest carnal movements. Nevertheless he licitly hears confessions of this kind, provided, however, that he intends a good end, namely, the salvation of the soul, the honor of God, etc., and bears himself only permissively toward those evil effects, which he not only does not seek, but detests. On the contrary, it is not licit to dig a pit on one's own land with the (inordinate) intention that an enemy may fall into it and be gravely injured. For although to dig a pit on one's own land is a good or indifferent action, nevertheless the intended end is dishonest.
48 Cf. below n. 121 sqq.
60. 4. Lastly it is required that there be a proportionately grave cause for acting and permitting the evil effect. For the evil effect, although it is joined with the work of the agent beside the intention, always remains a material sin; indeed not rarely it induces grave danger of formal sin. Further, it is not licit to effect material sins, and especially it is not licit to expose oneself to the danger of formal sin, without a proportionately grave cause. I say proportionately grave; for the greater the malice of the effect is, the greater the excusing cause required. But what cause in a particular case is truly proportionately grave must not be weighed from one point. One must consider the circumstances. First, it must be seen whether from the omission of the action which produces two effects, one good and the other evil, some notable harm would truly follow. If not, the action must be omitted; for example, a bookseller who does not offer some dangerous book in his shop indeed loses a small profit, but he does not suffer notable harm. In this case the merchant must desist from such a sale. - On the contrary, if great harm would follow from the omission of the action, it is permitted to complete the action; for example, a confessor experiences vehement temptations; nevertheless he is not bound to desist from hearing confessions, because otherwise great harm would arise for him. - Then it must be seen whether the cause produces the evil effect proximately or only remotely. In causes proximately influencing, a greater motive is required than in those acting remotely. Thus, for example, a very urgent cause is required so that a maidservant may be able to exercise service in some house in which she is often allured to sin by the son of the family; but a much lesser motive would suffice if not the son of the family, but some stranger not so frequently coming into this house, were soliciting her to sin. Generally it can be said: A greater excusing cause is required in proportion as
1. the evil indirectly willed is more grave;
2. the action influences this evil more nearly;
3. the evil truly follows more certainly;
4. the obligation from office of impeding this following evil is greater.
61. Resolves: 1. Soldiers who in a just war attack a city licitly discharge war-cannons, even if from this innocent private persons perish. The reason is that the action, namely, the discharge, is just; the end of the agent is good, namely, the punishment of the enemy; and finally there is a proportionately grave cause.
2. A priest who from confession alone knows that some man is in the state of mortal sin licitly gives communion to him asking for it. The reason is that to give communion is a good action; the end of the priest is good, just as there is also a proportionately grave cause, namely, the preservation of the sacramental seal.
3. A physician who, in treating a sick woman, suffers grave temptations and carnal movements, can licitly continue the care, if a proportionate cause exists. The reason is that the curative action is honest, the end is honest, and a proportionate cause is present. Likewise a physician can, from a proportionate cause, administer medicine necessary for obtaining the health of a pregnant woman, although he foresees that an abortion will follow per accidens. The reasons are the same. But it is never permitted directly to procure an abortion, since this is the direct killing of an innocent man and therefore an intrinsically evil action.
4. A witness cannot perjure himself in order to save the life of the accused. The reason is that to perjure oneself is an intrinsically evil action.
5. A wife cannot render the conjugal debt to an onanist husband unless there is a grave cause. The reason is that although to render the conjugal debt is a good act and the wife's end is right, nevertheless without grave cause it is not permitted to cooperate materially so proximately with the sin of another.
62. Scholion. Several authors, speaking of an evil effect indirectly voluntary, add other conditions, namely, that the agent then only is bound to avoid the evil effect, or that then only the evil effect is imputed to him, if a) he foresaw (at least confusedly) the evil effect; b) if he was able not to posit the cause; c) if he was obliged not to posit the cause. But the first and second condition are verified not only in the indirect voluntary, but in any act whatever done by man. For an effect which he did not foresee, or whose cause he was not able to avoid, is never imputed to the agent. The reason is that in each case the free voluntary is lacking. But the third condition is precisely the point of the question. For our investigation turns on this alone: when a man is bound not to posit a cause from which a twofold effect follows, one good, the other evil. Since these things are so, those three conditions are better omitted in the explanation of the indirect voluntary.