Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 2. On the Morality of the External Act and of the Following Event
132. Preliminary Note. External acts are taken here in the broader sense; they are not only those which are completed by external organs, as walking, speaking, etc., but also all acts commanded by the will, whether they are of the intellect, or of the sensitive appetite, or of the members of the body:129 "We do not ask whether the exterior act is good or evil; we suppose as certain that it is so; for by this very fact, that it is voluntary, conforming or difforming to reason, it has everything which is required that it be good or evil. Moreover eight precepts of the Decalogue concern external acts. - But we ask whether the exterior act is good or evil by a formal goodness or malice distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, which it superadds to it. And the question concerns the exterior act as it is the mere execution of the interior. For if some goodness were accidentally and from without annexed to the exterior act, for example, special grace to the exterior reception of the sacraments, or the grace of an indulgence to almsgiving or exterior prayer, it is certain that the exterior act would add this accidental goodness to the interior act." Thus Billuart, l. c. - The state of the question becomes still clearer by an example. Peter wishes to give one hundred francs in alms and truly gives them; another time the same Peter wishes to give the same sum in alms, but by an unforeseen event a thief carried off the one hundred francs destined for alms, so that Peter now cannot execute his purpose. It is asked whether Peter in the first case placed an act of greater moral goodness than in the second, in which he truly did not complete the purpose externally.
129 Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in I-II, q. 20, a. 1, who treats this question very subtly. Billuart, l. c. a. 8, however, thinks that the external act is only the act of external members.
133. Principle. The external act by itself does not increase the morality of the internal act, but only sometimes by accident. Thus St. Thomas,131 all Thomists, St. Alphonsus,132 and other theologians most commonly, against Scotus133 and many Scotists.134
The first part is proved. 1. From Scripture, in which everywhere perfected volition is no less praised or rebuked, rewarded or punished, than if it had been completed in work. For example, Abraham is equally rewarded for the will of sacrifice as if he had truly immolated his son. And therefore the angel says to him: "Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not spared thy only-begotten son for my sake, I will bless thee."135 Christ136 says: "Every one who shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Concerning these words St. Chrysostom137 says: "It is not the work, but the will, which is rewarded, whether good in good things or evil in evil things; works, however, are testimonies of the will."
2. From reason. a) What does not have its own proper and distinct liberty also does not have its own proper and distinct morality, since liberty is the first condition of all morality. But the external act does not have its own proper and distinct liberty, but as much as it has, it has entirely from the interior act of the will, of which it is the complement. Therefore the external act, if it is considered separately, has no morality, and consequently by itself is able neither to increase nor to diminish the morality of the interior act from which it proceeds. But the external act has the same morality numerically which the internal act of the will has. - b) It is then proved from an inconvenience: If the exterior act added a distinct morality, it would follow that someone could deprive another, against that other's will, of moral goodness; for someone can impede another, against that other's will, from the external act, as if a thief carried off money destined for alms, or if he detained by force one going to church. But these things seem absurd. Therefore the external act by itself does not increase the morality of the internal act,138 and it is not moral except by a certain analogy or denomination taken from the internal act. Wherefore St. Thomas139 says: "As from the healthy which is in the body of an animal, healthy is derived to medicine and urine; nor is the health of medicine and urine other than the health of the animal, which the medicine causes and the urine signifies. And in this way from the goodness of the will is derived the goodness of the exterior act and conversely, namely, according to the order of one to the other."
The second part is proved. By accident morality is increased through the external act, and indeed:
a) By reason of greater intensity, insofar as the will is borne toward the object with greater vehemence; for example, fornication desired through an internal act is not usually accustomed to procure disordered pleasure so intensely as fornication actually perpetrated.
b) By reason of greater duration, insofar as the execution of the work is accustomed to require a greater duration of deliberate volition than a simple internal act; for example, someone wishes devoutly to say the whole Rosary; another truly devoutly says the whole Rosary. The volition of the second man lasts longer than the simple internal act of the first man.
c) By reason of multiplication, because the act of volition is often repeated in external execution.
"Moreover, through an external act the senses are more dulled, and the exterior powers are rendered more prone to evil; scandals are brought forth; sometimes excommunication is incurred, or irregularity, or an obligation to restitution, which are not incurred through an interior act."140
131 S. theol. I-II, q. 20, a. 4, and 2, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 3.
132 Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 40.
133 2, dist. 42, q. 4, n. 2, and Quodlib. q. 18, n. 12.
134 Elbel-Bierbaum (l. c. n. 70) says: "Most probably [the external act] superadds morality. Thus holds Scotus, whom the Scotists follow, with few exceptions."
135 Gen. 22:16 sq.
136 Matt. 5:28.
137 Hom. 19 in Matth. (Migne, Patr. graec. 57, 274).
138 Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 8, where this matter is abundantly treated and the objections of the Scotists are perfectly solved.
139 S. theol. I-II, q. 20, a. 3 ad 3.
140 Thus St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 40.
134. Scholion. On Declaring the External Act in Confession. Although the external act by itself does not change the morality of the interior act, nevertheless it must always be declared in confession whether the sin was done only internally or also externally, because otherwise the confessor cannot sufficiently judge concerning the condition and obligation of the penitent. For example, one man with vehement desire wishes to steal one hundred francs; another actually steals one hundred francs. Certainly the sin of each thief is equal (other things being equal), but the confessor is bound to lead the second penitent to restitution of the thing taken away, while on the contrary he is bound only to deter the first from his depraved desire. More broadly on this matter will be treated in the chapter on the integrity of confession.
135. The event or effect foreseen and in some way intended increases the goodness or malice of the act, whether it follows by itself or by accident. The reason is obvious. For the better or worse is the act, the better or worse is the will producing this act. But the will of him who, foreseeing and intending good or evil events that will follow from his work, does it, is better or worse than if he foresaw and intended none of these things. Therefore the following event, foreseen and intended in some way, increases the morality of the act.141 - It is by no means required that the event or effect always be directly intended, but it suffices that it be indirectly intended, that is, that it could and ought to have been foreseen. Wherefore, for example, a man who, although he could and ought to have foreseen scandal that would arise from his lascivious speeches, nevertheless makes such speeches, incurs not only the guilt of lascivious speech, but also of caused scandal.
But if the event (especially an evil one) is indeed foreseen, but not intended, then the rules given above n. 57 sqq. for the indirectly voluntary must be applied.
141 Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 20, a. 5, and Billuart, l. c. a. 9.