§ 4. On the Cessation of the Law Itself by Revocation and by the Cessation of the Total End

269. The law itself can cease in a threefold way: 1. through revocation; 2. through the cessation of the total end; 3. through contrary custom. - Concerning custom there must be special treatment in the following paragraph. There remain in this paragraph a few things to be said concerning the revocation of law, and then concerning the cessation of the end.

270. Revocation of law by a superior can be made either totally or partially: 1. through abrogation,¹¹⁹ which is the total abolition of a law made by the legislator himself (or his successor or superior); 2. through derogation,¹²⁰ which is a partial abolition or change made in the same way;¹²¹ 3. through subrogation, which is an addition to an already existing law; 4. through obrogation, which is had if a law is removed by a contrary law.

Those who can make laws are likewise able to abrogate, derogate, subrogate, and obrogate laws, according to that adage: "A thing is dissolved by those causes by which it is born." Since the Supreme Pontiff is the supreme legislator in the Church, he can abrogate any merely ecclesiastical law, even if it was made by an ecumenical Council. Thus Pius X abrogated the celebrated decree Tametsi, which had been made by the ecumenical Council of Trent. - But all Prelates having ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum can abrogate not only their own laws, but also those of their predecessors.

The mode by which laws are abrogated or by which derogation is made from them is not always the same. Sometimes abrogation or derogation is expressly declared; sometimes new laws are substituted, through which previous laws are implicitly abrogated or derogated from. Concerning this implicit abrogation or derogation the rule holds: A later general law indeed derogates from or abrogates an earlier opposed general law, but not a particular law, unless this is expressly established. The reason of the first part is that opposed and contrary things exclude one another. The reason of the second part is that a particular law, as having from the beginning been made as a certain exception of the general law, is judged to endure so long as it has not clearly and certainly been revoked.¹²² It is established specially: "Any laws, whether universal or particular, opposed to the prescriptions of the new Code of Canon Law, are abrogated, unless concerning particular laws something else is expressly provided." "In doubt the revocation of a preexisting law is not presumed, but later laws are to be drawn to earlier laws and reconciled with them, insofar as it can be done."¹²³

¹¹⁹ Repeal of a legal prescription (Aufhebung einer Rechtsvorschrift).

¹²⁰ Alteration of a legal prescription (Abänderung einer Rechtsvorschrift).

¹²¹ "Derogation is made from a law when a part is taken away; a law is abrogated when it is entirely removed" (l. 102 D. 50, 16). Cf. also Fragmenta D. Ulpiani I, 3.

¹²² Cod. iur. can. c. 22.

¹²³ Ibid. c. 6, n. 1 and c. 23.

271. Cessation of the total end, or of the adequate motive cause, on account of which the law was made, produces the cessation of the law itself. The reason is that, when the total cause ceases, the effect also must cease.¹²⁴ Thus, for example, if a bishop prescribed a prayer for recovering the health of the king, when the king has died, by that very fact this prayer is to be omitted. - The end of the law can cease universally, particularly, contrarily, and negatively.

1. If the total end ceases universally, i.e., for the whole community, or even for by far the greater part of the community, the law itself ceases. The reason is that then the law becomes useless, indeed also harmful, and therefore null.

2. If the total end of the law ceases particularly, i.e., for some particular persons, a distinction is needed:

a) If such an end ceases contrarily, so that observance becomes harmful or too burdensome, the law itself ceases, or at least its obligation.^124a The reason is that no positive law obliges with great inconvenience. But it would be a great inconvenience if in that case the law were still to oblige.

b) If the total end of the law ceases for some subjects only negatively, i.e., if observance of the law is indeed without utility, but also without great inconvenience, then the law does not cease. Thus the opinion to be held in practice.¹²⁵ The reason is that otherwise the sinew of discipline would be loosened, a broad gate would be opened to dangerous hallucinations, and the common good would be harmed. And truly, if each one could freely omit the observance of the law which seems useless to him, hallucinations would be inevitable and gradually the number would increase of those who from the same motive would neglect the law. Hence, for example, the law of matrimonial proclamations does not cease in that case in which someone knows with certainty that no impediment stands in the way of the marriage; the law concerning the prohibition of books, made for avoiding dangers arising from the reading of bad books, does not cease because someone firmly thinks that no danger threatens him from the reading of a proscribed book.

¹²⁴ Cf. theol. I, 2, q. 97, a. 2.

^124a Cf. nevertheless those things which above, n. 233, were said concerning invalidating law.

¹²⁵ Cf. nevertheless St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 199 and below II, 410.