§ 4. On Violation Of Secret

Just as lying violates the virtue of truthfulness by defect, so violation of a secret violates it by excess, as was already said above. Hence, conveniently, after lying and mental restrictions there is discussion of violation of secret.

175. Notion. Secret taken objectively is the hidden thing itself; but accepted subjectively it is knowledge of that hidden thing and the obligation of not betraying the knowledge received. Concerning this secret accepted subjectively there is treatment here.

Division. A threefold secret is usually distinguished:

1. A natural secret, which is an obligation of concealing something arisen not from contract, but from the very nature of the thing, because, namely, such a secret cannot be manifested without another being reasonably unwilling, even if no entrusting or promise has intervened. This natural secret indeed is again distinguished as either simple or extorted. A simple natural secret is that which someone knows either by chance or because of the levity or lack of consideration of another, e.g., someone by chance sees another's hidden disgraceful vice. - An extorted natural secret is that which someone has known after a crafty investigation has been made; e.g., someone by design investigates concerning the private life of another.

2. A promised secret is that which someone promised to another after knowledge of the matter had been received. This promise indeed can be given in a twofold way. a) Someone has already known another's secret matter from another source, and now promises him that the secret is to be kept. b) Someone has heard a matter from another without secrecy and afterward promises him secrecy. Therefore in a promised secret, knowledge of the secret precedes the promise, and that promise is (ordinarily) gratuitous.³⁴⁸

3. An entrusted or strict secret (anvertrautes Geheimnis) is that which was not communicated except after there had first been an implicit or explicit pact of keeping secrecy. If this pact was implicit or tacit, the secret is called official (Amtsgeheimnis), because it arises from an office undertaken. By such an official secret, e.g., physicians, midwives, counselors, etc., are bound. But if the pact was explicit, this secret is called a privately entrusted secret; e.g., Peter says to Paul: I wish to narrate to you a matter of great moment, provided you promise me strict silence. Paul, having promised silence, hears the matter. This secret is entrusted to him in a private way. - Stricter is the secret which obliges from an oath taken, such as, e.g., officials of the Roman Curia emit. But the highest degree of entrusted secret is obtained by the sacramental secret, or the confessional seal, concerning which there will be discussion in the treatise on penance. In an entrusted secret, knowledge of the secret follows the promise, and that promise is onerous.

³⁴⁸ Under promised secret, privately entrusted secret also is included by some authors, e.g., by D'Annibale, Haine.

176. Principle 1. It is not lawful by unjust means to explore another's secret; but when sufficient cause accedes, it is lawful to use just means for knowing another's secret.

The first part of this principle is plain of itself, since it is never lawful to use unjust means for obtaining some end. There is added that a secret truly is another's thing. Now, just as it is not lawful to usurp another's thing, so neither is it permitted to explore another's secret. Hence it is not lawful to listen at a wall or door, to open another's letters, to discover an invention of art by unjust means; much more strongly, it is not lawful to use knowledge of a secret unjustly received, for this would be to renew or continue the injustice already committed.³⁴⁹ But he who uses knowledge of a secret unjustly received with grave damage to another is held to restitution; e.g., he who unjustly opens another's letters and from this causes grave material damage to another must repair this damage. When it is lawful to manifest a secret will be said below, n. 180 and 192.

The second part of the principle likewise is easily proved. For just as it is not a sin to take away another's material thing when a legitimate cause accedes, namely, if the owner is now not reasonably unwilling, so also from a sufficient cause it is lawful to use just means for exploring another's secret. Thus, e.g., it is lawful by just means to explore in war the forces and positions of the enemy; a father may inquire concerning the hidden crimes of a son for correcting him.

³⁴⁹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 969.

177. Principle 2. A natural secret obliges of itself under grave matter.

The reason is that the neighbor has a strict right to a natural secret from the very nature of the thing. But from the revelation of such a secret the neighbor is saddened, and quite often damages arise for him in the goods of fortune or of reputation. Hence it is plain that he who without just cause wounds a natural secret sins, and indeed from its genus mortally, in almost the same way as a thief who takes away another's thing. From lightness of matter or of the damage caused this sin becomes venial. Therefore he sins who without sufficient cause reveals the hidden sins or hidden defects of another. - What are just causes of revealing a natural secret will be said below.

178. Principle 3. A merely promised secret of itself ordinarily does not oblige except under light matter.

I say 1: a secret merely promised. For often a secret of this kind is also natural, and then the preceding principle must be applied. - I say 2: of itself it does not oblige; for by accident violation of a promised secret can be a grave sin, namely, if because of this violation grave damage is caused to the neighbor. - I say 3: ordinarily it does not oblige except under light matter; for it can happen (although rarely) that someone promises under grave matter that he will keep a secret; e.g., I promise you the secret so firmly that, if I break it, I shall pay 1000 francs. - The principle taken with these clauses is proved in this way: Violation of a promised secret is only violation of a gratuitous promise or of fidelity. But the virtue of fidelity, which is a certain part of truthfulness, does not oblige of itself except under light matter, as was said above, n. 165 and 170, concerning lying. Therefore violation of a promised secret of itself is only a venial sin. - Nevertheless, violation of a promised secret is greatly to be avoided, because quarrels and grave enmities often arise from it.

179. Principle 4. An entrusted secret obliges of itself under grave matter, and indeed more gravely than a natural and a promised secret.

The reason is 1. because in an entrusted secret there is always a contract (implicit or explicit) of not revealing those things which are known, and 2. he who violates an entrusted secret wounds the right both of the neighbor and of society. For the neighbor would not have revealed his secret except under the condition of faithfully guarding it. Besides, the good of society demands that all can safely seek counsel or help from those who, from a special office approved by public authority, are able to furnish it. But if those officials could, without a legitimate and urgent cause, reveal secrets entrusted to them, no one would now approach them; and this would certainly bring great inconvenience for the common good. - Hence civil Codes also gravely punish the wounding of an entrusted secret.³⁵⁰

As appears from what has been said, the obligation of diverse secrets is diverse. As a general rule it can be held:

A secret obliges according to the quantity of damage which is unjustly brought upon either the public good or private good from its violation.

³⁵⁰ Cf. German Penal Code § 300.

180. Just causes of manifesting a secret. Just as the neighbor's material thing can lawfully be taken away under certain conditions, so equally also a secret, to which otherwise the neighbor has a right, can sometimes be revealed, indeed must be. For the keeping of a secret is prescribed on account of both private and public good. But the general principle is: When the end of a law ceases contrarily, i.e., when the law has become not only useless, but even harmful, the law itself ceases. Hence in the case in which the law concerning keeping a secret by no means profits but rather harms private or public good, this law ceases; or in other words: a just cause of manifesting a secret is urgent necessity of public or private good. For in that case the neighbor is irrationally unwilling that the secret be revealed; or he is considered to renounce his right concerning the keeping of his own secret.

1. Therefore urgent necessity of the public good demands the manifestation of a secret; and therefore the Angelic Doctor: "Against the common good it is lawful to receive no secret."³⁵¹ But I say: urgent necessity; for if only some utility is present, it is not lawful to disclose a secret. For this reason the same principles are to be applied here which above were established concerning the obligation of denunciation. E.g., a physician is held to denounce some sick person who could easily infect others gravely.

2. Necessity of a private good regards either a) the one knowing himself, or b) a third person, or c) the very one who handed over the secret.

a) The proper good of the one knowing is then a just cause of manifesting a secret when otherwise grave damage would follow for him. This damage indeed ordinarily must be graver than that which follows for the other from revelation of the secret. If there is question of keeping a secret which is altogether necessary for the common good, it can in no way be revealed, even if death threatens; e.g., a soldier captured by enemies can in no way reveal the secrets of his fatherland. But if there is question only of the secret of some private man, then almost always no one is held to keep a known secret with great damage to himself, because no one is supposed to undertake such a secret with so great an inconvenience. The exception is if someone explicitly promised to keep the secret even with the greatest inconvenience. For then, according to the truer opinion, the promise is to be kept. There are nevertheless several authors who even in this case permit violation of the secret from a most grave reason.³⁵²

b) The good of a third person requires revelation of a secret if otherwise he would unjustly suffer great damage. E.g., Peter, knowing under secret that Paul is preparing death for Andrew, must first, as far as he can, turn Paul away from a perverse plan of this kind; but if he does not wish to desist, Peter must make Andrew more certain concerning the danger threatening him. Or a physician, knowing by force of his office that a bridegroom, who feigns himself healthy, labors under a grave and contagious syphilitic disease, must turn him away from marriage; but if this will have been vain, he can manifest the matter to the bride, in order to forestall the greatest danger to her and to the offspring perhaps to be born. Thus at least from natural law. For in practice the statutes of positive law in this matter must also be attended to, because otherwise grave penalties are usually inflicted.³⁵³

But what must be said if Peter knows from an entrusted secret that Titius is the murderer, but in his place innocent Sempronius has been accused, condemned, and is now about to be punished by death? The general rule is: I am held to keep an entrusted secret so long as the one entrusting the secret has a right that I not betray it. But in that case Titius is not held to confess his crime with the most immediate danger of his own death. Therefore he retains the right to the secret. Therefore Peter cannot manifest the entrusted secret for saving Sempronius.³⁵⁴ - Nevertheless this opinion does not seem sufficiently proved. For although the rule proposed is excellent, nevertheless it is not sufficiently proved that in that case Titius still has a right to the secret. For although he is not held to betray himself, because he can love his own life more than the life of another, nevertheless it by no means follows from this that neither can nor ought I betray him for saving an innocent man. For in this case two lives are endangered, namely, the life of the innocent man and the life of the guilty man. Now, other things being equal, I ought rather to save the life of the innocent man than the life of the guilty man. But the guilty man cannot be reasonably unwilling that I save the life of the innocent man, although this cannot be done without revelation of the entrusted secret.

c) The good of him who handed over the secret permits or requires manifestation of the secret if otherwise great damage would come to him. For he is not presumed to be unwilling in that case, and if nevertheless he resisted the manifestation of the secret, he would be irrationally unwilling. Hence if someone secretly entrusts to you that he wishes to enter marriage notwithstanding the impediment of bond, and you cannot impede him otherwise, you are held to reveal this impediment to the proper pastor, so that concubinage may thus be avoided.

³⁵¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 68, a. 1 ad 3.

³⁵² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 971; St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 70, a. 1 ad 2.

³⁵³ Cf. German Penal Code § 300.

³⁵⁴ Thus Laymann in Noldin, De praeceptis n. 670.

181. Scholion. On reading another's letters.

He who reads another's secret letters or writings without the consent of the sender or recipient, or without legitimate authority or a just cause, or otherwise by force or fraud fishes out another's secret, sins against justice. Thus rightly Billuart.³⁵⁵ The reason is that he acts like a thief or robber who unjustly takes goods away from another. For a secret is a good to which the neighbor has a strict right. This sin will be mortal or venial according to the quantity either of damage, or of danger, or of the intention of damaging gravely or lightly. Hence he sins only venially who opens letters which he knows with moral certainty contain nothing except greetings or matters of lighter moment. On the contrary, he sins mortally if he knows or even doubts that they contain matters bringing infamy, or matters which it much concerns him who sends or receives that they remain secret.³⁵⁶ In practice all who unjustly intercept or read another's letters must be corrected severely. Modern criminal Codes also are accustomed to punish gravely those who violate epistolary secrecy.³⁵⁷

But I said 1: another's secret letters or writings, such as closed letters, or even open ones if they are kept in a secret place, e.g., in a cabinet, or even by chance have been lost; otherwise, if they have been thrown away, because then they are regarded as abandoned. But letters torn into minute pieces and thrown into a public place are nevertheless considered secret. Wherefore with St. Alphonsus³⁵⁸ I judge that he sins against justice who astutely gathers, composes, and reads the fragments. The reason is that it is too difficult to burn all letters or destroy them in another way than by tearing. But such a throwing into an accessible place by no means signifies (as Lugo³⁵⁹ wishes) that the owner yields his right in letters thus torn into minute pieces, the reading of which he cannot prevent.

I said 2: without the consent of the sender or recipient. This consent indeed can be express or tacit. Thus a husband ordinarily does not sin by reading the letters of his wife, since she does not wish to conceal anything from her husband.

I said 3: or without legitimate authority. In several religious and also civil institutes (e.g., in prisons, in hospitals of the insane, etc.) it is established that superiors can or must read the letters of subjects. Excepted, however, are letters directed to major superiors or sent by them. Statutes of this kind are not unjust, because anyone either freely entered such an institute, and then is considered to have given consent concerning his letters, or because of his moral or physical defects he is compelled to enter such an institute, e.g., into prison, and then the opening of letters is either a just penalty or is necessary for the common good. But if these letters open secrets of conscience, let the superior abstain from reading.

I said 4: or a just cause. Namely, for averting grave damage either to oneself or especially to the republic. Hence in time of war the leader of an army can lawfully open the letters of enemies. The father of a family can read the letters of his children, at least if they are minors. A private man who foundedly fears that some letter may unjustly bring grave damage upon him can read it.

³⁵⁵ De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 4, appendix.

³⁵⁶ Cf. Billuart, l.c.

³⁵⁷ Cf. German Penal Code §§ 299 and 354 sqq.

³⁵⁸ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 7.

³⁵⁹ De iust. et iure diss. 14, n. 151.