§ 6. On Injury To Reputation

187. Notions. Reputation taken generally is frequent and common speech about some matter; thus we speak of the rumor of war, of the bad reputation of some evildoer. But more strictly reputation (good reputation) is the common estimation (brought forth in speech) concerning someone's excellence. In this strict sense we now speak of reputation, and thus we say, e.g.: This man has a good reputation (guten Ruf), when, namely, many proclaim his good morals or other excellences. Good reputation principally concerns a virtuous life, secondarily also other good qualities,³⁷⁹ e.g., concerning medical skill. That to every man there belongs a strict right to a good reputation has been said above, n. 7, concerning the object of dominion. This right indeed is preserved even for dead men, since their immortal soul still exists. Hence it is not lawful to take away good reputation even from them without sufficient reason. Likewise this right belongs to moral or juridical persons, e.g., a monastery, a society, etc.; and therefore it can be a grave sin to say unjustly concerning some monastery that grave disorders are committed there. - The good reputation of a man is injured by defamation.

Defamation is the unjust blackening of another's reputation.

It is explained. It is said 1. unjust blackening, because not every blackening of reputation, but only one made without sufficient cause, is defamation or detraction. It is said: blackening, because just as a man shines with a good reputation, so by defamation, through the revelation of a true or imputed crime, he is blackened or obscured, although his good reputation is not always totally taken away. It is said 2. of another's reputation, because, properly speaking, no one can commit detraction against his own reputation. St. Thomas, Bl. Albert, and many others add in the definition: by hidden words. Here is the text of St. Thomas:³⁸⁰ "Just as someone harms another by deed in two ways: manifestly indeed, as in robbery or any violence inflicted; but secretly, as in theft and a deceitful blow; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely; in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction.... Detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the manner of proposing the words, because, namely, the contumelious man speaks openly against someone, but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the intended end, or as to the harm inflicted, because, namely, the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation." Therefore only an injury to reputation, while the defamed person is absent, is defamation or detraction. But he who openly detracts from him while the defamed person is present commits contumely; because then honor is injured together with reputation. Other authors, however, teach that in this case there is both contumely and detraction.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 1, § 1.

³⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1.

³⁸¹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 1.

188. Divisions. Defamation is twofold: formal and material. Formal defamation is had when someone by his words explicitly intends to blacken the reputation of another. But material defamation is present when someone from talkativeness or levity of mind brings forth defamatory words, yet without having an intention of defaming. - Each defamation (formal and material) is again twofold, namely, either direct, when another's vices are narrated, which occurs in four ways, namely: a) by imputing a false crime, b) by exaggerating a true crime, c) by revealing a hidden crime, d) by interpreting a good work sinisterly; or indirect, when another's endowments are diminished, which also happens in four ways: a) by denying the good works of one's neighbor, b) by diminishing those good things, c) by being silent when others praise, d) by praising coldly.³⁸² - These eight modes indeed were expressed by ancient authors in these little verses:

Imputing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil, Who denies or diminishes, keeps silent, or praises faintly.

Modern theologians more briefly distinguish defamation from narration of a true but hidden defect, which they call simply detraction,³⁸³ and lying defamation, which arises from narration of a false crime or defect, which they call calumny.³⁸⁴ We also shall take detraction and calumny in this way in what follows.

Whispering also is reduced to detraction,³⁸⁵ which is detraction by which discord is sown among friends. Therefore whispering adds to detraction the end of sowing discords. E.g., Peter and Paul are friends. Andrew narrates to Peter the vices of Paul, with the intention that the friendship between Peter and Paul may be destroyed. - Whisperers in Sacred Scripture are called double-tongued, because they are accustomed to use a twofold manner of speaking, namely, otherwise before one and otherwise before the other. Whispering is a vice which renders a man not only sinful, but also contemptible and hateful; it destroys at once the reputation and the friendship of one's neighbor. Hence it is deservedly said in Sacred Scripture: The whisperer will defile his own soul, and he will be hated in all things.... The whisperer and the double-tongued man is cursed: for he will disturb many who have peace.³⁸⁶ But St. Thomas says: "And therefore whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved than to be honored."³⁸⁷ - It is self-evident that he by no means commits whispering who destroys a truly harmful or dangerous friendship by lawful means, and indeed even by manifesting the true crimes of either friend.

Rash judgment also is in some way reduced to defamation; special discussion about it will return in the following paragraph.

³⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1 ad 3.

³⁸³ Ehrabschneidung, médisance.

³⁸⁴ Verleumdung, calomnie.

³⁸⁵ Ohrenbläserei, rapport, délation.

³⁸⁶ Eccli. 21, 31 and 28, 15.

³⁸⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2.

189. The generic malice of defamation.

Principle. Unjust defamation (whether it is simple detraction, or calumny) is from its genus a mortal sin both against justice and against charity.

It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. "A good name is better than many riches."³⁸⁸ But unjustly to snatch away riches is a mortal sin. Therefore, a fortiori, the detractor commits a mortal sin who unjustly takes away from his neighbor a good name. - The evil-speaking will not possess the kingdom of God.³⁸⁹ But every defamer is a true evil-speaker.³⁹⁰

2. from the common sense of theologians and Fathers. Thus St. Augustine, that he might deter his guests from this vice, had an inscription placed above the table:

Whoever loves by sayings to gnaw the life of the absent, Let him know that this table is forbidden to him;³⁹¹

and St. Bernard inveighs vehemently and with great eloquence against detractors, saying: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Most savage indeed, surely, which so lethally infects three with one breath," namely, it kills itself, the hearer, and him from whom detraction is made.³⁹²

3. from reason. Man has a strict right to reputation, as is clear from what was said above concerning dominion. But this right is violated through defamation. Wherefore St. Thomas³⁹³ teaches: "To take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things. On account of which it is said:³⁹⁴ Have care for a good name; for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin." "Yet contumely is a graver sin than detraction, insofar as it has greater contempt of one's neighbor; just as also robbery is a graver sin than theft."³⁹⁵

That calumnious defamation is of itself a mortal sin against justice is easily understood. For it causes great injury to one's neighbor, to whom, although innocent, it falsely imputes a crime. Hence calumny is gravely punished not only by God, but also by civil law. The matter is not so clear if it is a question of simple detraction, i.e., the undue revelation of a true crime. Civil laws are accustomed rather rarely to punish revelations of this kind. But from this it does not yet follow that simple detraction is not even punished by God. For there are many things which civil law does not punish (e.g., simple fornications), which nevertheless are grave sins before God.

The reason why even simple detraction is sinful is that by it 1. the right of one's neighbor is violated, 2. the rights of God are usurped, 3. the social good is damaged. - The right of one's neighbor is violated, and therefore justice is truly injured, because a hidden sinner still possesses a good reputation, from which possession he cannot be expelled except by a just title. But the unjust detractor does not have a just title of expelling the hidden sinner from the good reputation possessed; otherwise it would no longer be detraction, but the lawful revelation of another's crime, concerning which below, n. 192. - The rights of God are usurped by the detractor, because it belongs to God alone to judge the living and the dead according to the hidden things of their hearts, all of which indeed will be made manifest in the last universal judgment. - The social good is damaged by the detractor, because from the undue revelation of a hidden fault there are accustomed to arise contentions, quarrels, and very great hatreds.

That unjust defamation also injures charity is almost self-evident, because, as St. Thomas most rightly says: "Reputation is a disposition toward friendship and ill repute toward enmity";³⁹⁶ and: "He who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning the love of one's neighbor."³⁹⁷

³⁸⁸ Prov. 22, 1.

³⁸⁹ Cf. 1 Cor. 6, 10.

³⁹⁰ St. Thomas also cites the text of St. Paul (Rom. 1, 30), where detractors and whisperers are called hateful to God, but many exegetes understand this text otherwise (cf. Cornely, Comm. in ep. ad Rom.).

³⁹¹ In Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 52.

³⁹² Sermo 17 de diversis n. 4-5 (Migne l.c. 183, 585). Cf. also De modo bene vivendi c. 33 (Migne l.c. 184, 1256).

³⁹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 2.

³⁹⁴ Eccli. 41, 15.

³⁹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 3 ad 2.

³⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2 ad 2.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. ad 3.

190. The specific and numerical malice of defamation.

1. Calumny and simple detraction do not differ in moral species (at least mortal species),³⁹⁸ since the end and effect of each is the same, namely, the defamation of one's neighbor. In calumny indeed a lie is added, but this is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless, when it is a question of grave calumny, this must commonly be declared expressly in confession, because then the confessor can more easily know both the gravity of the sin and assign the fitting mode of reparation. Yet there are authors who teach that calumny and detraction differ in species,³⁹⁹ because calumny injures the reputation of one's neighbor in a wholly other way than simple detraction does.

2. Defamation does not seem to acquire a diverse moral species according as this or that crime is unduly narrated (e.g., that someone is an adulterer or a thief). For this difference seems to be only material in the injury of reputation. Hence just as theft does not have diverse species according as someone has stolen, e.g., money or clothes, so also defamation is not specified by the diverse crimes narrated or imputed. Thus Cajetan, Serra, Noldin,⁴⁰⁰ etc. But St. Alphonsus,⁴⁰¹ with many others, judges that in this case several sins are committed; but it is not so certain whether the holy Doctor wished to say that there are several sins numerically, or even specifically distinct. In practice, at least when defamation of this kind has been made in one impulse of passion, it seems to be one sin both in species and in number. Concina also,⁴⁰² who otherwise theoretically asserts that there are several sins in this case, seems to admit this for practice. Hence the confessor would act imprudently who asked from the penitent the diverse matters of detraction, unless this were necessary for judging concerning the gravity of the detraction and concerning the modes of making reparation.⁴⁰³

3. He who detracts from someone before several people seems indeed to commit a graver but single sin. "The reason is, because to detract before several people is only an aggravating circumstance, since the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple."⁴⁰⁴ Hence it suffices to confess: I detracted before several people.

³⁹⁸ Thus also Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1418; Noldin, De praec. n. 648.

³⁹⁹ Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de iust. n. 385; Marc, Instit. mor. I, n. 1195; Mausbach, Kathol. Moraltheol. II, 2, § 57.

⁴⁰⁰ De praeceptis n. 648.

⁴⁰¹ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 48.

⁴⁰² De pecc. in commun. diss. 1, c. 6, n. 21.

⁴⁰³ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 1.

⁴⁰⁴ S. Alph., l.c. n. 49.

191. Rules for judging the gravity of defamation.

The sin of defamation, which is from its genus a mortal sin, becomes venial 1. from imperfection of the act, 2. from lightness of matter, i.e., from the slightness of the damage caused. - From the first reason, detractions are often venial sins on account of inadvertence or an erroneous conscience, since no sins seem to be more subject to lack of consideration and false judgment than those which are born from talkativeness. Moreover, how easily a talkative man finds reasons excusing him from keeping silence concerning the defects of others! Hence innumerable detractions are accustomed to be made even by persons otherwise good. Nevertheless, let the confessor fight with all his strength against this evil manner of acting, mindful of the verses of St. Augustine related above. - From the other reason likewise, many detractions are only venial sins. But in each case it must be weighed, not indeed what vice has been revealed or calumniously imputed, but whether, all the circumstances of the persons and the speech being considered, grave damage has truly been caused or not. Hence:

a) The person speaking is first to be considered; if he is serious and prudent, he harms more than if he is frivolous and talkative. Hence, if talkative women publicly known as liars detract or calumniate, often there is no mortal sin, because no one believes them. Nevertheless, let the confessor not indulge them too much, mindful of that saying: "Calumniate boldly; something always sticks." The truth of this saying, alas, appears too much in newspapers and pamphlets, which often calumniate priests and other religious persons.

b) The injured person and his condition and dignity are then to be considered. For one who is of unimpaired reputation and great dignity suffers much greater detriment from detraction and calumny than a person of low condition. Hence it can happen that grave damage is inflicted if a light sin is narrated concerning some very dignified person, e.g., if someone should say: The Pope is a liar. On the contrary, perhaps slight damage would be caused, and therefore there would be a light sin or no sin, if someone should narrate that a certain soldier known to be undisciplined had entered a brothel.

To manifest natural defects without sufficient reason, e.g., to say that someone is ignorant or illegitimate, ordinarily is not a grave sin, because defects of this kind easily come to the knowledge of others and do not injure reputation as gravely as moral defects. I say, however, that ordinarily it is not a mortal sin; for if a natural defect is very disgraceful and reputation is greatly diminished by its revelation, it is a grave sin to reveal it; e.g., to narrate that a certain pastor is an illegitimate son, which until then had been wholly unknown.⁴⁰⁵

c) The hearers of the defamation likewise are to be considered. For if they are numerous and talkative, grave damage will more easily be present than if they are few and discreet. But theologians do not agree whether it is a grave defamation to manifest to one prudent person a grave defect of another. If this manifestation is made for a reasonable cause, e.g., for seeking counsel, there is no sin; but if it is made from talkativeness, some theologians judge such a manifestation to be a grave sin, because it is truly hard to lose one's reputation with a dignified and prudent person. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion, saying: "Although even if someone speaks evil of an absent person to one alone, he corrupts his reputation not in whole but in part";⁴⁰⁶ but Billuart, who treats this question excellently,⁴⁰⁷ adds: "From the opposite opinion it follows, 1. that a prudent man, to whom you reveal the crime of another, can with equal right reveal it to another prudent man, and he to another, and thus one's neighbor will be gravely defamed among several people without mortal sin. It follows, 2. that he who alone hears a grave detraction could tolerate it as venial, accounting himself prudent, which is against the common opinion." Nevertheless, Cajetan,⁴⁰⁸ Navarrus, Bonacina, and others deny that this is a mortal sin, because grave damage is not thereby caused to the defamed person. The matter is therefore uncertain. But to calumniate in a grave matter even before one person is a mortal sin, because it is a much greater injury to impute a false crime to someone than to manifest a true hidden crime.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 967.

⁴⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1 ad 2.

⁴⁰⁷ De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Comm. in II, II, q. 73, a. 2.

192. d) Finally, the motive on account of which the defects of others are manifested is to be considered. If it is a question of calumny, an honest motive can never be present; and therefore, if a grave defect is falsely imputed to another, there is almost always a mortal sin, unless, however, it is certain among the hearers that the calumniator is lying. Wherefore Innocent XI condemned the following propositions (44): "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone, that he may defend his own justice and honor. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable"; and (43): "Why should it not be merely venial to destroy by a false crime the great authority of one detracting, which is harmful to oneself?"⁴⁰⁹

On the revelation of a hidden crime. If it is a question of simple detraction, then there is no sin at all if the manifestation of the defect is made for a proportionately grave cause. Proportionately grave causes are: the public good and a private good, whether this latter is that of the delinquent himself, of the revealer, or of another neighbor.

The public good not only permits, but altogether demands, the manifestation of a harmful defect; e.g., defects ought to be manifested to a canonical visitor; a lustful boy dwelling in some college and seducing others ought to be denounced to the legitimate superior, that harm to many may be forestalled.

The good of the delinquent himself likewise sometimes permits the manifestation of a crime, if, namely, this is necessary for his correction or for forestalling great harm to him; e.g., a girl given to dangerous love affairs, from which she is unwilling to desist, can be denounced to her father, that she may be corrected and her honor preserved.

The good of the revealer excuses the manifestation of a crime if this is necessary for the sake of defense, consolation, or seeking counsel; e.g., a penitent can sometimes confess his sin even if the confessor thereby recognizes the accomplice. In this case, however, it would at least be more perfect to approach another confessor, with whom the reputation of the accomplice would remain unimpaired.⁴¹⁰

Finally, the good of one's neighbor permits or demands the manifestation of some delinquent, as is clear in the example given above of the lustful boy seducing several persons in some college. Thus also it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to inform a betrothed woman of the hidden crimes of the bridegroom, at least those which will probably render the future marriage unhappy.

Question. Is it lawful for a grave reason to manifest a hidden crime, knowledge of which was acquired unjustly (e.g., by reading another's letters)? Lugo⁴¹¹ and St. Alphonsus⁴¹² deny it; Lessius, Concina, and others⁴¹³ affirm it, because to acquire knowledge in this way is indeed illicit, but for a grave reason to use this knowledge once acquired is contrary to no natural or positive law; just as, by an almost parallel case, to acquire money through prostitution is illicit, but to use such money is not of itself illicit. In practice, even the authors of the negative opinion sometimes permit the manifestation.

⁴⁰⁹ Denz. nn. 1194 and 1193.

⁴¹⁰ Cf. below in the tract on penance, concerning the accomplice not to be manifested, III, n. 381.

⁴¹¹ De iust. et iure disp. 14, nn. 100-108; cf. also above, n. 160, concerning excuses from giving testimony, and n. 176.

⁴¹² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 969.

⁴¹³ In S. Alph., l.c.

193. On the spreading of a notorious crime.

A public or notorious crime cannot indeed be revealed, as is self-evident, but it can be spread more and more.

a) A twofold notoriety must be distinguished: of law and of fact. Notoriety of law is had when the crime is established by a sentence of a judge or by the judicial confession of the accused. But notoriety of fact is present when the crime is already known to the greater part of the community (an altogether public or widely known crime), or so many and such talkative persons know it that the whole community will shortly know it (a simply public or notorious crime).⁴¹⁴

b) This distinction having been premised, the following principles seem to be observed:

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 2197.

194. Principle 1. Without sufficient reason and from mere talkativeness or from an itching to narrate bitter things, to speak about the crimes of others, even public ones, is always at least a certain imperfection, which produces nothing good and often much evil; indeed, sometimes it is against charity, but not against justice.

The reason is that, even if he whose crime has become notorious by notoriety either of law or of fact has indeed lost a strict right to reputation, nevertheless he is deservedly and reasonably unwilling that his reputation be destroyed more and more without sufficient advantage either to the speaker, the hearer, or the commonwealth. Hence, e.g., it seems to be a sin against charity when highly defaming condemnatory sentences passed against a delinquent who will no longer bring harm either to his neighbor or to the commonwealth are published in newspapers without sufficient reason. Certainly it is lawful to spread condemnatory sentences or crimes of this kind if certain harms are thereby forestalled. For it is expedient that the wicked not be held as upright. From these things it also follows that it is illicit, without a cause of true utility or necessity, to narrate a crime which in former times was notorious but has now been given over to oblivion and amended; likewise, to spread a crime wholly unknown in one place which is notorious in another distant place. - But a violation of commutative justice, and therefore an obligation of restitution, does not seem to be present in these cases, because he whose crime was once truly public has simply lost the strict right to conceal that crime.⁴¹⁵

Principle 2. Even the deceased retain a right to reputation; hence it is not lawful for historians to reveal and spread their vices and crimes without sufficient reason.

Nevertheless, in our times there is almost always a sufficient reason for narrating all things which are historically true. For history ought to be the teacher of life, the witness of truth, and the vindicator of divine justice; hence it is of great importance that all historical facts be set forth according to the truth of the matter. Wherefore Leo XIII ordered the Pontifical Archives to be accessible to all, so that history might be composed according to the truth of the matter. Yet in writing the history of recent times care must be taken lest survivors who are connected with the deceased person suffer any harm.

⁴¹⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 974.

195. On those cooperating in defamation.

1. He who induces another to detract, e.g., by inquiring about the defects of one's neighbor, by praising and approving the narration, sins in almost the same way as the detractor himself; indeed, if the reputation of one's neighbor is thereby injured among other persons hearing it, he sins against justice and is held to reparation. Hence, e.g., he who in some gathering unduly induces someone publicly to narrate the hidden crimes of one's neighbor is held in solidum to repair the injured reputation and the other damages thence ensuing. It is clear, because he is an unjust cooperator.

2. He who rejoices in, and willingly hears and approves, grave detraction sins gravely against charity; indeed, in affection also against justice, because he consents to the detractor, who assuredly sins against justice. Hence St. Bernard says: "To detract or to hear one detracting, which of these is more damnable, I could not easily say."⁴¹⁶ Thus, at least objectively speaking. Subjectively, however, it is often only a venial sin, because that joy is accustomed to arise more from a certain disordered curiosity than from hatred against one's neighbor. But curiosity is a venial sin.

3. A superior who does not prevent the defamation of his subject (whether active or passive) fails in his office and therefore sins,⁴¹⁷ since he is held to correct the defaming subject, but to protect the defamed subject. The superior in these cases indeed sins against charity and piety, but not against strict justice, because by reason of his office he is not held thus to watch over the temporal good of his subjects. St. Alphonsus⁴¹⁸ calls this opinion perhaps the more probable. Lugo,⁴¹⁹ however, rightly observes that if the defamed person and the defamer are subjects of the same superior, and the defamed person implores the authority of the prelate that his reputation be restored to him, then the latter is held to this from justice, provided he can do it without fear of graver harm.

4. A private person who is displeased by the sin of detraction, but who "from fear or negligence or even a certain shame omits to repel the detractor, indeed sins, but much less than the detractor, and for the most part venially." Thus St. Thomas.⁴²⁰ But he who for a reasonable cause does not correct the detractor in no way sins. Reasonable causes are, e.g., the uselessness of the correction, uncertainty whether the defamation is truly unjust, the great anger of the detractor, etc. The reason is that fraternal correction, which would have to be employed in this case of detraction, does not oblige with great inconvenience, such as would often occur if the detractor were corrected before others. Yet if it is a question of certain calumny, and not of simple detraction, even a private person is more easily bound under grave sin to resist the calumniator; because there can never be a cause excusing calumny, whereas there is often a sufficient reason for speaking about the true crimes of one's neighbor. He who hears an unnecessary narration concerning the crimes of others should at least show displeasure by his countenance; for "a sad countenance ... dissipates a detracting tongue."⁴²¹

⁴¹⁶ De consid. l. 2, c. 13 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 757).

⁴¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 4.

⁴¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 980.

⁴¹⁹ De iust. et iure disp. 14, n. 131 sqq.

⁴²⁰ L.c.

⁴²¹ Prov. 25, 23.

196. On the restitution of reputation.

1. The obligation of the defamer. An unjust defamer (whether he is a detractor or a calumniator) is held from justice to repair: a) as soon as possible, the injured reputation; b) all material damages which he foresaw, at least in a confused manner, would follow from the defamation.

For the defamer is an unjust damager. But an unjust damager is held to repair all damages culpably caused and foreseen at least in a confused manner, as is clear from what was said above, n. 93. The former obligation, namely, to repair the injured reputation, is a strictly personal obligation, and therefore does not pass to the heirs of the defamer.⁴²² But the other obligation is rather real and, when the defamer has died, falls upon his heirs, yet not beyond the goods received from the inheritance. Each of these obligations is grave if the defamation itself was gravely culpable; otherwise it is light. It must be recalled, however, that defamation does not become gravely culpable from the nature of the crime revealed or imputed, but from the evil effect ensuing and foreseen. Hence if someone, e.g., by unjustly narrating that a certain man is talkative, thereby brings it about that the office of secretary which was about to be conferred upon him is denied to him, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, provided it was foreseen at least in a confused manner.

Since the defamer is an unjust damager, the same principles concerning the obligation of reparation must be applied in defamation as in damaging. From these is resolved the controversy whether the defamer is held to repair the reputation not only among those to whom he himself narrated the hidden vices, but also among others to whom the same vices were afterward narrated by them. The answer is: If the defamer could and ought to have foreseen such spreading, and if reparation is morally possible for him, he is held; otherwise not. Yet there are authors who excuse the first defamer from this obligation, since he is not always the cause, but only the occasion, that his defamation is propagated further.⁴²³

⁴²² S. Alph., ibid. n. 996.

⁴²³ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 991.

197. 2. The manner of repairing the effects of defamation.

Reparation must be made in one way by a calumniator and in another way by a detractor.

The calumniator is held openly and effectively to retract his calumnious lies, "confessing that he spoke falsely,"⁴²⁴ unless sufficient excusing causes are present, concerning which there will immediately be discussion. - Hence he is held to say that he narrated something false; if he calumniated in public newspapers, he is held also to sing a recantation in the newspapers.

The detractor indeed cannot properly say that he lied, but he can and ought to excuse the crime revealed by all lawful means by which he can; he ought also deliberately to praise and treat honorably before others him from whom he detracted.

⁴²⁴ The Angelic Doctor briefly embraces the diverse modes of repairing defamation in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, where he seems also to teach that the defamer ought to compensate with money for the injured reputation if another restitution is impossible. St. Alphonsus holds the contrary opinion as the more probable, Theol. mor. l. 3, nn. 627 and 1000.

198. 3. Causes excusing from the reparation of reputation:

a) If no grave defamation actually followed from the unjust speech, e.g., because no one believed it.

b) If the defamation has already been given over to oblivion by the lapse of time.⁴²⁵ It is self-evident.

c) If the defamed person has legitimately remitted the reparation either expressly or tacitly. Compensation can be held as remission, i.e., if the defamed person has also defamed the defamer, and neither wishes to repair the injured reputation. A man placed in public office often cannot remit defamation, and especially calumny, which has gravely injured not only his person but also his state; e.g., a priest, magistrate, etc., cannot gratuitously remit calumnies, because otherwise their state and also the public good would be injured.

d) If reparation is morally or physically impossible, e.g., if the hearers of the detraction are unknown or cannot be approached, if the crime has become public by another way, or if reparation cannot be made without far graver damage to oneself. Certainly the defamer (and especially the calumniator) is held to repair the injured reputation even with great damage; but nevertheless, if that damage far exceeds the harm caused to the defamed person, the latter is judged to renounce his right.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1438.

⁴²⁶ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 1002.