The Cardinal Virtues and Their Parts

262. Cardinal virtues can be considered in three ways: a. As special virtues, distinct among themselves and from others, namely insofar as their object is restricted to a determined matter in which a special honesty shines forth.

b. As general virtues, or as four genera of virtues, which contain other moral virtues under themselves. Thus every virtue which brings it about that operations are directed according to reason is called prudence; every virtue which brings it about that operations are exact according to what is due is called justice; every virtue which restrains the passions is called temperance; every virtue which renders the soul firm against any difficulties whatever is called fortitude.

c. As general properties, which must in some way be present in every virtue: for every virtue must be prudent in operating, lest it err through lack of consideration; just, so that it renders what it owes to God, neighbor, and the one operating himself; brave, so that it persists constantly in good and yields to no difficulties; temperate, so that in all things it preserves moderation (the mean) and does not exceed the mode prescribed by reason.

If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide.

But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour’s crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case¹ Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence² ‘The answer must be ‘“‘ No.”’ For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

¹ Rom. iii 8.

² Summa, 2-2, q. 64, a. 7.

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

In order that such an obligation may be imposed, certain conditions must be fulfilled which it will be well to state more explicitly.

(a) The damage must be inflicted voluntarily, with knowledge and the will to do the wrong. For a man is only responsible in the forum of conscience for his free and voluntary actions. There must be theological fault, as theologians express it, otherwise there will be no obligation in conscience to make good any damage, at any rate before lawful sentence of a judge competent to impose such an obligation. For the law sometimes imposes the obligation of making good damage which has been done, even though it was not foreseen or intended. This is especially the case when there has been legal negligence or the omission of that diligence which the law requires in the circumstances. There are three degrees in this negligence: “ Ordinary neglect has been defined to be the omission of that care which every man of common prudence, and capable of governing a family, takes of his own concerns; gross neglect is defined to be the want of that care which every man of common sense, however inattentive soever, takes of his own property; and slight neglect to be the omission of that diligence which very circumspect and thoughtful persons use in securing their own goods and chattels.”¹ In some cases the law punishes even slight neglect, in others ordinary, in others only gross neglect. The omission of that care which the law requires in the case is called juridical fault, and after sentence there will be an obligation in conscience to make good damage caused through juridical fault, for the laws prescribing this are just, inasmuch as they make men more careful and conduce to the public good.

If something has been done without foreseeing that it would cause damage to another, but this danger was noticed before the damage actually took place, there will be an obligation in justice for him who performed the action to prevent the damage as far as he can; if he does not do this, he will be bound to restitution. For as long as he can prevent the evil consequences of his action, this is under his control, and may, from the point of view of morals, be considered as continuing, and thus, unless he prevents the evil when he can do so, the agent is the voluntary cause of it. If, however, he cannot prevent the damage without relatively serious inconvenience to himself, there is just cause for excusing him. And so, if I inadvertently throw a lighted match on the ground, and then notice that it may probably cause a conflagration with loss to others, I am bound in justice to extinguish the light, otherwise I must repair the damage done.

If slight negligence caused slight damage to another, there will be an obligation of repairing it under pain of venial sin. If slight negligence caused serious loss to another, there is a difficulty as to whether before any judicial sentence there be an obligation to make restitution. Many theologians deny that there is, for no grave obligation can arise from a slight fault, and a light obligation has no proportion to serious matter; there cannot be a light obligation to avoid homicide, for example.²

(b) In order that there may be an obligation to make restitution for causing damage to another, the damage must be really and objectively unjust. If damage to another follows from the lawful exercise of my rights, I am not bound to make it good. If I dig a well in my property and thereby deprive my neighbour of his supply of water, I am not bound to make restitution for the damage. Similarly, I may sell a new machine or invention, though it may indirectly cause loss to many who had on sale machines of older pattern for which now there will be no market.

I may lawfully use persuasion to induce a rich relative to leave his money to me, though others who would have had it thereby suffer loss, If, however, I make use of unjust means such as threats, violence, or calumny, and so prevent another from getting what he otherwise would have got, I commit a sin against justice and am bound to make restitution to the injured party. This is true even though he had no strict right to what he would have got, for at least he had a right not to be balked of his expectations by unjust means, And so in a competitive examination or concursus where something of value is the prize at stake, one who secures the prize by unjust means must make restitution to him who would otherwise have secured it. If there were no certainty of his securing it, restitution as far as possible must be made according to the degree of probability of his success.

(c) The unjust action must be the cause, not merely the occasion, of damage being done to another, in order that there may be an obligation of making restitution. For we are only responsible in justice for damage which we have caused. And so if I commit theft and others are induced to do the same by my bad example, I am indeed bound to make restitution for what I have stolen, and I commit a sin against charity by giving bad example to others; but probably at least, according to many theologians, I am not bound to make restitution for what others stole through my bad example. Similarly, I am not bound to make restitution for damage which was caused accidentally by my action, when there was antecedently no probable connection between my action and the damage caused. As, for example, if I lit a fire in my property, and there was no probable danger of its causing damage to my neighbour, I am not in conscience before judicial sentence bound to make good damage which it caused him on account of an unforeseen change in the direction of the wind. Some theologians would bind the man who lit the fire to restitution in this case if he hoped for the change of wind and intended the damage. They say that the wrongful intention supplies the want of physical causation and puts him under the obligation of making restitution. This opinion is probable, but the opposite also is probable, for although the evil intention makes the man guilty of affective injustice, he is not guilty of effective injustice, for his evil intention makes no difference in the physical sequence of cause and effect, and if he was not the cause of the damage prescinding from his evil intention, that evil intention could not make him the cause.

In the same way, if the theft of one servant is wrongly imputed to another, and this one is dismissed in consequence, the thief is not bound to make restitution to the injured man unless in some way he caused the false imputation.

One who is not sure whether any harm was caused by his action is not bound to make restitution, for a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source. Whether there is any obligation of making restitution for damage which was certainly caused, but it is uncertain whether the author was A or B, is a disputed point among theologians. Many teach that there is an obligation on all the probable authors in common to make good the damage, and each will be bound to make good the whole in default of the rest. This is certainly true in case of conspiracy; but if each acted independently, and it is not certain which one caused the damage, it is hard if the burden of restitution is imposed on someone who perhaps did not cause the harm.³

If an incendiary intended to set fire to the house of A, and by mistake he destroyed the house of B, it would seem that he is bound to make restitution, for all the requisite conditions are present. His action was voluntary, really, and effectively unjust. Some theologians, however, deny that the obligation of making restitution can be imposed in such cases. For the injury should be formal, and they deny that it is formal in this case. He did not intend to injure B; it was purely by mistake that his house was burnt down. Some weight must be allowed to this opinion on account of the authority of those who maintain it, but it would seem to be over-subtle and against the common sense of mankind. The injury was formal, inasmuch as it was voluntary and knowingly unjust. This is sufficient to induce the obligation of making restitution; it is not necessary that the wrongdoer should intend to injure a definite person.

¹ Chitty, The Law of Contracts, p. 412.

² St Alphonsus, 3, n. 552.

³ Bucceroni, 1, n. 1369.

Whoever by provocation or ridicule, or by praise or flattery, causes another to commit an injury, or is the cause why reparation is not made for injustice committed, is himself bound to make restitution in the same way as one who is the cause of injustice by counsel.

I. Notion of a Supernatural Moral Virtue. Just as the theological virtues immediately regard the supernatural ultimate end, so supernatural moral virtues immediately regard intermediate supernatural ends. From this it follows that the material object of these virtues can be constituted only by those actions which immediately touch intermediate ends. But since such acts of themselves have their being in a mean, which can be predicated of the theological virtues only per accidens, it is also clear that their morality must be measured according to reason illumined by the principles of faith. From this doctrine it follows that a supernatural moral virtue is suitably defined: a supernatural virtue inclining or disposing one to exercise supernatural acts concerning the means to the supernatural end.

Note. Since natural virtues in their own order, both as to objects and as to number, agree entirely with supernatural virtues, therefore, with due qualifications, the things which we shall say about supernatural virtues can be applied to natural virtues. But since we have been called to the supernatural order, when in the future we speak of moral virtue, of itself we understand supernatural virtue.

II. Existence of Supernatural Moral Virtues. Scotus and the Scotists deny that there are supernatural moral virtues, and say that natural moral virtues, that is, acquired virtues, suffice even in the supernatural order, because they can receive a rule from faith and be commanded by charity, and thus can attain a supernatural end. Nevertheless this opinion has become obsolete, and the existence of supernatural moral virtues is now almost commonly admitted.

It is proved:

1. By the mind of the Church. The Council of Vienne,¹ choosing as more probable the opinion teaching that grace and virtues, as to habit, are infused even into little children in baptism, openly supposes the proposed opinion. For that by those virtues are understood not only theological virtues but also infused moral virtues is clear from the fact that the Council chooses that opinion which: a) theologians at that time, with St. Thomas against the Scotists, admitted, namely that even moral virtues are infused; and b) Innocent III in his own time had mentioned but left undecided. But Innocent says that this opinion asserts that "faith and charity and other virtues" are infused into little children.² The Roman Catechism teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace] is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace." Then it calls them "an abundance of virtues," and again "so great an abundance of virtues";³ these phrases are less suitably applied to only the three theological virtues. Leo XIII, in the letter to the Archbishop of Baltimore given on January 22, 1899, openly distinguishes supernatural moral virtues from natural acquired virtues and teaches that the former must be preferred to the latter.

2. By the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Thus teach St. Augustine,⁴ St. Clement of Rome,⁵ St. Polycarp,⁶ Origen,⁷ St. Basil,⁸ St. Gregory Nazianzen,⁹ St. Hilary,¹⁰ St. Ambrose,¹¹ St. Prosper,¹² and St. Gregory the Great.¹³

3. By theological reason. Man constituted in the supernatural order must be perfected both as to essence and as to operation in relation to the supernatural ultimate end, and also as to operation in relation to the intermediate ends through which he must tend toward this ultimate end. But as to essence he is perfected by habitual grace; as to operations in relation to the ultimate end, by infused theological virtues. Therefore it is connaturally necessary that he be perfected as to operation in relation to intermediate ends by infused moral virtues.

Confirmation. The order of grace is more perfect than the order of nature and perfects it. But in the order of nature man is perfected not only in operations concerning the natural ultimate end by the habit of first principles and by the natural rectitude of the will and inclination toward that end, but also in operations concerning intermediate ends by acquired moral virtues.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

² Corpus Iuris, book 3, Decretals of Gregory, title 42, chapter 3, Maiores.

³ Part 2, chapter 2, questions 39-40.

⁴ Enarratio in Psalmum 83, v. 8, n. 11 (ed. G., 4, col. 1267).

⁵ Epistula I ad Corinthios, cc. 35 and 58 (M.P.G. 1, cols. 278 and 327).

⁶ Epistula ad Philippenses, c. 12 (M.P.G. 5, cols. 1015-1016).

⁷ Book 10, In Epistolam ad Romanos, n. 7 (M.P.G. 14, col. 1261 B).

⁸ Homily on Psalm 29, n. 5, § 8 (M.P.G. 29, cols. 315-318 inclusive).

⁹ Oration 21, c. 1 (M.P.G. 35, cols. 1082-1083 A inclusive); book 1, theological poems, section 2, poem 49-51 inclusive (ibid. 37, cols. 949-950); cf. Oration 14, cc. 1-5 inclusive (ibid. 35, cols. 859 A-863 B inclusive).

¹⁰ Commentary on Matthew, c. 11, n. 9 (M.P.L. 9, cols. 982 C-983 A inclusive).

¹¹ Book 6, Hexaemeron, c. 7, n. 42 (M.P.L. 14, col. 258 B); De paradiso, n. 14 (ibid., col. 280).

¹² Contra Collatorem, c. 9, n. 3 (M.P.L. 51, cols. 237 B-238 A inclusive).

¹³ Book 2, Moralia, c. 49, nn. 76-77 (M.P.L. 75, cols. 592-593); book 1, Homily 5 on Ezekiel, n. 11 (ibid. 76, col. 825).

III. Number of Moral Virtues. As concerns the number of moral virtues, take the following:

1. Since the distinction of virtues is taken from the specific distinction of formal objects, there exist as many specifically distinct moral virtues as there are formal objects of them distinct in species. Therefore, since the formal object of moral virtues is their conformity with reason illumined by faith, there are as many specifically distinct moral virtues as there are specifically distinct reasons of conformity.

2. Among moral virtues some are distinguished as principal, not because they are more perfect than all the others, but because human life is more principally occupied in them and the other virtues are founded on them. These principal virtues are called cardinal, from the hinge on which a door turns, because moral life too in some way turns and is founded on these virtues as on certain principles (St. Thomas, De virtutibus cardinalibus, q. 1, a. 1). Four cardinal virtues are enumerated: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "And if anyone loves justice, her labors have great virtues: for she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful to men in life."¹ This doctrine is confirmed by the holy Fathers, among whom, for example, St. Augustine teaches: "For the virtues of our active life are described by many as four, and they are found in Scripture. Prudence is said to be that by which we distinguish between good and evil. Justice is said to be that by which we render to each one his own. ... Temperance is said to be that by which we restrain lusts. Fortitude is said to be that by which we bear all troublesome things."² Finally it is proved by reason, and indeed in two ways: first, from the side of the formal principle of virtue; second, from the side of the subject.

Therefore from the side of the formal reason of virtues it is shown thus: the formal reason of virtues is the good of reason, and this good can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is in the very consideration of reason alone, and thus there will be the virtue of prudence. In another way, insofar as the good of reason is placed concerning something. And this is considered in two ways: either as it is concerning operations, and thus justice is posited; or as it is placed concerning passions. And this in two ways: either concerning passions impelling toward the contrary of what reason dictates, and thus temperance is posited; or concerning passions drawing one back from the good of reason on account of difficulties, and thus fortitude is posited.

But from the side of the subject the conclusion is proved as follows. For the subject of virtue is twofold: either rational by essence, which is the intellect, and in this prudence is posited; or rational by participation, and this is either the will, which is the subject of justice; or the concupiscible appetite, which is the subject of temperance; or the irascible appetite, which is the subject of fortitude.³

But that the things said above may be taken more rightly, observe the following:

a) The cardinal virtues can be considered under a twofold aspect: either as general modes or properties of all virtues, or as special virtues. Taken in the former sense, they are not special and distinct habits, but properly general conditions of every virtue. Thus prudence so considered is nothing other than a certain rectitude of discretion in any act and any matter; justice, a certain rectitude of soul by which a man works what he ought in any matter; temperance, a certain disposition of soul which preserves measure for every passion and operation, lest they be carried beyond what is due; fortitude, a certain disposition of soul by which a man is formed according to reason against any impulses of passions or labors of operations whatever (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61, a. 4).

Taken in the other sense, the cardinal virtues are special and distinct habits, and as their material object they have that matter in which the general mode of which we have spoken above is especially evident. Now rectitude of discretion appears especially in the command of reason; therefore prudence is the virtue commanding what things are to be done or omitted. Rectitude of soul in performing what is due is especially evident in those things which are with equality toward another; hence justice is the virtue which renders to each one his right. The disposition of soul preserving measure in operation and passion appears especially in restraining the pleasures of touch; therefore temperance is the virtue which moderates these pleasures. The disposition of soul sustaining the impulses of passions and the labors of operations is especially evident before all else in undergoing dangers of death; hence fortitude is the virtue by which we undergo dangers of death (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61, a. 3). Considered in this way, the cardinal virtues are opposed to the four wounds of original sin: prudence is opposed to the wound of ignorance, justice to malice, fortitude to weakness, and temperance to concupiscence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 3).

b) The other moral virtues are reduced to these cardinal virtues, indeed either as subjective parts, or as potential parts, or as integral parts, according as they participate in their reason in different ways.

alpha. Subjective parts of some cardinal virtue are called those virtues which truly participate in the general reason of that cardinal virtue, although they nevertheless have their own specifying object. Thus, for example, sobriety is a subjective part of the cardinal virtue of temperance; for just as temperance moderates the passion of touch, so sobriety moderates the passion for intoxicating drink. But because subjective parts participate in the general reason of their cardinal virtue, there cannot exist subjective parts of a cardinal virtue which already has an entirely specific notion, as happens in relation to the cardinal virtue of fortitude, which has a plainly determinate matter, namely dangers of death.

beta. Potential parts are called those virtues which agree with a cardinal virtue in the general formal mode of attaining their object, but differ from it insofar as they do not have as their object that matter in which the general formal mode is especially evident. Thus meekness, which moderates anger, is a potential part of temperance; just as temperance moderates the pleasure of touch, so meekness moderates the passion of anger.

gamma. Integral parts of a cardinal virtue are not virtues of themselves, but only conditions or dispositions which, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "must concur for the perfect act of virtue" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48, single article). Thus, for example, shamefacedness is fear of a base act insofar as it is reproachable. It primarily regards reproach, and therefore, by suffusing the soul with horror of baseness, it helps the virtue of temperance to place a perfect act; therefore it is an integral part of this cardinal virtue.

¹ Wis. 8:7.

² Enarratio in Psalmum 83, v. 8, n. 11 (ed. G., 4, col. 1267).

³ Hieronymus de Medicis, on I-II, q. 61, a. 2; nevertheless, with regard to the supernatural virtues of temperance and fortitude, there is dispute concerning the subject of inherence (n. 370).

IV. Subject of Inherence of Moral Virtues. The subject which and total of moral virtues, equally with that of theological virtues, is, as is clear, the person himself who possesses the said virtues. It remains, therefore, that we speak of the subject by which of inherence. Now:

1. As regards natural moral virtues, the following hold:

a) The cardinal moral virtues inhere as follows: prudence, since as a perfection of practical judgment it is right reason concerning things to be done, inheres in the practical intellect; justice, as perfecting the rational appetite in the pursuit of the neighbor's good, inheres in the will; fortitude, which perfects the sensitive appetite in overcoming dangers, inheres in the irascible sensitive appetite; temperance, perfecting the sensitive appetite in moderating pleasures, inheres in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.

b) Moral virtues which are subjective parts of a cardinal virtue have the same subject by which of inherence as the cardinal virtue itself, because a species is never outside its genus.

c) Moral virtues which are potential parts do not of themselves inhere in the subject in which the cardinal virtue is, whose formal mode of attaining the object they agree with. Thus, for example, humility is in the irascible sensitive appetite and yet is reduced to the cardinal virtue of temperance, which is in the concupiscible sensitive appetite, because it follows not the formal mode of fortitude, which is in the irascible appetite, but that of temperance.

2. As regards supernatural moral virtues, the following hold:

a) The cardinal moral virtues inhere as follows: prudence inheres in the practical intellect; justice inheres in the will. With regard to fortitude and temperance there is dispute. According to some, they inhere in the will;¹ according to others, fortitude inheres in the irascible sensitive appetite, and temperance in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.²

b) Moral virtues which are subjective parts of a cardinal virtue have the same subject of inherence, because, as we said above, a species is never outside its genus. Hence the subjective parts of prudence inhere in the practical intellect, the subjective parts of justice in the will; the subjective parts of temperance, according to some, in the will, and according to others, in the concupiscible sensitive appetite. Fortitude lacks subjective parts.

c) Moral virtues which are potential parts of a cardinal virtue, according to those who teach that the sensitive appetite is not a subject of inherence of supernatural virtues, according to them, I say, the potential parts of prudence are in the practical intellect, and the potential parts of the other cardinal virtues are in the will. But those who think that the sensitive appetite is also a subject of inherence of supernatural virtues teach the same here as was said above concerning the potential parts of natural virtues (IV. 1. c).

¹ Cf. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, p. 128 sq.

² Cf. Gonet, Manuale, second part, tract 3, chapter 4.

There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.

These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the other moral virtues hinge on them.

With a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs the action really to be placed here and now, it is altogether unlawful to operate. - For only a subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And in this sense that saying is consequently false: He who acts probably, acts prudently. L. 1. 1. n. 58. 69. 80. Therefore the whole question here concerns a speculatively probable conscience, which only remotely directs the action, stating the probable existence of a law: namely whether by means of some reasoning we can lawfully make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience, or, what is the same, whether, while a probable opinion stands concerning the honorableness of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honorableness of such an action in a particular and individual case, and thus licitly follow in practice a speculatively probable opinion. To resolve this question we establish the following propositions.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

You will resolve: Therefore we make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience by the following reasoning. What is forbidden by no certain law is licit. But such or such an action, which truly probably is prohibited by no law, is by that very fact forbidden by no certain law. Therefore such an action is licit. Since the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion too will be certain. And hence again it is clear that an opinion both tenuously and doubtfully probable is altogether excluded from probabilism. But the conclusion contains the judgment or dictate of conscience. The same transition can be made by force of another reasoning. He who acts according as prudence dictates, acts honorably. But he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts according to the dictate of prudence. Therefore, he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts honorably. Since again the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion will also be certain. L. 1. 1. n. 67. 68. 69. 84; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What is avarice? Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal goods. An inordinate appetite, by being unwilling rather to lose them than God; by denying alms to the poor when the obligation of charity urges; by unjustly desiring others' things; by loving or desiring riches too much, or by taking too much delight in them. Too much, beyond due measure, namely by acquiring or retaining them according as they are necessary for life, according to one's own condition. Avarice, insofar as it is precisely opposed to the virtue of liberality, is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless it can become mortal in three ways: 1. Against charity toward oneself, by constituting the last end in riches, or by transgressing the precepts of God rather than suffer loss in temporal goods. 2. Against charity toward neighbor, by not helping him when constituted in grave necessity, etc. 3. Against justice, by taking what belongs to another, etc. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 1; 2. 2. q. 118; L. 68.

Liberality is the virtue by which we use well all those external goods which have been granted to us for our sustenance. There is a twofold use of exterior goods, one toward oneself, another toward others. And therefore it pertains to liberality that on account of immoderate love of money someone not be impeded from fitting expenditures, nor from fitting gifts. But to give pertains most of all to liberality, since this is more perfect than to receive, or to spend upon oneself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 117, aa. 1, 4. As avarice, so also prodigality is opposed to liberality, both according to excess in giving, and according to defect in retaining and acquiring. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, 119.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

Is it licit to serve prostitutes or concubinarians? Is it licit for Catholics to attend civil funerals? R. To the first. Negatively, per se and ordinarily speaking, both because of the scandal of others and also because of the greatest danger of falling. Therefore those cases which are to be excepted in practice will have to be judged from the degree of necessity and the circumstances of persons, removing scandal and proximate danger of sinning. R. To the second. Affirmatively, per se, because the homage is merely civil. Per accidens, by reason of scandal, it can easily be illicit.

What is adoration and of how many kinds is it? - Adoration is honor exhibited to another by an external gesture of the body, by which we testify our submission and the excellence of another; or insofar as it is a sign of internal estimation, reverence, and submission toward another, and consequently also of his excellence. Therefore adoration requires two internal acts: one of the intellect, the other of the will. The former is a speculative judgment concerning the excellence of another, and a practical judgment that it is honorable for us to be submitted to him on account of his excellence and our inferiority with respect to him. But the latter is the command of the will to lower oneself on account of that superior excellence in another. Whence at last the execution itself exists in the exterior gesture of the body.

Adoration is one thing political, another religious, according as it exhibits worship to another on account of a merely civil dignity or excellence, or on account of a supernatural excellence which is found in God and in his Saints. The latter comprehends under itself three species or quasi-species. The first is latria, which, with the genus taken for the species, is also simply accustomed to be called adoration; it is supreme and singular, which we owe to God alone, on account of the divine excellence proper to him, and which therefore is communicable to no other, according to Matt. 4:10. The second is dulia, which belongs to the Angels and other Saints, on account of the supernatural and created excellence which is in them. The third is hyperdulia, which is exhibited to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her supernatural and created excellence, but one altogether singular and greater and more eminent than all other created excellences. Species or quasi-species, because there is not sufficient agreement whether they are one species from one relation to God or threefold from a threefold diverse proper excellence.

Moreover any species of adoration is divided into absolute and respective. It is absolute when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence intrinsic to itself; and thus God, the Most Holy Trinity, Christ also as man, and the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist are adored with absolute worship of latria; but the Saints with absolute worship of dulia, and the Most Holy Virgin with absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is respective when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence and sanctity extrinsic to itself, but intrinsic to him to whom it is referred in moral estimation; and thus the Most Holy Name of Jesus Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and the Cross are adored with respective worship of latria; relics and images of the Saints, etc., with respective worship of dulia; images of the Most Holy Virgin, etc., with respective worship of hyperdulia. The title "The Penitent Heart of Jesus" is altogether condemned. Holy Office, 15 July 1892. The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, representing the Heart alone, is permitted only for private devotion, but is by no means to be exposed on an altar for public veneration. Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891. Because there is one excellence of the Three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is owed to them, and consequently one adoration. Trent, sess. 25, Decree on Invocation, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2 ad 3; q. 84; q. 103, aa. 3, 4; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 2, l. 1, c. 2; Struggl 11 seqq.

A determinate place is not required for adoration as though by necessity of the thing itself, but only according to fittingness, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed by place, but on account of the adorers themselves: first indeed on account of the consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be heard more; secondly on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity which are contained there; thirdly on account of the gathering of many adorers, from which prayer becomes more fit to be heard. The obligation of adoration is abundantly satisfied by otherwise fulfilling obligations toward God, in which adoration of God is contained implicitly and often also explicitly, as, for example, when prayers are poured forth to God, when one assists at the sacrifice of Mass, etc. E. M.

Can men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity be adored? - They can be honored with private worship. But they cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been numbered by the Supreme Pontiff in the Catalogue of Saints or Blessed. Public worship, however, is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church, or as instituted by her; private worship is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not licit to erect churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified, cf. 463; nor is it licit to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their relics or images for public veneration, or to carry them around in processions. Yet it is permitted to keep these images or relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private, which is not prohibited. Struggl 18; E. M.

Those are called Saints who solemnly, a definitive sentence having been issued, are enrolled by the Roman Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints, and their worship is permitted to all the faithful. Those are called Blessed who, from a special concession of the Roman Pontiff, can be honored with some public worship only in some place or in some Religious Institute. Those are Venerable concerning whom the cause of introduction of their beatification has been signed by the Roman Pontiff. Servants of God are those who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom. But "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X... forbade Servants of God, whose causes are henceforth introduced, to be called Venerable; likewise he decreed that solemnities are not permitted to be carried out on the occasion of the decree issued concerning the introduction of the cause... nor panegyric orations. But he permitted that Servants of God be adorned with the title Venerable only after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or concerning martyrdom, yet in such a way that from this permission no argument of granted veneration can be inferred or claimed... Solemnities for giving thanks to God even after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or martyrdom he likewise prohibited; yet by this prohibition he did not intend to prevent the addition in Masses, as is fitting, of a collect for thanksgiving." S. R. C., 26 Aug. 1913. This Decree also contains several other prescriptions to be observed in the beginning of causes of Servants of God, namely so that the cause may be duly instituted. There are special Instructions concerning the processes of causes of Martyrs in regions of unbelievers. Cf. Consulente Ecclesiastico, 1905, p. 313 seqq. Likewise there is a Decree to be observed concerning judicial order in causes of Servants of God proceeding by way of an excepted case. S. R. C., 11 Nov. 1912. "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, for treating causes of lesser moment of Servants of God, namely concerning reputation for sanctity in general, concerning non-cult, concerning the validity and relevance of processes, and other similar things, constituted a particular Congregation." Decree S. R. C., 9 Dec. 1908.

What is vain observance? - Vain observance consists in this, that someone employs means neither proportioned by their nature nor instituted by God or by the Church for obtaining a certain effect. It differs from divination in that the latter is ordered to knowledge of hidden things, but vain observance to any effects whatsoever to be obtained. It agrees with divination because it also rests upon a pact, express or tacit, with a demon. It matters little indeed that a demon is not expressly invoked; for he is invoked equivalently. For since God does not mingle himself with vain things, the effect can be expected only from a demon. Since someone uses inept means, he uses them not as causes but as signs, and thus they pertain to pacts of significations entered into with demons. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96, aa. 1, 2, 3; L. 24.

Is it permitted to offer oneself to martyrdom? - One must distinguish with St. Thomas. Either a legitimate cause is present or not. If the first, for example, to avoid blasphemies, to procure the glory of God and of faith, to remove in one's neighbor the danger of unbelief, it is certainly permitted, since it is a work of the greatest charity. If the second, it is not permitted, since no one is lord of his own life so that he can squander it at his own pleasure. Whence he sins gravely, when good faith or divine inspiration does not excuse, as we know happened in several Saints. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 174, a. 3; L. 32, l. 6, n. 101. "To sustain martyrdom on account of Christ falls under precept, because namely man ought to have his mind so prepared that he would sooner permit himself to be killed than deny Christ or sin mortally. And thus also to leave one's own goods falls under precept, because the mind of a Christian ought to be prepared rather to sustain the plundering of his goods than to deny Christ or sin mortally." S. Th., Quodl. 4, a. 20.

What is sacrilege? - Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing, insofar as sacred; that is, of a thing dedicated to divine worship, taken not materially but formally, namely insofar as it is ordered to this worship. That is to say, for some action to be sacrilege, the thing must be violated in that by which it is sacred. Whence if someone speaks badly about someone who has a vow of chastity, his detraction does not assume the nature of formal sacrilege, because that person is sacred to God only as to bodily purity, but not as to integrity of reputation. Moreover, only that thing is properly judged sacred which is not sacred in just any way, or dedicated to divine worship in just any way, but by public rite and divine or ecclesiastical institution, or by the power of the Church, has been deputed to the worship of God. Therefore it is not sufficient that a thing has been simply blessed, namely by a merely invocative blessing, by which we pray for the good of a thing or person; but a constitutive blessing is necessary, by which a thing from profane becomes sacred, as can be seen in holy water or blessed candles. Indeed, even more, a constitutive blessing is necessary by which a thing is consecrated uniquely and perpetually to divine worship; and this is properly consecration, as sacred vessels, churches, priests, clerics. And thus it is not illicit "to throw to dogs the bones of a lamb or eggs which are blessed... just as it is also licit to use holy water and candles for profane use." L. l. c., n. 94. By the blessing of these things only the special assistance of God is invoked concerning the use of those same things. La-Croix, l. c., n. 227; Struggl 9; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1; q. 99, aa. 1, 2; Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 88, a. 11; L. l. 6, n. 94.

Blessing is numbered among the sacramentals. It is an invocation of good: one merely invocative; another constitutive, by which a thing from profane becomes sacred; another constitutive and consecrative, by which a thing is destined uniquely and in perpetuity to divine worship. Blessings which are made without sacred oils are called verbal; those made with these employed are real, and are accustomed to be called consecrations. Real blessings, or consecrations, are of the episcopal order; of verbal blessings, some are of the episcopal order, others of the presbyteral. Some presbyteral blessings are parochial, such as the blessing of bridegroom and bride, the blessing of a ship, of houses on Holy Saturday. Which verbal presbyteral and episcopal blessings there are must be deduced from the Ritual, Pontifical, and Missal; but parochial blessings are those which bear before themselves some jurisdiction.

What is the third precept of the Decalogue? - The third precept of the Decalogue is: Remember that you sanctify the sabbath day ... you shall not do any work in it. Ex. 20:8, 10. Two things are contained in this precept: that man be free on the sabbath for divine things, and that he cease from every servile work. This precept is natural insofar as it commands that some time be dedicated to public divine worship; but insofar as in the Old Law it designates the sabbath, in the New Law Sunday by the determination of the Church, and other feast days, it is positive. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4 ad 4.

This precept, as determined by the Church, insofar as it is negative, chiefly prohibits servile works on a feast day. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands under grave obligation to be present at Mass on Sundays and other feast days. And this is clear: 1. from various places of Canon Law, especially from C. Missas 64, de Consecr., D. 1, likewise from C. Omnes 63, de Consecr., D. 1; 2. from all Catechisms, by which the indubitable precept of hearing Mass on these days is declared; 3. from proposition 52 condemned by Innocent XI. But each, both to be present at Mass and to cease from servile works, is more truly from the precept of the Church; for this third precept of the Decalogue as to the sabbath day was ceremonial; and otherwise the Church could not dispense in these things, at least as to Sundays. S. Th. l. c. Besides this, however, it commands nothing else under grave obligation, or even under light obligation per se. The reason is that in fact nothing else is found prescribed in Law, or legitimately introduced by custom.

Hence it is clear: 1. That in reality there is no obligation from the force of this precept, insofar as it is natural or insofar as it is ecclesiastical, under grave or under light obligation, per se, of assisting at the evening office on Sundays and feast days, or of hearing a sermon. From the force of this precept; for perhaps someone could sin against other virtues and obligations of his state by omitting a sermon, catechesis, and other works of piety. 2. That he who hears a single Mass on the day of the Nativity of Jesus Christ satisfies this precept. 3. That there is no obligation of hearing Mass on Ash Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday of greater week, nor on the days of Rogation, and on the day of all the faithful departed.

But this precept obliges all the baptized who have the use of reason, even priests not celebrating, but not infants before the completed seventh year, or catechumens. The first reason is because it is universal. The second reason is because then they are not yet regularly capable of observing it in a human manner. The third reason is because they are not subject to the Church.

Finally the obligation of a feast day begins from one midnight to another. For such is the present use of the Roman Church. Roman Catechism, n. 1 seqq.; L. 263-271, 308; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4; Struggl 12-14; Ithur., Cas. 20, nn. 1-4; E. M.

What is the fourth precept of the Decalogue? - The fourth precept of the Decalogue is: Honor your father and your mother. Ex. 20:12. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, because "they are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3. But secondarily and implicitly it regards both the obligations of parents toward children, and also the mutual obligations of other blood-relatives, and of other inferiors and superiors. Roman Catechism, p. 3, c. 6, nn. 2, 8. Therefore this precept concerns acts per se of the virtues of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, legal justice, and gratitude.

Piety is a certain special virtue, to which it pertains to exhibit worship toward parents and one's fatherland, from whom and in which we are born, because they are "a connatural principle producing in being and governing." For piety regards this "principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and fatherland, and upon those things which are ordered to these." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 3. Besides this, piety also exhibits worship toward other blood-relatives, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; and likewise toward benefactors of the fatherland, because in them we behold the favor and help of the fatherland. S. Th. l. c., a. 1. "Through the fact that we are born from parents, both blood-relatives and fatherland pertain to us." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 5. Hence piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "because between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as coadjutors for the preservation of the blood-relationship of both, which each spouse has from his own parents; for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is preserved. And we say the same about children, namely because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as preservers of the blood-relationship received from parents." Cajetan, on 2. 2, q. 101, a. 1.

Worship is an act by which someone professes his own subjection to another in testimony of the latter's excellence. Hence the worship owed to parents imports reverence, obedience, and duty. Obedience imports compliance. Duty imports obedience and assistance.

Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1. Honor imports a certain testimony concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, such as inclinations, or also by exterior things, for example, the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness shines out in the knowledge of many, and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 1.

Observance also pertains reductively to this fourth precept; since, just as parents are for us a principle producing in being and governing, so persons constituted in dignity not only have a certain excellence in themselves, but also a certain power of governing with respect to some things, whence the nature of principle also belongs to them, as a Prince of a city is in civil matters, a leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines. Hence it is that all such persons are also called fathers because of the likeness of care. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; Quodl. 10, a. 12; Roman Catechism, n. 8.

Dulia is "a certain species of observance, because through observance we honor any persons whatever who excel in dignity; but through dulia, properly taken, servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3. They venerate, by furnishing due service to masters. A certain species of observance. For observance has diverse species according to the diverse nature of excellence. And thus in one way a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher. S. Th. l. c., a. 4; q. 104, a. 2 ad 4.

Obedience properly is "a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept" of a superior. "But if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for omission of the same from any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 2. The former is usually called formal obedience; the latter, material obedience. "Obedience proceeds from reverence, which exhibits worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered in itself, insofar as it regards the nature of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for Prelates it is contained in some way under observance; insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1. But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Cf. 835.

Gratitude or thankfulness is a virtue which recompenses benefactors for some particular and private benefit received, by the action of thanks, and by spending something gratuitously. Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude, which according to the diversity of circumstances is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude was great. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 107.

Therefore gratitude is a certain virtue which comes after piety and observance, as deficient from them, since "not whatever we owe to a father or to a person excelling in dignity do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 106, aa. 1, 3, 6; q. 107. But honor and reverence are owed to a benefactor because he has the nature of a principle, and per accidens relief or support, if he is in need.

How does the obligation of an accepted promise cease? - It ceases on account of the following causes: 1. On account of condonation by the promisee; for anyone can renounce his own right. - 2. On account of change of the object, namely if the thing promised meanwhile became impossible, illicit by laws, or harmful or useless to the promisee, for whose utility and advantage it was made. C. A. 936. - 3. On account of a supervening change of state of the promisor or of the promisee, so that the promisor would not have promised if he had foreseen this change; as, for example, if someone promised one hundred florins to a poor person, and meanwhile he himself falls into poverty, and needs them for sustaining himself or his family honorably; or, if someone promised marriage to a girl who afterward becomes poor, very deformed, or is corrupted by another. - 4.

On account of ingratitude of the promisee; for this not only takes away the obligation of the promise, but also, if it is grave, makes a donation revocable, as is had in C. ult. de Donat. 5. Through compensation, namely when two persons promised something to each other, and one does not wish to stand by the promises; for, as is said in R. 75 of Law in the Sixth, In vain does someone ask faith to be kept to himself by him to whom he refuses to keep the faith furnished by himself. 6. On account of defect of the condition, or of the principal cause of the promise itself; as if someone promised something to another on account of poverty, whom afterward he finds not to be poor. For a promise is always considered made under such tacit conditions. Struggl 23; L. 720; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 110. a. 3 ad 5; Gousset 784.

What are the exceptions to the irrevocability of donation inter vivos? - A donation 1. is resolved, but not by full right, if the attached conditions are not fulfilled. Cf. C. I. 1078, 1079, 1080; C. G. 953, 954, 956; C. H. 647, 651, 1333; C. B. 525 ff. 2. It can be revoked if the donee shows himself ungrateful toward the donor in the cases and time determined by law. Inst. 1. 2. t. 7. § 2; C. B. 530; C. I. 1081, 1082; C. G. 955, 956, 957; C. H. 648-650, 653; C. L. 1482, 1488 ff.; C. A. 948, 949; unless, however, they are donations on account of marriage, and also according to C. I. unless they are purely remunerative donations. C. I. 1087; C. G. 959. 3. But it is revoked by full right according to C. G. and C. H., but not by the law itself according to C. I., because of offspring supervening, even if that offspring had already been conceived at the time of the donation, even also if it was born posthumously, or if the donor has legitimated a natural son born after the donation; excepting according to C. G. mutual donations of spouses, or of ascendants in favor of spouses, made on account of marriage; excepting according to C. I. remunerative donations and those made on account of marriage. According to C. H. 1333, donations on account of marriage are not revoked unless the marriage does not follow. According to C. L. 1482, 1483, 1486, the donor can revoke the donation because of the supervening of children, unless at the time of the donation the donor already had a legitimate descendant, or unless it was made on account of marriage. Nor can he renounce this right. Certainly just and pious is the presumption of law, that a donor lacking offspring made the donation with this virtual or tacit condition: Unless I acquire children; for everyone is judged tacitly to wish to prefer his own to outsiders. Hence every contrary agreement is also regarded as null. But since in this case the donation is revoked by the law itself, it does not revive through the death of the offspring. C. I. 1083-1087, 1090; C. G. 960, 961-966; C. H. 644-646. - According to C. A. 954, by the reception of children, donations do not vanish. 4. All donations inter vivos made by either spouse to the other can always be revoked. Nor indeed does the wife need the consent of the husband or the authority of the judge. C. G. 1096. According to C. B. 519, 528, the donor can fail to execute a donation if he is in need, or if he cannot fulfill the obligation of supporting others, and he can revoke a completed donation. According to C. A. 947, 954, if the donor suffers need, he can demand the fruits of the donated thing. The same right belongs to the donor's children born after the donation in a case of need. - According to C. B. 534, a donation which has as its cause a moral duty or a motive of propriety is not subject to restitution or revocation.

L. 738, 739.

What is baptism of blood; what are its required conditions? - Baptism of blood is the shedding of blood or death endured for faith, or for another Christian virtue. But this baptism is equated with true baptism, because as if ex opere operato, after the manner of baptism, it remits guilt and punishment. As if, because martyrdom does not operate so strictly and properly as the sacraments do, but from a certain privilege by reason of real imitation of the Passion of Christ. Therefore martyrdom profits even infants. The Church honors the Holy Innocents as true martyrs.

For the martyrdom of an adult, that it be such as is necessary for salvation, five things are required: 1. the infliction of death; 2. acceptance of the same from a pious cause; 3. that one not resist the tyrant; 4. that by faith he hold the truth for which he suffers; 5. legitimate disposition for grace. But what such a disposition is, is controverted. The first opinion teaches that true contrition, perfect from love of God above all things, is necessary. The second holds that the will of suffering for Christ suffices, and that there is no need of another penance, even if the man remembers his sins. The third asserts that at least attrition is required, if the man is conscious of sin.

Moreover, contrition can be required for the fruit of martyrdom in two ways: first directly, as a necessary disposition; second indirectly, as a work necessary for avoiding a new sin. - If the one for whom martyrdom is imminent is in mortal sin, contrition is necessary for him for the fruit of martyrdom indirectly, or at least attrition which is thought to be contrition, as a work necessary for avoiding a new sin which would impede its fruit. The reason is that if ever the precept of contrition obliges, it does so especially in danger of death. - Yet contrition is not necessary in itself and directly as a disposition for the fruit of martyrdom, but attrition is required and suffices. The first reason is that the Fathers equate the martyrdom of adults with baptism in its force of destroying sin. Here it must be noted that the very endurance of death according to itself is compared with baptism, and no lesser force in washing away sins is attributed to it than to baptism; nor is this force attributed to internal contrition, but to the external work. Therefore, just as baptism does not require contrition in order to confer grace, so neither does martyrdom. The second reason is that it is certain that for remission of guilt some penance is always required in adults from Trent sess. 14, c. 1.

• Theol. Wirceb. 57 ff.; Suarez d. 29, s. 1, 2; L. 95, 97; St. Thomas Quodl. 6, a. 4; 2.2, q. 124; 3 p., q. 66, a. 12 ad 2.

6. The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

10. The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.

17. Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.

The principal acts of Religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days... Concerning the last three it will be said in the 2nd and 3rd precept. Concerning sacrifice, in the Treatise on the Eucharist. Here therefore only concerning adoration and prayer.

412. Penance, considered generally, signifies the same as sorrow of soul, which anyone experiences after he has done or omitted something which he would wish not to have done or not to have omitted. But in the strict and proper sense, penance is sorrow of soul insofar as it is referred to God offended and hostile to us ¹.

¹ Take care to distinguish properly the twofold sense in which an offense against God is the formal object now of charity, now of penance; otherwise you may perhaps fall into the false doctrine which finds penance only where there is contrition perfected by charity. Cardinal De Lugo speaks well concerning these things: It is one thing, and a far different one, to detest sin because it is opposed to God, or because it is an evil of God, at least extrinsically, and because it displeases God, which pertains to charity; but it is another thing to detest sin because it offends God, or because it provokes God and turns Him away from man, which pertains to this other virtue of Penance.... For even among men these two things are distinguished, and I can be unwilling to offend another lest I reasonably render him averse to me, although otherwise I have no friendship with him nor desire to have it; for friendship tends to avoid his evil because it is his evil; but this other virtue tends formally to avoid an offense, not because it is his evil, but rather because it is evil and dishonorable for me to have another reasonably averse to me (On Penance, disp. 2, no. 52).

But he had previously explained the object of Penance more clearly thus (ibid., nos. 50-51): Even among men another virtue inclines one to remove an offense, which prohibits giving someone a sufficient and reasonable cause of indignation and aversion..., and inclines one also to remove it when it has been committed, by offering sufficient satisfaction through acts of service, through a petition for pardon, and other similar things according to the magnitude of the offense; for when this satisfaction has been made, the offense is extinguished. For if the offended person were harsh in accepting satisfaction, prudent men would nevertheless no longer judge him to remain reasonably averse, but entirely unreasonably so.... This being supposed, we say that there is another similar virtue of man toward God, which inclines one to have peace with God, or to avoid an offense against God and to remove it by every means when it has been committed. Its formal object is the goodness of peace with God, or not to have God averse and indignant. But since God is offended by all sins, this virtue hates all of them under that formal aspect, because they are offenses against God; and it endeavors to remove all of them, so that it may again have God pacified and appeased. And therefore it is called a reconciliatory virtue, because it tends to this, that it may reconcile to us the God who is averse.... But that this virtue is Penance is proved from the fact that, etc. And in this sense indeed the Author is to be understood when he presently adds that Penance is a moral virtue which inclines to the detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, namely, insofar as it renders God averse and indignant toward us.

I. Penance, as a virtue, is defined: A moral virtue inclining to the detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice.

Penance is necessary for the sinner by a necessity of means for salvation. For in the present economy it is repugnant that an impenitent sinner be received by God into friendship.

It is also necessary by a necessity of divine precept, as is clear from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, for example, Luke 13.5: Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish, etc.

The effect of penance ², however, is twofold: 1. the remission of sins, as is established from six hundred passages of Sacred Scripture; 2. the remission of eternal punishment. For a justified man cannot be liable to eternal punishment. This is also established from Trent, sess. 6, ch. 7.

² Understand this of perfect penance, namely, that which leads to those acts of service by which God Himself has revealed that, from His immense mercy, He is appeased and reconciled with sinful man.

II. Penance, as a Sacrament, is defined: A Sacrament of the new law instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, to a contrite man who has confessed, sins committed after

Baptism.

This Sacrament differs from the others especially in this, that it is administered after the manner of a judgment; for there is present the penitent, at once the accused, witness, and accuser; and the Priest, the judge pronouncing sentence.

1048. Through the theological virtues and the virtue of religion, we tend directly toward God, our last end; through the moral virtues, our actions are rightly disposed concerning those things which are toward the end, namely duties toward ourselves and neighbor. We have already said above, n. 585, that moral virtues, insofar as they are natural, can be defined as acquired habits by which we are disposed to acting; and insofar as they are supernatural, that they are divinely infused, exercised under the influence of supernatural grace, and ultimately ordered to a supernatural end. Likewise it has been said, n. 587, that all these virtues can be referred to four, which are called cardinal, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47-170, who discusses these virtues splendidly before others; and his Commentators, among whom John of St. Thomas; Billuart, Tract. de Prudentia, Fortitudine, etc.; the Wurzburg theologians, Appendix de Virt. cardinalibus (t. IV, ed. 1883, Paris); Lequeux, De Virtutibus, diss. II; Pesch, Praelectiones, t. IX, n. 1-292; Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 682-735. - Cf. ascetical authors, such as Schram; Alvarez de Paz; Rodriguez; Olier, Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes; Scaramelli; Philippus a SS. Trinitate; Gaudier, de Perfect. vitae spiritualis; Gay, De la vie et des vertus chretiennes; Ribet, Les Vertus et les Dons, Paris, Lecoffre, 1901; especially St. Francois de Sales, Introduction, Amour de Dieu, Sermons et Lettres.

Prudence directs all our acts to the honest good, whether toward ourselves or toward others; justice inclines us to render to another what is owed to him; fortitude and temperance directly help us to fulfill duties toward ourselves (above, n. 589). - Since justice, on account of the manifold rights and duties which it embraces, demands a fuller exposition, we discuss it in a special Treatise; therefore it remains to speak of the three virtues, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, yet briefly, since a fuller exposition of these virtues is found among ascetical theologians.

1049. 1. Definition. Prudence (in Greek, phronesis), which is often called wisdom, is a virtue directing the intellect so that, in individual operations, we may discern what is honest and conducing to the end. Accordingly here there is no question of merely human prudence, or cleverness, which pursues only the useful, but of that which orders our acts to the last end, and especially of supernatural prudence.

(a) Prudence primarily perfects the intellect, namely practical reason; and it is, as it were, the director of morals, insofar as it disposes the mind to judging rightly concerning those things which conduce to the end, by pronouncing what is honest or base: for prudence which considers only what is useful is very imperfect, from what was said above, n. 44-47. From this it is clear that its object is very broad, since it embraces all human actions capable of morality.

(b) Yet it differs from the science of morals; for the latter is concerned with universal good and the general rules of ethics, while the former applies the universal principles of morals to individual actions, pronouncing what in this or that circumstance is honest. - Nor, however, is it the same as conscience (above, n. 350-351): for conscience is considered as a faculty, or as an act by which we judge concerning the liceity of acts; while prudence is the virtue perfecting conscience itself and inclining it to judge rightly concerning the honesty of actions.

1050. 2. The elements by which it is constituted. Prudence primarily supposes a natural faculty of judging rightly (bon sens, common sense), and, as regards supernatural things, the light of faith by which right reason is perfected and illuminated. It consists especially in three elements, which are necessary for rightly choosing means to the end: consultation, by which we diligently inquire concerning all the means and their utility and honesty; judgment of mind, by which practical reason, all things having been weighed, rightly pronounces concerning the honesty and opportuneness of this or that means; precept, by which reason commands those acts which it has already declared necessary or useful for the end.

1051. (A) The first act of prudence is solicitous consultation, or investigation, by which we seriously and attentively think about the various means which can conduce to the intended end, about their honesty and opportuneness, not only in general, but with all adjuncts attended to.² Toward obtaining this more efficaciously, five things especially serve:

² This indeed is done, according to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 51, a. 2), under the influence of eubulia, which is a virtue annexed to prudence.

(a) Memory of past things, insofar as these can help for judging rightly concerning present things. For since for the most part at least the same means, employed in the same circumstances, produce the same effects, from past things we can often judge how one must act in present adjuncts. Wherefore history has deservedly been called the teacher of men, and the method which they call of observation, or experience, is held by moderns as the best directress of life. Therefore the prudent man considers those things which are far off, so that from them he may learn what must be done here and now.

(b) Understanding of present things; for, past things having been considered, it is also necessary that the present operation be attentively inspected, both in its nature and in its circumstances; and not only on the surface, but intimately; and not under one respect only, but under diverse respects. For since there is question of the honesty of some action not in general, but in the concrete, all adjuncts being posited, all these things must be attended to, so that the action to be placed here and now may be good under every respect. For it belongs to prudence wisely to adapt the general principles of morals, which are immutable in themselves, to all circumstances of places, times, and persons.

(c) Providence of future things: for the honesty of an act does not depend only on its nature, but also on its effects, whether as regards the agent or as regards others; therefore these, insofar as human frailty permits, must be foreseen, so that from them the honesty or opportuneness of the action to be placed here and now may be judged.

1052. (d) Docility in taking the counsel of others: for since the judgment of very many is worth more than the judgment of one, to rely exclusively on our own wisdom is not without folly; therefore the prudent man will frequently, solicitously, and reverently take the counsels of others, especially of elders and prudent men; he will inquire with them concerning the matter to be done, will lend an attentive ear to their reasons, and will not despise their judgment: "Prudence," says St. Thomas,³ "consists about particular operable things, in which, since there are infinite diversities, all things cannot be sufficiently considered by one man, nor in a short time, but through length of time. Hence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and especially by elders, who have obtained sound understanding concerning the ends of operable things." Yet the counselor must be chosen cautiously, a prudent and upright man, who cares for the good of others, and not solely for his own advantage.⁴

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

⁴ Concerning which Ecclesiasticus wrote excellent things, 37:7-29.

(e) Prayer to God, according to that saying:⁵ "And in all these things beseech the Most High, that He direct thy way in truth." For, even in natural matters, it is expedient that we humbly ask from the Father of lights, who is the best counselor, what we ought to do; but in matters regarding the supernatural end, this is necessary, since only by supernatural light can we find the way of salvation.

⁵ Ecclus. 37:19.

1053. (B) The second act of prudence is judgment: for when all things have been diligently investigated, it remains that practical reason bear judgment concerning them, by pronouncing what, all things having been weighed, is honest and opportune. For this there is required first of all the faculty of judging rightly; but besides, immunity from prejudices and passions, which easily turn the mind away from the right path of truth; deliberate consideration of all motives and circumstances, so that it may be discerned which of the various means devised conduces more efficaciously to the end; finally a firm pronouncement of judgment, so that the mind not remain uncertain.⁶

⁶ For performing this, St. Thomas asserts that there are two virtues which are joined to prudence: synesis, or right sense (bon sens), by which we judge rightly concerning things to be done according to common rules; and gnome, or perspicacity, by which we judge rightly concerning the same things beyond common rules.

1054. (C) The third act of prudence is precept, by which practical reason not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it: for it is not enough to take counsel and to judge, but it is necessary to operate; but operation proceeds from the command of reason, which, after it has judged what is good and what is evil in such adjuncts, says to the will: this must be done by you.

An act of this kind is the principal one, according to St. Thomas:⁷ "And because this act is nearer to the end of practical reason, hence it is that this is the principal act of practical reason, and consequently of prudence..."

⁷ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

For rightly commanding, there is especially required solicitude, which strenuously urges the execution of those things which are to be done: for if it was necessary to deliberate slowly, it is necessary to operate quickly, nor is that to be put off until tomorrow which can and ought to be done today.

1055. 3. Concerning the various species of prudence. Prudence assumes various names, and is distributed into various species, according to the various objects about which it is concerned. It is customarily called personal prudence, or monastic, by which a man governs himself; domestic, or economic, by which someone rightly orders whatever regards the good of the family; social, or political, when it regards the common good of the state; military, when it is concerned with military affairs, etc. But in all these, the same essential elements which we have described are found; but those things which are particular to each species are set forth in various treatises.

1056. 4. Concerning the vices opposed to prudence. From this one is given to understand what the vices opposed to prudence are. Certain ones are directly opposed to this virtue, namely by defect; others indirectly, insofar as they have a false likeness with it.

(A) The vices which are directly opposed to this virtue are called by the common name of imprudence; but because prudence consists in three principal acts, above, n. 1050, three vices likewise are customarily distinguished: precipitation, which omits consultation; inconsideration, which harms judgment; negligence and inconstancy, which are opposed to precept.

(a) Precipitation consists in this, that a man, neglecting the various means of inquiry which are at hand, acts before he considers; wherefore he is borne toward acting, not from the dictate of reason, but from the impulse of prejudice or passion. When precipitation arises from contempt of the directing rule, it is properly called rashness, and is a graver sin.

(b) Inconsideration consists in this, that someone despises or neglects diligently to weigh all those things which are required so that he may bear an equitable judgment; for thus he exposes himself to the danger of judging badly concerning those things which are here and now to be done, and therefore of acting badly.

(c) Negligence is the defect of a prompt will in executing the judgment of reason, or in commanding those things which have been judged necessary or useful. Akin to this vice is inconstancy, which, without sufficient reason, withdraws from a good proposal already elicited: it arises for the most part from the impulse of passions which resist the good proposal, and little by little induce a man to change his counsel, and therefore to leave those things which had already been wisely begun.

In all these things, a grave sin is committed if someone acts in such a way that he contemns divine rules; but if he acts without contempt, and without detriment to those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin.¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 1.

1057. (B) To the virtue of prudence there are opposed, by a false likeness, prudence of the flesh, craftiness, and excessive solicitude for future things.

(a) Prudence of the flesh, which seeks ways of living according to the desires of corrupt nature, and therefore tends to an end which is not truly good, but apparent. Concerning this the Apostle says:² "For the prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace. Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God."

² Rom. 8:6-8.

(b) Craftiness, which is not necessarily concerned with an evil end, but uses simulated and fallacious means for attaining the intended end, whether good or evil. It is, as it were, a practical lie, and is opposed to Christian simplicity. Exteriorly it is manifested by deceit and fraud, of which there is treatment where Contracts are discussed, n. 630.

(c) Excessive solicitude for future things, which is vicious when it preoccupies a man outside the opportune time, or in an immoderate way. Christ reproves this as a defect of trust in God:³ "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on... Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" St. Thomas explains this more fully,⁴ by setting forth that this excessive solicitude is illicit in three ways: if we seek temporal things as an end, - or if we so set our heart upon temporal things that we are drawn back from spiritual things, which we ought more principally to serve, - or if we fear that, by doing what we ought, necessary things may fail us, which is opposed to divine providence: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."⁵

³ Matt. 6:25-26.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6.

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

These sins indeed are grave when the last end is constituted in creatures, or when means gravely culpable in themselves are assumed.

1058. 1. The excellence of prudence. (A) Scripture praises prudence many times, which it often calls wisdom, especially in the books of Proverbs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus.

Thus in Proverbs:⁶ "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom, and who aboundeth in prudence. The purchasing thereof is better than the merchandise of silver, and her fruit than the first and purest gold... Possess wisdom, possess prudence... Take hold on her, and she shall exalt thee; thou shalt be glorified by her when thou shalt embrace her: she shall give to thy head increase of graces, and protect thee with a noble crown." - Likewise in Wisdom,⁷ prudence is described as the directress of our life, and the fountain of all goods, to be preferred to all riches. - Wherefore Ecclesiasticus exhorts young men that from youth they receive prudence, and cultivate the same up to old age.⁸

⁶ Prov. 3:13-14; 4:5-9.

⁷ Wis. 6-9.

⁸ Ecclus. 6:18-37.

The Fathers teach no less clearly that prudence is the charioteer and fountain of the other virtues, so that without it it is impossible to cultivate the other virtues: for it chooses the means by which the other virtues can grow.⁹

⁹ St. Ambrose, De officiis, l. I, c. 27, P.L., XVI, 60; St. Augustine, De moribus eccl., l. I, c. 15, P.L., XXXII, 1322; St. Gregory the Great, Moral., l. II, c. 49, P.L., LXXV, 592.

1059. (B) Reason shows the same thing. For prudence helps and perfects all virtues, so that without it the others cannot subsist. (a) For every moral virtue ought to hold a middle way between two extremes; thus liberality subsists as a mean between prodigality and avarice. But it belongs to prudence to prescribe to the virtues what the mean to be held between extremes is, since, from what was said, it inquires and judges concerning all things in order to the end, and solicitously determines what is honest. (b) Besides, so that a man may act well, he ought to know not only what he should do, but also how he should do it; but it belongs to prudence to define, after attentive consideration of all the circumstances, what the better means are for attaining the end, and how these can opportunely be employed.

Wherefore a man destitute of prudence is deservedly compared to a ship lacking a pilot, which is driven hither and thither by the impulse of winds and waves, and at length is forced to perish by shipwreck. On the contrary, prudence is called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections and teacher of morals, since it directs all our acts safely to the port of salvation.

1060. 2. Means of progressing in prudence. These can be gathered from what was said concerning the elements in which prudence consists, n. 1050.

(a) First of all, since God is the author of all wisdom, prudence must be earnestly asked from Him: for He Himself assigned us the end, and also the means opportune for attaining it; therefore when we do not know what must be done, it is necessary to implore the divine light: "But as we know not what we ought to do, we have only this left, that we direct our eyes to Thee."¹⁰ In the book of Wisdom (IX), a very beautiful prayer is found for obtaining wisdom, or prudence.

¹⁰ 2 Par. 20:12.

(b) Since prejudices and passions, especially pleasure, cloud the mind, and hinder it from attentive and sincere consideration of motives consonant with reason, it is altogether necessary that we renounce prejudices and conquer passions; otherwise reason, disturbed and blinded, will not bear judgment according to equity and honesty, but according to the vicious propensities of corrupt nature.

(c) Before you bear judgment, attentively consider and weigh all motives, all circumstances, and the effects probably going to follow from your action, both as regards yourself and as regards others; and concerning all these things judge in order to eternity, as if you were soon to die and to render account of your action to the supreme judge. - Nor should you rely on your own prudence, but "do nothing without counsel, and after the deed thou shalt not repent"¹¹... "Always seek counsel from a wise man."¹² By these and other means of this kind, you will progress in prudence.

¹¹ Ecclus. 32:24.

¹² Tob. 4:19.

1061. 1. Definition. Fortitude (andreia), of which there is question here, is fortitude of mind, and can be defined: the virtue by which the will is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good, neither because of difficulties, nor even because of the danger of death.¹

¹ This is the definition of fortitude, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue. Sometimes, however, by this name is designated that constancy by which we strive to overcome ordinary difficulties which are accustomed to occur in the exercise of all virtues: this is not a special virtue.

Fortitude, like the other moral virtues, is both natural and supernatural, according as it pursues an arduous natural or supernatural good, and indeed by natural or supernatural means.

(a) The object of this virtue is the arduous moral good, or that which bears before it a special difficulty. Every good indeed is arduous in some way; but when special difficulties and great dangers occur, especially the danger of death,² the special virtue of fortitude is required for overcoming all these. Hence the chief act of this virtue is martyrdom undertaken for God, of which there is treatment in the Treatise on Baptism, n. 42-44.

² The Scholastics, after Aristotle, held that fortitude especially shines forth in that genus of death which threatens in war, because then the common good of the fatherland is preferred to a private good; but St. Thomas (II-II, q. 122, a. 1) notes that under the name of war come all attacks which someone sustains on account of truth and justice. Cicero, moreover (De offic., lib. I, 22), deservedly says: "Although most men think military affairs greater than civil ones, this opinion must be diminished... But truly, if we wish to judge, many civil affairs have arisen greater and more renowned than military ones."

1062. (b) The subject of this virtue is commonly said to be the irascible appetite: for this is concerned with the arduous good, and uses anger duly moderated for overcoming difficulties; for it pertains to anger to leap upon obstacles and conquer them. Nevertheless it seems to us that fortitude exists primarily in the will, and secondarily in the irascible appetite; for here there is question of pursuing the honest good, which is properly the object of the will, but not of the useful or sensible good, which is the object of the lower appetite. Therefore the virtue of fortitude resides primarily in the will, which deliberately and firmly adheres to the honest good. But because difficulties and dangers often stand in the way, which frighten not only the will but also the lower appetite, it is necessary that fortitude secondarily influence the irascible appetite, for strengthening it against vain fears, and exciting it to approach arduous things strenuously.

1063. (c) The act of fortitude is chiefly twofold: to endure and to attack: to endure, that is, to stand immovably in dangers and tolerate the gravest torments with an unconquered soul;³ to attack, that is, strenuously to do arduous and dangerous things. - Generally to endure, other things being equal, is more difficult and more meritorious than to attack: for he who endures already feels imminent dangers, while he who attacks has them as future; moreover, to endure imports length of time, while to attack can be from a sudden movement; but it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be borne by a sudden movement toward something arduous.⁴

³ Horace expressed this elegantly (Odes, III, 3, 8): "The just man and tenacious of purpose is not shaken in his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding perverse things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant... If the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him undaunted."

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 6.

1064. 2. The various degrees of fortitude. (a) The first consists in the restraint and mortification of passions. This is true fortitude; for if those are called strong who tame wild beasts and conquer the enemies of the fatherland, they surely must be judged stronger who so restrain and govern anger, lust, and cupidity that they use these not for evil, but for strenuously working good: "The patient man is better than the valiant: and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities."⁵ - Especially to be praised are those who, despising the vain judgments of men, are never deterred from duty by the mockeries of others.

⁵ Prov. 16:32.

(b) The second degree, which surpasses the first, is this: that, for the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, they expose liberty, reputation, and their own life to probable danger. The Apostle excelled by this fortitude, who, for the salvation of souls, often exposed himself to diverse dangers, "in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils from his own nation, in perils from the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils from false brethren."⁶ Today the same fortitude is exercised not only by missionaries who preach the Gospel among remote peoples, but also by laymen and priests who, among Christian nations, invincibly defend the orthodox faith against rising unbelievers and politicians, with risk of reputation, goods, and even liberty.

⁶ 2 Cor. 11:26.

1065. (c) They attain the third degree who, in sudden cases, tolerate horrible evils with a strong and unconquered soul. For he who could not prepare himself against rushing evils by previous meditation, and sustains all things undaunted, shows that he has acquired the habit of fortitude by long exercise.

(d) But they ascend to the fourth degree who willingly and lovingly undergo martyrdom for Christ, as St. Ignatius the martyr underwent it, who, writing to the Romans, said: "Would that I may enjoy the beasts which are prepared for me, which I also pray may be swift for my destruction and punishments!" - Few indeed today suffer martyrdom properly so called; but the peace of the Church has its own martyrs: for those who, for Christ and the salvation of souls, spend all things and themselves, sustain all things, attack all things, daily ready to give their life for their sheep, can truly, although not in the strict sense, be called martyrs.

1066. 3. Concerning the vices opposed to fortitude. There are two chief ones: (a) Timidity, or cowardice, which does not endure strongly enough, by fearing where one must not fear, or more than is fitting. To fear those things which are deservedly to be feared, and in the way in which they are to be feared, for example sin or hell, is not timidity; nor is it illicit to flee evils, from the toleration of which no good comes, all things having been diligently weighed. But to consent to vain fears, and from this to neglect duties, is the sin of timidity, whose gravity depends on various circumstances, especially on the gravity of the duty omitted. - In our days that fear which is called human respect must carefully be avoided, by force of which so many Christians omit their religious duties, lest perhaps they displease others.

(b) Excessive daring, or rashness, which is an excess in attacking the arduous good, which is not fitting, or when it is not fitting, or in a manner in which it is not fitting. It arises from contempt of life or of other goods, - from pride, which trusts too much in its own powers, - from boasting, which desires to show its own powers, - or from a certain stupidity of soul. The sin committed from this head must be judged both from the cause from which it arises and from the effects which it induces; for example, he sins gravely who, without cause, exposes himself to grave danger.⁷

⁷ To these vices is generally added fearlessness, which does not fear when one ought to fear (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 126, a. 1-2); but almost the same can be said of it as of rashness.

1067. To attack and to endure are the two offices of fortitude, from what was said above, n. 1063; for fulfilling these more easily, certain virtues are joined to fortitude: namely magnanimity and magnificence, which are ordered to attacking great things; patience and constancy, which regard enduring harsh things. These must be discussed separately.

1. Magnanimity is promptness of soul for performing great acts of virtues, namely those which are worthy of great honors.

(A) It differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of human honors; for the magnificent man wills to work those things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only those things which are common, but also those which are excellent. He despises riches, pleasures, honors of this world, and breathes after heavenly things. He indeed intends great honors, but such as are conferred by God: "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather despises them... and similarly he is not broken by dishonors, but despises them, as things which he reckons are brought upon him unworthily."⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 2, ad 3.

Wherefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility, as the Angelic Doctor excellently declares:⁹ "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things according to the consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; thus if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man account himself little, according to consideration of his own defect." - And so the magnanimous man relies not so much on his own powers as on divine help, and places his trust especially in God.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4.

1068. (B) To this virtue there is opposed, by excess, presumption, and by defect, pusillanimity.¹⁰

¹⁰ Two others are commonly enumerated, ambition and empty glory; but of these there was treatment above, where the capital vices were discussed, n. 515-516.

(a) Presumption is the sin by which someone attacks that which is far beyond his powers; for example, he who undertakes the offices of judge, confessor, pastor, etc., for the fulfilling of which he is altogether unequal, from defect of knowledge, prudence, and other virtues; or he who, existing in the state of imperfect virtue, at once tries to do the greatest works. Let Peter be an example, who, trusting too much in himself, was ready to die for Christ, and soon at the voice of a maidservant denied the Master. (b) Pusillanimity is a disposition of soul by which someone flees those things which, all circumstances being considered, he could and ought to do; thus he who, frightened by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors,¹¹ or does not fulfill the duties of his own state from empty fear.

¹¹ Accordingly there is no question here of him who, for the sake of humility, declines offices and honors, but of him who is frightened by difficulties and lacks trust in God.

For judging the malice of sins arising from this double vice, attention must especially be paid to the gravity of the effects which follow from them.

1069. 2. Magnificence seems to be a certain part of magnanimity, and inclines one to do great things through great expenses, for example, in constructing splendid churches, or erecting colleges, universities, monasteries, when the good of the Church or the fatherland demands this.

To this virtue two vices are opposed: (a) excessive sumptuousness, when someone makes great expenses in matters of slight moment; this indeed is irrational, especially when works very necessary for the honor of God and the good of the faithful are neglected; (b) parvificence, which in great matters wills to make only small expenses, so that the works which are undertaken remain very unbecoming.

1070. 3. Patience is the virtue which so moderates sadness arising from present evils that, because of it, the will is not moved away from good, but rather is confirmed in it. Therefore this is not insensibility, or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. The patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but moderates both, and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason; for he remembers the words of Paul:¹ "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not."

¹ Rom. 5:3-5. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 3; Olier, Introduction, ch. 9.

Various degrees are distinguished in patience: (a) to bear with an equal soul the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends, even when these things happen to us without our fault; (b) to bear those things which are repaid by the ungrateful for benefits received; (c) to sustain all these things not only patiently, but with joy, like the apostles, who "went rejoicing from the presence of the council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus."²

² Acts 5:41.

To this virtue is opposed impatience, by which someone grieves too much and from sorrow withdraws from what is right, for example, by complaining bitterly about God and men, and for that reason seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness. - Impatience is in itself a venial sin, but it can become grave if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and divine ordinances, or from this commits lethal sins.

1071. 4. Constancy, or perseverance, is a virtue confirming the mind against fear of impending evils, and for overcoming difficulties which arise from the long exercise of virtue. - Therefore it regards future difficulties, while patience regards present evils; moreover, it is ordered to overcoming that special difficulty which generally proceeds from long practice of virtues: for many experience a certain fatigue and weariness from the fact that the same efforts must often be repeated; for overcoming this, the special virtue of constancy is desired. - Of how great a moment it is to cultivate this virtue is established from this, that only by often-repeated efforts, carried through to the end of life, is solid virtue acquired and the crown of justice obtained: "But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved."³

³ Matt. 10:22.

To this virtue there is opposed: (a) by defect, inconstancy, or softness of soul, which easily withdraws from a good proposal on account of occurring difficulties, or from weariness of duration; this disposition indeed arises partly from natural temperament, partly from the custom of indulging pleasures and from horror of difficulties; (b) by excess, or abuse, pertinacity, or inclination to persist in a proposal where right reason dictates that one must desist; for, although we ought to persevere in a proposal as long as it appears good to right reason, one must withdraw from it when it is certainly detected as having been undertaken from erroneous judgment, or when circumstances so change that what before was good and opportune now becomes evil or at least less good.

1072. Besides prayer, to which it is necessary to have recourse for all virtues, the chief means by which fortitude can be acquired or increased are these:

1. Frequent meditation on the fragility of temporal goods, when they are compared with eternal goods. For Christian fortitude arises first of all from the intimate persuasion that temporal evils are nothing in comparison with eternal ones; indeed, they become desirable when they are considered as means of obtaining or increasing eternal happiness. For then the Christian does not fear the evils of this world, nor flee arduous things, but rather embraces them, so that from this he may receive an unfading crown. Likewise he is not easily allured by the pleasures and honors of this world, but rather despises them as impediments by which he is kept from attaining eternal beatitude. Wherefore he is deterred from fulfilling duty neither by threats nor by flatteries, but undauntedly endures evils and attacks arduous things, so that he may securely attain his end.

2. Foresight of evils which can happen, so that we may be able to strengthen the will against them. For from long premeditation we prepare our soul against dangers: just as in war an unforeseen enemy easily oppresses the unprepared, so in spiritual combat we are easily overcome by enemies, if we are unprepared. But, on the contrary, dangers long foreseen become less terrible. The reason for this is that fear, against which fortitude is ordered, weakens our powers unless we resist it strenuously; but if we foresee the evils which can happen, and apprehend them not as harmful, but as useful for virtue and salvation, fear soon withdraws, and the will turns all its powers toward pursuing good, notwithstanding any dangers whatever.

1073. 3. The custom of acting strenuously in the lesser dangers occurring daily: for by this means the soul acquires the firmness necessary for strongly sustaining graver evils and manfully attacking more arduous things. Just as a soldier by daily exercise prepares himself for more arduous and dangerous things, so a Christian, by acting strongly in lesser things, becomes fit for greater things. Therefore those labor under presumption who desire to suffer or do grand things, and at the same time neglect lesser things: if they are weak in the least things, they cannot be strenuous in greater things: "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in that which is greater: and he that is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater."⁴

⁴ Luke 16:10.

4. Fervent love for God adds the greatest powers to the will. For "love is strong as death,"⁵ and therefore renders the lover intrepid, fit for tolerating all adverse things strongly, and for performing the greatest arduous things manfully. If love of creatures inspires such fortitude in the hearts of mortals, as daily experience establishes, how much greater fortitude will pure love of God, love of the infinite good, inspire! This indeed can be illustrated by the example of Paul, who, from the fact that he burned with love of Christ, vehemently desired to suffer all things, to do all things on account of Christ: "Who then shall separate us from the charity of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or famine? or nakedness? or danger? or persecution? or the sword?... But in all these things we overcome because of Him that hath loved us."⁶ - Wherefore it will help much frequently to consider the fortitude which the Savior exhibited throughout His whole life, and especially in the Passion, from the time when He began to agonize in the garden of Gethsemani up to the hour in which, dying, He cried out:⁷ "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" By this example the Apostles exhorted the faithful to tolerate all things strongly: "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow His steps... Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought."⁸ And in reality many Christians, adhering to the footsteps of the beloved Master, went rejoicing because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for His name. But because today many Christians are desired who are endowed with unconquered fortitude, for defending and promoting the faith against innumerable enemies, it is necessary that an ardent love of Christ be inspired in the souls of the young, by which, being inflamed, they may be able strenuously and cheerfully to fight for the Christian faith.

⁵ Cant. 8:6.

⁶ Rom. 8:35-37; let the whole passage be read.

⁷ Matt. 27:46.

⁸ 1 Pet. 2:21; 4:1.

1074. As fortitude moderates the irascible appetite, strengthening it against arduous things, so temperance moderates the concupiscible appetite, restraining the inordinate love of pleasurable things. Here therefore temperance is treated, not as it is a general virtue moderating all human operations and passions, but insofar as it is a special virtue restraining sensible pleasures.

1075. 1. Definition. Temperance is a virtue so restraining the appetite for sensible pleasures, especially of taste and touch, that on account of them the will does not withdraw from good, but rather is confirmed in it.

(a) For understanding this, it must be known that pleasure was annexed by the Author of nature to our operations, for this end, that we might operate more easily and so tend toward our end. No pleasure is evil in itself, but it must be regarded as a means instituted by God for attaining some end. Therefore to will pleasure on account of the end predetermined by God is not evil, but honorable (above, n. 157); but it is evil to act on account of pleasure alone, without any relation to the end. It belongs to temperance so to moderate pleasure that it is sought, not for itself, but for an honorable end, and therefore without any excess.

(b) Among the pleasures of the senses, there are two which attract most men more vehemently, namely, pleasures in food and drink, which are ordered to the conservation of the individual, and venereal pleasures, which are ordered to the conservation of the human species. Therefore temperance chiefly tends to moderate these. St. Thomas explains this thus:¹ "And because pleasure follows upon a natural operation, some pleasures are the more vehement in proportion as they follow upon operations that are more natural. But the operations by which the nature of the individual is conserved through food and drink, and the nature of the species through the union of male and female, are most natural to animals; and therefore temperance is properly concerned with pleasures of food and drink, and with venereal pleasures."

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 4.

1076. 2. The general rule of temperance. For rightly ordering pleasures of this kind, right reason, enlightened by faith, proposes a double rule: one proximate, which is taken from the necessities of this life; the other remote, which is the attainment of supernatural beatitude.

(a) According to the first rule, all pleasurable things which come into man's use must be referred to some necessity of life as to their end. For this reason, first of all, we must cut off all pleasures which stand in the way of honorable good, or prevent some present or future duty from being fulfilled. Moreover, one must act not on account of pleasure itself, but on account of an honorable, necessary, or truly useful end. Thus, with respect to food and drink, it is lawful to take whatever is necessary or truly useful for preserving life and health, and also for rightly performing the operations of the mind. And the same must be said of other pleasures.

(b) But the second rule, which is more perfect, demands that those pleasures be cut off which do not serve the good of the soul; for example, that only so much food and drink be taken as is fitting for exercising virtues; and therefore that one abstain from food and drink insofar as this is necessary for taming the body and its vicious propensities: "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences."²

² Gal. 5:24.

Augustine hands down both rules thus: "Therefore the temperate man has, in mortal and fleeting things of this kind, a rule of life confirmed by both Testaments, that he love none of them, think none of them to be sought for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of this life and of duties, insofar as is enough, with the modesty of one using, not with the affection of one loving."³ - And elsewhere: "For hunger and thirst are certain pains; they burn and, like a fever, kill, unless the medicine of nourishment comes to their aid. Since this medicine is at hand from the consolation of Thy gifts, in which earth and water and heaven serve our infirmity, calamity is called delights. This hast Thou taught me, that I should approach food to be taken as medicines are taken. But while I pass to the quiet of satiety from the trouble of need, in that very passage the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for me... These temptations I strive daily to resist, and I invoke Thy right hand for my salvation."⁴

³ St. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae, l. I, c. 21, n. 39, P. L., XXXII, 1328.

⁴ St. Augustine, Confessions, l. X, c. 31, P. L., XXXII, 797.

1077. 3. The species of temperance. Temperance, insofar as it preserves moderation in food, is called abstinence; insofar as it preserves the same in drink, it is called sobriety; but insofar as it does this in venereal matters, it is named chastity; to this is referred pudicity, the guardian of chastity, which moderates pleasures in kisses, touches, and embraces.⁵ - To abstinence is opposed gluttony; to sobriety, drunkenness; to chastity, lust. Concerning the first two vices we have already spoken above, n. 538-555; concerning lust, the treatment will be given in the Treatise on Chastity.

⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 143, a. un.

1078. Temperance properly so called is concerned with sensible pleasures; but to it are annexed virtues which restrain even spiritual pleasures. Among these are counted: humility, which moderates the interior movements of hope and boldness; meekness, which restrains the movements of anger tending to revenge; modesty, which moderates bodily movements.⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 143, a. un. There also the holy Doctor counts continence, which restrains the interior movements of carnal concupiscence; but this belongs to chastity, concerning which elsewhere.

1079. (A) The genuine concept. Humility is a virtue which checks the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, and inclines a man to acknowledge his own lowliness according to truth.

³ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 4-7; Olier, Introduction, ch. 5; the pious author of the work Formation a l'humilite, Paris, 1902.

(a) I say according to truth; for there are some who think humility consists in fictitiously exaggerating our defects, or diminishing our endowments, and in fleeing every honor and glory. This indeed is false; for true virtue cannot be an enemy of truth. It does indeed repress the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, according to what was said above, n. 514; but it by no means forbids us gladly to acknowledge the natural and supernatural goods which God has bestowed on us: to be unwilling to acknowledge them is not humility, but ingratitude. - Nor likewise is it forbidden to seek some honor or glory, provided it be sought with God, according to His good pleasure and according to our merits. Thus Christ said of Himself:⁸ "I have glorified Thee on the earth... And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with Thee." Nor otherwise did the Blessed Virgin say:⁹ "For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed, because He that is mighty hath done great things to me." Paul indeed says: "Let no man therefore glory in men";¹⁰ but before this he had said: "He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord";¹¹ and he himself expected the crown of justice "which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day."¹²

⁸ John 17:4-5.

⁹ Luke 1:48-49.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 3:22.

¹¹ 1 Cor. 1:31.

¹² 2 Tim. 4:8.

1080. (b) But in order that we may estimate ourselves and our endowments according to truth, to God first of all must be attributed whatever proceeds from Him. Now the Apostle testifies that all natural and supernatural endowments which are in us are from God:¹³ "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received?" - We do indeed have good works and merits; but these must be attributed primarily to God, although they are truly ours, since we have existence, faculties, the power of meriting, and the divine help necessary for merit only from the Lord; therefore concerning these we can glory only in the Lord, and the chief part of the glory must be rendered back to God. - Moreover we have sinned, and under this title we deserve ignominy and confusion before God and men.

¹³ 1 Cor. 4:7.

1081. (c) If we compare ourselves with our neighbor, we ought first to admire and esteem the gifts, both natural and supernatural, granted to him by God: if greater gifts are seen in him than in us, we ought gladly to acknowledge his superiority. Furthermore, if he has committed lesser sins than we have, he is worthy of lesser ignominy, and under this title it is necessary to confess that we ourselves are inferior. But because we are prone to magnify our own endowments and to diminish the qualities of others, equity demands that we guard ourselves in our judgments against this unjust propensity. Nor must this be passed over: often there are hidden defects in us and hidden qualities in others, so that it is not lawful, on account of manifest things alone, to prefer oneself to others; therefore the neighbor is wisely presumed to be better than he appears: "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."¹⁴

¹⁴ Phil. 2:3.

To the point Augustine says:¹⁵ "This also must be considered, that there is no man who cannot have some good which thou dost not yet have, even if it lies hidden, in which without doubt he can be superior to thee. This thought avails for crushing and taming pride, lest thou think that, because certain goods of thine stand out and appear, therefore another has none hidden, and perhaps goods of greater weight by which, while thou dost not know it, he surpasses thee."

¹⁵ St. Augustine, Quaestiones 83, q. 71, n. 5, P. L., XL, 82.

1082. (B) Concerning the chief acts of humility. (a) The humble man acknowledges himself to be nothing before God: for just as a little drop of water is said to be nothing when compared with the ocean, so our being, compared with the divine, can be held as nothing: "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing, and vanity."¹⁶ Moreover he confesses that whatever good is in him ultimately proceeds from God, in the sense explained above, n. 1080.

¹⁶ Isa. 40:17.

(b) He further confesses himself to be a sinner, and under this title to be worthy of contempt, especially if he has sinned lethally (above, n. 463).

(c) He judges himself unworthy of all the gifts of God, and of himself unfit for every good work, especially supernatural work. For since by sin he has offended God, he has incurred His wrath and indignation, and therefore is unworthy of His benefits. On the other hand, by his own powers, without divine concurrence, he can do nothing good, especially in the supernatural order, according to that saying:¹⁷ "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God."

¹⁷ 2 Cor. 3:5; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6, ad 1.

1083. (d) He is not puffed up in prosperity, nor cast down in adversities; for he knows that prosperous events, and also adverse ones, are wisely ordered by God according to His good pleasure, and do not ultimately depend on us. Wherefore with all his powers he indeed strives to act well, so as to please God: if things turn out prosperously, he returns praises to God; if unfortunately, he patiently bears the humiliation taken from this: "I know both how to be humbled, I know also how to abound..."¹⁸ "In all things we suffer tribulation, but are not distressed; we are straitened, but are not destitute; we suffer persecution, but are not forsaken; we are cast down, but we perish not."¹⁹ Indeed he receives humiliations gladly, as means for obtaining grace and glory from God: "And do ye all insinuate humility one to another; because God resisteth the proud, but to the humble He giveth grace. Be you humbled therefore under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt you in the time of visitation; casting all your solicitude upon Him, for He hath care of you."²⁰

¹⁸ Phil. 4:12.

¹⁹ 2 Cor. 4:8-9.

²⁰ 1 Pet. 5:5-7.

1084. (e) Wherefore, impelled by love of truth, he does not desire to be made great or to be praised by others, judging that this belongs not to himself but to God, from whom all good things proceed: for a picture or statue does not deserve praise, but the artist. Therefore if he sees himself honored by others, he does not keep the honor for himself, but refers it to God, to whom alone are honor and glory: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us; but to Thy name give glory."¹ - Where the will of God and an undertaken duty do not demand the contrary, he flees honors and chooses the lowest place. For Christ taught this by word and example:² "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so: but he that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger; and he that is the leader, as he that serveth. For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? Is not he that sitteth at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." When, by force of office and duty, he must receive honors, he is not puffed up by them, but receives them as one bearing the place of God.

¹ Ps. 113:1.

² Luke 22:25-27; cf. John 13:15-16; Matt. 23:12.

(f) Indeed, since he is conscious of his own lowliness and of the sins which he has committed, he sincerely desires, as far as lies in him, to be despised by others; for he desires to be esteemed by others as he knows himself to be according to truth. Yet prudence often demands that we not disclose our defects to others, lest perhaps we lose that good esteem which we need for rightly fulfilling our duties.

1085. (g) The saints, comparing themselves with others, generally judge themselves more vile and worse than all; for this is the character of humility, to look in ourselves upon the defects which proceed from us, and in others upon the endowments which are from God. Wherefore they leave the better things to others, but seek the baser things for themselves. - Yet the truly humble man generally does not vilify himself by words, nor deliberately seek to be vilified by others; but he is silent concerning himself, loving to be unknown and to be counted as nothing. Besides, as St. Thomas says,³ "in the exterior acts of humility, as also in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation must be employed, lest they be able to turn to the detriment of another."

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 3, ad 3.

1086. (C) Concerning the excellence of humility. (a) Some so extol humility that they seem to prefer it to the other virtues. This, however, is not agreeable to truth. For certainly the theological virtues, by which we tend directly to God, are more excellent; more excellent is the virtue of religion, by which we profess the excellence of God and render Him due worship. It is also commonly taught that prudence is more excellent than humility, because it is more universal and necessary. But it seems more excellent than the other moral virtues. For humility subjects man to the order of reason and to the divine law with respect to all things, while other virtues do so only with respect to some special matter;⁴ for he who is humble by that very fact gladly acknowledges the supreme dominion of God, and is prepared to obey Him in all things. Moreover it is of no little profit for the practice of the theological virtues, because it removes pride, which most harms these virtues.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 5.

(b) In truth humility is deservedly held as the foundation of many virtues, their mother and nurse, insofar as it is necessary for acquiring and retaining them.

To the point Augustine says:⁵ "Dost thou wish to be great? Begin from the least. Dost thou think to construct a great building of height? First think of the foundation of humility. And how great a mass of building each one wills and disposes to place above, the greater the building will be, the deeper he digs the foundation... But because the summit is great, think of the foundation. What foundation, thou askest? Learn from Him, because He is meek and humble of heart. Dig this foundation of humility in thyself, and thou shalt come to the summit of charity." - For he who cultivates humility renounces inordinate love of self, which is the greatest impediment of Christian perfection; he easily subjects his mind to God through faith, charity, and obedience; and, since he judges himself inferior to others, he cultivates love toward the neighbor without difficulty; the same can be said of many other virtues.

⁵ St. Augustine, Sermo 69, n. 2, P. L., XXXVIII, 441 sq.

Therefore it is of the greatest importance to cultivate humility assiduously, either by taming pride through the means explained above, n. 519, or by eliciting the acts described above, n. 1082.

1087. Meekness is a virtue which moderates anger according to right reason. It is born from humility and fortitude: for since the chief cause of anger is inordinate love of oneself, bearing with difficulty injuries received from others, he is easily meek who humbly acknowledges that he is worthy of many injuries on account of the sins which he has committed. On the other hand, for restraining anger, the greatest fortitude is required.

⁶ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 8-9; Olier, op. cit., ch. 10.

(A) Meekness tempers anger especially in two ways: (a) it forbids us to be angry without sufficient cause; for anger is ordered to repelling evil, and therefore it is lawful only insofar as it is necessary for repelling some evil; (b) it prevents anger, when it is legitimate, from passing beyond just limits, lest, for example, it arise too quickly or last too long, or exceed as to mode.

But the perfectly meek not only temper anger, but generally abstain from it, even when it is otherwise legitimate. Christ indeed counsels this when He says:⁷ "But I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other. And if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him."

⁷ Matt. 5:39.

Concerning the means of restraining anger, and therefore of acquiring meekness, we have already spoken, n. 534-537.

I. DEFINITION.—The respect we owe our fellowman refers immediately to his person, whilst justice (iustitia) is concerned with the rights which belong to him by nature.¹

¹ Cfr. Walter, Naturrecht, PP. 66 sqq.; J. Haring, Der Rechts- und Gesetzesbegriff, Graz 1899.

Justice may be defined as a habitual and constant disposition which inclines the will to give to every man his due or right (suum cuique) and, if necessary, to sacrifice ones own interests in favor of the common welfare.² Justice is essentially a virtue that governs man's relations to others (virtus ad alterum).

² M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, N. Y. 1917, pp. 81 sqq.—St. Ambrose, De Offic., I, c. 24 (n. 115): "Justice is that which gives to each his due, claims nothing belonging to another, and neglects its own advantage in order to preserve the common equity." (Migne, P. L., XVI, 57).—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. XIX, c. 21, n. 1: "Iustitia ea virtus est, quae sua cuique tribuit." (P. L., XLI, 649).—St. Bernard, De Diversis, s. 102, n. 1: "Iustitia est virtus, quae suum cuique reddit." (P. L., CLXXXIII, 728).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 1: "Iustitia est virtus, qua quis constanti et perpetuâ voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit."

2. DIVISION.-In view of the various relations of justice existing in society we may distinguish three species of this virtue: ³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 61, art. 1-2. * Cfr. Rom. XIII, 1-2, 5-7; 1 Pet. II, 13-16.

a) Legal justice, which defines the duties of the individual in relation to the social order. It is called legal (iustitia legalis) because these duties are generally determined by positive law.* b) Distributive justice, which regulates the distribution by the State of burdens and rewards among its subjects (iustitia distributiva secundum proportionalitatem).⁵ c) Commutative justice, which governs the relations between men as private individuals (iustitia commutativa). This species of justice demands a perfect adjustment of rights and prescribes that they be duly observed and respected.⁶ Commutative justice is the most perfect species of justice, and its violation not only involves moral guilt, but in addition entails the duty of restitution.

⁵ Jer. XXI, 12; XXII, 3; Prov. VIII, 15 sq.; Wisd. VI, 1-8.

⁶ Cfr., for instance, Ex. XX, 15, 17; Tob. IV, 15 sq.; Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 341 sq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 81 sqq.

A subspecies of distributive justice is vindictive justice, which metes out condign punishment to those who commit crimes and thereby injure the common weal.⁷ Vindictive justice (iustitia vindicativa) may be reduced to legal justice, in so far as the superior who punishes or the subject who is punished promotes the common weal, or to commutative justice, in so far as every judge is supposed to punish by virtue of his office and in accordance with the law.

⁷ Rom. XIII, 4; 1 Pet. II, 14.

It is objected that this conception of justice unduly stresses the demand of suum cuique and thus, by favoring selfishness, runs counter to the social ethos. This is a mistake. Egotism is absolutely excluded by the principle of giving to every one that which is his due or right. Commutative justice, in a sense, interferes with the freedom of the individual; however, legal and distributive justice counteract this effect by reuniting the separated members. One-sided insistence on commutative justice leads to extreme individualism, whilst undue emphasis on legal and distributive justice is apt to entail extreme Socialism. Here, as everywhere, it is necessary to stick closely to the golden mean.⁸ 3. Justice in all its forms is a duty inculcated both by the moral law of nature and by Divine Revelation.⁹ It is not only one of the so-called fundamental virtues, but a general virtue. "As the will of God directed to the creature, regarded in its total content, constitutes right, i.e., that which directs and governs human actions, so the totality of the free actions corresponding • to the divine will is justice, as virtus generalis. "> 10 "Justice," says St. Bonaventure, 'is said to surround all the powers of man, for it is not only a cardinal virtue, but likewise a general virtue, comprehending the entire rectitude of the soul, because it is defined as the right governance of the will. Hence it comprehends not only those virtues which control man's relations to his fellowmen, as, for example, equity and liberality, but also those that govern his relations to himself, for example, penance and innocence, as well as his relations towards God, e. g., worship, piety, and obedience." ¹¹ That which is due to a man according to the dictates of justice is called his right. Every man has a right to live, to enjoy a good name, to hold property, etc. Whoever deprives him of any of these rights is guilty of an injustice (iniuria), which is a mortal sin ex genere suo, because it destroys charity, though it admits of smallness of matter (parvitas materiae).¹²

⁸ F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 75 sq.

⁹ Cfr. S. Lueg and B. Mairhofer, Bibl. Realkonkordanz, Vol. I, 5th ed., Ratisbon 1900, pp. 534 sqq. 10J. E. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, und von der Gerechtigkeit, I, 5.

¹¹ Breviloquium, P. V. c. 4: "Prudence rectifies the rational power, fortitude the irascible power, and temperance the concupiscible power; justice, however, rectifies all these powers in relation to another. And because that other may determinately be one's neighbor, the same man may also be related to himself as to another, and the other may also be God Himself. Hence justice is said to encompass all the powers, for it is not only a cardinal virtue but also a general virtue, comprehending the rectitude of the whole soul, since it is itself called rectitude of the will. Therefore it comprehends not only the virtues ordering one toward one's neighbor, such as equity and liberality, but also those ordering one toward oneself, such as penance and innocence, and likewise toward God, such as worship, piety, and obedience."—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 5.

¹² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 59, art. 1-4; J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, Pp. 45 sqg. 18 Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 343г

Rights, then, are the subject-matter of justice.

A right may be defined as the moral power of having, doing, or exacting something.! Justice and right, therefore, are by no means synonymous terms. A right is a claim inhering in the human personality; whereas justice regulates the proper distribution of rights. A right is something definite and concrete, whereas justice is that which defines, determines, or guides. Rights, strictly speaking, appertain to jurisprudence, whereas justice belongs to ethics. The virtue of justice may be derived and developed from the principles of moral science. Christian revelation, containing within itself the highest and most perfect system of morality, also furnishes the most complete notion of justice. But the knowledge of what is "right" must be gathered from the science of jurisprudence, and in discussing the "rights" of men, theology is as dependent upon jurisprudence as jurisprudence in its turn is dependent upon the fundamental truths of Christianity for the correct notion of justice. We have a divine revelation concerning justice, but none concerning rights. ¹⁴ It is easy to be a jurist, but it is difficult to practice justice.

¹⁴ Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheol., P. 408.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58-61 (Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Aquinas Ethicus, or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Vol. II, [London 1896, pp. 11 sqq.]).-J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, Freiburg 1873.-A. Van Gestel, De Iustitia et Lege Civili, 2nd ed., Gröningen 1896, pp. 9 sqq., 46 sqq.—V. Cathrein S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 355 sqq.-Thos. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, PP. 340 sqq.- V. Cathrein, S.J., Recht, Naturrecht und positives Recht, Freiburg 1901.- A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, Bruges 1901, pp. 6 sqq.-J. E. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht und von der Gerechtigkeit, Vol. I, Ratisbon 1857, Pp. 5 sqq.—J. Kiefer, Die Tugend der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit, 2nd ed., Eichstätt 1908. -J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916.-J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, Pp. 241 sqq., New York 1919.-M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 80 sqq. -H. Woods, S. J., A First Book in Ethics, N. Y. 1923, pp. 71 sqq.

1. DEFINITION.—Veracity or truthfulness (veritas sive veracitas) means habitual regard for the truth, and may be defined for our present purpose as the duty of adhering to the truth in our intercourse with others.

St. James teaches: "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man; he is able also with a bridle to lead about the whole body."¹

¹ Jas. III, 2: “If anyone does not offend in word, he is a perfect man. For he can lead the whole body about with a bridle.”

Commenting on this passage, Dr. Belser says:

"What does it mean not to offend in word, and to be perfect in speech? It means to tell the truth always, to speak exactly as one thinks, to say neither too much nor too little, to speak in the right place and at the proper time, without anger, bitterness, or exaggeration. It is not enough to be cautious in speech for prudence sake or to observe a diplomatic reticence, but we should habitually control our tongue and employ it exclusively for the honor of God and the edification and salvation of our fellowmen."²

² J. E. Belser, Die Epistel des hl. Jakobus, Freiburg i. B. 1909, pp. 140 sq.

2. VERACITY A SOCIAL NECESSITY.—Man is an ethical and a social being. He is made for intercourse with his fellowmen and cannot live without their assistance. Now, community life depends upon mutual fidelity and veracity.³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 2: “Truth is a certain special virtue by which a man arranges his outward things—whether words, deeds, or signs—in due order.”—Ibid., qu. 129, art. 3, ad 1: “Every man needs first divine assistance, and secondly also human assistance, because man is naturally a social animal, since he is not sufficient unto himself for life.”

"Men could not associate with one another," says St. Thomas, "if they did not believe each other."⁴ This is but another way of saying that the virtue of veracity is one of the fundamental conditions of a well-ordered community life and, therefore, a duty resting upon each individual member of society. "Putting away lying," says St. Paul, "speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor; for we are all members one of another."⁵

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3, ad 1: “Because man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another that without which human society could not be preserved. Men, however, could not live together unless they believed one another as persons manifesting truth to one another. And therefore the virtue of truth in some way bears the character of a debt.”—Cfr. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. III, pp. 274 sqq.

⁵ Eph. IV, 25: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor; for we are all members one of another.”—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 2, ad 1: “Because man is naturally a social animal, he owes to other men, from a certain honorableness, the manifestation of truth, without which human society could not endure.... Man could not live in society without truth.”

3. VERACITY A DUTY.—Faith and mutual confidence, without which human society could not exist, are essentially conditioned upon vera- city, which consequently is a postulate of the moral order or, in other words, a natural duty. But it is more than that: it is also a supernatural duty, enforced by Revelation.⁶

⁶ Ex. XX, 16; Lev. XIX, 11; Ps. XIV, 3; XXX, 24; Zach. VIII, 16, 19; Prov. VI, 16 sq.; XII, 22; Ecclus. IV, 30; Matth. V, 37; 2 Cor. VI, 7; Eph. IV, 25; VI, 14.

Veracity as a duty has a positive as well as a negative side. Positively, it obliges a man to tell the truth; negatively, it obliges him not to lie. a) As a positive duty veracity obliges not absolutely, but merely in a conditional way; that is to say, we are not bound to tell our fellowmen all we know, but to reveal our thoughts to them only when obliged to do so by strict justice (as when questioned by legitimate authority) or by charity (as when it becomes necessary to uncover a harmful error or to aid an innocent man in obtaining his release from prison).

We are allowed to withhold the truth when we are not under positive obligation to reveal it and when to speak out would cause harm and inconvenience to ourselves. It is permitted to feign sleep or death in order to escape being murdered, to disguise oneself to avoid danger, and to dress poorly in order to conceal one's wealth or to avoid inconvenience or annoyance. By such acts one merely withholds facts or conditions which one is not obliged to reveal and allows others rather to deceive themselves. Even when asked by legitimate authority, one who is accused of a crime may refuse to confess if he can do so without being guilty of positive or negative untruth and without violating commutative justice, i. e., without seriously injuring his fellowmen, for instance, by causing an innocent person to be condemned.

Finally, there is the duty of not revealing to others what has been entrusted to us as a secret, or which we have bound ourselves by a promise or by the assumption of an office to keep to ourselves. Thus priests, physicians, counsellors-at-law, and editors are not allowed to divulge secrets they have learned in the exercise of their profession.

Besides this there is the general duty binding every Christian to guard his tongue at all times and to avoid useless or frivolous gossip, mindful of the fact that on the day of judgment he shall have to give an account of every word he has uttered.⁷

⁷ Matth. XII, 36; Jas. I, 19; III, 5 sqq.

A higher degree of veracity is frankness or simplicity of heart (simplicitas), which consists in habitually saying what one thinks, without reserve, exaggeration, or ulterior motive.⁸ Sim- plicity differs from veracity only in concept (in ratione), as the former has reference to the agreement between a sign and that which it signifies, while the latter aims at harmonizing the internal intention with its external expression.⁹ It is simplicity that constitutes the childlike disposition so highly extolled by our Divine Lord in conjunction with prudence. Simplicity renders the soul receptive to the influence of grace, fills the heart with joy, and is a mark of supernatural perfection.¹⁰

⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 2, ad 4: “Simplicity is named by opposition to duplicity, namely, whereby someone has one thing in his heart and shows another outwardly; and thus simplicity pertains to this virtue [truth]. It makes the intention right, not indeed directly (because this pertains to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another.”

⁹ Ibid., qu. 111, art. 3, ad 2: “The virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth, but differs only in concept, because truth is said according as signs agree with the things signified, whereas simplicity is said according as it does not tend to diverse things, namely, that one should intend one thing inwardly and pretend another outwardly.”

¹⁰ Prov. XI, 20; XXVIII, 18; Matth. X, 16; XVIII, 3.

The vice opposed to simplicity is duplicity, i. e., deceitfulness in character, speech, or conduct, more commonly called double-dealing. b) On the negative side the duty of veracity or truthfulness binds absolutely,—that is to say, we are not permitted, under any circumstances and for any reason, to lie, i. e., knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others. Ecclus. VII, 14: "Be not willing to make any manner of lie: for the custom thereof is not good."¹¹

¹¹ Ecclus. VII, 14. Cfr. Ex. XXIII, 7; Eph. IV, 25; Col. III, 9.

READINGS.—Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent., tr. 4, c. 5 (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 122 sqq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 212 sqq.).—St.

Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 38 (Opera Omnia, III, 836 sqq.).—Kössing, Über die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 1 sqq., 55 sqq.—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 124 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 647.—Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Buchanan; N. Y. 1914, pp. 113 sqq.).—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., “The Catholic Doctrine of Lying and Equivocation,” in Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215–233.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 60 sqq.

1. DEFINITION.—Closely related to veracity is fidelity. Veracity consists in speaking the truth or expressing one’s mind without deceit; fidelity (πίστις, fides, fidelitas), in keeping a promise or in performing that to which one is obliged.¹

¹ Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 23.

Fidelity is a most important virtue both morally and socially. Without mutual confidence there could be no social intercourse and society would fall to pieces. He who can be always trusted and relied upon to do his duty, is not only highly respected among men, but, as Holy Scripture says, worthy of entering into the joys of Heaven.²

² Prov. XXVIII, 20; Matth. XXV, 21.—Cfr. J. de Lugo, De Iust. et Iure, II, disp. 23, s. 1, n. 13: “Just as truthfulness inclines one to conform outward words to the mind, so fidelity inclines one to conform deeds to previous statements; fidelity obliges one to conform deeds to words signifying a promise.”—Horace, Carm., I, 24, 6: “Iustitiae soror, incorrupta fides nudaque veritas.”—Ibid., III, 3, 1: “Iustum et tenacem propositi virum non civium ardor prava iubentium,” etc.

2. The duty of fidelity, which is based upon the same grounds as veracity, may originate:

a) In a promise, i. e., a declaration of willingness to undertake a certain task or to live up to a certain obligation.³ A lawful and valid promise must be kept in the sense in which it was made by one and received by the other, that is, without equivocation or restriction, and it makes no difference whether he to whom it was given is an orthodox believer or a heretic (fides haereticis habenda).⁴

³ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 758: “A promise is a contract by which someone freely and spontaneously binds himself gratuitously to perform or omit something in another’s favor. The conditions required for the obligation of a promise are: (1) That there be a will to bind oneself, at least virtual and implicit, which he is judged to have who seriously wishes to promise, even if he does not advert to the obligation. (2) That the promisor’s consent be fully free and spontaneous, and therefore that all error and deceit concerning the substance and final cause, and all compulsion or unjust fear, be absent. (3) That the promise itself be manifested outwardly and accepted; for every agreement must consist in the mutual consent of two or more persons upon the same object, and, moreover, no one is judged to wish to bind himself toward another unless the latter accepts.”

⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 1: “According to moral rectitude [i. e., in conscience and before God], a man is bound to another man by any promise whatsoever, and this is an obligation of natural law.”—St. Augustine, De Doctr. Christ., l. IV, c. 18, n. 35: “What is least is least, but to be faithful in the least is great.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 105).—IDEM, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 6: “When faith is pledged, it must be kept even with an enemy against whom war is waged; how much more with a friend for whom one fights.” (P. L., XXXIII, 856).

If a promise forms the foundation of a legal relation (e. g., a contract, as in a betrothal) it constitutes a serious obligation, the non-fulfilment of which entails the duty of restitution.⁵ The obli- gation ceases when its fulfilment becomes morally impossible or injurious to the person to whom the promise was given (not so, however, if it would merely injure him who made it), or if the one to whom it was made lifts the obligation or fails to keep his part of the agreement, or, finally, if the promise has become useless or futile, or the circumstances of the case have so completely changed that if they had been foreseen, the promise would never have been made.⁶

⁵ Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 835: “A wholly gratuitous promise of itself binds from fidelity alone, and not under grave sin but only under venial sin, unless special circumstances are added.”—Ibid., n. 837: “A promise can bind in justice, and this actually occurs: 1. If an obligation of justice is expressly undertaken; 2. if it is tacitly undertaken, namely by knowingly allowing the risk that the promisee may suffer harm from the promise’s nonfulfilment. In that case the obligation of justice is either to fulfil the promise or to repair the loss caused. Otherwise there would be a harmful deception.”

⁶ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 760: “It is asked, when does the force of an accepted promise cease? The answer is: 1. If the promisee voluntarily remits it or yields his right; 2. if the thing promised becomes unlawful or useless; 3. if the promisee does not stand by his own promises; 4. if the state of affairs or persons changes in such a way that the promise does not appear to have been intended to include that event; 5. if something was promised for a reason that does not exist.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3, ad 5: “If [someone] does not do what he promised, he then seems to act faithlessly by changing his mind. Yet he may be excused in two ways: first, if he promised something that is manifestly unlawful, because he sinned in promising it, but does well in changing his purpose; secondly, if the conditions of persons and affairs have changed.”—Seneca, De Benefic., l. IV, c. 35: “All things must remain the same as they were when you promised, in order that you be held to the promisor’s pledge.”

The oft-quoted axiom, “Haereticis fides non est servanda,” says Dr. Linsenmann, could be justified only on the supposition of the medieval law that a heretic was an enemy of the public order and incapable of entering into legal relations with the faithful, in other words, that whoever espoused heresy knew that, as one denying an important truth of Christian Revelation, he would have no legal standing in the community and no right to expect fidelity from others. To-day, in civil society, we place the heretic on the same plane with the loyal Catholic, and therefore any promise made to him must be faithfully kept. It would not be permissible to break one’s word even to a robber or a murderer who had surrendered himself on the promise of immunity, provided, of course, no positive violation of the moral law were involved. A mere advantage to be gained for the commonwealth never justifies the breaking of a promise.⁷

⁷ Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, pp. 443 sq.

b) The duty of fidelity may originate, secondly, in the confidential relation existing between members of the same social group. Every social relation freely entered into, whether of superiority or inferiority, as between husband and wife, master and servant, etc., entails the obligation of mutual fidelity, which in some instances is solemnly vowed, in others silently assumed. Fidelity is a mutually binding duty, which must be observed in the spirit and meaning of each relation. It is opposed, on the one hand, to compulsion and slavish servility and, on the other, to a mere desire for remuneration, and forms the one and only ethically effective bond of all relations resting on mutual confidence and of all contracts. Only he who is faithful to his vocation will live up to its duties and make the sacrifices demanded by it, even though they be unforeseen. The duty of fidelity has no limit except when it conflicts with the irreducible demands of the moral law.

Fidelity, says Linsenmann, does not demand slavish obedience, but presupposes a spiritual distinction. A servant will often be able to serve his master more faithfully by using his own judgment than by obeying orders literally. . . . Fidelity’s closest ally is honor. Where fidelity is not esteemed, where conscientious compliance with duty is not gratefully acknowledged, where honest servants are not protected, where services rendered in confidential positions are rewarded with money only, there the spiritual bond which should connect master and servant is missing, and society is in danger of disruption.⁸

⁸ IDEM, ibid., pp. 444 sq.

3. Opposed to fidelity is infidelity or perfidy. If the promise was confirmed by an oath, infidelity becomes perjury. The guilt of perfidy is gauged by the subjective malice and the importance of the matter involved, and it may, therefore, be either a venial or a mortal sin according to circumstances. Perfidy dishonors a man, places him in opposition to God, who, as St. Paul says, is faithful,⁹ and destroys mutual confidence among men. The Apostle enumerates this sin among the vices on account of which God delivered the gentiles up to shameful affections.¹⁰

⁹ 2 Tim. II, 13; 1 Cor. X, 13.

¹⁰ Rom. I, 31; I, 26. On perjury, see this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 256, 264 sqq.

A particularly grievous sin of infidelity is that committed by a soldier who deserts his flag, especially when his conduct involves injury to the bonum commune, as it usually does in time of war. A deserter is bound to return to his allegiance, not only ex titulo oboedientiae et iustitiae legalis, but also, if he took an oath to uphold the flag, ex titulo fidelitatis et religionis, unless the punishment he would have to undergo were entirely too severe.¹¹

¹¹ Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, p. 148.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1, ad 3; qu. 88, art. 3.—Lessius, De Iust. et Iure, l. II, c. 47, n. 29 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 29 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 443 sqq.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 835 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, pp. 361 sq.

Utility. - Because the more practical questions of this treatise can also be weighed under various other heads, manuals of moral theology are accustomed scarcely to concede express mention to the cardinal virtue of prudence. Yet it is useful to possess a right and distinct notion of this virtue, and accurately to discern how it differs from human prudence, which, per se, is without merit. In these pages, insisting on the footsteps of St. Thomas, we shall attempt to furnish this.

I. Previous Notions Concerning the Practical Intellect and Intellectual Virtue. 1. The properly practical intellect is not yet that in which certain judgments concerning things to be done and omitted are made and contained. For these can present themselves speculatively to the human mind without any relation to future action. Cannot a professor propose ascetical norms without any zeal or will for pursuing perfection? Indeed it happens too often that a man acts against conscience, or a judgment of this kind. But a judgment to which a contrary action is opposed in truth does not pertain to the act, i.e. is not practical. But that intellect is called practical which, from the motion of the will wishing to act, deliberates, judges, and commands. Yet because the human will is not compelled by such deliberation and judgment of the intellect, but can deny consent and draw the intellect to another practical conclusion through the mediation of an opposite consideration, that intellect is to be called practical most especially which is mingled with action, or which, after consultation and judgment, is informed by the command of action.

And they note that, since the will is a rational appetite, it indeed lies in its power, by application of the intellect to considering diverse things, to change the ultimate judgment concerning an action to be done or omitted; but by no means can it happen that it act without a practical judgment, or disagree from some practically ultimate judgment. Therefore no free action is done without its being indicated in some way that one must so act.

This process of our actions can be narrated more distinctly thus.

From a true will of any end whatever the intellect is moved to considering, by inquiring, the means; then, at the end of the inquiry, to giving a sentence concerning suitable means; finally to proposing the execution of the means; which proposal, from the motion of the will, becomes a command, by which the proposal is prescribed to the active faculties as to be followed.

Let us suppose someone who wishes to obtain some office. He will deliberate, he will consult concerning the way. Besides conciliating to himself the benevolence of the prince or collator, which is immediately perceived to be necessary, the very mode of conciliating favor will be investigated. A sentence of this kind will impose an end upon that inquiry: this mode seems most suitable. And, from the same desire of office, the discovered mode will be proposed as to be embraced, with greater or lesser force, according to its efficacy, the estimation of the office, and the difficulties joined to its execution. The will chooses the proposed mode by approving it; and the discovered mode becomes the exemplar of execution: the act is accommodated to the intellectual reason.

2. Because every virtue perfects our free acts, intellectual virtue is not wholly in the intellect, but also supposes a good disposition of the will; nor can the act of such a virtue be had without motion of the will. Wherefore intellectual virtue grows together from a good disposition of will and intellect. Therefore qualities of mind, just as bodily health itself, can indeed aid virtue; yet they are not formally virtuous; and a good disposition of the intellect cannot, as such, be meritorious. Those qualities can be placed among the beginnings of virtues which the will can use for the end of virtue, and which are perfected from the use itself of virtue.

II. 1. Prudence, more broadly so called, is a certain art of attaining the intended end, which end can be merely human, indeed evil, so that the Lord could call the children of darkness more prudent than the children of light.

2. The virtue of prudence properly so called, in acting, presupposes the intention of good, and is accustomed to be defined: right reason of things to be done. Reason is the same as the representative form of the intellect presenting action as doable. - It is right insofar as it agrees with right appetite; or insofar as, after sufficient study, it says that that is to be embraced which appeared consonant with the rule of morals; and insofar as it proceeds from a good will. - Of things to be done. By this word there is assigned to prudence an object other than the object of art: art regards things to be made. But by the plural number the habit is indicated.

This right reason follows right inquiry and right judgment; and it is completed by the command of an honorable action.

3. Concerning eubulia. The solicitous inquiry of honesty, proceeding from the intention of the honorable, is an act of eubulia. If this solicitude is had easily and readily; if, for example, it is disturbed by no impulse of passions, it reveals in the intellect the acquired virtue of eubulia: indeed, its act is morally good, and no one uses it badly. For to inquire into the honorable from a will of acting honorably is necessarily morally good.

4. Concerning synesis or gnome. The sentence pronounced concerning the morality of such an action is also necessarily good, insofar as it too proceeds from zeal for the honesty of the action. If this sentence is founded in law or in a higher reason, it is ascribed to synesis or gnome. Again, if that sentence is easily sincere and firm, it will mark a virtuous habit of the same name.

III. Prudence, a Cardinal Virtue. The preceptive election of an action indicated as honorable, which election is composed of the practical conclusion of the intellect, that the action is to be done, and of the consent of the will, is the most proper act of prudence. This act is meritorious in the just man, for it flows from a free intention of the honorable, and by it one lives well. And if it has been prompt, ready, and efficacious, that election marks the virtuous habit of acquired prudence.

That we may set forth this process more distinctly: not otherwise than in the temporal order, so in the moral order, from the supreme judgment of synteresis, by which it is pronounced universally that the law of God is to be observed, that one must live honorably, the will freely inclines toward honesty, wishes to act honorably. - Consultation receives this intention of honorable good: what is honorable; that is, the inquiry of the honorable, which we are ordered to make solicitously, with the care which is fitting.

Judgment concerning the morality of the action completes the inquiry: this is honorable, good, or better. That judgment can be founded either in consideration of law, or in attention to a higher reason of the law. We are ordered to place a sincere judgment of this kind before our action. - Then the same judgment is offered by the intellect as to be followed practically, as if equivalently, with greater or lesser force of reasons, it had said: "Do this honorable thing."

The will assents; and there is had the election of an honorable action, which, from the motion of the will, is the command of that action imposed on the subject faculties. The honorable thing will be done according to such a command. Thus the idea of law in the Prince becomes, from the will of the prince, a precept for subjects and the exemplar of the actions of those who obey.

IV. Degrees of Acquired Prudence. The more vehement the intention of good will be, and the higher the good itself intended; then the more the intellect will be disposed to seek studiously, to recognize the honorable sincerely, and to discern better its lovableness in the light of reasons, the better and stronger the intellectual virtue will be.

It is necessary accurately to discern these superior dispositions of the intellect, by which it serves the will of the honorable, from qualities of mind, for example natural subtlety, which can be used for any use whatever. Thus a learned and acute man will more easily be able to find speculatively the reasons of the honorable; yet in true prudence he will yield to the duller mind of a more virtuous man, insofar as this latter is endowed with greater practical zeal for the honorable. For the moral value of the command must be estimated from the motive force of the intellect.

V. Corollaries. 1. A fuller description of prudence can be this: a virtue which perfects the practical intellect so that, with the will moving it, it promptly and easily commands things to be done which are apprehended as honorable and more honorable.

2. Prudence is not accurately described by acts of recognition or judgment. Wherefore Tanquerey, after, in II, n. 1049, he described prudence as the virtue by which the intellect is directed "so that in individual operations we may discern what is honorable and conducing to the end," is forced to correct himself, n. 1051, where he places the third and principal act of prudence as "the precept, by which reason practically not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it."

3. The province of prudence regards not the end itself but the things which are toward the end. For it supposes the intention of the end and ends in the election of the means.

4. The functions of prudence are: to consult well, or, under the respect of moral good, to investigate; to judge well, or, at the end of the investigation, to pronounce with certitude what must be done under the same respect; to command well, or efficaciously to order toward the work.

VI. Vices Opposed to Prudence. These vices are divided by St. Thomas, 2, 2, qq. 53, 54, 55, into two genera: imprudence, through defect either of prudence itself or of the previous acts which are required for prudence; and false prudence, which abuses the means of prudence insofar as it either pursues a disordered end, as the prudence of the flesh, or uses illicit ways, as cunning: these latter are opposed to the virtue of prudence by excess. That we may omit these latter things, defect can affect prudence in the prior acts of counsel or of judgment, or in the proper act of commanding. But counsel is impeded or vitiated by precipitation, judgment by inconsideration, right command by negligence or inconstancy (2, 2, q. 53, art. 2). Precipitation is in the impulse of will or passion, which passes over the elements of sound deliberation (*); inconstancy is defect of stability in commanding, or in a withdrawal from a good proposal previously defined; negligence is defect of solicitude or of prompt will.

(*) What precipitation is, and what mature deliberation requires, St. Thomas very beautifully explains in 2, 2, q. 52, art. 3, c.

But, just as natural gifts of mind effect a certain natural prudence which is without merit, so from defect of those gifts there results a certain imprudence which is without demerit. Blameworthy imprudence supposes a disorder of free will, as when by the impulse of passion it is carried away toward counseling, judging, or commanding badly. Yet conscious natural defect gives place to moral obligations of attention, precaution, and correction, which can be observed or violated.

In every sin a certain imprudence is committed; yet it is not a general vice, since it is concerned with special acts, i.e. acts of reason. But since it extends itself to every moral matter, it is not a special vice by reason of matter, and by accusing the sin committed, the imprudence itself is sufficiently accused, unless someone from formal contempt of prudence wished to be imprudent (cf. 2, 2, q. 53, art. 1, and 54, art. 1 c.).

VII. Concerning the Connected Gift of Counsel. In what way the Holy Spirit perfects our virtues through His gifts, we indicated in tome I, n. 497.

According to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 52, art. 2, prudence is aided and perfected by the gift of Counsel, by which we are moved by the Holy Spirit, as by a Counselor, toward inquiring rightly concerning things to be done. But why the gift of the Holy Spirit perfects the innermost act of the virtue of prudence, or consulting well, rather than the higher acts of prudence, St. Thomas brings this reason: judging and commanding, which are those higher acts, belong to one moving, not to one moved, while counsel can arise no less from another than from the one deliberating.

For since in the gifts of the Holy Spirit the human mind does not have itself as moving, but rather as moved (2, 2, q. 52, art. 2 ad 1), prudence must be perfected in that act which, from its nature, carries with itself the direction or admonition of another. But in consulting we are connaturally aided by the counsel of another. (Concerning the mode by which the gifts of the Holy Spirit act, cf. J. de Guibert, S.J., Dons du S. Esprit et vie mystique, Revue d'ascetique et de mystique, 1923, pp. 321 ff.)

— Prudence is to action what art is to making. Art is defined as right reason of things to be made; prudence is defined as right reason of things to be done. But this difference exists between each: art does not depend on a good will, while prudence properly so called, as every virtue, with the grace of God, lies in our power. For the rectitude of which there is question in the brief definition does not regard some human or temporal end: of this prudence, which is called prudence in a certain respect, even saints can lack or be deprived; but it is estimated in order to the good simply. Wherefore it is described more fully: a virtue which perfects the practical intellect so that, with the will moving it, it promptly and easily commands things to be done which are apprehended as honorable and more honorable. The practical intellect is that which truly, as a directive principle, is mingled with our action. It differs from the speculative intellect not in reality but in reason; the speculative intellect also can know practical things.

Furthermore, the functions of prudence are: to consult well or investigate, under the respect of moral good; to judge well, or, at the end of investigation, to pronounce with certitude what, under the same respect, must be done; to command well or efficaciously to order toward the work.

To the virtue of prudence there is opposed, by defect, imprudence, either in the prior acts of counsel, i.e. precipitation; or of judgment, i.e. inconsideration; or in the proper act of commanding, i.e. inconstancy or negligence. Yet blameworthy imprudence supposes a disordered will; and although it is special, since it affects special acts of reason, for the most part, when the sin to which the bad direction of the intellect has led has been accused, it is sufficiently accused.

Besides, the obligation either of paying more attention or of correcting a defect flows from a natural defect of prudence. To the same virtue of prudence there is opposed, by a certain excess, false prudence, which is toward an evil end, and cunning, which is materially prudent by illicit means.

Usefulness. - A twofold good especially can be procured for us by examination of this virtue: that we may discern the true virtue of Fortitude from its counterfeit species; and that we may know the way to be entered upon so that we may become sharers of so praised a virtue and learn to exercise it in so many present occasions.

Order of speaking. - First, the virtue itself must be sketched by us, according to the splendid documents which are supplied to us by the Angelic Doctor; then something must be said briefly concerning its acquisition and present exercise.

I. Notion. Fortitude is a virtue of the irascible appetite, "restraining fears and moderating daring." (Cf. St. Thomas 2, 2, q. 123 art. 3, c.).

The irascible appetite regards good or evil (properly sensible) under the aspect of the arduous, or as to be obtained or fled with difficulty (1, q. 81 art. 2, c.; 1, 2, q. 23 art. 1). To this appetite pertain the passions of daring, fear, and hope. Fear is the passion by which one flees from a future, difficult evil, which cannot be resisted (concerning fear cf. 1, 2, q. 41). Daring is the opposite passion; for "fear flees a future harmful thing because of its victory over the one fearing: but daring attacks an imminent danger because of its own victory over the danger itself" (1, 2, q. 45, art. 1, c.).

Although it pertains also to fortitude to restrain rash daring, the principal parts of fortitude consist in removing the impediment of fear. And in fact it is commonly conceived as a good habit by which difficulties are overcome and fear is checked.

Moreover we consider the virtue as it can be acquired, infused, and perfected by the gift of the Holy Spirit. Acquired virtue shows itself in facility of acts: infused virtue furnishes us the power of exercising it connaturally in a supernatural mode; perfected by the gift of the Holy Spirit it acquires the quality of security which we shall soon indicate.

II. The act of the virtue. The chief action of the virtue is this, that, against imminent evils, it confirms the will in good. But confirmation in this again consists in this, that the will not only continues to abstain from every evil, but also that it remits nothing of its positive good action on account of that evil.

Wherefore a twofold function is assigned to fortitude: to sustain and to attack. To attack pertains to fortitude, insofar as it moderates daring; to sustain, however, insofar as it represses fear. "It is more difficult ...," says St. Thomas, "to repress fear than to moderate daring, because the danger itself, which is the object of daring and fear, of itself contributes something to the repression of daring, but operates toward the increase of fear" (2, 2, q. 123 art. 6, c.). The Holy Doctor demonstrates that the function itself of sustaining is more difficult than aggression by this threefold reason: "first indeed, because someone seems to sustain when invaded by someone stronger; but he who attacks invades in the manner of a stronger one. But it is more difficult to fight with one stronger than with one weaker. Secondly, because he who sustains already feels the imminent dangers; but he who attacks has them as future. But it is more difficult not to be moved by present things than by future things. Thirdly, because sustaining imports duration of time; but someone can attack from a sudden movement. But it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than suddenly to be moved to something arduous." (Ibid., ad 1.).

III. The object of the virtue. Dangers of temporal evils, to be strongly undergone or attacked, are the common object of this virtue. But because the virtue would not be cardinal unless in that noble contempt of danger it showed itself principal, and the greatest temporal evil is death, thence its proper object is said to be the danger of directly imminent death; directly, insofar as it must be sustained for the sake of the good itself of virtue. Because again these dangers occur in a just war, therefore the virtue of fortitude is said properly to consist about dangers of death which are in war. Yet St. Thomas here, art. 5, c., understands war broadly, of every attack.

IV. Perfection of the virtue. 1. To attain the end of one's work, to escape evils or dangers, is not, as St. Thomas observes, always in the power of man; "but this the Holy Spirit works in man, when He leads him through to eternal life, which is the end of all good works and the escape from all dangers; and of this thing the Holy Spirit infuses a certain confidence into the mind, excluding the contrary fear; and according to this, fortitude is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit" (2, 2, q. 139 art. 1, c.). Therefore, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, there is added to the virtue a certain confidence of attaining the end, dangers opposing in vain, according to that text, that "to those loving God all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). By this confidence fortitude itself is wonderfully assisted.

2. Besides that supernatural perfection, fortitude is perfected by promptness in embracing the duty which is joined with danger, by strenuousness in exercising it; and by constancy by which, neither by sadness nor by duration, the soul is called back from a good purpose. Wherefore these are judged to give fortitude its integrity.

V. Christian necessity. Our religion wills us to be prepared for death for the sake of sustaining faith and any virtue whatever. Therefore all of us ought to be strong in the preparation of soul; in occasion we shall truly be so, with the grace of the Holy Spirit assisting.

VI. Potential parts of fortitude. By this name are designated various virtues which, in a less difficult matter, keep the soul upright and persevering in good. Thus magnanimity confirms the soul in the greatest goods or honors to be hoped for or obtained (2, 2, q. 129-133); magnificence directs great expenses to great works to be done suitably (2, 2, q. 134, 135); patience, against sadnesses, especially those which are inflicted by others, protects the good of reason (2, 2, q. 136); perseverance overcomes the difficulty arisen from duration of time (2, 2, q. 137).

To magnanimity St. Thomas also ascribes confidence, which confers promptness. Thus it comes about that the potential parts themselves give fortitude its integrity.

VII. Opposite vices. One can sin against fortitude not only by defect but also by excess. By defect, timidity and sloth are opposed to fortitude; by excess, fearlessness that loves dangers and immoderate daring too confident in itself.

VIII. Examples of the virtue. The most illustrious examples of fortitude, raised by the motive of charity to the highest perfection, are offered to us by the martyrs both of the first age of the Church and of the present century. Concerning martyrdom, its conditions and privileges, see III, 216. 217.

The daring of those who, without a proportionate cause, expose life has a false species of fortitude; duelists also have a false species. For fortitude does not look to this, that it approach dangers as such, but that by no danger it be delayed from doing good.

IX. Present occasions of the virtue. If we consider that constancy in every arduous work to be done is ascribed to the virtue of fortitude (cf. 2, 2, q. 139 art. 1), there are many occasions today of demonstrating fortitude of soul. Whether you consider public calamities, of the Church or even of the fatherland; or the many temptations which are created by worldly neo-paganism; or private difficulties of various kinds which often occur in following virtue: how strong is the man who will never be moved from the way of virtue, while so many seek excuses for gravest sins from the difficulty set before them! Although even today there is not lacking an occasion of bloody martyrdom; and missionaries, already strong in desiring an apostolic expedition, far from parents, from dear ones, from fatherland, can also have before their eyes, in more than one region, a probable death to be accepted for the faith of Christ.

X. Acquisition of the virtue. Sacred and profane letters, whether ancient or modern, celebrate with equal fervor the virtue of a man of constant soul, who has resolved to expect nothing from fraud or suspect arts, nothing from a less approved connivance, whom no fear deters, no difficulty breaks, whom, immovable in his good purposes, "Not the zeal of citizens commanding perverse things, - not the face of a threatening tyrant, - shakes in solid mind.... If the broken world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him unafraid" (Horace, Odes 3). That man is free, and ready for every illustrious deed.

But a good so greatly loved and praised is at the same time most greatly desired today. They deplore, in external and public action, the timidity of good people¹; we have to deplore so many personal and domestic falls of those who, on account of human annoyance, transgress the most sacred commands of God. Most opportunely, therefore, one asks concerning the means of strengthening the soul.

And this can already be a consolation to us, that fortitude is open to all in at least some degree. They say this who consider human psychology. What shall we say, we who are fortified by the protection of prayer and have the promised gift of the Holy Spirit?

Therefore these human means can be indicated: meditation on the price at which fortitude is to be held, on the noble glory which it communicates; - on the fragility and vanity of human things, so that more easily we may dominate them; - examples of strong men, which, by reading books, we can place before our eyes; - the companionship of those who demonstrate strength of soul; - small victories carried back from lesser dangers; - the practice of doing all things manfully; - praises themselves of fortitude in others; - finally hope in God exercised by frequent acts.

But if public utility holds us solicitous, we shall strive by every way to procure this, that both parents and those who are accustomed to instruct adolescents should set before themselves as something principal to instill and inculcate strength of soul already in infants themselves, then in adolescents and young people of either sex. From their tenderest years let them learn that there are certain things absolutely forbidden and absolutely necessary: far from boys let there be ridiculous tales which have been accustomed to fill the childish imagination with vain fears; let them be taught to act strongly; and if there has been occasion, let them be praised concerning sincerity of intentions and words; in schools let the manifold method be applied which is at hand for proposing examples of men who have been distinguished by fortitude, especially of recent martyrs; let the adolescents themselves be ordered to weave praises of those men in their written themes; let stage plays be such as effectively commend noble actions: let every softness be denied to the body, but, on the contrary, let exercises of this kind be done which, adding vigor to the body, wonderfully assist the vigor of the soul. What more, since books are not lacking which happily treat the argument of instructing the will.

¹ "The greatest evil of this century," says Montalembert, "is the timidity of good people."

I. 1. Fortitude, which is numbered the third cardinal virtue, is in the irascible appetite "as restraining fears and moderating daring" (2, 2, q. 123 art. 3), so that against the greatest evils, even of directly imminent death, it firmly preserves the will in the good of reason. "Even of directly imminent death," we say, not because it firms the will against this evil alone, but because, unless even then the good will remained stable, the virtue would not exist complete.

2. The functions of fortitude are to sustain and to attack; it is divided into no subjective parts, since it orders a very special matter; but its potential parts are various virtues which in a less difficult matter keep the soul upright and persevering in good. They are, from the doctrine which St. Thomas borrows from Tullius Cicero himself, magnanimity, which, operating immediately about the passion of hope, confirms the soul in the greatest goods or honors to be hoped for or obtained (2, 2, q. 129-133); magnificence, which directs great expenses to great works to be done suitably (2, 2, q. 134, 135); patience, which, against sadnesses, especially those which are inflicted by others, protects the good of reason (2, 2, q. 136); and perseverance, which overcomes the difficulty arisen from duration of time (2, 2, q. 137).

3. Promptness in embracing the duty which is joined with danger, strenuousness in executing it, constancy, by which the soul is not called back from a good purpose either by sadness or by duration: these complete the virtue. But that integrity is attributed to the very virtues which are the potential parts of fortitude.

4. The elicited act of the virtue of fortitude intends the very honorableness of fortitude; but for the most part it will be commanded by the higher virtue of faith or charity.

Fortitude can be harmed not only by defect, or excessive fear, but also by excess in one contemning or loving dangers, or too confident in acting.

II. Among the most precious qualities of a man is to be placed the virtue of fortitude, by which one becomes truly ready and free for doing every good. But by right instruction and patient exercise it becomes open to all in some degree.

But a distinguished example of fortitude is the martyr, whose fortitude is raised by the motive of charity to the highest perfection.

III. With the virtue of fortitude is connected the gift of the Holy Spirit of the same name, by which gift the virtue is perfected, and the virtuous man is led through even to the end of eternal life. To that gift correspond the two fruits of patience and longanimity (2, 2, q. 139 and 140).

Usefulness. - It will profit us not a little if, together with a more distinct knowledge, we procure for ourselves a true estimation of humility and mansuetude: both of which virtues, especially Christian, are today despised and held up to mockery by not a few.

Order of speaking. - After a brief exposition concerning the generic character of Temperance, we shall treat in distinct chapters of Humility, of Mansuetude, of Modesty, of Affability, and of Eutrapelia.

Notion of the virtue. Temperance, as a special cardinal virtue, is a virtue of the concupiscible appetite, moderating the delights of taste and touch. The concupiscible appetite is the common name of the passions which are concerned with delightful things.

Temperance is moderating. For, from common usage itself, temperance sounds as a certain moderation, a checking of natural appetency, by which excess is avoided. But in reality the passions by which we are borne toward delightful things, especially through their immoderation, easily are opposed to reason, to which they must be subjected. Wherefore chiefly as prosecutive they must be moderated by virtue.

But the cardinal virtue ought to moderate the more vehement concupiscences. Therefore Temperance is posited as moderating the delights of taste and touch, or of the flesh. (In antiquity venereal delights were called delights of touch.) Now, because generation provides for the necessary multiplication of men, but the use of food and drink provides for the necessary life of individual men, they are joined with delights which are restrained with the greatest difficulty. Yet this difference exists between each appetite, that the venereal appetite is accustomed to be strongest, although its satisfaction is not necessary to an individual man, while the appetite of food and drink is not such per se, except when necessity of life presses or on account of the vicious tyranny of custom.

Subjective parts or species of the virtue. Concerning delights of taste there are two virtues: abstinence and sobriety. This is not to be understood as though abstinence were concerned with food, and sobriety with drink. For abstinence moderates the delights of both food and drink, insofar as they are referred to the nourishment of the body, lest on account of their allurements or bodily necessity the mean of reason be exceeded. But drink, or another means, which intoxicates, in a peculiar mode disturbs the use of reason "insofar as it disturbs the brain by its vaporousness" (2, 2, q. 149 art. 2, c.). Wherefore for removing this a special virtue of sobriety is posited. We spoke of drunkenness in I, 473-484.

Concerning delights of the flesh there is chastity, which moderates the use of venereal things. It takes the name of modesty of purity insofar as it rules the surrounding delights in kisses, touches, and embraces, but of continence, insofar as it has to struggle with persevering difficulty. Concerning these things cf. IV, 17. 18.

Other delights of touch do not need a special virtue, because "the sensitive appetite, in which the passions are, is naturally subject to reason" (2, 2, q. 129 art. 2).

The potential parts of Temperance are various virtues which, like humility and mansuetude, restrain some propensity of appetite. Observe that it is by no means required that the potential parts of some virtue be in the same faculty in which the principal virtue has its seat. For there is question of the logical distribution of virtues, not of physical subordination.

Integral parts of the virtue. St. Thomas posits two: shamefacedness and honorableness. For the vice of intemperance, insofar as it detracts very greatly from man's excellence, is marked by a certain peculiar turpitude; while, on the contrary, a special comeliness belongs to the virtue of temperance. Now through shamefacedness, which rules fear of turpitude and reprehension, man flees from those things which are worthy of reproach, while by the name of honorableness is here designated the inclination toward following the comeliness of temperance. Does not the integral virtue abhor contrary acts and love and follow its own proper good?

Opposite vices. Men sin against temperance especially by excess. But this excess is generically called intemperance; but it is specially named gluttony when the appetite of food and drink is served too much. Yet one can also sin by defect. This defect is called insensibility, by which someone flees delight so much that he flees that very thing which is necessary for the conservation of nature (2, 2, q. 142 art. 1, c.).

I. Temperance is a virtue of the concupiscible appetite, which it moderates in seeking the delights of taste and touch.

Its subjective parts are abstinence and sobriety, chastity and modesty of purity. To this is referred continence, which, understood concerning the purpose of virtue persevering in the very rebellion of the passions, denies the facility which pertains to the nature of acquired virtue. Cf. 2, 2, q. 155 art. 1.

There are also other propensities to be moderated, which are not only in the concupiscible appetite. That moderation is ruled by special virtues which are assigned to Temperance as potential parts. Such are Humility and Mansuetude, concerning which we shall treat below.

II. Because generation provides for the necessary propagation of men, but the use of food and drink provides for the necessary life of individual men, therefore they are joined with delights which are restrained with the greatest difficulty. Yet this difference exists between each appetite, that the venereal appetite is generally strongest, while the appetite of food or drink is not such per se, except when necessity of life presses, or on account of the tyranny of vicious custom.

III. Moreover abstinence commonly rules the delights of food and drink, insofar as they have order to the sustenance or nourishment of the body; sobriety peculiarly prevents the disturbance of drunkenness.

Concerning chastity and modesty of purity there is speech in volume IV.

IV. But temperance is integrated from shamefacedness, which abhors the peculiar turpitude of intemperance; and from zeal for the comeliness of temperance, which is distinguished by the name of honorableness.

V. One sins against temperance especially by excess, which is generically called intemperance, but specially gluttony when there is question of the appetite of food and drink. One sins also by defect, to which is given the name of insensibility.

I. On Mansuetude. 1. Notion. Mansuetude is defined as a virtue moderating anger according to right reason. Because it is moderating, it is ascribed as a potential part to the virtue of Temperance. But once the nature of anger has been explained, almost the whole virtue has been explained.

2. Anger properly so called is the sensitive appetite of vengeance. Indeed it gave its name to the appetite in which it is, which is called irascible. But vengeance signifies an evil, after sin, inflicted upon one transgressing or sinning. This evil can be sought without a sensible movement of concupiscence or with sensible commotion. That commotion can be antecedent to the deliberation of the will, or follow such deliberation, and this either spontaneously, or from the very decree and action of the will.

3. The appetite of vengeance can be illicit from the object, from the intention or end, and from the mode or subjective commotion. From the object it is illicit if vengeance is sought without a sufficiently proved guilt or beyond the merit of the guilt. From the end it is illicit if it is exercised from hatred, or by resting in another's evil. But through vengeance a multiple good can be sought: the correction of the sinner; - his restraint; - the security and quiet of others; - the conservation of justice and the honor of God.

From the mode it is illicit insofar as too great an impulse of passion drags the will along with it. Yet just as, even in the right use of marriage, the mind suffers a certain captivity under sense which nevertheless is not sinful, so St. Thomas observes that anger is not to be morally reprehended because "in the very execution of the act it somewhat impedes the judgment of reason" (2, 2, q. 158, art. 1 ad 2), but that anger through zeal or voluntary anger, by which, according to the order of reason, the sensitive appetite is moved, is good and praiseworthy.

Yet because we are too prone to desiring vengeance for injuries, no virtue is named whose office is to excite anger according to right reason.

If anger is the appetite of vengeance, we have whence more greatly to detest and flee the easy angers which we experience on account of adverse things which occur not rarely, or in the smallest matters, without another's fault or the intervention of a free cause. For remotely and indirectly they prepare blasphemy, since no other free cause has efficacy in these things besides the divine will.

4. Function and merit of mansuetude. Mansuetude not only checks the anger of the sensitive appetite, but imposes a mode on every appetite of vengeance. Therefore it has the merit of checking passion and obeying justice. It makes man master of himself, so that he can freely judge and pursue truth.

II. On Clemency. This virtue, according to reason, remits something from punishments owed by common law. We say according to reason, because not every penal indulgence is worthy of praise. Too often today it is commanded by a motive that is not right, or the mode is exceeded in such a way that society is no longer sufficiently preserved from delicts. And even if, on account of the morbid propensities of the delinquent, punishments properly so called do not seem to be taken, nevertheless by a suitable method provision ought to be made for the common peace and quiet.

Clemency, because it remits punishments, is the proper virtue of him who has authority. But all of us can be merciful.

I. Mansuetude is a virtue moderating anger according to right reason. It is, on account of the mode which it preserves, a potential part of Temperance.

II. Anger is the appetite of vengeance: this can be desired well and badly. For vengeance, or evil imposed upon one sinning, if it is exercised from hatred, by resting in another's evil, is altogether illicit. But if through vengeance we seek some good: the correction of the sinner, his restraint and the quiet of others, the conservation of justice and the honor of God, then, the due mode being preserved, it is licit (2, 2, q. 108 art. 1).

Although in "the very execution of the act it somewhat impedes the judgment of reason" (2, 2, q. 158 art. 1, ad 2), consequent or voluntary anger, by which, according to the order of reason, the sensitive appetite is moved, or anger through zeal, is good and praiseworthy.

Yet because we are more prone to desiring vengeance for injuries, no virtue is named which is an exciter of anger according to right reason.

II. The merit and utility of the virtue is in this, that it makes man master of himself, and therefore able freely to judge and pursue truth.

III. Akin to mansuetude is clemency, which, according to reason, remits something from punishments owed by common law. Cf. 2, 2, q. 157.

458. Moral virtues are habits, whether acquired by good acts or infused together with sanctifying grace, which perfect the powers of man for acting rightly concerning those things which are means to the ultimate end. Already from the most ancient times¹²⁹ all moral virtues were commonly reduced to four principal ones, namely to prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But St. Ambrose¹³⁰ seems to have been the first among the Holy Fathers who called the four above-praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that the cardinal virtues are four: temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude." St. Thomas¹³¹ teaches that these virtues can be called cardinal or principal under a twofold respect, namely either because they are certain general conditions necessary for any virtue whatsoever, or because they concern the more principal moral matters.

As to the first, in every virtue there are required a) prudent discretion, so that man neither exceeds nor falls short; b) rectitude of soul, or justice; c) fortitude, lest man be drawn back from the exercise of virtue by dangers or difficulties; d) temperance, lest man be carried away by passions.

But as to the second sense, there are four more principal moral matters, namely the command itself of reason, concerning which prudence is occupied; external operations, concerning which justice is occupied; the passions of the irascible part, concerning which fortitude is occupied; and finally the passions of the concupiscible part, concerning which temperance is occupied.

A third respect can also be assigned: the four cardinal virtues, whether infused or acquired, greatly serve for healing the four wounds inflicted on us from original sin; for prudence drives away ignorance in the intellect; justice represses malice in the will; fortitude removes or at least diminishes weakness in the irascible part; and finally temperance restrains concupiscence in the concupiscible part.

¹²⁹ The quaternary number of moral virtues was already established by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (cf. Ziegler, Die Ethik der Griechen und Romer, 88). But Cicero enumerates the four moral virtues in explicit words: "It [simple honesty] therefore has four parts: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance" (De invent. 2, c. 53; cf. also De officiis 1, c. 5). Sacred Scripture indicates the same moral virtues not obscurely (Wis. 8, 7): "And if anyone loves justice, her labors have great virtues; for she teaches sobriety (σωφροσύνη, that is, temperance), and prudence (φρόνησις), and justice (δικαιοσύνη), and virtue (ἀνδρεία, that is, fortitude), than which nothing is more useful to men in life." In the tract De sacramentis (l. 3, c. 2 [Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 453]), which is falsely ascribed to St. Ambrose, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are called cardinal virtues.

¹³⁰ Expos. in Luc. l. 5, n. 49 and 62 (Migne, Patr. lat. 15, 1738).

¹³¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 61, a. 4.

631. The parts of prudence, not otherwise than of any other cardinal virtue, are of three kinds, namely a) integral, b) subjective, c) potential.

a) Integral parts are so called, not because from them as from parts the habit is composed, as, e.g., a house is composed from walls; for virtues are one habit and not something composed from several parts. But they are called integral parts because virtues cannot exercise acts in every respect perfect without those parts. Therefore integral parts are certain prerequisites for the perfect act of virtue. For prudence such prerequisites are enumerated by St. Thomas¹⁸ as eight, namely memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution; the five former of these pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive, but the three remaining according as it is preceptive by applying knowledge to work.

1. Memory¹⁹ (which here is not taken for the memorative power, but for the very recollection of past things) is very necessary for the perfect act of prudence, because it was deservedly said by the ancients: "Nothing new under the sun"; or, that which happened in past times in similar adjuncts of things will happen also now, if the circumstances are the same or similar. Hence from past experience we can with sufficient probability judge concerning present acts to be done, and for this reason it is certain that a good and vivid memory of past events is the best assistance of prudence. Hence also it is clear that those who have many experiences are generally more prudent than those who have not had such long experience. - Oblivion is opposed to memory. But since oblivion regards knowledge alone, while prudence consists not in knowledge alone but also in right appetite, oblivion can indeed impede prudence in some way, but not totally take it away.²⁰

2. Understanding or intelligence likewise is not taken here for the intellective power, but both for knowledge of present things and for right estimation of some end, or of a particular moral principle.²¹ That understanding accepted in this sense greatly concurs toward the act of prudence is self-evident; for, that someone may prudently dispose his actions, it is required that he have the present state of the matter well viewed, that he rightly know that moral principle which must be applied to the practical conclusion here and now.

3. Docility is an affection and promptitude for learning. That docility is necessary for perfect prudence is clear from this, that prudence is concerned with particular operable things, in which there are almost infinite diversities, which cannot be known and considered by one man. Hence man needs to be instructed by others. But contempt for hearing others, living or deceased, is a cause of imprudence. This will and promptitude for learning is docility.

4. Shrewdness or sagacity (eustochia) is a prompt conjecture concerning means congruent for obtaining some intended end, or shrewdness is a certain perspicacity of swiftly apprehending the means, which happens from natural aptitude and also from exercise.²² That this shrewdness helps very greatly for exercising prudence is self-evident. Shrewdness is indeed often a natural gift and not granted to all in the same degree; nevertheless it can also be acquired in some way by diligent exercise.

5. Reason, i.e. promptitude for reasoning or for collecting one thing from another, likewise is necessary for prudence, since often there is need of long reasoning before one arrives at a prudent practical judgment.

6. Foresight is taken here in a twofold sense, namely either for the ordering of means to an end,²³ or for the consideration of future events which can follow from a work.²⁴ Concerning foresight St. Thomas says: "For it is the principal part of prudence, to which the other two parts are ordered; namely memory of past things and understanding of present things, according as from past things remembered and present things understood we conjecture concerning future things to be provided for."²⁵

7. Circumspection²⁶ is attentive consideration of circumstances; for it happens that something considered according to itself is good and suitable to the end; nevertheless from some circumstances it is rendered evil and unsuitable for attaining the end. Hence it is clear that circumspection is necessary for prudence.

8. Caution²⁷ is the care of avoiding all evils and impediments by which from without the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded, e.g. lest damage be incurred, lest neighbor be offended.²⁸

¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 48, a. unic.

¹⁹ Erinnerung, souvenir.

²⁰ S. theol. l. c. q. 47, a. 16.

²¹ A clear survey of the state of the matter and sound moral judgment. S. theol. l. c. q. 49, a. 2 ad 1, and a. 5 ad 3.

²² Resourcefulness, swift insight into the causes of an appearance, presence of mind; presence d'esprit, sagacity. Cf. S. theol. l. c. q. 49, a. 4.

²³ Plan of execution.

²⁴ Foreseeing the consequences of an act; prevoyance.

²⁵ S. theol. 1, q. 22, a. 1.

²⁶ Circumspection.

²⁷ Caution; precaution.

²⁸ Concerning the accurate difference between foresight, circumspection, and caution, see Cajetan in 2, 2, q. 49, a. 8.

625. There are no subjective parts. The parts of a cardinal virtue can be threefold, namely, subjective, integral, and potential. But subjective parts are not customarily assigned to fortitude, insofar as it is a special virtue, because it is not divided into virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely, dangers of death.¹¹²⁴ Whence fortitude is called a most specific species, because it has no other species of virtues under itself. Therefore, its integral and potential parts remain to be assigned.

Integral and potential parts. The same virtues are assigned to fortitude both as integral parts and as potential parts, although considered under a diverse respect. Four parts are enumerated by St. Augustine from Cicero: confidence (fiducia), or magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. Insofar as these four parts or virtues concern the same matter as fortitude, namely, dangers of death to be attacked and endured, they are integrating parts of fortitude, assisting toward its perfect act; but insofar as they concern less difficult matter, they are potential parts and, as it were, secondary virtues annexed to fortitude.

To the point the Angelic Doctor writes:¹¹²⁵ "There is a twofold act of fortitude, namely, to attack and to endure. Now for the act of attacking two things are required. The first of these pertains to the preparation of the soul, namely, that someone have a soul ready to attack, and with respect to this Tully posits confidence, whence he says that 'confidence is that by which the soul itself places much trust in itself, with certain hope, in great and honorable matters.' But the second pertains to the execution of the work, namely, lest someone fail in executing those things which he confidently began; and with respect to this Tully posits magnificence; whence he says that 'magnificence is the thought and administration of great and exalted matters with a certain ample and splendid proposal of soul,' that is, execution, so that administration may not fail an ample proposal. Therefore, these two, if they are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, namely, to dangers of death, will be as integral parts of it, without which fortitude cannot exist; but if they are referred to certain other matters in which there is less difficulty, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude according to their species; nevertheless they will be joined to it as the secondary to the principal: as magnificence is posited by the Philosopher concerning great expenditures, whereas magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence, concerns great honors.

"For the other act of fortitude, which is to endure, two things are required. The first of these is that the soul not be broken by sadness through the difficulty of threatening evils and fall away from its greatness; and with respect to this he posits patience, whence he says that 'patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous or difficult things for the sake of honorableness or utility.' But the other is that through prolonged suffering of difficult things a man not become weary to the point of desisting, according to this: 'That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds,'¹¹²⁶ and with respect to this he posits perseverance; whence he says that 'perseverance is a stable and perpetual continuance in a reason well considered.' These two also, if they are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, will be, as it were, integral parts of it; but if they are referred to any difficult matters whatsoever, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude; and nevertheless they are joined to it as secondary virtues to a principal one."

The individual virtues will now be treated one by one insofar as they are potential parts of fortitude.

¹¹²⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 128, a. un.

¹¹²⁵ Ib.

¹¹²⁶ Heb. 12:3.

The cardinal virtues are opposed to the four wounds of original sin, insofar as these are to be cured through them: namely prudence to ignorance in the intellect; justice to malice in the will; fortitude to weakness in the irascible appetite; temperance to concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite.

In what order of perfection the cardinal virtues follow one another, we have taught from St. Thomas above, p. 109, col. 1, q. 2°, Resp. 1°.

They are called cardinal because on them, as on hinges, the other moral virtues, which for this reason are called adjunct or annexed, are founded;² they are also called principal because they are conversant about that which is most important in the matter of moral virtues, and under this reason the remaining ones are called secondary.³ For all can be reduced to one of the principal virtues, and this in one of these three modes, namely either as subjective parts, or as integral parts, or as potential parts.

Subjective parts are those virtues which are subjected to some cardinal virtue as to a whole as so many species into which it is divided.

Integral parts are those which, although they are not necessary for the being of some cardinal virtue, are nevertheless required for its perfect act, just as, for example, for a perfect house a foundation, walls, and roof are required.

Potential parts are virtues connected indeed with some cardinal virtue, but ordered only to certain secondary acts or matters, in which the reason of some cardinal virtue is not found fully, perfectly, exactly, and which therefore do not equal the whole power of some cardinal virtue, but only some part of it, after the likeness of the soul, which through any one of the powers does not unfold its whole power, but only part of this power. ... These things being premised, hold these few things concerning the individual cardinal virtues and concerning certain annexed virtues.

I. Prudence¹ is a habit of the practical intellect dictating what, considering the circumstances here and now, is to be done as licit, decent, expedient, or is to be fled as illicit, not decent, not expedient.

The material object of prudence is actions here and now to be posited or omitted; the formal object is the truth of the practical intellect, not however the truth of the speculative intellect, because this pertains to science; and therefore, as with right conscience, speculative falsity can indeed underlie prudence, but practical falsity cannot.²

The chief acts of prudence are: 1. good counsel or to inquire concerning the means to the end; 2. to judge rightly, namely concerning the means found; 3. to prescribe or command, that is, to execute the things found and judged.³

The subjective parts or species of prudence are: private or personal prudence, by which one rules himself; and governing or moderating prudence, by which one rules a community, for instance a family (economic prudence), a city, province, kingdom (political), an army (military).⁵

The quasi-integral parts of prudence are: memory, namely instructed by many experiences which we ourselves have had concerning past affairs or have heard from others; understanding of present things; providence of future things; shrewdness or quick conjecture of a means; docility, by which we willingly receive the counsels of others; circumspection, by which the circumstances of an affair are attended to; caution, by which impediments which can stand in the way of execution are avoided.⁶

The potential parts of prudence are: eubulia, or the habit of inquiring well concerning means (good counsel); synesis, or the habit of judging well concerning means found according to common rules, as sensible persons, or men of good sense, do, as St. Thomas has it; gnome, or the habit of judging well according to higher principles, where common rules fail, as happens in epikeia.¹

The vices² opposed to prudence by defect are precipitation, inconsideration, negligence. The first is contrary to the first act of prudence, the second to the second, the third to the third (see above). By excess the following are opposed to prudence: astuteness, which if committed by words is called deceit, if by deeds fraud; and generally prudence of the flesh, which is described by St. Gregory the Pope in the sixteenth book of the Moralia on chapter XII of Job (see Roman Breviary, Common of Confessors not Pontiffs, Lesson 2 of the second Nocturn, in the place).

II. What justice is, and what its subjective parts are, see n. 580, 581.

The integral parts are more commonly said to be: to render his own right to each one, and to avoid injury of the same.

The potential parts are all moral virtues, namely under the reason of debt of honesty (n. 74, p. 37, col. 1, § Moreover); but more specially religion; piety toward parents, blood relatives, and country; observance, or worship and honor exhibited to Superiors and those constituted in dignity and corresponding to their dignity (obedience is referred to this by St. Thomas³); penance; veracity; gratitude; vindicative justice; affability or friendship, to which by excess flattery is opposed, by defect harshness of conversation; liberality. They are only potential parts, because they fall short of Justice either because they do not render what is equal to the right of another, as the four prior virtues; or because a rigorous and perfect right is lacking in the other, as in the remaining virtues.⁴

The act of justice is to render to each one what is his.⁵ What the object of justice is, see in the Treatise on Right and Justice.

III. Fortitude, as a special virtue, is the considered undertaking of dangers and the enduring of labors or evils.⁶

Therefore its remote material object is dangers and evils, especially the gravest; the proximate object is to preserve the mean between daring and fear, which are conversant about those dangers and evils, by moderating the former and restraining the latter.¹

The acts of this virtue are to undertake (dangers) and to endure (evils); yet the more principal act is to endure, because it is more difficult.²

No subjective parts are assigned to it, since it is an indivisible species; for it is conversant about dangers of death to be undergone and the greatest pains to be sustained, which, although some are greater than others, are all of the same species; but more and less do not change the species.³

The integral parts are: magnanimity, greatness of soul; magnificence, external execution of great things; patience, so that the soul is not broken by the magnitude of evil; perseverance, lest it be wearied by the duration of the same. The two former are necessary so that the first act, undertaking, may be exercised perfectly; the two latter so that the other act, enduring, may be exercised perfectly.⁴

The potential parts are the same as the integral parts, but insofar as they are conversant about dangers and evils of lesser moment.⁵

The vices opposed to this virtue by excess are timidity, daring, and presumption; by defect, defect of just fear or intrepidity, pusillanimity, and cowardice.⁶

IV. Temperance is the virtue placing the mean of reason in bodily delights, especially those of touch.⁷

Its subjective parts are: abstinence,⁸ to which gluttony is opposed; sobriety,⁹ to which drunkenness is opposed; chastity,¹⁰ to which lust is opposed; modesty, which nevertheless is not a virtue distinct in species from chastity, and differs from chastity only in this, that the latter is conversant about the act destined for the propagation of the species, the former about its circumstances or "signs,"¹¹ for instance kisses, touches, looks, etc. It is called modesty from shame, because concerning these acts, even when they are licitly done, an honest soul is especially ashamed. In other words: "modesty pertains to chastity as its special circumstance, although sometimes one is put for the other."¹² How manifold chastity itself is, see n. 482.

The integral parts are shamefacedness, or fear of a base act and of the confusion arising from it,¹³ and honesty, or love of spiritual beauty as agreeing with reason.¹

The potential parts² are continence, meekness, and modesty.

Continence is taken here, not generally for the drawing back of the appetite from everything toward which it tends immoderately, nor for the virtue restraining the appetite from libidinous delights, in which manner it coincides with chastity; but specially for a habit residing in the will, which it so confirms against the impulses of concupiscence, especially against the impulses of delights of touch and principally venereal delights, that however much they swell up, it is not drawn by them into depraved consent. It is a potential part of temperance, because it is not judged perfect temperance, but only half-formed; for indeed it confirms the will against the rebellious motions of the passions, yet does not suffice to prohibit them from rising up immoderately.³

Meekness is the virtue moderating anger. But because in anger there are two things, namely the motion of anger and vengeance, this virtue contains two beneath itself: one which moderates the interior motion of anger, and this retains the common name of meekness; but the other, which tempers the external vengeance or penalty to be inflicted because of an injury which has been brought, as much as justice permits, and is called clemency.⁴

Modesty is the virtue by which someone holds a mode consonant with his condition in internal and external motions and exterior apparatus.⁵ Hence he is called modest, as though holding measure or standing in measure.⁶ It is divided into humility, studiousness, modesty of manners, eutrapely, and modesty of adornment. The two former hold measure in internal motions; for humility so moderates the appetite of excellence that in the affection and love of this excellence it does not exceed its lot;⁷ but studiousness restrains the desire of knowing within due limits.⁸ - Modesty of manners and eutrapely moderate exterior motions and actions of the body, so namely that they may be done decently and honestly, both in those things which are done seriously and in those which are done in play. If it moderates the exterior motions of the body in those things which are done seriously, for instance gait, voice, laughter, gaze, etc., it is called modesty of manners;¹ but eutrapely, when measure and decorum are preserved in playful words and deeds, for instance in games, jokes, and other things which are done for the sake of relaxing the soul.² - Modesty of adornment moderates exterior apparatus, or holds measure in clothing, furnishings, banquets, and other similar things, so namely that both display may be avoided and yet decorum preserved.³

Incontinence is opposed to continence.

To meekness by excess is opposed irascibility, by defect softness of soul; to clemency by excess cruelty,⁴ by defect excessive lenity.

To humility by excess pride is contrary, by defect excessive self-abjection. To studiousness curiosity is contrary by excess,⁵ negligence by defect.

To modesty of manners by defect is opposed crudity or rusticity of manners; by excess, petulance, insolence, affected courtliness. To eutrapely, scurrility by excess,⁶ moroseness by defect.⁷ To modesty of adornment by defect, neglect of apparatus is opposed; by excess, luxury.⁸

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 58-60; De Virt. q. 1, a. 4, 5, 12.

591. Moral virtue is said from custom, that is, an inclination to acting, which properly belongs to the appetite; whence moral virtue is a habit by which the appetite is well disposed so that it may be conformed to reason. In fact, it is a habitual conformity to right reason. But since to choose is an act proper to the human appetite, hence moral virtue is a habit elective according to right reason, and it is defined by Aristotle, Eth. VI, c. 6: an elective habit consisting in a mean relative to us, determined by reason as the wise man will determine.¹ It is said:

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, in Eth. VI, c. 6, lect. 7.

1. an elective habit, because choice is the proper act of moral virtue, and because a moral habit is the principle of choice;

2. consisting in a mean relative to us: this is the object or term of this action. The moral good which is the object of virtue is a mean between excess and defect, which must be estimated not in itself, but with respect to the one choosing, so that he may choose what is fitting to himself according to right reason, neither more nor less;

3. determined by reason: this is the cause of goodness. For it is reason which determines the mean between excess and defect, so that it may be good. And because it happens that reason is not always right but also sometimes erroneous, there is added: as the wise man, that is, the prudent man, will determine; namely, reason through prudence will rightly estimate what is good or evil in acts of the appetite (q. 58, a. 1 and 59, a. 1).

592. Principle I. Moral virtues are necessary. - For both the rational and the sensitive appetite do not obey reason wholly at command, but can contradict it, because they are properly operative, that is, they have their own motions and actions. Whence for operating well it is required that not only the intellect be well disposed through prudence, but also the appetite be well disposed, for obeying reason, through the habits of moral virtues; otherwise it would be moved as if violently and with sadness (q. 58, a. 2).

593. Principle II. Moral virtue is not one in species but multiple, both by reason of the subject or diverse power in which it inheres, and by reason of the object (the formal principle), which can have itself in diverse ways toward reason, in which it can participate more or less, and thus states a diverse relation to reason directing (q. 59, a. 2 and 4; q. 60, a. 1).

For reason directs both the operations of the will by which man is disposed, even externally, toward another, and the passions of the sensitive appetite, whether of the concupiscible or of the irascible, so that they may be conformed to reason and thus man may be well disposed internally, in order to himself. Whence in a threefold way: both a) by reason of the matter about which they are principally² concerned (external operations, interior affections impelling or withdrawing), and b) by reason of the subject in which they inhere (will, concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite), and c) by reason of the formal object (good according to commensuration to another, or good according to commensuration only to the one operating, either as delectable or as arduous), there are distinguished in species virtues concerning operations of the will, - virtues concerning passions of the concupiscible, - and virtues concerning passions of the irascible (q. 60, a. 2).

² Principally, for virtues concerning operations can consequently be concerned with passions, insofar as these impede due operations, and conversely virtues concerning passions can also be concerned with operations, if the passions have exterior effects and state a relation to another. Whence St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 2: "But it happens that in operations which are toward another the good of virtue is omitted on account of an inordinate passion of the soul, and then insofar as the commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, there is a corruption of justice; but insofar as the commensuration of the interior passions is corrupted, there is a corruption of some other virtue, as when on account of anger someone strikes another, in the undue striking itself justice is corrupted, but in the immoderation of anger meekness is corrupted. And the same is clear in other cases."

594. Principle III. The virtues concerning operations are diverse. - All the virtues which are concerned with operations agree in the general account of debt toward another. But the account of debt is not of one account in all: in one way something is owed strictly from pact; in another way, not strictly, from a promise or a benefit received; in another way something is owed to an equal, in another to a superior, in another to a lesser. Whence, according to the diverse accounts of debt, the virtues concerning operations are diverse, for example, justice, religion, piety, gratitude, truth, etc. (q. 60, a. 3).

595. Principle IV. There are also diverse virtues concerning passions of the concupiscible or the irascible, not indeed from the fact that the passions are diverse, but when they state a diverse relation to reason.

Hence a) the same virtue is concerned with contrary passions, between which it holds the mean, for example, fortitude between fear and daring (q. 60, a. 4);

b) furthermore diverse passions can be ordered to one another and to one thing in a certain order, and in the same way can be repugnant (or suitable) to reason, as happens for the passions of the concupiscible: love, desire, and delight of the same good (and consequently also for hatred, flight, and sadness concerning the opposed evil); whence all those passions pertain not to diverse virtues but to the same virtue, for example, to temperance (a. 4);

c) on the contrary, when passions are ordered to a diverse good of reason, and thus state a diverse relation to reason, as happens for the passions of the irascible, which "are not of one order but are ordered to diverse things. For daring and fear are ordered to some great danger; hope and despair to some arduous good; but anger to overcoming some contrary which has inflicted harm. And therefore concerning these passions there are diverse virtues, namely... fortitude concerning fears and darings, magnanimity concerning hope and despair, meekness concerning angers" (q. 60, a. 4);

d) a fortiori when they pertain to diverse powers, because then they are concerned with diverse objects; whence some virtues are concerned with passions of the concupiscible (good as such), others with passions of the irascible (good as arduous), for example, temperance and fortitude, philotimy and magnanimity, liberality and magnificence, temperance and meekness, etc.³ (a. 5).

³ Because reason rules the lower parts of man and also extends to exterior things, not at command but "in a certain order (and according to conditions determined by nature), therefore also according as one object of passion is apprehended by sense or imagination - or also by reason, and according as it pertains to the soul, the body, or exterior things, it has a diverse relation to reason, and consequently is apt to diversify virtues. Therefore the good of man, which is the subject of love, concupiscence, and delight, can be taken either as pertaining to the sense of the body (for example, food), or to the interior apprehension of the soul (for example, money, honor); and this either as it is ordered to the good of man in himself, either as to the body (money) or as to the soul (honor); or as it is ordered to the good of man in order to others (actions and speech, whether serious, by which he renders himself delightful or manifests himself to another, or playful). And every such diversity, on account of the diverse order to reason, diversifies virtue..." And because certain goods "can be considered either absolutely or with arduousness..., it is clear that according to Aristotle there are ten moral virtues concerning passions, namely, fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimy, meekness, friendship, truth, and eutrapely." q. 60, a. 5.

596. Corollaries. - From what has been said it follows:

1. "That the first principle of all human operations is reason,... whence just as appetite (rational or sensitive) is a principle of human act according as it participates in reason in some way, so moral habit has the account of human virtue insofar as it is conformed to reason" (q. 58, a. 2).

2. Hence, just as intellectual virtue is rational by essence, so moral virtue is rational by participation, insofar as the appetite, whether the superior appetite of the will or the lower appetite of the sensitive life, participates in reason (q. 60, a. 1; q. 56, a. 4 and ad 1; a. 6, ad 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 59, a. 4, ad 2; q. 61, a. 2).

3. Moral virtues can exist without the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and art; not, however, without prudence, which is necessary for rightly taking the means to the end and which itself supposes understanding of practical principles (q. 58, a. 4).

4. Intellectual virtues can exist without moral virtues; however, prudence does not exist without these. For in order that a work be of the virtue of prudence, it must be done for a right end, or for the good; moral virtue provides the right end (a. 5).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61; De Virt. q. 5, a. 1; q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

597. Principle I. Certain virtues are called cardinal, as principal virtues on which the others are founded: thus metaphorically from the hinge on which a door is turned; whence those are so called on which, as on hinges, moral life turns and the whole right human life is founded.¹ Since they are principal in human life, they are not merely intellectual virtues and virtues in a qualified sense, but are virtues simply so called and moral virtues, which alone contain rectitude of appetite and which, with respect to good, surpass the intellectual virtues.

¹ Ambrose seems to have been the first who called them cardinal, exp. in Luc., l. V, n. 49 and 62.

That there are four cardinal virtues is proved:

1. By reason of the object: the good of reason, which is the object of virtue, can be considered either in the very act of reason which considers it, or in the various matters in which it must be produced, namely, in operations and in passions. But some passions impel toward something contrary to reason; others draw one back from that which reason dictates. Thus, therefore, there will be one principal virtue which makes good in reason itself: prudence; and one which makes good in operations: justice; and one which moderates and represses passions impelling to what is contrary to reason: temperance; and one which strengthens us against passions drawing us back from the order of reason: fortitude.

2. By reason of the subject: there are four faculties of the soul in which virtues reside, and in each there must be a principal virtue: therefore in reason there is prudence; in the will, justice; in the concupiscible, temperance; in the irascible, fortitude.

598. Cardinal virtues are not always understood by all in the same sense. - For some take them in a generic sense, as general modes which are found in several, indeed in all virtues;² either:

² Thus Ambrose and Gregory.

a) as four genera or collections of virtues, under which all the others are contained as species, so that whatever virtue makes good in the consideration of reason is called prudence (for example, eubulia), and whatever virtue makes rectitude in operations is called justice (for example, religion, piety, gratitude), and whatever virtue restrains and represses passions is called temperance (for example, meekness, humility), and whatever virtue makes firmness of soul against whatever passions is called fortitude (for example, magnificence, magnanimity); - or also

b) as general conditions required for any virtue whatever, insofar as every virtue ought to be prudent, just, strong, and moderated.

But although these things are true, nevertheless they do not describe the proper nature of the cardinal virtues in the strict sense.

599. Principle II. Cardinal virtues are to be taken in a specific sense and are special virtues, which have determinate matter and are distinguished from all others. For:

a) In each genus of virtues (of which there has been treatment above) there is something greatest, chief, and more difficult, concerning which there is had a special virtue: thus in the act by which reason considers, the chief and more difficult thing is to command well rather than to counsel and judge well; in operations toward another, the chief thing is the rectitude due to strict equality, in which rectitude most shines forth, namely, in commutations and distributions; similarly it is more difficult to restrain the more vehement delights, namely, the delights of touch, and to strengthen man against the greatest dangers, namely, dangers of death. Whence there are four principal virtues, as being those which are concerned with principal matter: prudence strictly so called, which is preceptive of the good; justice properly so called, which is concerned with due actions between equals; temperance properly so called, which represses the concupiscences of the delights of touch; and fortitude strictly so called, which strengthens against dangers of death.

b) But because he who is well disposed to doing the chief and more difficult thing thereby has a certain inchoate disposition and facility for the less difficult, according to the saying: He who can do the greater can do the lesser (just as he who can restrain the concupiscences of the flesh, which is more difficult, thereby is more apt for restraining other passions, which is easier; and he who is just can already become liberal, grateful, pious, which otherwise he could not), hence he who has these four special virtues has, at least according to an inchoation, all the other moral virtues; and therefore they are the foundation of all the others, and are rightly called cardinal.³

³ Cf. St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 4; and De Virt., q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

But the others are called annexed virtues, which are concerned with secondary acts or matters, or potential parts, as not having the whole power of the principal virtue.

In the first volume of this work, which is inscribed: "On Principles," there are found declared the wholly general principles of the whole of moral theology, and besides those special principles which regard the theological virtues. But since these virtues are concerned with the ultimate end itself, and in operable things the end is the first principle, hence those things which regard the theological virtues are also held among the more general principles of those things which rule practical science.

Now we come to treat of those things which are concerned with the means to the ultimate end. Some means are intrinsically necessary from the very nature of the thing, and to these the moral virtues dispose us, which are the four cardinal virtues with their annexed virtues; others are due from the positive and extrinsic ordination of God, namely, the sacraments instituted by Christ.

Leaving sacramental doctrine for the third volume, in this second volume is contained the ample matter concerning the cardinal and annexed virtues, with their acts, and the precepts and gifts pertaining to them, the opposite sins being at the same time considered; and indeed according to the doctrine and ordering of St. Thomas.

But since there are several positive determinations concerning these things, such as of ecclesiastical law concerning religion or temperance, or of civil law especially in the matter of justice, present-day law also will have to be considered, both canonical and civil: especially French law, which, having been worked out earlier and having been adopted in our country for a great part, was an exemplar for very many modern legislations, whose dispositions nevertheless, at least in the principal matters, should not seem to be passed over, so that their analogies and differences and particular orderings may be brought to light.

Whatever good, friendly reader, you will find in the work, attribute to God, the fountain of all goods, and to the great doctors and masters whose doctrine is reported, especially St. Thomas; whatever there is of defect or imperfection, attribute to the author and his weakness.

May God will that not weakness prevail, but His Truth and Wisdom, unto His praise and glory and the salvation of souls.

I was writing on the octave day of the feast of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, July 6, 1931.

The Author.

391. NOTION. Prudence is defined by the Angelic Doctor (2.2, q. 47, a. 2): right reason of things to be done. By others: "A habit of the practical intellect, for rightly determining, through an act of command, what is to be done in any particular case."

Hence: 1. The material object of prudence is particular human actions. But the formal object is the mean of reason, between defect and excess; or practical rectitude, as a form to be impressed upon each action (cf. n. 383, 2).

2. Prudence, by reason of its subject, is an intellectual virtue; for it resides in the intellect, so that it may decide what we ought to pursue and from what we ought to decline. But by reason of its object it is moral; for it is occupied about morals, all of which it directs, and over which it commands, although it does not elicit them: whence it is an essentially practical virtue (St. Thom., l. c., a. 5).

392. Acts of prudence. There are three acts or functions of prudence: 1. Prudence consults well, that is, it diligently and without precipitation investigates and deliberates what means, what circumstances, are necessary, so that the work may be done honestly and virtuously. 2. Prudence judges rightly, that is, after diligent deliberation, it firmly concludes and pronounces what means, among those sought and found, are good and fitting. 3. Prudence commands efficaciously, namely by moving the moral virtues to the execution of those things which have been diligently deliberated and firmly judged (Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. 3, c. 24, n. 5).

But these acts, so that they may be done duly, must be exercised with solicitude and fitting diligence; and if someone has applied this, and has done what he could, although he speculatively errs, nevertheless the judgment will be prudent, and he will not sin (cf. n. 21). See Billuart, de Prud., Diss. 1, a. 2.

From these things you will gather: 1. Prudence, in its functions, depends much upon the moral virtues: partly because the virtues restrain the passions, which disturb reason in the consideration of the honest, and display a delectable good; partly because they so dispose the subject that the honest work exhibits itself as most congruous to him, as drink to the thirsty, food to the hungry. "For each one judges according as he is affected." And: "As each one is, so does the end appear to him."

2. Perfect prudence cannot exist except in upright men, who have the affection rightly disposed in every matter of virtue. For these alone, in any business that occurs, are able to judge rightly. But in men who are not upright, or who are given to some vice, only imperfect prudence can exist: namely that maimed prudence by which they only consult and judge well toward some particular good, but not toward the end of the whole of human life; or by which, although they consult and judge well as regards this whole end, they by no means bring to effect the things which they consult and judge (cf. Lessius, de Prud., c. 1, n. 30-35).

393. Parts of prudence. I. The integrating parts, or endowments of perfect prudence, are eight, namely:

1. Memory, or recollection of past things; for past things teach us; whence that worn saying: "Believe Robert, the experienced one." 2. Understanding, that is, full knowledge of the state of the matter here and now to be done, and of the moral principles which ought to concur for judging prudently. 3. Providence, which, as if seeing from afar, considers the end of the work and future events. 4. Shrewdness, that is, sudden and ready discovery of a fitting means. 5. Docility, or promptness of soul for taking hold of others' counsels. 6. Reason, that is, a certain promptness in reasoning and gathering one thing from another. 7. Circumspection, or attention to all the circumstances of the work, lest some requisite be lacking. 8. Caution, or care of avoiding evils and impediments by which, from without, the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 48 and 49).

394. II. The subjective parts, that is, the species of prudence, are numbered as two, namely:

1. Personal or monastic prudence, through which man rules himself; this alone can absolutely and simply be called prudence. 2. Governing prudence, by which man rules others. This is manifold, namely domestic, civil, pastoral, military, etc. (2.2, q. 50). It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better (2.2, q. 47, a. 11, 12).

395. III. The potential parts of prudence, that is, the companion virtues which prudence uses, are numbered as three:

1. Eubulia, which is the habit of consulting rightly, that is, of finding good counsel in doubtful matters. 2. Synesis, or the habit of judging rightly concerning things consulted. Through this, men are called well-sensed. 3. Gnome, that is, the habit of judging rightly, when there is need, from higher principles, beyond the common rules of things to be done, yet according to the mind of the legislator. The act which corresponds to this in the will is called epikeia (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 51). Cf. n. 173 and n. 403, 3.

396. Vices opposed to prudence. I. Imprudence is opposed to prudence THROUGH DEFECT; under this name commonly come: 1. Precipitation, by which someone undertakes some work without sufficient deliberation. 2. Inconsideration, by which judgment concerning means is made without due attention. 3. Inconstancy of mind, that is, change of opinion on account of no cause or a slight cause. 4. Negligence, or omission of the diligence required for urging the execution of the matter deliberated (2.2, q. 53 and 54).

What kind of sin, you will ask, is imprudence? - Resp. Imprudence can be taken in three ways: 1. negatively, for the mere lack of prudence; and thus it can be without sin, as is clear in children; 2. privatively, for the lack of due prudence; and in this way it is a general sin, which is found in every theological fault; 3. contrariwise, when the counsels of prudence are positively spurned and repudiated; and in this way imprudence is a special sin, and indeed mortal, if there is grave contempt of divine rules; otherwise it will be venial.

397. II. Those things which have a likeness with prudence itself are opposed to prudence THROUGH EXCESS, namely:

1. Prudence of the flesh, which is the diligent devising of means for fulfilling the instincts of corrupt nature; and these can regard external goods, or the delectations of the senses, or one's own excellence. This prudence is of itself mortal, according to that saying (Rom. 8:6): The prudence of the flesh is death.

Indeed, moderate solicitude concerning temporal goods is not condemned, but that solicitude which is superfluous and disturbs the soul: because it imports distrust in the providence of God, and is a grave or venial sin according to the gravity of the matter (2.2, q. 55, a. 1).

2. Astuteness (or craftiness, or cunning), which is knowledge and use of depraved means for deceiving, with the intention of attaining what is intended, whether good or evil. Yet properly astuteness is taken in an evil sense (St. Thom., l. c., a. 3).

398. NOTION. Justice, taken generally, designates the complex of all virtues. For that is called just which equals its measure.

But justice, as a cardinal virtue, is customarily defined: "The constant and perpetual will of giving each one his right." Thus defined, it comprehends all moral virtues which are toward another, that is, toward God or toward one's neighbor (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 57).

The material object of justice is a thing or action in some way owed to another. But the formal object is the notion of debt, or the special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own (Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 1).

For true and perfect justice three things are required, namely: 1. that it be altogether toward another; for, since the name of justice imports equality, from its nature justice has this, that it is toward another; for nothing is equal to itself, but to another; 2. that it be occupied about a rigorous debt, that is, about a debt from whose violation not only moral baseness is contracted, as in all those things which are owed from the title of honesty (for example, of gratitude), but a strict obligation of restitution or reparation arises; 3. that it render to equality, that is, as much as is owed (2.2, q. 58, a. 2).

Between father and son, husband and wife, Creator and creature, there is not justice properly and simply so called in those things, namely, which they owe as son, as father, etc.; because the son, as son, is not considered diverse from the father, but something of the father; similarly the wife is considered one flesh with the husband, etc. It is otherwise if such persons should come together in some contract, as fellow citizens and distinct parties; for then the status of the persons would be something secondary, and their agreement would regard a debt of justice alone. Likewise, if a son should kill his father, he would violate not piety alone, but also justice, because the father, considered as a man, has a right to life, as do the rest.

399. Parts of justice. I. The integral parts are: 1. to do good under the aspect of debt; 2. to decline from evil under the aspect of injury. Whence St. Ambrose (de Offic., l. 1, c. 24, n. 115): "Justice assigns his own to each one, does not claim what is another's."

400. II. The subjective parts, or species of justice, are assigned as three, namely commutative, distributive, and legal justice.

The reason of the division is that there is a threefold respect under which justice gives to another what is his: namely, the respect either of part to part, or of the whole to the part, or of the part to the whole. For the first is established commutative justice, through which a part renders to a fellow part what is his. For the second is placed distributive justice, through which the superior of the community dispenses the common goods according to the merits of individuals. For the third is assigned legal justice, through which all and each give what is owed to the community by reason and force of the laws (St. Alph., III, 486).

1. COMMUTATIVE justice is the virtue inclining a private man to render to another private man his strict right, an absolute equality of the thing to be rendered to the thing accepted being preserved (cf. n. 383). Nevertheless commutative justice can intervene between a private person and the community, but only where the community has itself after the manner of a private man.

It is called commutative, because it is founded chiefly upon various contracts and upon the innumerable exchanges which are accustomed to take place among men. It is also called strict or rigorous, because those three things which are required for perfect justice are present in it, and in it alone (n. 398, 2).

Note. Various species of injuries are opposed to commutative justice, concerning which in the last six precepts of the Decalogue.

2. DISTRIBUTIVE justice is the virtue which inclines the community, or its prince as minister, to distribute rewards, dignities and honors, and also common burdens, according to the proportion of merits or capacities.

This differs specifically from commutative justice, because it has a diverse formal object, namely the debt of the community, as such, to the parts; whence it comes about that it establishes or regards a diverse equality. For commutative justice regards arithmetical equality, such as there is between two equalities, for example ten and ten. But distributive justice looks to geometrical equality or proportion, which consists in the proportion of the thing to be distributed with the dignity and merit, or capacity, of the person to whom it is to be distributed, comparison being made to others to whom right also belongs in the distribution of goods or burdens. It is imperfect justice, because it is not founded upon strict right, but upon a debt of fittingness (2.2, q. 61, a. 2).

Note. Acceptance of persons is opposed to distributive justice; concerning this we shall speak when discussing the offices of the Bishop, prince, judge, etc. If something to be divided equally among several by strict right were divided unequally, for example a common treasury, a public foundation, etc., commutative justice also would be violated.

3. LEGAL, or GENERAL, justice is the virtue which inclines a private person, or a prince, to render all those things which are owed to the community, in order to the common good. It is called legal, because it is occupied about all things established by laws for the common good. It is called general, insofar as it commands and directs the acts of all virtues to the general prosperity of the commonwealth.

Nevertheless it is a special virtue, because it has a special object, namely public right, or the good of the whole, to be procured by the part, namely by the head or by a member. It is true justice, because between the community and citizens there is true equality, while one renders to the other all that he owes him according to the laws. But it falls short of the notion of perfect justice, because it is not perfectly toward another, since this other is something of the whole. Yet it is nobler than the other species of justice, since the common good, which it regards, is superior to the private good; and since the common good must be procured, or at least preserved, in such a way that private good is always subordinated to it.

Note. To legal justice is opposed: materially, every transgression of laws; formally, and as a special sin, contempt of law, or of the common good, whether on the part of private persons, when deliberately they act against it, as, for example, internationalists, socialists; or on the part of the prince, and of other persons set over others, when they neglect the common good which is endangered, or prefer private good to it (Lessius, l. c., l. 2, c. 1, n. 11).

It is asked: What is VINDICATIVE justice?

Resp. It is the virtue inclining the prince or magistrate of the community to punish the guilty according to the laws. The object of this justice is punishment to be done according to merit; the subject is the judge constituted by legitimate authority, to whom alone it belongs to take vengeance concerning delicts.

This justice primarily pertains to legal justice. Yet often it also pertains to commutative justice: both because the judge, from office and on account of salary, is bound to protect and preserve the public good; and because he ought so to punish delicts that he also exact and procure reparation of the damage which has been inflicted upon private persons. Hence not rarely judges, on account of their negligence in punishing, are obligated to restitution, whether toward the community or toward private persons (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 62, a. 7).

401. III. The potential parts, or virtues annexed to justice, are those which indeed regard another, but in some way fall short of the notion of perfect justice. Nine virtues of this kind are numbered, distributed into three classes (2.2, q. 80, a. un.).

The FIRST CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice for this reason, that the debt which they render to another cannot be rendered to equality. These virtues are: religion, piety, and observance. See the things to be said at n. 530 and 687 seqq.

402. The SECOND CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice because the debt which they render to another is not indeed required by force of justice, but only from the honesty of virtue; yet it is so required that its omission is a sin. - Of this kind are: truthfulness, gratitude, and vindication.

1. TRUTHFULNESS, or truth, inclines to always saying what is true. To this virtue are recalled: a) FAITH or fidelity in promises; b) SIMPLICITY, by which someone exteriorly exhibits himself in words and deeds as he is interiorly.

2. GRATITUDE inclines to compensating a benefit received. But recompensation is made: a) by affection, through kindly acknowledgment, or estimation, of the benefit received; b) by effect, through opportune giving of thanks and requital of the benefit.¹

3. VINDICATION, or severity, repels force or injury, and whatever is going to harm, by defending or avenging. The special object of this virtue is vengeance, required and to be taken by a legitimate judge; not with the mind of harming, but either from zeal for recovering honor unjustly taken away, or from love of that honesty which shines in the punishment of the malefactor, to whom punishment is owed of itself, just as thanks to a benefactor. See the things said (n. 400) concerning vindicative justice.

Related to vindication is penance, concerning which we shall speak at n. 1644.

403. The THIRD CLASS comprises those virtues which regard a certain debt contributing to greater honesty, and whose omission of itself involves no sin. The virtues of this third class are liberality and affability; to which equity can be numbered, although this is rather referred to legal justice.

1. LIBERALITY moderates the love of money, so that we may freely and promptly expend it for our own usefulness and our neighbor's, and for God's honor. To this is referred MERCY, insofar as it is a moral virtue inclining to relieving another's misery.

2. AFFABILITY (to which friendship, urbanity, and benevolence are referred) renders conversation with one's neighbor pleasing and decent. For man is bound, says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 114, a. 2, ad 2), from the natural debt of honesty, to live pleasantly with others.

3. EQUITY, or epikeia, inclines to acting contrary to the words of the law, when some higher consideration demands it. See the things said at n. 173.

404. Vices opposed to justice. Besides formal injustice, which, either by damaging or by taking away, wounds the goods of man, there are given multiple other vices which are opposed to the potential parts of justice, whether by excess or by defect.

To religion are opposed those things concerning which the first three precepts of the Decalogue treat.

To piety are opposed impiety, cosmopolitanism (defect), and nationalism (excess). Cf. Muller, l. 2, § 34, 40.

To observance are opposed irreverence and disobedience.

Contrary to truthfulness are: lying, simulation, and revelation of a secret.

To gratitude are opposed: indiscreet gratitude (excess) and ingratitude (defect).

Severity not tempered degenerates into cruelty or excessive lenity.

Enemies to liberality are prodigality (excess) (cf. n. 363) and avarice (defect).

Affability is a mean between flattery (excess) and moroseness (defect) or envy.

405. NOTION. Fortitude, taken broadly, is firmness of soul in operating good. Taken strictly, it is a cardinal virtue, confirming the soul of man for duly undertaking or sustaining difficult things, chiefly dangers of death (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123-140). Cf. Lessius, de Jur. et Just., l. 3.

The material object of fortitude is dangers and labors; but the formal object is the honesty which firm constancy of soul in undertaking or sustaining arduous things contains.

There is a twofold act of fortitude: to undertake and to sustain with firmness of soul. But this latter is the more principal, because (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123, a. 6) it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring. - To this second act pertains martyrdom, concerning which at n. 1452.

406. Parts of fortitude. I. There are no subjective parts or species of fortitude (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 128, a. 1): because this virtue, taken strictly, is occupied about matter contained within narrower limits and entirely specified, namely about dangers of death: and these dangers, although some are greater than others, nevertheless are contained in the same genus.

II. The integrating parts of fortitude (which can also be called potential, when and insofar as they are extended to less arduous matters) are four, namely: magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance.

1. MAGNANIMITY is a virtue inclining to great and heroic works in every genus of virtues. To this virtue pertain confidence or trust and security. The difference between security and confidence consists in this, that security imports a certain perfect quiet of soul from fear; but confidence imports a certain strength of hope. - Goudin treats excellently concerning magnanimity, Philosoph., P. III, q. 6, a. 4.

2. MAGNIFICENCE is a virtue inclining to great works (chiefly to those which pertain to the worship of God) to be completed with great expenses, according to the prescription of right reason. It differs from magnanimity because this latter intends great things in every matter, while magnificence regards only things to be made. St. Thomas (2.2, q. 134, a. 2, ad 3).

3. PATIENCE is a virtue strengthening the soul in the toleration of afflictions. Through it, the good of reason is preserved against sadness, lest reason succumb to affliction. This virtue is most necessary to man, because in this mortal life evils must be tolerated by him, immense in number and gravity, and because the passion of sadness has much power for impeding the good of reason, according to that saying (2 Cor. 7:10): The sadness of the world works death; and (Eccli. 30:25): Sadness has killed many, and there is no usefulness in it. To patience is joined LONGANIMITY, which is the equanimous toleration of affliction arisen from the delay of a hoped-for good.

4. PERSEVERANCE is a virtue by which man firmly persists in a good work, notwithstanding annoyances and difficulties which arise from the long duration of the act. Related to it is CONSTANCY, a virtue which bestows so great an immutability in good that man preserves an even mind in all things, and perseveres unchanging against whatever difficulties arise.

Vices opposed to fortitude. To fortitude are opposed rashness (excess), by which someone undertakes arduous things contrary to the prudent dictate of reason, and cowardice (defect), which flees from undertaking what is fitting for repelling evil. Also opposed are fearlessness (excess), which does not fear when it ought, and timidity (defect), which grows afraid inordinately.

Furthermore, considering the potential parts of fortitude, we have the following:

Contrary to magnanimity are: presumption, ambition (excess), and pusillanimity (defect).

To magnificence are opposed: parvificence (defect) and profusion (excess).

To patience are opposed: impatience (excess) and insensibility (defect).

Perseverance is wounded by: pertinacity (excess), inconstancy and softness (defect).

407. NOTION. Temperance, taken broadly, is that moderation of soul which pertains to all parts of life, and is common to every virtue. Taken strictly, it is a cardinal virtue which, according to the rule of reason, moderates the appetite in those things which most allure, namely in the delectations of taste and touch (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 150-170). Cf. Lessius, de Just., l. 4.

The material object of temperance is bodily delectations, namely those which are ordered to the preservation either of the individual or of the species, and are perceived from foods, drinks, and venereal things. The formal object is the honest use of the same, or the honesty of moderation which is applied in these, such as is consonant with the dignity of human nature.

The rule or measure of temperance, which reason assigns, is taken according to the necessity of the present life. St. Augustine beautifully expresses this thus (de Mor. Eccl., c. 21): "The temperate man has a rule in the things of this life..., that he love none of them, think none to be sought for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of life and of duties, as much as is enough, with the modesty of one using, not with the affection of one loving." Yet under the name necessity, understand also usefulness or fittingness, according to the condition of the person, state, occupation, etc.

408. Parts of temperance. I. The integral parts which concur for the perfection of temperance are shamefacedness and honesty.

1. Shamefacedness is fear or flight from a base act, and from the confusion arising from it. It is not properly a virtue, but rather a certain passion, yet good and praiseworthy. 2. Honesty is love and pursuit of decorum. Indeed honesty (the state of honor), generally, does not differ from virtue, nor from decorum or moral beauty; nevertheless, honesty and beauty are attributed by a special title to temperance, because it belongs to this virtue to repel altogether that which is most base in man.

409. II. The subjective parts, or species of temperance, are: abstinence and sobriety in the matter of taste; chastity and modesty about venereal things (St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 8; Lessius, opusc. Hygiasticon). Cf. the things to be said at n. 757, 764, and 1218.

410. III. The potential parts of temperance are secondary virtues which imitate this principal virtue in an easier matter. Whence moderation of any inordinate movement is a potential part of temperance.

Virtues of this kind are especially numbered as seven, namely: continence, meekness, clemency, humility, modesty, studiousness, and eutrapelia.

1. CONTINENCE is a virtue which resists movements of concupiscence provoking to intemperance. To contain oneself (2.2, q. 155, a. 1, ad 2) is the same as to hold oneself in oneself, according to reason. Continence differs from temperance as the imperfect and begun differs from the perfect and complete. The temperate man has already overcome the concupiscences of foods, drinks, and venereal things; but the continent man so restrains the same concupiscences, still rebellious, that the superior part of the soul is not conquered.

2. MEEKNESS is a virtue which moderates anger according to the dictate of right reason, namely so that man does not grow angry except when, and as much, and in the way that he ought (St. Alph., Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 6 and 12).

3. CLEMENCY is a virtue mitigating punishments within the limits of right reason; or, it is the lenity of a superior toward an inferior, remitting something from due punishment, as much as justice, the good of discipline, the salvation of the delinquent, and public edification permit.

4. HUMILITY is defined by St. Bernard (de Grad. hum., c. 1, n. 2): "A virtue by which man, by the truest knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself." And by St. Thomas (2.2, q. 161, a. 1): "A virtue tempering and restraining the soul, lest it tend immoderately to lofty things." A twofold humility is usually distinguished: humility of judgment or cognition, by which we know that we are nothing before God; and humility of affection or of heart, by which we tread underfoot the glory of the world. Wherefore St. Thomas (ibid., a. 6) says: "Humility consists essentially in appetite, according as someone restrains the impulse of his soul, lest he tend inordinately toward great things; but it has its rule in cognition,"

"namely, that someone not judge himself to be above that which he is; and the principle and root of both is reverence which one has toward God." See St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 11.

Note. HUMILITY pleases God exceedingly; for it is a certain profession of truth, which especially redounds to his honor. But how necessary it is to man for obtaining eternal salvation is gathered from the words of Christ the Lord saying (Matt. 18:3): Unless you become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Cf. also ibid., 11:29. Whence St. Augustine (Ep. ad Dioscorum) says: "The first virtue is humility; the second, humility; the third, humility; and as often as you would ask, I would say this" (cf. n. 386, 1).

5. MODESTY is defined: A virtue by which someone keeps himself within the mode and limits congruous to him, as regards internal and external movements (2.2, q. 160 and 168). Yet only moderation of externals pertains to modesty strictly so called. It is twofold: a) Modesty OF MOVEMENTS, which arranges the movements of the body, in words and actions, according to the mode of reason. b) Modesty OF CULT, which applies the moderation of reason in exterior arrangement, or in clothing, furniture, banquets, according to the condition of person, time, place, etc. See St. Thom., l. c., q. 169.

This virtue indeed has humble matter, but by right great praise: for the exterior man is the indicator of the interior, nor easily can man in exterior habit act constantly according to the norm of right reason, unless interiorly he has all things well ordered and is furnished with other virtues. But on the contrary, the exercise of modesty also helps much toward acquiring, preserving, and increasing other virtues (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 876).

6. STUDIOUSNESS is a virtue which moderates the appetite of knowing, and study itself, according to right reason. The office of this virtue is: a) to restrain the excessive appetite of knowing; b) to incite to diligently learning matters fitting to the condition and capacity of each one (St. Alph., H. Ap., VII, 52); c) to refer study and acquired knowledge to the due end, namely to one's own or another's usefulness, and to the glory of God (2.2, q. 166).

7. EUTRAPELIA (modesty in playful things) is a virtue preserving mode and decorum in sayings and deeds instituted for the recreation of the soul (2.2, q. 167). - "I will that at last you spare yourself," says St. Augustine (de Musica, l. 2, at the end): "for it pleases that the wise man sometimes relax the attention decently intent on things to be done." Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 178; ed. G., I, p. 483.

Vices opposed to temperance. To temperance are directly opposed: a) by excess, insensibility toward delectable things, such that one refuses to use them even if one ought. Of itself, this is venial, but for some persons (for example, for spouses) it can become mortal; b) by defect, intemperance, by which someone immoderately pants after pleasures, contrary to the rules of reason (2.2, q. 124, a. 4).

To the SUBJECTIVE PARTS, the species of temperance, many vices are opposed, namely: to abstinence, gluttony (cf. n. 364); to sobriety, drunkenness (cf. n. 757); to chastity, lust (cf. n. 767); to modesty, immodesty (cf. n. 769).

To the POTENTIAL PARTS of temperance several vices are opposed, whether by defect or by excess:

To meekness are opposed irascibility (defect) and excessive indulgence (excess).

Clemency holds the mean between cruelty (defect) and lenity (excess). Cf. n. 403, 3.

To humility is opposed inordinate self-abjection (excess), for example, if a father casts himself down beneath a son, and pride (defect), concerning which we have already spoken at n. 360.

To modesty are opposed both courtliness and luxury (defect), and rusticity and neglect of fitting arrangement.

Studiousness holds itself as mean between curiosity (excess) and negligence of studies (defect).

Finally, eutrapelia is equally hostile to moroseness (defect) and to buffoonery (excess), concerning which the Apostle speaks to the Ephesians, 5:4. See n. 2231, concerning games prohibited to a cleric.

Thou shalt not have strange gods before me...
(Exod. 20:3).

529. The first precept, by forbidding that a false deity be worshiped, prescribes the worship which is owed to the true God. This precept is so general that it already includes the two following in itself. Yet these were proposed explicitly because, for the gravity of the matter, the sanctification of the divine Name and the appointing of a day singularly consecrated to divine worship demanded a special promulgation for themselves (Cat. Rom., on the 1st and 3rd precept, n. 1).

But here there comes to be treated: 1. the virtue of religion in general; 2. the acts of religion commanded by the first precept; 3. the sins opposed to the same precept.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 81; St. Alphonsus, III, tr. 1; ed. G., p. 370; Suarez, de Virt. Relig.; Lessius, de Just., P. 2, c. 34; Aertnys, l. III, tr. 1; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 459; Noldin, II, n. 131; Piscetta, II, tr. 2; Berardi, tr. 2, n. 312; Huby, Manuel d'Hist. des Relig.

530. NOTION. RELIGION, as it is taken here, is defined: A moral virtue inclining man to the due worship to be exhibited to God as the first Principle of all things and the supreme Lord.

The MATERIAL object of religion is worship owed to God. - The FORMAL object is the special honesty which is apprehended in that worship, on account, namely, of the supreme excellence of God.

The virtue of religion holds the first place among the moral virtues, because, after the theological virtues, it approaches more closely to God. By the bond of religion man is united with God, but not in the same way as in the theological virtues, insofar as man, by exercising acts of religion, first proclaims himself to be distinct from God and subject to God the Creator.

The virtue of religion is specifically one. It indeed has various offices, contains eminently piety, observance, and gratitude, and also has various acts, as to vow, to pray, etc.; but it produces all these things from one formal motive of worshiping God (Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 36, n. 14).

These things having been premised, we shall speak: 1. of the notion of worship; 2. of the species of sacred worship; 3. of the distinction of acts of religion, by which due worship is exhibited to God.

531. DEFINITION. Worship, in general, is honor furnished with submission. And since honor is a sign of our estimation concerning another's excellence, worship can be defined: testimony of another's excellence and of one's own submission (Polm., 2.2, n. 780 and 781). - HONOR is exhibited not only to Superiors, but also to equals, indeed to inferiors, according to that saying of the Apostle (Rom. 12:10): With honor preventing one another. And God himself furnishes honor to his Saints. - But worship is attributed to Superiors alone, because it includes fitting submission of oneself to another's excellence. Cf. n. 554.

DIVISION. 1. By reason of the object which is worshiped, worship is civil or religious, according as it regards natural or supernatural excellence.

Civil worship is called filial, if it regards parents; political, if it regards persons constituted in dignity. Religious worship is called such simply, if it regards the supernatural excellence of a man still a wayfarer, for example of a priest, Bishop, or also of one demonstrating singular sanctity. But it is called SACRED worship (in the stricter sense), if it regards divine excellence, whether in itself or inseparably communicated, as is that of the blessed who are indivisibly joined with God.

2. By reason of the intended end, worship is: absolute, if it is attributed to someone on account of excellence inhering in him, for example to God, or to the Saints on account of their dignity; respective or relative, if it is attributed either to a person or to an inanimate thing on account of the relation which it has with some person worthy of honor, for example to a servant in view of the master; to a statue or image in view of the prototype.

3. By reason of the mode in which it is attributed, worship is internal or external, insofar as it is exhibited either by internal powers of the soul, or by external acts of the body.

But external worship is either public or private. a) PUBLIC, or liturgical, is that which is exhibited in the name and by the authority of the Church, and in the form prescribed by her. b) PRIVATE, that to which one of these conditions is lacking. Thus,

for example, a layman reciting the divine Office exhibits only private worship: because, although he observes the form prescribed by the Church, nevertheless he does not act in the name and by the authority of the Church. Nor does worship cease to be private if all the laymen of some parish, jointly in the sacred building, recite prayers approved by the Church: because they do not act in the name of the Church. On the contrary, it is public, although a subdeacon privately pays the divine Office: because here he acts in the name of the Church and in the form prescribed by her (Kon., n. 322).

Note. The form prescribed by the Church comprehends two things: 1. WORDS, which are either from God or from the Church; 2. RITE, or liturgical action, which again is either from Christ the Lord, as the essential rite of the sacrifice of the Mass and the matter of the sacraments; or from the Church, as the various gestures, inclinations of the head, etc. Each is to be sought from the liturgical books and from decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, and the vulgar tongue is never to be employed. See n. 1742.¹

532. We distinguish a twofold species of sacred worship, namely of latria and of dulia, according to the uncreated or created excellence which it regards. Wherefore we shall treat: 1. of the worship of latria; 2. of the worship of dulia (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 10).

DEFINITION. The worship of LATRIA (or adoration) is honor exhibited to God on account of his supreme excellence, superior to all things, with a protestation of our every-kind submission toward him.

533. PRINCIPLES. I. God alone is to be worshiped with the worship of latria. It is established 1. from Matt. 4:10: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve; 2. by reason, because God, and he alone, has supreme and infinite excellence, communicable to no creature.

II. The most holy humanity of Christ the Lord, considered as joined to the Word, is to be worshiped with the worship of latria, absolute indeed, but simultaneous with the Word. The same is to be said concerning the species of bread and wine in the Eucharist, which, as sacramentally united to Christ the Lord, are co-adored. See the dogmatic theologians.

III. The most holy Name of Christ, drops of the most holy Blood left behind, the Cross and other instruments of the Passion are also to be adored with the worship of latria, but respective: with the worship of latria, because they represent Christ, or were in some way joined to him; respective, because they have only extrinsic excellence.

The same holds concerning sacred vessels and ornaments, churches, and other things or places specially deputed to the worship of God. "Their worship is reduced to the worship of latria by reason of the sacrifice to which they are ordered" (III, 132).

534. Let the following be noted FOR PRACTICE:

I. The most holy Blood which is preserved in certain churches as an eminent relic is not worshiped with absolute adoration, because in fact it does not retain the hypostatic union (S. R. C., n. 2660; Collius, de Sang. Christi, l. V, disp. 8, c. 6).

II. The true Cross is adored by a twofold title: 1. as an eminent relic of Christ, even if divided into the smallest parts; 2. as an image representing Christ crucified. Other crosses made in likeness of the true Cross are to be adored by reason of representation only (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 10, n. 24).

As regards specifically a particle from the wood of the most holy CROSS, these things are to be adverted to: 1. If it has been exposed in the principal place over the altar, those passing before it ought to bend one knee, and Mass before it is to be celebrated as before the enclosed Sacrament. But if it is put away in a case, those passing before it should incline the head. 2. Where immemorial usage carries this, it can be carried processionally under a canopy, with two thurifers incensing and with head uncovered. 3. After the procession or exposition, before it is put away, the officiant, standing, incenses it with three swings; then, having assumed the humeral veil and made one genuflection, he blesses the people with it, saying nothing (Kon., n. 327). 4. It is not licit on Friday in Parasceve after the ceremonies to expose a relic of the Holy Cross so that it remains exposed until the function of the next day (S. R. C., n. 2740).

535. III. Sacred things, in the broad sense, are called all things pertaining to the worship of God, although they have not been blessed, but insofar as they have been withdrawn from the profane commerce of men and dedicated to the service of God. Of this kind are candlesticks, lamps, canopy, cruets, vessel for holy water, etc.

STRICTLY SACRED THINGS are those which, through a special blessing (namely constitutive), or consecration (in which an anointing intervenes), are destined for the worship of God. Of this kind are blessed churches or chapels (sacred places), altars, chalices, corporals, priestly vestments, etc. Likewise sacred bibles, missals, and similar things, which of themselves, without blessing, are sacred (III, 40). See below n. 1444.

1. Sacred things of whatever kind must be treated reverently. Therefore: a) let them serve neither superstitious nor indecent uses; b) let them be consonant with liturgical prescriptions, at least decent and clean. See n. 1630 seqq.

2. Strictly sacred things must be treated with special reverence; nor can they be applied to profane uses, even honorable ones. "What has once been dedicated to God is not thereafter to be transferred to human uses" (Rule of Law in 6). See n. 583.

This rule ceases: a) If it is a question of things not strictly sacred, for example candles, branches, water, incense, the Paschal lamb, and similar blessed things, which are licitly applied to profane use; provided that you do not always and indifferently use them thus. b) If a strictly sacred thing is totally changed, so that it returns to common matter, for example if a chalice by fire or iron is reduced to a common mass of silver (III, 40, 41; VI, 94, 371). Cf. Gennari, Consult. mor. can., n. 33.

Those things which can no longer serve the use for which they have been destined are to be withdrawn from the same in a decent manner, and indeed: a) Ruined churches, no longer repairable, can be converted indeed into profane uses, but not sordid ones; yet with a cross erected there, as Trent prescribes (Sess. 21, c. 7), unless sacrilege is feared; in which case at least a commemorative inscription is to be placed. b) The sacred oils are to be burned each year (and the ashes thrown into the sacrarium); likewise vestments, after they have been worn out, unless perhaps they are applied to making or repairing others. 3. Baptismal water, on Holy Saturday and on the vigil of Pentecost, after the new water has been blessed, is to be poured into the sacrarium.

536. DEFINITION. The worship of dulia (or veneration) signifies the worship by which we attest our reverence and submission toward holy creatures, on account of the supernatural excellence of grace and glory intrinsic to them (St. Alph., on Trent, Sess. 25, de Invoc. SS.).

Note. To HOLY PERSONS a twofold reverence indeed belongs: 1. of respective latria, on account of their extrinsic excellence, because they represent and contain divine excellence (better than sacred things or places); 2. of absolute dulia, on account of their intrinsic excellence. Yet in practice, on account of danger of error, neither the Saints, nor the Blessed Virgin herself, are adored, at least explicitly, with the respective worship of latria (St. Thom., III, q. 25, a. 5). Nevertheless irreverence toward them, and especially blasphemy, redounds to God himself, whose servants, friends, sons, etc., they are (cf. n. 596). Similarly, veneration exhibited to the Saints implicitly and virtually honors God; and thus it pertains, broadly speaking, to the virtue of religion.

DIVISION. By reason of the degree of participated excellence, dulia is distinguished in two ways. There is simple dulia, which regards created supernatural excellence common as it were to all Saints. There is hyperdulia, which regards excellence created indeed and finite, but singular and very eminent.

537. PRINCIPLES. I. The most blessed Virgin Mary is to be venerated with the absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is the common opinion of Catholics. For the Blessed Virgin Mary has a singular and altogether ineffable eminence of dignity and sanctity, "which, besides God, no one can reach by thinking" (Bull Ineffabilis of Pius IX). Whence the Church beseeches the Blessed Virgin Mary more frequently, more insistently, and with greater solemnity than the Saints and angels. Cf. Muller, l. 2, § 46.

538. II. Saints and angels are to be venerated with the worship of dulia simply so called. For it is defined of faith by the Second Council of Nicaea and by Trent that all the Saints are to be honored with some veneration.

Yet some difference is present in the worship which is attributed to them (cf. n. 531). And indeed:

1. To CANONIZED Saints sacred and public worship is owed; because, through the infallible testimony of the Church, we are now made certain that they reign with Christ in the heavens; and therefore we must honor their souls and bodies as truly and properly sacred.

2. To the BEATIFIED the same sacred and public worship is exhibited, but more limited, namely such as is determined either by custom, if their worship is immemorial, or by Pontifical Indult, if the ordinary way is proceeded by. But if someone, in other churches or places not designated by the Supreme Pontiff, were to celebrate concerning a Blessed, he would sin gravely, because change of place is a transgression of the decree in a grave matter (Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. I, c. 39, n. 12).

3. To men or women dead with an opinion of sanctity, but not yet beatified, it is licit to exhibit no public worship; yet private religious worship is licitly deferred to them. "Images of the same (authentic Decrees, n. 3835) ... can neither in any way be placed on altars nor outside altars be painted with aureoles, rays, and other signs of sanctity; yet their images or deeds and facts can be exhibited on the walls of a Church, or in colored glass, provided those images bear before themselves neither any indication of worship or sanctity, nor anything profane or alien from the custom of the Church." Besides, from the new decree of Aug. 13, 1913, only after the heroic nature of the virtues has been recognized is a Servant of God to be adorned with the title Venerable. But prayers in honor of a Servant of God always need the approval of the Ordinary (A. A. S., VI, p. 192).

III. Relics, statues, etc., of the Saints are to be honored with the same veneration as the persons whose relics, etc., they are, but with respective worship. It is established from Trent, Sess. 25, where, for the rest, it is added: "Let the Bishops diligently teach ... that great fruit is perceived from all sacred images."

For practice, let the following be noted:

539. I. On Holy Relics. 1. RELICS of the Saints are: a) In the stricter sense, their bodies and parts of the body, even the smallest; likewise oil or another liquid sometimes flowing from them; b) more broadly, all things which the Saints used in life, as garments, books, instruments of punishments and mortifications; c) most broadly, all things which have touched either the body, or the sepulcher, or other relics of a Saint; and likewise oil from a lamp hung before the sepulcher, and dust from the place where they are preserved.

2. Eminent relics of Saints are, besides the whole body, the head, the anterior part or the upper part of the arm; or the heart, tongue, hand, if they are preserved intact from a miracle, the leg (not the bones of the thigh), or that part of the body in which a martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small (S. R. C., n. 430, 555, 4041).

3. Relics of the Saints are to be venerated not only with religious but also with sacred worship; not, however, public worship unless their authenticity has been approved by the Ordinary of the place where they are to be honored, and this even if they have already been recognized at Rome or by another Bishop.²

4. Relics are to be preserved only in a church, yet never in the tabernacle. If it is a question of small relics enclosed in cases, the use is commonly conceded today even to private persons.

5. Relics can be exposed for the veneration of the faithful. But they are not to be placed: a) above the tabernacle in which the most holy Sacrament is preserved, so that the tabernacle serves as a base for them; b) before the little door of the same tabernacle, or in another way by which simple persons could be led to adore the relics as the most holy Sacrament; c) with the Most Holy when it is exposed on the same altar. If they are exposed, let two lights burn continually on the altar. The one exposing and replacing should be vested in surplice, and also in humeral veil, if he blesses the people with the relics. But the blessing must be made without chant, without a formula of blessing, the relics having been incensed with unblessed incense, with two swings.

6. In processions, relics of canonized Saints can be carried; but: a) not under a canopy; b) with head uncovered (a Bishop, however, with miter); c) not in a procession of the most holy Sacrament, unless by force of indult or custom.

7. Concerning a Saint of whom an eminent relic is certainly possessed, the Office can be made and Mass celebrated, provided he is found in the Roman Martyrology.

540. II. On Holy Images. 1. Among holy images, these can be specially honored: a) blessed images; b) those which are at the same time relics, as an image of the Blessed Virgin Mary which is said to have been painted by St. Luke; c) those which are renowned for miracles, and copies of them.

2. In churches it is not licit to expose images deformed from the sense and decrees of the Church (Bened. XIV, Const. Sollicitudini). Images furnishing to the rude an occasion of dangerous error are opposed to the sense of the Church, such as, however, generally are not images of the Most Holy Trinity; likewise images in which something profane or dishonorable appears.

3. That these laws may be observed more efficaciously, the Council of Trent (Sess. 25) established that no unusual image can be exposed unless it has been approved by the Bishop. And Leo XIII, Const. Officiorum (tit. 1, c. VI, n. 15), declared these things concerning any images whatsoever, even those serving only private devotion: "Images in whatever way printed of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the Angels and Saints, or of other Servants of God, deformed from the sense and decrees of the Church, are altogether forbidden. But new images, whether they have prayers annexed or are published without them, are not to be published without license of ecclesiastical power." But if new images are printed without this law having been observed, the publisher indeed sins, but the faithful are not prohibited from their use.

4. Holy Images are honored in the same way as relics, except that with them a blessing is not given; nor concerning them, unless it has been specially conceded, is the Office made or Mass celebrated. In a procession with the most holy Sacrament, outside the case of indult or custom, they are not to be carried (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 10, n. 81).

Religious acts are either elicited by the virtue of religion, or commanded by it.

541. I. The ELICITED or proper acts of religion are: devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, offerings, first-fruits, tithes, vow, oath, adjuration, praise of God (2.2, q. 82 seqq.; q. 87, a. 1, ad 5).

For those things which belong to man (goods of body and soul, external goods) and those things which belong to God (authority, fidelity, and infinite perfection of God) are suitably assumed for the worship of God. Cf. Grassi, de Virt. Relig.

II. COMMANDED acts of religion are all acts which are elicited by another virtue and at the same time are performed from the motive of religion. Thus, for example, fasts undertaken in honor of God or of the Saints, or ordered by the Church in preparation for solemnities, are acts elicited by temperance, but commanded by religion.

To commanded acts of religion can also be referred acts elicited by FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY; for religion can rightly direct to the worship of God acts which already of themselves tend to this end, according to that saying of St. Augustine (Enchir., c. 3, n. 1): "God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity."

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 82; St. Alphonsus, H. Ap., App. 4; work On the Great Means of Prayer (ed. Walter, II, p. 633); St. Francis de Sales, Philothea; Polman, 2.2, n. 815; Herrmann, Inst. dogm., 942, 1226; Tanquerey, I, n. 862 seqq.; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Virt. Relig., n. 9 seqq.

542. To the first precept of the Decalogue pertain those acts of religion by which FIDELITY is furnished to God (n. 528), or by which we profess the supreme dominion of God over us and our every-kind dependence upon him, by subjecting to him the soul, body, and external goods. Now we subject the soul to God through DEVOTION and PRAYER, the body through ADORATION, the remaining goods through SACRIFICE, OFFERINGS, FIRST-FRUITS, and TITHES. Concerning sacrifice we shall speak elsewhere. Wherefore we shall treat: 1. of devotion; 2. of prayer; 3. of adoration and also of offerings, first-fruits, and tithes.

543. DEVOTION is taken in a twofold sense: 1. for the general condition of all acts of religion, and thus it is readiness of the will to draw itself to the service of God; 2. for a special act, and thus it is internal offering and handing over of oneself to the service of God. For to devote is the same as to consecrate or offer, and to make oneself over to another.

The obligation of the act of devotion sometimes urges of itself; but the frequency of the acts can be determined with great difficulty, since no time has been assigned for its obligation. - This obligation urges per accidens: 1. when there is grave danger of the opposed vice, namely sloth in spiritual things; 2. when we are bound to elicit other acts of virtues, for the eliciting of which devotion itself is necessary, as are acts of faith or adoration, hearing Mass, etc. (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 9, n. 7).

VI. Concerning vengeance Berardi asks, Praxis confessariorum, n. 195: "When, whether in desire or in joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, or in avenging injuries received, will sin be present?

Resp. In practice the more common cases are the following.

1. If this is done from a cause not honorable or not at all reasonable, for example from envy, as Cain acted against innocent Abel..., or from impatience, weariness, and anger, as those act who wish death to their own querulous, tedious, sick relatives, etc.

2. If vengeance is... excessive: namely if between the injury received and the quantity of punishment inflicted or desired there is no proportion, for example by extending signs of indignation too long; by exceeding too much in rebukes, in blows, or in other deeds having the character of vengeance; by from the heart imprecating most grave evils, for example death, hell, etc., against him who has inflicted on you a damage not so grave.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 2; q. 159, a. 1.

3. If vengeance is indeed just, but induces scandal of the little ones: for in this case care will have to be taken that, at least by explaining the matter, scandal be removed.

4. If one wishes vengeance to be done by private authority, even in those cases in which this is altogether not lawful, namely a) if it can be obtained by means of tribunals; b) if it is too great; c) if it is useless, namely if it is no longer apt to protect our rights, but rather to provoke new injuries and to effect that discords and suits never have an end, as too frequently happens in practice.

5. If vengeance is done or sought either from profound hatred, or from an end not so much of obtaining reparation and protection of one's own rights, as of delighting oneself concerning the punishment of the neighbor. Moreover this is wicked. St. Thomas said⁵ that vengeance indeed is lawful, but not with the intention of harming; truly, with the intention of removing harms. It is also to be noted that delight concerning the punishment of the neighbor can degenerate into cruelty and savagery."⁶

⁵ II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., q. 159, a. 2.

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 60.)

Judgment, as taken here, is the definition or determination of right or of the just ; but the just, as appears from what has been said, is the equal owed to another, which is the object of justice³²⁵. From which it is clear that it is an act of justice, because it belongs to justice to define and determine what is just and the equal owed to another. ³²⁵ Hic q. 60, a. 1, o.

We treat therefore of judgment taken in this sense, not only as it is exercised outwardly by a judge between litigating parties, but also as it is exercised, whether outwardly or inwardly, by private persons concerning the life, goods, and morals of others.

I say: Judgment clothed with due circumstances is licit³²⁶. It is against the Waldenses and Anabaptists. ³²⁶ Ibid., a. 2, o.

Proof. 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XVI, 18, God says to Moses : Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates,... that they may judge the people with just judgment³²⁷. ³²⁷ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra

And chap. 1, 16 : Judge that which is just. Which Christ repeats, John, VII, 24. The Apostle, to the Romans, XIII, 4, asserts that not without cause does the judge carry the sword ; for he is God's minister, an avenger in wrath upon him who does evil. Peter judged Ananias and Saphira, Acts, V, 3 ; Paul the incestuous Corinthian, 1 Cor., V, 3.

Proof. by reason. Every act of virtue is licit. Now judgment clothed with due circumstances is an act of virtue, namely of justice, as was said³²⁸. Therefore. ³²⁸ Ibid., o.

I said, « clothed with due circumstances », which are three³²⁹ : first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice ; second, that it proceed from the authority of the one presiding ; third, that it be uttered according to right reason and prudence. The first condition can be understood in a twofold sense : first, that judgment not be against justice ; second, that it be from love of justice, and not from some human motive, say hatred, anger, avarice, vain glory, etc. Through defect of the first condition understood in the first sense, judgment is perverse and unjust. Through defect of the same condition understood in the second sense, it is not properly an unjust judgment, yet evil and illicit gravely or lightly according to the quality of the motive. Through defect of the second condition, it is usurped judgment. But this regards public judgment ; since justice is found in private persons, there can be in them also true and right judgment without authority. Through defect of the third condition, it is rash judgment, namely when someone for light reasons judges doubtful and hidden things. ³²⁹ Ibid.

The chief acts of religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and sanctification of certain days. Concerning the last three there will be discussion in the 2nd and 3rd precept; but concerning sacrifice in the tract on the Eucharist. Here therefore only concerning adoration and prayer.

I ASSERT first, that in necessity, either of upholding justice or of dying, everyone is bound to undergo death for Christ.

IT IS PROVED first by St. Bonaventure, on Luke 9: Whoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty.

FURTHER it is proved by the Seraphic Doctor, from 1 John 3: Because he laid down his soul for us, and we ought to lay down our souls for the brethren.

THIRD: All are more bound to love God than all created things: Therefore if one must be lost, we ought to squander all created things.

I assert second. Outside of necessity, it is a work of supererogation.

IT IS PROVED by the Seraphic Doctor, first. John 15: Greater love than this no one has, than that a man lay down his soul for his friends: Therefore to undergo death for Christ is of the highest perfection; but the imperfect are not bound to heroic works: Therefore.

FURTHER he proves it from the Gloss on Rom. 6., asserting the same.

THIRD the Seraphic Doctor proves it, from D. Augustine, tractate 5 on the First Epistle of John. This is perfect Charity, that a man be ready to die for the brethren. But the Seraphic Doctor infers that Prelates are bound to a greater perfection than subjects are bound; for they are bound to lay down their souls for all. John 10: The Good Shepherd gives his soul for his Sheep. Which the Seraphic Doctor observes also on John, chapter 10.

THEREFORE in time of pestilence they are bound to expose themselves to danger of life, in administering the necessary Sacraments, as the Doctors commonly assert. But Diana admonishes, Treatise 4 on the Sacraments, resolution 167, that in time of pestilence a moribund person can be anointed with a long rod with Extreme Unction, and resolution 168, that one part can be anointed quickly, saying: By this holy unction, etc. may the Lord pardon you whatever you have sinned by sight, hearing, etc. So also Sylvester, part 3, question 32, article 2, and the Doctors of Louvain, in the years 1573 and 1588, as related by Octavius Tricornicensis, Apostolic Nuncio in Germany, and in the Directory of Ecclesiastical Discipline of Chappeau, chapter 5, question 30. Diana adds that he himself would anoint rather most rapidly, without a cross, one eye, one ear, etc.

AFTER the Theological virtues the theologians treat of the Cardinal virtues, the first of which is reckoned to be Prudence. For this is set over the whole OEconomy of the moral virtues, and directs them, either by discerning, as Counselor, or by defining, as Commander, to their acts: it reviews things past, disposes of things present, and provides for things to come; hence it has as its subjective parts the Memory of things past, the Intelligence of things present, and the providence of things to come; moreover it holds the reins of the passions, and if ever they rise up with a sudden impulse, it restrains them at once and reduces them to concord; sometimes it is worldly, in heaping up riches; human, in pursuing the comforts of the flesh; but Divine, it is enslaved to eternal observances, as the Holy Doctor notes in the places to be noted below; its nature and quality still remain to be investigated.

THE name of prudence is taken in various ways, as St. Bonaventure teaches, book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34, in the Dieta, title 5, chapter 5, and in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues, and On the seven Journeys, Journey 7, distinction 5, and in the Pharetra, book 2, chapter 27.

First, indeed, it signifies any knowledge of truth acquired by human study; thus it is taken by St. Ambrose, book 1 on offices, chapter 24, by Tully, book 1 on offices and book 2 on Invention, cited by St. Bonaventure, in the Pharetra and part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 41, and sermon 6 of the Hexaëmeron.

SECOND, it signifies only practical knowledge of things that ought to be sought or repudiated. Thus St. Augustine takes it, book 1 on free choice, chapter 13, and book 83 questions, question 31: that Prudence is the science of things to be sought and avoided: thus it is taken also by the Holy Doctor, in the Pharetra, and by St. Isidore, in the Etymologies, book 10, under the word Prudentia: The prudent man is so called, as it were one seeing far ahead; for he is perspicacious, and foresees the chances of uncertain things. Whence in Greek it is φρόνησις. And in this way it is taken by the Holy Doctor, in the Exposition of the Terms of Theology, and in the Centiloquium, loc. cit., and by St. Gregory. But neither is this proper Prudence, which ought both to know and to provide.

THIRD, Prudence is taken for all the faculties of the practical intellect that contribute, or are even necessary, to rightly instituting the actions of human life. Thus it is frequently taken by the Philosopher, book 6 of the Ethics, chapters 5, 10 and 11.

FOURTH, Prudence, in the most proper sense, names a certain faculty of the practical intellect for rightly determining what is to be done in any particular act.

Furthermore, Aristotle defines this Prudence, book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 5: Prudence is a habit of the intellect, active with true reason, concerning those things which are good and bad for man.

The same St. Doctor wills, in On the seven Journeys, Journey 7, distinction 5, defining: Prudence is to direct all things according to the norm of reason.

And in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues: Prudence is the discernment of good things and bad, both with the flight of evil and the choice of good: from which proceed circumspection, docility, and caution. Circumspection is the wariness of contrary vices, by which we flee avarice and guard against prodigality, etc. Docility is the power of teaching, in this order, that you first instruct yourself, and afterward others. Caution is the prudence of discerning vices that bear the appearance of virtues.

To this is referred also the definition of Macrobius, book 1 on the dream of Scipio: Prudence is to direct all things, which it considers, whatever it does, according to the norm of reason, and to will or do nothing besides what is right. Thus St. Bonaventure, book 6 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34.

It is defined also by Tully, On the repose of the mind: Prudence is the science of good things and bad, with the love of one or the other and the detestation of the rest: cited by St. Bonaventure, part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 41.

SIMILAR is the definition of St. Augustine, On the morals of the Church, book 1, chapter 15, cited by St. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Centiloquium: Prudence is love, sagaciously discerning those things by which it is aided toward God from those by which it is hindered. And book 83 questions, 52, he defines: It is the knowledge of things to be sought and fled.

He DESCRIBES, moreover, Prudence as it is a purgatorial virtue, from Macrobius, book 1 on the dream of Scipio: Prudence is to despise this world, and all things that are in the world, through the contemplation of divine things, and to direct all the knowledge of the soul to the divine alone. But Prudence, as it is the virtue of a purified mind, is defined: It is to know the divine alone, and to gaze upon it as if nothing else existed. Thus it is defined in book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34, and in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues, and elsewhere.

IT IS CERTAIN that Prudence is a Virtue.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, book 1 on chapter 8 of Wisdom, and in book 3, distinction 33, questions 1 and 4, from those words: He teaches Sobriety, and Prudence, and Justice, and Virtue, that is, Fortitude. The same is proved by that verse of Proverbs 8: Prudence is mine, fortitude is mine. By me kings reign, and lawmakers decree just things.

IT IS PROVED secondly by St. Bonaventure in the Dieta, title 5, chapter 5, and by other places of Scripture, Proverbs 28: A leader lacking prudence shall oppress many, etc.

PROVERBS 6: O sluggard, go to the ant, and learn Prudence; which, though it has no guide, nor master, nor prince, prepares for itself food in the summer, and gathers in the harvest what it may eat.

PROVERBS 30. The prudent man is compared to four little animals, praised in the same place. There are four little ones of the earth, and they are wiser than the wise: The ant, a people without strength, which prepares its food in the harvest: The rabbit, a weak folk, which makes its bed in the rock: The locust has no king, and goes forth all together by its bands: The stellio supports itself on hands, and dwells in the houses of kings. These four animals are set before us as Masters of prudence, as Lyranus notes there, together with St. Bonaventure, who there excellently expounds these animals for us in mystical parallels; that we may imitate the rabbit, making our bed in the rock, which is Christ, as is said 1 Corinthians 10. The stellio, or lizard, which, having no wings, supplies by its hands the lack of nature; so too let diligent prudence supply in acting the defect of nature: the locust, which mounts on high and at once descends to the earth; for so also the prudent man mounts high through holy desires, and at once descends to the knowledge of his own infirmity, and thence acknowledges the necessity of divine help; according to Psalm 110: He ascends even to the heavens, and descends even to the abysses. And according to St. Gregory below. Lastly, let us imitate the ant, that we may prudently lay up merits for ourselves, according to John 9: Work while it is day.

Matthew 10: Be therefore prudent as serpents, to which comparison the Holy Doctor best expounds in the place cited with five parallels.

FIRST, indeed, the serpent exposes its whole body to blows, that it may save its head; so the prudent Christian exposes all things, that he may preserve the honor of Christ the Head, as is said Philippians 3: Those things that were gains to me, I have counted as loss for Christ.

SECONDLY, the serpent, among narrow and smooth rocks, strips off its old skin; so too the Christian ought to put off the old man, as the Apostle admonishes, Ephesians 4.

THIRDLY, the serpent beguiles the charmer, as is said Psalm 57. So too prudent Saints beguile the demon, stopping one ear with the tail, that is, the memory of last things; according to Ecclesiastes 7: Remember your last things, and you shall not sin forever; and they stop the other ear, in the manner of the serpent, in the earth, by the memory of their own fragility, because it is said Genesis 4: You are dust, and into dust you shall return.

FOURTHLY, the serpent lies in wait for the heel; so prudent men conquer the desires of the flesh, attending to what the end of pleasure is, namely infernal death, according to Romans 6: The end of them is death.

FIFTHLY, the serpent flees woman on account of the enmities, Genesis 3, declared against it; so the prudent man flees the occasions of fornication, according to the counsel of Paul, 1 Corinthians 10.

ANOTHER prudence of the serpent the Holy Doctor expounds in the sermon on the Holy Apostles Philip and James, for when it feels itself weighed down by poison, it eats a certain herb, by whose virtue it vomits up the poison; then it hastens to a bath of water, and there washes itself, and remains fasting for many days; whence the skin is loosened from the flesh, and amid the smooth narrows of the rock it sheds its skin, that it may put on a new one. So too man, prudent, wishing to become a new man from the old, ought to wash himself with tears, eat the bitter herb of penance, and thus vomit up the poison of sins by confessing; then pass through the narrow gate of satisfaction, and thus, stripped of the spoils of faults, put on grace. See the holy Doctor there.

The SAME comparisons he has in sermon 2 on one Holy Doctor, which is sermon 31, and sermon 33, where he speaks according to Aristotle in the book on the history of animals, book 8, chapter 17:

IN THE sermon 2 on St. Anthony of Padua, from Job 38, he praises the prudence of the cock: Who gave the cock understanding. And in the sermon on St. Lucy he recounts many examples of prudence from sacred and profane histories. That it is a virtue, indeed, confess Aristotle, books 3 and 6 of the Ethics, chapters 5 and 13, Cicero, books 1 and 2 of the Tusculans, 99, Seneca, letter 68, Plutarch, in the book on the virtue of morals, Juvenal, Satire 10, Valerius Maximus, on prudence. See the Holy Doctor also in book 3, distinction 33, question 3, citing them.

IT IS PROVED thirdly by the Holy Doctor, in the book cited, the Pharetra, chapter 27, from the Holy Fathers unanimously asserting it.

ST. AUGUSTINE, book 1 on the morals of the Church, chapter 15, divides the four Cardinal virtues, as St. Bonaventure also teaches in book 3, distinction 33, question 2, to the first argument; then in the Soliloquies, book 1, chapter 14, he teaches that the perfect work is made by prudence, saying: Great care must be taken, while we act in this body, lest the feathers of our wings be impeded by any viscous thing of the senses: these must be whole and perfect, that we may fly forth to that light from these darknesses.

ST. AMBROSE, on offices, book 1, chapter 10: The wise man, that he may speak well, first considers many things, what he may say, and to whom, in what place and time, and chapter 27, says: The first fount of duty is prudence. St. Gregory, book 2 of the Morals, chapter 36, says: The solid edifice of our mind is sustained by these four virtues, of which the first is prudence, and book 7 of the Morals, chapter 15: When the uprightness of Saints raises men to liberty of voice, consideration of one's own infirmity guards them in humility.

St. Bernard on the Canticle, sermon 49: Discretion is not so much a virtue as a certain moderator and charioteer of the virtues, and the orderer of affections and the directress of morals: Take this away, and virtue will be vice. In the same way speaks St. Isidore, the book On Synonyms, chapter 16: Whatever you do well with discretion is virtue; whatever you carry out without discretion is vice. For virtue without discretion is reputed as vice. And book 2 on the supreme good, chapter 25: It helps nothing, that we discern with a more prudent sense between good and evil, unless by our works we guard against ill-conceived thoughts, or carry forward good things begun.

II. Question I. What is Religion? Answer. The common definition of Religion is this: Religion is a virtue which renders to God the worship due to him as the first principle of all things. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, art. 1, derives the etymology of Religion from re-reading [relegendo] those things that pertain to divine worship, because such things must frequently be turned over again in the heart. Religion is not a theological virtue, because it does not regard God proximately, but a moral virtue — and indeed the chief among these virtues, whose object is the worship to be shown to God, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 81, art. 5.

IV. Penance is a true virtue. Since those things which are commanded by God pertain to virtue. But penance is frequently commanded by God, Matthew 3: Do penance. … Bring forth fruit worthy of penance. Again, Luke 6: Do penance. See St. Thomas, III, q. 85, art. 1.

1. The enumeration of cardinal virtues is a piece of Greek philosophy that has found its ways into the catechism. Prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are mentioned by Plato as recognised heads of virtue. They are recognised, though less clearly, by Xenophon, reporting the conversations of Socrates. It does not look as though Socrates invented the division: he seems to have received it from an earlier source, possibly Pythagoras. They are mentioned in Holy Scripture (Wisdom viii., 7, which is however a Greek book), and Proverbs viii., 14. They make no figure in the philosophies of India and China.

2. The cardinal virtues are thus made out.—Virtue is a habit that gives a man readiness in behaving according to the reason that is in him. Such a habit may be fourfold. (a) It may reside in the reason, or intellect itself, enabling it readily to discern the reasonable thing to do, according to particular circumstances as they occur. That habit is the virtue of prudence. (b) It may reside in the rational appetite, otherwise called the will, disposing a man to act fairly and reasonably in his dealings with other men. That is justice. (c) It may reside in the irrational, or sensitive, appetite, and that to a twofold purpose; (a) to restrain the said appetite in its concupiscible part from a wanton and immoderate eagerness after pleasure; that is temperance: (b) to incite the said appetite in its irascible part not to shrink from danger, where there is reason for going on in spite of danger; that is fortitude.

3. Plato compares the rational soul in man to a charioteer, driving two horses: one horse representing the concupiscible, the other the irascible part of the sensitive appetite. He draws a vivid picture of the resistance of the concupiscible part against reason, how madly it rushes after lawless pleasure, and how it is only kept in restraint by main force again and again applied, till gradually it grows submissive. This submissiveness, gradually acquired, is the virtue of temperance. Clearly the habit dwells in the appetite, not in reason: in the horse, not in the charioteer. It is that habitual state, which in a horse we call being broken in.

The concupiscible appetite is broken in to reason by temperance residing within it. Plato lavishes all evil names on the steed that represents the concupiscible part. But the irascible part, the other steed, has its own fault, and that fault twofold, sometimes of over-venturesomeness, sometimes of shying and turning tail. The habit engendered, in the irascible part, of being neither over-venturesome nor over-timorous, but going by reason, is termed fortitude.^{6 6} It will help an Englishman to understand Plato's comparison, if instead of concupiscible part and irascible part, we call the one steed Passion and the other Pluck. Pluck fails, and Passion runs to excess, till Pluck is formed to fortitude, and Passion to temperance.

4. As the will is the rational appetite, the proper object of which is rational good, it does not need to be prompted by any habit to embrace rational good in what concerns only the inward administration of the agent's own self. There is no difficulty in that department, provided the sensitive appetite be kept in hand by fortitude and temperance. But where there is question of external relations with other men, it is not enough that the sensitive appetite be regulated, but a third virtue is necessary, the habit of justice, to be planted in the will, which would otherwise be too weak to attend steadily to points, not of the agent's own good merely, but of the good of other men.

5. Thus we have the four cardinal virtues: prudence, a habit of the intellect; temperance, a habit of the concupiscible appetite; fortitude, a habit of the irascible appetite; and justice, a habit of the will. Temperance and Fortitude in the Home Department; Justice for Foreign Affairs; with Prudence for Premier. Or, to use another comparison, borrowed from Plato, prudence is the health of the soul, temperance its beauty, fortitude its strength, and justice its wealth.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 61, art. 2, in corp.; ib., q. 56, art. 4, in corp., ad 1-3; ib., q. 56, art. 6, in corp., ad 1, 3; ib., q. 59, art. 4, in corp., ad 2; Plato, Laws, 631 B, C.

76. II. Prudence perfects the intellect, directing it to discern on all occasions what is best suited for the attainment of our last end. Thus defined, prudence is a general virtue, which includes: (a) Clear-sightedness, or a quick, accurate perception of the true value of means to an end; (b) Caution, which bids us take time to notice difficulties and to provide against them; (c) Self-distrust which disposes us to examine matters with care, and to accept the advice of others, especially if our own case is in question.

§ 2. The Judiciary.

243. The task of the judiciary is twofold:

1. To settle disputes between rival claimants: this is done in the civil courts.

2. To prosecute, in criminal courts, persons charged with violating the law, and, in case of their conviction, to award the penalty appointed for the transgression. The settlement of civil disputes is often submitted by the disputing parties to arbiters chosen by themselves. An arbiter differs from a judge in this, that the latter acts in virtue of the sovereign power of the State, and, therefore, possesses authority over the parties concerned, while an arbiter has no rights in the matter under dispute except such as are conceded to him by the litigants. From the decision of the lower courts appeal may be made in important cases to higher courts. But there must be, in the nature of things, a supreme court from whose decision there can be no appeal. Though even this higher tribunal may err, nevertheless the public good requires that its decisions shall be final.

244. The courts are guided by existing laws, the expediency of which is no matter for their consideration; their work is the interpretation and application of existing laws to special cases. Yet certain courts are sometimes called upon to decide whether a given enactment is truly a law, whether it has all the requirements of a just law (No. 81). If an enactment is evidently unjust or is openly at variance with the Constitution of the country, it is not a law, and judges cannot justly enforce it.

245. The preservation of public order, one of the primary functions of civil society, necessitates the punishment of social crimes. Now, a social crime is an outward disturbance of civil society by the violation of a strict right of our fellow-men. Evil acts in which injury is done to those persons only who freely take part in them, do not violate a strict right of any man, and are, therefore, not subject to the punishments of civil authority.

It is for the legislative power to appoint the punishment of crimes, for the judiciary to award the punishment in individual cases, for the executive to inflict it, or, in exceptional circumstances, at the discretion of the official holding the necessary authority, to remit or commute the penalty.

246. Thesis VIII. Civil society has the right to punish social crimes.

Proof. Every natural society has a right to those means which, in the ordinary course of events, are necessary for it to obtain its ends; but the punishment of social crimes is such a means for civil society. Therefore civil society has the right to punish social crimes.

247. Let us consider how and why such punishment is necessary in order that civil society may attain its end.

1. That end is the maintenance of social order. To secure this, it is necessary that advantage and pleasure be consequent on the observance of order. But the criminal disturbs the order of things by seeking to make advantage and pleasure consequent upon disorder. Accordingly, justice requires, for the restoration of right order which he has disturbed, that he shall lose advantages or feel pain. For this purpose, then, various kinds and degrees of punishment are needed to match the various kinds of evil doings and the various grades of guilt. Hence, one purpose of legal punishment is expiation.

2. The end of civil society is likewise to guard rights from violation; but this cannot be done unless offenders be punished in a manner to deter others from following their evil example; the penalty should, for this purpose, be proportioned to the crime.

3. The criminal himself needs correction, i. e., by the bitter medicine of pain he is to be induced to give up his vicious practices, and kept from disturbing the social order in the future.

248. Thus a threefold reason exists for the infliction of legal punishment; it is expiatory, deterrent, and medicinal. In domestic society, punishment is primarily medicinal for the correction of the offender, yet at times it may be deterrent for others. In civil society, punishment is chiefly expiatory and deterrent, and it need not be medicinal.

249. Thesis IX. Civil society has the right to inflict the death penalty for enormous crimes.

Explanation. We know from Revelation that God has bestowed this right upon civil authority; we maintain here that it belongs to civil society by the principles of natural reason.

Proof. The means employed by civil society must be sufficient to attain its end. Now, in many cases, nothing less than capital punishment is sufficient to attain that end. For, (a) There are criminals so depraved and so indifferent to other forms of punishment that the death penalty alone can deter them from committing enormous crimes. (b) Some crimes, such as deliberate murder, treason, or parricide, disturb social order to such an extent that capital punishment alone approaches a proportionate atonement.

250. Objections:

1. Man is too noble a being to be slaughtered as a warning to others. Answer. Such certainly he is if he has done no wrong; not, however, if he has degraded himself by a monstrous crime.

2. The present doctrine would justify "Lynch law," and mob violence, which are evident evils. Answer. A mob has no authority to inflict death: civil society receives such authority from God, its founder.

3. Every man has an inalienable right to his life; therefore the State cannot condemn him to death. Answer.

When we say that a right is inalienable, we mean that no one can take it away except God and one delegated by Him for that purpose; now the State has a commission from God to inflict the death penalty for enormous crimes.

4. In some States the death penalty has been abolished; therefore it is not necessary. Answer. That consequent does not follow from the antecedent. It is not clear that the purposes of civil government are sufficiently attained in those States. If they are, it is owing to special circumstances, and constitutes an exception to a general rule.

5. Desperate men are not restrained by fear of the death penalty. Answer. Nevertheless it is the most potent restraint that the State can use; besides, such men are prevented by the prompt infliction of the penalty from multiplying their enormities. Moreover, few criminals have been found so hardened as not eagerly to desire a commutation of capital punishment to imprisonment for life.

I PROPOSE in this little book to discuss the relations which exist between religion and other human interests. We shall thus gain a clearer knowledge of what religion is, we shall appreciate it more, and we should be induced to practise it more faithfully and more zealously. But, first of all, we must be sure that we have a clear and correct notion of what religion means. The word has had very different meanings at different times and for different writers on the subject. Lactantius, who wrote at the time of the first Christian Emperor of Rome, tells us that all pagan religions consisted only in rites and ceremonies performed in the worship of the gods; they did not trouble themselves about morality. A modern authority on the subject agrees with Lactantius. " If any of the thinkers of antiquity," says M. Jastrow, " had been asked to define religion, the same answer would have been given by each one—the worship of the gods."* Matthew Arnold thought that religion was only Morality touched with Emotion. For Fichte religion was a view of the world

* M. Jastrow, The Study of Religion, p. 131.

it furnished the supreme truth by man's contemplation of himself as the mirror in which God is reflected. For Schleiermacher religion was neither metaphysics nor morality; it was a state of feeling, which arises at the moment that we become conscious of a contact between ourselves and the universe. Lucretius and Hume identified religion with superstition. Man finds himself in the grip of natural forces vastly more powerful than himself; he personifies those forces of nature, and through fear seeks to propitiate them. According to Herbert Spencer, religion has to do with the infinite, and as man's very finite capacities cannot attain to the infinite, which must always remain unknowable, agnosticism is the only reasonable attitude for man to take up with regard to religion. Since the rise of the historical school of students of religion there has been more agreement as to what religion is. It is admitted that religion is a universal phenomenon of human nature; that as man is a rational animal so he is also a religious animal; that religion is a permanent element in the chequered career of humanity, and in a sense the only permanent element that is to be found there. The views of the modern school of students of religion are well summed up for us by Pius X. in his condemnation of the errors of the Modernists. The Holy Father says "However, this Agnosticism is only the negative part of the system of the Modernists the positive part consists in that they call vital immanence. Thus they advance from one to the other. Religion, whether natural or supernatural, must, like every other fact, admit of some explanation. But when natural theology has been destroyed, and the road to revelation closed by the rejection of the arguments of credibility, and all external revelation absolutely denied, it is clear that this explanation will be sought in vain outside of man himself. It must therefore be looked for in man; and since religion is a form of life, the explanation must certainly be found in the life of man. In this way is formulated the principle of religious immanence. Moreover, the first actuation, so to speak, of every vital phenomenon — and religion, as noted above, belongs to this category—is due to a certain need or impulsion; but speaking more particularly of life, it has its origin in a movement of the heart, which movement is called a sense. Therefore, as God is the object of religion, we must conclude that faith, which is the basis and foundation of all religion, must consist in a certain interior sense, originating in a need of the divine. This need of the divine, which is experienced only in special and favourable circumstances, cannot of itself appertain to the domain of consciousness, but is first latent beneath consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern philosophy, in the subconsciousness, where also its root lies hidden and undetected. "It may perhaps be asked how it is that this need of the divine which man experiences within himself resolves itself into religion? To this question the Modernist reply would be as follows: Science and history are confined within two boundaries, the one external — namely, the visible world; the other internal, which is consciousness. When one or other of these limits has been reached, there can be no further progress, for beyond is the unknowable.

In presence of this unknowable, whether it is outside man and beyond the visible world of nature, or lies hidden within the subconsciousness, the need of the divine in a soul which is prone to religion, excites—according to the principles of fideism, without any previous advertence of the mind—a certain special sense, and this sense possesses, implied within itself both as its own object and as its intrinsic cause, the divine reality itself, and in a way unites man with God. It is this sense to which Modernists give the name of faith, and this is what they hold to be the beginning of religion."* Judged by principles such as these, all religions are equally natural and equally true. They are the product of religious experiences and of the religious instinct among peoples of very different characters and needs. They owe their origin and growth to very different circumstances, but they are all faithful manifestations of the human spirit ever striving and groping after the Infinite. Very different from this is the teaching of the Catholic Church. She asserts and defends the dignity and power of the human intellect. She affirms that the great principle of causality is of universal application. The progress of science is due to the ceaseless application of that principle to the phenomena of nature; it is universally true, and should be applied fearlessly to the question of man's origin. If it is so applied we come to the knowledge of a supreme Being who made us and all that exists beside Himself. We have an intellect and a will; He who gave them to us must be similarly endowed, but in far greater measure. We

* Encyclical Pascendi, pp. 8, 9. English translation.

are persons, free and independent, with the right to work out our own destiny. Personality exists in its truest and fullest sense in our divine Creator. As the Vatican Council solemnly declared " The Holy, Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will and in every perfection; who since He is one, singular, altogether simple and unchanging spiritual substance, must be proclaimed really and essentially distinct from the world, in Himself and of Himself most blessed, and ineffably raised above all things which exist and can be conceived beside Himself.... The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known for certain from the things that He has created by the natural light of human reason. For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."* Modern science, as interpreted by its best and highest representatives, does not contradict this teaching of the Catholic Church. On the contrary, it defends it. Not long before his death Lord Kelvin was asked to write down for publication what he had already expressed in public on this subject. At the request of the editor this prince of British scientists sent the following declaration to the Nineteenth Century, June, 1903: " I cannot admit that with regard to the origin of life, science neither affirms nor denies

* Sess. III., cc. 1, 2.

Creative Power. Science positively affirms Creative Power. It is not in dead matter that we live and move and have our being, but in the creating and directing Power which science compels us to accept as an article of belief. We cannot escape from that conclusion when we study the physics and dynamics of living and dead matter all around. Modern biologists are coming, I believe, once more to a firm acceptance of something beyond mere gravitational, chemical, and physical forces; and that unknown thing is a vital principle. We have an unknown object put before us in science. In thinking of that object we are all agnostics. We only know God in His works, but we are absolutely forced by science to believe with perfect confidence in a directive Power—in an influence other than physical, or dynamical, or electrical forces. Cicero (by some believed to have been editor of Lucretius) denied that men and plants and animals could come into existence by a fortuitous concourse of atoms. There is nothing between absolute scientific belief in a Creative Power, and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. Just think of a number of atoms falling together of their own accord and making a crystal, a sprig of moss, a microbe, a living animal. Cicero's expression, 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' is certainly not wholly inappropriate for the growth of a crystal. But modern scientific men are in agreement with him in condemning it as utterly absurd in respect to the coming into existence, or the growth, or the continuation of the molecular combinations presented in the bodies of living things. Here scientific thought is compelled to accept the idea of Creative Power.... Do not be afraid of being free thinkers! If you think strongly enough you will be forced by science to the belief in God, which is the foundation of all religion. You will find science not antagonistic but helpful to religion."* Undoubtedly, that is the solid foundation of all religion. There we have the first principle and foundation of religion, not in the thoughts, feelings, or needs of man. God emphatically IS. That great objective fact is the basis of religion, and it should be recognised by all reasonable beings. There is without doubt also the inner instinctive need of God within the human breast. As the new-born child begins instinctively to grope for its mother's breast, so the human heart is driven instinctively to grope after its God. Our hearts were made for Him, and they know only unrest till they rest in Him. Still, we cannot build religion on our subjective instincts and feelings. They are too liable to be warped and twisted by human passion and prejudice. The only firm foundation of religion is the solid bed-rock of objective fact. God is—His existence is the cause and explanation of all other being. Religion rises spontaneously from the recognition of that fact. Just as when the mind of the child recognises its parents and all that it owes to them, it naturally concludes that it has a moral duty to reverence, obey, and love them as the authors of its being; so when the mind recognises God, its Creator, it forthwith concludes that it is bound to Him by the ties of reverence, obedience, and love. That is why the Fathers and Schoolmen loved to derive the very word religion from a Latin root meaning to bind man with his Creator. It expresses the moral obligation recognised by right reason that the rational creature should worship its Creator and Lord. Natural reason, then, shows the necessity of natural religion. But natural reason refuses to admit that this is the only basis of religion. Within and without any man with eyes sees abundant traces of the goodness of his Creator, and he cannot rest satisfied with the notion that after creating the world and man, the Creator left mankind to their own feeble gropings after Himself. The supreme Artificer loves the work of His hands, and love forbids Him to desert His child. Of course, then, what all religions teach is and must be true.* God has spoken, has manifested, has revealed Himself and His Will to man. His delight is to be with and to converse with the children of men. That trait must be characteristic of divine as it is of human love. If anyone will properly dispose himself for heavenly visits, God will infallibly come to him and will take up His abode with him. Mystics like St. Teresa have ever verified the truth of those words. The "locutions" of God to the saints are matters of everyday occurrence. Their possibility is obvious, and the experience of all who have learnt how to pray proves the fact of constant communication between God and His rational creatures. As God can and does frequently speak with the individual soul, and thus teaches it and fosters its private spiritual life, so God can and does speak with chosen instruments of His, with a view to their teaching others and fostering public and social religious life. Thus He spoke to His prophets of old, thus last of all, more fully and more especially, He revealed Himself and His divine Will to the world through His only Son. " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days, hath spoken to us by His Son.”* When God thus reveals His Will to mankind through a chosen messenger, He takes care that the messenger is duly accredited. There have always been plenty of false prophets in the world who claimed to speak to men in the name and with the authority of God. When He sent His only begotten Son into the world He took care to accredit and guarantee His divine mission. This He did by prophecy and miracles. Jesus Christ Himself frequently insisted on this point. When asked who He was and by whose authority He spoke and acted, He would answer: If I tell you, you will not believe Me. Consult your Scriptures, for they witness to Me; behold the miracles that I work, for they prove that I am sent by God. "And John called to him two of his disciples, and sent them to Jesus, saying: Art thou he that is to come, or look we for another?... And answering he said to them: Go, and relate to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, to the poor the gospel is preached.”† "But I have a greater testimony than that of John: for the works which the Father hath given me to perfect; the works themselves, which I do, give testimony of me, that the Father hath sent me.”‡ " Jesus answered them: I speak to you and you believe not: the works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me.... If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works; that you may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father."* That is the divine apologetic adopted by Jesus Christ to prove His mission from God. The Catholic Church has always treasured it, and teaches and uses it to this day. Many are unconvinced by it nowadays, just as many were unconvinced by it in the time of Our Lord, but the fault does not lie in the argument.

* loc. cit., p. 1068.

* M. Jastrow, Study of Religion, p. 127.

* Heb. i. 1, 2. † Luke vii. 19-22. ‡ John v. 36.

* John x. 25-38.

I HAVE no difficulty in understanding the practical indifference which a bad man shows towards religion. He has made up his mind not to lead a good life, and having done that, he does not care to make pretence of religion. He does not care to add hypocrisy to the list of his misdeeds. But I cannot understand the attitude of a man who poses as a good man and yet practises no religion. He tries to be a good husband, a good father, a good citizen. He prides himself on being upright and honest in his dealings with his fellow-men, but he has no inclination for religion. He does not see the use of it, he gets no benefit out of it. With such men the subjective theory of religion utterly breaks down. You appeal to his spiritual needs, you hint at those mystical yearnings and longings which at certain times surge up from the region of the subconscious. He stares at you with a blank look and says bluntly that he has never felt them. His yearnings and longings are for much more concrete things which he can see and feel. This is certainly one of the causes of that weakening of the religious spirit which all good and thoughtful men deplore in our time. The reason is because they have a false view about religion and they take no interest in it. The question is not whether one feels the need of religion or not, whether it appeals to one, whether one gets any benefit out of it. Religion rests on a great central fact. God exists, He is our Creator and our Lord, He is our first Beginning and last End. If we are rational creatures and wish to be good men, we must recognise those tremendous facts. What should we think of a son who prided himself on being a just and honest man, a straightforward man, and a kindly neighbour, but entirely neglected his poor old parents? He never assisted them, never went to see them, never even wrote to them. He ignored them and desired to have nothing to do with them. Such a one has obviously forgotten that a good man does not pick and choose what suits him in the moral life. A good moral life is a complex thing and comprises many duties. We may not neglect any, but above all we must not neglect the most important of all. As our relation to our parents demands that we should honour them with reverence, obedience, and love, so our relation with God our Creator demands that we should recognise our indebtedness to Him and honour Him with reverence, obedience, and love. That is the first and the greatest commandment. Nobody who neglects that can lay claim to doing his duty as a good and honest man. He fails in the most important duty of all, in what constitutes the very kernel and essence of a good life. It is no answer for an irreligious man to say that he never got any benefit out of religion. If religion is practised rightly it confers innumerable blessings on him who practises it. Still, that is not the chief reason why we should practise it. We should practise it because it is our duty and God commands it. It would be a poor excuse for neglecting our parents to say that we never got any benefit out of honouring them. We do not do our duty to them for that; neither should so mercenary a consideration influence our conduct towards God.

The religion revealed to the world by Jesus Christ is a complete guide to a perfect moral life. He is the Light of the World; one that follows Him walketh not in darkness. By that Light we see everything in its true proportions, we know what value to set on everything. We have no doubts as to whence we came or whither we are going. We know our goal and we know how to get there. The different duties and occupations of life fall into their proper place in the scale of importance or necessity. The scheme is a workable scheme, it has stood the test of two thousand years, and by means of it man can live and society can thrive and prosper. No other light gives so cheery an outlook on the world and on the future. Behind the mechanism of things, under the whirl of perpetual change, apparently heedless of man and his interests, the Christian recognises the mighty love of his Father and leaves himself trustfully in His guiding hands. The future is not the inexplicable riddle that it is for the mechanical evolutionist. The Christian looks forward to it with confidence and hope. Some have said that the Christian outlook is too good to be true. They know nothing of the wonders of infinite love. In the Christian hope millions upon millions have found the source of their sweetest joy, and of patience and resignation amid the inevitable trials and sorrows of life. The Christian religion confers these and many more benefits on human life, but it would be a great mistake to suppose that we can abandon Christian teaching and continue to reap its benefits. One of the greatest benefits which the Christian religion confers on man is to furnish him with a complete and objective rule of conduct. Public opinion, custom, and human law can do something towards making a man subject his vicious propensities to right reason so that they will not threaten destruction to himself and to his fellows. But many external actions can be concealed from public opinion and human law; and the more important sphere of the inner man escapes their scrutiny altogether. Every thought, word, and deed is subject to the Christian code; no human act escapes the judgment of the Christian conscience. Human opinion and human law are liable to err; they sometimes approve of what is destructive to the best interests of human nature. They sanction divorce and the loosening of the ties of family life, though history and reason loudly protest that the family must be kept together at all costs. On these and on other scarcely less important points the Gospel of Christ is firm as a rock. Private judgment can interpret and whittle away the dead letter of the Bible: it can do nothing against the voice of the ever-living Church speaking with the authority of Him who inspired the Bible. Passion and prejudice can distort a rule in favour of individualism and selfishness: they cannot warp the judgment of unerring truth. We have only to open our eyes and ears to realise the importance of preserving the objective rule of conduct which is taught us by the religion of Jesus Christ. Moral chaos is the consequence of its rejection. Let us take a few examples from recent writers. We cannot do better than go to Germany for our first example. The rejection of the Christian standard of conduct, with its inevitable consequences, has gone furthest in Germany. Nietzsche taught that Christianity was a retrograde movement. According to him Christianity is a religion for the degenerate, anaemic, and world-weary. Christian teachers are "body despisers" and " preachers of death." If we would be on the right track we must get back to nature and the natural. This world is a good world if only we know how to enjoy it. Unfortunately the great mass of mankind are too degraded to lead a truly natural life. For that purpose a man must be full of vitality. He will have to be the product of careful breeding and training. He must be truly noble, and the only nobility is that of birth and blood. He will not be one of the common herd: he will be " superman." As such he will be distinguished by the "Will-to-power." For him the whole duty of man may be summed up in two words—"Be powerful." He will have two different standards of conduct. Towards his equals and those of the same class his conduct will be marked by restraint, regard, delicacy, and friendship. Towards others, he will conduct himself " not so much as better, but rather as an uncaged beast of prey. Here he enjoys liberty from all social restraint, the wilderness must compensate him for the tension produced by a long incarceration and enclosure in the peace of society.” For common suffering humanity he has no pity or compassion, but rather indifference and contempt. Christianity will do very well for them; they only want " herd-morality." They will always form the necessary basis on which the social pyramid will be raised. Above them will be the commercial classes, while on the top will live and reign the " superman." Many of the traits in this picture are clearly characteristic of the Prussian Junker as he has been revealed to an astonished world by his deeds of “frightfulness” during the war. If he shows himself in his true colours after the war he may safely be left to be dealt with by the police. The Scotchman, John Davidson, was as violently anti-Christian as was Nietzsche, but he had no faith in progress or the superman, and cared nothing about the future. For Davidson Nietzscheanism was merely a perverted form of Christianity, and he would have none of it. ‘His Antichrist is Christ, whose body and blood And doctrine of miraculous rebirth Became the Overman: Back-of-beyond, Or—what's the phrase? Outside good-and-evil; That's his millennium, and we'll none of it. I want the world to be much more the world; Men to be men; and women, women; all Adventure, courage, instinct, passion, power.’ Davidson's philosophy is a glorification of the animal appetites and an exhortation to all to enjoy life while it lasts. Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Mr. Bernard Shaw has many affinities with Nietzsche, whose conception of the superman he adopted. Still, there are great differences between the two writers. Nietzsche is individualistic, while Mr. Shaw is Socialistic. The latter does not hope for the regeneration of mankind from the superman, but from the State. It is in and through the State that the individual is to be blessed. He does not share Nietzsche's contempt for pity, nor think that Nature's methods should be imitated in the elimination of the weak and the unfit. Society should have a care for its weaker members. The only heaven that man can look forward to is to make the best of this world. "Be what you want to be, follow instinct," says Mr. Shaw, "and you will be on the right road." All these writers are men of ability, but their schemes for the conduct of human life contain many glaring inconsistencies and contradictions. They neither agree with each other nor with themselves.* They show that the rejection of Christian teaching and Christian morality leads inevitably to the mental and moral chaos from which the Light of the World rescued us two thousand years ago. Professor Karl Pearson and others appear to suppose that all that is necessary is to lay down and teach to the young a code of rational ethics. Unfortunately, most of us have had the same experience as the Latin philosopher: ‘Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.’ " I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse." It is not only that man's intellect is so feeble, so liable to be warped and twisted by passion and self-interest, especially in questions of conduct. His will is, if anything, weaker still, and fails so lamentably in the execution of what it knows to be right. It has been proved by the experience of ages that man cannot live a decent and rational life without the help of God. All that God need do to punish man for his rejection of Himself is simply to leave him alone. Left to himself, he quickly becomes the prey of his passions and demonstrates the necessity of religion for man. The argument has never been put more forcibly than by St. Paul, and we cannot do better than ponder over his words. Of the pagan philosophers of old St. Paul writes: " So that they are inexcusable, because that when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God, nor given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise they became fools. Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness to dishonour their own bodies among themselves,... For this cause God delivered them up to shameful affections. For their women have changed the natural use into that which is against nature. And in like manner the men also, leaving the natural use of the woman, have burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men, working that which is filthy, and receiving in themselves the recompense which was due to their error. And as they liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things that are not fitting; being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, avarice, wickedness, full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity, whisperers, detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy."* The terrible picture was truthfully drawn two thousand years ago; it has stood the test of time, and is as faithful to the facts now as it was when first drawn. Experience proves only too fully that man stands in dire need of religion. The modern cry of "Back to Nature" means back to the pagan immorality described by St. Paul. Would that the evidence were less clear than it is. We cannot hope for salvation merely from the teaching of rational ethics. That would enlighten the mind, but it would not strengthen the will. And it is the will above all that needs strengthening. The theory of mechanical evolution only adds to the difficulty. As a recent writer says:

* Cf. L. S. Thornton, Conduct and the Supernatural.

* Rom. i. 20-31.

“On the part of scientific men the study of evolution in general, and social evolution in particular, has given rise to a sort of scientific pessimism.... The latest teachings of modern science have thus thrown a sort of pall over the human mind and introduced a new philosophy —a philosophy of despair, it may be called, because it robs its adherents of all hope in any conscious alteration of the course of nature with respect to man, and denies the efficacy of effort."* As the Catholic Church constantly insists, our only hope is in the grace of God and in religion. The religion of Jesus Christ not only enlightens the mind; above all it strengthens and braces the will so as to enable it not only to keep in check the lower appetites and make them obedient to reason, but to climb the loftiest heights of heroic virtue. It is not necessary to appeal to past history in proof of it; every Catholic experiences it whenever he prays or worthily approaches the Sacraments.

* L. F. Ward, Applied Sociology, p. 14.

Commutative justice, as the name implies, has to do chiefly with buying and selling and other contracts. It regulates relations which exist, or which ought to exist, between different and independent persons, whether physical or moral. It is a matter of commutative justice to observe agreements between nations as well as between individuals. It prescribes that what is due to another as his strict right should be rendered to him. Those who hold an office of any kind are bound by commutative justice to fulfil its duties. Statesmen, judges, magistrates, public, and private servants, lawyers, and doctors sin against commutative justice if they fail to do their duty. They violate an implied or expressed contract entered into when they assumed office.

• Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, i 57. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II–II, q. 186, a. 9.

What must be rendered to another in justice is his due or his strict right. Such rights are of various kinds, both natural and acquired. The right to life, liberty, and proper treatment at the hands of officials are instances of natural rights. A man has a natural right to make things his own, or to acquire private property. Commutative justice recognizes that such a right should be respected. Robbery and theft are against the natural law of justice. Thou shalt not steal is a precept of the natural law.

If commutative justice be violated an injury is done to another, and it is peculiar to such an act that it entails an obligation of making restitution or reparation for the injustice that has been done. This follows from the very nature of commutative justice. When commutative justice is violated, another person is deprived of what belongs to him, of his right. But justice requires that each one should have what belongs to him, and so justice is not done till what he has been deprived of, or its equivalent, is restored to him. This is what is meant by making restitution.

There are two roots of restitution: possession of what belongs to another, and unjust damage of what belongs to another.

If I find a watch I may keep it till I find the owner, but when I have found the owner, I must give him his watch. The watch is his, it belongs to him, and I sin against justice if I do not give another what belongs to him. There is a peculiar connection between the owner and his watch; that connection gives the owner the right to possess his watch; justice demands that the watch should be in the possession of its owner, the watch cries for its owner, just as the child cries for its mother.

If I unjustly destroy or damage what belongs to another, he has not what belongs to him. I must then give him an equivalent. I must put him as far as possible in the possession of the rights of which I unjustly deprived him. I must make restitution to him. Justice demands that, for justice demands that each one should have what belongs to him.

Are prices of commodities a matter of justice, or may a seller get what he can for his goods?

Until quite recent times the answer given to this question was that prices of commodities are certainly a matter of justice, and that a seller who tries to get for his goods more than they are worth is a cheat. At present the question is involved in the greatest confusion, chiefly due to political economists. Some economists merely abstract from the question of justice in prices. Justice, they say, is a matter for ethics, and political economy has nothing to do with ethics. Others assert that prices are regulated by natural forces as inexorable as those which govern the weather, and so are not subject to the law of justice. The Catholic doctrine is that justice is a moral virtue and that it should rule all men’s actions, and therefore his buying and selling, as well as the rest. Price is the money measure of value, but what is value? We must distinguish carefully between use-value and exchange-value. The use-value of a thing is the advantage which one derives from using it, and the consequent esteem in which he holds it. It is something individualistic, subjective, and variable. The use-value of a glass of water depends on the individual, on his tastes, on his variable needs. Exchange-value is what a thing will exchange for, what the owner can get for it. A glass of water has great or little use-value, according to circumstances; it has no exchange value, because nobody will give anything for it; it can be got for nothing. In order that a thing may have exchange-value, it must be capable of satisfying men’s wants, it must be of limited quantity and relatively scarce, and there must be a society of men in existence who have different goods which they are willing to exchange for others. Exchange-value can only exist in society. It is a social product; society gives goods their exchange-value; the social, or common, estimate is the measure of exchange-value. Because it is a social estimate, exchange-value is not mathematically determined. There is a certain indefiniteness about it. In a given society at a certain time those who are acquainted with the exchange-value of a horse will say on seeing a particular horse: “Oh! he’s worth about forty pounds.” You might get forty-five pounds for him, but hardly more. You might have to let him go for thirty-five pounds, if you are compelled to sell. In other words, the exchange-value of commodities and consequently their price fluctuates, and even when stable it is not determined to the last penny.

But justice requires that prices should be fair and reasonable. Nobody likes to give more for an article than it is worth, and the common estimate of people acquainted with the state of the market is the measure of its worth. Its use-value to the buyer will be greater than the price which he pays for it, or else he would not part with his money. But justice requires that exchange-values should be equal when things are exchanged in ordinary contracts of buying and selling. That is the doctrine expounded by Aristotle and faithfully adhered to as being the teaching of natural reason until the time of Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes and Locke denied the traditional teaching without attempting to show that it was false. When the road had thus been cleared, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other leading economists developed a doctrine of value which was to produce the most important results. They taught that labour is the source and measure of value. Commodities are exchanged according to the amount of labour which has been put into them. Karl Marx adopted this theory of value and built on it his doctrine of scientific Socialism. He argued that if labour is the source of value, then the worker produces all the wealth of the world. The capitalist pays the worker less for his labour than it is worth and takes the surplus value for himself. Thus the capitalist robs the worker, and no wrong is done by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains.

The doctrine of Karl Marx is the cause of a great deal of the social and economic troubles of our time. It shows how disastrous false teaching may become, and how important it is to keep to the truth.

Labour is, indeed, a source of value, but it is false to say that it is the only source of value or that it is the measure of value. A few examples will make this perfectly clear. There are things of great value which have been acquired without any labour at all, as, for example, a diamond found by chance on the South African veldt. The same quantity of labour often produces commodities of very different values. The faggot maker, the ordinary carpenter, and the cabinet maker may each work for eight hours a day, but the product of their labour will be of very different values. Not unfrequently a workman complains that his labour has been thrown away; he has mixed his labour with the material, but the result is worthless. The Marxian theory of value is false, and the consequences to which it leads are false and disastrous.