Chapter I. On Supernatural Moral Virtues in General

I. Notion of a Supernatural Moral Virtue. Just as the theological virtues immediately regard the supernatural ultimate end, so supernatural moral virtues immediately regard intermediate supernatural ends. From this it follows that the material object of these virtues can be constituted only by those actions which immediately touch intermediate ends. But since such acts of themselves have their being in a mean, which can be predicated of the theological virtues only per accidens, it is also clear that their morality must be measured according to reason illumined by the principles of faith. From this doctrine it follows that a supernatural moral virtue is suitably defined: a supernatural virtue inclining or disposing one to exercise supernatural acts concerning the means to the supernatural end.

Note. Since natural virtues in their own order, both as to objects and as to number, agree entirely with supernatural virtues, therefore, with due qualifications, the things which we shall say about supernatural virtues can be applied to natural virtues. But since we have been called to the supernatural order, when in the future we speak of moral virtue, of itself we understand supernatural virtue.

II. Existence of Supernatural Moral Virtues. Scotus and the Scotists deny that there are supernatural moral virtues, and say that natural moral virtues, that is, acquired virtues, suffice even in the supernatural order, because they can receive a rule from faith and be commanded by charity, and thus can attain a supernatural end. Nevertheless this opinion has become obsolete, and the existence of supernatural moral virtues is now almost commonly admitted.

It is proved:

1. By the mind of the Church. The Council of Vienne,¹ choosing as more probable the opinion teaching that grace and virtues, as to habit, are infused even into little children in baptism, openly supposes the proposed opinion. For that by those virtues are understood not only theological virtues but also infused moral virtues is clear from the fact that the Council chooses that opinion which: a) theologians at that time, with St. Thomas against the Scotists, admitted, namely that even moral virtues are infused; and b) Innocent III in his own time had mentioned but left undecided. But Innocent says that this opinion asserts that "faith and charity and other virtues" are infused into little children.² The Roman Catechism teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace] is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace." Then it calls them "an abundance of virtues," and again "so great an abundance of virtues";³ these phrases are less suitably applied to only the three theological virtues. Leo XIII, in the letter to the Archbishop of Baltimore given on January 22, 1899, openly distinguishes supernatural moral virtues from natural acquired virtues and teaches that the former must be preferred to the latter.

2. By the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Thus teach St. Augustine,⁴ St. Clement of Rome,⁵ St. Polycarp,⁶ Origen,⁷ St. Basil,⁸ St. Gregory Nazianzen,⁹ St. Hilary,¹⁰ St. Ambrose,¹¹ St. Prosper,¹² and St. Gregory the Great.¹³

3. By theological reason. Man constituted in the supernatural order must be perfected both as to essence and as to operation in relation to the supernatural ultimate end, and also as to operation in relation to the intermediate ends through which he must tend toward this ultimate end. But as to essence he is perfected by habitual grace; as to operations in relation to the ultimate end, by infused theological virtues. Therefore it is connaturally necessary that he be perfected as to operation in relation to intermediate ends by infused moral virtues.

Confirmation. The order of grace is more perfect than the order of nature and perfects it. But in the order of nature man is perfected not only in operations concerning the natural ultimate end by the habit of first principles and by the natural rectitude of the will and inclination toward that end, but also in operations concerning intermediate ends by acquired moral virtues.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

² Corpus Iuris, book 3, Decretals of Gregory, title 42, chapter 3, Maiores.

³ Part 2, chapter 2, questions 39-40.

⁴ Enarratio in Psalmum 83, v. 8, n. 11 (ed. G., 4, col. 1267).

⁵ Epistula I ad Corinthios, cc. 35 and 58 (M.P.G. 1, cols. 278 and 327).

⁶ Epistula ad Philippenses, c. 12 (M.P.G. 5, cols. 1015-1016).

⁷ Book 10, In Epistolam ad Romanos, n. 7 (M.P.G. 14, col. 1261 B).

⁸ Homily on Psalm 29, n. 5, § 8 (M.P.G. 29, cols. 315-318 inclusive).

⁹ Oration 21, c. 1 (M.P.G. 35, cols. 1082-1083 A inclusive); book 1, theological poems, section 2, poem 49-51 inclusive (ibid. 37, cols. 949-950); cf. Oration 14, cc. 1-5 inclusive (ibid. 35, cols. 859 A-863 B inclusive).

¹⁰ Commentary on Matthew, c. 11, n. 9 (M.P.L. 9, cols. 982 C-983 A inclusive).

¹¹ Book 6, Hexaemeron, c. 7, n. 42 (M.P.L. 14, col. 258 B); De paradiso, n. 14 (ibid., col. 280).

¹² Contra Collatorem, c. 9, n. 3 (M.P.L. 51, cols. 237 B-238 A inclusive).

¹³ Book 2, Moralia, c. 49, nn. 76-77 (M.P.L. 75, cols. 592-593); book 1, Homily 5 on Ezekiel, n. 11 (ibid. 76, col. 825).

III. Number of Moral Virtues. As concerns the number of moral virtues, take the following:

1. Since the distinction of virtues is taken from the specific distinction of formal objects, there exist as many specifically distinct moral virtues as there are formal objects of them distinct in species. Therefore, since the formal object of moral virtues is their conformity with reason illumined by faith, there are as many specifically distinct moral virtues as there are specifically distinct reasons of conformity.

2. Among moral virtues some are distinguished as principal, not because they are more perfect than all the others, but because human life is more principally occupied in them and the other virtues are founded on them. These principal virtues are called cardinal, from the hinge on which a door turns, because moral life too in some way turns and is founded on these virtues as on certain principles (St. Thomas, De virtutibus cardinalibus, q. 1, a. 1). Four cardinal virtues are enumerated: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "And if anyone loves justice, her labors have great virtues: for she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful to men in life."¹ This doctrine is confirmed by the holy Fathers, among whom, for example, St. Augustine teaches: "For the virtues of our active life are described by many as four, and they are found in Scripture. Prudence is said to be that by which we distinguish between good and evil. Justice is said to be that by which we render to each one his own. ... Temperance is said to be that by which we restrain lusts. Fortitude is said to be that by which we bear all troublesome things."² Finally it is proved by reason, and indeed in two ways: first, from the side of the formal principle of virtue; second, from the side of the subject.

Therefore from the side of the formal reason of virtues it is shown thus: the formal reason of virtues is the good of reason, and this good can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is in the very consideration of reason alone, and thus there will be the virtue of prudence. In another way, insofar as the good of reason is placed concerning something. And this is considered in two ways: either as it is concerning operations, and thus justice is posited; or as it is placed concerning passions. And this in two ways: either concerning passions impelling toward the contrary of what reason dictates, and thus temperance is posited; or concerning passions drawing one back from the good of reason on account of difficulties, and thus fortitude is posited.

But from the side of the subject the conclusion is proved as follows. For the subject of virtue is twofold: either rational by essence, which is the intellect, and in this prudence is posited; or rational by participation, and this is either the will, which is the subject of justice; or the concupiscible appetite, which is the subject of temperance; or the irascible appetite, which is the subject of fortitude.³

But that the things said above may be taken more rightly, observe the following:

a) The cardinal virtues can be considered under a twofold aspect: either as general modes or properties of all virtues, or as special virtues. Taken in the former sense, they are not special and distinct habits, but properly general conditions of every virtue. Thus prudence so considered is nothing other than a certain rectitude of discretion in any act and any matter; justice, a certain rectitude of soul by which a man works what he ought in any matter; temperance, a certain disposition of soul which preserves measure for every passion and operation, lest they be carried beyond what is due; fortitude, a certain disposition of soul by which a man is formed according to reason against any impulses of passions or labors of operations whatever (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61, a. 4).

Taken in the other sense, the cardinal virtues are special and distinct habits, and as their material object they have that matter in which the general mode of which we have spoken above is especially evident. Now rectitude of discretion appears especially in the command of reason; therefore prudence is the virtue commanding what things are to be done or omitted. Rectitude of soul in performing what is due is especially evident in those things which are with equality toward another; hence justice is the virtue which renders to each one his right. The disposition of soul preserving measure in operation and passion appears especially in restraining the pleasures of touch; therefore temperance is the virtue which moderates these pleasures. The disposition of soul sustaining the impulses of passions and the labors of operations is especially evident before all else in undergoing dangers of death; hence fortitude is the virtue by which we undergo dangers of death (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61, a. 3). Considered in this way, the cardinal virtues are opposed to the four wounds of original sin: prudence is opposed to the wound of ignorance, justice to malice, fortitude to weakness, and temperance to concupiscence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 3).

b) The other moral virtues are reduced to these cardinal virtues, indeed either as subjective parts, or as potential parts, or as integral parts, according as they participate in their reason in different ways.

alpha. Subjective parts of some cardinal virtue are called those virtues which truly participate in the general reason of that cardinal virtue, although they nevertheless have their own specifying object. Thus, for example, sobriety is a subjective part of the cardinal virtue of temperance; for just as temperance moderates the passion of touch, so sobriety moderates the passion for intoxicating drink. But because subjective parts participate in the general reason of their cardinal virtue, there cannot exist subjective parts of a cardinal virtue which already has an entirely specific notion, as happens in relation to the cardinal virtue of fortitude, which has a plainly determinate matter, namely dangers of death.

beta. Potential parts are called those virtues which agree with a cardinal virtue in the general formal mode of attaining their object, but differ from it insofar as they do not have as their object that matter in which the general formal mode is especially evident. Thus meekness, which moderates anger, is a potential part of temperance; just as temperance moderates the pleasure of touch, so meekness moderates the passion of anger.

gamma. Integral parts of a cardinal virtue are not virtues of themselves, but only conditions or dispositions which, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "must concur for the perfect act of virtue" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48, single article). Thus, for example, shamefacedness is fear of a base act insofar as it is reproachable. It primarily regards reproach, and therefore, by suffusing the soul with horror of baseness, it helps the virtue of temperance to place a perfect act; therefore it is an integral part of this cardinal virtue.

¹ Wis. 8:7.

² Enarratio in Psalmum 83, v. 8, n. 11 (ed. G., 4, col. 1267).

³ Hieronymus de Medicis, on I-II, q. 61, a. 2; nevertheless, with regard to the supernatural virtues of temperance and fortitude, there is dispute concerning the subject of inherence (n. 370).

IV. Subject of Inherence of Moral Virtues. The subject which and total of moral virtues, equally with that of theological virtues, is, as is clear, the person himself who possesses the said virtues. It remains, therefore, that we speak of the subject by which of inherence. Now:

1. As regards natural moral virtues, the following hold:

a) The cardinal moral virtues inhere as follows: prudence, since as a perfection of practical judgment it is right reason concerning things to be done, inheres in the practical intellect; justice, as perfecting the rational appetite in the pursuit of the neighbor's good, inheres in the will; fortitude, which perfects the sensitive appetite in overcoming dangers, inheres in the irascible sensitive appetite; temperance, perfecting the sensitive appetite in moderating pleasures, inheres in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.

b) Moral virtues which are subjective parts of a cardinal virtue have the same subject by which of inherence as the cardinal virtue itself, because a species is never outside its genus.

c) Moral virtues which are potential parts do not of themselves inhere in the subject in which the cardinal virtue is, whose formal mode of attaining the object they agree with. Thus, for example, humility is in the irascible sensitive appetite and yet is reduced to the cardinal virtue of temperance, which is in the concupiscible sensitive appetite, because it follows not the formal mode of fortitude, which is in the irascible appetite, but that of temperance.

2. As regards supernatural moral virtues, the following hold:

a) The cardinal moral virtues inhere as follows: prudence inheres in the practical intellect; justice inheres in the will. With regard to fortitude and temperance there is dispute. According to some, they inhere in the will;¹ according to others, fortitude inheres in the irascible sensitive appetite, and temperance in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.²

b) Moral virtues which are subjective parts of a cardinal virtue have the same subject of inherence, because, as we said above, a species is never outside its genus. Hence the subjective parts of prudence inhere in the practical intellect, the subjective parts of justice in the will; the subjective parts of temperance, according to some, in the will, and according to others, in the concupiscible sensitive appetite. Fortitude lacks subjective parts.

c) Moral virtues which are potential parts of a cardinal virtue, according to those who teach that the sensitive appetite is not a subject of inherence of supernatural virtues, according to them, I say, the potential parts of prudence are in the practical intellect, and the potential parts of the other cardinal virtues are in the will. But those who think that the sensitive appetite is also a subject of inherence of supernatural virtues teach the same here as was said above concerning the potential parts of natural virtues (IV. 1. c).

¹ Cf. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, p. 128 sq.

² Cf. Gonet, Manuale, second part, tract 3, chapter 4.