Whether judgment is lawful?

Judgment, as taken here, is the definition or determination of right or of the just ; but the just, as appears from what has been said, is the equal owed to another, which is the object of justice³²⁵. From which it is clear that it is an act of justice, because it belongs to justice to define and determine what is just and the equal owed to another. ³²⁵ Hic q. 60, a. 1, o.

We treat therefore of judgment taken in this sense, not only as it is exercised outwardly by a judge between litigating parties, but also as it is exercised, whether outwardly or inwardly, by private persons concerning the life, goods, and morals of others.

I say: Judgment clothed with due circumstances is licit³²⁶. It is against the Waldenses and Anabaptists. ³²⁶ Ibid., a. 2, o.

Proof. 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XVI, 18, God says to Moses : Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates,... that they may judge the people with just judgment³²⁷. ³²⁷ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra

And chap. 1, 16 : Judge that which is just. Which Christ repeats, John, VII, 24. The Apostle, to the Romans, XIII, 4, asserts that not without cause does the judge carry the sword ; for he is God's minister, an avenger in wrath upon him who does evil. Peter judged Ananias and Saphira, Acts, V, 3 ; Paul the incestuous Corinthian, 1 Cor., V, 3.

Proof. by reason. Every act of virtue is licit. Now judgment clothed with due circumstances is an act of virtue, namely of justice, as was said³²⁸. Therefore. ³²⁸ Ibid., o.

I said, « clothed with due circumstances », which are three³²⁹ : first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice ; second, that it proceed from the authority of the one presiding ; third, that it be uttered according to right reason and prudence. The first condition can be understood in a twofold sense : first, that judgment not be against justice ; second, that it be from love of justice, and not from some human motive, say hatred, anger, avarice, vain glory, etc. Through defect of the first condition understood in the first sense, judgment is perverse and unjust. Through defect of the same condition understood in the second sense, it is not properly an unjust judgment, yet evil and illicit gravely or lightly according to the quality of the motive. Through defect of the second condition, it is usurped judgment. But this regards public judgment ; since justice is found in private persons, there can be in them also true and right judgment without authority. Through defect of the third condition, it is rash judgment, namely when someone for light reasons judges doubtful and hidden things. ³²⁹ Ibid.