§ 1. On the Nature of Justice.

266. Notion of right. The notion of justice supposes the notion of right, which is its object. Right, in its proper and primary sense, signifies the inviolable moral power of a person to have, do, or exact something; in this sense we say: he uses his right, he transfers his right to another. Secondarily, it signifies that which is just, equal, or what is owed to another, namely the objects themselves about which that power turns; in this sense we say: to each one his own right must be given. These two significations of right are correlative; the one exhibits the thing owed, the other the title of the debt: for nothing would be owed to anyone unless he had the power of exacting or retaining it. Now right, insofar as it signifies that which is owed to another, constitutes the object of justice.²

a. The power is called moral, both because it is not physical and because it is according to right reason; it is called inviolable because each one is bound to observe it, so that it cannot be violated without fault. But the reason and foundation of this inviolability is the dignity and independence of the person, which consists in this, that man has the character of an end, not of a means, and that he ought to tend toward his end, not be driven to it. Since he cannot effect this unless he can order certain created goods to his good and end, he is furnished with this twofold and inviolable power: of ordering himself to his end, and of applying certain goods as means for obtaining his proper end and good.

b. Moral power or right is distinguished in two ways: improperly so called, which is founded in superiority and cannot be rendered to equality, of which kind is God's right to worship, a father's right to obedience; and properly so called, which is founded in personal independence and can be rendered to equality, of which kind is the laborer's right to wages.

c. A threefold debt is distinguished: a. moral debt, which arises only from the honesty of virtue, without there being in another the power of exacting it, as is the debt of charity, mercy, gratitude, truthfulness; therefore he who does not observe this debt does not injure the right of another, but only falls short of the honesty of the virtue which each one must observe in his actions. b. legal debt, which arises from right improperly so called, which another can therefore exact as owed to himself, but which nevertheless cannot be rendered to equality, as is the debt of religion, piety, obedience.³ c. juridical debt, which arises from right properly so called, which another therefore exacts as owed to himself by his own right, and which also can and must be rendered to equality, as is the debt of justice.

d. Right, insofar as it signifies a power, is subjective right; insofar as it signifies a debt, it is objective right. To subjective right there corresponds on the other side a debt or juridical office, at least of not hindering another in the use of his right. Wherefore a juridical relation (das Rechtsverhaltnis) involves both: right and juridical debt.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 57 ff.; q. 61. Molina, De iustitia et iure, tract. 1. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, sect. 1, c. 1 ff. Lugo, De iure et iustitia, disp. 1, sect. 1. Holzmann, Theologia moralis, IV, n. 286-336. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia (Bruges: Beyaert, 1901), n. 1-76. Pottier, De iure et iustitia (Liege: Ancion, 1900). Victor Cathrein, Die Cardinaltugend der Gerechtigkeit, Zeitschrift fur kath. Theologie 1901, p. 635 ff.

² Cf. what Lugo (De iustitia, disp. 1, n. 2 ff.), Vermeersch (loc. cit., n. 5 ff.), Cathrein (Moralphilosophie, I, p. 415 ff.), and others dispute concerning the nature and properties of right, subtly as well as ingeniously.

³ Legal debt is so called because this debt can also be urged by human law.

267. Division of right. Right properly so called, insofar as it is a legitimate power, is distinguished in two ways: right in a thing and right to a thing.

a. Right in a thing is the legitimate power which someone has in a thing already his own, of which kind is the right in a thing bought. This right immediately affects the thing itself and therefore is called real right (dingliches Recht).

a. Therefore he who has right in a thing has the thing itself obligated and bound to himself; wherefore this right gives a personal and real action, namely, the one having right in a thing can pursue it in court against whomever possesses it, and take it wherever he has found it.

b. For acquiring right in a thing three conditions are required: a. a just title, as donation, purchase, right of inheritance; b. that the thing be determined as an individual; c. delivery of the thing, at least for the most part.

b. Right to a thing is the legitimate power which someone has that some thing may become his, of which kind is the right to a promised thing, the right to payment of a debt. This right does not immediately affect the thing itself but the person, that he deliver the thing owed, and therefore it is called personal right (Forderungsrecht).

a. Therefore he who has right to a thing has not the thing itself, but the person, bound and obligated to himself for delivering the thing to him; wherefore this right gives only a personal action against the debtor, but not an action against the thing itself or against a third person who perhaps possesses the thing owed.

b. For acquiring right to a thing, which is also called inchoative, nothing else is required except a just title, by force of which the thing can be exacted. Titles of this kind are the law which grants this right, the fact from which it arises, as death, from which arises inheritance by intestacy before acceptance, donation, sale before delivery of the thing. In some codes sale already before delivery of the thing produces right in the thing.

268. Notion of justice.¹ Justice is the moral virtue which inclines man to render to each one his own right, or what is owed to him, according to equality.

a. The name justice is taken in three ways:

a. In a broader and improper sense it denotes both the complex of all virtues together and any virtue whatever, since it is some part of that complex, some justice. In the former sense it is said: Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice.² Thus it befits us to fulfill all justice;³ in the latter: Take heed that you do not do your justice, that is, your mercy, before men.⁴

b. In a stricter and improper sense it signifies some genus of virtues, namely those moral virtues which order man to another, whether God or man, and which are reduced to the cardinal virtue of justice as integral and potential parts.

c. Strictly and properly it signifies the moral and cardinal virtue which the proposed definition exhibits.

b. Three things belong to the nature of justice:

a. That it be toward another: for no one can properly be just or unjust toward himself. Therefore distinction of person is required between him who renders the debt and him to whom it is rendered, so that justice may have a place, whether the person is physical or moral.

b. That what is rendered to another be owed to him by his own right. That debt is called owed by one's own right which is founded in the personal dignity of the other and in his independence which results from it (266, b).

Since justice by its nature is toward another and is founded in individual independence, theologians asked whether a debt of justice intervenes between father and son, since the son is something of the father and what belongs to the son belongs to the father. The question is solved by making a distinction between father and son insofar as they are father and son, and insofar as they are men. Therefore in those obligations which exist only because the one is father and the other son, the nature of justice does not intervene between them; but in those obligations which exist because they are men, the nature of justice does intervene between them. Hence if a father does not nourish his son, and a son does not obey his father, as each is bound, they do not injure justice; but if a father detracts from his son, and a son steals from his father, each injures justice.⁵

c. That the debt be rendered to another according to equality. He renders the debt according to equality who pays it adequately, or in such a way that he no longer owes anything further.

c. The material object of justice is everything which is owed to another by his own right; the formal object is the natural honesty which is discerned in this, that to each one there be rendered adequately what is owed to him: for justice intends this on account of the natural honesty intrinsic to it, that equality be established between the right of the one and the debt of the other.

¹ The opinions of authors concerning justice and its species are various. Many attribute the nature of justice properly so called to commutative justice alone, which they distinguish from distributive and legal justice by the name of justice simply perfect or most perfect. Others, on the contrary, attribute the nature of justice properly so called both to commutative justice and to distributive and legal justice, and refer them as true species to justice generically accepted. This opinion, which among the older authors Tanner, Holzmann, Metzger, Coel. Mayr, and others defend, among recent authors P. Vermeersch learnedly champions (loc. cit., n. 1-70).

² Matt. 5, 6.

³ Matt. 3, 15; cf. Matt. 1, 19; Luke 1, 6.

⁴ Matt. 6, 1.

⁵ Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 4. Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 4.

269. There are three species of justice when account is taken of the relations which actually exist in civil society: commutative, distributive, and legal justice. For in the republic there is a threefold order in which to another his own right must be given: the order of part to part, citizen to citizen, which order commutative justice rules; the order of the whole to the parts, the community to the citizens, which distributive justice rules; the order of the parts to the whole, the citizens to the community, which legal justice rules.

a. In the common nature of justice all agree univocally, since the three elements required for the essence of justice are found in all; nevertheless each one participates in it in a specifically diverse mode. The three species of justice agree in this, that their object is right properly so called and therefore perfect, namely that which is founded in the dignity and independence of a person, whether physical or moral, and that they render this right according to equality. But they differ in this, that the nature of the right and of the debt which they regard is essentially diverse, and in like manner the equality which they establish between debt and what is received is specifically diverse.

b. There are three rights properly so called, but specifically diverse: a. the right of a private person toward a private person, or of a part toward a part of the same community, which commutative justice regards; b. the right of a private person, or part of society, toward society, which distributive justice regards; c. the right of society as such toward private persons, or parts of society, which legal justice regards. From the threefold diverse right there arises a threefold diverse debt consonant with the right, which the three virtues of justice pay: the debt of a private person or part to furnish that which a private person exacts by his right; the debt of the community as such to furnish that which a private person, a member or part of the same community, exacts by his right; the debt of a private person or part to furnish that which the community exacts by its right from its parts and members.

270. Commutative justice is that by which a private person gives to a private person what is owed to him by right.

a. It is called commutative because it turns especially about exchanges, purchases and sales, and other contracts. Citizens among whom exchanges are made constitute the subject of commutative justice.

b. The material object of commutative justice is the goods of each private person which belong exclusively to him. In exchanging these goods, to each one there must be rendered what is owed to him, or care must be taken that no one be deprived of his own thing. The formal object is the honesty of equality between the right of one private person and the juridical debt of another likewise private person, both of whom are members of the community.

c. It belongs to all species of justice to render to another the debt owed by right; but it is peculiar to commutative justice to render to another his own thing, either completely or at least inchoatively (n. 267, b), since its material object is things which have already in some way been made the proper things of another, as when the debt of wages is rendered to a laborer.

d. Since there is a manifest difference between the right which commutative justice regards and the right which distributive justice regards, nothing prevents the former from being able to be called strict right, the latter less strict right, although both are true right, properly so called and perfect, inasmuch as each contains in itself the integral nature of right described above. For the right which commutative justice regards is a right of property, or right in a thing, or at least to a thing.

271. Distributive justice is that by which the community gives to citizens what is owed to them by right; for to citizens, by the very fact that they are parts of society, there belongs the right of exacting that they be assisted by society in the pursuit of their end, according as the nature of society bears; and conversely there rests upon society the office of caring that from common goods there be given to each what is owed to them.

a. The office of distributing common goods inheres in those who represent society, princes and their ministers: for these alone can act for society and in the name of society. Therefore these constitute the subject of distributive justice.

b. The material object of distributive justice is common goods, of which kind are the protection of rights, money for erecting public schools, subsidies for promoting the sciences and arts, for relieving the need of citizens, etc.; public offices, common burdens. The formal object is the honesty of equality between the less strict right of the private person, insofar as he is a part of the community, and the juridical debt of the community as such.

c. Distributive justice must render according to equality what is owed to citizens; nevertheless that equality is not of thing to thing, but of proportion of things to citizens, so that goods are proportioned to merits, subsidies to needs, burdens to the faculties of citizens.

d. The injury of distributive justice is called acceptance of persons. This properly consists in this, that in the distribution of common goods attention is paid not to the dignity of persons, but to other qualities, e.g. consanguinity, friendship.

272. Legal justice is that by which there is given to the community what is owed to it for procuring the common good.

a. The material object is constituted by certain acts of diverse virtues which the common good exacts: for society then has itself well if its members are well disposed and ordered in relation to God, to themselves, to other members of the same society, and to society itself. These acts, as owed to society, are commanded either by positive law or by natural law. The formal object is the honesty of equality between the right of the community as such and the juridical debt of the part as such.

b. As regards the subject of legal justice, this virtue is found both in the prince and in subjects, but it is exercised by them in diverse acts: the prince exercises it by prescribing those things which are necessary for procuring the common good; subjects by obeying and carrying out those things which have been prescribed for the common good.

c. Legal justice renders a debt according to equality insofar as it furnishes what is owed to the community, for example, pays tribute, performs military service, in such a way that the debt is now extinguished.

d. This justice is called legal, both because law determines the acts of virtues which are necessary for the common good, and because through it the citizen conforms himself to law; it is called general, not because it has no special object, but because its material object is the acts of all other virtues, insofar as they are owed to the community.

e. Those who in this time treat of the social question often speak of social justice, by which name they signify either legal justice, because its formal object is the common or social good of men living in civil society, or at the same time legal and distributive justice, insofar as the latter exacts that common advantages and burdens be distributed according to the norm of equality.

Note. Vindicative justice, which afflicts the guilty with a just punishment, is reduced by some to legal justice, insofar as the common good exacts that the superior punish crimes and the guilty man, by obeying the sentence of the judge, pay the penalty. By others it is reduced to distributive justice, insofar as it inflicts punishments congruous with the quantity of crimes. Finally, by others it is considered as a special virtue distinct from the rest, whose formal object is the natural honesty which is contained in this, that the moral order injured by a crime be in some measure repaired through punishment. Yet in no way can it be numbered as a fourth species among the subjective parts of justice, because the formal nature of justice does not belong to it. For justice properly so called regards a true right in him to whom the debt is rendered; but no one would say that the guilty man has a right to punishment. Therefore vindicative justice, if it is considered as a special virtue, is referred not to the subjective parts, but to the potential parts of justice, and is called vindication.

273. Parts of justice. 1. The subjective parts of justice are commutative, distributive, and legal justice.

For establishing an accurate division of the cardinal virtue of justice, justice generically accepted must immediately be divided into two species, namely general and particular justice, according as the good about which justice turns is owed to the community or to a private person. Then particular justice is again divided into two species, into distributive justice, which has society, a moral person, for its subject, and commutative justice, which has a private person for its subject.

2. The integral parts of justice are two: to do good and to decline from evil.¹

The reason why, as integral parts of justice, two elements are posited which are found in all virtues must be taken from the peculiar nature of justice. For justice has this as proper to it, that it can and must be observed in a twofold mode, through a negative act, not taking what belongs to another, and through a positive act, rendering the debt, so that even he is truly called just who does not take what belongs to another. On the contrary, other virtues, e.g. temperance, can be observed in only one mode, namely through positive acts exact according to the norm of temperance; for he who does not eat is not called temperate. Now through negative acts of justice we decline from evil, but through positive acts we do good.

3. The potential parts of justice, which have some likeness with justice but nevertheless fall short of the perfect nature of justice, are all virtues which are toward another.

But they fall short of the perfect nature of justice:

a. some, because they do not regard debt: gratitude, vindication, truthfulness, friendship, liberality, equity;

b. others, because they do not regard juridical debt, and the legal debt which they do regard is so great that it cannot be rendered according to equality: religion, piety, observance, obedience.

§ 2. On the Obligation of Justice.

¹ St. Thomas II-II, q. 79, a. 1.

274. Principles. 1. Commutative justice obliges of itself under grave obligation and with the burden of restitution, if it has been injured.

a. The end which commutative justice regards is of great moment, namely both private and public good: for by preserving another's right uninjured, it provides both for mutual charity and conjunction among men, and for public peace and tranquillity. Hence St. Paul says: Do not err: neither fornicators ... nor thieves ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God.¹ Yet it admits smallness of matter, because an injury of this justice in a slight thing does not gravely oppose its end.

b. Commutative justice exacts that to each one be given what is his; therefore if through an injury of commutative justice there is taken from another what is his, either by theft or by damage-infliction, justice itself exacts that what has been taken from another be rendered; but it is rendered through restitution; therefore it obliges to restitution.

2. Legal and distributive justice likewise oblige under grave obligation, because the injury of each of these forms of justice also can introduce grave disorder into society; nevertheless of themselves they do not oblige with the burden of restitution.

To explain why injury of commutative justice, but by no means injury of distributive justice, induces an obligation of restitution, these things are to be noted. Injury of commutative justice affects a good which already in some way, at least inchoatively, has been appropriated to one or to individuals, which therefore already belongs to one or to individuals by strict right, in a thing or at least to a thing. But injury of distributive justice affects a good which in no way, not even inchoatively, has been appropriated to one or to individuals, which therefore by strict right belongs not to individuals but to the community alone, and is only destined to be appropriated to individuals through distribution. The same must be said concerning the injury of legal justice through defrauding taxes.

3. Accidentally, injury of legal, vindicative, and especially distributive justice also obliges to restitution, namely when commutative justice is injured at the same time. For it often happens that by reason of a pact, either explicit or implicit, the obligations of the other species of justice must also be observed from commutative justice, and therefore their injuries likewise induce an injury of strict right.

a. With distributive justice, commutative justice is injured at the same time: a. in distributing goods, if the distributor confers offices and benefits on the unworthy, so that subjects suffer damage on account of bad administration, which a superior, both ecclesiastical and civil, is held by strict debt to avert; b. in distributing burdens, e.g. in imposing taxes, when a greater burden is imposed on subjects than the common good exacts according to the faculties of individuals. For subjects have a strict right not to be deprived of their goods unless the common good exacts this according to the measure of their powers.

b. With vindicative justice, commutative justice is injured at the same time, both if delinquents are not punished with damage to others, and if they are struck with a punishment more grave than is just. For the judge is held by strict obligation toward citizens to impede by just punishment that delinquents inflict damages, and toward delinquents not to punish them beyond what is condign. Therefore if the guilty man is punished with a punishment more grave than is just, through this excess of punishment commutative justice toward the guilty man is injured at the same time.

c. With legal justice, commutative justice is injured at the same time if the prince by unjust laws and statutes inflicts damage on subjects in their goods. For subjects have a strict right of exacting that damage in their goods not be inflicted on them.

¹ 1 Cor. 6, 9.

131. Notion. Religion is defined: a moral virtue inclining the will to exhibiting to God the worship owed to Him as the supreme principle of all things.

a. Religion is said in a threefold sense: a. it signifies the whole relation of man to God, which embraces the truths declaring this relation and the duties which are derived from it; b. it signifies the special virtue by which we render to God the worship owed; c. it signifies the state of those who are perpetually deputed to divine worship through profession of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Ethics and apologetics treat of religion taken in the first sense; dogmatic and moral theology treat of religion taken in the second sense; canon law treats of religion taken in the third sense.

b. Worship is to be distinguished from honor: honor is an external signification of the excellence of another; worship is an external signification of excellence with submission toward him who is worshiped. Hence worship cannot be exhibited except to a superior in some kind of excellence, but honor can be exhibited even to an equal and inferior. The excellence on account of which worship is owed to God is this: that He is the supreme principle of all things.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 81-100; Suarez, De virtute religionis, tr. 1-6; Laymann, Theologia moralis, bk. 4, De virtute religionis; Castropalao, Operis moralis, pars II-III, De virtute religionis et ei annexis; Bouquillon, De virtute religionis, Bruges: Steyaert, 1880; J. B. Wirthmuller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, Freiburg: Herder, 1881.

132. Object of religion. The material object of religion is the worship itself to be exhibited to God, or those actions by which God is worshiped and His excellence is signified, such as praises, prayers, inclinations, genuflections, sacrifices, etc. The formal object is not divine excellence, but the natural moral goodness which is found in divine worship: for to exhibit a sign of divine excellence and of our subjection is fitting to rational nature and owed to God. But the reason on account of which worship is morally good and owed to God is His infinite excellence. Therefore, although divine excellence is not the formal object of religion, nevertheless it is the reason why God is to be worshiped, and therefore the foundation of religion or its remote formal object.

133. Religion a moral virtue. Religion is a moral virtue, not a theological one; nevertheless among the moral virtues it is the most excellent. Therefore sins opposed to religion are the gravest after sins against the theological virtues.

a. Moral: For theological virtues immediately attain God Himself as their proper object, both material and formal; but the object of religion is not God. For religion is not immediately occupied with God, but with actions, whether internal or external, by which God is worshiped; and its formal object is the aspect of debt and fittingness which is derived from the relation of creature to Creator. Therefore the proximate and immediate object of religion is not God but the worship of God, just as the immediate object of justice is not the neighbor, but the thing owed to the neighbor; but the end and term of religion is God, just as the term of justice is the neighbor.¹

b. Most excellent: because it rightly disposes man toward God Himself, not toward himself or toward other men, and because therefore the term and object to which worship is exhibited is God Himself on account of His excellence. Hence it is not strange that Christ the Lord especially gave men the most excellent example of this virtue.²

¹ Cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, bk. 2, c. 36, n. 7 ff.

² Cf. Heb. 10:7; Luke 23:46; and very many testimonies in which He is read to have prayed to God the Father and to have given thanks to Him.

134. Acts of the virtue of religion. a. The proper acts of the virtue of religion suppose an act of the intellect by which the highest excellence of God and our entire subjection and dependence are known; and the same acts contain an act of the will by which it intends to exhibit to God the worship and honor owed, and therefore commands certain acts, whether internal or external, by which that worship is actually exhibited.

b. The act of religion immediately elicited is devotion, or the prompt will and intention of worshiping God: for devotion is defined as a prompt will of doing those things which pertain to the worship of God. The acts of religion mediately elicited and commanded by devotion are all those acts, whether internal or external, by which the worship owed to God is exhibited; but they are chiefly six: adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days.

Of these acts, those by which religion is principally exercised (adoration, prayer, sacrifice) pertain to the first precept; those by which it is secondarily exercised (vow, oath) pertain to the second; finally that act by which public and common worship is exhibited to God (sanctification of days) pertains to the third precept. From these things it is clear that the first three precepts of the first table prescribe acts of the virtue of religion.

c. Besides elicited acts of religion, which properly and of themselves are referred to this virtue, other acts can pertain to religion accidentally, namely acts of other virtues which are commanded by religion, because they are exercised from the motive of religion or are directed to the worship and honor of God, for example fasting undertaken in honor of God or of some saint.

135. Notion. Adoration taken in a broader sense is an act by which we attest the excellence of another and our subjection toward him. In this broader sense adoration is the same as worship, and in this sense in Sacred Scripture even angels and men, for example kings, are said to be adored.² Adoration strictly taken is an external act of religion by which we attest the supreme excellence and dominion of God and our perfect dependence on and subjection to Him. This adoration belongs and is owed to God alone.³

a. Adoration comprehends a twofold act: one internal, both of the intellect and of the will, namely acknowledgment of another's excellence and of one's own subjection, and the intention of manifesting veneration and submission outwardly by some sign; and another external, namely an act of humiliation and subjection by which the internal act is outwardly signified.

b. The external acts by which adoration can be exhibited are: a. sacrifice; b. prostration on the ground; c. inclination of head and breast; d. genuflection; e. a kiss impressed upon him who is adored, or upon his garment; f. uncovering of the head, etc.

c. All these external acts of adoration (sacrifice alone excepted) are indifferent and can be exhibited both to God and to creatures; therefore in these acts the species of worship which is rendered to someone depends and is discerned not from the external act, but only from the internal act. For he who by an external act, for example of prostration, intends to submit himself to someone as to God, exhibits an act of latria; he who intends to submit himself as to a friend of God exhibits an act of dulia; he who intends to submit himself as to a powerful man exhibits an act of civil worship.

¹ On sacrifice cf. vol. III, De sacramentis, n. 162 ff.

² Cf. Gen. 18:2; 3 Kings 1:16; Acts 10:25.

³ Matt. 2:11.

136. Division of worship. a. Worship is one kind civil or political, another sacred or religious, according as it is exhibited on account of natural or supernatural excellence.

b. Religious worship is twofold: one which is owed to God on account of His supereminent excellence and supreme dominion; the other which is owed to the saints on account of divine excellence communicated to them by a certain participation. The former is called the worship of latria, which is adoration strictly taken and owed to God alone; the latter is the worship of dulia. This again is twofold: one is the worship of hyperdulia, by which we attest the supereminent supernatural excellence of the Blessed Virgin Mary and our subjection toward her; the other is the worship of dulia, by which we attest the supernatural excellence of the saints and our subjection toward them.

c. Some worship is absolute, by which someone is worshiped on account of excellence inherent in him; other worship is relative, by which something is worshiped on account of excellence external to it, or because of relation to a person holy in himself, excellent in himself.

With absolute worship of latria, God, the Most Holy Trinity, Jesus Christ, and the sacrament of the Eucharist are adored; with absolute worship of hyperdulia, the Blessed Virgin Mary is honored; with absolute worship of dulia, angels and saints are honored. With relative worship of latria, the most holy name of Jesus, an image of the crucified one, the holy cross, the instruments of Christ's Passion - the crown of thorns, nails, lance, etc. - are honored; with relative worship of hyperdulia, images of the Blessed Virgin Mary are honored; with relative worship of dulia, relics and images of saints are honored.

d. Some worship is public, which has been instituted by the Church and is exhibited in the name of the Church; other worship is private, which either has not been instituted by the Church, or is not done in the name of the Church.

Two things are required for public worship: that it be instituted by the Church, and that it be performed in the name of the Church by a person deputed for this. Hence the divine office recited by a layman is private worship; likewise prayers recited commonly by men of the whole parish in church are private worship. On the contrary, the divine office recited outside choir by a cleric constituted in sacred orders is public worship.

137. On the precept of adoration. 1. By precept both natural and positive we are obliged to adore God with internal and external worship of latria, and Him alone. This precept is natural: for since God, the principle and end of all things, is of highest and most perfect excellence, He must be adored with the most perfect worship.¹ At the same time the precept is positive: The Lord your God shall you adore, and Him alone shall you serve.²

2. From the virtue of religion we are without doubt bound sometimes to worship God as the first principle and lord of all things; but the time and manner in which this precept must be satisfied have not been determined by God. But it has been established by the Church that God should be worshiped by the whole Christian people on Sundays and feast days through hearing Mass and religious cessation from labor. Therefore he who observes the precept of the Church at the same time satisfies the divine precept. But he who cannot observe the precept of the Church, in order to satisfy the divine law, ought at least several times in the year (on any days whatever) to assist at the sacrifice of the Mass.

¹ That by the law of nature worship, both internal and external, both individual and social, is owed to God, moral philosophers and apologists show at length. Cf. C. Gutberlet, Lehrbuch der Apologetik, 2nd ed., Munster: Theissing, 1895, I, p. 25 ff.; G. Wilmers, De religione revelata, Ratisbon: Pustet, 1897, p. 16 ff.; Th. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturae, Freiburg: Herder, 1900, II, p. 24.

² Matt. 4:10.

148. What sins against religion are. a. One can sin against religion by omission, by neglecting the precepts of religion, such as due adoration or prayer; and by commission, by positive acts against the negative precepts of religion. The positive sin generically opposed to religion is irreligiosity taken generically, which can be committed by excess and by defect. By excess indeed, not because God can ever be worshiped with greater worship than He Himself deserves, but because divine worship is exhibited viciously.

b. Sins against religion committed by excess are called by the proper name superstition (Aberglaube), which is defined: vicious worship of the true or of a false deity. Divine worship can be vicious in a twofold way: by reason of the object, when something is worshiped as God which is not God; or by reason of mode, when God is worshiped in an undue mode. Wherefore superstition is twofold: one by which God is worshiped with undue worship; another by which a creature (especially the demon) is worshiped with divine worship. This latter superstition, according to the different reason of the end on account of which divine worship is attributed to the creature, is threefold: idolatry, divination, and vain observance, to which magic and malefice are reduced.¹

c. Sins against religion committed by defect are signified by the name irreligiosity taken specifically. Irreligiosity taken in this sense consists in this, that God is affected with irreverence and injury, which can be done by tempting God, sacrilege, and simony. Therefore there will be eight articles of this question: a. on undue divine worship; b. on idolatry; c. on divination; d. on vain observance; e. on magic and malefice; f. on tempting God; g. on sacrilege; h. on simony.

By these are comprehended only sins committed against religion which are prohibited by the first precept of the Decalogue. To gather in one view all sins committed against religion, there must also be added sins against the second and third precepts of the Decalogue, which likewise are opposed to the virtue of religion, namely: blasphemy, perjury, violation of vows, omission of Mass, servile works.

Article First. On the Superstition of Undue Worship

The superstition of undue divine worship is one thing as superstition of false worship, another as superstition of superfluous worship.

¹ Simar, Der Aberglaube, 2nd ed., Cologne: Bachem, 1897, Vereinsschrift der Gorres-Gesellschaft; Walter, Aberglaube und Seelsorge, Paderborn: Schoningh, 1904.

149. 1. Superstition of false worship is committed if in the worship of the true God something of falsity or lie is contained, wherefore it is customarily called superstition of false worship.

This can be done in many ways: a. if God were now worshiped by ceremonies of the old law, for example by eating the paschal lamb; b. if someone proposed false miracles or false revelations for confirming faith, or if he exhibited false relics to be venerated; c. if one who is not a priest presumed to celebrate Mass or absolve; d. if someone wished to worship God by a dishonorable action; e. if someone fabricated a miracle for promoting the worship of some saint.

2. Superstition of false worship is for the most part a grave sin, because it is gravely injurious to God, who cannot be worshiped by falsity and lie, and because it is pernicious to religion, since it renders religion suspect of error.

It is said for the most part because it seems to be conceded that superstition of false worship can sometimes be a venial sin because of smallness of matter. Thus if a preacher in an otherwise true miraculous history added a false circumstance, or fabricated an entire history in order to move the people more, this could be a venial sin, both because the falsity is not employed immediately for worshiping God, and because this does not much prejudice true religion.¹

¹ Cf. Struggl, Theologia moralis, tr. 5, q. 5, n. 6; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 353.

150. 1. Superstition of superfluous or vain worship is committed if God is worshiped contrary to the custom of the Church by some superfluous and useless thing.

a. Worship of this kind is superfluous: to wish to hear Mass before sunrise with a certain number and order of candles, of a priest who is called John or who has the stature of Christ; not to eat from the head of an animal on the day of the beheading of St. John: for these things contribute nothing to the worship of God. To kiss the foot of the chalice when it is put down after the elevation in Mass; in the office or in Mass to add prayers, crosses, alleluias, or other things which are contrary to the rubrics. For all those things which disordered devotion devises contrary to the prescription and custom of the Church, although in themselves they are not vain, nevertheless because they are contrary to the decrees and usage of the Church, are useless, superfluous, and superstitious.

b. This sin of superstition is also committed through new worships and new devotions which, although they contain nothing unfitting, nevertheless are proposed to the faithful and propagated among them without the approval of the Church. In the constitution Officiorum (n. 13), it is expressly prohibited that devotions of this kind be introduced; therefore new devotions introduced without license of the Church have rather often been prohibited.¹

2. Superstition of superfluous worship of itself does not exceed venial sin, because it does not contain grave irreverence; but good faith and simplicity sometimes excuse entirely from sin. Yet by reason of scandal and notable defect against the ordering of the Church, even this superstition could become mortal sin.

¹ Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscientiae, 3rd ed., Rome: Typographia Augustiniana, 1903, n. 40.

257. Notion. Adjuration is an action by which someone is induced to doing or omitting a thing by invocation of God or of a sacred thing.

a. Adjuration differs from oath: for in an oath God is invoked for confirming truth; but in adjuration, for rendering a command more efficacious or for confirming a petition. It differs from prayer, because by praying we ask something from God; in adjuration we command or urgently demand something through God.

b. Adjuration is an act of the virtue of religion: for by adjuration we profess that the authority or goodness of God is so great that anyone, scarcely having heard the name of God, is immediately induced to furnishing what is exacted from him through the name of God, which yields to the honor of God.

c. There can be adjured: alpha. God or Christ; beta. the Blessed Virgin Mary, angels, saints; gamma. wayfaring men, as if a subject adjures a superior, a friend a friend, a poor man a rich man, that he furnish something for the love of God; delta. demons.

258. Adjuration is divided. 1. Into solemn and private, according as it is made in the name of the Church, by ministers of the Church and by a rite instituted by the Church, or without solemnities of this kind.

2. Into imperative and deprecatory, according as it is made by command or by prayers.

alpha. Imperative adjuration is that by which the chief priest adjured Christ: I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou art the Christ;¹ deprecatory is that by which St. Paul sometimes adjures those to whom he writes: I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God.²

b. God can be adjured only deprecatorily, because He is not capable of command; a demon can be adjured only imperatively, because he is capable only of command, not of deprecation; he who is capable both of command and of deprecation, such as a subject man, can be adjured imperatively and deprecatorily.

c. God is adjured deprecatorily if, from the use of the Church, salt, water, mice, locusts, storms are exorcized, and indeed either through Himself (His mercy, goodness, etc.) or through the merits of Christ or through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary and of the saints. This mode of supplicating is called obsecration.

¹ Matt. 26:63.

² Rom. 12:1.

259. Principles. 1. Adjuration does not induce an obligation of furnishing that which is asked (from the adjured man), whether the adjuration is deprecatory or imperative: for adjuration has not been instituted for inducing obligation, but for exciting in the adjured person fear or love of the divine name, by which he is moved to furnishing what is asked from him.

Therefore if a superior adjures a subject by imperative adjuration to furnish the thing asked, the subject is indeed held to obey, yet not by force of the adjuration, but by force of the precept joined with the adjuration. Hence if the subject does not furnish the thing commanded, he does not sin against religion, but only against obedience.

2. In order that adjuration be licit, the same three conditions are required as in an oath: truth, justice, and judgment.

a. The truth of adjuration requires that the one adjuring truly intend to obtain what he asks by adjuring, and that the cause on account of which he asks be true.

Defect of truth in adjuration does not exceed venial sin, because divine authority is not introduced for confirming a lie, but only for moving another to furnishing something, as if a fictitious poor man should ask alms through God.

b. Justice requires that the one adjuring ask for a licit thing.

Defect of justice in adjuration is a grave sin if the thing asked or commanded is gravely evil; and it is a light sin if the thing asked or commanded is lightly evil: for to induce another to an evil thing with divine authority interposed certainly contains irreverence toward God, and indeed greater or less according as the thing is more or less evil.

c. Judgment requires that adjuration be made from a just cause of necessity or usefulness, and with due reverence of the divine name.

Defect of this condition is only a venial sin.

278. On piety. 1. Piety is defined as a moral virtue by which due worship is paid to parents and country.

a. Piety is taken in a threefold sense: alpha. for religion or divine worship, in which sense it is said in sacred Scripture: "piety is profitable to all things";¹ beta. for mercy or for the affection of kindness, in which sense God is called pious and merciful;² gamma. for the special virtue by which we worship parents and country as the principle of our origin.

b. God, who is the supreme principle of life and governance, through creatures as through secondary principles communicates life to others and governs them. Therefore, just as to God as the supreme principle of life and governance worship is owed, which is exercised through the virtue of religion, so to parents and country worship is owed, which is exercised through the virtue of piety.³

c. The virtue of piety is exercised not only by children toward parents, but also by spouse toward spouse and by parents toward children; wherefore the offices which are owed by parents to children and which are owed by spouse to spouse are called offices of piety.

2. The material object of piety is constituted by those acts by which parents are worshiped, namely love, reverence, and obedience; the formal object is the natural honesty which is perceived in this worship. For natural reason understands that, on account of the special relation of superiority by which parents as principle of life and education are referred to children, honor and worship are owed to them.

Piety toward parents differs from charity toward neighbor, because piety worships parents precisely insofar as they are authors of life and education; and piety toward country differs from legal justice, because the motive of the latter is the good of the community, of which someone is a part, to be procured chiefly through the observance of laws; but the motive of the former is the good which country confers for our origin and education, both bodily and spiritual. Hence it is that piety toward country must be shown even by him who has left his native soil; but only he is held to exercise legal justice who actually is a part of the community, even if he was neither born nor educated in it.

Note. Sins against piety. a. Sins committed against parents put on the specific malice of wounded piety if the evil which is inflicted upon them immediately injures their person or personal good, such as life, safety, honor, reputation; therefore sins of hatred, wounding, detraction, etc., are against piety, but by no means sins of theft. Something similar must be said about sins which are committed by parents against children.

b. Sins committed against brothers or sisters, even if they injure their personal goods, do not put on the grave malice of wounded piety unless a most grave evil is inflicted upon them, as of a very grave wound, killing, notable defamation. For conjunction with brothers is not as great as with parents; therefore the evil which, inflicted on parents, suffices to constitute another species of sin does not suffice when inflicted on brothers, but a greater evil is required. - Sins committed against blood-relatives in more remote degrees do not induce a special malice against piety.⁴

¹ 1 Tim. 4:8.

² Ecclus. 2:13.

³ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 101, a. 1.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, De poenit., disp. 16, n. 299, 307.

279. On observance. 1. Observance (Hochachtung) is defined as a moral virtue by which due worship is shown to superiors and to persons constituted in dignity.

That which this virtue chiefly regards in persons constituted in dignity is governance. Nevertheless by this virtue we worship not only superiors, but all who are endowed with some excellence: the former, indeed, because they actually govern us; the latter, because on account of their excellence they are fit to govern us.¹

2. According as this dignity of the person is diverse, diverse observance is distinguished: a. civil, if the dignity is human, as in kings, masters, teachers; b. religious, if the dignity is conjoined with religion, as in the pope, bishops, priests. Religious observance is either natural or supernatural, according as the religion is natural or supernatural; to the latter is also referred the worship which we pay to the saints and call dulia.

3. Its material object is the honor and worship to be shown to superiors and other persons constituted in dignity; the formal object is the honesty which is perceived in this worship: for reason understands that honor and submission are owed to those who after God are our superiors and govern us toward the due end.

Observance is distinguished from piety by motive: for piety is owed to parents because they are authors of our life; observance is owed to superiors because they govern us. Insofar as parents govern their children still constituted under paternal power, observance is owed to them by children; but this virtue in children is not distinguished from piety, since piety "in a higher and more eminent mode also contains that which is the honesty of observance."²

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

² Lehmkuhl, I, n. 778.

280. On obedience. 1. Obedience is defined as a moral virtue by which we comply with the will of a superior.

a. Its material object is that which the superior wills, whether by the will of precept or by the will of counsel or good pleasure; the formal object is the natural honesty which is in this, that a man conforms himself to the will of the superior, whether he commands or not, provided he has the power of commanding, since the will of the superior is a certain rule of the subject.

b. Whether obedience properly so called requires a true precept of the superior, or whether a manifestation of the will short of precept suffices for it, is disputed. Lessius indeed holds (n. 27) that obedience requires a true precept; but Lehmkuhl holds (n. 779) that he performs an act of true obedience who executes the will of a superior even not commanding, because he subjects himself to the will of him who has the right and power of commanding.

2. To satisfy the precept of obedience it is not necessary that the enjoined work be done from the motive of obedience, but it is enough that the prescribed work be posited from an honest end; but if it is done because it has been commanded, it will be an act of the special virtue of obedience.

3. A special sin of disobedience is committed only when someone does not obey from contempt of the precept or of the one commanding, or when someone does not obey because it has been commanded.

a. In all sins, indeed, some material or general disobedience is found, but not the formal or special sin of disobedience unless contempt accedes. The omission of a prescribed work is a sin against that virtue to which the prescribed work itself pertains, if the superior has legislative power and has used it by commanding; otherwise it is a sin against that virtue, such as religion, piety, etc., from which obedience is owed.

b. Since the formal sin of disobedience involves contempt of the law or lawgiver, or of authority itself, it is clear that the sin of disobedience is always a grave sin.

634. On veracity. 1. Veracity is a virtue which inclines the will to inducing conformity between our mind and the signs by which we manifest something to our neighbor; therefore it inclines to taking care for truth in signs.

a. Veracity is a special virtue, because it regards a special honesty distinct from the honesty of other virtues, namely truth in sayings and deeds.

b. Veracity is a virtue annexed to justice: alpha. because it is toward another: for signs have been given to us so that we may manifest to others the judgments of our mind; beta. because of itself it induces a moral debt; but per accidens it can happen that a strict right belongs to others of requiring truth, for example, in contracts.

2. The material object of this virtue is signs by which we manifest our mind to our neighbor; the formal object is the honesty which is found in the conformity of the mind with external signs: for that signs which have been given to us for making the mind open to others be discordant from the mind is opposed to the natural order; then, without truth social life cannot stand.

3. The duties of veracity are: a. to love truth in sayings and deeds; b. to take care lest anything be said against the judgment of the mind; c. to express the mind where reason and occasion demand this: for veracity does not require that always and everywhere the judgment of the mind be opened, which rather sometimes must be hidden; d. to inquire into the truth of the thing when something must be absolutely affirmed or denied; e. to execute promises.

¹ Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 47, n. 29 ss.; Kossing, Uber die Wahrheitsliebe (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1893).

635. On fidelity. 1. Fidelity is a moral virtue inclining the will to conforming deeds to promises, that is, to past words promising.

a. Fidelity is akin to veracity: for just as veracity requires that we conform words to the mind, so fidelity requires that we conform deeds to words.

b. Like veracity, so also fidelity has very great social moment: for faith and trust in one's neighbor (das Vertrauen) are founded on fidelity; but human commerce requires no less that we be able to trust those promising than that we be able to believe those speaking.

2. The obligation of fidelity arises from promise, by which someone freely obligates himself to doing something afterward: for it belongs to the nature of promise that the one promising intends in some way, either from justice or from fidelity, to obligate himself to doing the thing promised.

a. A saying by which someone predicts that a future action will be done or omitted signifies two things: the present will, or purpose, of the future action, and the future execution of the purpose. Therefore the same saying must have a twofold conformity: conformity with the present purpose, which veracity requires, and conformity with future execution, which fidelity requires.

b. Not any purpose whatsoever of a future action or omission expressed before others obliges to execution; only a promise made to others induces the obligation of execution. He who does not execute a purpose, even a serious one, is accused of inconstancy; he who does not execute a promise is accused of infidelity: for a saying in an externally expressed purpose is nothing except a sign of the internal will of doing something; but in a promise a saying is a surety of future execution, or is faith made to another concerning future execution (sein Wort geben).

c. He who seriously promises something must have the will of obligating himself to doing that which he promises, and the will of fulfilling the promise. He who promises without the former will sins by lying; he who promises without the latter will sins by mental infidelity.

3. Fidelity from itself obliges only under light obligation; wherefore infidelity does not exceed venial sin, unless damage follows to one's neighbor because the thing promised is not furnished.

There are those, such as Lessius, Suarez, and Vasquez, who say that fidelity in grave matter obliges under grave obligation; but Lugo rightly notes¹ that the dishonesty which is contained in infidelity is not grave. For he who does not observe faith given to another deceives the other, who had hope, not right, concerning the thing promised; but to frustrate hope of this kind is not grave. Moreover he who does not observe faith given is not worthy that trust be given to his promises; but neither is this deformity and baseness of the one promising grave. The reason is the same on account of which a lie from itself is only a light sin.

¹ De iustitia et iure, disp. 23, sect. 6, n. 90 ss.

215. Notion. 1. Penance in general signifies sorrow concerning some thing previously committed by oneself. Penance as a virtue signifies sorrow concerning sin previously committed by oneself. General and special penance are distinguished. He elicits general penance who sorrows for sin from the motive of some virtue having relation to God; and he elicits special penance who sorrows for sin from the particular motive of the virtue of penance.

Sorrow concerning a committed sin can proceed either from the peculiar motive of the virtue of penance, or from the motive of some other virtue. Now of these virtues some have relation to God himself, because their motive is the good of God, such as charity, hope, religion, obedience, gratitude; others do not have relation (at least immediate relation) to God, because their motive is the good of rational nature, such as temperance, fortitude, truthfulness, commutative justice.

2. Penance insofar as it is a special virtue is defined: sorrow and detestation of a committed sin, insofar as it is an injury to God.

a. The virtue of penance taken fully and completely contains several acts in itself: alpha. hatred and detestation of sin, by which we will that this, as far as can be done, not be present or not have been done; beta. sorrow and sadness concerning the sin committed; gamma. the will of destroying sin in ourselves, and consequently of using the means necessary for this, namely confession, which is understood from the will of God to be necessary for destroying sins; delta. the will of satisfying God wounded by sin: for an offense and injury inflicted on another is followed by the obligation of satisfaction to be rendered freely by the offender; epsilon. the purpose of absolutely avoiding sins in the future.

b. The essence of the virtue of penance formally consists in detestation and sorrow. For true penance includes both acts: for a committed sin is apprehended as an evil in some way present, either insofar as it has not yet been fully destroyed as to guilt and punishment, or at least insofar as it is true that it was committed at some time. Now, as soon as the sinner apprehends the committed sin as an evil, an act of hatred (abhorrence), displeasure or detestation arises in the will; and because this evil is apprehended as present, in a will capable of sorrow there also arises at the same time sorrow and sadness, just as a good which is apprehended as present cannot be loved without joy arising concerning it.

c. True penance always implicitly contains the purpose of not sinning: for by the act of penance a man detests past sin; but since the same malice, on account of which he detests the past sin, is present also in future sin, he virtually detests future sin also. But if penance is conceived from a universal motive, by which a man detests every grave sin, in it there is likewise contained a universal purpose of committing no sin in the future. Therefore the Council of Trent says that contrition excludes the will of sinning, certainly also in the future.³

¹ St. Thomas, III, q. 84-90. Supplement, q. 1-28. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 425-705. Suarez, De poenitentia, disp. I-XXXVIII. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. I-XXVII. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis sacramentalis, Pars III, De poenitentia. Coninck, De sacramentis, Tom. II, De poenitentia. Stoz, Tribunal poenitentiae. Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, Vol. III, pars 9, De sacramento poenitentiae. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, Vol. V, sect. 5, De sacram. poenit. Lehmkuhl, Theol. moralis, II, tr. 5.

² Cf. Coninck, De poenitentia, disp. 1.

³ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4, and sess. 6, c. 6.

216. Object of the virtue of penance. The material object of penance is sins committed by the penitent; the formal object is the malice of sin, which consists in an injury inflicted on God, and the honesty or goodness which is contained in repairing the injury brought upon God. For every sin is repugnant to divine authority and to the honor due to God, which honor the sinner has wounded by the greatest injury to God. And since the will cannot detest an evil unless it loves the good contrary to it, to the formal object of penance there also belongs the goodness which is contained in repairing the wounded honor of God.

In any sin there are diverse malices on account of which we can detest the sin: alpha. that it is against the will of God commanding and therefore disobedience; beta. that it is against the authority and honor of God and therefore an injury to God; gamma. that it is an evil of God and therefore an offense of God; delta. that it deprives us of eternal beatitude and constitutes us guilty of eternal punishment. Now he who detests sin because it is an injury to God exercises an act of the virtue of penance; he who detests it from another motive exercises another virtue, namely that from which the motive of detestation and sorrow has been taken.

217. When penance obliges. On a man existing in mortal sin there lies the obligation of turning himself to God through penance and of reconciling himself with offended God; this obligation Sacred Scripture intimates by these words: Be penitent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.¹ Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near.²

1. The precept of penance is a special precept distinct from other precepts, so that the sinner not doing penance is damned not only because of the sin of which he has not repented, but also because of the sin of impenitence.

2. The precept of penance does not oblige immediately after mortal sin has been committed.

a. It is an affirmative precept, which does not oblige always, but only at a determinate time; but by no argument can it be demonstrated that this time is that which immediately follows the sin committed.

b. Moreover, if it obliged immediately, it would oblige at individual moments; therefore he who delays penance would commit a new sin at least as often as, adverting to the obligation, he does not repent. But this is opposed to the common sense of the faithful, who do not think that they sin because they are not converted immediately after a sin has been committed, but defer conversion to a time.

3. The precept of penance obliges of itself in death: for if on a sinful man there lies the obligation of doing penance and converting himself to God, this obligation certainly presses when it is necessary and no other time remains in which satisfaction can be made to it.

4. Those offend against the precept of penance who defer conversion for a notable time, much more until death. But how much this notable time is, beyond which penance and conversion cannot be deferred without sin, different authors determine differently. Probable, indeed more common, is the opinion which Laymann establishes, namely that he who satisfies the precept of annual confession does not defer penance beyond the licit time.³

a. Concina thinks that penance cannot be deferred beyond a week without sin. St. Alphonsus (n. 437) "does not altogether acquiesce" in the opinion which holds that he does not sin who does not defer penance beyond a year; but he judges that penance cannot be deferred beyond a month without sin. Nevertheless he grants that sinners, especially the unlearned, are ordinarily excused from the sin of delayed penance, because they scarcely ever advert to this obligation.

b. There are those who with St. Thomas⁴ say that the precept of penance of itself obliges only in death; and they demonstrate this affirmation by this argument: the obligation of this precept, as affirmative, must be restricted only to that time for which it is certain to us, and must not be extended to other times; but no time can be assigned within which the precept of penance obliges, except in death. But those who with Suarez⁵ extend this obligation also to other times confirm their opinion in this way: alpha. Sacred Scripture⁶ and the holy Fathers⁷ urge penance with most grave judgments and with one voice condemn too great a delay of conversion, especially until death. beta. It is judged to be mortal sin voluntarily to persist through one's whole life in enmity with God and to defer until death the compensation of the injury inflicted on God by mortal sin: for this manner of acting seems to involve contempt of God, especially since he by his grace warns and moves one to conversion.⁸ gamma. He who, turned away from God, lives in the state of mortal sin is lacking in his primary obligation of tending to the ultimate end and of working his salvation; but it seems incredible that a man can without sin neglect this obligation for a long time, indeed through his whole life. Less efficacious for this end is the argument taken from this, that a man can die at any moment of time.

¹ Acts 3:19.

² Matt. 4:17. Cf. Ezech. 18:30; Rom. 2:5.

³ Laymann, De poenitentia, c. 2, n. 6.

⁴ Cf. II-II, q. 14, a. 2; yet the holy doctor himself deduces the necessity of penance outside danger of death from another head, namely from the obligation of avoiding mortal sin, which cannot be avoided for long in the state of sin. Cf. I-II, q. 109, a. 8.

⁵ Suarez, disp. 15, sect. 6, n. 2 ff.

⁶ Cf. Rom. 2:4, 5; Eccl. 5:8, 9.

⁷ Cf. Suarez, disp. 15, sect. 6, n. 3.

⁸ Lugo, disp. 7, n. 234.

Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

Whoever by provocation or ridicule, or by praise or flattery, causes another to commit an injury, or is the cause why reparation is not made for injustice committed, is himself bound to make restitution in the same way as one who is the cause of injustice by counsel.

To the cardinal virtue of justice, besides subjective and integral parts, several potential parts are assigned; each of these requires a longer exposition. Therefore we divide this matter into three sections, which are: 1. on justice in general; 2. on the subjective and integral parts of justice; 3. on the potential parts of justice.

I. Notion of Justice. Since justice of its own nature imports a certain rectitude of order, it can be taken in a broad sense, "according as the highest thing in man is subjected to God, and the lower powers of the soul are subjected, namely, to reason" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 113, a. 1). In this sense justice is nothing other than the complex of all virtues and coincides with holiness. But justice is also taken in a less broad and in a strict sense.

Justice taken in a less broad sense is said of every moral virtue which is toward another and renders to him his right, whether taken more strictly or broadly; in this sense justice comprehends both justice strictly so called and its potential parts.

Justice taken in the strict sense is said of that moral virtue which renders to another a right taken in the stricter sense; and it is usually defined: a supernatural moral virtue inclining man to render to each one his own right (understand this as taken more strictly) (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 58, a. 1). It is said:

1. His own right. Here this is understood as a juridical debt which can be rendered according to equality.

a) A juridical debt, that is, a debt which someone must render to another because the other enjoys the power of exacting it, as a debt toward God, toward parents, or toward the seller of some thing.

It is distinguished from a moral debt, which someone must render to another from the moral goodness of virtue alone, without the other having the right to exact it. These debts do not pertain to justice properly so called, but to other virtues, for example gratitude and liberality.

b) Which can be rendered according to equality. Namely, among juridical debts some are so great that they cannot be paid according to equality, for example toward God (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 3) and parents. Nor do these debts pertain to justice properly so called, but to religion, piety, and observance. Other juridical debts are of such a kind that they can be rendered according to equality, for example the debt of a buyer toward a seller, likewise of a member toward a society or of a society toward a member. Now only these latter debts are spoken of in the definition given.

2. To each one, that is, to anyone who is at least morally another, as we shall soon explain more fully.

II. Object of Justice. 1. The material object is a thing, or an action or omission, owed to another according to equality; and in this indeed consists the remote material object of justice, while its proximate material object is formed by the very actions which the thing owed to another according to equality, whether to be preserved or to be restored, prescribes.

2. The remote formal object of justice is a thing owed to another according to equality, insofar as it is owed, or the very reason of debt; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering the debt just explained.

III. Conditions Required for Justice. "The nature of justice consists in this, that there be rendered to another what is owed to him according to equality" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 80, single article). From these words of the divine Thomas it follows that three conditions are required for justice, namely the condition of otherness, of debt, and of equality.

1. The condition of otherness. This condition is something specifically proper to the virtue of justice. For while the other cardinal virtues regard the internal acts of the agent himself, whether of the intellect, as prudence does, or of the will insofar as it is ordered to commanding the irascible sensitive appetite, as fortitude does, or of the will insofar as it is ordered to commanding the concupiscible sensitive appetite, as temperance does, justice by its nature has reference to another. But for this condition of otherness it suffices that the other person, although physically one, be virtually twofold: either by reason of office, as, for example, a creditor who at the same time is a guardian, for as creditor he can demand the debt from the ward, and as guardian in the ward's name render it back to himself; or by reason of a twofold nature, as in Christ, who as man made satisfaction for the sins of the human race to Himself as to another, namely considered under the divine nature.

2. The condition of debt, that is, of juridical debt, as was explained above, whether that debt arises from the title of a special destination of a thing for someone's advantage, or from a title inhering in the subject, for example one worthy to whom some good is granted, or from a title of jurisdiction.

3. The condition of equality, namely between the right which belongs to one and that by which this right is satisfied. Equality is distinguished as threefold, namely: 1. equality of thing to thing, specially destined for someone's advantage; it is called arithmetic and is regarded by commutative justice; 2. equality to be rendered, with the merit of the parties compared with one another being considered; it is usually called geometric, or of proportions, and is regarded by distributive justice; 3. equality to be rendered, with the necessity of the whole being considered; it is called equality of necessity and is regarded by legal justice.

The subjective parts of justice are those which participate in the general reason of justice, or in which the conditions required for justice, namely otherness, debt, and equality, are verified. They are verified in commutative, distributive, and legal justice, as follows from what has been said and will be clearer from what is to be said. We must speak of each.

I. Commutative Justice. 1. Notion. Commutative justice is justice inclining an individual man to render to another individual his own right, that is, a strict right, or a right founded on the special destination of a thing for the advantage of some individual. But note that even a moral body or society is sometimes in the manner of an individual or private person. It is called commutative because it chiefly occurs in exchanges and contracts (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 61, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 486).

2. Opposed vices. To commutative justice is opposed a vice by which the strict right of another is injured without title. This is done in goods of fortune by the sin of theft, robbery, and fraud of every kind; in goods of the body, by the sin of homicide and mutilation; in goods of the soul, by the external sin of infamy, contumely, whispering, violation of a secret, and by the internal sin of rash judgment; in goods of marriage, especially by the sin of adultery.

II. Distributive Justice. 1. Notion. Distributive justice is justice inclining the ruler to render to the members of society, as such, their own right, that is, goods¹ which belong to them in view of their capacity, merits, and necessity. It is called distributive because it is primarily occupied in the act of distributing by the ruler; secondarily it is in the members insofar as they subject themselves to a just distribution (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 61, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. Opposed vices. To distributive justice are opposed, on the part of the ruler, every sin of acceptance of persons, whether internal or external; and on the part of the subject, every sin of murmuring, whether internal or external (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 63, a. 1).

¹ According to others, distributive justice is also occupied around burdens; but with respect to burdens there is required a debt to society, which belongs to legal justice; but with respect to goods, a debt is rendered to a member, which belongs to distributive justice. According to others, distributive justice is indirectly occupied around burdens, insofar as the ruler, by imposing a burden on one, frees another from a burden, which has the reason of a good. But freedom from a burden is rather, and at most, a quasi-consequence of legal justice exercised, than a good granted by distributive justice.

III. Legal Justice. 1. Notion. Legal justice is justice inclining the ruler and the subject to render to society, as such, its own right, that is, the good which is owed to society, as such, with regard to its end, which is to provide for the common good. It is called legal "because it belongs to law to order toward the common good" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 58, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, cited place). It is also called social,¹ because it regards the good of society and is exercised by men joined in society. It is also called general or universal, insofar as the acts of diverse virtues can be directed to the common good or be placed from the motive of the common good. Moreover, legal justice too is a special virtue according to its essence, insofar as it regards the common good as its proper object. But it is "in the ruler principally and as it were architectonically; in subjects, however, secondarily and as it were administratively" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 58, a. 6). Therefore in the ruler it is exercised especially by establishing laws useful for the common good and by preserving right order; in the subject, chiefly by fulfilling laws insofar as they serve the common good.

2. Opposed vices. To legal justice is opposed, besides contempt of the common good, the transgression of a law enacted from the motive of the common good, that is, of a good owed to the community, as such, such as a military or tributary law, as will be explained more fully in its place.

There is also a justice which is called vindicative, and which inclines one to inflicting just punishment on the guilty: just punishment, I say, by which the injured order is repaired and injuries to order are guarded against. Now, with its ends considered, it seems to regard the common good and to be reduced to legal justice, unless, which seems not altogether improbable, it must be held as a special virtue and a potential part of justice which in a private person is called vindication (n. 407).

Objection. Vindicative justice seems to be reducible to commutative justice, because it concerns rendering a debt according to equality of thing to thing.

Response. It concerns rendering a debt according to equality of thing to thing, that is, to a thing specially destined for the advantage of someone, I deny; according to equality proportionally defined (n. 379), I concede. Now commutative justice seems to regard only the former equality.

Nevertheless, by force of a tacit contract, a judge is bound by commutative justice to discharge his office rightly.

Corollary I. Besides commutative justice, concerning which there is no dispute, the reason of justice truly belongs also to distributive and legal justice. The reason is that the three conditions required for justice according to the explanation given above are found in each.

Corollary II. Commutative, distributive, and legal justice differ in species, because their formal object, that is, the reason of debt as founded on a morally diverse title (n. 379), is morally diverse.

Corollary III. Although the reason of justice truly belongs to the aforesaid justices, it is nevertheless doubted whether or not justice is divided into them as a genus into species, or in other words whether the division of justice into commutative, distributive, and legal justice is univocal or only analogical. On this point first observe that a division of a genus into species is had when the species or parts of the division participate perfectly in the reason of the genus. Now some deny that the division of justice into commutative, distributive, and legal justice is a division of a genus into species, because the reason of justice is found perfectly in commutative justice alone, and not in the others. In it there is the perfect reason of another, since ordinarily it has reference between two equal and independent individuals or quasi-individuals; the perfect reason of debt, since it is founded on the strict right of another; and the perfect reason of equality, namely arithmetic equality. The other two justices lack this perfect reason: distributive justice lacks the perfect reason of another, since it is constituted in the relation of the whole to the part; it lacks the perfect reason of debt, since greater dignity or more suitable capacity does not furnish a strict right, and consequently neither a strict debt; it lacks the reason of equality, since it claims for itself only geometric equality. The same must be said of legal justice: it falls short of the perfect reason of another, since it is between the part and the whole; it falls short of the perfect reason of debt, since its debt has its foundation only in the ruler's power of jurisdiction; it falls short of the perfect reason of equality, since it regards only equality of necessity.

Others admit the contrary, because the reason of justice is found perfectly both in commutative justice and in distributive and legal justice. For justice is the habit of rendering to each one his own right; hence the concept of the genus of justice involves rendering a debt to another proportionately. Now the concept of debt imports nothing other than debt as such, no matter in what title it is founded; the concept of another imports nothing other than someone distinct; the concept of rendering proportionately as such regards both arithmetic proportion and another kind. But if these things are true, the reason of justice is found in the three justices in every way, or perfectly, and therefore justice is divided as a genus into three species. Who will disentangle these involved matters!

¹ Cf. the encyclical of Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

IV. Integral Parts of Justice. According to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 79, a. 1), the integral parts of justice are two, namely: 1. to do good under the reason of debt, whether in relation to the community or in relation to the neighbor; 2. to decline from evil under the reason of what is harmful, whether in relation to the community or in relation to the neighbor. These, namely, are required for perfect justice. For "it belongs to the same thing ... to establish something, and to preserve what has been established in those things which are toward another. But someone establishes the equality of justice by doing good, by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he preserves the equality of justice already established by declining from evil, that is, by inflicting no harm on the neighbor" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 79, a. 1).

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 57-60.)

After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human actions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over fortitude and temperance, which govern the passions and make man virtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor. The logical order, then, is that justice should precede fortitude and temperance.

Nature of Justice.—In God justice is an attribute in virtue of which He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded complaint against Him: “His own justice supported Him. He put on justice as a breastplate” (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness towards God or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by various names, such as “justice,” “equity,” “truth,” “righteousness.”

(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness, or the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)” (Matt., v. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is also called justice or justification: “The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him” (Rom., iii. 22).

(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or right: “Love justice, you that are judges of the earth” (Wis., i. 1); “If in every deed you speak justice” (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense the word “justice” is hereafter used.

Definition of Right.—Right signifies originally that which follows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard, as in the expressions “right ahead,” “to be in the right.” But in moral matters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper, suitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective, the former being the foundation of the latter.

(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the law itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done, especially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense there is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason itself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).

(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by reason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives to one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right, right properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of respecting that authority (passive right, duty).

Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing or possessing something.

(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law giving one a true title and forbidding others to interfere with its enjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make right; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered from exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere legal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an ethical power that enables one to act licitly before God and conscience.

(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own land). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action (e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what he owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property); while the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to transfer, etc.

Divisions of Right.—(a) By reason of its source, or of the law from which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to life, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right to receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of parishioners that Mass be said for them by their pastor, the right of citizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of the power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict (moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it is one’s own by a proper and exclusive title (e.g., the right to life and property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one, only because it is something common that is to be distributed and one is a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an appointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to receive gratitude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue (e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or friendship by others) requires it.

Natural rights are subdivided as follows:

(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being based on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its parent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being based on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g., the right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the nature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent fact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);

(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they are had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of life in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in course of time through some contingent fact. Thus, titles to goods of fortune which the owner is the first to possess (original titles) are obtained by occupation and accession; titles to goods obtained from others (derivative titles) are obtained through prescription, inheritance, contract;

(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is, they are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they are not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink alcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to renunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to repel temptation, the right to serve God).

Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be Distinguished.—(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one as one’s own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The right of a beggar to receive some assistance from someone is not a strict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or any individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right, since it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.

(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence it may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical force. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of presents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a falling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a reconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries show signs of gratitude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be enforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his employer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means. It should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a proper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or positive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right (e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally not defensible, the right of a parent to his child’s respect) does not prove that the right is not strict.

A strict right to have or to own is either in re or ad rem. (a) A right in re (real or complete right) is the right to that which one already lawfully has as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right ad rem (personal or inchoate right) is the right to that which one is entitled to obtain as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised him by Balbus).

Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.—(a) The right in re authorizes recourse to a real action (actio in rem), that is, to a suit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be held, as when one sues to recover one’s property through the ejectment of a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically bound to him who has the right, as being his own.

(b) The right ad rem enables one to enforce one’s claim by a personal action (actio in personam), that is, to bring a suit against a definite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic relationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery on account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.

The right in re to property is either perfect or imperfect.

(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one to exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at will of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it (e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down, etc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one’s property to exclude the public).

(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is restricted as to the right of the disposition of one’s goods, for example, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of disposition without the right of use, for example, when one is forbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns (radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right of disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent alterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful dominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the right of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor’s flock from grazing in one’s pasture (ownership subject to servitude).

The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It Exists.—(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called just because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b) nor is it in the sensitive appetite, since a sense faculty does not apprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice is in the rational appetite or will.

The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.—(a) The material object of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is remotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and distribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are exchanged or distributed.

(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it principally intends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of others, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring, may be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is owed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the neighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self, while justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and gives him what belongs to him.

Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so fully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.

(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the parent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that spring from their special relationship pertain to the virtue of filial and paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more strictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations that spring from relationships that are common (e.g., from a contract between a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these relationships they treat with one another, not as father and son, but as man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one, inasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and the same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.

(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and than master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and neither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal society and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another stricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another, although those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of justice.

Division of Justice.—Justice is divided according to the rights it respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of law) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or subordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law and the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice (fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.

Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a general condition found in all virtues?

(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch as its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe all the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as fortitude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of the courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence, as Aristotle says (Ethics, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man primarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as being that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It differs even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by one’s own debt to the source of one’s life) and from obedience (for legal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that are not commanded).

Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.—(a) Particular justice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater distinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and the party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when the latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive characteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account of the independence or “otherness” of those between whom it exists, so much so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when only one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man and his soul, body, powers).

(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or filial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good as such) and is more voluntary.

Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of its members one of legal or one of particular justice?

(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has over the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the common good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion the citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the community of which he is part.

(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation for their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an implicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will serve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the expenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals (see 1708).

Distributive and Commutative Justice.—On account of the inequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists, particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative, which are distinct species of justice.

(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that this justice—that is, relations towards particular persons—is either the relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations are governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to portion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens (e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but according to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by commutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the individual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the rights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the right to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from the fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in exchanges, such as buying and selling).

(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and commutative is specific appears from the fact that the main characteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality between payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice in a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when a thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it is already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice, when a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it and a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or abilities.

Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is arithmetical, or of quantity (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is just to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice is geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of 90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90, it is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays $80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and commutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private matters and unjust in public matters. Example: Titus, an office-holder, pays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends, whether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.

Corrective Justice.—Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive) justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties adequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance or retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person the desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not justice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only a potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).

(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a punishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality between the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to another on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness by taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the party offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If the person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also practises commutative justice.

(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge may intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as of the individual who has been injured.

Different Species of Justice in One Act.—Different species of justice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be elicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of justice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of vindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of justice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of distributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the payment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution from common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services contracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say that wages for services given the community are due in commutative justice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice equality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter between the proportion received by one and the proportion received by another, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value received in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).

The Object of Justice.—The function of a moral virtue is to direct according to moderation all those things that are subject to the free will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions of man and the external things of which he makes use.

(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as to include both those internal affections that are accompanied by notable bodily changes (the passions, such as anger, sadness), and those actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations). Every virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is defined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but not every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since the virtues of fortitude and temperance regulate, not the operations, but the passions.

(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not communicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and external, by which men communicate with one another. These latter either have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money, produce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease and other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have such operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues have to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good election of the will; but there is this difference between justice and the other moral virtues, that fortitude and temperance merely dispose the intellectual appetite for a good choice by the regulation they give to the sensitive appetite, while justice has for its proper act to choose well the means for moderating external operations. As for external operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but not of the other two moral virtues.

The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in himself; for the passions that are moderated by fortitude and temperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and not other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to regulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and things directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But both the passions and external operations have effects and consequent ends that give them new relationships, and hence we may distinguish between the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the secondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the effects of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external things; the primary object of fortitude and temperance is the passions, for justice seeks the good of others, whereas fortitude and temperance seek the good of the agent.

(b) The secondary object of justice is the passions, whenever its principal object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the passions. Thus, when lust urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice to the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue of temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the passion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fortitude and temperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the subject of the principal object (i.e., the passions) has reactions in reference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fortitude and desire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as combat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to others; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and if desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food or drink.

The Golden Mean of Virtue.—The golden mean of virtue is not the same in all the moral virtues (see 154).

(a) Thus, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions for the benefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of excess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined by reason from a consideration of the subject and his circumstances (the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with individual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying that what is one man’s meat is another man’s poison. It would be absurd to say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and that all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and quantity of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the contrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be moderate which agrees with the health, appetite, duties, manner of life, etc., of the person.

(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the benefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in order that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality, which means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the middle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of external things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and of the thing), and so it does not vary with the circumstances of the subject. If the real value of a horse is $100—it makes no difference whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich or poor—the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the buyer, deficiency to the seller.

Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the person who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be that this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of the person to whom justice is owed.

(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of the thing in distributions consists in equality between relative proportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of persons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice must consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as compared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe equality by giving proper shares to all.

(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when the condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a ruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the mean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the payment and the debt.

Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act just, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?

(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the affirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its mean is observed. The mean of fortitude and temperance cannot be observed without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is not brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength); but the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last penny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a sacrifice).

(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the negative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a virtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circumstances are agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely out of vainglory exercises fortitude materially, not formally; and likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.

Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.—The differences between particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore, the following:

(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good of the agent himself;

(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the passions;

(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;

(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the circumstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.

While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual virtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral virtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appetite. The superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed virtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.

(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they pursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good. “Great is the splendor of justice,” says St. Ambrose (De Officiis, lib. I, cap. 28), “which is born for others rather than for itself, and which aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all may be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow assistance, not refuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others.” Moreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the courageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal justice, as Aristotle says (Ethics, lib. V, cap. 2), is often regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it perfects a nobler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the good, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is impartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even though a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an injured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An indication that justice is nobler than regulation of the passions is seen by Aristotle (Ethics, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is more difficult and rarer: “Many people are capable of exhibiting virtue at home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor. Accordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that ‘office will reveal a man,’ for one who is in office is at once brought into relation and association with others. As then the worst of men is he who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to his friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his own life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task.”

Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is nobler than they.

(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war, it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.

(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few, while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all; justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than liberality without justice.

Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.

(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the worship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man; and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.

(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due to another.

Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the objective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby they are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects), but also from the viewpoint of the subjective participation of them in the souls of their possessors.

(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor, since all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see 1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with the growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).

(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from the order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and promptitude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally on the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as natural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of God (see 135, 136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and enjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus, Abraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery, David in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is praised as “a just man” (Matt., i. 19).

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 61, 62.)

The Three Species of Justice.—The subjective parts of a virtue are those that partake of its essence and that are the subordinate species into which it may be distinguished, as prudence is divided into individual, domestic and political (see 1639). There are three species of justice, and their division is taken from the threefold relation that exists in a whole.

(a) Thus, legal justice directs the parts to respect the rights of the whole, and it is exercised by all those who promote the common good of a society by fulfilling well the duties which pertain to their position and rank in the society.

(b) Distributive justice regulates the whole in reference to the parts, and it is exercised by all those who seek for such a distribution of the common things of a society as accords with the inequalities of merit and ability of the members. Hence, distributive justice is found not only in the heads of a state, or family, or other body, but also in the subordinates who are content with the fair distributions made by the heads.

(c) Commutative justice orders the relations between the parts, and it is exercised by all who practise fair dealing with their equals, that is, by states with states, families with families, societies with like societies, individuals with individuals; or with those who act as their equals, as when a society acting as a moral person makes a contract with one of its members as another moral person.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 79-100.)

The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.—The integral parts of a virtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the virtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are needed for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These parts are called here “quasi-integral,” so as not to be confused with the properly integral parts, or divisions of quantity, in a material composite. In its first use “integral part” is spoken of bodily things; in its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two previous articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present article will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the opposite sins.

The integral parts of justice are expressed in the words of Psalm xxxiii. 15—“Turn away from evil, and do good”—for the perfectly just man will both establish the equality of justice by giving others their dues, and will preserve that equality by refraining from injuries.

(a) Thus, these integral parts are acts of virtue, and hence the avoidance of evil here is not a purely negative attitude; it includes a positive repudiation by the will of all wish to harm others, and it is exercised especially when one is attacked and yet refuses to resort to injustice.

(b) These integral parts of justice are also distinct, one from the other. The other moral virtues regulate the passions by bringing them to the moderation that lies midway between two evil extremes, and hence in respect to those virtues to turn away from evil is the same thing as to do good. But justice regulates human operations and external things both by reducing them to due equality and also by avoiding that which upsets the equality, and thus in the matter of justice it is one thing to do good, another thing to avoid evil.

(c) These integral parts of justice are also special, that is, they are distinct from other virtues. For, while every virtue turns away from evil and does good, the two acts we are now considering do these things with the express purpose of fulfilling justice. Thus, he who observes the commands and prohibitions of the law in order to render to God and the common good their dues, is perfect in general or legal justice; he who gives to other individuals what is owed them and also avoids doing them injury, is perfect in particular justice. To the two integral parts of justice are opposed the two sins of transgression and omission (see 35-39).

The Potential Parts of Justice.—The potential parts of justice, that is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary to justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature or activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise decision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the government of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its principal act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as potential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which must be assigned to justice, since they regulate man’s will towards others, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because they do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential notes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal to a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal right (see 1692).

In the following enumeration are given the chief potential parts of justice in which there is a strict debt, but not an equal repayment.

(a) Thus, to God man owes whatever honor and veneration he manifests, but with all his efforts man can never pay to God a worship that is equal to the debt. Thus, man cannot sufficiently thank God for His benefits: “What return can I make to the Lord for all that He has done for me?” (Psalm cxv. 12). The virtue of religion, therefore, is a potential part of justice.

(b) To parents children cannot make a full return for the benefits of life and upbringing, and the same may be said of one’s country: “A due return is out of the question in honors paid to the gods and to parents ... but a person is considered to be virtuous if he pays such regard as lies within his power” (Aristotle, Ethics, lib. VIII, cap. 16). Hence, the virtue of piety is also a potential part of justice. In exceptional cases, however, a child may make an equal or even a greater return to his parents for the benefits received from them; for example, by saving his father from death he makes an equal return for the benefit of life, and by converting his parents to the faith he gives them spiritual life, which is more valuable than the natural life he received from them.

(c) To men of virtue we are unable to make a sufficient return for the good they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor we show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue of reverence (observantia) is then a potential part of justice.

Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

Epieikeia.—The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are adjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be noted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice. This is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function of legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and preserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict interpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the crowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to a close.

The Commandments of Justice.—The various precepts regarding justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the first three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man has to his equals or to all fellowmen.

The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which consists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and they therefore outline first the service that is owed to God (Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to man (Commandments of the Second Table).

(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render to God the things that are God’s. We must avoid, therefore, the excess of superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy God in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou keep holy the Sabbath Day).

(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to those to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country, superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor’s external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility (Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife) they afford.

What is avarice? Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal goods. An inordinate appetite, by being unwilling rather to lose them than God; by denying alms to the poor when the obligation of charity urges; by unjustly desiring others' things; by loving or desiring riches too much, or by taking too much delight in them. Too much, beyond due measure, namely by acquiring or retaining them according as they are necessary for life, according to one's own condition. Avarice, insofar as it is precisely opposed to the virtue of liberality, is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless it can become mortal in three ways: 1. Against charity toward oneself, by constituting the last end in riches, or by transgressing the precepts of God rather than suffer loss in temporal goods. 2. Against charity toward neighbor, by not helping him when constituted in grave necessity, etc. 3. Against justice, by taking what belongs to another, etc. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 1; 2. 2. q. 118; L. 68.

Liberality is the virtue by which we use well all those external goods which have been granted to us for our sustenance. There is a twofold use of exterior goods, one toward oneself, another toward others. And therefore it pertains to liberality that on account of immoderate love of money someone not be impeded from fitting expenditures, nor from fitting gifts. But to give pertains most of all to liberality, since this is more perfect than to receive, or to spend upon oneself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 117, aa. 1, 4. As avarice, so also prodigality is opposed to liberality, both according to excess in giving, and according to defect in retaining and acquiring. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, 119.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

Is it licit to serve prostitutes or concubinarians? Is it licit for Catholics to attend civil funerals? R. To the first. Negatively, per se and ordinarily speaking, both because of the scandal of others and also because of the greatest danger of falling. Therefore those cases which are to be excepted in practice will have to be judged from the degree of necessity and the circumstances of persons, removing scandal and proximate danger of sinning. R. To the second. Affirmatively, per se, because the homage is merely civil. Per accidens, by reason of scandal, it can easily be illicit.

How are the external acts of religion divided? - These acts are distributed into three classes. To the first pertain those acts through which someone exhibits his body for venerating God; such is adoration. To the second pertain those acts by which something from external things is offered to God. Concerning these a twofold consideration occurs. The first indeed is concerning those things which are given to God by the faithful, where one must consider sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes, and the sanctification of feasts, which is treated in the third precept of the Decalogue. The other is concerning vows, by which certain things are promised to God, and this must be remitted to the second precept of the Decalogue. Finally, to the third class pertain those acts by which something divine is assumed by men, which is either some sacrament, or the divine name itself. But there will be place to speak concerning the assumption of a sacrament in the treatise on the Sacraments. The assumption of the divine name, however, is made in three ways: in one way by way of an oath for confirming one's own words; in another way by way of adjuration for inducing others; in a third way by way of invocation for praying or praising. Concerning prayer it has already been said; concerning the others it will have to be said in the second precept of the Decalogue. Therefore here there will be discussion only of adoration, sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes. S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 84, 85, 86, 89; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 1.

What is adoration and of how many kinds is it? - Adoration is honor exhibited to another by an external gesture of the body, by which we testify our submission and the excellence of another; or insofar as it is a sign of internal estimation, reverence, and submission toward another, and consequently also of his excellence. Therefore adoration requires two internal acts: one of the intellect, the other of the will. The former is a speculative judgment concerning the excellence of another, and a practical judgment that it is honorable for us to be submitted to him on account of his excellence and our inferiority with respect to him. But the latter is the command of the will to lower oneself on account of that superior excellence in another. Whence at last the execution itself exists in the exterior gesture of the body.

Adoration is one thing political, another religious, according as it exhibits worship to another on account of a merely civil dignity or excellence, or on account of a supernatural excellence which is found in God and in his Saints. The latter comprehends under itself three species or quasi-species. The first is latria, which, with the genus taken for the species, is also simply accustomed to be called adoration; it is supreme and singular, which we owe to God alone, on account of the divine excellence proper to him, and which therefore is communicable to no other, according to Matt. 4:10. The second is dulia, which belongs to the Angels and other Saints, on account of the supernatural and created excellence which is in them. The third is hyperdulia, which is exhibited to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her supernatural and created excellence, but one altogether singular and greater and more eminent than all other created excellences. Species or quasi-species, because there is not sufficient agreement whether they are one species from one relation to God or threefold from a threefold diverse proper excellence.

Moreover any species of adoration is divided into absolute and respective. It is absolute when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence intrinsic to itself; and thus God, the Most Holy Trinity, Christ also as man, and the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist are adored with absolute worship of latria; but the Saints with absolute worship of dulia, and the Most Holy Virgin with absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is respective when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence and sanctity extrinsic to itself, but intrinsic to him to whom it is referred in moral estimation; and thus the Most Holy Name of Jesus Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and the Cross are adored with respective worship of latria; relics and images of the Saints, etc., with respective worship of dulia; images of the Most Holy Virgin, etc., with respective worship of hyperdulia. The title "The Penitent Heart of Jesus" is altogether condemned. Holy Office, 15 July 1892. The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, representing the Heart alone, is permitted only for private devotion, but is by no means to be exposed on an altar for public veneration. Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891. Because there is one excellence of the Three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is owed to them, and consequently one adoration. Trent, sess. 25, Decree on Invocation, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2 ad 3; q. 84; q. 103, aa. 3, 4; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 2, l. 1, c. 2; Struggl 11 seqq.

A determinate place is not required for adoration as though by necessity of the thing itself, but only according to fittingness, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed by place, but on account of the adorers themselves: first indeed on account of the consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be heard more; secondly on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity which are contained there; thirdly on account of the gathering of many adorers, from which prayer becomes more fit to be heard. The obligation of adoration is abundantly satisfied by otherwise fulfilling obligations toward God, in which adoration of God is contained implicitly and often also explicitly, as, for example, when prayers are poured forth to God, when one assists at the sacrifice of Mass, etc. E. M.

Can men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity be adored? - They can be honored with private worship. But they cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been numbered by the Supreme Pontiff in the Catalogue of Saints or Blessed. Public worship, however, is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church, or as instituted by her; private worship is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not licit to erect churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified, cf. 463; nor is it licit to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their relics or images for public veneration, or to carry them around in processions. Yet it is permitted to keep these images or relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private, which is not prohibited. Struggl 18; E. M.

Those are called Saints who solemnly, a definitive sentence having been issued, are enrolled by the Roman Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints, and their worship is permitted to all the faithful. Those are called Blessed who, from a special concession of the Roman Pontiff, can be honored with some public worship only in some place or in some Religious Institute. Those are Venerable concerning whom the cause of introduction of their beatification has been signed by the Roman Pontiff. Servants of God are those who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom. But "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X... forbade Servants of God, whose causes are henceforth introduced, to be called Venerable; likewise he decreed that solemnities are not permitted to be carried out on the occasion of the decree issued concerning the introduction of the cause... nor panegyric orations. But he permitted that Servants of God be adorned with the title Venerable only after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or concerning martyrdom, yet in such a way that from this permission no argument of granted veneration can be inferred or claimed... Solemnities for giving thanks to God even after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or martyrdom he likewise prohibited; yet by this prohibition he did not intend to prevent the addition in Masses, as is fitting, of a collect for thanksgiving." S. R. C., 26 Aug. 1913. This Decree also contains several other prescriptions to be observed in the beginning of causes of Servants of God, namely so that the cause may be duly instituted. There are special Instructions concerning the processes of causes of Martyrs in regions of unbelievers. Cf. Consulente Ecclesiastico, 1905, p. 313 seqq. Likewise there is a Decree to be observed concerning judicial order in causes of Servants of God proceeding by way of an excepted case. S. R. C., 11 Nov. 1912. "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, for treating causes of lesser moment of Servants of God, namely concerning reputation for sanctity in general, concerning non-cult, concerning the validity and relevance of processes, and other similar things, constituted a particular Congregation." Decree S. R. C., 9 Dec. 1908.

You will resolve: It is by no means illicit to place an effigy or statue of some deceased person not canonized, whether in an oratory even public, or in a church, provided this is not done for honoring him with public worship, but from another manifest motive, for example, if he is the founder or benefactor of the church, or his statue is placed at his tomb in the church. Thus also images of emperors, kings, and other distinguished men could be hung; and the Basilica dedicated to Saint Peter at Rome is adorned with images or statues of Pontiffs not enrolled in the Catalogue of Saints. S. R. C., 14 Aug. 1894, Decr.

A priest can indeed accept a stipend and celebrate Mass in honor of a man deceased with a reputation for sanctity, or in thanksgiving for a benefit obtained, etc., provided that he takes the Mass from the feast or from the feria occurring on that day, but not from the common of non-Pontiffs, nor recites a special prayer concerning him or with his name. The reason is that to perform the sacred rite for the aforesaid intention is not to honor someone with public worship, since the intention of the celebrant is something altogether private. Elbel 443; E. M.

Note: For the public worship of relics, it must be certainly established that the relics to be venerated pertain to a Saint or Blessed one solemnly recognized as such by the Church. In addition, the seal of some Bishop or Prelate ought to be affixed; but the seal of the Bishop of the place suffices for relics to be honored with public worship, nor is an authentic written document necessary. In order that new relics, although authentic, be exposed for the public veneration of the faithful in a church or in a public oratory, it is required that they be recognized and approved by the Bishop of the place, even if they were sealed at Rome by the Apostolic Prefect. Trent, sess. 25, de Invocat., etc.; Sixtus V, Const. Dominus omnipotens, 13 Nov. 1588. For ancient relics, their immemorial exposition and public veneration suffice; this rightly supplies any other document and bears before itself a valid presumption of authenticity. For private worship only private moral certitude is required, such as, for example, is had from a man worthy of faith.

A relic of the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ for public veneration is to be separated from other Relics of Saints in a special case. S. C. Indulg., 22 Feb. 1847; S. R. C., 25 May 1906; A. A. S., v. 1, p. 507. One sins gravely by stealing notable relics, or even the smallest part of a very precious relic, for example of the Most Holy Cross, because, although they are not estimable by price, nevertheless this taking away can gravely sadden the possessor. But in the Roman district it is prohibited under penalty of excommunication to steal relics, even the smallest, pertaining to churches, from the Constitution of Clement VIII and Paul V. Therefore not in every case is the theft mortal sin, and it is a grave real sacrilege.

As to images, halos, or rays, cannot be placed on images of the deceased, although they are commonly held as Saints, unless they have been beatified by the Church; likewise neither tablets and images, nor lamps or any other lights, namely in veneration and worship, may be hung at their sepulchers. But with the license of the Ordinary or Bishop, it is permitted to keep similar relics of a Saint in a place separated from the church and secret, to receive offerings and tablets, and to recount in little books the benefits received, yet not without the recognition and approval of the Bishop, and with a declaration first made by the author that he does not intend to win for his statements any faith other than that of human history, as Urban VIII established in the Decree Sanctissimus, 13 March 1625, and another special Constitution Caelestis Hierusalem, 5 July 1634; S. R. C., 31 July 1821; General Decree, 14 Aug. 1894; Leo XIII, Const. Officiorum ac munerum, General Decree, sec. 13; Pius X, Encyclical Letter Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907, paragraph De sacris Reliquiis.

Images of the Blessed are to be painted with rays only; of the Canonized, with a diadem around the head. Ferraris, v. Veneratio SS., n. 46. Likewise images of Our Lord and the Blessed Virgin, of Angels and Saints, ought to be painted or sculpted in that form and habit which from ancient time has been in use in the Church. Urban VIII, Const. Sacrosancta Tridentina, 15 March 1642; Benedict XIV, Const. Sollicitudini, 1 Oct. 1745.

As to the Blessed, it is not permitted to name churches or altars after them, and their images and relics can be retained and exposed only in those churches in which it is permitted to celebrate their office. Urban VIII, cited Decree Sanctissimus; Clement XI, Const. 82, n. 11. Images of Saints are laudably blessed, and privately any priest can bless them. S. R. C., 12 July 1704. S. R. C., 27 Sept. 1659; 17 Apr. 1660; 12 June 1660, Boianen.; Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; L. 1. 3, nn. 45, 532; Epist. Resp. at the end of c. 1; Benedict XIV, de Canon. SS., l. 2, c. 11; Struggl 18; Scav., ed. 12, Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 168 seqq. There is an Instruction of the S. R. C., 22 May 1912, on the privileges which, in the triduum or octave to be celebrated within the year from beatification or canonization, are usually granted by Rescript of that Sacred Congregation from the Supreme Pontiff. E. M.

463.a What is the nature and obligation of sacrifices? - The offering of sacrifices, considered in common, is from the natural law itself. For it proceeds from natural reason that, just as some things are offered to temporal lords in recognition of dominion, so also we should offer to God, as the supreme lord of all, certain sensible things as a sign of due subjection and honor. But the determination of sacrifices is from human or divine institution. The sacrifice which is offered exteriorly signifies the interior spiritual sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God, because exterior acts of religion are ordered to interior acts. But the soul offers itself to God in sacrifice, as to the principle of its creation and as to the end of its beatitude. Therefore the honor of sacrifices is to be exhibited to God alone. This also we see observed in every republic, that its supreme ruler is honored by some singular sign which, if it were offered to anyone else, would be the crime of lese majesty. Trent, sess. 22, c. 3.

Moreover there is a threefold good of man. The first indeed is the good of the soul, which is offered to God by a certain interior sacrifice through devotion and prayer and other interior acts of this sort, which are ordered to divine reverence. The second is the good of the body, which is offered to God in a certain way through martyrdom and abstinence or continence, or when someone subjects his own body to some affliction on account of divine reverence, and it is offered by exterior sacrifice. The third is the good of exterior things, from which an exterior sacrifice also is offered to God, if it again is ordered to divine reverence: directly indeed, when we immediately offer our things to God; mediately, when we communicate them to neighbors on account of God.

But sacrifices are properly so called when something is done concerning things offered to God, as that animals were killed and burned, that bread is broken and eaten and blessed. And the name itself sounds this: for sacrifice is so called from this, that man makes something sacred.

Hence sacrifice is commonly defined: the offering of a sensible thing, made to God by a legitimate minister, through real change, for acknowledging his supreme dominion and our subjection. Wherefore only priests offer sacrifices which are specially ordered to divine worship not only for themselves, but also for others. But other sacrifices anyone can offer to God for himself. All are bound to offer interior sacrifice to God, for all are bound to offer a mind devoted to God. Likewise all are bound to offer exterior sacrifice to God when exterior acts of other virtues are assumed into divine reverence, which fall under precept. But as to the exterior sacrifice by which something is exteriorly offered to God in protestation of divine subjection, under the New Law the faithful are bound to that one sacrifice which Jesus Christ instituted at the Last Supper, concerning which there will be discussion in the treatise on the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and on the Eucharist. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 85; Lessius, de Virt. Rel., c. 2, d. 4.

463.b What is the nature and obligation of oblations? - By the name of oblation here is understood the presentation of some thing for the worship of God, not so that some sacred thing is as it were consumed, as in sacrifice, but so that it remains whole to be deputed to divine worship, or to be expended for the uses of ministers. In the New Law, oblations of this sort are free, unless they are to be made from the necessity of the Church or from introduced custom. Since the priest is mediator between God and the people, oblations are to be presented to him by the people, not only that he may assume them for his own use, but that he may faithfully dispense them in those things which pertain to divine worship and for the uses of the poor, who, as far as possible, are to be sustained from the goods of the Church, because the Lord too had purses for the use of the poor.

Likewise in the New Law there is no special obligation to offer first fruits from the fruits of the earth received, unless according to the custom of the country and the need of the ministers of the Church. For first fruits are given by way of oblation, of whose nature it is that it be voluntary. But first fruits are offered because we ought to exhibit to God that which is chief, and in recognition of the benefit of God, who grants the earth and the fruits of the earth. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 86.

463.c Is there, and of what sort, an obligation of paying tithes? - The precept of tithes is partly of natural law, partly of positive law. "For natural reason dictates that the people should furnish the necessities of life to those who ministered in divine worship for the salvation of the whole people, just as stipends for livelihood are owed by the people also to those who watch over the common utility, namely Princes and soldiers and others of this sort.... The determination that a tenth part be paid was instituted by the authority of the Church in the time of the New Law.... Thus therefore it is clear that men are bound to the payment of tithes, partly indeed from natural law, but partly also from the institution of the Church, which nevertheless, the circumstances of times and persons being considered, could determine another part to be paid.... Ministers of the Church ought to have a greater care for promoting spiritual goods among the people than for collecting temporal goods; and therefore... they laudably do not demand tithes of the Church where they could not be demanded without scandal, because of desuetude or because of some other cause. Nor, however, are those in a state of damnation who do not pay in those places in which the Church does not ask, unless perhaps, on account of obstinacy of mind, they have the will not to pay even if they were asked. "But the root of the payment of tithes is a debt, by which carnal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 9:11: If we have sown spiritual things among you, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things?... For upon this debt the Church founded the determination of the payment of tithes. But all things whatsoever a man possesses are contained under carnal things, and therefore tithes are to be paid from all things possessed.... And therefore in the New Law men are bound to personal tithes, according to the custom of the country and the need of ministers. But the right of receiving tithes is spiritual, for it follows that debt by which expenses are owed to ministers of the altar from the ministry, and by which temporal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things; this pertains only to clerics having the right of souls. Tithes are owed by the faithful to clerics insofar as they are ministers of the altar sowing spiritual things among the people. Whence such clerics, insofar as they have ecclesiastical possessions, are not bound to pay tithes; but from another cause, namely because they possess by their own right, or by succession from parents, or in any other way of this sort, they are obliged to pay tithes. Clerics are bound to give a tithe to the Supreme Pontiff if he should require it. For natural reason dictates that provision be made from all goods for him who has care for the common state of the multitude, whence he can execute those things which pertain to the common salvation." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 87.

What is vain observance? - Vain observance consists in this, that someone employs means neither proportioned by their nature nor instituted by God or by the Church for obtaining a certain effect. It differs from divination in that the latter is ordered to knowledge of hidden things, but vain observance to any effects whatsoever to be obtained. It agrees with divination because it also rests upon a pact, express or tacit, with a demon. It matters little indeed that a demon is not expressly invoked; for he is invoked equivalently. For since God does not mingle himself with vain things, the effect can be expected only from a demon. Since someone uses inept means, he uses them not as causes but as signs, and thus they pertain to pacts of significations entered into with demons. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96, aa. 1, 2, 3; L. 24.

What is sacrilege? - Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing, insofar as sacred; that is, of a thing dedicated to divine worship, taken not materially but formally, namely insofar as it is ordered to this worship. That is to say, for some action to be sacrilege, the thing must be violated in that by which it is sacred. Whence if someone speaks badly about someone who has a vow of chastity, his detraction does not assume the nature of formal sacrilege, because that person is sacred to God only as to bodily purity, but not as to integrity of reputation. Moreover, only that thing is properly judged sacred which is not sacred in just any way, or dedicated to divine worship in just any way, but by public rite and divine or ecclesiastical institution, or by the power of the Church, has been deputed to the worship of God. Therefore it is not sufficient that a thing has been simply blessed, namely by a merely invocative blessing, by which we pray for the good of a thing or person; but a constitutive blessing is necessary, by which a thing from profane becomes sacred, as can be seen in holy water or blessed candles. Indeed, even more, a constitutive blessing is necessary by which a thing is consecrated uniquely and perpetually to divine worship; and this is properly consecration, as sacred vessels, churches, priests, clerics. And thus it is not illicit "to throw to dogs the bones of a lamb or eggs which are blessed... just as it is also licit to use holy water and candles for profane use." L. l. c., n. 94. By the blessing of these things only the special assistance of God is invoked concerning the use of those same things. La-Croix, l. c., n. 227; Struggl 9; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1; q. 99, aa. 1, 2; Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 88, a. 11; L. l. 6, n. 94.

Blessing is numbered among the sacramentals. It is an invocation of good: one merely invocative; another constitutive, by which a thing from profane becomes sacred; another constitutive and consecrative, by which a thing is destined uniquely and in perpetuity to divine worship. Blessings which are made without sacred oils are called verbal; those made with these employed are real, and are accustomed to be called consecrations. Real blessings, or consecrations, are of the episcopal order; of verbal blessings, some are of the episcopal order, others of the presbyteral. Some presbyteral blessings are parochial, such as the blessing of bridegroom and bride, the blessing of a ship, of houses on Holy Saturday. Which verbal presbyteral and episcopal blessings there are must be deduced from the Ritual, Pontifical, and Missal; but parochial blessings are those which bear before themselves some jurisdiction.

What is adjuration? - Adjuration is: an appeal made through God, the Saints, or a sacred thing, to induce an intellectual nature to do or omit something. An appeal, that is, an invocation of the name of God, etc. Through God, etc., indicates the motive, for love, reverence, or fear of which the one adjuring intends to induce another to do or omit something. Made to induce: superiors indeed by entreating, inferiors by commanding. Yet no obligation is induced by force of the adjuration, but the obligation is only by force of command, which receives greater force from adjuration. An intellectual nature, namely God, Angels, men, demons. "Yet we use adjuration in one way toward man and in another way toward God. For by adjuring man we intend to change his will through reverence for the sacred thing; which indeed we do not intend concerning God, whose will is immutable. But that we obtain something from God through his eternal will is not from our merits, but from his goodness." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 90, a. 1. And thus God can be adjured through himself and through his attributes. Therefore irrational creatures are not properly and directly adjured, but only indirectly, namely by adjuring God or the Saints that their use may help us, or demons that through them they may cease to harm. 1 Thess. 5:27; L. 1, 2, 3; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 4.

Of how many kinds is adjuration? - One adjuration is solemn or private, according as it is made by ministers of the Church and in the manner determined by her, or is destitute of solemnities; another is deprecative or imperative, according as it is made through prayers or through command. L. 1, 3; Struggl 37 seqq.

What things are required for the liceity of adjuration? - That adjuration be licit, three things are required, as in an oath, namely: 1. Truth, that is, that the one adjuring truly intend to attain what he asks, and that the cause for which he asks be true. But lack of this truth will rarely be more than venial, since God is not in reality invoked as witness of the false. Hence a beggar who pretends that he is poor and asks through Jesus Christ sins against religion; nevertheless his sin is venial. 2. Justice, from the lack of which one asking for a gravely evil thing certainly sins gravely. But if someone asks for a lightly evil thing, some hold that it is mortal, others venial. Yet if someone deliberately adjured God himself or the Saints to furnish him help for a thing even lightly illicit, he would sin mortally, because such adjuration would be directly against the holiness of God. 3. Judgment, that is, due discretion; and therefore both that a sufficient cause of adjuring be present, and that due submission and resignation to the divine will be present. Lack of this judgment certainly is only venial. L. 2.

Is adjuration against demons licit? - Private adjuration against demons is indeed licit to all. But solemn adjuration through exorcisms belongs only to ministers duly ordained in the Church, namely exorcists; for it is an act of order. But in the present discipline of the Church, at least from introduced custom, it cannot be done except with the express license of the Bishop, without which it is prohibited under grave obligation. Cf. C. Benedict XIV, Magno cum animi, 2 Jun. 1751, § 34; and the Exorcisms published by order of Leo XIII, to which indulgences are attached even for private recitation. S. C. de Pr. F., 18 May 1890.

Adjuration against demons must not be made in a deprecative mode, but only in an imperative mode. For the former mode of adjuring seems to pertain to a certain benevolence or friendship, which it is not licit to use with demons. The latter mode is licit, because although the acts of demons are not subject to our disposition, nevertheless they are subject to the divine disposition and to that of the holy angels. Therefore by adjuring demons through the power of the divine name we can command them and compel them not to harm us spiritually or corporally. Such adjuration of a demon can in no way be made so that he furnish help, because this would pertain to having some fellowship with them, unless perhaps from a special impulse or divine revelation adjuration were made to obtain something through them. But it must be made only to remove harms and the vexation of one possessed. The reason is that power has not been given to us by God for invoking demons, but only for putting them to flight, as the most hostile enemies of God and of souls. Luke 9:1; 10:19; Mark 16:17; Roman Ritual, de Exorc. obsess. Exorcisms always obtain some effect, at least by weakening the powers of demons for harming, although they do not always have the infallible effect of expelling them, as is clear from experience and is plain from Matt. 17:18, 19. Struggl 42, 43; L. 4, 5; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 90, a. 2.

Does he sin who mixes conversations with a demon? - The doctors commonly say that he who had many useless conversations with a possessing demon cannot be excused from grave sin. Pallavicini affirms that to ask from a demon one or another curious thing is mortal; but St. Alphonsus more probably says that it is venial, if the adjuration is truly made in an imperative mode. At least it is venial, because this would pertain to vanity and curiosity. But it is licit for exorcists to interrogate a demon about all things which conduce to his expulsion, for example, about the number and names of those who dwell in the possessed person, so that the adjuration may be directed to them, from what time and for what cause, so that it may be removed, about the sign of departure, etc. L. 5.

Is it licit to ask imperatively from a demon the manifestation of some truth? - R. Negatively, because ministers do not seem to have any power except only of interrogating about those things which contribute to expelling him. And this besides seems to pertain to a certain fellowship with the demon. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 90, a. 2 ad 3. But it would be licit if this conduced to divine glory. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 4 ad 1; L. 5.

What is the third precept of the Decalogue? - The third precept of the Decalogue is: Remember that you sanctify the sabbath day ... you shall not do any work in it. Ex. 20:8, 10. Two things are contained in this precept: that man be free on the sabbath for divine things, and that he cease from every servile work. This precept is natural insofar as it commands that some time be dedicated to public divine worship; but insofar as in the Old Law it designates the sabbath, in the New Law Sunday by the determination of the Church, and other feast days, it is positive. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4 ad 4.

This precept, as determined by the Church, insofar as it is negative, chiefly prohibits servile works on a feast day. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands under grave obligation to be present at Mass on Sundays and other feast days. And this is clear: 1. from various places of Canon Law, especially from C. Missas 64, de Consecr., D. 1, likewise from C. Omnes 63, de Consecr., D. 1; 2. from all Catechisms, by which the indubitable precept of hearing Mass on these days is declared; 3. from proposition 52 condemned by Innocent XI. But each, both to be present at Mass and to cease from servile works, is more truly from the precept of the Church; for this third precept of the Decalogue as to the sabbath day was ceremonial; and otherwise the Church could not dispense in these things, at least as to Sundays. S. Th. l. c. Besides this, however, it commands nothing else under grave obligation, or even under light obligation per se. The reason is that in fact nothing else is found prescribed in Law, or legitimately introduced by custom.

Hence it is clear: 1. That in reality there is no obligation from the force of this precept, insofar as it is natural or insofar as it is ecclesiastical, under grave or under light obligation, per se, of assisting at the evening office on Sundays and feast days, or of hearing a sermon. From the force of this precept; for perhaps someone could sin against other virtues and obligations of his state by omitting a sermon, catechesis, and other works of piety. 2. That he who hears a single Mass on the day of the Nativity of Jesus Christ satisfies this precept. 3. That there is no obligation of hearing Mass on Ash Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday of greater week, nor on the days of Rogation, and on the day of all the faithful departed.

But this precept obliges all the baptized who have the use of reason, even priests not celebrating, but not infants before the completed seventh year, or catechumens. The first reason is because it is universal. The second reason is because then they are not yet regularly capable of observing it in a human manner. The third reason is because they are not subject to the Church.

Finally the obligation of a feast day begins from one midnight to another. For such is the present use of the Roman Church. Roman Catechism, n. 1 seqq.; L. 263-271, 308; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4; Struggl 12-14; Ithur., Cas. 20, nn. 1-4; E. M.

You will resolve: It is licit on a feast day not only to write, but also to transcribe, even if this is done for wages, and whether someone writes with a pen or with the American machine commonly in use. It is probably also licit on a feast day for printers to arrange type, because the work seems to pertain to the mind in the same way as the preceding writing, although it is done with greater bodily fatigue. But if it is exercised in a public workshop by many, by reason of the base apparatus and common estimation, it is held as servile work. Moreover, scandal can easily also be present. But the printing of books is altogether illicit, as being a work altogether servile. L. 278, 279, 292; Struggl 8; Laymann 3.

It is sufficiently probable that it is licit on a feast day to paint, and much more to draw, yet excluding great apparatus and labor, for example, mixing colors, planing boards, etc. For if the action is not liberal, it certainly is a middle action, and common to servants and free persons, while we often commonly observe noble men not blushing to learn and exercise this art of painting. Hence girls are also excused who with a needle reproduce images on cloth; and likewise those exercising the photographic art, unless it is done with base apparatus. But to sculpt, says St. Alphonsus, is commonly, at least in the estimation of men, numbered among the mechanical arts. "Yet Sporer excepts when goldsmiths sculpt very delicate things in moderate matter, in which almost no labor of the body, but the whole labor of mind and skill, intervenes." Struggl 8; L. 280, 283; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 212, a. 4 ad 3. "It is licit on a feast day to hunt, to catch birds, and to fish, without great apparatus and for the sake of recreation. The reason is that similar things, with greater apparatus and labor set aside, are not servile works, but common to masters and servants. Indeed similar things, if they are done without great apparatus, are also licit from custom, even if they are done for the sake of gain. But if they are done with great apparatus and labor, they are servile and illicit." Struggl 8; L. 283.

It is licit on a feast day to make a journey on foot, by bicycle, horse, carriage, automobile, ship, litter, railway, airplane, dirigible, etc. The reason for this is that making a journey is not a servile work, but natural and common to all men. Thus the doctors commonly; and besides, universal custom so has it. Moreover, by this very fact that it is licit to make a journey on a feast day in the aforesaid ways, it is also licit to perform the works which are necessary and conducive to this, as for example, to prepare horses, to join a carriage, to carry a litter, and to draw oars in water. The reason is that the accessory follows the nature of its principal. Struggl 8; L. 275.

Sanchez grants that it is licit to grind on feasts "if it is a mill which is driven by water or wind; but not if it is driven by beasts, and in which great labor and occupation is required. From which doctrine Tamburini, n. 14, and La-Croix, n. 578, sufficiently probably infer that when the cooperation and application of man is moderate, it is not illicit, at least gravely, even to grind with beasts." L. 277. Likewise distillation is licit if, without base apparatus and not in a public workshop, it is done for physical experiment, or without fatigue of the body. L. 328.

What is the fourth precept of the Decalogue? - The fourth precept of the Decalogue is: Honor your father and your mother. Ex. 20:12. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, because "they are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3. But secondarily and implicitly it regards both the obligations of parents toward children, and also the mutual obligations of other blood-relatives, and of other inferiors and superiors. Roman Catechism, p. 3, c. 6, nn. 2, 8. Therefore this precept concerns acts per se of the virtues of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, legal justice, and gratitude.

Piety is a certain special virtue, to which it pertains to exhibit worship toward parents and one's fatherland, from whom and in which we are born, because they are "a connatural principle producing in being and governing." For piety regards this "principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and fatherland, and upon those things which are ordered to these." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 3. Besides this, piety also exhibits worship toward other blood-relatives, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; and likewise toward benefactors of the fatherland, because in them we behold the favor and help of the fatherland. S. Th. l. c., a. 1. "Through the fact that we are born from parents, both blood-relatives and fatherland pertain to us." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 5. Hence piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "because between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as coadjutors for the preservation of the blood-relationship of both, which each spouse has from his own parents; for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is preserved. And we say the same about children, namely because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as preservers of the blood-relationship received from parents." Cajetan, on 2. 2, q. 101, a. 1.

Worship is an act by which someone professes his own subjection to another in testimony of the latter's excellence. Hence the worship owed to parents imports reverence, obedience, and duty. Obedience imports compliance. Duty imports obedience and assistance.

Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1. Honor imports a certain testimony concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, such as inclinations, or also by exterior things, for example, the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness shines out in the knowledge of many, and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 1.

Observance also pertains reductively to this fourth precept; since, just as parents are for us a principle producing in being and governing, so persons constituted in dignity not only have a certain excellence in themselves, but also a certain power of governing with respect to some things, whence the nature of principle also belongs to them, as a Prince of a city is in civil matters, a leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines. Hence it is that all such persons are also called fathers because of the likeness of care. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; Quodl. 10, a. 12; Roman Catechism, n. 8.

Dulia is "a certain species of observance, because through observance we honor any persons whatever who excel in dignity; but through dulia, properly taken, servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3. They venerate, by furnishing due service to masters. A certain species of observance. For observance has diverse species according to the diverse nature of excellence. And thus in one way a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher. S. Th. l. c., a. 4; q. 104, a. 2 ad 4.

Obedience properly is "a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept" of a superior. "But if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for omission of the same from any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 2. The former is usually called formal obedience; the latter, material obedience. "Obedience proceeds from reverence, which exhibits worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered in itself, insofar as it regards the nature of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for Prelates it is contained in some way under observance; insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1. But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Cf. 835.

Gratitude or thankfulness is a virtue which recompenses benefactors for some particular and private benefit received, by the action of thanks, and by spending something gratuitously. Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude, which according to the diversity of circumstances is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude was great. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 107.

Therefore gratitude is a certain virtue which comes after piety and observance, as deficient from them, since "not whatever we owe to a father or to a person excelling in dignity do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 106, aa. 1, 3, 6; q. 107. But honor and reverence are owed to a benefactor because he has the nature of a principle, and per accidens relief or support, if he is in need.

How does the obligation of an accepted promise cease? - It ceases on account of the following causes: 1. On account of condonation by the promisee; for anyone can renounce his own right. - 2. On account of change of the object, namely if the thing promised meanwhile became impossible, illicit by laws, or harmful or useless to the promisee, for whose utility and advantage it was made. C. A. 936. - 3. On account of a supervening change of state of the promisor or of the promisee, so that the promisor would not have promised if he had foreseen this change; as, for example, if someone promised one hundred florins to a poor person, and meanwhile he himself falls into poverty, and needs them for sustaining himself or his family honorably; or, if someone promised marriage to a girl who afterward becomes poor, very deformed, or is corrupted by another. - 4.

On account of ingratitude of the promisee; for this not only takes away the obligation of the promise, but also, if it is grave, makes a donation revocable, as is had in C. ult. de Donat. 5. Through compensation, namely when two persons promised something to each other, and one does not wish to stand by the promises; for, as is said in R. 75 of Law in the Sixth, In vain does someone ask faith to be kept to himself by him to whom he refuses to keep the faith furnished by himself. 6. On account of defect of the condition, or of the principal cause of the promise itself; as if someone promised something to another on account of poverty, whom afterward he finds not to be poor. For a promise is always considered made under such tacit conditions. Struggl 23; L. 720; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 110. a. 3 ad 5; Gousset 784.

What are the exceptions to the irrevocability of donation inter vivos? - A donation 1. is resolved, but not by full right, if the attached conditions are not fulfilled. Cf. C. I. 1078, 1079, 1080; C. G. 953, 954, 956; C. H. 647, 651, 1333; C. B. 525 ff. 2. It can be revoked if the donee shows himself ungrateful toward the donor in the cases and time determined by law. Inst. 1. 2. t. 7. § 2; C. B. 530; C. I. 1081, 1082; C. G. 955, 956, 957; C. H. 648-650, 653; C. L. 1482, 1488 ff.; C. A. 948, 949; unless, however, they are donations on account of marriage, and also according to C. I. unless they are purely remunerative donations. C. I. 1087; C. G. 959. 3. But it is revoked by full right according to C. G. and C. H., but not by the law itself according to C. I., because of offspring supervening, even if that offspring had already been conceived at the time of the donation, even also if it was born posthumously, or if the donor has legitimated a natural son born after the donation; excepting according to C. G. mutual donations of spouses, or of ascendants in favor of spouses, made on account of marriage; excepting according to C. I. remunerative donations and those made on account of marriage. According to C. H. 1333, donations on account of marriage are not revoked unless the marriage does not follow. According to C. L. 1482, 1483, 1486, the donor can revoke the donation because of the supervening of children, unless at the time of the donation the donor already had a legitimate descendant, or unless it was made on account of marriage. Nor can he renounce this right. Certainly just and pious is the presumption of law, that a donor lacking offspring made the donation with this virtual or tacit condition: Unless I acquire children; for everyone is judged tacitly to wish to prefer his own to outsiders. Hence every contrary agreement is also regarded as null. But since in this case the donation is revoked by the law itself, it does not revive through the death of the offspring. C. I. 1083-1087, 1090; C. G. 960, 961-966; C. H. 644-646. - According to C. A. 954, by the reception of children, donations do not vanish. 4. All donations inter vivos made by either spouse to the other can always be revoked. Nor indeed does the wife need the consent of the husband or the authority of the judge. C. G. 1096. According to C. B. 519, 528, the donor can fail to execute a donation if he is in need, or if he cannot fulfill the obligation of supporting others, and he can revoke a completed donation. According to C. A. 947, 954, if the donor suffers need, he can demand the fruits of the donated thing. The same right belongs to the donor's children born after the donation in a case of need. - According to C. B. 534, a donation which has as its cause a moral duty or a motive of propriety is not subject to restitution or revocation.

L. 738, 739.

Whether simulation is licit? "Formal simulation, namely when someone intends through an external deed to signify something other than he has in mind, is never licit, because it is a true lie of deed; but material simulation, that is, when someone does something, not intending the deception of another, but some end of his own, is licit with a just cause, always and when from the circumstances others can conjecture that it is done for another end; as was said about restriction not purely mental. Thus Christ the Lord, Luke 24, at Emmaus feigned that he would go farther, not intending that the Disciples believe this, but wishing to signify that he truly would have gone farther unless he were invited by them." L. 171. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1. Dissimulation is had when, by not speaking, not acting, something is covered and someone is deceived from it. Of itself it is licit, for there is no obligation of always manifesting the truth.

How must right process be instituted? - In a civil case the process must be instituted at the petition of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is so called from action. Action is the right of pursuing in judgment what is owed to oneself. Hence he who proceeds in judgment by actions is called plaintiff.

But it is necessary that he be able to stand in judgment; that he have an action in judgment according to the laws; that he manifestly prove what he seeks. Proofs are made by examination of laws and facts, by sentences given in other similar cases, by presumptions, by sworn witnesses, by writings, by the sworn confession of the party. C. I. 1312 ff., 2142; C. G. 1315 ff., 2275; C. L. 2404 ff. But actions are repelled on the part of the defendant by exceptions, which he himself likewise is bound to prove. "Exception is so called as a certain exclusion, which is customarily interposed against the action of any matter in order to exclude that which has been brought into the intention or condemnation." L. 2 de Except. Wherefore one exception is of fact, another of law. By the former the fact is excluded, for example, the loan received. By the latter the law is excluded, for example, if a homicide, not criminal, was committed in order to defend oneself.

Other proofs having been omitted, either an interrogatory or an oath can be tendered to the defendant. If an interrogatory is tendered, the defendant must answer, and if he has not answered, it will be taken as confessed. C. I. civil procedure 216 ff. But an oath is twofold, decisory and supplementary. A decisory oath is a certain species of settlement for ending a lawsuit, and therefore it is tendered by one party to the other. Hence, if the defendant does not furnish the oath, he is condemned; likewise, if the plaintiff does not furnish the oath tendered to him, he is condemned. But if the defendant furnishes it, even if he is perjured, he is absolved. C. I. 1364 ff.; C. G. 1358 ff. Namely, he is absolved, even if perjured, in the external forum, but he is not freed from obligation in the forum of conscience; for the settlement was made by oath, not by perjury. The oath is tendered concerning one's own fact, and also concerning the fact of another, if there is a presumption that it is known by the one swearing, and if it is necessary for expediting the case to know that fact. A supplementary oath is one which is tendered by the judge to complete proofs, but not to the defendant himself in a criminal case. C. I. penal procedure 232. Cf. L. 11 de Act. rer. amot. ff. As regards the forum of conscience, the judge cannot tender it to one who probably will perjure himself, without injuring charity and justice. For it is in his power to tender it or not. C. I. 1314 ff.; C. G. 1366 ff. Cf. Rules of the S. R. Rota, title 4; L. fin. de Iureiur. ff.; C. L. 2520 ff.

In a criminal case from Roman Law, and also from more recent law as regards the very substance of the matter, the process can be instituted in three ways: 1. By way of accusation, when there is some accuser who promises that he will prove the crimes objected. 2. By way of denunciation, when the one reporting the crime does not wish to assume the burden of proving. 3. By way of inquisition, which the magistrate institutes.

In the accusatory process the whole case is conducted between the accuser and the accused. The accuser objects the crime; the accused responds, denies or confesses the fact, and if he confesses he is as condemned. Witnesses are all examined before both, and orally. For no one is to be condemned unheard and without witnesses. Formerly the defendant was tortured on the rack, so that full proof might be made from his confession. But by present laws no one can be compelled to bear testimony against himself. Then the sentence of innocence or guilt is pronounced, and punishment is imposed by law on the guilty person. If the accuser has failed in proof of the crime and from malice has brought someone into danger of grave penalty, formerly he suffered a similar or talion penalty. Today an action of calumny and defamation is granted against the accuser. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 4; Deut. 24, 19 ff.; Decretal de Calumniator.

The way of denunciation falls back into inquisition. For when the matter has come to the knowledge of the magistrate through denunciation, either from one lodging complaint, or from an informer, or from ministers of public order, then he begins to inquire into the delict and the delinquent. He can inquire into the delict from the slightest indications, but into the delinquent only from grave ones. Once the inquisition has been completed, the delinquent is subjected first to summary examination, then to ordinary examination. Then the criminal process is instructed before him, and witnesses are examined in it. If from it the defendant is proved guilty, he is condemned; if he is proved innocent, he is absolved; if neither is established from the acts and proofs, he is dismissed.

Moreover, inquisition is threefold. The first is general, namely when it is asked in general whether the laws are observed, whether there are transgressors. The second is special, when inquisition is instituted concerning a certain crime and concerning a certain person as its author. The third is mixed, when either the person alone or the crime alone is special, for example, whether Titius is guilty, or who killed Caius. L. 197; S. Th. Quodl. 11, a. 13.

Therefore by whatever way the process is instituted, there is always some accuser, whether a private or public person, whether physical or moral. Accusation can be both formal and virtual. Hence the evidence of the fact, public infamy, or notoriety of the crime supplies the place of the plaintiff or accuser. In judgments three persons are required: judge, plaintiff, defendant. For judgment is an act of justice, which is not toward oneself, as are the other virtues by which man is ordered in himself, but is toward another, ordering man to another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 67. a. 3.

By canon law a previous admonition of the defendant is often required, for example, in causes of clerics who are concubinarians, and where excommunication is to be inflicted. Trent, sess. 25, c. 3, 14 de R.

Decretals l. 2; L. Qui crimen C. de iis, qui accusare non possunt; L. ult. C. de Accusat. et inscript.; Sanchez, Cons., l. 6, c. 2, proem.; Lessius, l. 2, c. 29, n. 106; Lugo d. 27, n. 75; E. M.

The rack: It is a kind of torment, namely a wooden machine put together in the manner of a horse, cavalletto, upon which those concerning whom there was inquiry about some crime were stretched out and tortured, so that full proof might be made from their confession.

What is an accuser? What is a denouncer? How many kinds of denunciation are there? - An accuser is said to be one who in criminal causes reports a crime to the judge, and from him demands vindication on account of the common good, and at the same time undertakes the obligation of proving the crime objected. But in civil causes, he who as the injured party compels the adversary to the judge is not called accuser, but plaintiff. An accuser differs from a denouncer, who reports a crime to a superior or judge, and nevertheless does not undergo the obligation of proving it.

Denunciation is twofold: one juridical, another evangelical. The former is a report made to a superior as to a judge, so that, once the case has been known, he may proceed from judgment; and its scope is the punishment of the delinquent and the good of others, especially the common good, which redounds from the punishment of the wicked, and also the good of the denouncer himself. The latter is a report made to a superior as to a father; and its scope is not punishment, but the amendment of the neighbor, or the good of the one denounced, through the paternal admonition of the superior intervening, from which, on account of his authority, a more certain amendment is hoped for. When denunciation is made to a Superior as to a father, he cannot himself proceed as judge.

Juridical denunciation can be made judicially, the due forms having been observed, and extrajudicially, by simply manifesting the matter to the superior and committing to his prudence what ought to be done. It pertains to the same virtue to which the vindication of the judge belongs, namely to legal justice.

L. 235; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1, 2 c. ad 3; s. q. 62. a. 3 ad 6; Quodl. 1, a. 16; Quodl. 11, a. 13.

Who are prohibited from accusing? - From natural law, regularly speaking, infamous persons, stained by greater crimes, are prohibited from accusing; for their testimony can be of no authority. Enemies; because accusation is reasonably presumed to proceed from an affection of vengeance. Children against parents, a wife against a husband; for this is repugnant to piety, unless it concerns imminent common damage, or one's own or another's damage which cannot otherwise be avoided. These also are repelled from bearing testimony. L. 236.

From Canon Law clerics are barred from the office of accuser in secular judgment, especially in a case of blood. Except, however, if they accuse the defendant for this end, that they may guard against their own damage, or that it may be repaired to them; then a cleric and religious can accuse the malefactor even before a lay judge. This is lawful not only in one's own case, but also in the case of one's own church, or of relatives to the fourth degree, or even of domestics. Likewise, if common evil or the evil of others cannot otherwise be impeded, they must denounce the delict, even if it is worthy of death. Nevertheless, to avoid danger of irregularity, the cleric and religious must first make protestation before the judge that he does not act unto vengeance, nor unto penalty of blood, but rather for the defense only of himself or his own and for the triumph of justice. If this protestation is omitted, even through inculpable forgetfulness, irregularity is still incurred; because forgetfulness excuses from fault, not from this irregularity, which was introduced by reason of gentleness. C. Praelatis 2 de Hom. in the Sixth; L. 1. 7, n. 468.

Laymen cannot accuse clerics, unless the cleric is a dissipator of the goods of the church, or a heretic, simoniac, sacrilegious person, etc.; or unless the layman prosecutes his own case, or the case of his own, or if damages are to be inflicted on others in the future in such a way that they cannot otherwise be impeded. Likewise clerics cannot accuse religious, who can be accused only by religious of the same Order. L. 238; l. 7, n. 468. Non-tolerated heretics and excommunicated persons cannot be accusers with respect to the faithful. L. 238. "Children are commonly prohibited from accusing parents, subjects prelates, servants masters, likewise public sinners, as is gathered from various Decrees.... Yet all these can denounce when the crime is pernicious to the republic.... For one's own injury anyone can accuse. Moreover, as regards this, an injury is reputed one's own which pertains to himself or to his own." Lugo d. 38, n. 7, 10. Decretals de Accusationib.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 ad 1, 2; q. 70. a. 1 ad 3, a. 3.

From Roman Law, wards, those below puberty, women, magistrates, infamous persons, those closely joined, that is, children with respect to parents, brothers with respect to brothers, a wife with respect to her husband and conversely, are prohibited from accusing. L. 1 ff. de Accusationibus et inscriptionibus. "It is not permitted to a woman to make anyone a defendant in public judgment." L. 1 de Accus. et Inscript.

From C. I. penal procedure 41, 42, 98, 422 ff., denunciation of a crime can be made by anyone to the General Procurator, the royal Procurator, or another official of judicial police. But the accusation in judgment is sustained by the General Procurator. The same is had from C. G. criminal procedure 22, 29, 30, 271, 284, 315.

When is someone bound to accuse or denounce? - He is bound to accuse or denounce, whether judicially or at least extrajudicially, even without fraternal correction having been sent beforehand: 1. When it concerns avoiding common damage. But crimes against the common good are heresy, rebellion, falsification of coinage, homicides and thefts committed by assassins or highway robbers, subornation of votes in elections to public chairs, offices of magistrates, etc., the sin of a religious bringing damage to religion, etc. "If the crime," says the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 c., "has been such that it turns to the detriment of the republic, a man is bound to accusation, provided that he can prove it sufficiently, which pertains to the office of an accuser; for instance, when someone's sin turns to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the multitude." Lugo d. 38, n. 2, 14; L. 236.

2. If grave damage is imminent to an innocent person. For charity obliges us to impede the damage of the neighbor. But by hypothesis this can be done either by accusing or by denouncing. Therefore there will be a grave obligation of making accusation, or at least denunciation. Eccl. 4, 9; L. 236.

Note "nevertheless, that there is not always an obligation of impeding the damage of an innocent person through denunciation of him who inflicts the damage, if this latter person would have to suffer equal damage, because since he is a neighbor, there is no source from which an obligation arises to damage him so in favor of the other; not always, for there is an obligation if the innocent person is very joined to you, for example, if he is your father or your son, or if it would redound to common damage, or if the damager of himself ought to undergo that damage to free the innocent person." La-Croix l. 2, n. 2, n. 219.

3. If someone receives a stipend for this from the republic or from private masters, as do fiscals, or guards of houses or fields, superintendents of customs, etc.; and they are held even with grave inconvenience to themselves. For they are obliged from quasi-contract and from justice, not from mere charity.

Otherwise they are bound to restitution of the damages which come to the republic or masters because of the omission of accusation or denunciation. L. 236. Indeed more than this, these are often held even from office to seize the guilty and hand them over, once seized, to the magistrate to be punished. But whether these are also bound to restore the value of the penalty or fine, if they do not denounce, some from St. Alphonsus 237 "affirm very probably... because, by omitting denunciation, to which they were held by reason of office, they are the cause that the treasury or master does not exact the penalty to which he had a right. But others deny this sufficiently probably... because penal law does not intend that the treasury or masters be enriched by fines, but that they themselves be preserved unharmed, and that transgressors be punished. But indirectly and accidentally the law furnishes a right that fines be exacted from it, but after sentence; for before it neither the treasury nor masters have any right to the penalty. Hence, although fiscals by not denouncing sin against legal justice, nevertheless they do not sin against commutative justice with respect to the fine; and therefore they are bound only to repair the damage of revenues which merchants ought to have paid." Cf. 15.

4. "Someone is sometimes bound to denounce, indeed even to accuse, a delinquent, if this is necessary for avoiding or repairing the damage of his own family, which otherwise would remain dishonored, or destitute of support." L. 237. For this is owed not only from charity but from piety.

5. There is an obligation of denouncing from the precept or edicts of prelates and superiors. Not only ecclesiastical prelates, but also secular Princes can command under various penalties that those who know such and such a delict manifest it at once. And thus Pontifical Constitutions command denunciation of heretics, or of those suspected of heresy; of those soliciting in Confession, or asking the name of an accomplice, with absolution denied unless it is revealed; of hidden leaders of sects; of superiors of lay Institutes, or religious superioresses, daring to induce religious or nuns or sisters to the opening of their own conscience; of those violating the oath prescribed by the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum and unwilling to sign the formula of the same oath; of those injuring or terrifying those who denounce to the Holy Office; of Bishops absent from their dioceses; of impediments of marriages and sacred orders; of pernicious books. Yet where heresies rampage with impunity, this obligation of denouncing heretics is not very urgent, unless the destruction of others were feared and could be impeded by denunciation. L. 1. 6, n. 993; l. 7, n. 214-217; Lugo d. 38, n. 17 ff.; Lehmkuhl, 8th ed., v. 1, n. 812.

Without fraternal correction having been sent beforehand, namely unless perhaps someone firmly judged that by a secret admonition immediately he could impede evils of this kind. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7. Indeed, by the Lord's precept concerning admonition to be sent beforehand, the question is chiefly of a sin which harms only the delinquent, or has been committed against us, not of sins to the detriment of the community, or to be punished in judgment for preserving justice. S. Th. 4, d. 10, a. 3, q. 1 ad 4; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, dub. 14. But no admonition need be sent beforehand whenever it is prudently feared that the defendant, having been warned, may sin more secretly and with greater destruction of the civil or Christian republic. C. I. penal procedure 98, 101, 162, 172, 179, 286, 288; C. G. criminal procedure 29, 30, 317, 321.

When is someone not bound to accuse or denounce? - You are not bound, even with the precept of a superior posited, to accuse or denounce a crime: 1. If the delinquent has been amended, without danger of relapsing, and full satisfaction has been made to the injured party, nor is any danger imminent to others, nor is the crime notorious. The reason is that the infamy of the neighbor would follow without cause. L. 239, 244; Lugo d. 38, n. 23; S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 12; Quodl. 11, a. 13.

2. If you know the crime under a natural secret committed to you, as counselor, advocate, physician, etc.; unless nevertheless he who committed the secret should unjustly vex an innocent person or the republic and be unwilling to desist. L. 239, 248; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 70. a. 1 ad 2; q. 68. a. ad 3; Quodl. 1, a. 15.

3. If from it grave danger to your life, honor, and goods is imminent, unless the crime redounds to common damage to be averted. The reason is that neither charity nor a positive precept obliges with so great an inconvenience. L. 236, 239, 248; Lugo d. 14, n. 117; d. 38, n. 36; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, d. 22, n. 2.

4. If you would also be compelled to prove and could not. "But if the sin has not been such that it redounds into the multitude, or even if he cannot adduce sufficient proof, he is not held to attempting accusation; because no one is held to that which he cannot complete in the due manner." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 c.; L. 239.

5. If the delict is altogether hidden, and does not turn in any way to the common damage, or to the private damage of anyone, but harms only the delinquent; for his right to reputation would be injured. L. 248; S. Th. Quodl. 1, a. 16; Quodl. 4, a. 12. Likewise if the criminal action has been prescribed. Cf. Enchir. Mor., 4th ed., p. 172.

6. "It must be said that a man ought not proceed to accusation unless concerning a matter altogether certain to himself, in which ignorance of fact has no place." S. Th. q. 18, a. 3 ad 1.

7. Whenever the delinquents are sufficiently known to the superior and no fruit is hoped for from denunciation, denunciation can licitly be omitted. The reason is that no one is bound to do a useless thing. Likewise denunciation can be omitted when the delict is indeed against the common good, yet not so gravely harmful that it obliges to accusing; when an injury was brought upon you or your own, which you are not bound to prosecute. Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 38, n. 5; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, d. 17, n. 2; S. Th. q. 3 de Virtute, a. 2 ad 7. But no one is bound to denounce himself, since this obligation is had by no law; nor the companions of his crime, since this would be the same as denouncing himself. But if someone is legitimately interrogated by the judge concerning a crime, he is bound to denounce both himself and his associates. L. 254, 238; C. I. penal procedure 288-290.

8. But someone can licitly accuse and denounce whenever some delict is public, although by reason of itself it brings damage neither to society nor to another private person, but harms only the delinquent. The reason is that in such a case no right of the delinquent to his own reputation is injured, and denunciation in itself is always useful for the common good by reason of the scandal which is present in that publicity of the delict. And, if "scandal of many arises, now the sin harms not only him, but many." Wherefore the superior can then command that that sin be manifested; and with a just precept of the superior intervening, someone not only can but also must disclose the crime and obey the superior. S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 12. Someone can also denounce a hidden delict already committed, if it would probably be foreseen that the delinquent would bring damage to others, or that his crime would soon become public. And therefore it is lawful to denounce a thief, murderer, etc., even if his delict is hidden. S. Th. ibid. The same must be said if denunciation is necessary so that you may recover your thing, although you can yield your right. C. I. penal procedure 288-290; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7; Roncaglia tr. 6, q. 4 de Eleemos. spirit., rule in practice, observation III; L. 245; l. 6, n. 1000.

Whether, if someone knows the sin of the neighbor, he sins mortally by reporting it at once to his prelate? - The Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 11, a. 13, says: "I say that in these matters one must distinguish concerning the conditions of the subject and of the prelate. For if I know that a brother will be corrected by me, then I ought not denounce this to the prelate. But if it seems that this will be done better through the prelate, and the prelate nevertheless is pious, discreet, and spiritual, not having rancor or hatred against that subject, then this can licitly be denounced to him; and then he does not tell the Church, because he does not tell it to him as prelate, but as to a person profiting toward the correction and amendment of the neighbor. But because, on account of the diverse conditions of prelates and subjects, a general judgment cannot be given in this, because sometimes the prelate is moved to hatred against the subject, or the subject would not bear well the words of the prelate, therefore this must be held as a rule, that in all these things charity must always be preserved, and what seems better and more expedient; and if he intends this, namely the amendment of the neighbor, and preserves the good of charity as much as he can, then by denouncing he does not sin; but if he denounces this to any person from malice, and so that the neighbor may be confounded or oppressed, then the one denouncing or accusing sins mortally.... It must be said that if someone immediately reports to the prelate, applying due circumstances and considering that it is more expedient, he does not act against the precept of the Gospel, because he does not tell this to the Church, but to a person profiting, as was said, and therefore he does not sin mortally." Suarez, de Carit., d. 8, s. 6, n. 7; Lugo d. 14, n. 117 ff.

63 bis. Whether a subject is bound to reveal to a commanding prelate the hidden crime of a brother? - "It must be said that sin can be hidden in two ways. In one way simply; namely in such a way that it has in no way come to the knowledge of many; and such a hidden sin harms only the one doing it. And therefore he who knows such a hidden sin of a brother ought to intend only this, that he procure the salvation of the sinning brother; whence the order of fraternal correction was instituted by the Lord, Matt. 18: that first someone correct a brother sinning secretly between himself and him alone; afterward he should bring two or three witnesses; and then at last, if he is not corrected, tell the Church. If a prelate commands against this order, that the hidden sin of a brother be told to him, he is not to be obeyed, and he himself sins by commanding, because one must obey God rather than men, Acts 2. But if the sin of the brother is not so hidden that it does not come to the knowledge of the multitude through some suspicions, whence scandal of many arises, now the sin harms not only him but many. And because the good of the multitude is preferred to the good of one, therefore the prelate ought to investigate the truth concerning the fact, so that the scandal of the multitude may cease either through the punishment of the sinner or through his excuse. And therefore in such a case he can command one knowing the crime of a brother to manifest it; and he to whom it is commanded is bound to obey the prelate. For thus, since the crime is not altogether hidden, it pertains to the judgment of the prelate; and in this case the Decretal speaks, but not in the first." Quodl. 4, a. 12. Cf. C. Accepimus 16 De Purgatione Canonica.

If one of the spouses is publicly unworthy, can the other enter into marriage with that one, and consequently minister the sacrament to him or her? - Resp. In the negative, if the person is unworthy because he or she is an excommunicate to be avoided, as is clear. - In the affirmative, if the person is unworthy because excommunicated, but tolerated; for the Council of Constance granted indistinctly that the faithful can communicate with tolerated excommunicates. In the affirmative, if the person is unworthy because of some sin, and the other spouse could not recede from the marriage without grave inconvenience. Thus more probably and more commonly. The reason is that the aforesaid administration is by them as ministers not consecrated for this. L. 55; H. A. tr. 14, n. 6. Hence one who contracts with an unworthy person is excused from mortal sin; for he does not sin insofar as he ministers to the unworthy person, because charity alone forbids this, and grave inconvenience excuses, which is scarcely absent, or not even scarcely; nor insofar as he asks from an unworthy person, because that person is a minister not consecrated for this. - Lugo d. 8, n. 226, 230; L. l. 2, n. 60.

6. The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

10. The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.

17. Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.

The principal acts of Religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days... Concerning the last three it will be said in the 2nd and 3rd precept. Concerning sacrifice, in the Treatise on the Eucharist. Here therefore only concerning adoration and prayer.

257. • Adoration taken more broadly is worship exhibited to someone on account of his dignity, or is the act by which someone exhibits his own subjection to another in testimony of that one's excellence. Thus Princes and others constituted in dignity are said in some way to be adored; likewise those who are specially loved by others.

But adoration taken more strictly is honor exhibited to God on account of his highest excellence and supreme dominion.

Hence worship is distinguished as 1º Of Latria, which can be exhibited to God alone on account of his supreme dominion over all creatures.

2º Of Hyperdulia, which is attributed to the Blessed Virgin Mary.

3º Of Dulia, which belongs to Angels and other Saints.

The worship of latria is due to God 1º by natural right on account of his highest majesty and supreme dominion over creatures; 2º by positive divine right, as is proved from innumerable texts of Sacred Scripture, for example Matt. 4. 10: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve.

Worship is either direct or relative, according as it is rendered either to God himself or to the Saints, or to images or to those things which have a special relation with them.

258. • Men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been enrolled by the Supreme Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints or Blessed. But public worship is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church or as instituted by her; private worship, however, is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not lawful to erect Churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified; nor is it lawful to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their Relics or images to be publicly venerated, or to carry them around in processions. Nevertheless it is lawful to preserve these images or Relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private.

1º New Relics of Saints are not to be exposed to public veneration, unless the Bishop has recognized them. - Thus the Council of Trent, sess. 25. on the invocation, veneration, and Relics of the Saints.

2º Aureoles, or rays, cannot be applied to images of the dead, although they are commonly held as Saints, unless they have been beatified by the Church; likewise it is not lawful to hang lamps at their sepulchers. - V. Casus, n. 447.

Irreligiosity is a special irreverence which is inflicted on God, either immediately in himself, or mediately in persons or sacred things. Its principal species are tempting God, sacrilege, simony, blasphemy, and perjury. Concerning the last two it will be said in the 2nd precept.

316. Definition. Adjuration is an authoritative and deprecative petition, with the Name of God, or of the Saints, or of a sacred thing interposed, so that another may be induced to do or omit something.

Therefore it differs from an oath in this, that it does not introduce God as witness, but only interposes His Name for obtaining the desired thing more efficaciously because of the reverence due to the Divinity or to sacred things.

Division. Adjuration is distinguished:

1. Into solemn or private, according as it is done by the ministers of the Church, and in the mode determined by her, or is destitute of solemnities and can be done by all.

2. Into deprecative or imperative, according as it is done through prayers or through command. This latter belongs only to superiors toward subjects, and to exorcists toward demons. - St. Alphonsus, Appendix On Adjuration, n. 1 (after n. 193).

317. Principles. I. Solemn adjuration is lawful only to ministers of the Church to whom it is expressly permitted by the Bishop; but to others, in the present discipline of the Church, it is prohibited under grave obligation; indeed in many places clerics incur the penalty of suspension if they presume to perform exorcisms without due faculty of the Church. - St. Alphonsus, ibid., n. 4.

II. Private adjuration is lawful or unlawful in all those circumstances in which an oath is lawful or prohibited; hence the things which have been said about an oath are also to be applied to adjuration.

III. Only intellectual creatures, namely men and demons, can be directly adjured; irrational creatures also can be adjured indirectly, such as the sun, water, clouds, locusts, etc., namely by adjuring demons lest they harm us through them, or by beseeching God or the Saints that they assist those who will use things of this sort. - St. Alphonsus, ibid., n. 3.

But adjuration against demons must be done only in the imperative mode, and for removing harms and the vexation of the possessed person, not for vanity or curiosity. - St. Alphonsus, n. 5.

318. Questions. Q. 1. Whether it is lawful to use exorcisms when possession is doubtful?

Resp. It is affirmed, if the Bishop, with the matter clearly known, approves it; but scandal and contempt of the Church must be carefully avoided.

Q. 2. Concerning what matters can a demon be interrogated?

Resp. In general, concerning all things which conduce to his expulsion, for example concerning the time and cause of the possession, concerning the sign of departure, etc. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Q. 3. How does he sin who curiously interrogates a demon about those things which do not pertain to the matter?

Resp. Per se he sins gravely if he has many useless conversations with the besieging demon; a fortiori, if he jokes with him. It is otherwise if he interposes only one or another curious question in an imperative mode. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Q. 4. What are the signs of true possession?

Resp. The chief signs are: 1. to speak in a language entirely unknown before the time of possession; 2. to manifest hidden and distant things which naturally cannot be known by man; 3. to obey a merely internal command of the priest, etc.; 4. a greater vexation of the demon, or greater peace, to appear from a wholly unknown contact with sacred things, etc. - See Cases, n. 303.

In general, it is not to be easily believed that someone is possessed by a demon; because true possessions in our times are rare, and most of those which are reported are found false.

24. • An accuser is said to be one who in criminal causes brings a crime before the judge, and asks from him vindication on account of the common good, and at the same time undertakes the obligation of proving the crime charged; but in civil causes, one who, as the injured party, compels an adversary to the judge, is called not accuser but plaintiff.

An accuser differs from a denouncer ¹, who brings some crime before the superior or judge, and yet does not undergo the obligation of proving it. - St. Ligorius, n. 253.

¹ ** Understand denunciation here not indeed as fraternal denunciation, whose aim is not punishment but the amendment of one’s neighbor, with the paternal admonition of the superior intervening, from which, because of his authority, amendment is hoped for more certainly; but juridical denunciation, whose aim, no otherwise than that of accusation, is the same as the aim of the judge in punishing, namely the common good, which redounds from the punishments of the wicked. Wherefore juridical denunciation seems to pertain to the same virtue to which the vindication of the judge pertains, namely to legal justice. See note to n. 518, vol. I.

According to Roman Law, all who are not specially prohibited by law can be accusers. But wards, the prepubescent, women, magistrates, the infamous, those closely joined, namely children with respect to parents and vice versa, brothers with respect to brothers, a wife with respect to her husband, and conversely, are prohibited. But by Canon Law there are excluded from the office of accuser 1º clerics in a secular judgment, especially in a cause of blood; 2º laymen with respect to clerics, unless the crime is monstrous, or tends to great harm of the Church; 3º heretics not tolerated, and excommunicated persons, with respect to the faithful. - St. Ligorius, n. 238.

Accusers according to the same Roman Law, if they are convicted of calumny, incur the penalty of retaliation, namely the penalty which they were seeking for the accused they themselves must undergo.

But by French law it is lawful for no private person to institute an accusation, but the whole office of accusing and of proving the crime is reserved only to the magistrate constituted for this, or to the general procurator of the Government. Hence it happens that it is also called the public ministry, because it undertakes and protects the interests of the community and of good morals against the accused.

The accused is said to be he who is accused in a trial, whether criminal or civil, whether he is guilty or innocent. Concerning the accused various doubts occur, especially about confession of the crime and flight. Hence:

25. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Is the accused, when questioned by the judge, bound to confess the truth?

Resp. 1º No, if he is not legitimately questioned; which happens when the judge is not legitimate, or when he does not observe judicial form, as if he questions without a previous accusation, etc.; they also add, when there is not at least half-full proof of the crime. Thus commonly. - St. Ligorius, n. 272.

Resp. 2º Yes, if the accused is legitimately questioned, because he must obey the just precept of the judge. Except, sufficiently probably, if there is question of undergoing a great penalty; because the law is not judged to impose upon the accused so arduous an obligation, which seems to exceed human strength, namely that he, by confession of the crime, should spontaneously commit himself to the certain risk of a very grave penalty, provided however that grave public damage is not imminent from his silence ². St. Ligorius, n. 274, also says this opinion is sufficiently probable even intrinsically, although he calls the contrary more probable.

² St. Alphonsus expresses this exception thus, after other doctors (Bk. 4, n. 274): “Unless common damage is imminent from the withholding of confession of the crime, for example of heresy, treason, etc.; for then the accused is bound to betray himself, or at least his associates, as much as is necessary to avert the common damage, even if death is imminent to him from the revelation of the associates, from whom he will become convicted in court.” Moreover, two things occur that must be noted. For 1º damage to the republic must be understood not as just any kind, but as very great. For as Lugo says (On Justice, disp. 40, n. 15), human law can oblige a subject with danger of life only very rarely and on account of very great damage to the republic; but in the present case that danger is most certain. 2º Since the reason of averting this damage equally obliges all who are conscious of the crime, even if they have not been called into court, and since a precept which brings certain danger of life presents the greatest difficulty, hence it is plain that some impunity is fittingly granted from time to time to the accused, so that from a fuller knowledge of crimes and delinquents provision can be made more suitably for the public good.

Add also the warning from St. Alphonsus (l.c.): “All agree, as is fitting, in saying that if the accused is in good faith, and it is known that he will be induced with difficulty to confess the crime when questioned by the judge, the confessor must leave him in his good faith.”

QUESTION 2º. Can an innocent accused person reveal the hidden crimes of the witnesses or of the accuser for his own defense?

851. 1. Notion. The theological virtues, of which we have treated, intimately and directly unite us to God; nevertheless, because we remain distinct from God and dependent upon Him, it is necessary that we acknowledge His infinite excellence by a special worship. Now the supernatural virtue by which the will is inclined to render to God the worship due to Him on account of His infinite excellence is called religion.²

¹ In this treatise we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue: the first, namely: "I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath... Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them"; the second: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; the third: "Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day" (Exod. 20:2-8).

² Worship in general is an act by which we venerate someone on account of his excellence; it is also called veneration, and is rendered to any person truly excellent. But the worship which is rendered to God, on account of His infinite excellence, is called the worship of latria or adoration, while the worship rendered to the saints retains the name of dulia or veneration. Formerly, however, these words were predicated indiscriminately of God and creatures. Cf. De Incarnatione, n. 255-256.

852. 2. Principal acts. Considered psychologically, religion embraces manifold acts. (a) First, when we consider the divine excellence, we cannot but admire His infinite perfections and supereminent goodness. (b) This admiration, moreover, soon begets love: for the will is drawn affectively toward the infinite goodness which we have perceived with the mind. (c) Yet reverential fear is joined to love: for while we think of the divine majesty and holiness, we clearly behold our own littleness and imperfection, and we appear before God only with fear. (d) Thence arises the religious sense, or veneration and adoration, by which, with love and fear together, we worship God as first principle and supreme Lord, and subject our whole being to Him. Moreover the habitual will of promptly handing over and devoting oneself to divine worship is called devotion.³ (e) But because we know that all the goods which are in us, both natural and supernatural, have been conferred gratuitously by God, we acknowledge Him as a distinguished benefactor, and offer Him acts of thanksgiving. (f) But, since daily we need new benefits and new graces, which we are able to obtain only from God, we have recourse to Him by prayer, that we may obtain them. (g) Sometimes also it happens that, because of our frailty, we commit sin and inflict upon God an offense which ought to be repaired: thence arises a sense of penance, by which we strive to compensate the injury inflicted upon the Supreme Deity. (h) Among the various acts which are able to express the aforesaid dispositions, sacrifice certainly stands forth, or the offering and immolation of a victim publicly made, in the name of the whole community, in order to acknowledge the supreme dominion of God.⁴

³ Devotion, when it is exercised, becomes an act; but generally it is taken as a habitual disposition.

⁴ The acts of religion are enumerated somewhat differently by St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 82-91) according to the ontological order: a) interior acts, which are the more principal, namely devotion and prayer; b) exterior acts, by which some exterior things are offered to God, namely sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits, and tithes; or by which something is promised to God, as vows; or by which something divine is assumed, namely an oath and the assumption of the divine name.

These indeed are the principal acts of the virtue of religion. Others are less principal, as oath and vow; others, from positive law, are ordered to the sanctification of certain days, as cessation from servile work and assistance at the sacrifice of the Mass.

853. 3. Place among the virtues. From this it follows that the virtue of religion is a special virtue, not properly theological, but the most excellent among the moral virtues.

(a) The virtue of religion is a special virtue, or one distinct from others. For it pursues a special good, namely the worship due to God, and indeed on account of a special motive, namely His supreme and singular excellence. Now where a particular object and motive are present, there is a distinct virtue.

(b) Theologians unanimously teach that this virtue is not properly theological: for while a theological virtue immediately regards God Himself, religion of itself directly regards the worship due to God. Nevertheless supernatural religion, of which we are here treating, supposes the theological virtues, and cannot be perfect unless in its own sphere it embraces certain acts of these virtues. Thus only by faith do we know the supernatural excellence of God, which we worship by religion; when we pray, we must elicit an act of hope; true devotion, by which we hand ourselves and our goods over to God, involves an act of charity.⁵

⁵ Some spiritual authors, especially of the school of the seventeenth century in France, take the virtue of interior religion as a complex of the theological virtues by which we perfectly worship God through Christ, the perfect adorer of the Father. Thus Olier, Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes, ch. I, where, among other things, he writes: "Finally Our Lord, in order to expand His holy religion toward God, and to multiply it in our souls, comes into us and leaves Himself on earth in the hands of priests as a host of praise, in order to communicate to us His spirit of a host... He pours Himself out in us, He insinuates Himself into us, He perfumes our soul and fills it with the interior dispositions of His religious spirit."

(c) Wherefore religion far surpasses the other moral virtues. For virtues are more perfect insofar as they are nearer to the last end; and therefore the theological virtues are better than the rest, because they immediately attain God, the last end. But among the moral virtues religion stands forth: for it approaches God more nearly, because it is ordered directly to divine honor and worship, while the other moral virtues tend only indirectly to the honor of God, by prescribing duties toward the neighbor and ourselves.

854. 4. Division of the treatise. Treating of the acts of the virtue of religion, and treating of the vices opposed to the same, we shall speak:

I. Of the more principal acts, adoration and prayer;

II. Of the secondary acts, oath and vow;

III. Of the social act, or the sanctification of Sunday and feasts.

And thus we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

855. 1. Notion. In the broad sense, adoration is an act by which we profess the excellence of another and our subjection toward him; in this sense kings and men endowed with excellence are said to be adored.² In the strict sense it designates the act by which we profess the infinite excellence of God and His supreme dominion, and our dependence upon Him; of this we speak here. Adoration embraces a twofold act: internal, by which the intellect and will together acknowledge the divine excellence and their own subjection;³ external, or the manifestation of this interior sense by some sensible sign, for example, by sacrifice, prostration upon the earth, genuflection, and other such things, which vary among different nations.

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 84; Suarez, De Virtute et Statu Religionis, Tr. I, l. II, c. 1-2; Billuart, diss. III, art. 1; Bouquillon, De virtute religionis, Bruges, 1880, n. 46-50; Muller, § 40; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, Conf. I; Tyrrell, External Religion, La Religion exterieure, lectures II-IV.

² 3 Kings 1:16; Acts 10:25.

³ St. Thomas, with many other theologians, enumerates adoration among the external acts of religion, because he considers it especially as a bodily act; but he supposes that it is nothing other than the expression of interior adoration (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 84, a. 2).

856. 2. Thesis: properly so-called adoration, internal, external, and public, is due to God. (A) Scripture. Christ, tempted by the devil, answered him:⁴ "For it is written: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve." Moreover He thus openly declares to the Samaritan woman that this adoration ought to be internal:⁵ "But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth. For the Father also seeketh such to adore Him. God is a spirit; and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." That it ought likewise to be public, and therefore external, is clear from the institution of the eucharistic sacrifice, by which the sacrifice of Christ on the cross is vividly represented:⁶ for sacrifice is an external and public act of adoration, offered to God in the name of the whole community.

⁴ Matt. 4:10.

⁵ John 4:23-24.

⁶ This we proved in De Eucharistia, n. 153-161.

857. (B) Reason shows the same. (a) For God is the supreme Lord of men: since He created them out of nothing, and indeed as to their whole being, both as to substance and as to faculties; besides, He conserves them in being; for by their own weight they tend to nothingness, since they are from nothing, and unless they were positively sustained by God at every instant, they would be reduced to nothing; indeed, He concurs with them in acting: for although they enjoy activity implanted in them by God, they cannot break forth into act unless they are helped by the supreme cause of all things. Therefore men, entirely as they are, depend upon God and are constituted under His dominion. But the supreme Lord, upon whom all things depend, has a right, and indeed a strict right, that His dominion be acknowledged by all rational creatures: for they are rational for this reason, that they may follow the order of reason and spontaneously and freely confess their dependence upon the supreme Cause; this indeed is done by adoration, by which we profess God as first principle and last end, or, in other words, as supreme Lord; therefore God has a strict right that He be adored by men, and he who denies it to Him is guilty of true injustice.

858. (b) That this adoration ought to be not only internal, but also external, is clear from a twofold argument:

1. External worship is necessary by reason of itself. For God is the author not only of the soul, but also of the body, and has lavished upon us not only spiritual but also bodily benefits; therefore we depend upon God also as to the body; therefore we ought to express that dependence not only internally, but also in a sensible mode, namely by using the body which we have received from Him. - This indeed will be still more apparent if it is noted that man, as leader of sensible creatures, is as it were the pontiff of irrational nature, and therefore is bound to praise and adore God not only in his own name, but also in the name of inferior creatures. But this he cannot do better than by exhibiting external worship by the help of the body, which is a microcosm, or compendium of the whole of sensible nature.

2. External worship is necessary also by reason of internal worship, namely to express and foster it. For we are so constituted by nature that the interior affections of the soul, especially when they are more vivid, are expressed in a sensible mode, by the eyes, countenance, gesture, and whole bearing of the body; therefore if man truly and sincerely reveres and loves God, spontaneously and as it were necessarily he will manifest reverence and love by external acts, words, gesture, and the whole bearing of the body; but we are bound sincerely to love and adore God; therefore also to express this worship by external acts. - Otherwise internal worship would soon perish: for since, from what has been said, man is naturally prone to manifest outwardly the interior feelings of the soul, when external signs and ceremonies decrease, generally the very sentiments of religion are diminished, and when such signs are removed, commonly religion itself perishes. Nor is this wonderful: for man is led by sensible things to spiritual things, by external things he is stirred to the thought and practice of interior things, and if incentives of this kind are lacking, gradually even the dispositions of the soul languish and are extinguished.

Augustine had already observed this:⁷ "For those praying," he says, "do with the members of their body what is fitting for suppliants, when they fix their knees, when they extend their hands, or even prostrate themselves on the ground, and if they visibly do anything else; although their invisible will and the intention of the heart are known to God, nor does He need these signs in order that the human mind may be opened to Him; but by this man rather stirs himself to praying and groaning more humbly and fervently." Nor can it be said that from this it happens that our religion consists only in external rites; for, as the Angelic Doctor deservedly says,⁸ "because in all acts of latria, that which is external is referred to that which is internal, as to the more principal, therefore external adoration itself is done for the sake of internal adoration; namely that, through the signs of humility which we exhibit bodily, our affection may be stirred to subject itself to God, because it is connatural to us that we proceed through sensible things to intelligible things."

⁷ De Cura pro mortuis, c. V, Migne, P. L., XL, col. 597.

⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 84, a. 2.

859. (c) This adoration ought not only to be external, but also public or social. For man was born for society, and in fact lives in society. Now not only each man, but also society itself, as a moral person, arises from God and depends upon Him; therefore it is necessary that not only private individuals worship God, but also that the whole commonwealth, after the manner of one body, exhibit adoration to God. - For this reason indeed God chose a special day, which would be as it were exclusively devoted to divine worship: for He willed that on this day all should rest from servile work, so that they might be able to exhibit public honor to God, as we shall explain below.

860. 3. Points to be noted for practice. (a) Therefore the faithful should be admonished that external and public acts of religion are indeed necessary, but derive their principal value only from interior acts: "God is a spirit; and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Wherefore genuflections, inclinations of the head, and other signs of adoration should be performed with the intention of worshiping and loving God.

(b) Since, from what was said in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, n. 243-246, Christ is the mediator of religion and the supreme Pontiff, through whom the Angels praise the divine majesty and the Dominations adore it, nothing is more fitting than to praise, adore, and glorify God through Christ: "Through Him, and with Him, and in Him, is to Thee, God the Father almighty, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, all honor and glory."⁹

⁹ Roman Missal, Canon of the Mass.

958. 1. Notion and species. (A) Adjuration, which is akin to oath, is called the interposition of the divine name or of a sacred thing, by which someone is induced to do or omit something. Accordingly it differs from an oath, because God is not invoked as witness or guarantor, for confirming truth, but as a motive for obtaining something more efficaciously.

(B) It is deprecatory when it is made through prayers, for example: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God..."¹; thus also God Himself is sometimes prayed by way of adjuration, for example, through the mystery of Thy holy Incarnation, through Thy Passion, etc. - It is preceptive, or imperative, when it is made by command or mandate; for example, when the high priest said to Christ:² "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ." - God can be adjured only deprecatorily, because no one can command Him; the devil only imperatively, because he is not capable of deprecation; man both imperatively and deprecatorily, because he is capable both of command and of deprecation.

¹ Rom. 12:1.

² Matt. 26:63.

Adjuration is called solemn when it is made in the name of the Church, by ministers specially deputed, as in exorcisms; but private if it is employed in a private name.

959. 2. Principles. (A) Adjuration does not induce an obligation of religion in the person adjured: for it is not used for this, but for exciting in him fear or love of the divine name, by which he may be moved more easily and efficaciously to perform what is asked. If a subject is already bound to obey a superior, he ought indeed to comply with him, not by force of the adjuration, but by force of the precept joined with the adjuration.

960. (B) But on the part of the one adjuring, certain conditions are required so that he may act licitly; for on his part, adjuration is an act of religion, which ought to be adorned with the same qualities as an oath: (a) truth, insofar as the one adjuring ought to set forth only a true cause: from this head a fictitious poor man sins who, by God or by the Virgin, asks alms without cause; (b) justice, insofar as only a licit thing can be asked; (c) judgment, that is, for a reasonable motive, but not from vanity alone, or curiosity. The defect of these conditions is grave or light sin, according as the matter is grave or light. Thus a fictitious poor man who squeezes out a great sum of money, or who asks for a gravely illicit thing, sins mortally; but venially, if he solicits a modest alms, or induces to a light sin.

I. DEFINITION.—The respect we owe our fellowman refers immediately to his person, whilst justice (iustitia) is concerned with the rights which belong to him by nature.¹

¹ Cfr. Walter, Naturrecht, PP. 66 sqq.; J. Haring, Der Rechts- und Gesetzesbegriff, Graz 1899.

Justice may be defined as a habitual and constant disposition which inclines the will to give to every man his due or right (suum cuique) and, if necessary, to sacrifice ones own interests in favor of the common welfare.² Justice is essentially a virtue that governs man's relations to others (virtus ad alterum).

² M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, N. Y. 1917, pp. 81 sqq.—St. Ambrose, De Offic., I, c. 24 (n. 115): "Justice is that which gives to each his due, claims nothing belonging to another, and neglects its own advantage in order to preserve the common equity." (Migne, P. L., XVI, 57).—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. XIX, c. 21, n. 1: "Iustitia ea virtus est, quae sua cuique tribuit." (P. L., XLI, 649).—St. Bernard, De Diversis, s. 102, n. 1: "Iustitia est virtus, quae suum cuique reddit." (P. L., CLXXXIII, 728).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 1: "Iustitia est virtus, qua quis constanti et perpetuâ voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit."

2. DIVISION.-In view of the various relations of justice existing in society we may distinguish three species of this virtue: ³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 61, art. 1-2. * Cfr. Rom. XIII, 1-2, 5-7; 1 Pet. II, 13-16.

a) Legal justice, which defines the duties of the individual in relation to the social order. It is called legal (iustitia legalis) because these duties are generally determined by positive law.* b) Distributive justice, which regulates the distribution by the State of burdens and rewards among its subjects (iustitia distributiva secundum proportionalitatem).⁵ c) Commutative justice, which governs the relations between men as private individuals (iustitia commutativa). This species of justice demands a perfect adjustment of rights and prescribes that they be duly observed and respected.⁶ Commutative justice is the most perfect species of justice, and its violation not only involves moral guilt, but in addition entails the duty of restitution.

⁵ Jer. XXI, 12; XXII, 3; Prov. VIII, 15 sq.; Wisd. VI, 1-8.

⁶ Cfr., for instance, Ex. XX, 15, 17; Tob. IV, 15 sq.; Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 341 sq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 81 sqq.

A subspecies of distributive justice is vindictive justice, which metes out condign punishment to those who commit crimes and thereby injure the common weal.⁷ Vindictive justice (iustitia vindicativa) may be reduced to legal justice, in so far as the superior who punishes or the subject who is punished promotes the common weal, or to commutative justice, in so far as every judge is supposed to punish by virtue of his office and in accordance with the law.

⁷ Rom. XIII, 4; 1 Pet. II, 14.

It is objected that this conception of justice unduly stresses the demand of suum cuique and thus, by favoring selfishness, runs counter to the social ethos. This is a mistake. Egotism is absolutely excluded by the principle of giving to every one that which is his due or right. Commutative justice, in a sense, interferes with the freedom of the individual; however, legal and distributive justice counteract this effect by reuniting the separated members. One-sided insistence on commutative justice leads to extreme individualism, whilst undue emphasis on legal and distributive justice is apt to entail extreme Socialism. Here, as everywhere, it is necessary to stick closely to the golden mean.⁸ 3. Justice in all its forms is a duty inculcated both by the moral law of nature and by Divine Revelation.⁹ It is not only one of the so-called fundamental virtues, but a general virtue. "As the will of God directed to the creature, regarded in its total content, constitutes right, i.e., that which directs and governs human actions, so the totality of the free actions corresponding • to the divine will is justice, as virtus generalis. "> 10 "Justice," says St. Bonaventure, 'is said to surround all the powers of man, for it is not only a cardinal virtue, but likewise a general virtue, comprehending the entire rectitude of the soul, because it is defined as the right governance of the will. Hence it comprehends not only those virtues which control man's relations to his fellowmen, as, for example, equity and liberality, but also those that govern his relations to himself, for example, penance and innocence, as well as his relations towards God, e. g., worship, piety, and obedience." ¹¹ That which is due to a man according to the dictates of justice is called his right. Every man has a right to live, to enjoy a good name, to hold property, etc. Whoever deprives him of any of these rights is guilty of an injustice (iniuria), which is a mortal sin ex genere suo, because it destroys charity, though it admits of smallness of matter (parvitas materiae).¹²

⁸ F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 75 sq.

⁹ Cfr. S. Lueg and B. Mairhofer, Bibl. Realkonkordanz, Vol. I, 5th ed., Ratisbon 1900, pp. 534 sqq. 10J. E. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, und von der Gerechtigkeit, I, 5.

¹¹ Breviloquium, P. V. c. 4: "Prudence rectifies the rational power, fortitude the irascible power, and temperance the concupiscible power; justice, however, rectifies all these powers in relation to another. And because that other may determinately be one's neighbor, the same man may also be related to himself as to another, and the other may also be God Himself. Hence justice is said to encompass all the powers, for it is not only a cardinal virtue but also a general virtue, comprehending the rectitude of the whole soul, since it is itself called rectitude of the will. Therefore it comprehends not only the virtues ordering one toward one's neighbor, such as equity and liberality, but also those ordering one toward oneself, such as penance and innocence, and likewise toward God, such as worship, piety, and obedience."—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 5.

¹² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 59, art. 1-4; J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, Pp. 45 sqg. 18 Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 343г

Rights, then, are the subject-matter of justice.

A right may be defined as the moral power of having, doing, or exacting something.! Justice and right, therefore, are by no means synonymous terms. A right is a claim inhering in the human personality; whereas justice regulates the proper distribution of rights. A right is something definite and concrete, whereas justice is that which defines, determines, or guides. Rights, strictly speaking, appertain to jurisprudence, whereas justice belongs to ethics. The virtue of justice may be derived and developed from the principles of moral science. Christian revelation, containing within itself the highest and most perfect system of morality, also furnishes the most complete notion of justice. But the knowledge of what is "right" must be gathered from the science of jurisprudence, and in discussing the "rights" of men, theology is as dependent upon jurisprudence as jurisprudence in its turn is dependent upon the fundamental truths of Christianity for the correct notion of justice. We have a divine revelation concerning justice, but none concerning rights. ¹⁴ It is easy to be a jurist, but it is difficult to practice justice.

¹⁴ Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheol., P. 408.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58-61 (Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Aquinas Ethicus, or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Vol. II, [London 1896, pp. 11 sqq.]).-J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, Freiburg 1873.-A. Van Gestel, De Iustitia et Lege Civili, 2nd ed., Gröningen 1896, pp. 9 sqq., 46 sqq.—V. Cathrein S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 355 sqq.-Thos. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, PP. 340 sqq.- V. Cathrein, S.J., Recht, Naturrecht und positives Recht, Freiburg 1901.- A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, Bruges 1901, pp. 6 sqq.-J. E. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht und von der Gerechtigkeit, Vol. I, Ratisbon 1857, Pp. 5 sqq.—J. Kiefer, Die Tugend der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit, 2nd ed., Eichstätt 1908. -J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916.-J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, Pp. 241 sqq., New York 1919.-M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 80 sqq. -H. Woods, S. J., A First Book in Ethics, N. Y. 1923, pp. 71 sqq.

What it is. Adjuration is an imperative or deprecative demand, made by interposing the name of God, of the saints, or of a sacred thing (2, 2, q. 90). Toward superiors or equals it is made only deprecatively; toward inferiors it is made also imperatively; indeed, toward the demon it cannot be made except imperatively, and that he may not harm, not however that he may teach or that we may obtain a good from him. - The adjuration of an irrational creature is directed to him by whom they are moved: deprecatively to God, imperatively to the demon.

What sort is licit. Private adjuration can be made by anyone, and it is licitly made as an argument of an honorable petition. A false pauper who asks alms in the name of God does not sin on this head except venially.

Solemn adjuration is had chiefly in exorcism properly so called. It, without the special and express license of the Ordinary, is forbidden to be made ¹; and the license is to be committed only to a most approved priest. Exorcisms, however, can be made upon non-Catholics themselves or excommunicates. Concerning true possession by the demon, it must prudently be established (cf. cc. 1151-1153). The Roman Ritual must be observed. An exorcist sins only venially who during the exorcism asks a few things out of curiosity but imperatively.

Nevertheless the use of the exorcism of Leo XIII is permitted to all (cf. Rituale, appendix).

¹ At least publicly, says Prummer, Manuale, q. 352, nota.

I. Oath. 1. An oath "is the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth" (c. 1316). That is, the one swearing, so far as is in him, invites God that, before His infinite knowledge and veracity, He may will to confirm his statements. But because a religious man is not judged to will to derogate from divine reverence, nor a prudent man to expose himself to divine punishments, therefore he himself confirms his statements before men by oath.

The invocation of God can be explicit or tacit. No one swears before men unless he manifests by suitable signs the intention (which suffices for you to swear before God). And usage can make unsuitable a formula sufficient of itself. He does not swear who is judged merely, with great force, for example by the species of imprecation against himself, or by using comparative words, to affirm certain things.

2. It is distinguished, from the exterior form, as verbal, real, mixed; - from the force of the formula, as invocatory or contestatory, and execratory or imprecatory; - from the object, as assertory and promissory, which can be absolute or conditioned, and to which the comminatory oath is referred; - from the rite, as simple and solemn. Thus it is essential in the canonical rite that one swear personally (c. 1316, § 2).

3. Of defined faith is the honesty of an oath clothed with due conditions; and it is demonstrated by the fact that it encloses in itself a religious profession of divine truth and Providence. The conditions, however, are: a) truth, that the one swearing be truthful, and therefore that the things which he affirms be established for him by such certitude as, for the circumstances, is reasonably expected: in an oath, insofar as it is assertory, this condition is always required under grave sin; b) judgment, that a discreet use be made of an oath, and therefore that one swear only because of sufficient utility, which every serious cause supplies. This condition is of itself demanded under venial sin; c) justice, which, properly pertaining to a promissory oath, forbids promising those things which are forbidden to be done: and this must be avoided at least in a grave matter under mortal sin. In an assertory oath, this condition is judged to have been lacking if someone narrated what he is prohibited from reporting, at least under oath: this of itself is venial.

4. A promissory oath affirms a present intention of fulfilling the things promised; and thus it is assertory; and further it supplies a certain security of that execution, because of reverence toward God, so that it introduces a peculiar obligation of religion of fulfilling what has been promised. It almost always accedes to a promise, either to increase the obligation, in which case it does not oblige except as much and insofar as the promise obliges; or to remove the nullity of the act or promise, and then, unless that confirmation itself is illicit or, from positive law, impossible, there arises an obligation which, of itself, is of religion alone; by accident, because of harmful circumstances or positive law, it can also be of justice. An obligation of religion alone can, unless an acquired right stands in the way, be removed by dispensation. A dispensation requires a just cause in order to be valid. A just cause is had if the oath has been extorted by force or fear. But if the obligation of religion confirms a right acquired by another from an accepted promise, then dispensation from the oath is said to injure that right, insofar as it removes a certain security. In the same way in which a promise not sworn is to be explained, a promissory oath is to be explained; and therefore strictly, according to law and the intention of the one swearing.

If the one swearing acted fraudulently, c. 1321 wills, at least in the external forum, that the oath be explained according to the intention of him to whom it is sworn.

To swear feignedly will then only be licit when it is done without a lie, and with grave cause.

Neither a feigned nor an invalid oath obliges as such. The obligation ceases by remission, by substantial change of the thing, by failure of the final cause or condition, by irritation, dispensation, commutation; but by whatever power you can use over vows, by the same you can use over oaths, from c. 1320.

5. Adjuration, or an imperative or deprecative demand, which is made by interposing the name of God, of the Saints, or of a sacred thing, can be made privately by anyone; public adjuration is permitted only according to the norms of the law which was passed chiefly concerning exorcism. Toward Superiors or equals it is made only by deprecation; toward inferiors it is made also imperatively; toward the demon it cannot be made except imperatively. The exorcism published by Leo XIII can be used by every priest, from the appendix of the Ritual itself.

398. NOTION. Justice, taken generally, designates the complex of all virtues. For that is called just which equals its measure.

But justice, as a cardinal virtue, is customarily defined: "The constant and perpetual will of giving each one his right." Thus defined, it comprehends all moral virtues which are toward another, that is, toward God or toward one's neighbor (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 57).

The material object of justice is a thing or action in some way owed to another. But the formal object is the notion of debt, or the special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own (Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 1).

For true and perfect justice three things are required, namely: 1. that it be altogether toward another; for, since the name of justice imports equality, from its nature justice has this, that it is toward another; for nothing is equal to itself, but to another; 2. that it be occupied about a rigorous debt, that is, about a debt from whose violation not only moral baseness is contracted, as in all those things which are owed from the title of honesty (for example, of gratitude), but a strict obligation of restitution or reparation arises; 3. that it render to equality, that is, as much as is owed (2.2, q. 58, a. 2).

Between father and son, husband and wife, Creator and creature, there is not justice properly and simply so called in those things, namely, which they owe as son, as father, etc.; because the son, as son, is not considered diverse from the father, but something of the father; similarly the wife is considered one flesh with the husband, etc. It is otherwise if such persons should come together in some contract, as fellow citizens and distinct parties; for then the status of the persons would be something secondary, and their agreement would regard a debt of justice alone. Likewise, if a son should kill his father, he would violate not piety alone, but also justice, because the father, considered as a man, has a right to life, as do the rest.

399. Parts of justice. I. The integral parts are: 1. to do good under the aspect of debt; 2. to decline from evil under the aspect of injury. Whence St. Ambrose (de Offic., l. 1, c. 24, n. 115): "Justice assigns his own to each one, does not claim what is another's."

400. II. The subjective parts, or species of justice, are assigned as three, namely commutative, distributive, and legal justice.

The reason of the division is that there is a threefold respect under which justice gives to another what is his: namely, the respect either of part to part, or of the whole to the part, or of the part to the whole. For the first is established commutative justice, through which a part renders to a fellow part what is his. For the second is placed distributive justice, through which the superior of the community dispenses the common goods according to the merits of individuals. For the third is assigned legal justice, through which all and each give what is owed to the community by reason and force of the laws (St. Alph., III, 486).

1. COMMUTATIVE justice is the virtue inclining a private man to render to another private man his strict right, an absolute equality of the thing to be rendered to the thing accepted being preserved (cf. n. 383). Nevertheless commutative justice can intervene between a private person and the community, but only where the community has itself after the manner of a private man.

It is called commutative, because it is founded chiefly upon various contracts and upon the innumerable exchanges which are accustomed to take place among men. It is also called strict or rigorous, because those three things which are required for perfect justice are present in it, and in it alone (n. 398, 2).

Note. Various species of injuries are opposed to commutative justice, concerning which in the last six precepts of the Decalogue.

2. DISTRIBUTIVE justice is the virtue which inclines the community, or its prince as minister, to distribute rewards, dignities and honors, and also common burdens, according to the proportion of merits or capacities.

This differs specifically from commutative justice, because it has a diverse formal object, namely the debt of the community, as such, to the parts; whence it comes about that it establishes or regards a diverse equality. For commutative justice regards arithmetical equality, such as there is between two equalities, for example ten and ten. But distributive justice looks to geometrical equality or proportion, which consists in the proportion of the thing to be distributed with the dignity and merit, or capacity, of the person to whom it is to be distributed, comparison being made to others to whom right also belongs in the distribution of goods or burdens. It is imperfect justice, because it is not founded upon strict right, but upon a debt of fittingness (2.2, q. 61, a. 2).

Note. Acceptance of persons is opposed to distributive justice; concerning this we shall speak when discussing the offices of the Bishop, prince, judge, etc. If something to be divided equally among several by strict right were divided unequally, for example a common treasury, a public foundation, etc., commutative justice also would be violated.

3. LEGAL, or GENERAL, justice is the virtue which inclines a private person, or a prince, to render all those things which are owed to the community, in order to the common good. It is called legal, because it is occupied about all things established by laws for the common good. It is called general, insofar as it commands and directs the acts of all virtues to the general prosperity of the commonwealth.

Nevertheless it is a special virtue, because it has a special object, namely public right, or the good of the whole, to be procured by the part, namely by the head or by a member. It is true justice, because between the community and citizens there is true equality, while one renders to the other all that he owes him according to the laws. But it falls short of the notion of perfect justice, because it is not perfectly toward another, since this other is something of the whole. Yet it is nobler than the other species of justice, since the common good, which it regards, is superior to the private good; and since the common good must be procured, or at least preserved, in such a way that private good is always subordinated to it.

Note. To legal justice is opposed: materially, every transgression of laws; formally, and as a special sin, contempt of law, or of the common good, whether on the part of private persons, when deliberately they act against it, as, for example, internationalists, socialists; or on the part of the prince, and of other persons set over others, when they neglect the common good which is endangered, or prefer private good to it (Lessius, l. c., l. 2, c. 1, n. 11).

It is asked: What is VINDICATIVE justice?

Resp. It is the virtue inclining the prince or magistrate of the community to punish the guilty according to the laws. The object of this justice is punishment to be done according to merit; the subject is the judge constituted by legitimate authority, to whom alone it belongs to take vengeance concerning delicts.

This justice primarily pertains to legal justice. Yet often it also pertains to commutative justice: both because the judge, from office and on account of salary, is bound to protect and preserve the public good; and because he ought so to punish delicts that he also exact and procure reparation of the damage which has been inflicted upon private persons. Hence not rarely judges, on account of their negligence in punishing, are obligated to restitution, whether toward the community or toward private persons (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 62, a. 7).

401. III. The potential parts, or virtues annexed to justice, are those which indeed regard another, but in some way fall short of the notion of perfect justice. Nine virtues of this kind are numbered, distributed into three classes (2.2, q. 80, a. un.).

The FIRST CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice for this reason, that the debt which they render to another cannot be rendered to equality. These virtues are: religion, piety, and observance. See the things to be said at n. 530 and 687 seqq.

402. The SECOND CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice because the debt which they render to another is not indeed required by force of justice, but only from the honesty of virtue; yet it is so required that its omission is a sin. - Of this kind are: truthfulness, gratitude, and vindication.

1. TRUTHFULNESS, or truth, inclines to always saying what is true. To this virtue are recalled: a) FAITH or fidelity in promises; b) SIMPLICITY, by which someone exteriorly exhibits himself in words and deeds as he is interiorly.

2. GRATITUDE inclines to compensating a benefit received. But recompensation is made: a) by affection, through kindly acknowledgment, or estimation, of the benefit received; b) by effect, through opportune giving of thanks and requital of the benefit.¹

3. VINDICATION, or severity, repels force or injury, and whatever is going to harm, by defending or avenging. The special object of this virtue is vengeance, required and to be taken by a legitimate judge; not with the mind of harming, but either from zeal for recovering honor unjustly taken away, or from love of that honesty which shines in the punishment of the malefactor, to whom punishment is owed of itself, just as thanks to a benefactor. See the things said (n. 400) concerning vindicative justice.

Related to vindication is penance, concerning which we shall speak at n. 1644.

403. The THIRD CLASS comprises those virtues which regard a certain debt contributing to greater honesty, and whose omission of itself involves no sin. The virtues of this third class are liberality and affability; to which equity can be numbered, although this is rather referred to legal justice.

1. LIBERALITY moderates the love of money, so that we may freely and promptly expend it for our own usefulness and our neighbor's, and for God's honor. To this is referred MERCY, insofar as it is a moral virtue inclining to relieving another's misery.

2. AFFABILITY (to which friendship, urbanity, and benevolence are referred) renders conversation with one's neighbor pleasing and decent. For man is bound, says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 114, a. 2, ad 2), from the natural debt of honesty, to live pleasantly with others.

3. EQUITY, or epikeia, inclines to acting contrary to the words of the law, when some higher consideration demands it. See the things said at n. 173.

404. Vices opposed to justice. Besides formal injustice, which, either by damaging or by taking away, wounds the goods of man, there are given multiple other vices which are opposed to the potential parts of justice, whether by excess or by defect.

To religion are opposed those things concerning which the first three precepts of the Decalogue treat.

To piety are opposed impiety, cosmopolitanism (defect), and nationalism (excess). Cf. Muller, l. 2, § 34, 40.

To observance are opposed irreverence and disobedience.

Contrary to truthfulness are: lying, simulation, and revelation of a secret.

To gratitude are opposed: indiscreet gratitude (excess) and ingratitude (defect).

Severity not tempered degenerates into cruelty or excessive lenity.

Enemies to liberality are prodigality (excess) (cf. n. 363) and avarice (defect).

Affability is a mean between flattery (excess) and moroseness (defect) or envy.

After enough has been said concerning right, now that virtue must be treated whose object is right, namely the virtue of justice. This question is divided into two chapters: 1. on the notion of justice, 2. on the parts of justice.

Preliminary Note. Diverse authors do not assign the parts of justice in a uniform way.¹³⁶ We prefer the mode indicated by St. Thomas. But the Angelic Doctor assigns¹³⁷ the subjective parts or species of justice; then the integral parts, i.e. acts and habits necessary for perfect justice; and finally the potential parts, i.e. virtues annexed to justice.

¹³⁶ Modern authors are accustomed to distinguish justice as threefold: legal, distributive, commutative. For justice orders man to others. But this order to others is threefold, namely of part to whole, of whole to part, of part to part. Now legal justice orders the parts to the whole, inclining the members of society to work for the common good of the republic; distributive justice orders the whole to the part, i.e. inclines the governor of the republic to distributing goods and burdens according to the merits and powers of each one; commutative justice orders the parts among themselves, inclining individual men to rendering to each his own right. - This division indeed is very easily understood, but already by Dominic Soto (De iust. et iure l. 3, q. 5, a. 1) it was attacked. For virtues are not properly distinguished according to the subjects which they order, but according to the formal objects into which they first and per se tend. Now the formal object into which justice first and per se tends is not threefold but twofold, namely either the common good (legal justice) or the private good (distributive and commutative justice). Whence Aristotle (Eth. l. 5, c. 2) and after him St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 7) more rightly and more profoundly employed a two-member division of justice, namely into general or legal justice, and particular justice. - Although distributive and commutative justice tend first and per se to the private good, remotely nevertheless they also procure the common good of the republic. Cathrein (Moralphil. I 359, ed. 5) defends a singular opinion, namely that legal justice does not pertain to the cardinal virtue of justice. Vermeersch (Quaest. de iust. n. 20 sqq.) deservedly rejects this opinion.

¹³⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 5 sqq., and q. 61, a. 1.

72. St. Thomas enumerates two quasi-integral parts of justice, namely to do good and to decline from evil, not indeed under a general aspect, but under the special ratio of debt toward another.

The Angelic Doctor writes to the matter:¹⁴⁷ "If we speak of good and evil in common, to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue, and according to this they cannot be posited as parts of justice, unless perhaps justice is taken insofar as it is every virtue: although even justice accepted in this way regards a certain special ratio of good, insofar namely as it is owed in order to divine or human law. But justice, according as it is a special virtue, regards good under the ratio of debt to one's neighbor; and according to this it pertains to special justice to do good under the ratio of debt in comparison to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to one's neighbor. But to general justice it pertains to do the good owed in order to the community and to God, and to avoid the opposite evil. But these two are called parts of general or special justice, as it were integral parts, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to establish equality in those things which are toward another, as is clear from the things said above.... But someone establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another what is owed to him; but he preserves the equality of justice already established by declining from evil, i.e. by inflicting no harm upon his neighbor." - From these things it follows that the act of restoring another's good unjustly taken and the act of repairing damage caused, which are sometimes enumerated as acts of justice, are reduced to the act of declining from evil inflicted upon one's neighbor.

Some modern authors enumerate as integral parts of justice constitutive justice, which bestows upon each what is his own, and restitutive justice, which repairs injured justice.

¹⁴⁷ L. c. q. 79, a. 1.

73. As has already often been said, the potential parts of some cardinal virtue are called virtues which indeed agree with it in its object considered generally, but in some way fall short of the perfect ratio of it. But the function of justice is to render to another what is owed, and indeed according to equality. Therefore in two ways can some virtue existing toward another fall short of the ratio of justice: 1. insofar as it falls short of the ratio of the equal; 2. insofar as it falls short of the ratio of strict debt.

On account of the first deficiency, namely in rendering strict equality, three virtues are joined to justice as potential parts, namely religion, piety, observance. 1. For religion is the virtue rendering due worship to God, but man is never able to worship God as He deserves. 2. Piety is the virtue inclining one to render due honor and love to parents. But according to equality there cannot be recompensed to parents what is owed to them by children. 3. Observance is the virtue inclining one to offer due reverence to men excelling in great virtue and dignity. Moreover great virtue also is not recompensed according to an equal reward on this earth.

On account of the other deficiency, namely of strict debt, six virtues are joined to justice: namely 1. veracity or truth, which is the virtue inclining one always to say the true and never to lie. To this virtue are reduced a) faith or fidelity in promises; b) simplicity, by which someone exteriorly shows himself in words and deeds to be such as he is interiorly. To veracity are opposed lying, infidelity, hypocrisy, simulation, and generally all those things concerning which there is discussion in the eighth precept of the Decalogue. 2. Gratitude or grace, which is the virtue inclining one at least in some way to compensate a benefit received. 3. Vindication, which is the virtue avenging injuries committed. Very closely related to vindication is the virtue of penance, by which one tries to repair injuries inflicted upon God by sinning. 4. Liberality, which moderates the love of money, so that we may willingly expend it for our own utility and that of our neighbor and for the honor of God. 5. Affability, which makes conversation with one's neighbor pleasing and fitting. 6. Equity or epikeia, which inclines one from just causes to pass over the words of the law and rather to act according to the presumed intention of the legislator.¹⁴⁸ - As is easily clear to one considering the matter, in all these six enumerated virtues there is not so strict an obligation of debt as in justice, and consequently all are deservedly enumerated as potential parts of the cardinal virtue of justice. Concerning the individual ones there will be discussion below.

¹⁴⁸ Epikeia is taken in diverse senses, as will be said below, n. 617. Cf. also I, n. 231 sqq.

Order of treatment. After what has been said concerning the virtue of justice itself, we must treat, following the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor, the potential parts of justice, or the other virtues annexed to justice. Nine or ten such virtues are enumerated, namely, religion, piety, observance, obedience, gratitude, vindication, truth, affability, liberality, and epikeia.¹ Among all these virtues, the virtue of religion holds the first place, since it approaches more nearly to God.² The virtue of religion is annexed to justice as a potential part, because it indeed agrees with justice in the notion of its object, namely, in rendering to another what is due; but it falls short of the perfect mode by which justice attains its object, since it does not render what is due according to strict equality. For religion indeed renders due worship to God, but not according to strict equality, because no creature is able to venerate God as much as is fitting. The due worship to be rendered to God is commanded in the first three precepts of the Decalogue. Hence the treatise on the virtue of religion contains nearly all those things which other manuals treat under these three precepts of the Decalogue. The virtues of piety, observance, and obedience embrace nearly those things which are commanded in the fourth precept of the Decalogue. Hence this second section is suitably subdivided into three questions:

1. On the virtue of religion (or on the first three precepts of the Decalogue).

2. On the virtues of piety, observance, and obedience (or on the fourth precept of the Decalogue).

3. On the remaining potential parts of the virtue of justice.

¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 80, a. unic.

² Ibid., q. 81, a. 6.

Preliminary note. Thus far there has been discussion of piety, observance, and obedience, which virtues, although they do not introduce so strict a due as justice, nevertheless still regard a true due which is customarily called legal, for the exercise of those virtues is exacted by positive laws. Thus, for example, positive laws, even civil laws, exact that piety, observance, and obedience be shown to parents.

Now those virtues must be treated which import only a due of fittingness or moral due, that is, a due which indeed cannot be strictly exacted, but which arises from a certain moral goodness and equity. These virtues, namely, gratitude, vindication, affability, liberality, and epikeia, are indeed rarely violated to such an extent that mortal sin arises, but nevertheless they are of great importance not only for the spiritual life, but also for peaceful and pleasant human intercourse. Therefore a confessor will read with great fruit those things which the Angelic Doctor discusses concerning them in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 106ff. Striving for brevity, we hand down very few things concerning them.

131. Order of things to be said. - Besides prudence, which disposes reason itself so that it may rightly judge and command all human actions in particular, in order to the honorable good and to the last end, there are three other cardinal virtues with the virtues annexed to them, which order the other powers and place the good of reason in them, so that all the movements of our appetite may be conformed to right reason and prudence, and thus may tend to the honorable good and to the last end.

But movements of the appetite 1) some are those which of themselves imply an order only to ourselves, namely, the passions of the sensitive appetite, of which a) some impel toward delectable good against reason, which temperance moderates and restrains, which removes the impediments of rectitude in the concupiscible appetite; b) others decline from the good and withdraw from that which reason dictates, against which fortitude strengthens the soul, which removes the impediments of rectitude in the irascible appetite; - 2) other movements are those by which we are also ordered to others, namely, operations of the will, which justice rectifies.

Justice therefore also regards the good of another, so that man may have himself well toward another; fortitude and temperance regard only the good of the one operating, so that he may have himself well toward himself; whence justice is more universal. And because it immediately perfects the will, which is nearer to reason, it participates more in the order of reason, and therefore we begin to speak of the cardinal virtue of justice.

132. Division of the treatise.¹ - The treatise is divided into six parts: 1. on justice in general; 2. on legal justice; 3. on commutative justice; 4. on distributive justice; 5. on the virtues annexed to justice; 6. on the precepts of justice.

¹ Lest confusion arise, we indicate only the division according to the large lines, referring, for the subdivisions, to the several questions.

The 1st Part treats of justice in general: 1st, of justice according to itself; - 2nd, of right, which is the object of justice: a) of right in general; b) of the species of right; c) of the object of right and dominion; d) of the subject of right and dominion; e) of the acquisition of right and dominion; - 3rd, of injustice and injury in general; - 4th, of the division of justice, or of its integral, subjective, and potential parts.

The 2nd Part treats of legal justice: 1st, of pursuing the common good; - 2nd, of procuring the common good; - 3rd, of the defense of the common good.

The 3rd Part treats of commutative justice: 1st, of its proper act, namely, of restitution in general; - 2nd, of justice and injustice in involuntary commutations: a) in the internal goods of soul and body; b) in the goods of marriage; c) in external goods; d) in reputation and honor; - 3rd, of justice and injustice in voluntary commutations or contracts: a) of contracts in general; b) of unilateral contracts; c) of onerous bilateral commutative contracts; d) of gratuitous bilateral contracts; e) of aleatory contracts; f) of subsidiary contracts.

The 4th Part treats of distributive justice: 1st, of judgment, which primarily and formally is an act of distributive justice; - 2nd, of justice and injustice in distributing goods; - 3rd, of justice and injustice in distributing burdens; - 4th, of justice and injustice in public judgments.

The 5th Part treats of the virtues annexed to justice: 1st, of religion according to itself; - 2nd, of the acts of religion; - 3rd, of sins opposed to religion; - 4th, of piety and observance; - 5th, of truthfulness; - 6th, of the remaining habits annexed to justice: gratitude, vindication, liberality, affability, equity, and the gift of piety.

The 6th Part treats of the precepts of justice.

133. Importance of the treatise. - The treatise on justice excels among the others, both 1) in breadth, because it treats of the cardinal virtue which, among the purely moral virtues, is the more principal in ordering morals and upon which almost the whole moral and social life depends, since the precepts of the Decalogue, according to St. Thomas, II-II, q. 122, a. 1, all regard justice; and 2) in difficulty, because it considers questions very arduous and yet of the greatest moment, especially in our times, when the means of communicating among men have become more numerous and intricate and infinitely varied.

Bibliography. - For justice itself, the following can usefully be compared: St. Thomas, in V Eth.; in I-II, q. 59, a. 4; q. 60, a. 1-3; q. 64, a. 2; in II-II, q. 57 and following, with the commentaries of Cajetan, Victoria, Bannez, Sylvius, and Billuart. Likewise St. Raymond of Pennafort, in Summa; Dom. Soto, De Iustitia et Iure; St. Antoninus, in Summa theologica; Cajetan, in Summula casuum, and in the opuscula; Concina, Theologia Christiana, t. VII, De Iustitia et iure; Lumbreras, De Iustitia, 1938.

Outside the school of St. Thomas, among the theologians of the Society of Jesus: Molina, Lessius, and Lugo, each of whom wrote a work de Iustitia et Iure; and Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia; and Theol. Mor., t. II; - Reiffenstuel, O. M., in Theol. Mor.; and St. Alphonsus, in Theol. mor., l. III.

Among the more recent authors: Carriere, De Iustitia; De Contractibus; Marres, De Iustitia; De Contractibus; Waffelaert, De Iustitia, tom. 2; and L'Obligation en conscience des lois civiles; Sweens, Institutiones theologicae de virtute cardinali iustitiae. Besides Ballerini, Opus theol. mor., vol. III; and the best-known manuals, such as Lehmkuhl, Genicot and Noldin; Marc and Aertnijs; Van der Velden; Haine, Theologia Mechliniensis, Mulier, Pruner, Tanquerey; Prummer, Goepfert, Mausbach, Schilling.

Likewise special works: Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia; Salsmans, Gerechtelijke plichtenleer; Van Roey, De Obiectis et actibus ad iustitiam pertinentibus; van Gestel: De Iustitia et lege civili; Van Egeren, Notationes de selectis materiis moralibus; E. Janssens, Cinq lecons sur la Justice; Michel, La Question sociale et les principes theologiques: Justice legale et Charite; M. St. Gillet, Conscience chretienne et Justice sociale; Rutten, La Doctrine sociale de l'Eglise; Lachance, Le Concept de Droit selon Aristote et S. Thomas; Faidherbe, La Justice distributive.

Among philosophical works: Goudin, Roselli, and Zigliara in the manuals; Taparelli, Droit Naturel; Meyer, Institutiones Iuris naturalis; Castelein, Philosophie morale et sociale; Droit Naturel; Cathrein, Philosophia moralis; Biederlack, Die soziale Frage; De Pascal, Philosophie morale; Schwalm, Lecons de Philosophie sociale; Lehu, Philosophia moralis et socialis; De Bie, Philosophia Moralis; Beysens, Ethiek of Zedenleer; Sertillanges, La morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin.

Among orators: Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Justice et le Droit.

Finally, subsidiary works: Gousset, Le code civil commente dans ses rapports avec la morale; Allegre, Le Code civil commente a l'egard du clerge; Aubry and Rau, Cours de Droit civil francais; Beaudry Lacantinerie, Precis de Droit civil; Lehmkuhl, Das Burgerliche Gesetzbuch; W. Duynstee, Burgerlijk Recht en Zielezorg. Likewise Liberatore, Principi di Economia politica; Antoine, Cours d'Economie sociale; Brants, Les grandes lignes de l'Economie politique; Schrijvers, Manuel d'Economie politique with a preface by Father Rutten; Vliebergh, Staathuishoudkunde, and generally economists such as Paul Leroy Beaulieu, de Molinari, Cauwes, Gide, V. Fallon, etc.

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 58, a. 1 and 2.

134. Justice according to the name is a habit which inclines one to doing what is just (recht-vaardigheid). Etymologically it is from just;¹ what is adequate or commensurate and adjusted to another, and it imports a certain equality: for commonly those things which are made equal are said to be adjusted;² but equality is toward another, for nothing is equal to itself but to another, and therefore justice in the proper sense, by its own nature, signifies the special virtue which renders us equal to another, or which orders man, in those things which are toward another, as he ought, and inclines him to rendering to each one what is his, up to equality.

¹ In Greek, dikaios, as if divided in two, imports equality of thing to thing, according to Aristotle, V Eth., c. 7.

² Thus they are said: just parts, a just measure, a just price, a just petition.

Nevertheless, according to a likeness, in one and the same man diverse principles of actions are considered as if they were diverse agents; and therefore metaphorically justice is said to be in one and the same man, insofar as reason commands the other faculties and these obey reason as they ought, according as to each part of man there is attributed what is suitable and due to it. Thus justice consists in the due ordering of the parts of the soul and in adequation or conformity to its rule (gerechtigheid), and thus it includes every virtue.

Hence in sacred usage justice is more often taken in a metaphorical and general sense, and signifies:

1. either holiness, or the complex of all virtues by which we are made adequate to the divine rule or law (Mt. V, 6; I, 19; "original justice"; S. Th. II-II, q. 79, a. 1);

2. or any act of virtue and all good works (Mt. VI, 1; V, 20; Prov. VIII, 20);

3. or the root of justice, namely, justification, in which grace making one pleasing and the virtues are infused (Rom. IV, 3; V, 17 and throughout); - but

4. also it is sometimes taken in the strict sense, as the special virtue of justice (Acts XVII, 31: "He will judge the world in equity," Greek dikaiosyne = in justice strictly so called).

135. Justice according to the thing, as a special virtue, is usually defined from Ulpian: The perpetual and constant will of giving to each one his right, where perpetual and constant will is not put for the power of willing, or for a passing act, but for a habit inhering in the soul by which the will perpetually and constantly wills. For stable will is required for virtue, which immovably operates the good; and this cannot exist without habit. Whence, if someone wished to put the definition in due form, he could say with St. Thomas: A habit according to which someone, with constant and perpetual will, gives his right to each one (q. 58, a. 1), or with more recent authors: a virtue inclining the will to rendering to another his right unto equality. It is said:

1. habit, i.e., a firm and permanent disposition which inclines the power to operating either well or badly, and thus is distinguished from a power and from an act, because it mediates between each;

2. by which with constant and perpetual will: for he who would wish to render right only by turns, for a time, or only in some business, and only to certain persons, could by no means be called endowed with justice.³ Whence will is required:

³ Otherwise this can be without habit, from natural inclination alone.

a) perpetual, not on the part of the act, as if it were to endure perpetually, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man has the purpose of preserving justice at every time and in every business;

b) moreover constant (which is not the same as perpetual) on the part of the subject, namely, of the will itself, insofar as it firmly perseveres in the said purpose, and someone has a firm and constant will of preserving justice perpetually and in all things;

3. someone gives to each one his right, not only positively by procuring that which is owed, but also negatively (through omission, by which the right of another is left intact), by abstaining from every violation of right. By these words there is indicated that by which justice is distinguished from all other virtues, namely, its own proper act, and its proper object: right owed to another, which namely a) belongs not to me the agent, but to another, b) is owed to each one not from mere fittingness or the honesty of virtue or charity (a moral debt), but by strict obligation (a legal or rigorous debt), and c) is rendered integrally unto equality; otherwise the whole due right would not be given, and under this respect the act would fall short of the perfection of justice. In which case there is present justice not strict and perfect, nor metaphorical, but imperfect and according to something, which "by an enlarged name" (i.e., by extension) is called justice (I-II, q. 60, a. 3, ad 1).

136. Three conditions are required for justice strictly so called:

1. that it be toward another: for since justice is concerned with establishing equality, it has from its nature that it tend toward another for giving right to another, because nothing is equal to itself but to another;⁴

⁴ It pertains essentially to the just that it be commensurated according to equality to another to whom it ought to be equaled. Whence St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 1: the adequation of justice comprises three things: 1st, that it be ordered to another; 2nd, that it be owed to him, otherwise it would exceed; 3rd, that as much be rendered as is owed, otherwise it would fall short in less.

2. that right, and indeed right properly so called, or a true legal debt, be present to the other for that which is given to him, for example, if he has bought a thing or has merited it as the wage of labor. Thus almsgiving is not an act of justice, by defect of right in the poor person to whom it is given;

3. that it be given to another adequately, i.e., unto equality, so that as much is rendered as is owed. Thus if someone owes one hundred francs, he must render one hundred, neither more nor less: if less is rendered, justice is not preserved, because something owed remains; if more, the excess does not pertain to justice but to charity or liberality, or to vice.

By defect of the first condition, there is not justice of man toward himself;

by defect of the second condition, fidelity, gratitude, and liberality fall short of the character of strict justice, in which there is only a moral debt, though one obliging under sin;

by defect of the third condition, religion, piety, and observance do not pertain to strict justice, because we cannot render an equal thing to God, to parents, and to superiors.

Hence a) if the three conditions are present, there is justice in the proper, strict, and perfect sense;

As the Symbol is the epitome of things to be believed, so the Decalogue is the epitome of things to be done. For it comprehends the ten precepts handed down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai, in which all the duties of man which the natural law prescribes are contained more or less openly. The first three immediately regard God, the remaining ones are referred to the neighbor.

I am the Lord thy God.... Thou shalt not have strange gods.¹

This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, prescribes in the first place the acts of Religion, by which the worship owed to the Divinity is rendered; insofar as it is negative, it prohibits vices opposed to Religion.

322. • Acts of the virtue of religion come under the general name of worship.

But worship is defined: the complex of those acts by which we bear witness to the infinite excellence of God, and show service to Him.

Division. - A. By reason of mode: 1) it is internal or external, insofar as it is shown either by internal powers of the soul or by external powers of the body. Writers of Speculative Theology show that both are owed to God.

2. External worship is either private or public, according as it is shown in the name and authority of the Church and in the form prescribed by her, or not. Therefore that worship will be private to which one of these conditions is lacking. Thus, for example, a layman reciting the Divine Office shows only private worship, because, although he observes the form prescribed by the Church, nevertheless he does not act in the name and authority of the Church; nor will it cease to be private, although all the laymen of some whole parish publicly in the church commonly recite prayers approved by the Church. On the contrary, it will be public, although a subdeacon recites the Divine Office privately; for the former do not act in the name of the Church, although they act publicly; but the latter acts both in the name of the Church and in the form prescribed by her, although he acts privately. - Public worship is also, and indeed properly, called liturgical.

323. • The form prescribed by the Church:

1. Comprehends two things, namely words (for example, of prayers) by which, and rite (for example, extension of the hands) by which worship is to be shown.

2. It has either a natural or a symbolic sense. Thus, for example, the corporal and pall, according to the Pontifical de Consec. corporal., symbolically signify the clean linen cloth concerning which in Matthew.

3. It must not be posited as merely external, or outside every connection with internal worship.

4. It is worthy of the highest veneration.²

5. It must be sought from the liturgical books and from the decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites.

324. • Liturgical words 1) are either from God, as the forms of the Sacraments, the most holy Name of Jesus, Lessons from Sacred Scripture in the Breviary and Mass, Psalms and Canticles; - or from the Church, as Collects, Hymns, the Doxology, Lessons of the Breviary, shorter Prayers.

2. They must not be pronounced in the vernacular tongue.¹

3. They must be pronounced and sung in the mode prescribed by the Church.²

A liturgical action or rite, like words, is either from Christ the Lord, as the essential rite of the Sacrifice of the Mass - which action must be called by excellence - and the proximate matter of the Sacraments; or from the Church, as the Sign of the Cross; the use of candles, incense, blessed water; various gestures, as genuflection, inclination of the head, etc.

325. • B. By reason of the object which is worshiped, worship is 1) of latria or of dulia; 2) direct or relative.

The worship of latria is the same as adoration strictly taken (worship), or honor shown to God because of His highest excellence and supreme dominion. The worship of dulia (veneration) is shown to Saints and Angels. This again is distinguished as twofold, namely hyperdulia, which is rendered to the Blessed Virgin Mary alone, and simple dulia, which is rendered to other Saints and Angels.

Note. - Among the Saints, Cornelius a Lapide³ contends not undeservedly that the worship of dulia, highest after the Blessed Virgin Mary, is owed to St. Joseph; and 150 of the Fathers of the Vatican Council requested from the Sacred Congregation of Rites that this be decreed for the Spouse of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Thus far, however, it has not been decreed.

Direct worship, which is also called absolute, is that which is shown to someone because of the gifts with which he is endowed; such is rendered not only to God, but also to the Saints. For these truly possess excellent gifts on account of which they are to be honored. Relative worship is rendered to certain things because of the relation which they have to God or to the Saints; thus the cross, the image of Christ, the images and relics of the Saints are worshiped.

326. • Concerning the worship of the Saints these things are to be held.

I. By divine law only acts of dulia are to be shown to them.

II. By ecclesiastical law these acts are to be shown according to the laws of the Church, the principal of which are the following.

A. Let public worship not be shown to them before it is established by the judgment of the Church that such worship can be shown to them, or before they have been beatified or canonized by her. That this would thereafter be done by the Supreme Pontiff alone was established by Alexander III in the twelfth century; but Urban VIII prescribed the rules according to which it ought to be done today. The sum of these rules is this. Men who depart from this life with a reputation of sanctity are called Servants of God, and without any permission of ecclesiastical power they can be called so. Private worship can be shown to these. The Ordinaries of those dioceses in which the Servant of God dwelt longer, or did greater things for God, inquire into the reputation of sanctity. When this inquiry, which comes under the name of the Ordinary Process, has been duly performed, the cause is referred to the Holy See; if it is admitted by the latter, the Apostolic Process is said to be introduced, and from then the title Venerable Servant of God is assigned to the Servant of God. The principal end of the Apostolic Process is to inquire whether it is established concerning the theological and cardinal virtues, and the virtues annexed to them, of the Venerable Servant of God N. N. in a heroic degree, and concerning two miracles; if these are established, Beatification follows through the Supreme Pontiff himself. Public worship can be shown to those beatified, yet restricted, both as to the kingdoms, provinces, dioceses, or Orders in which, and as to the mode in which, it is permitted by decrees, whether general - especially those of Alexander VII, dated 27 Sept. 1659 - or special. Beatification, after two other miracles have been approved, if nothing stands in the way, is followed by Canonization, by which the restrictions placed upon the public worship of those Beatified are removed. The Process described thus far is called formal; but equivalent is that by which the worship shown to some Servant of God from immemorial time is confirmed by the Holy See.

327. • B. Concerning the public worship of Relics these things especially are to be noted.

1. By Relics of Saints and Blessed are understood: a) in the stricter sense, their bodies and even the smallest parts of the body, likewise oil or another liquid sometimes flowing from them; b) in the broader sense, all things which the Saints used in life, as garments, books, etc.; likewise instruments of punishments and mortifications; c) in the broadest sense, all things which have touched either the body, or the sepulcher, or other Relics of a Saint; likewise oil from a lamp hung before the sepulcher, and dust from the place where they are preserved.

2. From the Relics of Saints the Relics of the Lord must be carefully distinguished, that is, drops of the Blood of Christ; instruments of His passion, as thorns from the Crown, nails, lance, etc. To these, as to Relics of the Most Holy Cross, at least more distinguished worship must be shown. As specifically regards a particle from the wood of the Most Holy Cross, these things are to be observed: a) The practice of separating it from Relics of Saints is right.¹ b) If it has been exposed in the principal place above the altar, those passing before it ought to bend one knee before it, and Mass before it is to be celebrated as before the enclosed Sacrament; but if it is enclosed in a case, those passing before it incline the head.² c) Where immemorial usage carries this, it can be carried processionally under a baldachin, with two thurifers incensing, and with head uncovered; and d) after the procession or exposition, before it is placed away, the Officiant standing incenses it with three swings; then, having assumed the humeral veil and made a genuflection of one knee, he blesses the people with it, saying nothing.³

3. Distinguished Relics of Saints are the whole body of a Saint or a great part of the same, namely the head, arm, or leg, but these whole, that is, consisting of the two principal bones (not, however, the bones of the thigh),⁴ or that part of the body in which a Martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small.⁵

4. Relics of Saints are to be venerated not only with religious worship, or worship commanded by the virtue of religion - as are the bodies of those dying in communion with the Church - but also with sacred worship;⁶ yet not public worship, unless their authenticity has been approved by the Ordinary of the place where they are to be worshiped,⁷ and this although they have already been recognized at Rome or by another Bishop; for it belongs to the Ordinary to see that no fraud creeps in and to inspect whether they have truly been approved at Rome.⁸

5. Relics must be preserved: a) any Relics whatever outside the tabernacle; b) distinguished Relics near the high altar or in another conspicuous place of the church, but not in private houses or among laymen, unless there is question of great princes or principal prelates of the Church.

6. Relics are not to be exposed: a) above the tabernacle in which the most august Sacrament is preserved, in such a way that the tabernacle serves as a base for them;¹ b) before the little door of the same tabernacle, or in another manner by which simple persons can be induced to adore Relics for the Blessed Sacrament; c) outside a case, unless, beyond the lamp, two lights continually burn on the altar;² d) unless the one exposing them (and replacing them) is vested with surplice and also stole,³ and, if he blesses the people with the relics, also with the humeral veil. But the blessing must be done without chant, saying nothing, after the Relics have been incensed with a double swing, with incense not blessed; e) with the Blessed Sacrament on the same altar.

7. In processions the relics of canonized Saints can be carried, but a) not under a baldachin; b) with head uncovered (yet the Bishop with miter); c) not in the procession of the Blessed Sacrament, unless by force of an Indult or custom.

8. Of a Saint whose distinguished Relic is had, the Office can be made and Mass celebrated, provided he is found in the Roman Martyrology.

328. • C. Concerning the worship of images hold these things.

1. Among images representing the same object, some can be worshiped more specially: a) those blessed; b) those which at the same time are Relics, as the image of the Blessed Virgin Mary which is said to have been painted by St. Luke; c) those illustrious by miracles,⁴ and copies of them, as is clear from the practice of the Church.

2. It is not licit to expose in churches images: a) of Servants of God not yet canonized or beatified, especially with rays or signs of sanctity.⁵ But Beatified persons are to be painted with rays only; canonized persons, however, with a diadem around the head; b) furnishing occasion of false dogma and of error dangerous to the uneducated, of which sort, nevertheless, the images of the Most Holy Trinity generally are not;¹ c) unusual ones, unless they have been approved by the Bishop; d) painted or adorned with provocative beauty, or in which something profane or immodest appears; e) unless every superstition, base gain, and whatever is disordered or accommodated perversely and tumultuously is avoided.²

3. Images are worshiped in the same way as Relics, except that a blessing is not given with them, nor is an Office made or Mass celebrated of them, unless they have been specially conceded. They are not carried in a procession with the Blessed Sacrament, outside the case of an Indult or custom.

329. On veneration owed to places and things, whether sacred or religious.

Principles. - I. Places and things become sacred either by consecration, or by a blessing not simply invocative, but constitutive or consecrative, concerning which n. 1247, I. What places and things are to be consecrated or blessed, and by what reason they are polluted or execrated, see ibid., V, and n. 1329, q. 4°, q. 5°.

II. They ought to be 1) agreeable to liturgical prescriptions; 2) if it can be done, precious; or 3) at least decent and clean.

III. They are to be treated reverently, in a sense both negative and positive. 1) Negatively, so that they serve neither for superstitious, nor for indecent, nor, if there is question of things sacred by blessing, as above, for profane uses.³

a) Hence it is not licit in churches, after they have been consecrated or even only blessed, to conduct secular judgments, secular⁴ or political⁵ meetings, or, among us, for laymen⁶ to speak to the people without permission of the Ordinary; to have rooms above their lateral chapels, in which daily celebration occurs, for living or sleeping; indeed private oratories also ought to be free from all domestic uses.

b) Those things which can no longer serve the use for which they are destined must be withdrawn from it in a decent manner. Thus 1° the place of a ruined church which can in no way be repaired can be converted to profane, indeed, but not sordid uses; yet with a cross erected there,¹ which erection of a cross, if it cannot be done without danger of sacrilege, almost to be feared among non-Catholics among us, is to be omitted; 2° each year the Sacred Oils are to be burned (and the ashes thrown into the sacrarium); likewise vestments after they have been worn out, unless nevertheless they are used for making or repairing other things;² 3° baptismal water on Holy Saturday and on the Vigil of Pentecost, after new water has been blessed, is to be poured into the sacrarium; 4° chalice and paten can be newly gilded and repaired by laymen without permission of the Bishop.³

2. Positively, or holy things in a holy manner; concerning which in their places.

The principal acts of Religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days.... Of the last three there will be discussion under the second and third precepts. Of sacrifice, in the Treatise on the Eucharist. Of adoration, there was discussion in the article immediately preceding, I. Therefore here there is treatment only:

330. Definition. - Prayer, taken more broadly, is the elevation of the mind to God, or any pious affection of the soul toward God and supernatural things. But in the stricter sense it is the petition of becoming things from God. - St. Thom.⁴

Division. It is 1° mental or vocal, according as it is performed by the mind alone, or the concepts of the mind are also expressed by the mouth; - 2° private or public, according as it is made by a private person and in a private name, or in community or by the authority and name of the Church. Yet that which is made in community is not by this very fact and in this sense public, so that it can be called liturgical (n. 322).

Principles. - I. Prayer is necessary for all adults by necessity of precept, indeed also by necessity of means. - 1° This is evinced from innumerable places of Sacred Scripture, for example, "Watch ye and pray."¹ - "It is necessary always to pray and not to faint."² - 2° Because prayer is the ordinary means established by God for obtaining necessary graces: "Ask, and you shall receive."³ - St. Alph.⁴

II. The precept of praying obliges frequently, as is clear from the cited texts, yet not without interruption, which is impossible to human weakness. - Therefore the words, "It is necessary always to pray," according to the common interpretation of Doctors, signify that one must pray frequently at an opportune time, and never cease from weariness, torpor, or dejection of soul; or also that our actions are generally to be directed to God.

III. Prayer which someone performs for himself, or, according to many,⁵ for others not placing an obstacle, endowed with the due conditions, has infallible efficacy from the promise of Christ. "Every one that asketh receiveth,"⁶ etc. - "If you ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you."⁷

But the necessary conditions are that it be made: 1° piously, devoutly, and attentively; - 2° with perseverance; - 3° with humility and confidence; - 4° about things necessary or useful.

Temporal things ought not to be asked except with a condition, at least implicit, namely insofar as they can contribute to the salvation of the soul.

331. Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the necessity of prayer urge?

Resp. 1° It urges of itself frequently, so that it cannot be omitted for a notable time without grave sin; the time of one or certainly of two months is reputed notable. - Suarez, Lessius, etc. 2° At the instant of the use of reason. 3° At the article of death. Besides, the confessor, as Doctors hold, ought to be more solicitous in inculcating the necessity of praying frequently than in determining the grave fault of omitted prayer.

Resp. 2° It urges by accident: 1° in grave temptation which cannot easily be repelled in another way; 2° in public calamities; 3° as often as another precept is to be fulfilled for which prayer is necessary, for example if Sacraments are to be received; 4° as often as some special divine help seems necessary to us.

332. • Quaer. 2° Does he sin who omits morning or evening prayers?

Resp. Negatively, precisely of itself, if they are omitted only sometimes. The reason is that there is no law which prescribes determined prayers on individual days and at certain hours. Yet some observe that rarely is some fault of negligence and sloth absent.

Besides, in practice those who rather often omit those prayers cannot be excused altogether from some fault, both because perhaps they in no way pray at another time or in another mode, and thus they will sometimes be lacking to the precept of prayer; and because, on account of the dangers which occur daily, when prayer is neglected, they fall into many sins.

Quaer. 3° In what way does one distracted voluntarily in prayer sin?

Resp. Of itself he sins venially as often as he is voluntarily distracted without a just reason, and this holds even if the prayer is made without obligation; because he inflicts some irreverence on God. - Elbel.¹

333. • Quaer. 4° For whom must one pray?

Resp. 1° For ourselves; 2° for all men, wayfarers, even infidels; 3° for souls detained in purgatory. This is derived 1° from the general law of Charity; 2° from the words of St. Paul:² "I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings," etc.; ... nor are enemies to be excepted, as is clear from the words of Christ:³ "Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you."

Quaer. 5° Whom besides God can we pray to?

Resp. The Blessed Virgin Mary, as our mediatrix; the Angels, as guardians of men; all the Saints and friends of God, as our intercessors before Him. Privately, baptized infants and those dead before the use of reason can also be invoked; and the same must more probably be said of souls detained in purgatory.

But the invocation of Saints is of counsel, not of precept, since Trent¹ only says that it is good and useful to invoke them. Yet he will seem very careless of his salvation who never invokes the Blessed Virgin Mary, since by a peculiar and wonderful providence she has been constituted our mediatrix.

Note. - On 16 June 1880 "the Sacred Congregation of Rites considered it of its office to warn the Most Reverend Ordinaries of places that they not allow other Litanies to be recited publicly except" those of the Most Holy Name, those of the Blessed Virgin Mary called the Lauretane, and those of the Saints, "or others, if any have been recognized and approved by the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition; and at the same time they should beware" (be cautious) "of subjoining their approbation for printing to those books in which Litanies are found lacking apostolic sanction." - According to the periodical of Innsbruck "fur kath. Theol." for 1881, p. 573, the Sacred Congregation responded to some Bishops of Germany inquiring about the sense of this Monitum, that it had wished to keep Litanies not approved by the Holy See away only from Liturgical offices, not, however, to prohibit their approbation by Bishops, nor the custom of some places of reciting publicly (that is, commonly indeed in church, yet outside Liturgical offices) Litanies approved by the Ordinaries.

The vices opposed to Religion are: 1° superstition by excess; 2° irreligiosity by defect.

"Superstition," says St. Thomas,² "is a vice opposed to religion according to excess; not because it shows more in divine worship than true religion, but because it shows divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in the manner in which it ought not."

334. • Idolatry is an action by which worship owed to God alone is rendered to a creature; and this happens not only by sacrifice, but by any sign of honor by which someone intends to submit himself to a creature as to God, for example by genuflection.

Idolatry is distinguished as twofold, namely: 1° Material or simulated, when someone without internal affection, from grave fear, shows worship to an idol. It would also be called material if it proceeded from invincible error, for example if someone, falsely thinking a host to be consecrated, were to adore it. - In the first case it would be a mortal sin; in the second, none, as is clear.

2° Formal and proper, which is done 1° by adoring a creature as God; 2° by showing worship to a demon or another creature as if to God, or at least from the mind of obtaining something from such a creature which can be asked from God alone.³

335. • Vain observance is superstition which employs means neither proportioned nor instituted by God for obtaining a certain effect.

It is of three kinds, namely: 1° Notory art, or the art of acquiring knowledge without labor. 2° Art of healings, or the art of healing by various signs or sacred things. 3° Observance of events, by which from consideration of some fortuitous event it is conjectured that something favorable or unfavorable will be in the future.¹

Principles. - I. Vain observance is a grave sin, because it attributes divine honor to a creature, while it expects from it what must be expected from God alone; and because it rests upon an implicit pact with a demon. Yet it can often be venial from imperfection of the act, from simplicity, from some ignorance, or from timidity, as happens especially among the uneducated in the observance of events.²

II. Vain observance is discerned especially: 1° from the insufficiency of the cause for naturally producing the effect; 2° from the joining of a vain or false circumstance as if necessarily required; 3° from the infallibility which is attributed to means in no way infallible.³

III. In doubt whether effects proceed from a natural cause or from a demon, they can be attributed to the powers of nature; and therefore it is licit to procure them, because it is not established that the thing is evil. Yet Doctors counsel a previous protestation against any intervention of a demon. - But in doubt whether effects are produced by a demon or by God, if there is present a certain probability that they cannot proceed from a natural cause, they are to be attributed to the demon, unless the sanctity of the one working or other clear signs persuade the contrary, because it is rash to think that miracles are always occurring. Hence it is not then licit to try whether the effect is going to follow or not. - St. Alph.,¹ St. Thom.,² and others commonly.

336. You will resolve. - 1° Those are guilty of superstition who wear ligatures marked with certain characters; who invoke certain unknown names, or employ a certain number of crosses or prayers for healing wounds, for rendering themselves invulnerable, ... etc.²

2° Likewise those who wear certain prayers, expecting an effect altogether infallible from them. - Yet those are not to be blamed, indeed are very much to be praised, who wear pious medals, sacred images, or Relics of Saints, hoping that they will specially obtain divine help for themselves.³

3° Likewise those are guilty of superstition who regard certain days as favorable and others as unfavorable, so that they direct their actions from this; or who for expelling diseases require herbs gathered on such a feast, ... etc.⁴

4° But it is not superstitious to observe the moon or times more suitable for gathering herbs, cutting trees, etc.; ... nor to wear sacred things or words of Sacred Scripture for the honor of God or the Saints and for imploring their help. Likewise neither to recite a certain number of prayers, nor to do all those things which can increase devotion, provided that an infallible power is not attributed to them.⁵

5° Nor is it in any way superstitious, indeed it is very religious and pious, to recite novena prayers, or to repeat prayers so many times in worship of Our Lord, or of the Blessed Virgin, or of some Saint, provided that an infallible power is not attached to such a number, to a certain day, or to a fixed time.⁷

337. Definition. - Divination is the inquiry of hidden things by the help of a demon.

Division. It is 1° express, if it is done through the express invocation of a demon; 2° tacit, if that invocation is only in disproportionate means.

Various kinds of divination are distinguished, of which sort are especially: 1° Judicial Astrology from the stars; 2° Augury from the song or flight of birds; - 3° Auspice from the song of birds; - 4° Haruspicy from the entrails of animals; - 5° Chiromancy from the lines of the hand; - 6° Geomancy from signs in the earth; - 7° Omen from a fortuitous event; - 8° Necromancy from invocation of a dead person; - 9° Oneiromancy from dreams; - 10° Sortilege from lots; - 11° Oracle from idols; - 12° Vaticination from prophets or cards.¹

338. Principles. - I. Whatever of hidden things is known in another way than by revelation or by natural means must be attributed to divination; for no other means is given for investigating hidden things. - But in doubt whether knowledge arises from natural means or not, whether from a good or from a bad spirit, the rules set forth above concerning vain observance must be applied (n. 335, II).

II. Express divination can never be excused from mortal sin, not even through ignorance; for it is clear that a pact with a demon, or to invoke him, even without a pact, is something most gravely illicit.

This is clearly established from Sacred Scripture, Deut. 18. 10; Lev. 20. 6.

III. But tacit divination can sometimes be excused from mortal sin because of simplicity or ignorance, or because of defect of certain faith.²

339. You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from grave fault who, using disproportionate means for some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with a demon; for he acts against his protestation, and implicitly invokes the demon, since neither God nor the Angels mix themselves with such things. - Yet otherwise in doubt whether the effect is had from a natural cause, as was said concerning vain observance³ (n. 335, II).

2° Natural effects must be carefully distinguished from free effects; for the former can often be conjectured, as, for example, from the song and flight of birds, or from the aspect of the stars, one conjectures storm, rain, or serenity of the sky, etc.; for by experience it is established that there is a natural connection among these things. But one must speak otherwise of the latter.

3° Character or state of soul can sometimes in some way be conjectured from the color of the face or other external signs, although in practice for the most part one must abstain from such conjectures because of the danger of rash judgment. But free acts, whether past or future, can never be known with certainty.

4° Those sin gravely who inquire from diviners about their future fortune or life (in English: to consult fortune-tellers; card-cutting); unless they act from simplicity, jest, or from cause of curiosity, without giving faith to the things said.¹ - Yet if the diviner does this seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation.

340. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is the use of lots ever licit?

Resp. 1° Dividing lots, by which it is discerned what is to be assigned to each in settling lawsuits or in distributing things, are certainly licit, since they are entirely free from all superstition.

Resp. 2° Consultory lots, by which the divine will is investigated so that it may be known what is to be done, are not licit unless they are made by a special impulse of God, or there is question of a grave affair in which another counsel is lacking. The reason is that, according to ordinary providence, God does not will that inquiry be made in this way about His will, but recourse must be had to prudent men or ecclesiastical Superiors.

Resp. 3° Divinatory lots, by which the manifestation of a hidden thing is sought, for example from the casting of dice, etc., ... are always gravely illicit, as containing at least tacit invocation of a demon. Superstition of this sort is properly called sortilege, by which name also other kinds of superstitions commonly come.²

341. • Quaer. 2° Is it licit to conjecture future things from dreams?

Resp. Negatively, ordinarily, because dreams almost always proceed from natural causes, for example from the stirring of humors, etc. ... Besides, dreams sent by God are very rare, and are joined with signs through which they can be certainly discerned from natural or diabolical dreams.³

Quaer. 3° Is the use of a divining rod licit?

Resp. 1° Certainly it is to be condemned as often as the rod is moved or not moved according to the mere intention of him who holds it in his hand, and is not moved in the presence of another thing not sought, although of the same nature. For there is no proportion between a natural thing and the intention of man. Hence those sin gravely who use a rod for seeking a thief, or for detecting the stone marking the boundary of a field.¹

Resp. 2° To some the use of the rod for detecting waters or metals does not seem certainly to be condemned, if the rod is moved over these things in every case equally, whether they are sought or not. Yet a protestation against diabolical operation, which perhaps can be present, will prudently be made, and every superstitious spirit must be excluded.³

342. • Quaer. 4° Is Magnetism licit?

Preliminary note. A threefold principal effect or degree is attributed to Magnetism: a) the state of sleep, by which the senses are lulled, as in natural sleep, but often so that "neither the greatest crash reaches the ears of the one lulled, nor can any violence of iron or fire excite him." Thus the Postulate of the Bishop of Lausanne, 19 May 1841; b) the state of somnambulism, in which someone, although he is altogether destitute of the use of the senses, nevertheless sees, hears, speaks, and responds to all things about which he is interrogated; c) the state of clear intuition, or wonderful knowledge of one's own or another's state, and of remedies suitable to illnesses, as well as vision of the actions of other men, even far distant, and of all things which are done both near and far.

Resp. Theologians formerly went off into three opinions, of which the first ascribes all, the second none, the third some of its effects to the devil. This third opinion can no longer be approved practically, and the first seems altogether to have to be admitted. For the simple will, or intention of the magnetizer, or even the consent of the magnetized person joined to this will, is declared to be either the sole or certainly the primary cause of all and individual of these three effects; but this cause is altogether disproportionate to individual effects. For that cause cannot be called proportionate: 1) the will with its immanent acts, because the whole power of an immanent act is consumed in the will itself, and does not pass over to an effect extrinsic to itself; nor 2) the will using the ministry of another power, because thus it is circumscribed by the faculty of that other power, so that the effect cannot exceed the faculty itself of this other power. (In what way, for example, will a Magnetizer who endeavors to know some matter which he is ignorant of be able to transmit knowledge of this thing into the magnetized person?) - nor 3) a fluid, because between a spiritual and a material substance there is no medium. Therefore these words of the Encyclical of the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition, dated 4 Aug. 1856 (see p. XLIX), can be applied to each degree: "In all these things, whatever art or illusion" (namely the magnetizers) "may use, since physical means are ordered to non-natural effects" (of which sort is also sleep, as described above), "there is found deception altogether illicit and heretical, and" (which ordinarily is present in the manner of magnetizing) "scandal against uprightness of morals." Wherefore we think that one must altogether subscribe to these words of the illustrious Perrone:¹ "Although not a few Catholics have judged and still judge that in general the use itself of magnetism was proscribed and eliminated by the Church, yet there are not lacking those, and learned and pious ones, who deny this. Nevertheless we are persuaded that, if not theoretically, yet practically, magnetism of this sort was and is disapproved by the same Apostolic See."

Nor does the declaration of the same Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, 28 July 1847, stand in the way: "With every error, sortilege, explicit or implicit invocation of a demon removed, the use of Magnetism, namely the mere act of employing physical means otherwise licit, is not morally forbidden." For the Sacred Congregation, as consultants of the same Holy Congregation have often holily testified, never instituted any examination about the physical question of this magnetism.

Hence precisely it will not be licit to consult magnetizers even about the nature of illnesses, so that it may be discerned what cure is to be applied to them. For unless, as we saw in n. 335. III, there is present a certain probability that certain effects proceed from a natural cause, it is not licit, not even with protestation against any intervention of a demon, to employ means even only doubtfully superstitious; but the effects of magnetism, far from being certainly or probably to be said to proceed from a natural cause, rather are to be attributed to a demon according to things commonly happening. Therefore practically, etc. - It is added that, as will soon be said, it cannot be asked from a magician that he remove a spell unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. Therefore likewise remedies for illness must not be sought from magnetism unless it can reasonably be presumed that they are to be known in a natural way; but certainly the contrary must be presumed. Therefore. Cf. Capellm. p. 37 sqq.

Quaer. 5° What about Spiritism?

Resp. It is certain today that turning or knocking tables and the other means which Spiritism uses are partly deceitful tricks, partly diabolical superstitions,¹ and therefore that it is illicit either to try the operations of Spiritism, or to approve them, or to favor them in any way, for example by being present.

343. I. - Magic, taken broadly, or natural or artificial magic, which is called white magic, is the art of doing wonderful things, at least apparently, through natural causes or the industry of man, without any ministry of a demon.

Magic, strictly said, is the art of doing wonderful things which, although they are not supernatural, nevertheless surpass the powers of man, and therefore can happen by the help of a demon alone, explicitly or implicitly invoked.

II. Malefice is the art of harming with the intervention of a demon. It is distinguished as twofold, namely amatory and venomous. Amatory malefice, or a love potion, is a diabolical art by which lubricous love or hatred in some person toward another is vehemently excited, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by showing more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors. Venomous malefice is precisely the art of harming the neighbor by the help of a demon, and this in various ways, for example by illnesses, stupidity, etc.²

Malefice is commonly called sortilege, because through it an evil lot is cast upon those against whom vengeance is exercised through diabolical operation. Hence in Canon Law and in ecclesiastical history magicians and witches are called male and female sorcerers.

344. You will resolve. - 1° Magic does not differ from vain observance except in that its effects are more wonderful, for example the changing of bodies, etc. But in moral species it differs neither from vain observance nor from divination; because it matters little whether knowledge of hidden things or wonderful effects are sought from a demon.

2° But malefice differs in species from other superstitions, because beyond the sin opposed to Religion it adds damage to the neighbor.

3° Amatory malefice does not induce one necessarily to perpetrating a sin of luxury, because it does not remove liberty, but only vehemently excites to lust toward some determined person, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by presenting more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors.¹

Quaer. Can it be asked from a magician that he remove a malefice?

Resp. Negatively, unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. - Thus commonly Theologians.² Cf. n. 319.

Irreligiosity is special irreverence which is inflicted on God, either immediately in Himself, or mediately in persons or sacred things. Its principal species are tempting God, sacrilege, simony, blasphemy, and perjury. Of the two last there will be discussion in the second precept.

345. • Temptation of God is a word or deed for taking an experiment about God through an extraordinary effect rashly expected from Him. - Thus the common doctrine with St. Thom.³

But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone doubting about some perfection of God says or does something with the mind of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection, and this is called formal or express; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing about the perfections of God, without necessity wills to obtain either the manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through wonders, and this is called implicit or interpretative.

It is certain that formal or express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against Religion. - But if it is only implicit, often because of ignorance or inadvertence it can be venial, although of itself it is more probably mortal.¹

You will resolve. - 1° Those formerly sinned gravely against Religion who demanded that their innocence be proved by duel, by burning iron, etc., or who without a just cause freely offered themselves to martyrdom, unless they were excused by good faith or divine inspiration. - Nevertheless it is licit to ask from God a miracle under the condition, if it has pleased Him, as often as there is a grave cause for our own or others' salvation, or for fulfilling the divine will, or, as St. Thom.² says, when there underlies a just necessity or pious utility and the other things which ought to concur for this. For then it is not to tempt God, but to request the help of God at an opportune time.

2° Likewise he sins gravely who, without a just cause, exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without certainly trusting in divine Providence, he does not sin against Religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3° He sins only lightly who in a light illness, with remedies rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from all fault if he hopes that he will be freed naturally from such an illness with God's help.³

4° Likewise he sins of himself venially who from negligence approaches unprepared to preaching the word of God, hoping for special help from God.

346. • Sacrilege is the violation or unworthy treatment of sacred things. It is distinguished as threefold: 1° personal; 2° local; 3° real.

Principles. - I. Sacred here is called whatever is deputed to divine worship from divine or ecclesiastical institution, and therefore deserves special reverence. - St. Thomas.¹

Hence 1° Sacred persons are those who are deputed to divine worship through Sacred Tonsure, or through religious vows, or more probably also through any vow of chastity.

2° Sacred places are those which by the authority of the Church are dedicated to worship, as temples and public chapels (not private ones), yet consecrated or blessed; likewise blessed cemeteries. L. IV. 460.

3° Sacred things are those which pertain to divine worship or are proximately referred to it, as Sacraments, consecrated vessels, Relics or images of Saints; likewise those things which pertain to the adornment of the Church or of ministers; finally ecclesiastical goods, even movable ones. - St. Thom.²

II. Sacrilege is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to the most excellent moral virtue, namely Religion, and for the most part regards grave matter. - Yet it can become light by reason of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.³

III. Sacrilege differs in species according as it affects a person, place, or sacred thing; hence in confession those circumstances must be explained. - St. Alph.⁴ St. Thom.⁵

347. You will resolve. - 1° Personal sacrilege is committed: 1) by inflicting violent hands on a Cleric or Religious; 2) by any sin of luxury perpetrated by or with a person bound by a vow of chastity; 3) by violation of personal immunity. - But it will not be sacrilege to detract from a priest, because his person alone is sacred, but not his reputation.⁶

2° Local sacrilege is committed: 1) by all sins by which a Church is polluted by Law, namely by illicit shedding of human blood or seed, homicide, or burial of an excommunicated person or infidel in the Church; 2) by all sins which are done against the immunity and sanctity of a sacred place, as breaking in, despoiling, theft, quarrels, and similar things; 3) by actions unbecoming the sanctity of the place, as are markets, assemblies, and the din of judgments, unless a grave cause excuses.¹

3° Real sacrilege is committed: 1) by unworthy administration or reception of the Sacraments; 2) by unworthy treatment of sacred Relics, images, etc.; 3) by profanation of sacred vessels, instruments, or ornaments; 4) by theft of a thing pertaining to divine worship or to the Church; 5) by abuse of Scripture, for example by twisting its words to vain things, etc.; 6) by neglect of sacred vessels, corporals, etc., in those who ought to care for these things religiously.²

348. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is violation of a person bound by a simple vow of chastity outside Religion sacrilege?

Resp. It is controverted. The more probable opinion of St. Alph.³ affirms, because through any vow of chastity man is truly consecrated to God. For one's own will suffices for consecrating one's own acts to God, while for public consecration public authority is required.⁴ See p. LXXXIX. 7.

Besides, whoever is bound by a vow of chastity, as often as he violates this, certainly commits a twofold sin: namely one against chastity, and the other against Religion. - Lacroix.⁵

Quaer. 2° Are all sins of luxury committed in a Church or cemetery sacrileges?

Resp. 1° Merely internal sins are not to be held as sacrileges, because they do not seem specially to affect the sacred place, unless there is a desire of sinning externally in the sacred place itself. - Thus commonly.⁶

Resp. 2° As to external sins, it is certain that sacrilege is committed through consummated acts, namely through voluntary pollution, fornication, etc. This is openly clear from Canon Law. But whether it is also committed through other grave external sins, for example gravely impure touches, is controverted. St. Alph.,⁷ Collet, etc., more probably affirm.

Quaer. 3° Is every theft in a Church sacrilege?

Resp. 1° It is established that every theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, and also theft of a non-sacred thing nevertheless committed to the custody of a sacred place, as is clear from Canon Law.¹

Resp. 2° As to things which by chance or by accident are found in the Church, as purses, a watch, etc., it is probably controverted on both sides.

349. • Quaer. 4° Does the injury of any goods whatever belonging to Clerics constitute sacrilege?

Resp. Negatively, but only injury of goods which Clerics possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, and of which they cannot dispose, and of those which pertain to the adornment of the church, because these alone are sacred.² (II) p. 479.

Quaer. 5° To whom is it licit to touch sacred vessels?

Resp. If they actually contain the Blessed Sacrament, outside a case of necessity or danger of profanation, it is licit for no one, without grave sin, to touch them, even mediately, except for a priest or deacon; otherwise, for all Clerics without special permission. The same is licit for sacristans, whether regular laymen, or oblates of secular congregations, or nuns; likewise for those who in clerical dress serve churches. For other laymen it is prohibited under venial sin to touch them immediately, unless a reasonable cause excuses.³

But it is licit for all to touch other sacred things, of which sort are, for example, Agnus Dei, at least from modern custom, Relics of Saints, sacred ornaments, except those which immediately touch the holy Eucharist, as, for example, corporals, palls, purificators after use and before washing. But the first washing of these must be performed by a cleric in sacred orders, yet probably it can also be performed by a tonsured cleric; but it cannot be done without venial sin by a layman, or even by a nun or pious women living a common life under rule;⁴ but the second and third washing, although more suitably done by a cleric, can nevertheless be done without sin even by a layman. It would also be venial not to throw the water of the washing into the sacrarium.⁵

350. Definition. - Simony, so called from Simon Magus, is the studied will of selling or buying for a temporal price something spiritual, or something annexed to the spiritual. It is said studied will, not only because, no differently from other sins, it demands deliberation, but also because for its essential malice it is not required that the pact be completed by mutual consent or in reality; but the interior affection even of one suffices, namely the simoniacal will of making a pact or of obligating.

A temporal price is distinguished in Canon Law¹ as of three kinds: 1° a gift from the hand, or recompense of any temporal thing estimable by price; 2° a gift from the tongue, or patronage, under which name come praises, commendations, prayers, etc., to be interposed from pact in favor of the one conferring the spiritual thing; 3° a gift from service, or any servitude, or offices furnished to another, for example servitude or any similar office.

351. • Likewise, the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual is threefold: 1° antecedently, to which the spiritual thing accedes, as the right of patronage inhering in land; 2° consequently, which depends on the spiritual, as the fruits of a benefice or office; 3° concomitantly, as labor in sacred functions. But labor of this sort is annexed to the spiritual thing either intrinsically or extrinsically. It is called intrinsically annexed if it is not easily separable from the thing itself; otherwise it is called extrinsically annexed. Thus celebration of Mass is labor intrinsically annexed to a spiritual thing; but extraordinary fatigue, as singing, delay until midday, a long or difficult journey to be undertaken for celebrating, and other similar things pertain to labor extrinsically annexed.

Division. Simony is distinguished as:

1° Mental, if it is done merely internally or without pact, as if someone recommends a son to the collator of a vacant parish, and meanwhile under the appearance of a liberal gift sends silver vessels to him with this internal intention, that he move and oblige him to nominate his son.

2° Conventional, if a pact indeed intervenes, but is in no way carried into execution, at least by both parties.

3° Real, if the pact is fulfilled by each party, at least inchoatively.

To this is added confidential Simony, which is done by any pact, or confidence, in election or presentation to benefices, or in resigning them, etc.¹

Simony is also distinguished as of divine or natural law, and of ecclesiastical law. The former is had if the thing simoniacally exchanged is spiritual from its nature, as are indulgences, Sacraments, etc.; but the latter, if something is done against some law which has been made by the Church because of either the danger or the appearance of simony.

352. Principles. - I. For Simony it is required that the temporal thing be given or accepted, either formally or virtually, for the spiritual thing itself and in exchange for it, so that an equating of the spiritual thing with the temporal thing is made, or a commutation, from the primary motive of having one thing for the other as a price or just compensation. The reason is clear from the very definition of Simony. Hence if some honest motive intervenes, by force of which the temporal thing is given, and in turn the spiritual, one would no longer be the motive of the other, but only its impelling cause, and therefore it would not be Simony.

I said: 1° formally, that is, that someone directly intends to receive the spiritual in place of the temporal thing and because of its estimation.

I said: 2° virtually, namely that someone wills to obtain the spiritual thing proximately and immediately through the temporal thing, and no other true and honest motive intervenes. For in this will there is virtually included the intention of commuting one thing with the other.

II. It is licit to give for a price the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual antecedently and concomitantly extrinsically, provided the price is not increased because of the spiritual thing annexed. But in no way is it licit to give for a price what is annexed to the spiritual concomitantly intrinsically, or inseparably, nor what is annexed consequently.

The first reason is because the thing and the labor of the action are truly estimable in themselves by price. Yet by Canon Law the sale of balsam which is contained in Chrism is prohibited, although it preexists the consecration; because since it is of small price, the Bishop would seem to sell Sacraments.²

Nevertheless, as to blessed Oil or Sacred Chrism, Scavini observes that in some cathedral Churches the use has prevailed that something is accepted from particular Churches for compensating the expenses made in obtaining the matter.

The second reason is because what is intrinsically annexed to the spiritual is inseparable from it; hence the thing itself or the action would be judged to be sold. Yet, even apart from extrinsic labor, something can licitly be accepted for sacred ministry by reason of a stipend or support, as is established from the practice of the Church. For natural equity demands that honest support be granted to those who are vacant for the utility of others. Hence Christ:¹ The laborer is worthy of his hire. And the Apostle:² Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they who serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.

The third reason is because that which is consequent is judged spiritual, or bound to the spiritual. It is also derived from a special disposition of Canon Law.

III. Simony is a most grave sin; and if it is of divine and natural law, it does not admit smallness of matter. But if the Simony is of ecclesiastical law, there can be smallness of matter in it according to St. Alph.³ - The reason is that any spiritual thing, from comparison with a temporal thing, is treated as vile with great injury against God Himself. This is established also from the words of St. Peter to Simon Magus:⁴ Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be possessed with money.

353. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it Simony to give principally indeed a temporal thing for a spiritual, but not uniquely?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that even thus there is present a comparison of the temporal thing with the spiritual. For the motive which is added, however honest it may be, does not destroy the malice and impiety of the prior motive because of which the temporal thing is principally given. This is established also from propositions 45 and 46 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XVI).

Quaer. 2° Is it Simony to give or procure for a Superior a temporal thing for conciliating him to oneself with a view to obtaining a benefice or office?

Resp. Negatively, if the primary intention is of giving the temporal thing gratuitously; because then the immediate comparison is made of a temporal thing with a temporal thing, namely the benevolence of the Superior. But otherwise if the spiritual thing is intended as a due recompense, not, however, as the effect of gratitude of soul. This intention, unless the opposite either is established or can be gathered from adjuncts, for example from the smallness of the gift, etc., is to be presumed to exist virtually, if another title is lacking, for example of removing an unjust vexation, etc.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it Simony to perform sacred functions principally because of a stipend, or to receive something for sacred doctrine?

Resp. to the first. Negatively, at least more probably, because the stipend is not received as the price of the sacred thing, but as something owed to the person who is occupied for the sake of the neighbor. - Lacroix and others commonly,² against some. Therefore if some inordinate affection intervenes (for there will be no fault if need or another honest cause impels one to seeking stipends of this sort), it will not be the vice of Simony, but of avarice.

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, if the instruction tends to the spiritual good of others, because it is a spiritual thing, unless nevertheless it is accepted by title of stipend or support. But otherwise if the instruction is merely temporal, for example in handing on an explanation of Sacred Letters or Theology.³

354. • Quaer. 4° Is it Simony to redeem oneself with money from unjust vexation concerning benefices, or another spiritual good, for example Sacraments, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least more probably, because liberation from vexation, which alone is directly intended, is something temporal. - Hence you can give money to your enemy if he tries through fraud to impede the collator from favoring you. - St. Alph.⁴ and others commonly. Indeed Doctors agree in the same, even if he wishes to impede by prayers alone. But you cannot give money to those who can harm or benefit by electing or presenting to a benefice or by conferring it; for to offer money to them lest they harm would be the same as to offer it so that they benefit, that is, so that they not deny consent.⁵

Quaer. 5° Is it Simony to give or accept something for entrance into Religion?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not licit to give or accept something for entrance alone; because this would be a commutation of a sacred thing, of which sort Religion is, with a temporal thing.

2° It is certain also that it is licit for a poor monastery to exact something for the support of the one entering, because then the spiritual thing is not commuted with the temporal; and otherwise equity demands that something be received, lest the monastery fall burdened by expenses.

3° It is likewise certain that it is licit for a monastery to exact something for the support of Novices, because since they do not yet pertain to Religion, and can depart at will, and often in reality do depart, it is not equitable for the monastery to undergo so grave a burden for them. Yet the Religion of Friars Minor can receive nothing from a special decree.

4° But if there is question of a wealthy monastery, it is controverted. St. Alph.¹ denies, unless the one to be received is old or infirm. Besides, now all doubt vanishes because of the difficulty of the times. For no monasteries are found so wealthily founded that they need no alien help at all for the present and the future. Besides, as is established from several decrees, Nuns always can exact the established dowry, and for choir nuns they ought to [n. 1188. II. 3)].

VI. Concerning vengeance Berardi asks, Praxis confessariorum, n. 195: "When, whether in desire or in joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, or in avenging injuries received, will sin be present?

Resp. In practice the more common cases are the following.

1. If this is done from a cause not honorable or not at all reasonable, for example from envy, as Cain acted against innocent Abel..., or from impatience, weariness, and anger, as those act who wish death to their own querulous, tedious, sick relatives, etc.

2. If vengeance is... excessive: namely if between the injury received and the quantity of punishment inflicted or desired there is no proportion, for example by extending signs of indignation too long; by exceeding too much in rebukes, in blows, or in other deeds having the character of vengeance; by from the heart imprecating most grave evils, for example death, hell, etc., against him who has inflicted on you a damage not so grave.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 2; q. 159, a. 1.

3. If vengeance is indeed just, but induces scandal of the little ones: for in this case care will have to be taken that, at least by explaining the matter, scandal be removed.

4. If one wishes vengeance to be done by private authority, even in those cases in which this is altogether not lawful, namely a) if it can be obtained by means of tribunals; b) if it is too great; c) if it is useless, namely if it is no longer apt to protect our rights, but rather to provoke new injuries and to effect that discords and suits never have an end, as too frequently happens in practice.

5. If vengeance is done or sought either from profound hatred, or from an end not so much of obtaining reparation and protection of one's own rights, as of delighting oneself concerning the punishment of the neighbor. Moreover this is wicked. St. Thomas said⁵ that vengeance indeed is lawful, but not with the intention of harming; truly, with the intention of removing harms. It is also to be noted that delight concerning the punishment of the neighbor can degenerate into cruelty and savagery."⁶

⁵ II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., q. 159, a. 2.

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 60.)

Judgment, as taken here, is the definition or determination of right or of the just ; but the just, as appears from what has been said, is the equal owed to another, which is the object of justice³²⁵. From which it is clear that it is an act of justice, because it belongs to justice to define and determine what is just and the equal owed to another. ³²⁵ Hic q. 60, a. 1, o.

We treat therefore of judgment taken in this sense, not only as it is exercised outwardly by a judge between litigating parties, but also as it is exercised, whether outwardly or inwardly, by private persons concerning the life, goods, and morals of others.

I say: Judgment clothed with due circumstances is licit³²⁶. It is against the Waldenses and Anabaptists. ³²⁶ Ibid., a. 2, o.

Proof. 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XVI, 18, God says to Moses : Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates,... that they may judge the people with just judgment³²⁷. ³²⁷ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra

And chap. 1, 16 : Judge that which is just. Which Christ repeats, John, VII, 24. The Apostle, to the Romans, XIII, 4, asserts that not without cause does the judge carry the sword ; for he is God's minister, an avenger in wrath upon him who does evil. Peter judged Ananias and Saphira, Acts, V, 3 ; Paul the incestuous Corinthian, 1 Cor., V, 3.

Proof. by reason. Every act of virtue is licit. Now judgment clothed with due circumstances is an act of virtue, namely of justice, as was said³²⁸. Therefore. ³²⁸ Ibid., o.

I said, « clothed with due circumstances », which are three³²⁹ : first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice ; second, that it proceed from the authority of the one presiding ; third, that it be uttered according to right reason and prudence. The first condition can be understood in a twofold sense : first, that judgment not be against justice ; second, that it be from love of justice, and not from some human motive, say hatred, anger, avarice, vain glory, etc. Through defect of the first condition understood in the first sense, judgment is perverse and unjust. Through defect of the same condition understood in the second sense, it is not properly an unjust judgment, yet evil and illicit gravely or lightly according to the quality of the motive. Through defect of the second condition, it is usurped judgment. But this regards public judgment ; since justice is found in private persons, there can be in them also true and right judgment without authority. Through defect of the third condition, it is rash judgment, namely when someone for light reasons judges doubtful and hidden things. ³²⁹ Ibid.

The chief acts of religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and sanctification of certain days. Concerning the last three there will be discussion in the 2nd and 3rd precept; but concerning sacrifice in the tract on the Eucharist. Here therefore only concerning adoration and prayer.

Adoration taken more broadly is an act by which someone exhibits his own subjection to another in testimony of the other's excellence; thus princes and others constituted in dignity are said to be adored in some way. But more strictly adoration is the honor exhibited to God on account of his highest excellence and supreme dominion.

I Say. There is a true precept of adoring God. This is clear both from natural right, by virtue of which we are obliged to acknowledge the highest majesty of God and his supreme dominion over creatures, and from positive divine right, because it is said, Matt. iv, 10: "The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve." - But as pertains to practice, the faithful are not to be disturbed concerning the fulfillment of this precept who sufficiently satisfy the precept of praying to God, concerning which there will be treatment below; for it is altogether impossible to pray to God and not adore him.

Related to adoration is worship, which, insofar as it is habitually furnished to God, can be defined: the complex of those acts by which we testify to the infinite excellence of God and exhibit service to him. - Cf. Scavini, lib. 2, tract. 5, n. 7.

Omitting those things which are handed down at length in dogmatic theology concerning the necessity and divisions of worship, here we add certain things concerning the worship, relics, and images of the Saints, insofar as they can pertain to practice.

§ 1. To the Most Holy Trinity, to the single Persons of the same, to Christ the Lord, even under the sacramental species, the worship of latria is owed; to the Blessed Virgin Mary, the worship of hyperdulia; to others reigning with Christ in heaven, the worship of dulia.

§ 2. To sacred relics also and images there is owed veneration and relative worship of the person to whom the relics and images are referred (Can. 1255).

Worship, if it is offered in the name of the Church by persons legitimately deputed to this and by acts from the institution of the Church to be exhibited only to God, Saints, and Blessed, is called public; otherwise, private (Can. 1256).

It is good and useful suppliantly to invoke the Servants of God reigning together with Christ, and to venerate their relics and images; but before the rest, let all the faithful follow the Most Blessed Virgin Mary with filial devotion (Can. 1276).

§ 1. It is licit to venerate with public worship only those Servants of God who by the authority of the Church have been numbered among the Saints or Blessed.

§ 2. To those canonically numbered in the roll of Saints the worship of dulia is owed; Saints can be honored everywhere and by any act of that kind of worship; but the Blessed cannot, except in the place and mode which the Roman Pontiff has conceded (Can. 1277).

The ministers of the Church in exercising worship ought to depend solely on ecclesiastical Superiors (Can. 1260).

When the decree has been published by which in the name of the Supreme Pontiff it is declared that all the virtues of a Servant of God in heroic degree, or martyrdom, have been well proved, the Servant of God can be called Venerable; which title imports no permission of public worship. - Cf. can. 2115, § 2.

§ 1. Notable relics or precious images, and likewise other relics or images which are honored in some church by great veneration of the people, cannot validly be alienated nor perpetually transferred into another church without permission of the Apostolic See.

§ 2. Notable relics of Saints or Blessed are the body, head, arm, forearm, heart, tongue, hand, leg, or that part of the body in which a martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small (Can. 1281).

§ 1. Notable relics of Saints or Blessed cannot be preserved in private houses or oratories without the express license of the Ordinary of the place.

§ 2. Relics not notable can be kept with due honor even in private houses and piously carried by the faithful (Can. 1282).

§ 1. Only those relics can be honored with public worship in churches, although exempt, which are established as genuine by an authentic document of some Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, or of the Ordinary of the place, or of another ecclesiastical man to whom the faculty of authenticating has been conceded by apostolic indult.

§ 2. A Vicar General cannot declare relics authentic without a special mandate (Can. 1283).

Ordinaries of places should prudently remove from the worship of the faithful a relic which they know certainly not to be authentic (Can. 1284).

§ 1. Relics, when they are exposed, must be enclosed and sealed in reliquaries or cases.

§ 2. Relics of the most holy Cross are never to be exhibited for public veneration in the same reliquary with relics of Saints, but must have their own separate reliquary.

§ 3. Relics of the Blessed, without a particular indult, are not to be carried about in processions, nor exposed in churches, except where their office and Mass are celebrated by concession of the Apostolic See (Can. 1287).

It is unlawful to sell sacred relics; and therefore Ordinaries of places, vicars forane, and others having care of souls should diligently take care lest sacred relics, especially of the most holy cross, be sold, or pass into the hands of non-Catholics. - Cf. Can. 1289.

An unusual image is not to be placed in Churches, even exempt ones, and in other sacred places, unless it has been approved by the Ordinary of the place; who is not to approve an image to be publicly exposed which does not agree with the usage of the Church, or which is of false dogma, or which does not display due decency, or which furnishes to the rude a particular occasion of error. - Cf. can. 1279.

Irreligiosity is a special irreverence which is inflicted on God, either immediately in himself or mediately in sacred persons or things. Its chief species are: tempting God, sacrilege, simony, blasphemy, and perjury. Concerning the last two there will be discussion in the 2nd precept; but now concerning tempting God, sacrilege, and simony.

JUSTICE is one thing, directing man in good, and this embraces the other virtues; wherefore it is called General: Another is that correcting and Coercing from evil, which is called Iudicial; Finally another is that which renders to each one his own proper and due good, of which we treat here, and which is called Cardinal: This is Illustrated with various similitudes by St. Bonaventure, which I shall indicate below quaest. 3.

THIS also is at times confounded with the prior acceptation of Justice among the Fathers, by oratorical application; thus it is defined from St. Bernard by the Seraphic Doctor, lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 42. Justice is a virtue, rendering to each one what is his own; render therefore to the three, what is theirs; render to the superior, render to the inferior, render to the equal, to each what is his own, the same pursues there: We have before us, superiors; after us, juniors; at the right, friends; at the left, enemies; let us render therefore to each what is his own, to superiors obedience; to juniors Doctrine; to friends joy; to enemies patience. But how far this stands from legal Justice, of which we dispute here, I shall show in quaestione 3.

JUSTICE, beyond the other virtues, holds this privilege, that it makes man concordant with God, with himself, and with his neighbor; hence, in its full breadth, it is a kind of general virtue, nor does it take command of the soul before it is attended by a great company of many virtues and is secure in its own dominion; we have weighed its chief rights and duties down to this point; we have also examined the vices which have waged perpetual war against it. There remain, then, here certain handmaid virtues, perpetually serving Justice; it pleases us now to examine them: And first occurs Piety, exhibiting a benevolent regard toward one's country, parents, etc.; Second, Observance, rendering due honor to superiors; Third, Dulia, which venerates the saints and all that belongs to them; Fourth, Obedience, omitting nothing commanded; Fifth, Gratitude, in which the benefit remains stored in the depths of the mind, so that it may repay it in due time; Sixth, finally, Vindication confronts us, which does not leave unpunished the injury done to Justice. Against these are opposed many vices, more than there are virtues, since evil is wont to divide into more heads than good, which is the more secure with united forces. I shall treat each with my usual brevity.

I. Adoration, taken generally, is an act by which someone subjects himself to another in testimony of that other's excellence. The chief reason of adoration is the excellence, or dignity, of the person adored. There are, then, as many adorations as there are kinds of dignity. There are, moreover, two dignities: one uncreated, the other created. Adoration, then, is divided, first, into that which is owed to uncreated majesty, or to God, and is called latria; and into that which is shown to creatures on account of the excellence of the supernatural order participated from God, of grace, of sanctity, of beatitude, by which the Saints and the blessed spirits are honored; and this is called dulia. But because the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of Christ the Lord, is wonderfully eminent above all the Saints, and heavenly spirits, she is therefore adored with a peculiar worship, which is called hyperdulia — that is, above the worship of dulia to be shown to the Saints, and below the worship of latria owed to God.

II. Adoration, again, is distinguished into internal and external. The former is an interior act by which the spirit subjects itself to God, as the supreme founder of all things. By this reasoning, Angels, and blessed souls, adore God. This bursts forth outwardly, and manifests itself by external signs, such as the bowing of the head, the prostration of the body, kisses, genuflections, and similar signs of this kind. Internal adoration can exist without external; the reverse cannot. Indeed, exterior adoration, destitute of interior, is not adoration, but flattery, feigning, and mockery. We are bound to show both to God, as St. Thomas excellently teaches (II-II, q. 84, art. 2): "Since man is composed of a twofold nature, namely intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration: namely, a spiritual one, which consists in the interior devotion of the mind; and a corporeal one, which consists in the exterior humiliation of the body. And because, in all acts of latria, that which is exterior is referred to that which is interior, as to what is principal, therefore the exterior adoration itself is done for the sake of the interior, so that, namely, by the perceptible humility which we show corporeally, our affection may be excited to subject itself to God: since it is connatural to us that we proceed through sensible things to intelligible ones."

III. Adoration is divided, third, into absolute and relative. Absolute, say the theologians of Salamanca, with other more recent writers (tract. 21, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 3), is that which is shown to creatures who are, of themselves, capable of excellence, and sanctity. Only rational creatures, however, are capable of this dignity, and sanctity; and therefore to them alone is absolute adoration owed. This description, according to the common mind of Theologians, can hold a sound sense; but, so that the calumny with which the heterodox reproach us may be entirely removed, it must be said that all religious worship regards God, is resolved into God, and rests, and finds quiet, in God. Wherefore, if we wish to speak exactly, only the adoration shown to God is absolute in every respect; but the worship which we offer to the Saints is referred to God as to the true and first principle: for we honor the Saints on account of God, on account of the dignity, grace, and sanctity intimately conjoined with, and participated from, God. Wherefore the worship of these always expresses a reference to God. It is called by Theologians, however, absolute adoration shown to the Saints, in relation to images, and relics, which, being inanimate things, are destitute of intimate excellence; and the worship which is offered to them regards the persons whom they represent: for this reason the worship shown to them is relative.

IV. Adoration which is shown to creatures on account of natural gifts and dignities is customarily called reverence, and can be made by the same external signs by which God is worshipped. For external bodily actions are indifferent, and can be employed both for worshipping God, and for honoring men. By genuflection, by prostration of the body, God is adored; and yet by these same signs Judith, seeing Holofernes, adored him, prostrating herself upon the ground (ch. 10). By genuflection too we adore Supreme Pontiffs. We stretch out our hands to heaven, so that we may adore God: "I spread out my hands to the Lord my God" (Esdras 1:9); and the Royal Prophet says: "The lifting up of my hands as evening sacrifice." And yet we also use this sign to implore men's aid. The striking of the breast is likewise, of itself, indifferent; although, according to common use, it is more properly determined for obtaining pardon of sins from God, nothing nonetheless prevents us from using the same sign to appease a man whom we have offended, and to ask forgiveness for the offense inflicted. But this sign pertains more to the virtue of penance than to that of religion. Private external adoration, then, unless it is made divine by the intention of the one adoring, depends on that intention, unless some peculiar law, use, or custom has already destined it to divine worship. Hence it is that, while private persons perform such external actions publicly, it does not suffice for them to have a good intention; but the circumstances of place, time, persons, and custom must be observed. Of all these kinds of external actions, the most excellent, and which is owed to God alone, is sacrifice, by which God is proper to himself owed.

V. Question I. Is there a divine and natural precept of worshipping God by both internal and external acts? Response: The affirmative conclusion is certain, of faith. That there is a divine precept is established from several texts of Scripture, chiefly from Exodus 20, and Deuteronomy 5: "I am the Lord thy God.... Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing." This commandment is affirmative, insofar as it prescribes worship; and negative, insofar as it forbids the worship of other gods. It is more congruently expressed in negative words, because man, by natural instinct, is so borne toward the worship of God, that he needs rather the rein of prohibition, to restrain him lest he slip into superstition, than to be urged by goads, that he might adore his Creator. That this precept, moreover, is natural, is likewise clear. For what is more implanted in us by nature than to venerate him from whom we have received all things? Since, moreover, we have received a twofold nature from God, spiritual and corporeal, it follows that he ought to be worshipped by us with the acts of both natures, or by internal adoration, or by internal and external mixed together. All of which are more certain than to need proof.

VI. Question II. When does this precept, of itself, oblige? Response: This precept, insofar as it is negative, obliges always, and for always, as do all negative precepts, which forbid actions evil by their own nature; but, insofar as it is affirmative, it obliges at fixed times. Certain more recent Probabilist writers — Fr. Thomas Tamburini (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 4, §2, n. 4), Fagundez (Bk. I, on the Decalogue, ch. 32), Bassaeus (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 5, dub. 2), and others whom Roccaberti, whom Leander cites, teach that this precept, of itself, at no time imposes adoration directly, and per se; but only presupposes it. This lax opinion is not worthwhile to expound in words; I will only say that it betrays laxity, and horror. The common opinion of Theologians teaches that this precept, of itself, and directly, imposes adoration. At what time, and how often it must be exercised, see what has been said concerning the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for the reasoning of both precepts is the same. For we have been brought into the light for this reason: that we might worship our God by faith, hope, charity, and acts of religion; and thus our moral, and Christian, life ought to live by these actions. We ought, then, to repeat these offices of religion with such frequency as suffices to nourish and foster our moral and Christian life. Besides the natural and divine precept, there is likewise given an ecclesiastical mandate, on feast days, by which we are bidden to worship God with all our resources. For all feasts regard this worship of God, and all the faithful, on these days, together with the Priest, offer sacrifice to God.

VII. Question III. Is there a determined place in which God must be worshipped? Response: If the discourse concerns a place prescribed by natural or divine right, it is certain that no place is designated; but, since God is present everywhere, we can, and ought to, adore him everywhere. The Church, however, God himself so prescribing, has erected temples, in which sacrifices, and the solemn rites of divine worship, might be celebrated. The Angelic Doctor adduces three congruent reasons, by which he establishes the fitting and becoming institution of temples (II-II, q. 84, art. 3, ad 2): "A determined place is chosen for praying, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed in a place, but on account of the ones adoring; and this for a threefold reason. First, indeed, on account of a special consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be better heard, as is clear from the adoration of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Second, on account of the sacred mysteries, and other signs of sanctity which are contained there. Third, on account of the concourse of many adoring, from which prayer is made more likely to be heard." He adds, in the same place, ad 3: "It is more fitting for us to adore God with the temple's face turned toward the east, both on account of Christ, who is the light of the world, and is called the East; and on account of paradise, established in the east — as though, wishing to return to paradise, we, while we pray, turn ourselves in that direction."

I. God alone is of infinite dignity, which can be communicated to no creature. This infinite dignity, moreover, is common to all three Persons; therefore the worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, according to that saying (Matthew 4): "The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve." For latria is the servitude which we are bound to show to God alone. Hence it follows that the individual Persons can be adored separately by the worship of latria, since each individually is God; provided, however, that none is explicitly excluded — for each can be conceived without the other. Wherefore the Church has dedicated to each individually a feast day, so that we might adore them distinctly.

II. Since, however, external adoration, generally considered, is indifferent, it is necessary to designate some sign by which we manifest the worship owed to God alone. This, moreover, is sacrifice, which it is unlawful, without superstition, to offer to any creature, however excellent. For, as the Angelic Doctor says (II-II, q. 84, art. 1): "No one ever thought to sacrifice, except to him whom he either worshipped, or thought, or feigned, as God" — which Augustine had already taught (Bk. X, On the City of God, ch. 4). It is certain, then, among all, that both the one God, and the three Persons individually, can, and ought, to be adored by us both jointly, and separately.

III. Question I. Can Christ the Lord, as man, be adored with the adoration of latria? Response: That Christ, as the second Person of the Trinity, ought to be worshipped with the worship of latria, is established from what has been said. This alone is brought into controversy: whether, as man, he ought to be adored with the same worship. All Theologians, with St. Thomas (Part III, q. 25, art. 1), affirm this, and give this reason: "Since in Christ there is only one divine person, and the human nature is also one hypostasis, and one supposit, there is indeed one adoration of him, and one honor, on the part of him who is adored; but on the part of the cause by which he is honored, several adorations can be said to exist, so that, namely, he is honored by one honor on account of his uncreated wisdom, and by another on account of his created wisdom. Christ, taking specifically both his divine nature, and..." his human nature, comprehends both; therefore in him shines infinite dignity, by which he claims for himself the worship of latria. For, that we may adore some whole, and its parts constituting that whole, it is not necessary that the reason of adoration be present in each and every part; but it is enough that the reason of adoration reside in some part. We adore the Eucharist with the worship of latria, because there is found there the flesh, which is the reason of adoration. And, while we worship some holy person, we venerate all his parts with the worship of latria, although the sanctity which is the cause of adoration is not present in all of them. Therefore, that we may adore Christ with the adoration of latria, even considered specifically as man, it suffices that his humanity be terminated by a divine subsistence, which is the formal reason of adoration.

IV. Question III. Is the humanity of Christ, considered as abstracted from the Word, to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: Theologians deny this, with the same St. Thomas — since humanity, considered as precisely abstracted from the Word, betrays only a created, and limited, dignity. Therefore, according to this reasoning, not the worship of latria, but of dulia, is owed to it. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor (III Part, q. 25, art. 2): "The proper adoration of latria is owed to the hypostasis of infinite dignity; but the reason of honor can be that which does not subsist, on account of which the subsisting person is honored. Adoration of Christ's humanity, then, can be understood in a twofold way. In one way, so that it is the adoration of that which is adored, and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing other than to adore the incarnate Word of God — just as to adore the King's garment is nothing other than to adore the clothed King; and according to this, the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration of latria. In another way, the adoration of Christ's humanity can be understood, so that the perfection of Christ's humanity itself is the reason for which Christ is adored, and thus the adoration of Christ's humanity is not the adoration of latria, but of dulia."

V. Question III (bis). Is it lawful in practice to adore the humanity of Christ with the worship of dulia, on account of the created perfections with which it shines? Response: Several deny this, such as Vázquez, Sylvius, and others. The contrary opinion affirms this, resting on the authority of St. Thomas, who says that the same person of Christ is adored with the worship of latria on account of his divinity, and with the worship of dulia on account of the perfection of his humanity (loc. cit.). That such a twofold adoration can be shown to Christ the Lord on account of the two natures is already established from what has been said. But whether they can, and ought, really to be offered separately in practice is not a question of such great moment as to need a more severe discussion. While we adore Christ with the worship of latria, we honor, by a supreme and more excellent worship, both his divinity, and the humanity conjoined to it. If someone wished to meditate separately on Christ's humanity, and to worship it with a peculiar veneration on account of its created perfections, he would perform a true office of religion. Nonetheless, as it seems to me, it is better, these distinctions set aside, to adore Christ the Lord with the worship of latria according to the common, and obvious, manner.

VI. Question IV. Was the body of Christ, during the three days of his death, to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: The common opinion affirms this, because it was united to the divine Word. The same must be asserted of the natural blood shed in his passion, since this was never separated from the Word. The same, too, must be said of the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which the body of Christ is coupled, in an ineffable manner, to the divine person by hypostatic union. And this the Council of Trent defined, against Luther and Calvin.

VII. Question V. Is the host to be adored by the Priest, elevated in the Mass, absolutely, or under an added condition? Response: This is St. Thomas's own response: "It must be said that one who adores a non-consecrated host can adore it under a condition, namely, if it is consecrated. It is not, however, necessary that this condition always be actually explicit; but it suffices that he hold it habitually. Whence one adoring it does not sin, because he does not adore a mere creature, but Christ according to his intention. The priest, however, so far as it is in him, makes the people commit idolatry, because he offers them a mere creature." It is not necessary that this condition be expressly added; but it suffices that it be present habitually, and implicitly. It is absolutely lawful to adore it, since no prudent reason of suspicion occurs that the Priest failed to consecrate it. It suffices that he be so disposed, as a Catholic, that, if he knew it was not consecrated, he would abstain from adoration. He, however, who adores a host really not consecrated, does not exercise an act of the virtue of religion, but an act of idolatry, which is not imputed to him as fault, on account of invincible error.

VIII. Question VI. Is the flesh, or blood, which sometimes appears in a consecrated host by miracle, to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: The common opinion affirms this. Because that flesh, or blood, either is Christ's, or is something divinely produced referring to Christ. No one doubts that the former is to be adored with the worship of latria; if it is something divinely produced, it represents Christ himself. Now every image of Christ is to be adored, if it truly is one, with the reverence of latria. And in all these apparitions which are narrated to be made divinely, Christ the Lord is represented; indeed they are instituted for the purpose of representing him, so that faith and devotion may be wondrously increased. To this opinion St. Thomas accedes (III Part, q. 76, art. 8), where he asks whether, when flesh, or a child, miraculously appears in the Eucharist, the body of Christ is truly there. To this question he responds thus: "But on the contrary is this, that by such an apparition made, the same reverence is shown to that which appears as was shown before — which indeed would not happen, if Christ were not truly there, to whom we show the reverence of latria." If all confess that the consecrated host, under the species of bread, presented to us, is to be adored with the worship of latria, by a stronger right we owe such worship to it once the miraculous apparition has occurred. Would God, then, work a notable prodigy so as to diminish the worship due to the most august sacrament? For we suppose the apparition to be wrought by divine power, for the greater glory of God, the confirmation of faith, and the devotion of the people.

All Catholics affirm it.

I. Question I. Is the Cross of Christ to be adored? Response: All Catholics affirm this. For the Cross of Christ is an image of Christ. But the image of Christ is worshipped with the same worship as Christ himself. That the Cross is a special sign, or symbol referring to the person of Christ, is clear from that text of Matthew 24: then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man — from which text all the commentators teach that the Cross of Christ is meant. The Angelic Doctor explains this matter excellently. He says: it must be said that no reverence is shown to the image of Christ insofar as it is a mere thing (say, a carved or painted sign); for reverence is owed only to a rational nature. It remains, then, that reverence is shown to it only insofar as it is an image; and thus it follows that the same reverence is shown to the image of Christ as to Christ himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that his image is to be adored with the adoration of latria (III Part., q. 25, art. 3).

It should be added that the Cross to which the incarnate Word was affixed must be adored not only because it is an image of Christ himself, but also on account of its physical contact with his members, and on account of that precious blood with which it was sprinkled, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches in the place cited, art. 4. If, then, we speak of that very Cross on which Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in two respects: in one respect insofar as it represents to us the figure of Christ, which is present in it; in another respect from its contact with the members of Christ, and from the fact that it was drenched with his blood. Hence in both respects it is adored with the same adoration as Christ, namely the adoration of latria.

II. Question II. Are the other inanimate instruments of Christ's most sacred Passion — the lance, the cords, the nails, the scourges, the crown, the reed, the sponge, and the like — to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: All Catholics affirm this, on account of their physical contact with the body of Christ. For it is from this contact that they become notable relics, and acquire a special relation to Christ himself, as St. Thomas explains in the place cited, ad 3: the precious wood, as sanctified by contact with the sacred body and blood, is fittingly to be adored; likewise the nails, the garments, the lance, and the like. These, however, do not represent the image of Christ as the Cross does, which is called the sign of the Son of Man that shall appear in heaven. It is, then, contact with the most sacred body of Christ that brings it about that we worship these inanimate instruments with the same worship as Christ, because it is entirely on account of Christ that we adore them; for they are not capable of any intrinsic adoration in themselves, since they possess no intrinsic dignity.

For this reason, animate instruments — such as the hands of those who crucified him, or the lips of those who kissed [Judas' kiss] that same Christ — are not to be adored, on account of the crime perpetrated by such members. For sins defile even the external members through this contact. Wherefore, although they would otherwise be worthy of adoration, on account of the crime committed they are worthy not of adoration but of detestation.

III. Azor adduces the authority of St. Augustine, drawn from Sermon 8 on the Words of the Lord, to argue that Augustine taught that inanimate instruments are to be adored not with the worship of latria but of dulia; and Leander presses the same authority — a man who marks even the smallest faults of other casuists with his censorious pen. But that sermon is in fact spurious, and is placed among the apocryphal works, as may be seen in the Appendix to Tome X [of Augustine's works]. Indeed, the very words that Azor and Leander cite in opposition are not even found in that sermon, as the theologians of Salamanca note (tract. 21, cap. 10, punct. 10).

IV. The arguments customarily raised against us by heterodox writers — namely, that we worship wood and metal — are wretched falsehoods, refuted so many times already. For in these symbols and figures we worship Christ himself, and we venerate these signs on this one ground alone: that they call to our memory the exemplar which they represent. Equally worthless is the other fabrication they blurt out, that no son worships the gallows or the noose by which his father was hanged. To this argument St. Thomas replies that in the Cross of Christ, insofar as it is considered according to the intention or opinion of the unbelievers, one sees the reproach of Christ; but insofar as it is considered according to its effect for our salvation, one sees in it the divine power by which he triumphed over his enemies. The Cross of Christ, therefore, is worshipped not as an infamous punishment chosen by the Jews to put Christ to a most shameful death, but as the standard of the victory which Christ won over the enemy of the human race, and as a triumphal monument of our salvation. Finally, as to the objection that the hands of the Virgin, of her spouse Joseph, and of the disciples, which touched the body of Christ, would likewise have to be adored with the worship of latria — the reply is that the case is not parallel. For instruments devoid of a soul are not, considered in themselves, capable of veneration; hence the whole of the worship we show them is referred entirely to Christ. The Virgin, her spouse, and the disciples, however, are themselves adorned with intimate excellence, and are therefore worthy of worship in themselves — though of the worship we show to the Saints, not of latria — because the Blessed Virgin, according to herself, is capable of veneration; and so the reasoning is not the same (III Part., q. 25, art. 5, ad 3, where he explains this more fully in the body of the article).

V. As to the Cross itself, a distinction must be drawn between that Cross on which Christ hung and other crosses fashioned in its likeness. The former is worshipped on a twofold ground: by reason of the image of the extended Christ which it bears in itself, and by reason of its contact with that same most holy body. Wherefore even if that Cross were broken into pieces and lost the very shape of a cross, it would still be to be adored with the worship of latria, on account of that distinct contact. All other crosses, made to represent that first one, are adored on the single ground of the image; hence, if they should lose the figure representing Christ, they are in no way to be worshipped. Finally, in order for the Cross of Christ to be worshipped, it must have been deliberately made for the purpose of recalling the sacred mystery. For this reason other crosses that happen to arise by chance — from timbers, straws, or other things crossing one another fortuitously — are not to be worshipped; rather, like any other wood, they may be disregarded or put to ordinary use. The names of God are to be venerated insofar as they refer to what they signify, and are honored as representing those persons; for they signify God, Christ, Jesus Christ, and the Blessed Virgin — names that make known persons worthy of holiness and veneration. Therefore, just as images are to be honored, so too such names, due proportion being kept, are to be honored. So the theologians commonly teach.

II. Question I. What is Religion? Answer. The common definition of Religion is this: Religion is a virtue which renders to God the worship due to him as the first principle of all things. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, art. 1, derives the etymology of Religion from re-reading [relegendo] those things that pertain to divine worship, because such things must frequently be turned over again in the heart. Religion is not a theological virtue, because it does not regard God proximately, but a moral virtue — and indeed the chief among these virtues, whose object is the worship to be shown to God, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 81, art. 5.

III. Question II. How many are the acts of Religion? Answer. There are two kinds of the acts of Religion: one of interior acts, such as devotion and prayer; the other of exterior acts, which are divided into three classes. Some subject the very body to God, as adoration; others immolate exterior things to God, as sacrifices, oblations, tithes, first-fruits, and the rest of that kind, which are commonly comprehended under the one name of oblation; the last are those by which something is applied in protestation of the divine honor, such as oaths, by which the name of God is invoked, and vows, by which something is promised to God. Of all these there must be discourse.

I. Question I. What, and of how many kinds, is adoration? Answer. Taken generally, it is an act by which someone subjects himself to another in testimony of that other's excellence. There are as many adorations as there are kinds of dignity. There are two dignities, uncreated and created. To the uncreated divine Majesty is owed the adoration called Latria. To creatures, on account of the supernatural excellence of grace and sanctity participated from God, is owed an adoration far inferior, which is called Dulia. To the Blessed Virgin, who after God stands eminent above all the Saints, is owed the adoration called Hyperdulia.

II. Adoration is one interior, the other exterior. The former subjects the spirit inwardly to God; the latter breaks forth into exterior acts. Again, one adoration is absolute, and the other respective. The absolute is owed to God alone; the respective, to the Saints: for we worship the Saints for God's sake, or we adore God in his Saints. For the worship which we offer to the Saints is always referred to God, as to the supreme Lord, from whom the Saints receive a share in their dignity and excellence.

III. The adoration which is shown to creatures on account of their natural gifts and dignities is commonly called observance, and can be shown by the same exterior signs by which God is worshipped. For the exterior actions of the body are absolutely indifferent of themselves. By kneeling, by prostration of the body, God is adored. Similarly, by these signs Judith, having seen Holofernes, adored him, prostrating herself upon the earth: chapter 10. By kneeling, and by bending the body, we worship supreme Pontiffs, Princes, and Kings. Exterior adoration, then, that it be made divine, depends upon the intention of the one adoring, unless it be destined, by some peculiar law, rite, custom, or circumstance, for the adoration of God. Wherefore, when private persons perform such actions publicly, it does not suffice that they have a good intention, but the circumstances of time, place, nation, and custom must be regarded.

IV. Question II. Is there a divine precept of adoring God with acts both internal and external? Answer. The affirming opinion is certain, of faith. This commandment is affirmative insofar as it commands the worship of God, and negative insofar as it forbids that the worship owed to God alone be paid always and forever to creatures. This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges of itself at fixed times. God must be worshipped in every place; yet temples have been erected in which sacrifices and the solemn rites of divine worship are celebrated.

V. Question III. Must Christ the Lord be adored as man with the worship of latria? Answer. The worship of latria is owed to the one and triune God alone: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve: Matthew 4. Each divine Person, then, can and must be adored by us both conjointly and severally. Wherefore that Christ, as the second Person of the Trinity, must be adored by us with the worship of latria is certain. It could only be disputed whether he must be adored with such worship as man. And this too the Theologians affirm, in this sense: that in Christ the Lord there is one hypostasis, and one subject of infinite dignity, to whom the worship of latria is owed. But to the humanity of Christ, as abstracted from the divine Word, only the worship of hyperdulia is owed, because thus it betokens only a finite dignity. During the three days of death, the body of Christ had to be adored with the worship of latria, because it was conjoined with the divine Word. The same must be said of the body of Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, hypostatically conjoined to the divine Person, as the Council of Trent defined against Luther. The consecrated Host must be adored absolutely, no express condition being added. It suffices that a Catholic be so disposed in affection that, if he knew it were not consecrated, he would abstain from adoration.

VI. Question IV. Must the Cross of Christ be adored with the worship of latria? Answer. All Catholics affirm it: since the Cross of Christ is his image. Now the image of Christ is adored with the same worship as Christ himself. But the Cross to which Christ was affixed must be adored with the worship of latria, not only because it is a symbol and image of Christ, but also on account of physical contact, and that precious blood with which it was sprinkled. The other inanimate instruments of Christ's passion too must be adored with the worship of latria, on account of physical contact.

VII. The arguments which the Heretics are wont to object — that we worship wood and metals — are lies and calumnies: for in the recounted figures and symbols we worship Christ himself. The Cross of Christ is worshipped, not as the infamous gibbet chosen by the Jews to punish Christ with a most shameful death, but as the banner of victory, and the instrument which Christ used to free us from the power of the devil. Nor is there anything for them to snarl about, that the hands of the Blessed Virgin, of Joseph, of the Disciples, which touched Christ's body, would have to be adored with the worship of latria: since instruments destitute of soul are not capable of worship, considered in themselves; therefore the whole worship which we show to them is referred to Christ. The Blessed Virgin and the other Saints are adorned with an intimate excellence, and so are worthy of worship, although we refer even the very worship which we render to the Saints unto God, as St. Thomas teaches, III, q. 25, art. 5, ad 3. We adore those Crosses which have been instituted and destined to represent Christ's passion. Other crosses which by chance arise fortuitously in wood, straw, or other things are not to be adored, but must be disregarded like other pieces of wood.

I. QUESTION I. Is anyone bound to accuse or to denounce? ANSWER. This distinction between an accuser and a denouncer St. Thomas constitutes, II-II, q. 68, art. 1: that a denouncer intends a brother's amendment, an accuser the punishment of a crime. Those who by office are deputed to this duty, and who receive a stipend from the commonwealth, are bound in justice to accuse offenders inflicting public losses, such as are fiscal officers, watchmen, keepers of fields and woods, and so forth. If a crime turn to public loss, whether temporal or spiritual, even private persons are bound either to accuse or to denounce. Crimes which tend to public loss are the betrayal of one's country, the adulteration of coins, poisonings, heresy, and so forth. Wherefore Alexander VII proscribed the following thesis: Although it be evidently established that Peter is a heretic, one is not bound to denounce him, if one cannot prove it. A denouncer is not bound to prove, but only an accuser. For those who cannot prove a crime are not bound to accuse.

IV. Penance is a true virtue. Since those things which are commanded by God pertain to virtue. But penance is frequently commanded by God, Matthew 3: Do penance. … Bring forth fruit worthy of penance. Again, Luke 6: Do penance. See St. Thomas, III, q. 85, art. 1.

1. Justice is a habit residing in the will, prompting that power constantly to render unto everyone his own. The fundamental notion of Justice is some sort of equality. Equality supposes two terms, physically distinct, or capable of existing separately, one from the other. Between such terms alone can equality be properly predicated. Any less distinction than this leaves room only for equality improperly so called, and therefore no room for what is properly termed Justice. When therefore Plato, going about to find a definition of Justice, which is a main object in his Republic, acquiesces in this position, that Justice consists in every part of the soul, rational, irascible, and concupiscible, fulfilling its own proper function, and not taking up the function of another, he fails for this reason, that all Justice is relative to another, but the different parts of one soul are not properly other and other, since all go to make up one man: therefore, however much Justice may be identical with doing your own business, and leaving your neighbour free to do his, yet this relation obtaining among the various parts of the soul cannot properly be called Justice. What Plato defines is the beauty, good order, and moral comeliness of the soul, but not Justice in any sense, inasmuch as it is not referred to any being human or divine, collective or individual, outside of the man himself.

2. Going upon the principle that all Justice is of the nature of equality, and is therefore relative to another, we arrive at the definition of general justice, which is all virtue whatsoever, inasmuch as it bears upon another person than him who practises it. This Justice is perfect social virtue, the crown and perfection of all virtue from a statesman's point of view; and in that aspect, as Aristotle says, "neither morning star nor evening star is so beautiful." Whoever has this virtue behaves well, not by himself merely, but towards others—a great addition. Many a one who has done well enough as an individual, has done badly in a public capacity: whence the proverb, that office shows the man. This Justice may well be called another man's good: though not in the sense of the sophists of old, and the altruists of our time, that virtue is a very good thing for everyone else than its possessor. Virtue, like health, may be beneficial to neighbours, but the first benefit of it flows in upon the soul to whom it belongs: for virtue is the health of the soul.

3. Another elementary notion of Justice connects it with Law, taking Justice to be conformity to Law. This notion exhibits legal justice, which is the same thing, under another aspect, as the general justice mentioned above, inasmuch as general justice includes the exercise of all virtues in so far as they bear upon the good of others: and the law, to which legal justice conforms a man, enjoins acts of all virtues for the common good. It must be observed, however, that though there is no natural virtue of which the law of man may not prescribe some exercise, still no human law enjoins all acts of all virtues, not even all obligatory acts. A man may fail in his duty though he has kept all the laws of man. In order then that legal justice may include the whole duty of man, it must be referred to that natural and eternal law of God, revealed or unrevealed, of which we shall speak hereafter. By being conformed to this divine law a man is a just man, a righteous man. It is this sense of Justice that appears in the theological term, justification. In this sense, Zachary and Elizabeth "were both just before God, walking in all the commandments of the Lord without blame." (St. Luke i. 6.)

4. General, or legal, justice is not the cardinal virtue so called, but is in one point of view identical with all virtue. Distinguished from the other three cardinal virtues is particular justice, which is divided into distributive and commutative justice. Distributive justice is exercised by the community through its head towards its individual members, so that there be a fair distribution of the common goods, in varying amount and manner, according to the various merits and deserts of the several recipients. The matters distributed are public emoluments and honours, public burdens, rewards, and also punishments. Distributive justice is the virtue of the king and of the statesman, of the commander-in-chief, of the judge, and of the public functionary generally. It is violated by favouritism, partiality, and jobbery. Distributive justice is the Justice that we adore in the great Governor of the Universe, saying that He is "just in all His works," even though we understand them not. When it takes the form of punishing, it is called vindictive justice. This is what the multitudes clamoured for, that filled the precincts of the Palace of Whitehall in the days of Charles I. with cries of Justice, Justice, for the head of Strafford.

5. Neither legal nor distributive justice fully answers to the definition of that virtue. Justice disposes us to give to another his own. The party towards whom Justice is practised must be wholly other and different from him who practises it. But it is clear that the member of a civil community is not wholly other and different from the State: he is partially identified with the civil community to which he belongs. Therefore neither the tribute of legal justice paid by the individual to the State, nor the grant of distributive justice from the State to the individual, is an exercise of Justice in the strictest sense. Again, what the individual pays to the State because he is legally bound to pay it, does not become the State's own until after payment. If he withhold it, though he do wrong, yet he is not said to be keeping any portion of the public property in his private hands: he only fails to make some of his private property public, which the law bids him abdicate and make over. If this be true of money and goods, it is still more evidently true of honour and services. In like manner, in the matter of distributive justice, the emoluments which a subject has a claim to, the rewards which he has merited of the State, does not become his till he actually gets them into his hands. It may be unfair and immoral that they are withheld from him, and in that case, so long as the circumstances remain the same, the obligation rest with and presses upon the State, and those who represent it, to satisfy his claim: still the State is not keeping the individual from that which is as yet his own. In the language of the Roman lawyers, he has at best a jus ad rem, a right that the thing be made his, but not a jus in re; that is, the thing is not properly his before he actually gets it.

6. Commutative justice alone is Justice strictly so called: for therein alone the parties to the act are perfectly other and other, and the matter that passes between them, if withheld by one of the parties, would make a case of keeping the other out of that which he could still properly call by right his own. Commutative justice runs between two individuals, or two independent States, or between the State and an individual inasmuch as the latter is an independent person, having rights of his own against the former. This justice is called commutative, from being concerned with exchanges, or contracts, voluntary and involuntary. The idea of voluntary contract, like that between buyer and seller, is familiar enough. But the notion of an involuntary contract is technical, and requires explanation. Whoever, then, wrongfully takes that which belongs to another, enters into an involuntary contract, or makes an involuntary exchange, with the party. This he may do by taking away his property, honour, reputation, liberty, or bodily ease and comfort. This is an involuntary transaction, against the will of the party that suffers. It is a contract, because the party that does the damage takes upon himself, whether he will or no, by the very act of doing it, the obligation of making the damage good, and of restoring what he has taken away. This is the obligation of restitution, which attaches to breaches of commutative justice, and, strictly speaking, to them alone. Thus, if a minister has not promoted a deserving officer in face of a clear obligation of distributive justice, the obligation indeed remains as that of a duty unfulfilled, so long as he remains minister with the patronage in his hands: but the promotion, if he finally makes it, is not an act of restitution: it is giving to the officer that which was not his before. And if the opportunity has passed, he owes the officer nothing in compensation. But if he has insulted the officer, he owes him an apology for all time to come: he must give back that honour which belonged to the officer, and of which he has robbed him. This is restitution. In a thousand practical cases it is important, and often a very nice question to decide, whether a particular offence, such as failure to pay taxes, be a sin against commutative justice or only against some more general form of the virtue. If the former, restitution is due: if the latter, repentance only and purpose of better things in future, but not reparation of the past.

7. The old notion, that Justice is minding your own business, and leaving your neighbour to mind his, furnishes a good rough statement of the obligations of commutative justice. They are mainly negative, to leave your neighbour alone in his right of life and limb, of liberty and property, of honour and reputation. But in two ways your neighbour's business may become yours in justice. The first way is, if you have any contract with him, whether a formal contract, as that between a railway company and its passengers, or a virtual contract, by reason of some office that you bear, as the office of a bishop and pastor in relation to the souls of his flock. The second way in which commutative justice binds you to positive action, is when undue damage is likely to occur to another from some activity of yours. If, passing by, I see my neighbour's house on fire, not having contracted to watch it for him, and not having caused the fire myself, I am not bound in strict justice to warn him of his danger. I am bound indeed by charity, but that is not the point here. But if the fire has broken out from my careless use of fire, commutative justice binds me to raise the alarm.

8. The most notable potential parts of Justice—Religion, Obedience, Truthfulness—enter into the treatise of Natural Law.

Readings.—Ar., Eth., V., i.; Plato, Rep., 433 A; ib., 443 C, D, E; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 58, art. 2, in corp; ib., q. 58, art. 5; ib., q. 58, art. 6, in corp; ib., q. 58, art. 7; ib., q. 58, art 9, in corp.; ib., q. 61, art. 1, in corp.; ib., q. 61, art. 3, in corp.; Ar., Eth., V., ii., 12, 13; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 62, art. 1, in corp., ad 2.

125. Thesis I. All men are bound to render to God the worship of interior and exterior adoration.

Proof. Reason dictates that a subject or dependent show honor to his ruler, and that such honor be proportioned to the ruler's dignity and the subject's dependence. But all men depend in every respect upon God, their Creator and Sovereign Lord, the Ruler of the Universe, the Master of life and death. Moreover, God is worthy of infinite honor. Therefore man owes God the greatest possible honor, such honor as is incommunicable to any created being.

The honor rendered in acknowledgement of God's sovereign dominion is called adoration. This, we maintain, ought to be both interior and exterior.

1. Interior adoration. We owe God the reverence and honor of our highest faculties, i. e., of our intellect and will. But operations of these faculties are interior; they are not, in themselves, perceptible by the senses. Therefore, we owe God the worship of interior adoration.

2. Exterior adoration. Man owes God the homage not of a part of his being, but of his whole being. His body, as well as his soul, is entirely dependent upon God, and should, therefore, contribute by outward or bodily action to the extrinsic glory of God. (No. 22.) Besides, on account of the close union between soul and body, interior reverence naturally finds expression in external action; and outward acts, in their turn, promote interior reverence. As outward action falls under the senses, our external reverence helps our fellow-men to elicit and express the reverence and honor which they, too, owe to God.

126. Men are not isolated individuals, but they are, as we shall prove later on, naturally social beings. Hence, in this connection, we may insert a thesis on the worship which men in their social capacity owe to God.

Thesis II. Men are obliged to render public worship to God.

Proof 1. Society is natural to mankind; hence it comes from the Author of nature. Society, therefore, no less than private individuals, is dependent upon God, and owes Him the worship due to His infinite Majesty. Consequently, men are obliged, as members of society, to render to God the homage proper to society, which is the worship of public adoration.

Proof 2. The public acknowledgment of God's supreme dominion over all created things is necessary for the welfare of civil society; so much so, that a notorious infidel has said: "If a God did not exist, we should have to invent one for the public good." On this public acknowledgment are based, in great measure, the sanctity of oaths, the binding power of contracts, the strength of the marriage bond, the fidelity of subjects as well as the integrity of rulers, and consequently the stability of governments and civil constitutions. Hence, those who attack the worship of God are dangerous enemies of mankind, for they are endeavoring to sap the foundations of society.

127. The vices directly opposed to religion are impiety, idolatry, and superstition. Impiety is the refusal to give supreme honor to God. If it takes the positive form of direct dishonor to God, it is called blasphemy. Idolatry consists in worshiping a creature with an adoration due to God alone. By superstition we mean certain practices, with a religious intent, that are irrational or unworthy of their purpose.

128. The principal acts of adoration are prayer and sacrifice, which have been practised by all nations from their beginning. The special forms that both should assume have not been determined by nature. Of course, God had the right to determine such forms by a supernatural Revelation and to make them obligatory upon all His subjects. No act of ours is sufficient by itself to regain the favor of our Creator if we have once lost it by sin; we could never know, except from a supernatural source, how to obtain the Divine pardon.

§ 2. The Judiciary.

243. The task of the judiciary is twofold:

1. To settle disputes between rival claimants: this is done in the civil courts.

2. To prosecute, in criminal courts, persons charged with violating the law, and, in case of their conviction, to award the penalty appointed for the transgression. The settlement of civil disputes is often submitted by the disputing parties to arbiters chosen by themselves. An arbiter differs from a judge in this, that the latter acts in virtue of the sovereign power of the State, and, therefore, possesses authority over the parties concerned, while an arbiter has no rights in the matter under dispute except such as are conceded to him by the litigants. From the decision of the lower courts appeal may be made in important cases to higher courts. But there must be, in the nature of things, a supreme court from whose decision there can be no appeal. Though even this higher tribunal may err, nevertheless the public good requires that its decisions shall be final.

244. The courts are guided by existing laws, the expediency of which is no matter for their consideration; their work is the interpretation and application of existing laws to special cases. Yet certain courts are sometimes called upon to decide whether a given enactment is truly a law, whether it has all the requirements of a just law (No. 81). If an enactment is evidently unjust or is openly at variance with the Constitution of the country, it is not a law, and judges cannot justly enforce it.

245. The preservation of public order, one of the primary functions of civil society, necessitates the punishment of social crimes. Now, a social crime is an outward disturbance of civil society by the violation of a strict right of our fellow-men. Evil acts in which injury is done to those persons only who freely take part in them, do not violate a strict right of any man, and are, therefore, not subject to the punishments of civil authority.

It is for the legislative power to appoint the punishment of crimes, for the judiciary to award the punishment in individual cases, for the executive to inflict it, or, in exceptional circumstances, at the discretion of the official holding the necessary authority, to remit or commute the penalty.

246. Thesis VIII. Civil society has the right to punish social crimes.

Proof. Every natural society has a right to those means which, in the ordinary course of events, are necessary for it to obtain its ends; but the punishment of social crimes is such a means for civil society. Therefore civil society has the right to punish social crimes.

247. Let us consider how and why such punishment is necessary in order that civil society may attain its end.

1. That end is the maintenance of social order. To secure this, it is necessary that advantage and pleasure be consequent on the observance of order. But the criminal disturbs the order of things by seeking to make advantage and pleasure consequent upon disorder. Accordingly, justice requires, for the restoration of right order which he has disturbed, that he shall lose advantages or feel pain. For this purpose, then, various kinds and degrees of punishment are needed to match the various kinds of evil doings and the various grades of guilt. Hence, one purpose of legal punishment is expiation.

2. The end of civil society is likewise to guard rights from violation; but this cannot be done unless offenders be punished in a manner to deter others from following their evil example; the penalty should, for this purpose, be proportioned to the crime.

3. The criminal himself needs correction, i. e., by the bitter medicine of pain he is to be induced to give up his vicious practices, and kept from disturbing the social order in the future.

248. Thus a threefold reason exists for the infliction of legal punishment; it is expiatory, deterrent, and medicinal. In domestic society, punishment is primarily medicinal for the correction of the offender, yet at times it may be deterrent for others. In civil society, punishment is chiefly expiatory and deterrent, and it need not be medicinal.

249. Thesis IX. Civil society has the right to inflict the death penalty for enormous crimes.

Explanation. We know from Revelation that God has bestowed this right upon civil authority; we maintain here that it belongs to civil society by the principles of natural reason.

Proof. The means employed by civil society must be sufficient to attain its end. Now, in many cases, nothing less than capital punishment is sufficient to attain that end. For, (a) There are criminals so depraved and so indifferent to other forms of punishment that the death penalty alone can deter them from committing enormous crimes. (b) Some crimes, such as deliberate murder, treason, or parricide, disturb social order to such an extent that capital punishment alone approaches a proportionate atonement.

250. Objections:

1. Man is too noble a being to be slaughtered as a warning to others. Answer. Such certainly he is if he has done no wrong; not, however, if he has degraded himself by a monstrous crime.

2. The present doctrine would justify "Lynch law," and mob violence, which are evident evils. Answer. A mob has no authority to inflict death: civil society receives such authority from God, its founder.

3. Every man has an inalienable right to his life; therefore the State cannot condemn him to death. Answer.

When we say that a right is inalienable, we mean that no one can take it away except God and one delegated by Him for that purpose; now the State has a commission from God to inflict the death penalty for enormous crimes.

4. In some States the death penalty has been abolished; therefore it is not necessary. Answer. That consequent does not follow from the antecedent. It is not clear that the purposes of civil government are sufficiently attained in those States. If they are, it is owing to special circumstances, and constitutes an exception to a general rule.

5. Desperate men are not restrained by fear of the death penalty. Answer. Nevertheless it is the most potent restraint that the State can use; besides, such men are prevented by the prompt infliction of the penalty from multiplying their enormities. Moreover, few criminals have been found so hardened as not eagerly to desire a commutation of capital punishment to imprisonment for life.

I PROPOSE in this little book to discuss the relations which exist between religion and other human interests. We shall thus gain a clearer knowledge of what religion is, we shall appreciate it more, and we should be induced to practise it more faithfully and more zealously. But, first of all, we must be sure that we have a clear and correct notion of what religion means. The word has had very different meanings at different times and for different writers on the subject. Lactantius, who wrote at the time of the first Christian Emperor of Rome, tells us that all pagan religions consisted only in rites and ceremonies performed in the worship of the gods; they did not trouble themselves about morality. A modern authority on the subject agrees with Lactantius. " If any of the thinkers of antiquity," says M. Jastrow, " had been asked to define religion, the same answer would have been given by each one—the worship of the gods."* Matthew Arnold thought that religion was only Morality touched with Emotion. For Fichte religion was a view of the world

* M. Jastrow, The Study of Religion, p. 131.

it furnished the supreme truth by man's contemplation of himself as the mirror in which God is reflected. For Schleiermacher religion was neither metaphysics nor morality; it was a state of feeling, which arises at the moment that we become conscious of a contact between ourselves and the universe. Lucretius and Hume identified religion with superstition. Man finds himself in the grip of natural forces vastly more powerful than himself; he personifies those forces of nature, and through fear seeks to propitiate them. According to Herbert Spencer, religion has to do with the infinite, and as man's very finite capacities cannot attain to the infinite, which must always remain unknowable, agnosticism is the only reasonable attitude for man to take up with regard to religion. Since the rise of the historical school of students of religion there has been more agreement as to what religion is. It is admitted that religion is a universal phenomenon of human nature; that as man is a rational animal so he is also a religious animal; that religion is a permanent element in the chequered career of humanity, and in a sense the only permanent element that is to be found there. The views of the modern school of students of religion are well summed up for us by Pius X. in his condemnation of the errors of the Modernists. The Holy Father says "However, this Agnosticism is only the negative part of the system of the Modernists the positive part consists in that they call vital immanence. Thus they advance from one to the other. Religion, whether natural or supernatural, must, like every other fact, admit of some explanation. But when natural theology has been destroyed, and the road to revelation closed by the rejection of the arguments of credibility, and all external revelation absolutely denied, it is clear that this explanation will be sought in vain outside of man himself. It must therefore be looked for in man; and since religion is a form of life, the explanation must certainly be found in the life of man. In this way is formulated the principle of religious immanence. Moreover, the first actuation, so to speak, of every vital phenomenon — and religion, as noted above, belongs to this category—is due to a certain need or impulsion; but speaking more particularly of life, it has its origin in a movement of the heart, which movement is called a sense. Therefore, as God is the object of religion, we must conclude that faith, which is the basis and foundation of all religion, must consist in a certain interior sense, originating in a need of the divine. This need of the divine, which is experienced only in special and favourable circumstances, cannot of itself appertain to the domain of consciousness, but is first latent beneath consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern philosophy, in the subconsciousness, where also its root lies hidden and undetected. "It may perhaps be asked how it is that this need of the divine which man experiences within himself resolves itself into religion? To this question the Modernist reply would be as follows: Science and history are confined within two boundaries, the one external — namely, the visible world; the other internal, which is consciousness. When one or other of these limits has been reached, there can be no further progress, for beyond is the unknowable.

In presence of this unknowable, whether it is outside man and beyond the visible world of nature, or lies hidden within the subconsciousness, the need of the divine in a soul which is prone to religion, excites—according to the principles of fideism, without any previous advertence of the mind—a certain special sense, and this sense possesses, implied within itself both as its own object and as its intrinsic cause, the divine reality itself, and in a way unites man with God. It is this sense to which Modernists give the name of faith, and this is what they hold to be the beginning of religion."* Judged by principles such as these, all religions are equally natural and equally true. They are the product of religious experiences and of the religious instinct among peoples of very different characters and needs. They owe their origin and growth to very different circumstances, but they are all faithful manifestations of the human spirit ever striving and groping after the Infinite. Very different from this is the teaching of the Catholic Church. She asserts and defends the dignity and power of the human intellect. She affirms that the great principle of causality is of universal application. The progress of science is due to the ceaseless application of that principle to the phenomena of nature; it is universally true, and should be applied fearlessly to the question of man's origin. If it is so applied we come to the knowledge of a supreme Being who made us and all that exists beside Himself. We have an intellect and a will; He who gave them to us must be similarly endowed, but in far greater measure. We

* Encyclical Pascendi, pp. 8, 9. English translation.

are persons, free and independent, with the right to work out our own destiny. Personality exists in its truest and fullest sense in our divine Creator. As the Vatican Council solemnly declared " The Holy, Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will and in every perfection; who since He is one, singular, altogether simple and unchanging spiritual substance, must be proclaimed really and essentially distinct from the world, in Himself and of Himself most blessed, and ineffably raised above all things which exist and can be conceived beside Himself.... The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known for certain from the things that He has created by the natural light of human reason. For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."* Modern science, as interpreted by its best and highest representatives, does not contradict this teaching of the Catholic Church. On the contrary, it defends it. Not long before his death Lord Kelvin was asked to write down for publication what he had already expressed in public on this subject. At the request of the editor this prince of British scientists sent the following declaration to the Nineteenth Century, June, 1903: " I cannot admit that with regard to the origin of life, science neither affirms nor denies

* Sess. III., cc. 1, 2.

Creative Power. Science positively affirms Creative Power. It is not in dead matter that we live and move and have our being, but in the creating and directing Power which science compels us to accept as an article of belief. We cannot escape from that conclusion when we study the physics and dynamics of living and dead matter all around. Modern biologists are coming, I believe, once more to a firm acceptance of something beyond mere gravitational, chemical, and physical forces; and that unknown thing is a vital principle. We have an unknown object put before us in science. In thinking of that object we are all agnostics. We only know God in His works, but we are absolutely forced by science to believe with perfect confidence in a directive Power—in an influence other than physical, or dynamical, or electrical forces. Cicero (by some believed to have been editor of Lucretius) denied that men and plants and animals could come into existence by a fortuitous concourse of atoms. There is nothing between absolute scientific belief in a Creative Power, and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. Just think of a number of atoms falling together of their own accord and making a crystal, a sprig of moss, a microbe, a living animal. Cicero's expression, 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' is certainly not wholly inappropriate for the growth of a crystal. But modern scientific men are in agreement with him in condemning it as utterly absurd in respect to the coming into existence, or the growth, or the continuation of the molecular combinations presented in the bodies of living things. Here scientific thought is compelled to accept the idea of Creative Power.... Do not be afraid of being free thinkers! If you think strongly enough you will be forced by science to the belief in God, which is the foundation of all religion. You will find science not antagonistic but helpful to religion."* Undoubtedly, that is the solid foundation of all religion. There we have the first principle and foundation of religion, not in the thoughts, feelings, or needs of man. God emphatically IS. That great objective fact is the basis of religion, and it should be recognised by all reasonable beings. There is without doubt also the inner instinctive need of God within the human breast. As the new-born child begins instinctively to grope for its mother's breast, so the human heart is driven instinctively to grope after its God. Our hearts were made for Him, and they know only unrest till they rest in Him. Still, we cannot build religion on our subjective instincts and feelings. They are too liable to be warped and twisted by human passion and prejudice. The only firm foundation of religion is the solid bed-rock of objective fact. God is—His existence is the cause and explanation of all other being. Religion rises spontaneously from the recognition of that fact. Just as when the mind of the child recognises its parents and all that it owes to them, it naturally concludes that it has a moral duty to reverence, obey, and love them as the authors of its being; so when the mind recognises God, its Creator, it forthwith concludes that it is bound to Him by the ties of reverence, obedience, and love. That is why the Fathers and Schoolmen loved to derive the very word religion from a Latin root meaning to bind man with his Creator. It expresses the moral obligation recognised by right reason that the rational creature should worship its Creator and Lord. Natural reason, then, shows the necessity of natural religion. But natural reason refuses to admit that this is the only basis of religion. Within and without any man with eyes sees abundant traces of the goodness of his Creator, and he cannot rest satisfied with the notion that after creating the world and man, the Creator left mankind to their own feeble gropings after Himself. The supreme Artificer loves the work of His hands, and love forbids Him to desert His child. Of course, then, what all religions teach is and must be true.* God has spoken, has manifested, has revealed Himself and His Will to man. His delight is to be with and to converse with the children of men. That trait must be characteristic of divine as it is of human love. If anyone will properly dispose himself for heavenly visits, God will infallibly come to him and will take up His abode with him. Mystics like St. Teresa have ever verified the truth of those words. The "locutions" of God to the saints are matters of everyday occurrence. Their possibility is obvious, and the experience of all who have learnt how to pray proves the fact of constant communication between God and His rational creatures. As God can and does frequently speak with the individual soul, and thus teaches it and fosters its private spiritual life, so God can and does speak with chosen instruments of His, with a view to their teaching others and fostering public and social religious life. Thus He spoke to His prophets of old, thus last of all, more fully and more especially, He revealed Himself and His divine Will to the world through His only Son. " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days, hath spoken to us by His Son.”* When God thus reveals His Will to mankind through a chosen messenger, He takes care that the messenger is duly accredited. There have always been plenty of false prophets in the world who claimed to speak to men in the name and with the authority of God. When He sent His only begotten Son into the world He took care to accredit and guarantee His divine mission. This He did by prophecy and miracles. Jesus Christ Himself frequently insisted on this point. When asked who He was and by whose authority He spoke and acted, He would answer: If I tell you, you will not believe Me. Consult your Scriptures, for they witness to Me; behold the miracles that I work, for they prove that I am sent by God. "And John called to him two of his disciples, and sent them to Jesus, saying: Art thou he that is to come, or look we for another?... And answering he said to them: Go, and relate to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, to the poor the gospel is preached.”† "But I have a greater testimony than that of John: for the works which the Father hath given me to perfect; the works themselves, which I do, give testimony of me, that the Father hath sent me.”‡ " Jesus answered them: I speak to you and you believe not: the works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me.... If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works; that you may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father."* That is the divine apologetic adopted by Jesus Christ to prove His mission from God. The Catholic Church has always treasured it, and teaches and uses it to this day. Many are unconvinced by it nowadays, just as many were unconvinced by it in the time of Our Lord, but the fault does not lie in the argument.

* loc. cit., p. 1068.

* M. Jastrow, Study of Religion, p. 127.

* Heb. i. 1, 2. † Luke vii. 19-22. ‡ John v. 36.

* John x. 25-38.

I HAVE no difficulty in understanding the practical indifference which a bad man shows towards religion. He has made up his mind not to lead a good life, and having done that, he does not care to make pretence of religion. He does not care to add hypocrisy to the list of his misdeeds. But I cannot understand the attitude of a man who poses as a good man and yet practises no religion. He tries to be a good husband, a good father, a good citizen. He prides himself on being upright and honest in his dealings with his fellow-men, but he has no inclination for religion. He does not see the use of it, he gets no benefit out of it. With such men the subjective theory of religion utterly breaks down. You appeal to his spiritual needs, you hint at those mystical yearnings and longings which at certain times surge up from the region of the subconscious. He stares at you with a blank look and says bluntly that he has never felt them. His yearnings and longings are for much more concrete things which he can see and feel. This is certainly one of the causes of that weakening of the religious spirit which all good and thoughtful men deplore in our time. The reason is because they have a false view about religion and they take no interest in it. The question is not whether one feels the need of religion or not, whether it appeals to one, whether one gets any benefit out of it. Religion rests on a great central fact. God exists, He is our Creator and our Lord, He is our first Beginning and last End. If we are rational creatures and wish to be good men, we must recognise those tremendous facts. What should we think of a son who prided himself on being a just and honest man, a straightforward man, and a kindly neighbour, but entirely neglected his poor old parents? He never assisted them, never went to see them, never even wrote to them. He ignored them and desired to have nothing to do with them. Such a one has obviously forgotten that a good man does not pick and choose what suits him in the moral life. A good moral life is a complex thing and comprises many duties. We may not neglect any, but above all we must not neglect the most important of all. As our relation to our parents demands that we should honour them with reverence, obedience, and love, so our relation with God our Creator demands that we should recognise our indebtedness to Him and honour Him with reverence, obedience, and love. That is the first and the greatest commandment. Nobody who neglects that can lay claim to doing his duty as a good and honest man. He fails in the most important duty of all, in what constitutes the very kernel and essence of a good life. It is no answer for an irreligious man to say that he never got any benefit out of religion. If religion is practised rightly it confers innumerable blessings on him who practises it. Still, that is not the chief reason why we should practise it. We should practise it because it is our duty and God commands it. It would be a poor excuse for neglecting our parents to say that we never got any benefit out of honouring them. We do not do our duty to them for that; neither should so mercenary a consideration influence our conduct towards God.

The religion revealed to the world by Jesus Christ is a complete guide to a perfect moral life. He is the Light of the World; one that follows Him walketh not in darkness. By that Light we see everything in its true proportions, we know what value to set on everything. We have no doubts as to whence we came or whither we are going. We know our goal and we know how to get there. The different duties and occupations of life fall into their proper place in the scale of importance or necessity. The scheme is a workable scheme, it has stood the test of two thousand years, and by means of it man can live and society can thrive and prosper. No other light gives so cheery an outlook on the world and on the future. Behind the mechanism of things, under the whirl of perpetual change, apparently heedless of man and his interests, the Christian recognises the mighty love of his Father and leaves himself trustfully in His guiding hands. The future is not the inexplicable riddle that it is for the mechanical evolutionist. The Christian looks forward to it with confidence and hope. Some have said that the Christian outlook is too good to be true. They know nothing of the wonders of infinite love. In the Christian hope millions upon millions have found the source of their sweetest joy, and of patience and resignation amid the inevitable trials and sorrows of life. The Christian religion confers these and many more benefits on human life, but it would be a great mistake to suppose that we can abandon Christian teaching and continue to reap its benefits. One of the greatest benefits which the Christian religion confers on man is to furnish him with a complete and objective rule of conduct. Public opinion, custom, and human law can do something towards making a man subject his vicious propensities to right reason so that they will not threaten destruction to himself and to his fellows. But many external actions can be concealed from public opinion and human law; and the more important sphere of the inner man escapes their scrutiny altogether. Every thought, word, and deed is subject to the Christian code; no human act escapes the judgment of the Christian conscience. Human opinion and human law are liable to err; they sometimes approve of what is destructive to the best interests of human nature. They sanction divorce and the loosening of the ties of family life, though history and reason loudly protest that the family must be kept together at all costs. On these and on other scarcely less important points the Gospel of Christ is firm as a rock. Private judgment can interpret and whittle away the dead letter of the Bible: it can do nothing against the voice of the ever-living Church speaking with the authority of Him who inspired the Bible. Passion and prejudice can distort a rule in favour of individualism and selfishness: they cannot warp the judgment of unerring truth. We have only to open our eyes and ears to realise the importance of preserving the objective rule of conduct which is taught us by the religion of Jesus Christ. Moral chaos is the consequence of its rejection. Let us take a few examples from recent writers. We cannot do better than go to Germany for our first example. The rejection of the Christian standard of conduct, with its inevitable consequences, has gone furthest in Germany. Nietzsche taught that Christianity was a retrograde movement. According to him Christianity is a religion for the degenerate, anaemic, and world-weary. Christian teachers are "body despisers" and " preachers of death." If we would be on the right track we must get back to nature and the natural. This world is a good world if only we know how to enjoy it. Unfortunately the great mass of mankind are too degraded to lead a truly natural life. For that purpose a man must be full of vitality. He will have to be the product of careful breeding and training. He must be truly noble, and the only nobility is that of birth and blood. He will not be one of the common herd: he will be " superman." As such he will be distinguished by the "Will-to-power." For him the whole duty of man may be summed up in two words—"Be powerful." He will have two different standards of conduct. Towards his equals and those of the same class his conduct will be marked by restraint, regard, delicacy, and friendship. Towards others, he will conduct himself " not so much as better, but rather as an uncaged beast of prey. Here he enjoys liberty from all social restraint, the wilderness must compensate him for the tension produced by a long incarceration and enclosure in the peace of society.” For common suffering humanity he has no pity or compassion, but rather indifference and contempt. Christianity will do very well for them; they only want " herd-morality." They will always form the necessary basis on which the social pyramid will be raised. Above them will be the commercial classes, while on the top will live and reign the " superman." Many of the traits in this picture are clearly characteristic of the Prussian Junker as he has been revealed to an astonished world by his deeds of “frightfulness” during the war. If he shows himself in his true colours after the war he may safely be left to be dealt with by the police. The Scotchman, John Davidson, was as violently anti-Christian as was Nietzsche, but he had no faith in progress or the superman, and cared nothing about the future. For Davidson Nietzscheanism was merely a perverted form of Christianity, and he would have none of it. ‘His Antichrist is Christ, whose body and blood And doctrine of miraculous rebirth Became the Overman: Back-of-beyond, Or—what's the phrase? Outside good-and-evil; That's his millennium, and we'll none of it. I want the world to be much more the world; Men to be men; and women, women; all Adventure, courage, instinct, passion, power.’ Davidson's philosophy is a glorification of the animal appetites and an exhortation to all to enjoy life while it lasts. Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Mr. Bernard Shaw has many affinities with Nietzsche, whose conception of the superman he adopted. Still, there are great differences between the two writers. Nietzsche is individualistic, while Mr. Shaw is Socialistic. The latter does not hope for the regeneration of mankind from the superman, but from the State. It is in and through the State that the individual is to be blessed. He does not share Nietzsche's contempt for pity, nor think that Nature's methods should be imitated in the elimination of the weak and the unfit. Society should have a care for its weaker members. The only heaven that man can look forward to is to make the best of this world. "Be what you want to be, follow instinct," says Mr. Shaw, "and you will be on the right road." All these writers are men of ability, but their schemes for the conduct of human life contain many glaring inconsistencies and contradictions. They neither agree with each other nor with themselves.* They show that the rejection of Christian teaching and Christian morality leads inevitably to the mental and moral chaos from which the Light of the World rescued us two thousand years ago. Professor Karl Pearson and others appear to suppose that all that is necessary is to lay down and teach to the young a code of rational ethics. Unfortunately, most of us have had the same experience as the Latin philosopher: ‘Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.’ " I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse." It is not only that man's intellect is so feeble, so liable to be warped and twisted by passion and self-interest, especially in questions of conduct. His will is, if anything, weaker still, and fails so lamentably in the execution of what it knows to be right. It has been proved by the experience of ages that man cannot live a decent and rational life without the help of God. All that God need do to punish man for his rejection of Himself is simply to leave him alone. Left to himself, he quickly becomes the prey of his passions and demonstrates the necessity of religion for man. The argument has never been put more forcibly than by St. Paul, and we cannot do better than ponder over his words. Of the pagan philosophers of old St. Paul writes: " So that they are inexcusable, because that when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God, nor given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise they became fools. Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness to dishonour their own bodies among themselves,... For this cause God delivered them up to shameful affections. For their women have changed the natural use into that which is against nature. And in like manner the men also, leaving the natural use of the woman, have burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men, working that which is filthy, and receiving in themselves the recompense which was due to their error. And as they liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things that are not fitting; being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, avarice, wickedness, full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity, whisperers, detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy."* The terrible picture was truthfully drawn two thousand years ago; it has stood the test of time, and is as faithful to the facts now as it was when first drawn. Experience proves only too fully that man stands in dire need of religion. The modern cry of "Back to Nature" means back to the pagan immorality described by St. Paul. Would that the evidence were less clear than it is. We cannot hope for salvation merely from the teaching of rational ethics. That would enlighten the mind, but it would not strengthen the will. And it is the will above all that needs strengthening. The theory of mechanical evolution only adds to the difficulty. As a recent writer says:

* Cf. L. S. Thornton, Conduct and the Supernatural.

* Rom. i. 20-31.

“On the part of scientific men the study of evolution in general, and social evolution in particular, has given rise to a sort of scientific pessimism.... The latest teachings of modern science have thus thrown a sort of pall over the human mind and introduced a new philosophy —a philosophy of despair, it may be called, because it robs its adherents of all hope in any conscious alteration of the course of nature with respect to man, and denies the efficacy of effort."* As the Catholic Church constantly insists, our only hope is in the grace of God and in religion. The religion of Jesus Christ not only enlightens the mind; above all it strengthens and braces the will so as to enable it not only to keep in check the lower appetites and make them obedient to reason, but to climb the loftiest heights of heroic virtue. It is not necessary to appeal to past history in proof of it; every Catholic experiences it whenever he prays or worthily approaches the Sacraments.

* L. F. Ward, Applied Sociology, p. 14.

Commutative justice, as the name implies, has to do chiefly with buying and selling and other contracts. It regulates relations which exist, or which ought to exist, between different and independent persons, whether physical or moral. It is a matter of commutative justice to observe agreements between nations as well as between individuals. It prescribes that what is due to another as his strict right should be rendered to him. Those who hold an office of any kind are bound by commutative justice to fulfil its duties. Statesmen, judges, magistrates, public, and private servants, lawyers, and doctors sin against commutative justice if they fail to do their duty. They violate an implied or expressed contract entered into when they assumed office.

• Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, i 57. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II–II, q. 186, a. 9.

What must be rendered to another in justice is his due or his strict right. Such rights are of various kinds, both natural and acquired. The right to life, liberty, and proper treatment at the hands of officials are instances of natural rights. A man has a natural right to make things his own, or to acquire private property. Commutative justice recognizes that such a right should be respected. Robbery and theft are against the natural law of justice. Thou shalt not steal is a precept of the natural law.

If commutative justice be violated an injury is done to another, and it is peculiar to such an act that it entails an obligation of making restitution or reparation for the injustice that has been done. This follows from the very nature of commutative justice. When commutative justice is violated, another person is deprived of what belongs to him, of his right. But justice requires that each one should have what belongs to him, and so justice is not done till what he has been deprived of, or its equivalent, is restored to him. This is what is meant by making restitution.

There are two roots of restitution: possession of what belongs to another, and unjust damage of what belongs to another.

If I find a watch I may keep it till I find the owner, but when I have found the owner, I must give him his watch. The watch is his, it belongs to him, and I sin against justice if I do not give another what belongs to him. There is a peculiar connection between the owner and his watch; that connection gives the owner the right to possess his watch; justice demands that the watch should be in the possession of its owner, the watch cries for its owner, just as the child cries for its mother.

If I unjustly destroy or damage what belongs to another, he has not what belongs to him. I must then give him an equivalent. I must put him as far as possible in the possession of the rights of which I unjustly deprived him. I must make restitution to him. Justice demands that, for justice demands that each one should have what belongs to him.

Are prices of commodities a matter of justice, or may a seller get what he can for his goods?

Until quite recent times the answer given to this question was that prices of commodities are certainly a matter of justice, and that a seller who tries to get for his goods more than they are worth is a cheat. At present the question is involved in the greatest confusion, chiefly due to political economists. Some economists merely abstract from the question of justice in prices. Justice, they say, is a matter for ethics, and political economy has nothing to do with ethics. Others assert that prices are regulated by natural forces as inexorable as those which govern the weather, and so are not subject to the law of justice. The Catholic doctrine is that justice is a moral virtue and that it should rule all men’s actions, and therefore his buying and selling, as well as the rest. Price is the money measure of value, but what is value? We must distinguish carefully between use-value and exchange-value. The use-value of a thing is the advantage which one derives from using it, and the consequent esteem in which he holds it. It is something individualistic, subjective, and variable. The use-value of a glass of water depends on the individual, on his tastes, on his variable needs. Exchange-value is what a thing will exchange for, what the owner can get for it. A glass of water has great or little use-value, according to circumstances; it has no exchange value, because nobody will give anything for it; it can be got for nothing. In order that a thing may have exchange-value, it must be capable of satisfying men’s wants, it must be of limited quantity and relatively scarce, and there must be a society of men in existence who have different goods which they are willing to exchange for others. Exchange-value can only exist in society. It is a social product; society gives goods their exchange-value; the social, or common, estimate is the measure of exchange-value. Because it is a social estimate, exchange-value is not mathematically determined. There is a certain indefiniteness about it. In a given society at a certain time those who are acquainted with the exchange-value of a horse will say on seeing a particular horse: “Oh! he’s worth about forty pounds.” You might get forty-five pounds for him, but hardly more. You might have to let him go for thirty-five pounds, if you are compelled to sell. In other words, the exchange-value of commodities and consequently their price fluctuates, and even when stable it is not determined to the last penny.

But justice requires that prices should be fair and reasonable. Nobody likes to give more for an article than it is worth, and the common estimate of people acquainted with the state of the market is the measure of its worth. Its use-value to the buyer will be greater than the price which he pays for it, or else he would not part with his money. But justice requires that exchange-values should be equal when things are exchanged in ordinary contracts of buying and selling. That is the doctrine expounded by Aristotle and faithfully adhered to as being the teaching of natural reason until the time of Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes and Locke denied the traditional teaching without attempting to show that it was false. When the road had thus been cleared, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other leading economists developed a doctrine of value which was to produce the most important results. They taught that labour is the source and measure of value. Commodities are exchanged according to the amount of labour which has been put into them. Karl Marx adopted this theory of value and built on it his doctrine of scientific Socialism. He argued that if labour is the source of value, then the worker produces all the wealth of the world. The capitalist pays the worker less for his labour than it is worth and takes the surplus value for himself. Thus the capitalist robs the worker, and no wrong is done by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains.

The doctrine of Karl Marx is the cause of a great deal of the social and economic troubles of our time. It shows how disastrous false teaching may become, and how important it is to keep to the truth.

Labour is, indeed, a source of value, but it is false to say that it is the only source of value or that it is the measure of value. A few examples will make this perfectly clear. There are things of great value which have been acquired without any labour at all, as, for example, a diamond found by chance on the South African veldt. The same quantity of labour often produces commodities of very different values. The faggot maker, the ordinary carpenter, and the cabinet maker may each work for eight hours a day, but the product of their labour will be of very different values. Not unfrequently a workman complains that his labour has been thrown away; he has mixed his labour with the material, but the result is worthless. The Marxian theory of value is false, and the consequences to which it leads are false and disastrous.