Question III: On the Principles or Sources of Morality

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4, 10.

138. Notions. - After we have spoken of the ultimate foundation and the first objective principle of morality, the immediate principles now come to be considered, which are called the sources of morality; namely, the elements of the human act from which it immediately comes about that it is conformed to the rule and good, or difform from it and evil, and indeed more or less. They are the object (the primary source), and the circumstances (the secondary source), of which the chief is the end, because it most greatly influences the act.

A. The object in the present matter is considered 1) not as the whole objective element or complex of all the circumstances, but in the proper sense as distinguished from circumstances: it is that which is first and per se attained by the act, or the matter (thing or person) about which it is concerned, that into which, primarily and per se from its own nature, it tends; hence it is the same as the intrinsic end;

2. not according to physical being, but according to moral being, that is, insofar as it is conformed or difform to the rule of reason.

Hence the words object, matter, end are used indiscriminately. For, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 75, a. 3, ad 1: "the object, although it is the matter about which the act is terminated, nevertheless has the notion of end, according as the intention of the agent is borne into it." Cf. q. 72, a. 3, ad 2.

B. Circumstances are secondarily attained by the act as accidents which affect and determine the human act in its constituted being. Some affect the human act according to physical being, and these are indifferent (for example, that someone steals in the morning or in the evening); others according to moral being, which they increase or diminish (for example, that he steals much or little): these are called moral, to which alone we attend here.

C. End is here understood not as the end of the work or intrinsic end, which is the same as the object, but as the extrinsic and adjoined end of the one acting, "by which the agent is moved to the work."

But since reason is not determined to one thing, but can tend first and per se to all things, hence the same thing can be the object with respect to one act and only a circumstance with respect to another, and indeed: a) moral being can be a circumstance of an act considered according to physical being, for example, that the thing is another's or deposited in a sacred place is a circumstance as to the act of taking, but it is the substance of theft or sacrilege; b) indeed, the circumstance of one act can be the object and substance of another act: thus with respect to theft it is not a circumstance that the thing is another's, but that it is sacred, although this is not a circumstance as to sacrilege.

139. Observation.

The object, and similarly the end and circumstance, can be considered in two ways: physically and materially in the being of a being, insofar as it is something in the nature of things, and thus it is always good, with the goodness of nature or of being; or morally and in the being of conduct, insofar as it is the object of such an act and insofar as it is attained by the one acting, and thus it can be morally good or evil. It is said:

1. As to the objective element: insofar as it is the object of such a human act, or has or does not have due proportion to such an act; that is, insofar as it is subject to the rule of reason and is conformable to it and morally good, or difform and evil, that such a thing or person be attained by such an act. Thus the object of theft is not another's thing considered in itself and physically, but insofar as the rule forbids that it be taken from its owner; the object of temperance is not food considered in itself, but insofar as it is conformable to reason that it be taken as much as is necessary. Hence:

a) An object physically good can be morally evil, and conversely. Thus, although God and sin according to themselves are a good or evil object, nevertheless God as to be hated is an evil object, and sin as to be destroyed is a good object conformable to reason.

b) One and the same physically single object can be morally good or evil, as to seize or to restore another's thing, to love and to hate a man.

c) The same act according to physical being can be of diverse species according to moral being: thus to give money is a donation if it is done as a favor, alms if to relieve misery, payment if to extinguish a debt, restitution if to compensate an injury, recompense if on account of merit.

d) An act physically the same can be morally good or evil according as it is done by diverse subjects, or by the same subject but at diverse times, for example, the act of fornication and the conjugal act, the eating of flesh on Thursday and Friday, the killing of a man by a robber or by a soldier.

e) Acts of the same physical species can be of diverse moral species, for example, to know one's own wife or another's, love of God and of wine, of virtue and of vice; on the contrary, acts of the same moral species can be of physically diverse species, for example, love and desire of the same object.

2. As to the subjective element: insofar as it is attained by the one acting, that is, is known as conformable or difform with the rules, or insofar as the object and its morality is known by the conscience of the one acting as conformable or difform to reason. For it can happen that an object in itself evil is nevertheless from invincible ignorance thought good: thus if someone takes another's thing which he thinks is his own, the act will be formally good; and conversely, as if someone thinks that today one must fast and does not fast, the act will be formally evil.

All the aforesaid things also hold concerning circumstances and the end.

140. Principle I. The object considered morally gives morality to the act, that is, goodness or malice, and indeed fundamental, principal, and primary morality.

It is said: 1) fundamental, because it is intrinsic and essential to the action, just as the object without which the act cannot be;

2. principal, because it gives to the act the moral species by which it is distinguished from others;

3. primary, because it is conceived before every other morality which comes from circumstances, and perseveres even when these are changed. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing on account of vainglory, the malice from the object, or injustice, is first and fundamental; the malice from the circumstances of sacredness and of the end is called secondary and accidental.

It is proved 1) by reason: that is good which has the fullness of being due to it, evil if it does not have the whole being which it ought to have. But something has being and therefore goodness first from that which gives it species, namely, from its form, for example a man generated from this, that he is a rational animal; on the contrary, it has principal and fundamental malice if it does not have the being of the species which it ought to have, for example if instead of a man a monster is generated. But a human act has its species from the object considered morally, as from form. Therefore from a fitting object it has goodness, and indeed primary and fundamental goodness; likewise malice if it does not have the fitting object which it ought to have.

The minor is proved: a human act is a movement or tendency toward the object considered morally, as toward a term. But every movement has species from the term as from its form, because it is to the term as potency to act. Therefore a human act has species from the object considered morally, as from its form.

This can be contracted briefly thus: every thing has fundamental being and goodness (and therefore malice) from its species. But a human act has species from the object, because it is a movement toward it as its term. Therefore the human act, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, has its species from the object by which it is terminated.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures and in the doctrine of Tradition it is often affirmed that good things are to be done, all evil things to be avoided; this must at least be understood of those things which are good or evil by reason of matter. Thus, for example, Ps. XXXIII, 14: Turn away from evil and do good; Prov. III, 7: Fear (that is, worship) God and depart from evil; Is. I, 16-17: Cease to act perversely, learn to do good. Alluding to these, the prince of the apostles says, I Pet. III, 10-12: He who wills to love life and to see good days, let him restrain his tongue from evil and his lips lest they speak deceit; let him turn away from evil and do good; let him seek peace and follow it, because the eyes of the Lord are upon the just and his ears unto their prayers, but the face of the Lord is upon those doing evil.

Hence Christ, replying to the young man asking, "What good shall I do that I may have eternal life?" (Mt. XIX, 16), answers (vv. 17-19): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments:... Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness. Honor thy father and thy mother, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; and these are evil or good precisely from the object.

141. Principle II. Moral circumstances as such give goodness and malice to human acts, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: a) moral circumstances, because they are not considered in themselves and physically, but morally, that is, 1) as to this act, insofar as it is conformable or difform to the rule of reason that the act be placed with these circumstances; and 2) insofar as this is known by the agent.

b) as such, because sometimes they also confer the first and essential goodness or malice, as if a work indifferent from the object becomes good by reason of a circumstance, for example, to drink moderately; but then the circumstance is intended first and per se and becomes the object, or that which is first attained.

c) secondary and accidental morality, because circumstances as such supervene upon the act in its being and moral species already constituted.

It is proved 1) by reason: fullness of being and goodness in things is not had only from that which gives them species, but also secondarily from supervening accidents, for example in man from figure, virtue, color, etc.; if something of these is lacking which ought to be present, or if something else is present which ought not to be present, according to this the thing will be evil. Therefore also in human acts the fullness of being and goodness does not consist wholly in the species which comes from the object, but is added secondarily from the arriving accidents which are circumstances; and if some due circumstance is lacking or an undue one is present, according to this the action will be evil.

It is confirmed: circumstances can imply a habitude of agreement or disagreement with the rule of reason just as the object itself can, for example, it is not only unfitting to steal but also to steal in a sacred place; it is not only fitting to pray but also to pray on bended knees. Therefore.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures, Christ himself (Mk. XII, 41-44) declared that the poor widow who gave two mites gave more than the rich who gave many things, because she gave from her want.

And 3) from Tradition we know that in confession the circumstances of sin must be declared which change the species, or so aggravate or diminish that they make a venial sin mortal or the reverse (which the Council of Trent defined, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7). But there would be no reason for this if they did not increase or diminish malice.

142. Principle III. The extrinsic and adjoined end as such and morally regarded gives goodness or malice to human acts, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: 1) extrinsic end: for the end of the work, or intrinsic end, is the same as the object; hence it is a question of the extrinsic and accidental end which is added by the one acting to the object;

1. St. Thomas: "The proximate end is the same as the object... but the remote end is posited as a circumstance," De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, ad 8.

2. as such: for the end sometimes assumes the notion of a moral object and gives the first morality, as if someone does an indifferent act on account of a good end or an evil end, or an act good from the object solely on account of the extrinsic end alone;

3. morally regarded, that is, insofar as it is conformable or difform to reason that such a thing be intended as an end and that such an act be chosen as a means to obtain it.

It is proved 1) by reason: a thing which depends upon another not only has fullness of being and goodness from species and accidents, but also from comparison to the cause upon which it depends; and as being depends upon the efficient cause and species, so goodness depends especially upon the final cause. But the human act depends upon an efficient and final cause. Therefore besides the absolute goodness which it has from being and species, it has relative goodness from the end if it has a due end, and malice if it does not have it.

It is confirmed. End expresses conformity or difformity to reason, for example, it is not only conformed to reason to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to get drunk. Therefore it cannot happen that the end does not influence goodness if it is good, and malice if it is evil.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures Christ says: "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them... The light of thy body is thy eye. If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome. But if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome" (Mt. VI, 1, 22-23). These things are to be understood of a depraved intention, which blinds the mind and removes God's pleasure in works; while the right intention, which directs all things, pleases God and is rewarded by him. Hence in v. 33 it is said: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." And the Apostle admonishes, I Cor. X, 31, that all things be done unto the glory of God.

143. Corollary. - Therefore in the human act a fourfold goodness can be found: one according to genus insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of act and entity, so much it has of (physical) goodness; another is according to species, that is, according to a fitting object; a third is according to circumstances as according to certain accidents; a fourth according to the end as according to a habitude to the cause of goodness (a. 4).