§ 1. On civil law prescribing that taxes be paid

On Civil Laws Which Command Taxes to Be Paid.¹⁶²

¹⁶² Since it is impossible in a small Manual to treat broadly this matter, which is of such great moment, we refer the reader to authors who treat of this matter expressly, for example, Marres, De iustitia (1888), l. 2, n. 191 sqq.; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia (1901), q. 94-132; Klemens Wagner, Die sittlichen Grundsatze bezuglich der Steuerpflicht (1906); Franz Hamm, Zur Grundlegung und Geschichte der Steuermoral (1908); Rud. Amberg, Die Steuer in der Rechtsphilosophie der Scholastiker (1909).

288. Since civil government must make very great expenditures for the common good, for example, for the security of citizens, for the security of the fatherland, for schools, for public roads, etc., it has a strict right that, other revenues being lacking, citizen-subjects furnish sufficient subsidies for paying the necessary expenses for the common good. These subsidies indeed are called taxes, assessments, customs-duties, and by other similar names. Hence a tax can be defined: money which citizens ought to furnish from civil law precisely for this end, that satisfaction be made for the public expenses of the republic.¹⁶³ But under the name of money are comprehended any material things whatsoever, for example, wheat, fruits, animals, etc., which in some regions are furnished or in ancient times were furnished in place of coin for taxes.

Although a customs-duty is not rarely taken in the same sense as a tax, nevertheless it differs in some way. For a customs-duty is that which by modern names is called Zoll, douane, custom, and is money to be paid on account of merchandise brought into some kingdom or town. But a tax is a charge imposed upon persons or things, without attention being given to the transport of merchandise. Very many other names are found in the older authors to signify taxes or customs-duties, for example, contributions, exactions, tithes, assessments, prestations, tallages, forced services, excises, guide-money, passage-toll, etc. - That money which is sometimes imposed to be paid by those who pass over some bridge or street is not a tax, but a contribution for paying the expenses of the bridge or street.

¹⁶³ Cf. Vermeersch, l. c. n. 97.

289. Divisions of taxes. Today almost innumerable kinds of taxes exist, according to the diverse things from which taxes ought to be paid. But all those diverse species can quite fittingly be reduced to two categories, namely to direct taxes and indirect taxes. Direct taxes are called those which after individual intervals are exacted from a person designated by name, or which are immediately imposed upon the person, whether by reason of goods or by reason of art or business.¹⁶⁴ - Indirect taxes are those which are directly imposed upon things and are not paid at fixed intervals, but by reason of a change of rights, for example, through contracts of buying and selling, or through succession, or through transport, etc.¹⁶⁵ - In practice it is sometimes with difficulty discerned whether some tax is direct or indirect.

Obligation of taxes.

Preliminary Note. In moral theology there are few matters in which so great a diversity of opinions among theologians is found as in the question concerning the obligation of taxes. This diversity indeed seems to have arisen in some measure because at different times and in different regions the justice and reason of taxes is not the same. Certainly, when and where many taxes are imposed which are most manifestly unjust, there no or only a small moral obligation of paying those taxes is incumbent upon individual citizens. But wherever taxes are justly distributed and imposed, citizens are obliged in conscience to pay such taxes. We speak of taxes which are determined by a law made by a legislative body which is composed of deputies elected by the people. In all modern constitutional kingdoms it can in some true sense be said that the people themselves impose taxes upon themselves, namely by means of deputies elected by the people and establishing tax laws.

¹⁶⁴ For example, land tax, income tax, business tax, etc.

¹⁶⁵ For example, inheritance tax, brandy tax, tobacco tax, customs-duties, etc.

290. General principle. Just tax laws oblige subjects in conscience.

Thus all Catholic theologians from St. Justin Martyr in the second century to our days, and it is manifestly drawn from diverse places of Sacred Scripture: Christ, after a coin was shown to him, says: "Render therefore the things which are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things which are God's to God," thus responding to the question of the Pharisees: "Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar or not?"¹⁶⁶ - But what Christ taught by word, he confirmed by his example, ordering Peter to pay the tax.¹⁶⁷ St. Paul clearly inculcates the same doctrine: "Be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience. For therefore you also pay taxes; for they are ministers of God, serving unto this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: to whom tribute, tribute; to whom custom, custom."¹⁶⁸ By these words of the Apostle two things are intimated: 1. taxes are not to be paid only on account of wrath, i.e., on account of fear of penalty, but also on account of conscience; 2. taxes are to be paid to rulers because they are ministers of God.

¹⁶⁶ Matt. 22, 17-21.

¹⁶⁷ Matt. 17, 23-26.

¹⁶⁸ Rom. 13, 5-7.

291. Controversies concerning the proper character of taxes. The principle stated can also be proved from the very nature of taxes and of human society. Modern authors¹⁶⁹ indeed do not agree concerning the nature of taxes and depart especially into four opinions.

a) Some wish them to be an implicit contract (Staatskontrakt, equivalence theory) between the people and the ruler: the ruler procures many public advantages for the people, and therefore the people give taxes to the ruler on account of these advantages received.

b) Others, determining this contract more closely, teach that taxes are nothing other than an insurance premium (insurance theory), namely for the juridical protection of goods and persons.

c) Others then teach that taxes are exactions imposed by the ruler by force of high dominion, by which the ruler prevails over the goods of subjects. For the ruler can expropriate the goods of subjects for a grave reason for the public good, provided that he furnish sufficient compensation for the goods thus expropriated. But now in the exaction of just taxes the ruler acts on account of the public good and also furnishes sufficient compensation, namely both public security and manifold goods which from taxes are procured for all citizens.

d) Finally others call taxes real obligations, which follow from the very nature of human society (solidarity theory). For man by his nature is a social animal; hence he is inclined not only to entering domestic society, but also the society of the republic. But the members of any society ought also to bear its burdens. Moreover, in our times very few republics (for example, Monaco) can procure sufficient revenues for paying public expenses without the imposition of taxes. Therefore taxes are necessary for the preservation of the republic, and accordingly subjects are held in conscience to pay necessary and just taxes. Therefore the necessity of paying taxes follows from the very nature of human society.

¹⁶⁹ Kl. Wagner treats of this matter, Die sittlichen Grundsatze etc., 20 sqq.; cf. also Amberg, Die Steuer etc., 13 sqq.

292. Restriction. There is no true obligation of conscience of paying taxes unless they are just. But for the justice of taxes three things are required: 1. legitimate authority; 2. a just cause; 3. due proportion.

The legitimate authority of imposing taxes in our days is usually some body of deputies, as has already been said. By force of the privilege of immunity clerics of themselves are exempt from the payment of civil taxes,¹⁷⁰ but today either from Concordats or from at least the tacit concession of the Supreme Pontiff, clerics are no longer exempt from taxes to be paid.

The just cause of taxes is the true public good to be procured; and therefore from the very threshold those taxes are unjust which are employed against true religion or good morals. Today not a few taxes are very unjust; notably those which are exacted from Catholics for the support of heretical worship, impious schools, disordered luxury, etc.

Due proportion is required in imposing taxes upon individual subjects. But how this proportion is to be measured in practice, men skilled in national economy do not at all agree.¹⁷¹ Before all else it is not established how great a part of taxes is to be received from direct taxes, and how great a part from indirect taxes. Generally it can be said that taxes are to be distributed according to the powers of individual citizens; but the powers are to be measured according to the revenues which remain to each one after the fitting support of himself and his own family. In practice it is morally impossible that individual citizens should truly be compelled to taxes strictly according to due proportion.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 20, de reform.

¹⁷¹ See some from the many modes of calculating the quota of taxes apud Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia n. 104.

293. Diverse opinions concerning the quality of the obligation of taxes. Although all theologians concede that just tax laws in some way oblige in conscience, nevertheless they by no means agree concerning the very quality of that obligation. Four opinions can be distinguished:

1. The obligation of all just taxes arises from commutative justice, so that their defrauding induces a strict obligation of restitution. St. Alphonsus¹⁷² calls this opinion most common and more probable, citing for it 23 authors, besides whom St. Antoninus and the Roman Catechism defend this opinion. Behold the words of St. Antoninus:¹⁷³ "Citizens who conceal their movable or immovable goods, or feign that they are worth less or that they have debts, so that less may be imposed upon them, commit theft and are bound to make satisfaction to the community." But the Roman Catechism¹⁷⁴ says: "In this crime of rapacity are included those who do not pay or who intercept and transfer to themselves the customs-duties, taxes, tithes, and other things of this kind which are owed to the rulers and magistrates of the Church." - The internal reason of this opinion is the implicit contract which is said to intervene between the ruler and the people. The ruler tacitly or expressly promised to administer the republic according to his powers and to procure the common good of the citizens; but the citizens at least tacitly promised that they would furnish the taxes necessary for satisfying all just expenses. Therefore if citizens do not pay just taxes, they injure this contract entered into and accordingly also commutative justice.¹⁷⁵ Then the same opinion can be proved by an indirect argument, namely: Just civil taxes oblige subjects in the same way as ecclesiastical taxes or tithes.¹⁷⁶ But just ecclesiastical taxes oblige from commutative justice; which indeed is commonly admitted by theologians. Therefore the same must be said of just civil taxes.

2. The obligation of all taxes arises from legal justice alone. This opinion does not seem to have been known in ancient times, but it pleases many modern authors, for example, Lehmkuhl,¹⁷⁷ Vermeersch,¹⁷⁸ Simar,¹⁷⁹ Wagner,¹⁸⁰ Waffelaert,¹⁸¹ Mausbach,¹⁸² Schindler.¹⁸³ Nevertheless some of these authors teach that an obligation of commutative justice is present if the quota of taxes has already been rightly and justly determined in a particular case. This limitation indeed is of little practical utility in our regions. For if taxes, whether direct or indirect, have once been determined in a particular case, they can scarcely be defrauded except by corrupting government officials. But such corruption, with almost all agreeing, injures commutative justice. Besides, if taxes have once been determined, they are customarily exacted with the greatest severity, so that defrauding is almost impossible. Therefore the question is not concerning the payment of taxes already assessed for an individual man, but concerning the obligation of paying taxes to be assessed according to an existing just law.

3. All laws of civil taxes are penal laws. This opinion was entirely unknown in ancient times. The first who in some measure defended it was Angelus Carletus (d. 1495) in his Summa Angelica.¹⁸⁴ Against him Sylvester Prierias, O. Pr. (1460-1523), fought vehemently.¹⁸⁵ In our times Biederlack,¹⁸⁶ Crolly,¹⁸⁷ Genicot,¹⁸⁸ Berardi,¹⁸⁹ Noldin,¹⁹⁰ etc., favor this opinion. Authors collect many reasons for this opinion: a) the common estimation of the people holds tax laws as merely penal, so that no one even of timorous conscience thinks himself held to restitution if he has defrauded taxes; b) modern legislators care nothing about obligation in conscience, and the enormous penalties which they inflict upon those defrauding taxes show clearly enough that tax laws are merely penal; c) if tax laws bound the consciences of subjects, then timorous men would be of a worse condition than impious men, who, since they care nothing about moral obligation and defraud taxes according to their powers, would cause great prejudice to timorous men, imposing upon them the taxes defrauded by themselves. - Each one easily understands that these reasons are not convincing.

4. Laws of direct taxes oblige directly in conscience; but laws of indirect taxes are merely penal. Thus after Ballerini¹⁹¹ a great part of modern theologians. The principal reason is the common estimation of the people, who in no way thinks that he sins if he defrauds indirect taxes, at least if habitual commerce does not arise from such defrauding.

In so great a number of opinions the truth is not easily discerned. Theoretically the first opinion seems to be preferred, both on account of the weight of authors and especially of Sacred Scripture and on account of internal reasons. For without the payment of just taxes social life today is very often truly impossible. Then, for taxes paid, most precious goods are given to citizens by the government: internal and external peace, streets, railroad, post, etc. All these things indeed are not judged to be granted gratis. Therefore if citizens do not pay taxes which are certainly just and nevertheless accept the benefits of government, they seem to commit a true violation of commutative justice.

¹⁷² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 616. Aertnys-Damen X 1, 831, embraces St. Alphonsus's opinion, but Marc-Raus II, 967, does not.

¹⁷³ S. theol. P. 2, tit. 1, c. 13, § 3; cf. also P. 3, tit. 8, c. 4, § 5.

¹⁷⁴ Part 3, c. 8, q. 8.

¹⁷⁵ Billuart, De iust. diss. 9, a. 7, § 2, excellently develops this reason.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. II-II, q. 87, a. 1.

¹⁷⁷ Theol. mor. I, 1170.

¹⁷⁸ Quaest. de iust. n. 106. In the work published afterwards, Theol. mor. II, n. 567, this author seems to teach that tax laws are rather penal laws.

¹⁷⁹ Lehrb. der Moraltheol. (1893), 368.

¹⁸⁰ Die sittl. Grundsatze bezugl. der Steuerpflicht 79. Nevertheless this author (p. 87) proposed the thesis: "Whoever neglects to pay a tax commanded in a just manner is indeed, toward the State (or generally toward the public community), not bound with respect to the unpaid tax to restitution in the proper sense; but there rests upon him in this respect simply the duty of subsequent tax payment, insofar as the State legally insists upon this subsequent payment, whether the nonpayment of the tax is 'malicious,' and therefore an actual so-called tax-defrauding, or not." Cf. also ibid. p. 96, the case of Titius. How this thesis coheres with an obligation of paying taxes from legal justice alone is difficult to understand.

¹⁸¹ Tractatus de virt. card., de iust. n. 420 sqq.

¹⁸² Kath. Moraltheol. III, 5 § 3.

¹⁸³ Lehrb. der Moraltheol. III, 829.

¹⁸⁴ s. v. pedagium.

¹⁸⁵ Summa s. v. gabella. Cf. Fr. Hamm, Zur Grundlegung und Geschichte der Steuermoral 217, where this matter is well treated.

¹⁸⁶ De iust. et iure (1891), n. 103; Innsbrucker Quartalschrift 1899, 164.

¹⁸⁷ Disp. theol. de iust. et iure III, n. 1010-1023.

¹⁸⁸ Theol. mor. I, 574.

¹⁸⁹ Prax. confess. (ed. 3) II, n. 413, and III, n. 57.

¹⁹⁰ I could not clearly perceive the mind of this distinguished author; de praeceptis n. 316 teaches: "tax laws which regard direct taxes in our regions of Austria and Germany seem to be preceptive from legal justice"; n. 476 the author seems to hold tax laws rather as penal.

¹⁹¹ Opus theol. I, n. 327. Noldin (De praeceptis n. 316) simply asserts: "Laws which regard indirect taxes are merely penal laws."

294. In practice the following things are to be considered:

a) In modern states no small part of taxes is certainly unjust, both because taxes are applied for impious things, for example, for false worship, for wicked schools, etc., and because taxes are not justly distributed according to the powers of each subject. But no one is held to pay unjust taxes.

Therefore those subjects who have made moderate defraudings of such taxes are not to be disturbed. Hence in not a few kingdoms a penitent who has defrauded only a third part of all his taxes cannot be obliged to restitution, even if the matter thus defrauded is grave in itself. But restitution, if any is to be made, can be made not only to the Treasury, but also to the poor or to pious causes, since the republic certainly ought to provide for these.

b) Defrauders of indirect taxes ordinarily can be treated more mildly than defrauders of direct taxes. The reason is that a sufficiently common modern estimation both of theologians and of the people holds laws concerning indirect taxes as merely penal. Not rarely also those indirect taxes rather unjustly burden citizens or even foreigners. Accordingly, restitution of profit taken from indirect taxes defrauded is indeed sometimes to be advised, but it does not seem to be imposed so strictly, unless, however, there is question of enormous defrauding made by some merchants, for example, in saccharin, as will be said below under d). Even timorous men do not think that they sin when they have not paid moderate customs-duties, at least if there is question of things destined for one's own use; for example, if someone does not pay a customs-duty for a moderate quantity of tobacco brought in for his own use.

c) Exactors of taxes by office sin gravely, indeed are held to restitution, if they knowingly favor defrauders in grave matter. For they gravely injure the contract entered into in taking up their office, namely the contract of faithfully fulfilling the office undertaken. Likewise all those who corrupt exactors so that they do not exact due taxes sin gravely and are held to restitution as unjust cooperators.¹⁹³

d) Those who deliberately and as though by way of commerce commit defraudings of taxes, for example, in the importation of saccharin, tobacco, silks, etc., are accustomed to sin gravely, because they expose themselves to the greatest dangers and employ very illicit means. They also seem to be held to restitution, both they themselves and their effective cooperators, for example, brokers, buyers of merchandise thus defrauded, especially if by continued defrauding of merchandise they have caused notable damage to other merchants. For other merchants have a strict right that from the violation of civil law grave prejudice not be inflicted upon them.

e) "Generally speaking (i.e., excepting the case named under c) concerning all customs-duties, Lugo with Molina thinks that peoples are to be admonished to pay taxes; but after the deed they are not to be compelled to restitution of the tax defrauded, if they probably persuade themselves that in so great a multitude of customs-duties they have paid something unjust or have contributed competently to public necessities." Thus St. Alphonsus.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Cf. Marc-Raus, Inst. mor. I, 968.

¹⁹⁴ Theol. mor. l. 3, 616.