Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Fourth. On the Obligation of Paying Taxes
314. Declarations. 1. Tax in general is everything which is paid to the republic for meeting common expenses.
A tax described in this way comprises several species of taxes, which are all reduced to two genera, direct and indirect taxes. A direct tax is tax strictly accepted, which is defined as a payment imposed to be paid by citizens for common necessities or utilities.
- Some taxes are direct, others indirect.
a. Those are called direct which are imposed immediately upon persons, whether by reason of goods, both movable and immovable, or by reason of art or business. To this belong personal taxes (Personalsteuer), which are exacted from individual persons or families according to movable wealth; real taxes, which are imposed on account of immovable goods, such as fields and houses (Grund-, Haussteuer); and concessions which are made to subjects for exercising an art or for exercising a business (Gewerbe-, Erwerbsteuer).
b. Those are called indirect which are imposed immediately upon certain things on the occasion of the change of rights by contract or succession (Steuer vom Vermogensverkehr, Erbschaftssteuer), on the occasion of the manufacture, sale, or use of certain things (Branntwein-, Brau-, Tabaksteuer, etc.), on the occasion of the transport of merchandise into another region (Zolle - customs).
alpha. Inheritance tax (Erbschaftssteuer) is referred by others to direct taxes, because it immediately affects the heir by reason of the inheritance.
beta. From taxes must be distinguished those things which are paid to the treasury by force of a private contract entered with it, as the price for transporting persons, merchandise, and letters; for these are owed from commutative justice.
315. On the law of taxes. 1. Political authority can establish tax laws obligating subjects in conscience, provided they are just; for by the very fact that it has the right and office of directing society to its proper end, it also has the right of demanding the means which are necessary or useful for governing society, and upon subjects falls the obligation of contributing those things which are demanded for this end.1
Therefore the obligation of paying taxes arises from the very fact by which someone is a citizen, that is, a part of civil society. For just as in the present order each one by natural necessity concurs for his own good to constitute society, so by the same necessity he ought to contribute that which is required for preserving the same society. Those do not rightly conceive tax who affirm that it is a recompense furnished by citizens to the community for the goods and advantages which individuals receive from social life. In determining the amount of tax to be imposed upon individuals, account can also be had of the advantage received from society; but the received advantage cannot be called the foundation of the obligation.
- In order that the imposition of taxes be just, besides legitimate power to impose them three things are required: a. a just cause, which is judged to be present if the tax immediately or mediately falls to the common good, to which must also be referred the support of the ruler suitable to his dignity; b. a just mode, that is, the tax must not be excessive but moderate, namely one which does not exceed the demand of public necessity or utility; c. just proportion with the means of the subjects, so that the rich ought to pay more than the poor. If one of these conditions is lacking, the tax law must be called unjust, and it does not induce an obligation of paying taxes except for avoiding a greater evil.
In doubt concerning the justice of a tax, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus (n. 615), it is licit to presume that it is unjust. Generally indeed in doubt one must presume in favor of the justice of the law and in favor of the obligation of obeying; yet if peculiar circumstances suggest the contrary, in doubt it is licit to hold it unjust. But the peculiar circumstances in our case are these: because the conditions which are required for the justice of taxes have in fact not been observed, unjust laws have several times been established, on account of which the presumption is rather contrary to these laws. Moreover, by tax law subjects are not only heavily burdened, but are also deprived of their own goods; but in doubt concerning the justice of such a law, subjects are not bound to obedience.2
1 Writers of ethics and natural law treat this matter professedly. Cf. Theod. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturae (Friburgi: Herder, 1900), II, n. 628 ss.; Vict. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1899), II, p. 625; A. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia^2 (Brugis: Beyaert, 1904), n. 97-128.
2 Cf. Lugo, De iustitia et iure, disp. 36, n. 86.
316. On the obligation of tax laws. 1. Just tax laws, if they are preceptive, oblige from legal justice; for tax laws have nothing special, but must be judged according to the norm of other laws;1 but other civil laws of themselves oblige from legal justice. And indeed, from legal justice subjects are bound to supply those things which are required for the common good, if by law they are demanded from them. Although now taxes are imposed through deputies elected by the people, nevertheless tax laws do not obtain the force of obligating from the consent of the people, but from the will of the deputies and of the ruler himself; and therefore they have the character of true law, equally as others do.
a. Most among the older authors, and those of the best reputation, were of this opinion: that tax laws, at least some, oblige from commutative justice. They derived this obligation from a quasi-contract tacitly entered between ruler and subjects, by which the former indeed obligates himself to good and right governance, but the subjects obligate themselves to furnishing a stipend by which the ruler can sustain public burdens.2 But, if we prescind from the feudal right of former times, no tacit contract of this sort intervenes; rather the ruler, without a contract, by natural ordination is bound from legal justice suitably to govern the republic, and subjects from the same legal justice are bound to supply the means necessary for good governance.
b. The obligation of tax law can be understood in such a way that subjects are not bound to pay taxes except insofar as they are demanded from them, determined as to quantity; for it belongs to the superior of the community to divide the common burdens among subjects, who therefore are not bound to furnish a determinate burden before distribution.
- Laws which regard indirect taxes are merely penal laws.
a. Indeed, among men even timorous ones, the persuasion is common that they are held to pay these taxes lest they incur the punishment enjoined upon those not paying. Moreover, punishments inflicted on those defrauding these taxes are extraordinarily grave; but very grave and exorbitant punishments inflicted on transgressors of a law are ordinarily a sign of a penal law. Finally, public power not only possesses sufficient means by which it may exact the payment of taxes, but in fact also employs these physical means, and these alone; but from this manner of acting it is gathered that it does not urge an obligation of conscience.
b. Therefore they do not sin nor are they bound to restitution who import and sell prohibited merchandise. Yet those who deliberately and as if from their own business are occupied in defrauding customs, smugglers (Schmuggler), cannot be excused from grave sin, both because they expose themselves to grave danger not only of incurring a very grave punishment, but also of undergoing damage to life, and because they are of a disposition so prepared that they would defend themselves even by inflicted force against public guards and collectors of customs.
- Tax laws which regard direct taxes, provided they are just, in our regions of Austria and Germany seem to be preceptive from legal justice: for of themselves they oblige from legal justice; but the reasons which are adduced for denying preceptive force as to indirect taxes do not seem to hold for these taxes. There is added the manner of speaking of sacred Scripture, from which taxes in general oblige in conscience: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's."3 "Be subject of necessity not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience: for therefore also you pay taxes; render therefore to all what is due: tax to whom tax, custom to whom custom."4
There is no lack of authors who, from nearly the same reasons which can be adduced concerning indirect taxes, think that direct taxes also are imposed by way of penal law. It must be conceded to these that among the faithful, even timorous ones, there is a common persuasion that among so many and such great taxes which are demanded, some are unjust or at least excessive, and therefore that they do not act against conscience if they do not pay all taxes, but sufficiently contribute to the common good insofar as they are bound, because they pay part of the taxes. Hence it is that they judge themselves not bound accurately to declare the goods on account of which taxes are demanded. Moreover, these authors take account of the conditions of their own region, where perhaps the legislator attaches little weight to an obligation of conscience and subjects hold these laws as penal.5
1 Cf. Suarez, De legibus, l. 5, c. 13, n. 6.
2 Cf. Lugo, l. c., disp. 36, n. 38; Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 33, n. 57; Sporer-Bierbaum, II, tract. 5, n. 926; and several others. Of more recent authors, from a similar reason, Marres, De iustitia^2 (Ruraemundae: Romen, 1889), l. 2, n. 196; Scavini, Theologia moralis^12 (Medolani: Oliva, 1890), II, n. 604; E. Muller, Theologia moralis^3 (Vindobonae: Mayr, 1894), II, p. 466; Amberg, Die Steuer in der Rechtsphilosophie der Scholastiker (Berlin and Leipzig: Rothschild, 1909).
3 Matt. 22:21.
4 Rom. 13:5-7.
5 Genicot (I, n. 474) affirms that tax laws at least in Belgium are more probably merely penal laws; Berardi (Prax. conf., II, n. 413) and Bucceroni (De leg., n. 81) teach the same universally. Ballerini-Palmieri (I, n. 327) affirms that only laws which regard indirect taxes are penal.
317. On declaring goods for which taxes are imposed. a. If there exists no obligation of conscience of paying the taxes themselves, neither does there exist an obligation of declaring the goods for which they are imposed. Wherefore stocks or merchandise on account of which indirect or unjust direct taxes are demanded do not have to be declared. Therefore merchandise which is imported can licitly be hidden, but one must abstain from lies and frauds.
b. Where there exists a strict obligation of paying direct taxes, the goods and their just value are to be declared from legal justice; for by a law issued by the ruler, it is commanded that citizens themselves declare their things subject to tax, and they are bound of themselves to obey this law from legal justice.
c. Nevertheless, one who tries to conceal a fourth or third part of goods must not be held guilty of injustice for a twofold cause: alpha. because some taxes can be held unjust, so that each person, with that part deducted, can still be judged to have satisfied his obligation of contributing to the common good for his part; beta. because this manner of acting is commonly observed also by others, from which it happens that others are not therefore forced to pay more, nor does the government lack necessary subsidies, since for this very reason it is accustomed to increase taxes.
Notaries who in drawing up instruments of sale or things of this sort declare a lesser value of things which are liable to tax do not act against commutative justice, since from the office committed to them they must not care for the utility of the government, but draw up authentic documents according to the norm of law. Indeed, both notaries and the private persons for whom instruments of this sort are drawn up can be excused from lying, where the usage has commonly prevailed of declaring a lesser value of things; for in this case the instruments affirm only that this is the value which, according to received custom, is subject to tax.
d. The oath by which it must sometimes be confirmed that all things have been rightly declared effects that a sin against religion is committed if anything has been hidden or if the price of things which are liable to taxes has been depressed below the lowest. Yet where it is established that a tax is unjust either wholly or in part, it is licit to use a mental restriction, so that, the oath having been emitted, religion is not injured, even if that which is unjustly demanded has been hidden.
Declaration has the character of a necessary means, without which the tax law cannot be committed to execution. Therefore by the same right and the same obligation by which the taxes themselves are demanded, the declaration of things which are liable to taxes is also imposed. It is clear that by the same right and the same obligation there is also demanded an oath concerning the declaration rightly made. One who justly and licitly hides part of the things liable to tax can also licitly emit an oath concerning the declaration rightly made, namely the one which is justly demanded.
318. Obligations of collectors. a. They are bound to exact the taxes and customs for whose exaction they have been constituted with suitable diligence, and indeed each one of them unless it is established that they are unjust, yet in such a way that they treat more kindly the poor and those who are diligent in paying taxes, and this from the reasonably presumed will of the ruler. If they do not diligently exact taxes and customs, or if without just cause they act more indulgently so that either the whole or a great part can be defrauded, they sin against commutative justice, because from contract and from the stipend received they have been constituted to exact taxes.
b. Collectors of taxes or customs who allow themselves to be corrupted by money or to be induced by other unjust means, so that they exact either no taxes and customs or lesser ones, or omit to inquire into things liable to tax, sin against commutative justice. Against the same justice also act those who corrupt collectors, because they induce them to a sin of injustice and by unjust means impede the treasury from obtaining the just tax.