Conscience

206. Conscience. 1. The existence of moral conscience is a universal fact: for all men, cultivated as well as barbarians, perceive the voice of conscience within themselves.

The authors cited above have diligently collected testimonies of this matter, especially Cathrein. Sacred Scripture everywhere supposes conscience, since it everywhere describes its various activities. Cf. Schindler p. 195.

2. By the name of moral conscience (synteresis) is signified first of all the habit of the first moral principles, which the Greeks call synteresis. Therefore synteresis is a certain property of the intellect by which it knows with great facility and evidence the most universal moral principles or supreme principles of the natural law. Then, however, synteresis also signifies these principles themselves.

a. Principles of this kind are, e.g.: good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; the supreme deity is to be worshiped; promises are to be kept; precepts are to be fulfilled; and other supreme principles of the natural law. From these universal principles moral science deduces the truths which it itself teaches, e.g. good is to be done; but to aid the wretched is good; therefore the wretched are to be aided; evil is to be avoided; adultery is evil; therefore adultery is to be avoided.

b. There is in man an innate disposition for leading a moral life (eine sittliche Anlage), which disposition comprises two things: a disposition of the intellect for knowing the moral law, and a natural propensity of the will for following the moral laws proposed by the intellect as the norm of free activity. Since each disposition is signified by the name conscience (synteresis), it is clear that conscience in this sense designates the whole moral life insofar as it proceeds from intellect and will, as when we call a man religious or lacking religion (gewissenhaft, gewissenlos).

c. Conscience, since it is a disposition and habitual quality of the intellect and will, can and ought to be cultivated and perfected: as regards the intellect, by the fact that by learning the laws to be observed we acquire moral science for ourselves; as regards the will, by the fact that we promptly obey moral laws. The same conscience, although it can never be entirely extinguished, can nevertheless by negligence, and especially by vices and pleasures, be obscured, weakened, indeed even vitiated. Hence we speak equally of an enlightened and vigilant conscience, and of a cauterized and sleeping conscience.

¹ St. Thomas I-II q. 19. St. Alphonsus l. 1. 1. tr. 1. n. 1-89. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia mor. decalog. (Paderbornae. Typographia bonifac. 1897) I. tr. 1. n. 1-109. Reuter, Theolog. mor. pr. 1, tr. 2. n. 59 ss. Bouquillon l. c. pr. 2. n. 243 ss. Lehmkuhl I. n. 41 ss. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theolog. mor. (Prati. Giachetti. 1898) I. n. 130-235. Simar, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit (Freiburg. Herder. 1902). Cathrein, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit (Freiburg. Herder. 1906).

207. Conscience (syneidesis). Moral conscience in the other sense is a judgment of the mind concerning the morality of an action, proximately practical, which judgment is customarily called a dictate (of conscience).

a. Conscience puts itself forth in a twofold manner: before an action it manifests that the action is good and to be done, or evil and to be omitted; after an action (or omission), if following the voice of conscience we have done good and omitted evil, it praises and approves, from which joy and tranquility of heart follow; but if we have acted against conscience, it censures us, whence anguish and pain of heart follow.

b. A judgment of the mind which has as its object the morality of a human action is one thing if remotely practical or speculative, which regards actions in the abstract and in general, as that theft is to be avoided, that one in need is to be assisted; another if proximately practical or simply practical, which is referred to moral actions in the concrete and in particular, to be placed here and now, together with all the circumstances in which they are found, and immediately directs the will of the agent, e.g. that this thing is not to be taken away by me as belonging to another, that this man in need is now to be aided by me. Not the former, but the latter, is called conscience.

c. Judgments concerning the goodness and malice of actions in general are either most universal, namely truths which constitute synteresis or the first moral principles, or less universal, which are so many conclusions deduced from the first principles: evil is to be avoided; theft is evil. These deduced truths constitute moral science. For deducing these judgments the intellect can acquire a habit, which is likewise called moral science. In forming the principles of synteresis the intellect does not err; in forming the principles of moral science it can err and sometimes does err.

d. The truths both of synteresis and of moral science are universal; conscience, on the contrary, is concerned with a singular action now to be placed, and therefore its dictates are particular, yet deduced immediately from the truths of moral science, mediately from the truths of synteresis. Therefore the dictate of conscience is always the conclusion of some syllogism, whose major contains the moral law, whose minor contains the action to be placed here and now, to which the law is applied, and whose conclusion exhibits the agreement or disagreement of the action with the law, e.g. theft is illicit; this action is theft; therefore this action is illicit.

208. The force of conscience. 1. Conscience is the proximate and internal norm of moral actions: for the will, since it is a blind power, needs suitable direction; but the will can receive direction only from conscience: for that power upon which the will naturally depends in its operations is reason; but reason which in a particular case dictates that this is to be done because it is good, that is to be omitted because it is evil, is conscience. It is called the proximate rule because it is nearer to the will than law is, and it is called the subjective and internal rule, so that it may be distinguished from law, which is the objective and external norm.

Therefore, and this must be carefully noted, human actions do not take their moral (formal) goodness or malice from the norm of morality or from law as it is in itself, but from law as proposed to the will through the dictate of conscience, or from conscience; wherefore those are distressed without reason over past actions placed in good faith who afterward hear that they were sinful.

2. The force of obliging truly belongs to conscience: for the force of obliging belongs to law truly and properly so called; therefore also to conscience, which is nothing other than law applied to individual human actions. Therefore the obligatory force of conscience is the same as that of law; and since every obligation of law must be derived from the will of God, conscience is commonly and not unsuitably called both the will of God and the voice of God.

But since God manifests His will to us through our reason, which can be deceived, the dictate of conscience can be erroneous; hence it can happen that we are bound to follow a conscience commanding evil.

209. Division. Conscience is divided in many ways:

1. By reason of the acts to which it is referred, into antecedent and consequent, according as the acts are either soon to be placed or already placed; the former judges what is good or evil, what is to be done or omitted, but the latter approves or accuses the past, or even, if this can be done, excuses it.

Antecedent conscience is given to us by God as guide and moderator of our moral life, which we are bound to follow in order that we may arrive at the end of eternal life; consequent conscience acts as judge of our actions, praising and approving if they are good, admonishing, reproving, censuring, terrifying, and chastising if they are evil. The approving judgment is called the testimony of a good conscience; the accusing and reproving judgment, remorse or the worm of conscience. The testimony of a good conscience brings consolation and reward, the gift of internal peace; the remorse of conscience brings anguish and punishment: There is no peace for the impious.¹ Hence conscience greatly helps man to attain his end.

Note. Antecedent conscience is the proximate rule of morals, concerning which alone we speak here, and to which therefore the divisions that follow pertain.

2. By reason of the obligation which it manifests, into prescribing, prohibiting, and permitting conscience.

3. By reason of assent, into certain and doubtful conscience. Certain conscience is that by which the mind firmly judges, without fear of erring, that an action is good and licit or evil and illicit; doubtful conscience is that by which the mind suspends judgment concerning the honesty of an action, or indeed forms it, but with fear of erring.

4. By reason of conformity with the object, into true and erroneous conscience.

a. True (right) conscience is that which dictates the matter as it is in itself; erroneous conscience is that which dictates otherwise than the matter is in itself.

Properly speaking, a distinction intervenes between true and right conscience. Ordinarily, indeed, right conscience will also be true. For that is called true which is consonant with the objective order of things, and therefore says good of that which in reality is good, and evil of that which in reality is evil. But the dictate of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of a syllogism, whose major proposition is a moral principle, and whose minor proposition is a human action to which that principle is applied, so that from this it can be concluded that the action is licit or illicit. Further, conscience is called right when it has been duly deduced according to logical laws from a moral principle. Now it can happen that the reasoning proceeds from a false moral principle; whence it can happen that the conclusion or conscience is indeed right, but false.

b. Erroneous conscience is either invincible and inculpable, whose error cannot morally be overcome; or vincible and culpable, whose error can be laid aside by employing moral diligence, but through carelessness is not laid aside.

Erroneous conscience can be invincible in two ways: either because not even a suspicion or doubt concerning the error comes into the mind of the agent, or because a doubt concerning the error has indeed arisen, but not even by employing moral diligence can the error be laid aside and the truth found. Thus he also errs invincibly who, doubting whether on such a day there is abstinence, after employing moral diligence is ignorant that abstinence is in reality prescribed. Nevertheless, the principle which follows is valid only concerning the former mode of invincibly erroneous conscience; concerning the other mode there will be discussion below.

5. Erroneous conscience is divided into lax and narrow conscience.

a. Lax conscience is called that which for a slighter cause either denies or diminishes the character of sin. To lax conscience is also reduced cauterized conscience (das abgestumpfte Gewissen), which, arising from a long-standing habit of sinning, makes light even of grave sins, and pharisaical conscience, which makes little of great precepts, but much of small and external observances.

b. Narrow conscience is called that which for a slighter cause affirms or increases the character of sin. To narrow conscience is reduced scrupulous conscience, which increases the character of sin too much, and perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin on both sides.

¹ Is. 57, 21. Printed as "Is. 22, 57"; corrected as a clear printer's error.

THE voice of conscience is the authoritative guide of man’s moral conduct. Not that the individual conscience is independent of all authority; if the individual conscience is right, it proclaims the duty of submitting to all properly constituted authority, and especially to the supreme and absolute authority of God. It is, as theologians are fond of saying, the herald or ambassador of God to each individual, making known to him and applying the eternal law of God to the conduct of life.

Although the term is also used with other meanings, here conscience signifies a dictate of the practical reason deciding that a particular action is right or wrong. The process by which we arrive at this judgement of the practical reason may be put in the form of a syllogism. The major premise will be some general law of conduct, the minor will be its application to the particular case, the conclusion will be the judgement, which is nothing else but conscience. Thus when a precept has been given by one who is in lawful possession of authority, the dictate of conscience is implicitly arrived at somewhat as follows: I must obey all who command me with lawful authority. A.B. commands me with lawful authority. Therefore I must obey him is the conclusion and the dictate of conscience.

Conscience is said to be certain, dubious, or probable, as the motive on which it is grounded is morally certain, doubtful, or only probable.

A right conscience is in accordance with the eternal law of morality; an erroneous conscience gives a false instead of a true judgement. If the mistake could and ought to have been avoided by the agent who has a false conscience, the conclusion is vincibly erroneous; otherwise it is invincibly erroneous.

A strict conscience is one which is apt to decide that there is an obligation when none exists, or a greater obligation than there really is; a lax conscience, on the contrary, is apt to deny an existing obligation or to make it less than it is in fact; a scrupulous conscience without sufficient reason apprehends sin where there is none.

A dictate of conscience which precedes the action, judging it to be right or wrong, is said to be antecedent; that which follows an action, approving it as rightly done, or condemning it as wrong and disturbing the inward peace of the soul, is consequent,

CERTAINTY in general is a firm assent of the mind to something known, without the fear of mistake. In mathematics and in other branches of exact science we can often attain absolute certainty, which rests on the evident truth of the principles which are employed to arrive at it. For anyone who is capable of following the demonstration there can be no manner of doubt that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. In the science of morality we have frequently to be content with a lower degree of certainty than this; there is often some obscurity about the principles to be applied, and human acts are not the matter of necessary and unvarying law. We have to be content with what is called moral certainty; but this again is of various degrees. I am morally certain of the existence of Berlin, though I never saw the city. Any person who doubted of its existence would be thought to be insane. The grounds on which the judgement that Berlin exists are based are so many and so strong that they leave no room for prudent doubt in the matter. In such cases we have perfect moral certainty. In other cases I may be conscious that mistake is possible but not probable, as when a man has been condemned on evidence which has satisfied a jury of intelligent men. In such cases if there can be no prudent doubt about the justice of the verdict I have moral certainty of an imperfect but real kind. If I could not safely rely in guiding my conduct on such a degree of certainty, I should have to abstain from action altogether. Ordinarily greater certainty cannot be obtained in human affairs.

In order to act lawfully and rightly, I must have at least moral certainty of the imperfect kind that the proposed action is honest and right. This degree of certainty will be sufficient, for ordinarily no greater can be had, as we have just seen. It is also required for right action; for if I am not at least to this extent morally certain that my action is right, I am conscious that it may be wrong. In this case I am bound to pause, and satisfy myself that it is right before acting; for if I do not do so my will is ready to embrace what may be wrong I am ready to do the action whether it is in right order or not. But such a will is malicious; it is not firmly set on doing what is right; and sin is thereby committed.

A subjectively certain conscience then, which tells me without prudent doubt that the action is right, is required for lawful action; “‘ All that is not of faith is sin,” as St Paul says.¹ It will be sufficient if we have imperfect moral certainty, as we have seen.²

¹ Rom. xiv 23.

² St Thomas, 2-2, q. 70, a. 2.

If I have this imperfect moral certainty that my action is right, I am justified in acting, and if with such certainty my conscience tells me that I am bound to act, I must do so, even though my conscience be erroneous. For my action is morally good if my will be good. My will is good when it tends to a good object as represented by my intellect, not as it is in itself. But if my will follows my conscience and determines on what it prescribes, my will then tends to a good object as represented by my intellect and is a good will. So that even though my conscience be erroneous, I am justified in following it, and I am bound to follow it when it prescribes any action to be performed.¹ This is true whenever I have a certain conscience—that is, when I have no doubt or suspicion about the honesty of my action, even though my conscience be erroneous. If I were the wilful cause of my conscience being in error by not taking means to inform it correctly, then any objectively wrong action that I perform is voluntary in the cause, and so far imputable to me, but here and now I must follow my conscience.

I am said to be bound by my conscience because it compels me to follow it under pain of doing wrong, committing sin, and being exposed to the pangs of remorse. It binds me also in the name of God, whose will it makes known to me, It speaks, therefore, with the authority of God, it sternly bids me follow his behests, and it reproves me with the authority of a superior if I neglect to follow its promptings. As representing the will of God its authority is greater, as St Thomas teaches,² than that of any merely earthly superior. .4. The question as to whether in any particular case a person acted with an erroneous conscience is a question of fact, which only he and God can decide. Still, following approved theologians, we may make use of certain presumptions drawn from the nature of things and from experience. It may be admitted that ignorant and dull people may have an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the malice of merely internal sins committed in thought only; but we should except efficacious desires to do what is known to be wrong. A person can scarcely know that the external action is morally wrong and be ignorant of the malice of an effective desire to commit such an action.

Again, the first principles of morality, which are certain general axioms of conduct, such as, Do to others as you would be done by, can scarcely fail to be known by anyone who has the use of reason. Even the secondary principles of the moral law, or the precepts of the Decalogue, are usually known by those who have attained the use of reason among civilized men; if in any case there is ignorance of them, it is vincible ignorance, and so more or less culpable. Theologians readily admit the possibility of an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the application of the general principles of morality to concrete cases. The theological disputes which they chronicle are proof of the fact. 1 St Thomas, 1-2, q. 94, aa. 4, 6.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 19, a. 5.

² De Verit., q. 17, a. 5.

WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind’s inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.

If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.¹

Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.

A doubt about law has reference to the law’s existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. 1.

It is not lawful to perform an action with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right or wrong. The reason is obvious; for, as we saw in the last chapter, we must have a certain conscience that the action is right before performing it, otherwise sin is committed, and one who has a doubtful conscience has not a certain conscience.

The sin which is committed by one who acts with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right takes its species and gravity from the doubtful conscience. If I eat meat with a practical doubt as to whether it is not forbidden on that day by the Church, I commit a sin of the same kind and malice as if I ate meat knowingly on a day of abstinence. The reason is obvious from what was said about a certain conscience. The species of a sin and its malice depend upon the mind and will of the agent, and when one acts with a doubtful conscience the will is prepared to commit a sin of the kind apprehended, and by that very act it commits the sin.

As long as the conscience is in a state of practical doubt, one may abstain from action altogether, or do what in any case would be licit. There is no danger of sin if, while doubting whether it is allowed to eat meat, one abstains from food altogether, or eats only what is allowed on days of abstinence. The axiom—In dubio pars tutior est sequenda—is to be taken in this sense. An effort may also be made to resolve the doubt by making inquiries of those who know, by consulting authorities, or by making use of certain principles of conduct which are approved by law and right reason. In this manner a certain conscience may frequently be formed.

There are various principles or axioms suitable for the purpose of forming one’s conscience when in doubt. They are for the most part taken from canon law, but they are also used in questions belonging to the forum of conscience.

In dubio melior est conditio possidentis—Possession is properly a physical fact, and consists in the corporal detention of a thing. In a wider sense rights are objects of possession, as a right of way, or the right to one’s liberty; so that if one’s liberty has hitherto been unrestricted, it is said to be in possession. The very fact of possession gives a right to continue in possession unless there is an adverse and stronger claim. There is also in the possessor a presumption of title to possess, for all men are jealous of their rights, and usually do not allow their property or rights to be held by others as owners. If, then, I am in possession of some object or right, and a doubt supervenes as to whether I am entitled to possession in the case or not, the question may be solved in the forum of conscience as it would be in a court of law, by applying the maxim —In dubio melior est conditio possidentis.¹

If, then, a doubt arises as to whether I have said my breviary, I must say it, for the law is in possession; if on the contrary a doubt comes into my mind as to whether I have taken food after midnight, I may go to Holy Communion, because my right to receive is in possession.

¹ Cf. Irish Eccles. Record, Sept. 1899.

In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio. (In doubt one must stand by that for which the presumption stands.) A presumption is a probable conjecture about an uncertain event. The conjecture is such as would be formed in the circumstances by a man of ordinarily sound judgement and prudence. This is called a praesumptio hominis to distinguish it from a praesumptio juris, which the law itself sanctions in certain circumstances. Thus, according to the old canon law, if the parents of a boy and girl promised them in marriage and they did not express dissent, there was a praesumptio juris that they gave their consent, and they were reputed betrothed to each other. This praesumptio juris admits, indeed, of proof to the contrary; in cases where proof to the contrary is not admitted, there is praesumptio juris et de jure, as it is called.

When in doubt, I can frequently form my conscience by the aid of this axiom. If, for example, I am in the habit of saying my little hours after breakfast, and some evening a doubt occurs to me whether I said them on that day, I need not say them then, the presumption being that I said them in the morning as usual, and—In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio.

¹ Cap. un., de despon. impub. in’ Sexto.

In dubio factum non praesumitur sed probari debet. Similarly, Nemo praesumitur malus donec probetur. (In doubt a fact is not presumed but must be proved. Similarly, No one is presumed wicked until he is proved so.) These axioms are understood of some principal fact, the fact of baptism, for example, or the commission of a crime, which obviously should not be presumed. If on the contrary the principal fact is certain, and a doubt arises as to some accessory circumstance, then other axioms should be used to guide the conduct: as, In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum; or, In dubio praesumitur factum quod de jure faciendum erat; or, In dubio standum est pro valore actus. (as, In doubt every act is presumed to have been rightly done; or, In doubt that is presumed to have been done which by law ought to have been done; or, In doubt one must stand by the validity of the act.) So that if I am certain that I baptized a child, but begin to doubt whether I anointed the head with chrism, according to the ritual, I am not bound to supply the ceremony afterwards.

A SUBJECTIVELY certain conscience that the proposed action is lawful is required before performing any action, as we have already seen. A great difficulty—a difficulty which has to be faced by all moralists—arises from this principle in consequence of the uncertainty as to whether many actions in the concrete are lawful. One need not consult the works of moralists to find out what difference of opinion there is among experts on many practical questions of morals. It will be sufficient to consult one’s own experience. In the conflict of rights and duties, and in the obscurity which exists as to the application of moral principles to concrete cases, we are frequently at a loss as to what course duty prescribes. The cases which are constantly submitted to the decision of courts of law, but which also belong to morality, illustrate the familiar truth that opinion and not certainty is very often alone attainable in the field of conduct. But if this be the case, what is a conscientious man to do? He finds himself in a difficulty; what the right thing to do under the circumstances may be is not clear. A young man has promised to marry a girl somewhat his inferior in social position; they are both satisfied that the union would be a happy one for both, but the young man’s parents will not hear of the thing, and strictly forbid him to see the girl again. Must he obey his parents, or may he follow his inclinations and keep his promise? He consults those whose knowledge and judgement he respects, and they give him contrary decisions. He goes to recognized authorities on morals, and finds the same difference of opinion.

This example is but a type of innumerable questions which constantly arise in everyday life. Is it possible to lay down any universal principle for the solution of such doubtful cases, so as to be able to act with a certain conscience ?

Catholic theologians answer this question in the affirmative, but they are not agreed as to what the principle is. A probabiliorist would tell the young man that he must obey his parents and break off the engagement unless the opinion that he may marry the girl in spite of the prohibition is distinctly ae more probable than the opposite. An equiprobabilist would say that he may marry the girl if the weight of opinion is fairly equal on either side. A probabilist would maintain that he may marry her if there is a solidly probable opinion which favours that course. The terms are technical, and their meaning should be carefully studied. - An opinion, as we have already gathered from St Thomas, is an adhesion of the mind to one proposition, but with a consciousness that the opposite may be true.

A probable opinion is one which rests on good and solid grounds, such as would incline a man of prudence and judgement to embrace it. If the intrinsic reasons of the opinion are the grounds for embracing it, we have an intrinsic probability; if authority is the ground, we have an extrinsic probability.

A more probable opinion is one which rests on weightier reasons than the opposite, but which leaves the opposite still probable.

A very probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that the opposite is not considered solidly probable.

A morally certain opinion excludes even slight probability in the opposite; it is an adhesion of the mind to a truth without any fear of mistake.

In this difficult question, the Catholic Church so far has been content to condemn extreme views, and allows her children to follow any of the moderate systems mentioned above. Alexander VIII¹ condemned rigorism, which required direct moral certainty in all cases about the lawfulness of an action, and denied that it is ever lawful to follow an opinion which is very probable among several. Laxism was condemned by Innocent XI, since it taught that one might lawfully act on a slight probability.² The systems which are known as Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism all have their adherents; the Catholic moralist is free to follow whichever he wishes.

To us it seems that probabilism is the true system, and if it be rightly understood, as it is taught by its moderate supporters, and not as it is misinterpreted by its opponents, we are convinced that it will recommend itself to practical common sense.

Its maxim may be formulated thus: When there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion, even though the opposite may be more probable.

The wording of the formula should be carefully weighed. The words “ when there is only question of committing sin or not ” limit the application of the principle to cases where the only question is whether by following such a course sin will be committed because a certain law, human or divine, will be broken. Probabilism, then, cannot be applied to cases where the validity of an act is in question, where some end must be obtained, or where there is question of the certain right of some other person which must be respected. In all these cases we are bound to safeguard the end by taking means that are sure and not merely probable. These are not so many exceptions to the use of probabilism; there is a certain obligation to use secure means to obtain the end in view in such cases, and so there can be no question as to whether probabilism is applicable or not. This will explain why Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that it is not unlawful for a minister of the sacraments to follow a probable opinion about their validity when administering them; and another, which taught that a judge might use probabilism in giving sentence in a court of law; and a third, which excused an infidel who followed a probable opinion and remained in infidelity. In all these cases there is not merely question of sin, but the certain rights of others are at stake, or there is question of an end which cannot lawfully be exposed to risk.

Again, the words “ it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion ” should be noted. It is not a question as to what is more perfect, what the noble and generous thing to do may be. The rule merely asserts that there is no obligation under pain of sin to follow the more perfect course, if in the case there be one.

Finally, the words are added “ even though the opposite may be more probable.” For the greater probability of the other view does not make it certain, nor is the supposed greater probability a sure guarantee that the more probable view is the more true. It very frequently happens that an opinion which is considered more probable at one time is thought less probable or altogether improbable at another. Moreover, degrees of probability are very difficult to determine. What seems more probable to one theologian seems less so to another, or even to the same at a different time. And even if it be granted that one opinion is certainly and absolutely more probable, the opposite may for all that remain solidly probable.³ With these provisos the proof of the thesis is not very difficult.

¹ Prop. 3, condemned December 7, 1690.

² Prop. 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

³ Decree of March 2, 1679, props. 1, 2, 4.

Whenever there is a solidly probable opinion that a particular action is lawful, there is no certain law forbidding one to perform it. But it is lawful to do what no certain law forbids. Therefore when there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even though the opposite may be more probable.

The major premise of this syllogism is obvious. No opinion can be probable which has a certain law against it. The certain law imposes a certain obligation. On the other hand, if an opinion is probable and acknowledged as such by five or six experts, good, prudent, and learned men, it is impossible that there should be a law contrary to the probable opinion. Or if there is such a law, the law cannot be sufficiently promulgated, or else it would be known to the experts. But a law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not bind; ignorance excuses from its transgression. The minor premise, too, is clear. We are at liberty to do what no certain law prohibits. If indeed I doubt whether an action is forbidden, I am bound to inquire and satisfy my conscience on the point. But whenever there is a probable opinion, this inquiry has been already made by experts, and with the result that no law forbidding the action can be discovered, otherwise the opinion will not be probable. The conclusion then is certain.

Therefore in cases where there is a probable opinion, or a positively doubtful conscience, I may arrive at a certain conscience required for lawful action by reasoning implicitly somewhat as follows: The opinion is probable that this action which I am contemplating is lawful—for example, marrying according to my promise a good and suitable person in spite of the prohibition of my parents which indeed does not seem to be reasonable. But if this is so, there is no law forbidding me to do it; I violate no obligation in marrying her. Therefore J may marry her.

The proof of probabilism from what we must call at least the toleration of the Church for some centuries will perhaps appeal still more strongly to Catholic minds, The guardianship of faith and morals has been committed to the Church by her divine Founder. He has promised that she shall not fail in the task committed to her even to the end of time. But if a false doctrine is widely held and publicly taught for some centuries in the Church, and she does not condemn it, does not protest against it, the promise of Christ ’ fails to be effective, which is impossible. So that probabilism, which has been widely held and publicly taught for some centuries as a theory of morals without being condemned by the Church, cannot be a false system¹ A third argument may be drawn from the approbation of the works of St Alphonsus Liguori by the Holy See. The decree of May 18, 1803, on the revision and approbation of the works of St Alphonsus with a view to his beatification, gives a list of his works and expressly states that after careful examination nothing reprehensible was found in them. Among the works mentioned is a dissertation on the moderate use of a probable opinion when it conflicts with a more probable opinion on the other side, published in 1755. In this dissertation St Alphonsus clearly and ably defends and proves probabilism; he never withdrew or corrected this dissertation, though to save his Congregation and the doctrine he afterwards modified the statement of his views. He followed probabilism in his choice of opinions while writing his great work on moral theology which subsequently, though he admitted corrections in details, remained substantially the same.

¹ St Alphonsus, Dissertation, anno 1755, n. 10.

It has been already pointed out that, although we may lawfully adopt and follow a probable opinion, there is no obligation of doing so, and it will frequently be more perfect to follow an opposite opinion. It is not intended to propose probabilism as the ideal of Christian conduct; we go to ascetical writers and elsewhere for that.¹ Probabilism is especially an instrument of moral theology, to be wisely and prudently used by the confessor in the confessional, as the doctor uses his medicines in the sick room.

¹ Cf. Rodriguez, On the Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection, i, c. 8.

Theologians warn us that only experts can judge of the intrinsic probability of an opinion. Others must be content to be able to discover extrinsic probable opinions. They can do this by consulting approved authors. If they find that an opinion is held as probable by five or six authors of repute, and it has not become obsolete by new legislation, by decrees of the Holy See, or by the progress of theological opinion, they may act upon it as solidly probable. The Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1831, declared that a professor of theology or a confessor might follow in practice the opinions of St Alphonsus.

In thus adopting extrinsically probable opinions with regard to conduct, the priest or the layman only does what anyone not skilled in law would do in a difficult legal case—he would consult an expert whom he could trust.

A limitation to the use of probabilism is mentioned by theologians. When one has decided on any course of conduct, he must loyally adhere to the consequences which the decision involves. He must not use a probable opinion to gain an advantage, and then in the same matter adopt the contrary opinion in order to shake off a burden. And so when a probable opinion has been adopted in favour of the validity of a will in my behalf, I cannot also adopt a contrary opinion that the will is invalid and refuse to pay the legacies,

A SCRUPLE is a groundless fear that there is sin where there is none. Hence a scrupulous conscience (the term is ordinarily used of the habit, not of the single act) is one which from some frivolous reason judges that a harmless action is sinful. A person, moreover, is not said to be scrupulous because of a scrupulous conscience in a single instance; the term is used of one who, either in some matter or in all his actions, is apt to be disturbed with unfounded scruples.

An upright, straightforward, and well-balanced conscience is what it is desirable to have, and so a scrupulous conscience is in itself a bad habit. A scrupulous conscience may indeed be useful for a time to purify the conscience, and to make it more delicate and sensitive to even the appearance of evil; it is sometimes permitted by God for this and other reasons. But if it continues for a long time it causes great trouble of mind, injures the health of body and soul, and sometimes drives its poor victim to desperation, so that he gives up all attempt to be good, or even loses his senses.

The confessor, then, should know how to recognize a scrupulous person, what the causes of scruples are, and what are the suitable remedies in particular cases. The prudent confessor will not at once believe a penitent to be scrupulous merely because he says that he is. Some people who are anything but pious think that it is a fine trait of character to be scrupulous, or they honestly think that they are scrupulous for want of self-knowledge, and tell the confessor so, He would obviously make a great mistake if he applied the rules for scruples to such cases. Nor can the confessor safely conclude that a penitent is scrupulous because he mentions in confession minute faults which common penitents hardly trouble themselves about. He may have before him a soul of great purity of conscience and great sanctity, who is in no sense scrupulous. Until he has heard a penitent’s confession more than once the confessor will usually suspend his judgement. ‘When the penitent keeps confessing things which are not sinful, when he says that he is troubled with doubts and anxieties about his actions, when he is not satisfied with his confessions but keeps coming back, or running from one confessor to another; when he will not follow the advice the confessor gives him, but remains obstinately attached to his own will, the confessor may usually conclude that his penitent is really scrupulous.

If he can find out how the scruples arose, the confessor will sometimes be able to apply a suitable remedy at once. They may arise from a variety of causes: from reading ascetical or theological books which are too rigorous or which are not suited to the person’s state of conscience; from associating with scrupulous people and contracting their malady; from a naturally weak judgement or from bad health; from immoderate and indiscreet fervour and spiritual pride; from the temptation of the devil, who wishes to ruin his victim, and from the permission of God, who for his own wise ends permits the evil for a time.

The confessor will then seek to apply a proper remedy. He may ask the scrupulous penitent whether he is prepared to follow his advice and direction. If the penitent will not do this, but goes from one confessor to another, the confessor will be able to do no good with him, and had better tell him to find someone whose directions he will follow. With one who trusts him and tries to follow his advice, the confessor should be kind and patient; he should give short, clear rules to the penitent, without going into further explanations; he should tell him to despise his scruples and to go against them, boldly to do what he groundlessly imagines to be sinful; as of course he is justified in doing, for he knows that his fear of sin in the matter is an idle scruple. The confessor should tell him not to mention his scruples in confession, and when great harm seems to threaten the penitent from his scruples he may tell him not to say anything about them, even if on occasions he has really committed sins; for scruples may be a valid reason for not making a full confession. The confessor will exhort him to keep body and soul fully occupied in interesting work and never to be idle; an idle brain is the devil’s workshop.

Scruples commonly have reference either to past confessions, suggesting that they were not properly made, and were bad, or to temptations against some virtue, as faith or purity; or to one’s actions in general, insinuating that they are sinful because not done with a proper motive, or for some other reason. With regard to the first class, the confessor will ask the penitent whether he is certain that he left out of his confession some grave matter, or that it was sacrilegious. Unless he can say that he is certain, he will tell him not to think of the past, to leave it with our good God, but to direct his thoughts to the present and future. Even if he says that he is certain that something serious was left out, or that he had not proper sorrow for his sins, the confessor after once or twice hearing him will forbid him to mention the past again.

One tempted against faith, purity, charity, or any other virtue, should be told that temptation is not sin, that sin is in the free consent of the will to evil, and that the best way to conquer such temptations is to despise them, to think as little as possible about them, and not to mention them in confession.

The confessor should tell a penitent who through scruples thinks he commits sin in every action to act boldly and fearlessly, that he may do whatever is not obviously forbidden, and that it is impossible for one who wishes to serve God to commit sin, especially grave sin, without being well aware of it.¹

¹ Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, n. 262.

With regard, however, to such laws as it is within the competence of the State to make, conscience obliges us to pay loyal obedience to those which urge and apply the law of nature. Near relatives are bound to support the indigent poor because it is their natural duty, and also because the State commands it; and, similarly, crime must be avoided because it is wrong, "and because the State forbids it. Where the law of nature is indeterminate and vague, but where the positive law has stepped in to define rights for the common good, conscience must also submit to the civil law. Unless we admit this, we shall have to say that in such matters there is no certain and definite rule for conscience to follow; rights and obligations will be left in uncertainty, to the serious disturbance of men’s consciences and the public inconvenience. Laws, therefore, which govern prescription, the rights of inventors and authors, the distribution of the property of intestates, the property rights of married women, the capacity of minors, and contracts, will have binding force in both the external and internal forum.¹

¹ D’Annibale, 1, n. 206.

(St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; I-II, q. 19, a. 5; In II Sent., dist. 24, q. 2, a. 4; De Veritate, q. 17, a. 1; Quodlibet 8, q. 6, aa. 13 and 15; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, bk. I, nn. 20-89, ed. Gaude; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 1).¹

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, De dubio solvendo in re morali dissertatio; Gaude, De morali systemate S. Alphonsi Mariae de Ligorio historico-theologica dissertatio; Ter Haar, De systemate morali antiquorum probabilistarum dissertatio historico-critica; Ven. Innocentii PP. XI de Probabilismo Decreti Historia et Vindiciae (1924); Le Bachelet, La question Ligorienne; De Caigny, De gemino probabilismo licito; De genuino morali systemate S. Alphonsi; Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI contre le probabilisme; Lehmkuhl, Probabilismus vindicatus; Jansen, Geschichte und Kritik im Dienste der Minus-probabilis; Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo; Pagani, De regulis ad certam nobis conscientiam praestandam brevis tractatio; Arendt, Aequiprobabilismus ab ultimo fundamento discussus; Bucceroni, Commentarii... Commentarius secundus de Conscientia et de Probabilismo; Frins, De actibus humanis, pars III, De formanda conscientia; Valensise, Super systema Theol. Mor. hodie in scholis evulgatum brevis disquisitio; Mondino, Studio storico-critico sui sistema morale di S. Alfonso; Beaudouin-Gardeil, Tractatus de conscientia; Noble, La conscience morale; Wurth, Die psychologischen Grundlagen der Gewissensbildung; Fernus, Zur Vorgeschichte der Moralsysteme von Vitoria bis Medina; Chollet, "Conscience," in Dict. de theol. Cath. III, cols. 1156-1174; Van Oosterhout, Psychologie van het geweten; Rombouts, Geweten en gewetensvorming; Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis; Delerue, Le systeme moral de St. Alphonse de Liguori.

After we have spoken of the remote rule of morality, or law, we must discuss the proximate rule of morals, or conscience. Namely, in order that law here and now, or in second act, oblige, it is required that it become known to the individual and be applied by him to a particular act. But it is applied to a particular act through conscience, which, as St. Thomas teaches, "adds to knowledge the application of knowledge to a particular act" (De verit., q. 17, a. 2, ad 2). And this is conscience properly so called, which accordingly imports a judgment concerning the morality of a particular act.

But conscience is also taken in a less proper sense for a habit or custom of judging about the morality of acts in this or that way; and thus strict, lax, and scrupulous conscience are distinguished. For the sake of practice we shall also undertake discussion of conscience considered in this way. Hence there is a twofold paragraph: the former concerning conscience properly so called, the latter concerning conscience improperly so called.

Conscience can be taken both physically and morally. Conscience taken physically, or physiological conscience, is the cognitive faculty of returning to one's own acts. Conscience taken morally, or moral conscience, imports a judgment about the morality of our acts; and it is twofold, antecedent and consequent, according as it regards an act, or respectively an omission, to be placed or already placed. Antecedent conscience commands, forbids, or permits an act to be placed. Consequent conscience approves or reproves an act already placed, and consequently causes joy or remorse (St. Thomas, De verit., q. 17, a. 1). But it is clear that the morality of an action does not depend on consequent conscience, which follows the act, but on antecedent conscience alone; in other words, this latter, not the former, is the rule of morality. Hence our discussion concerns antecedent conscience alone.

I. Notion. Conscience, moral and antecedent, is a dictate of the practical intellect by which someone judges that a particular action is commanded, prohibited, or free for him (St. Alphonsus, I, 2; cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De veritate, q. 17, a. 2). It is said:

1. A dictate, because conscience is an act, not a faculty or a habit.

2. Of the practical intellect, that is, of the intellect insofar as it directs to operation what it apprehends. This belongs to the practical intellect, which "knows truth as the speculative intellect does, but orders the known truth to work" (St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2).

3. A particular action; for conscience is not a judgment about the morality of an act considered in general and in the abstract, but about the morality of an act viewed in particular and in the concrete (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 2).

4. For him, namely, conscience judges about the morality of an act insofar as it belongs to the one judging himself, or insofar as it must be placed or omitted by the one judging himself, or can be placed or omitted at will.

5. Commanded, etc. That is, moral conscience does not judge about the utility or pleasantness of an act, but about its morality, that is, about the moral necessity or moral liberty of placing or omitting the act.

Corollary I. Conscience is the conclusion of a syllogism, at least a virtual one. The major proposition states some law. The minor proposition compares some act with the law; for example: Theft is illicit. But the taking of this thing would be theft. Therefore the taking of this thing is illicit for me.

Corollary II. Conscience differs from synderesis, from moral science, from casuistic science, from prudence, and from the last practical judgment.¹ Synderesis (Greek synteresis, that is, preservation) is the natural habit preserving the first and general practical principles, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled. Moral science is an acquired habit which concerns general conclusions deduced from first principles; for example: to each person his own must be left; but theft takes away from one's neighbor what is his; therefore theft must be rejected. Casuistic science is an acquired habit which applies the conclusions of moral science to particular cases considered in the abstract. But conscience applies general conclusions to particular cases, and to these as considered in the concrete, insofar as here and now they are to be brought into practice. Prudence is a habit which directs the intellect in deducing and applying conclusions. But conscience is the very act itself of applying conclusions to particular cases considered in the concrete. Finally, the last practical judgment dictates only that something is to be done or omitted; but it does not speak about the morality of the action or omission.

¹ Judgments formed in order to operation are distinguished into speculative, speculative-practical, and practical-practical. Speculative judgments regard the truth which founds the morality of a consequent act, for example the existence of some fact, as: Today is Sunday; or the value of an act, as: A sacrament administered in this way is invalid; etc. Speculative-practical judgments regard the morality of an act, but only in common, as: Mass is to be heard on Sunday. Practical-practical judgments concern the morality of an act in particular and constitute conscience properly so called, as: Today Mass is to be heard by me.

II. Division. Conscience is divided:

1. By reason of its relation to truth, into true or right¹ and false or erroneous, according as the morality which is predicated of a particular action is really present in the action or is not present in it (St. Alphonsus, I, 3).

An erroneous conscience is called vincibly or invincibly erroneous, according as the error can or cannot be driven out by moral diligence.

2. By reason of the morality which is judged to be present in the act, into commanding, prohibiting, and permitting conscience, according as something is judged to be commanded, prohibited, or free.

3. By reason of the state of the mind, into certain, opinionative, and doubtful conscience. Certain conscience is that by which someone judges firmly, that is, without prudent fear concerning the opposite, about the morality of a particular action. It is distinguished into two: directly and indirectly certain. The former rests on motives which show the objective morality of the action. The latter arises from a general, reflex, and certain principle, which is applied to an act about whose objective morality there is only doubt or opinion.² Opinionative conscience is that by which someone judges weakly, that is, with prudent fear concerning the opposite, about the morality of a particular action. Doubtful conscience is one which hesitates uncertainly concerning the morality of a particular action and suspends assent (p. 205; St. Alphonsus, I, 20).

A perplexed conscience is had when someone apprehends sin on both sides, and can neither form a safe conscience for himself nor abstain from choosing one side, as if someone judges, and persists in that opinion, that he sins whether by hearing Mass he leaves a sick person alone, or by remaining with the sick person he neglects Mass (St. Alphonsus, I, 10).

¹ Others call that conscience right which is prudently formed, whether it is true or false.

² Indirectly certain conscience is usually called probable conscience (St. Alphonsus, I, 40).

III. Directive force of conscience. 1. Certain conscience, whether true or false, or erroneous,¹ is the rule of morality; or it brings it about that an action has, with respect to the one judging it, that morality which is judged to be present in it. In other words, one who firmly judges that a particular action must be placed by him, or omitted by him, or is free for him, is in reality either bound to place it or omit it, or is free. For certain conscience involves a firm judgment about the ordinance of God the Best and Greatest concerning a particular action. But the mode or manner of acting must be conformed to such a judgment, whether it is true or false. For neglect of the aforesaid conformity would involve neglect of the divine ordinance itself (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 4, c. and ad 3; I, q. 79, a. 13; I-II, q. 19, a. 5; cf. St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

2. Certain conscience enjoys the force described above not from itself, but from the power of divine law. The reason is that the power of obliging, or of morally binding, cannot belong except to a superior. But a man's conscience is not superior to the man himself. "Conscience," says St. Bonaventure, "is like God's herald and messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as if from God, as a herald does when he publishes the edict of the king"² (cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 3).

3. Uncertain conscience, that is, opinionative or doubtful conscience, of itself lacks directive force, because direction necessarily takes place toward one thing, and therefore must proceed from a conscience which itself is determined to one thing. But uncertain conscience is not determined to one thing, but is disposed about different things. What must be done by one who is uncertain will be explained in n. 221.

Corollary I. One who acts against a certain conscience commanding or forbidding, whether true or false, commits as much and such a sin as he apprehends in the act. "A human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the good apprehended toward which the will is borne, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, art. 27).

Corollary II. One who apprehends the malice of an act, but thinks nothing, not even confusedly, about grave or light malice, sins only lightly. Nevertheless, commonly there is present, and therefore it is presumed that there is had, sufficient advertence and consent, though confused, to grave malice: first, if the matter is manifestly grave; second, if there is question of a man little concerned about the quantity of sin.

Corollary III. One who from an erroneous conscience judges that he sins, whether by not fulfilling a precept which he physically cannot fulfill, or by suffering an evil, for example rape, which he cannot prevent, does not sin. For there is physical impotence, and therefore the voluntary is lacking.

Corollary IV. One who apprehends sin on both sides should, if he can, form a safe conscience for himself by seeking the truth and by prudently solving the doubt, should it perhaps persist, with the help of a reflex principle. If he can neither form a certain conscience for himself nor abstain from choosing, let him choose what appears the lesser evil.³ If each appears equal, let him choose at will. If nevertheless he judges that he sins, he is still free from sin, because liberty is lacking and no one sins necessarily.

If he chooses what appears graver, he indeed sins, but only in proportion to the apprehended excess; since as regards the total malice he is not free, but he freely embraces the excess.

¹ Others add: provided it is invincibly erroneous. But certain conscience is necessarily here and now invincibly erroneous; for such a conscience supposes that here and now not even a suspicion of error is suggested. Hence such a conscience, if it commands or prohibits something, obliges, even if a vincibly erroneous conscience preceded it; if it permits something, it renders that thing licit here and now to the one so judging, although the erring person perhaps was not without fault led to such a conscience and therefore sinned before.

² In II Sent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3.

³ Of itself, that is, other things being equal, the transgression of a natural precept is to be guarded against more than that of a positive precept; of a divine precept more than of a human one; of a negative precept more than of an affirmative one.

Proposition. For acting licitly, certainty strictly so called concerning the honesty of the action to be placed here and now is required. This is clear, first, from Sacred Scripture. "But he who discerns, if he eats, is condemned, because it is not from faith. But everything that is not from faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23). Here St. Paul treats the controversy about the eating of foods which the Mosaic law prohibited. Moreover, the Apostle teaches that he sins who eats the aforesaid foods while discerning, Greek diakrinomenos, which in the context means: struggling with himself, doubting, hesitating,¹ whether the eating is licit. But according to the Apostle the reason is that every action placed without a firm persuasion concerning the honesty of the action is sinful. "It is said," says St. Alphonsus, "from faith, namely, from a certain dictate of conscience, so that a man is persuaded in his conscience that by acting he acts rightly" (I, 55). This interpretation is deduced from the context of the discourse (vv. 2, 14, 22), and even today is commonly admitted.² There is added, second, an argument taken from reason. Beyond doubt, he sins who wills and chooses an action, whether it is good or evil, whether it offends God or does not offend God. But one acts thus who wills and chooses an action about which he doubts whether here and now it is licit. Hence St. Augustine: "To do that which is uncertain whether it is a sin is a certain sin."³ St. Alphonsus asserts the same repeatedly (I, 22, 24; likewise I, 81 and Homo Apostolicus I, 65, where he teaches that not even a most probable opinion of itself and ultimately suffices).

Corollary I. Authors commonly teach that broad certainty suffices for acting licitly. But this is said less accurately; for broad certainty still admits prudent fear, or broad doubt. But it is not licit to place an action as long as one still prudently fears that it is formal sin, or a true offense against God. Moreover, this fear or broad doubt is easily excluded through some general reflex principle, for example: It is licit to follow an opinion certain in the broad sense; which principle others also call concomitant.

Corollary II. It suffices that someone in good faith be certain of the liceity of an action, even if the foundation on which the certainty rests is less solid. Nor is it required that someone reflexively judge that he is certain.

Corollary III. One who acts with a practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action commits as much and such a sin as that about which he doubts; for he perpetrates as much and such a sin as the danger to which he exposes himself (St. Alphonsus, I, 22). If only the notion of sin is apprehended, there is had a sin of unnamed species; concerning this, however, observe these words of St. Thomas: "When reason apprehends something as evil, it always apprehends it under some notion of evil; for instance because it is contrary to a divine precept, or because it is scandal, or on account of something of this kind; and then such an evil will is reduced to such a species of malice" (I-II, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3). "Yet it must be noted for practice, what many are ignorant of, that it is gravely illicit to act with a practical doubt about grave sin."⁴

¹ The source's Greek form is badly OCR'd; the intended term is diakrinomenos.

² That by "faith" supernatural faith is not understood, but a dictate of conscience, is clear from Lateran IV (c. 41); and that a certain dictate is understood is taught by Estius, Beelen, Cornely, Reithmayer, Bisping, and other interpreters commonly.

³ Bk. I, De Baptismo, c. 5.

⁴ Cf. Marc, n. 37; Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I, p. 504; Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 64.

We speak about him who lacks the conscience required for acting licitly, that is, about him who is not certain of the honesty of the action to be placed. Moreover:

I. One who is not certain of the honesty of some action, unless he wishes to abstain from it, is held before all else to inquire into the truth, that is, to investigate what the morality of the action is; in other words, what the ordinance of the eternal law concerning it is. And indeed one who neglects the aforesaid inquiry holds the divine ordinance itself cheap, since he rashly exposes himself to the danger of violating it. Hence St. Thomas: "But in doubtful and uncertain matters, reason does not give judgment without a preceding inquiry; and therefore inquiry of reason before judgment about things to be chosen is necessary; and this inquiry is called counsel" (I-II, q. 14, a. 1). And St. Alphonsus: "For acting licitly in doubtful matters we must inquire into the truth" (I, 54).

II. Concerning the manner of inquiring into the truth, hold these things:

1. The arguments, intrinsic and extrinsic, or authorities, of each opinion mutually opposed to the other, must be investigated and compared. For in doubts one part must be chosen before the other. But "choice imports a certain preceding comparison" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 13, a. 1).

2. The inquiry must be made with moral diligence proportionate both to the person inquiring and to the gravity of the matter of which there is question, and to the time that can be spent on the inquiry. The less learned should try to reach the truth by consulting the more learned, for example a pastor or confessor; the more learned, by their own inquiry. "It will be enough," says Benedict XIV in the encyclical De Praeparatione ad Annum Universalis Iubilaei (26 Jun. 1749), "to have admonished confessors that in a doubtful matter they not rely on their own opinion; but before they decide the cause, they should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid; and then they should descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Nor indeed did we teach anything else in our encyclical on usuries." Besides this, greater diligence is needed if there is question of a matter of great importance, say of notable restitution, than if the discussion concerns a small matter.

If someone, after the truth has been inquired into, continues to doubt, or is not certain of the honesty of the action, it is disputed to what extent one who thus doubts theoretically can come to practical certainty and place the action. Moreover, the diverse responses to this question constitute the diverse moral systems, about which we must now speak. But it is clear that this controversy is of the greatest importance: since a moral system governs the whole of moral doctrine and opens the way for solving for practice the innumerable doubts that occur in it. About to speak of this very grave matter, we shall set forth first the notion of a moral system, the state of the controversial question, and the diverse systems; then the proof of the system which seems true to us. Finally we shall add some points concerning certain sayings akin to the moral system, concerning the importance of the controversy between equiprobabilists and probabilists, and concerning the use of the moral system.

I. He has a strict conscience who habitually, from a slighter reason, judges that something is a sin or a grave sin which involves no malice or only slight malice. One who labors under a strict conscience should strive to submit his mind to the judgment of wiser and more prudent persons, especially with regard to the direction of others.¹ "It is indeed wrong to relax the observance of divine laws more than is permitted; but it is no less an evil to render the divine yoke harder for others than is fitting" (St. Alphonsus, I, 82).

¹ Cf. Sweens, Theol. Mor. fund., n. 739.

Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human conduct as directed by reason to man’s natural end, for Moral Theology uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man’s supernatural end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general conclusions.

In order that man many tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient that the way be pointed out in a general manner (as is done by the natural and positive laws), but these laws must be applied to each act in particular by the practical reason or conscience, as it passes judgment on the right or wrong of an action in the light of all the circumstances.

(Summa Theologica, I, q. 79, aa. 11-13.)

Definition.—Conscience is an act of judgment on the part of the practical reason deciding by inference from general principles the moral goodness or malice of a particular act.

(a) It is an act, and as such it differs from moral knowledge and intellectual virtues, which are not transitory but enduring. Moral understanding (synderesis), by which everyone naturally perceives the truth of general and self-evident principles of morality; moral science, by which the theologian or ethician knows the body of conclusions drawn from moral principles; prudence, by which the virtuous man is able to make right applications of moral rules to individual cases—all these are permanent states and are preparatory to the act of conscience, in which one makes use of one’s knowledge to judge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action in the concrete, as attended by all its circumstances.

(b) Conscience is an act of judgment, and thus it differs from the other acts employed by prudence—from counsel about the right means or ways of action, and from command as to their use. Counsel inquires what is the right thing to do, conscience gives the dictate or decision, the moral command moves to action.

(c) Conscience is in the reason—that is, it is a subjective guide, and thus it differs from law, which is objective.

(d) Conscience is in the practical reason. Unlike other judgments, which are speculative and deal not with action or only with theoretical aspects of action (e.g., the judgment that God is perfect, that the active faculties are distinct from the soul, etc.), conscience is concerned with action from the view-point of its moral exercise.

(e) Conscience is the inference from general principles, and thus it differs from moral understanding (synderesis). This latter is a habit by which everyone who is mentally developed is able to perceive without argument that certain more general propositions of morality must be true, such as the axioms of the natural law (see above, 319 sqq.); conscience draws conclusions from those axioms.

(f) Conscience judges concerning the morality of an act. Here lies the difference between consciousness and conscience; consciousness is a psychological faculty whose function is to perceive one’s own states and acts; conscience is a moral judgment concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of those states or acts. Thus, consciousness testifies that one is considering the performance of a certain act, conscience judges the morality, and permits or forbids; or consciousness testifies that a certain thing was done or not done in the past, conscience declares the morality—condemning, excusing, or approving what took place.

(g) Conscience judges concerning a particular act—that is, it considers an act that is to be done here and now (or was done), with all the attendant circumstances. Conscience, thus, differs from moral science, which, though it systematizes the body of conclusions drawn from the natural and positive laws, is not able to make the applications for the innumerable cases that arise. Even works containing moral cases, which give solutions for concrete instances, do not take the place of conscience in such instances, for it is still the individual who judges about those solutions or about their applicability to his particular circumstances.

Division.-Conscience is variously divided. (a) According as the act judged is in the future or in the past, conscience is antecedent or consequent. The antecedent conscience is a monitor which decides that a future act will be lawful or unlawful; the consequent conscience is a judge which causes peace or remorse for what has been done in the past. (b) According to the kind of direction or decision it gives, antecedent conscience is commanding, forbidding, permitting or counselling; while consequent conscience is excusing, approving, or condemning (Rom., ii. 15).

According as it agrees or disagrees with the external divine or human law, conscience is true or false. (a) A true conscience judges that to be good and commanded which is really good and commanded. Example: According to law, one may use money of which one has the disposal. A sum of money before Balbus is really at his disposal. Hence, his conscience is true if it decides that he may use this money.

(b) A false conscience judges the lawful to be unlawful, or vice versa: “The hour cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a service to God” (John, xvi. 2). Example: Balbus would have a false conscience, if he decided that he had no right to use the money before him. This would happen if he was mistaken about the general principle, or about the fact that the money was at his disposal, or if he drew a wrong inference from the premises.

According to its qualities and suitability as a guide of conduct, conscience may be viewed either with reference to the will or to the intellect. (a) With reference to the will, conscience is either good (right) or bad (wrong), according as it does or does not proceed from a well-meaning intention and a right disposition towards one’s end and duties. Example: If the Balbus mentioned above decided that the money was at his disposal because he wished to know the truth and had investigated to the best of his ability, his conscience would be good. But, if he decided this without sufficient investigation and only because he was prejudiced in his own favor, his conscience would be bad.

(b) With reference to the intellect, conscience is either certain or uncertain, according as the mind assents to its judgment without or with fear of error. Examples: If Balbus decides that he has the right to use the money, and is so firmly convinced that his judgment is true that he has no fears or doubts, his conscience is certain. But, if there remain solid difficulties or objections against his judgment which he cannot satisfactorily answer so that he assents to his view only with the fear that he may be wrong, his conscience is uncertain.

A conscience may have some and lack others of the qualities just mentioned.

(a) The same conscience may be true and bad, or false and good—that is, the judgment of the intellect may be in agreement with objective facts, but at the same time it may be directed by a wrong will and intention, or vice versa. Examples: Caius, through no fault of his own, is convinced that he is bound to tell a lie to help Sempronius, because Sempronius once helped him by lying. His conscience is false, but good. Titus is really not bound to pay a sum of money demanded of him. But the arguments by which he persuades himself that he is not bound are not honest, since he has recourse to what he knows are hair-splitting distinctions, quibbles and sophistical reasonings. His conscience is true, but bad.

(b) The same conscience may be good and uncertain, or bad and certain. Examples: If the Caius above-mentioned believes he is bound to lie, but has some qualms or suspicions that such conduct might not be right after all, his conscience would be good, seeing that he meant to do what is right; but it would be uncertain, seeing that he is not sure he is right. If the Titus above-mentioned had so habituated himself to insincerity and illogical reasoning that he no longer had any fears about his own judgments, and gave firm and unhesitating assent to his decision that he was not bound to pay the money demanded, his conscience, though bad, would be certain subjectively.

Obligation of Conscience.—Man is bound to be guided by conscience, both negatively and positively—that is, he must neither disobey when it forbids, nor refuse to obey when it commands.

(a) It obliges by reason of divine command, since it acts as the voice or witness of God making known and promulgating. to us the moral law. Hence “all that is not from conscience is sin” (Rom, xiv. 23).

(b) Conscience obliges from the nature of things, for, since the will is a blind faculty, it must be guided by the judgment, of the intellect, and must follow the inner light given it about the law. Apart from revelation, there is no other way of learning what God wishes one to do here and now.

The authority of conscience is not, however, unlimited.

(a) Conscience is not independent of external law and authority. It is not autonomous morality of the reason or will, nor private inspiration or interpretation; for its function is not to establish law or pass judgment on it, but to apply the law as expounded by the Church to a present case. Hence, conscience must aim to be true—that is, to agree with and express the objective law.

(b) Conscience is not independent of the righteousness of the will. It is not a speculative judgment, whose value depends solely on agreement between the mind and the facts, as is the case with a conclusion of pure science. It is a practical judgment, which has to guide all man’s conduct, and thus its value depends on the relation of the means it selects to the end towards which the means should be directed. Hence, conscience must be good—that is, a judgment dictated by a will well disposed towards the true end of life.

(c) Conscience is not independent of the certainty of the intellect. It is a judgment formed, not by sentiment, emotion, or one’s own wishes, but by evidence and firm conviction; for its office is to guide man reliably in the most important of affairs. Hence, conscience must be certain—that is, a judgment to which the intellect yields its unhesitating assent.

In order, therefore, that conscience may be the proper rule and moderator of man’s moral life, it must have the following qualities:

(a) It must be good, and practically true—that is, in agreement with the Last End of man and, as far as the efforts of the individual can attain to such agreement, with the objective law—for the standard of moral good is not each one’s wish or opinion, but God as the Last End and the external natural and positive law as means to that End.

(b) It must be certain—that is, without fear that one is wrong; at least, it must have that degree of certainty which is possible in moral matters. For to act with the fear that one is committing sin, is to be willing to do what may be sin, and is thus consent to sin.

Since conscience that has the requisite conditions is our immediate guide in moral matters, it follows: (a) that a conscience which is true objectively, good, and certain must be followed, whenever it commands or forbids; (b) that a conscience which is in invincible error (see 30), but seems to him who has it to be not only true but certain, must also be followed when it forbids or commands. Examples: If a child were told and believed that he was obliged to tell a lie to prevent an evil, he would be bound to do this. If a person eats what he wrongly thinks to be forbidden food, he is guilty of the violation he apprehends.

Exception.—If invincible error results from lack of sufficient intelligence to be capable of sin (see above, 249, 387), then the failure to follow one’s conscience in such error does not make one guilty. Example: If a person unable to walk were persuaded that he was bound nevertheless to walk to church for Mass, his conscience would not make his omission sinful. Conscience supposes sane judgment, but the judgment we are now considering is not sane.

A conscience that has not the requisite conditions is not a safe guide, and hence it cannot be followed.

(a) An erroneous conscience may not be followed, if the error is vincible and there is danger of sin; neither may one act against it if there be danger of sin. To follow such a conscience would be to do what is wrong and to act in bad faith (i.e., to have a bad and erroneous conscience); not to follow it, would be to act against one’s judgment, wrongly formed though it was, and to do insincerely what is right (i.e., to have a bad, though true conscience). Example: A person who has made up his mind that dishonesty is necessary in his business, but who realizes that his reasons are not convincing, sins against sincerity if he follows his opinion; he sins against conviction, if he does not follow his opinion. But his predicament is due to his own sophistry or bad will, and the escape from it requires only that he be honest enough with himself to inquire about the matter.

(b) A doubtful conscience may not be followed, if the doubt is such that one is not reasonably sure that a certain act is lawful. Example: If a man does not know whether a certain remedy will be helpful or seriously harmful to another, his conscience is doubtful as to the lawfulness of administering the remedy, and it may not be followed. If in spite of this he makes use of the remedy, he is guilty of the harm he foresaw, even though it does not happen.

Exception.—It is lawful to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience, if there is no danger of sin in this. Example: If a person has neglected inquiry about holydays of obligation, and through his own neglect believes that Good Friday is a holyday, he does not sin by attending the services that day.

The signs of a vincibly erroneous conscience are: (a) that in the past one did not use the same diligence to inform oneself about one’s religious duties as is employed by conscientious persons; (b) that in the present one has fears, doubts or suspicions as to one’s own sincerity of judgment.

Results of Conscience.—The results of following an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or permitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible. Example: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been told to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.

(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting evil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person who has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or advisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know better, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97 sqq.).

The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty. Example: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to do so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.

(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty. Example: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt occurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle it correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the time comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest he get into trouble. He is guilty.

The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of the same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is responsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example: He who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave calumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty than if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.

(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is of the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A person who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity, is guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.

(c) Sin committed by disobeying a vincibly erroneous conscience is of the species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to his promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his word was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As to the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is always the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is seriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong. Examples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his friend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person who persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication does not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless guilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state; for his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable ignorance cannot excuse him.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.)

As was explained in the previous article, conscience is not a proper guide unless it is good. In this article we shall speak of the good conscience and of its opposite the various kinds of bad conscience.

Definition.—The distinction of good and bad conscience is applied both to consequent and antecedent conscience (see 576).

(a) The consequent conscience is good, and one is said to have a good conscience, if it testifies that past acts were rightly performed, that past sins were forgiven, that one is in the friendship of God, etc.; “The end of the commandment is charity from a good conscience” (I Tim., i. 5); “War a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience” (ibid., 19). The consequent conscience is bad if it testifies in a contrary way: “Let us draw near with a true heart, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience” (Heb., x. 22).

(b) The antecedent conscience, with which we are now concerned, judges about the morality of an act to be performed here and now, or in the future. It is called good, if it is made by one who is in good faith—that is, one who sincerely loves goodness and who decides according to the truth as far as he is able to see it. It is called bad, if it is the judgment of one who is in bad faith—that is, one who is in error through his own fault, or who arrives at the truth by reasonings that are not honest or not understood by him. Example: Speaking of those who, though fearing that idol meats were forbidden, yet ate of them because they saw others do this, St. Paul says: “There is not knowledge in everyone. For some until this present, with conscience of the idol, eat as a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their conscience being weak is defiled” (I Cor., viii. 7).

Divisions.—By training and care a good conscience is developed and becomes better. (a) A vigilant conscience is one that asserts itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. (b) A tender conscience is one that inclines to a careful observance of all the Commandments and to a purification of the inner workings of the soul. A possessor of this kind of conscience is called conscientious. (c) A timorous conscience moves one through filial fear to shun even the slightest sins and imperfections, and to use all prudent efforts to avoid occasions and dangers of sin. The possessor of this kind of conscience is called God-fearing.

A bad conscience that is in vincible error is divided according to its effects into the scrupulous and the lax conscience. (a) The lax conscience errs on the side of liberty. It is moved by trivial reasons to judge the unlawful to be lawful, the gravely sinful to be only slightly evil, that which is commanded to be only counselled, and so on.

(b) The scrupulous conscience errs on the side of obligation. It is moved by trivial reasons to judge that there is sin in something lawful, grave sin in something venially wrong, and obligation in something that is only counselled; it sees inhability or defect where these do not exist, and so on.

According to the greater or less responsibility of the one in error, a lax conscience is either malicious or not malicious. (a) It is malicious when it results from one’s own disregard for religious truth, as in the case of the pagans who did not care to know God, and were thus led into perverse conceptions of morality. St. Paul calls such a conscience a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 28). (b) It is not malicious when it results from some less blamable reason, as in the case of the Christians at Corinth who thought that the eating of idol meats was sinful, but that it was to be practised on account of the example of others. St. Paul calls this a weak conscience (I Cor., viii. 10).

Laxity of conscience is either partial or entire. (a) A conscience entirely lax takes an easy and indulgent view in all things. It is careless both in little and great matters, both in directing self and in directing others. (b) A conscience partially lax is too liberal in some things, but not in others. Examples: Titus is very exacting with his girls, and wishes to have them models of virtue; but he is too easy with himself and his boys. Balbus is very loyal to friends, but has no sense of justice as regards those who do not agree with him. Sempronius tries to serve both God and mammon, being very faithful to church duties, but at the same time dishonest in business matters.

A conscience partially lax may even combine scrupulosity and laxism (see 610), becoming like a mirror that reflects large objects as small and vice versa; or like a color-blind eye: “Woe to you that call evil good and good evil, that put darkness for light and light for darkness” (Is., V. 20). This kind of conscience is called pharisaical.

(a) One may be lax and scrupulous about the same kind of things. Examples: Caius regards great disobedience in himself as a mote which he doesn’t need to worry about, but small disobedience in his children as a beam in the eye which he is seriously bound to extract (Matt, vii. 3-5). Titus is lax about almsgiving to those from whom he can expect nothing, but scrupulous about almsgiving to those from whom he expects a return later on.

(b) One may be scrupulous and lax about different things, straining at gnats and swallowing camels. Example: The Pharisees were scrupulous about external observances and minor things of the law, such as tithes; but they were lax about inward justice and the weightier things of the law, judgment, mercy and faith (Matt, xxiii. 13-31).

Causes of a Lax Conscience.—(a) If the laxity is inculpable but habitual, it is caused generally by lack of Christian training in childhood and the influence of evil principles and practices that are widespread. In particular cases a lax decision of conscience may be due to want of sufficient consideration or to a sudden storm of passion that obscures the reason, when one has no time for deliberation; and thus it is inculpable.

(b) If the laxity is culpable, its usual causes are an easy-going view of God’s law and its obligation (Is, xliii. 24); or a self-love that sees in one’s vices nothing but virtue or amiable weakness; or a long-continued indulgence of sin that has destroyed all refinement of conscience.

Special Dangers of a Lax Conscience.—(a) If the laxity is inculpable, it is an occasion of demoralization to others and a preparation for formal sin in him who has the conscience;

(b) if the laxity is culpable, it is the cause of formal sin; and if it is not corrected, it naturally leads to moral blindness, hardness of heart and impenitence: “There is a way that seemeth to man right, and the ends thereof lead to death” (Proverbs, xvi. 25).

Since a lax conscience is a species of erroneous conscience, the rules given above as to the kind of sins committed in consequence of an erroneous conscience, apply also to the lax conscience (see above, 588 Sqq.).

(a) When the laxity is concerned with the existence of sin, the conscience taking what is sinful for something lawful, he who follows such a conscience is guilty or not guilty according as his ignorance is culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a good conscience). Examples: The man who practises dishonesty, because he has cheated his conscience by sophistry into deciding that dishonesty is lawful; the child who uses profane language without realization of sin, because he hears his elders use it. But if the lax conscience takes what is sinful for a duty, he who disobeys it is guilty of sin. Example: The person who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to lie on account of a promise made.

(b) When the laxity is concerned with the gravity of sin, the conscience taking what is mortal for venial sin, he who disobeys such a conscience is guilty of mortal or venial sin, according as his ignorance is culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a good conscience). Examples: A child who thinks that calumny or missing Mass is only a venial sin, because he sees grown up persons treat these things lightly; a person that, to solace his conscience, advises with lax associates who always approve of what he wishes to do or has done.

He who knows, or who has good reason to think, that his conscience is lax, should guide himself by the following rules: (a) with reference to the past, if there is a doubt whether or not sin was consented to or was grave, the presumption is against him, for laxity willingly contracted makes one responsible for what ensues; (b) with reference to the future, a person must make use of the means prescribed for one who is in danger of sin (see above, 258 sqq.), for a lax conscience places one in danger of sin.

Remedies Recommended for a Lax Conscience.—(a) The defect of will or character should be corrected. Example: The presumptuous should reflect on the justice of God, and recall that the broad way leads to perdition. Those in whom the wish is father to the lax judgment should make war on the passion that leads them astray. Those who have become lax through bad habits, should set about acquiring good habits, like that of going to the Sacraments frequently. (b) The error of the intellect should be corrected. Example: If a person’s religious training has been neglected, he should do what he can to get correct information and advice as to his duties. If one has been influenced by lax ideas or conduct, one should change one’s reading or associations.

The scrupulous Conscience.—This is a species of erroneous judgment that sees sin where there is no sin, or grave sin where there is only light sin, and whose reasons are trivial or absurd. (a) It differs, therefore, from a strict or tender conscience, which, while it does not exaggerate sin, judges that one should try to avoid even slight sin and imperfection. This is the golden mean between a lax and a scrupulous conscience. Persons with this sort of conscience are sometimes called scrupulous or singular, because they are more exact than the majority. More accurately they are to be called conscientious or God-fearing.

(b) The scrupulous conscience differs also from scrupulosity, which is a state of mind in which one whose judgment is not erroneous, is nevertheless tormented by fears or doubts about his moral condition.

The rules given above (588 sqq.) for the erroneous conscience apply also to the scrupulous conscience. (a) He who follows a scrupulous conscience does not sin by this, even though he is vincibly in error; for there is no danger of sin in doing more than is required. Example: Caius is too lazy to make inquiries about his religious duties, but he has the exaggerated notion that grace at meals obliges under pain of grave sin. He does not sin by following his conscience, for grace at meals is recommended to all. (b) He who disobeys a scrupulous conscience commits the sin his conscience apprehends. Example: If Caius omits grace, he is guilty of grave sin.

Special Dangers of a scrupulous Conscience.—(a) As to himself, the scrupulous person suffers from his conscience; it makes him guilty of sin where there should be no sin, and by its exaggerated strictness it often drives him to the other extreme of laxity. (b) As to others, the scrupulous person is an annoyance and a detriment; he tries to impose his conscience on them, or at least he makes virtue appear forbidding.

The Perplexed Conscience.—Like to the scrupulous conscience is the perplexed conscience, which judges that in a particular instance one cannot escape sin, whether one acts or does not act. Example: Titus fears that, if he goes to church, he will sin by endangering his health, which is feeble; that, if he does not go to church, he will sin by disobeying the law. This seems to have been the conscience of Herod, who thought he was confronted with the alternative of perjury or murder when the head of John the Baptist was asked of him (Matt, xiv. 9).

St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is perplexed in conscience:

(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable advice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).

(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the lesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that Titus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive law of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less evil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit what is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he is not obliged in his circumstances to go to church.

(c) If decision cannot be delayed and the party cannot decide where the lesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to the impossible.

Scrupulosity.—Like to the scrupulous conscience is the state of scrupulosity, which manifests itself in moral matters especially as a vain fear or anxiety concerning the presence or magnitude of sin in one’s act. A psychopathic state, scrupulosity is usually listed as a form of psychasthenia which is characterized by weakness of soul, inability to cope with problems, and a lack of psychic energy. Clinically examined, the psychasthenic presents the following characteristics: (1) physically, he is listless and always tired; (2) intellectually, his tiredness makes it impossible for him to concentrate for long periods of time; (c) psychologically, he is an introvert concerned with himself as the center of his interests and activities.

The more common manifestations of the psychasthenic’s difficulties include: self-diffidence, uncertainty, hesitation, obsessions and scruples. A species of psychasthenia, scrupulosity may be described as an inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order, a special type of worry directed toward the morality of actions.

(a) scrupulosity must be distinguished, however, from the scrupulous conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is not a judgment, but a fear that accompanies one’s judgment. Example: A scrupulous person knows very well that it is not a sin to omit grace, nor a grave sin to pray with some voluntary distraction; but he worries over these things as if they were sins, or grave sins.

(b) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the tender conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is an exaggerated and harmful solicitude. A person of tender conscience is careful even in smaller duties, but in a quiet and recollected way, whereas the scrupulous person is all excitement and distraction.

(c) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the anxious or doubtful or guilty conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is a baseless fear or phobia. Examples: A person who has practised injustice for many years, has good reason to be perturbed in conscience when he reflects that restitution or reparation is a prerequisite to pardon; but a mother who did all she could to train her children well, is scrupulous, if she is constantly reproaching herself that she should have done better. A person who makes a contract while fearing that it may be unlawful, because good authorities hold its unlawfulness, acts with a doubtful conscience; but if he fears that the contract is unlawful, in spite of the fact that others regard it as lawful and that his only reason for doubt is that they may be wrong, he is scrupulous. The Egyptians at the time of the plagues could reasonably forecast grievous chastisements on account of their wickedness (Wis., xvii. 10); but a good person who worries constantly over the possibility of being damned must be scrupulous.

Scruples may be divided in various ways, but the simplest division seems to be by virtue of object, extension and duration. By reason of object, scruples may center on only one or, at most, a few moral activities, e.g., duties of charity, or sins against chastity, or they may embrace the whole moral life of the individual. By reason of extension, some scruples are limited to interior actions, others extend to external manifestations. By reason of duration, scruples may be classified as intermittent, or temporary, and quasi-permanent which is characteristic of the constitutionally scrupulous person whose physical and psychical disposition incline him to scrupulosity.

The signs or external manifestations of scrupulosity have been variously divided, but a simplified division into intellectual, or cognitive, affective, or volitional, and compulsive suffices for our present purpose.

(a) Intellectual: habitual abulia, i.e., an inability to decide, coupled with and interacting with constant doubt.

(b) Affective: closely allied to the intellectual state is the feeling of insufficiency which extends to actions, to the individual’s own personality, to his desire for higher goals, to his abilities, etc. This fosters and strengthens the inability to decide. Inordinate fears, anxieties and sadness contribute to the genesis and growth of the sense of inadequacy.

(c) Compulsive: numerous compulsion factors are present in more serious cases of scrupulosity, e.g., obsessions, phobias, and compulsions properly so called, which concern external actions or rituals.

Obsessions include irresistible, persistent and irrational ideas accompanied by feelings of tension and fear. These ideas which plague the individual are “discordant,” that is, out of harmony with his habitual attitude, and “impulsive,” tending to reduce themselves spontaneously to action. The scrupulous person is frightened and flustered by the thought of doing a thing for which he has a positive abhorrence and by his inability to get the thought out of his mind.

Phobias refer to habitual, irrational fears of a definite entity associated with a high degree of anxiety and unwarranted by objective reality. They are very intense fears, completely out of proportion to their causes or objects.

Finally, compulsions strictly so called may be defined as irresistible, unreasonable urges to perform actions to free the individual from an obsessing idea. Tension and anxiety are associated if the act or external ritual is not performed.

For the confessor, the recognition of a scrupulous person is not too difficult. The penitent’s own difficulties present the first and most obvious sign, e.g., irrational doubts about consent to temptation, as to the gravity of a sin, etc., and undue concern about circumstances. Concomitant signs confirming the judgment that a person is scrupulous include:

(a) Obstinacy of judgment; Although the scrupulous person seeks advice, frequently from many confessors, he tends to follow his own judgment. He is inclined to think that the confessor has not understood him, that he has not given a complete picture of his state of soul, etc.

(b) Inconstancy in acting owing to inability to judge rightly and the consequent frequent changes of judgment for light reasons.

(c) Irrelevant accusations of multiple circumstances that tend to lose the sin in the maze of circumstances.

(d) External motions by which the individual tries to do away with the fear, sin, or other difficulty.

Causes of a scrupulous Conscience.—Although the signs of scrupulosity are easily recognizable, the causes are not clearly defined, and authors are not entirely agreed in this matter. A listing of probable causes would include internal causes:

(a) physical—the physical causes are virtually unknown. Most authors admit a constitutional disposition to scrupulosity, just as there is one to its quasi-genus, psychasthenia. Reductively this might involve disorders in the vago-sympathetic nervous system and the neuro-endocrine system. (b) psychical—the cause is attributed to too low a psychic tension. The inability to cope with obsessions and the attacks of phobias serve to exhaust the individual; (c) moral—perhaps a suspicious and melancholy character, a disposition that is overly impressionable and changeable, or a self-opinionated nature, overconfident of its own ability.

The external causes of scrupulosity are: (a) the devil, who excites vain fears in order to diminish devotion, to discourage the use of prayer and of the Sacraments, to drive to tepidity and despair; (b) the neighbor, who teaches scrupulosity by his words or example; association with persons who are scrupulous; the reading of spiritual books of a rigoristic character; assistance by persons of a timid character at terrifying sermons on the divine justice; overly protective and overly rigorous education.

"1. Whether a Professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? 2. Whether a Confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred Tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this Confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 497 ff.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the Professors of Theology of the aforesaid University ought to hand down is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas, according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

"11. It is not necessary to reflect upon doubts which occur, whether one is proceeding rightly or not." Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

"1. It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, leaving aside the safer opinion, unless a law, an agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids it. Hence an opinion that is only probable is not to be used in conferring baptism, priestly ordination, or episcopal ordination. - 2. I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion that is even less probable. - 3. Generally, when, trusting in probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic and however slight, provided that the limits of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently. - 4. An unbeliever who does not believe, being led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity. - 21. The assent of supernatural faith which is useful for salvation is compatible with the fear by which someone fears that God may not have spoken." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679.

"26. When litigants have equally probable opinions in their favor, a judge can accept money for rendering judgment in favor of one rather than the other." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"3. It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"27. If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be considered probable so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"Rome, 19 April 1902. - A petition having been referred to this Supreme Congregation... in order to obtain official communication of the true text of the decree of the Holy Office on probabilism, directed to Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., the undersigned Assessor... has the honor to transmit herewith the authentic copy of the said decree, with an express declaration that this is the only true text; that consequently all the others, published in whatever manner and at whatever time, must be considered apocryphal; and that if any of these latter should happen to bear signs, even undoubted ones, of authenticity, it must be held that this occurred through mere mistake.... GIAMBATTISTA LUGARI, Assessor of the Holy Office."

"A report having been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written by the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously accepted and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the position of those who assert that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; and that he assure him that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the same Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the position of those asserting that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he pleases, may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and let him command them to submit themselves wholly to the mandate of His Holiness.

On 8 July 1680, when the aforesaid Order of His Holiness was reported by the Assessor to the Father General of the Society of Jesus, he responded that he would comply in all things as quickly as possible, although it had never been forbidden either by him or by his predecessors to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to teach it."

"I, the undersigned Notary of the Holy Office, testify that the above-written copy of the decree issued on Wednesday, 26 June 1680, was taken from the original acts of the same Sacred Congregation, and that it agrees with them exactly, as is established from a word-for-word collation.

Given at Rome, from the offices of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902. Canon MANCINI, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

"Chapter 11. 1. Likewise, that a man ought not to be content with authority in order to have certainty concerning some question. - 2. Likewise, that in order for a man to have certainty concerning a conclusion, he must be founded upon principles known of themselves. An error, if he speaks generally both of certainty of apprehension and of certainty of adherence." Error condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, with the Theological Faculty, in the year 1276, at the command of John XXI. Cf. nn. 114, 131.

"1. Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? - 2. Whether a confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831; Acta S. Sed. vol. 1, p. 497 ff.; Benedict XIV, On the Canonization of Saints, bk. 2, d. 28, nn. 5, 7.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

"1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the professors of Theology ought to hand down of the aforesaid University is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

1. Conscience can be taken in two ways, physically and morally. Conscience considered physically pertains to Psychology and Logic, according as it is considered either precisely insofar as it is a cognitive faculty of returning upon its own acts, or precisely insofar as it is an instrument for attaining truth. But conscience taken morally pertains both to Moral Theology and to Moral Philosophy. Wherefore here the discussion will be only about conscience considered morally. We shall speak first about the intrinsic nature of this moral conscience, and then about its various divisions.

2. Law regulates human actions in order to their moral honesty or turpitude by the aid of conscience. For in order to regulate them, it must be applied to the action to be done here and now, so that it may be seen whether such an action is commanded, forbidden, permitted by the law, or counseled; and from this application a judgment is then formed concerning this or that action to be done or omitted here and now, and this practical judgment is conscience. Wherefore conscience is nothing other than a practical judgment by which we pronounce a thing to be done or omitted here and now as good or evil; and this by way of precept, or counsel, or simple permission. A practical judgment, that is, a practical-practical or proximately practical judgment. For a judgment regarding not an action concretely to be placed here and now, but the licitness of an action in the abstract, is also a practical judgment, but speculative-practical or remotely practical. - Therefore, as law is the objective and external rule of human acts, so conscience is the subjective and internal rule of those same acts; the former remote, the latter proximate. Hence human acts derive their moral, formal goodness or malice from conscience and not from law. For the object of the will is that which is proposed by reason. Whence it follows that, from the fact that something is proposed by reason as good or as evil, the will, while it is borne toward it, receives the aspect of good or evil. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.

3. In order that we may form this conscience, we make a syllogism. In this syllogism the major proposition states the law generally. The minor proposition of the same syllogism compares the action which we wish to do here and now with the law. Finally, the consequent, from the conformity or deformity affirmed in the premises of this or that action with the law, pronounces that this or that action is to be done here and now as good, or to be omitted as evil; and this is called the judgment or dictate of conscience. Dictate, because to dictate is to command, to order; and conscience is, as it were, an interior law which binds man. Judgment, since just as a dictate concerns only those things which ought to be done or omitted, judgment also concerns those things which can be done or omitted. Wherefore conscience differs altogether from synderesis, which is the natural habit of the first principles of things to be done, which are the natural principles of natural law. - St. Thomas, I, q. 79, aa. 12, 13; I-II, q. 76, a. 1; De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1; q. 17, a. 1; 5, 2 d. 24, q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 4; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 1; L. I, n. 1, 2 (ed. Neap., 1819, unless another is expressly cited).

4. "And according to this mode it is clear how synderesis, natural law, and conscience differ: because natural law names the universal principles of law themselves; synderesis names the habit of them, or the power with the habit; but conscience names a certain application of natural law to something to be done, by way of a certain conclusion." St. Thomas, 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 24, a. 4. But from universal principles speculatively applied to particular matters, moral science is had, which deduces determinate conclusions, but in the abstract.

5. The Angelic Doctor, I, q. 79, a. 9, distinguishes higher and lower reason. It belongs to the former to judge according to the motives of wisdom; to the latter, according to the motives of science, according as reason intends, as St. Augustine says, in its judgment, eternal or temporal things. Hence the aforesaid comparison of the action which we wish to do here and now with the law can be made in two ways: in one way according to higher reason, or according to the knowledge of eternal things and of the divinely revealed law; in another way according to lower reason, or according to the rational knowledge of temporal things.

6. The Angelic Doctor himself illustrates by the following example the aforesaid syllogism by which we form conscience for ourselves, and the comparison of an action to be done with the law, by the judgment of higher and lower reason. "Synderesis," he says, "in this syllogism supplies, as it were, the major, the consideration of which is the act of synderesis; but higher or lower reason supplies the minor, the consideration of which is its own act; but the consideration of the elicited conclusion is the consideration of conscience. For example, synderesis proposes this: Every evil is to be avoided. Higher reason assumes this: Adultery is evil, because prohibited by the law of God; or lower reason would assume it because it is evil, because unjust, or dishonorable. But the conclusion, which is that this adultery is to be avoided, pertains to conscience." 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

7. Moral conscience, whose nature we have now described and of which we are speaking at present, is called antecedent conscience, so that it may be distinguished from another moral conscience, which is called consequent; and this is the conscience which refers to an action already done and to whether it was morally good or evil. Hence three things are attributed to conscience: to testify, to bind, to accuse, or to excuse. To testify, that is, to recognize that we have done or not done something; to bind, that is, to judge that something is to be done or not to be done; to accuse or excuse, that is, to judge that something which has been done was not well done or was well done. - But to avoid cavils concerning that prior conscience, namely that it should not be called conscience, since it bears judgment about a thing not done but to be done, for conscience refers to internal facts, we briefly note that usage has already obtained that it be so called. Usage, however, in this matter is a sufficient reason. But the very force of the name is in no way foreign to such a signification. For "conscience, according to the propriety of the word, imports an ordering of knowledge to something; for conscience is said as with other knowledge," that is, an application of knowledge to something, which is not done except through some act. Wherefore that act of the mind or intellect is rightly called conscience, by which a human act is directed in the concrete, or as to be placed here and now. And thence it is that synderesis, or the natural habit of the principles of things to be done, is also accustomed to be called conscience; for a habit is a principle of act, and "it is customary for causes and effects to be named from one another." St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; Laymann, l. 1, c. 2, n. 1; Sanchez, De Praec. Decal., l. 1, c. 9, n. 1.

8. Now the formal goodness or malice of human acts is to be taken not from consequent conscience, but from antecedent conscience. Hence those who study moral theology are sometimes deceived, because they think after acquiring the science that they sinned in many things; since they lacked that science when they acted, and then were acting in good faith. The same is to be said of the unlearned and of all others who, after hearing a sermon or after reading a pious book, begin to be troubled with anxiety about past operations. - St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De Veritate, q. 17, aa. 1, 2.

9. If in that syllogism which is to be formed so that conscience may be had, the major proposition, or law, were always established with evident certainty, and the minor proposition, or that this or that action is contained in the law, were also always established with evident certainty, there would be given only one conscience: certain and right conscience. But since both the law and the application of the law often must be gathered by the force of difficult reasoning, hence there are various species of conscience. Nevertheless error, as is clear, can never happen by force of synderesis, but only by force of erring reason. "It happens," says St. Thomas, "that conscience errs, not because of an error of synderesis, but because of an error of reason; as is clear in the heretic whose conscience dictates to him that he should rather allow himself to be burned than swear, because higher reason is perverse in this, that it believes an oath to be simply prohibited." 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

10. Therefore conscience is divided: 1. Into right and erroneous conscience. Right conscience is that which dictates what is true; erroneous conscience is that which dictates as true what is false. Erroneous conscience is either vincibly or invincibly such, according as the error morally could and should have been avoided, or morally could not have been avoided. 2. Into certain, probable, doubtful, strict, lax, scrupulous conscience, according as it is founded on a certain, probable, doubtful, stricter, laxer, or wholly vain motive. Conscience that is only subjectively certain, that is, which is thought to be such, and therefore with certainty taken more broadly, and likewise probable and doubtful conscience, can be objectively right or erroneous. Scrupulous, strict, and lax conscience are referred to erroneous conscience. For without sufficient reason, the scrupulous conscience fears sin where there is no sin; the lax conscience bends judgment in favor of liberty, either to avoiding the law simply, or to lessening its obligation; but the strict conscience affirms either an obligation which is not present, or a graver obligation than is really present.

11. There are several degrees of lax conscience. It is Pharisaical if someone, making much of certain small observances, makes little of grave precepts; it is cauterized if, from a contracted habit of sinning, it makes light of grave sins. - Lax conscience is often not taken for conscience, which is an act of the mind and not a habit, but for a habitual disposition of the soul toward laxity; and similarly scrupulous conscience is not rarely taken not for conscience itself properly, but for a habitual disposition of the soul inclined to scruples. - Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 2; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, a. 6 ad 2; Quodl. 3, a. 26.

12. Certain conscience properly is that conscience which rests upon a certain motive; and consequently judges concerning the honesty or turpitude of an action to be done without fear of erring. Less properly, it is that which simply judges concerning the honesty or turpitude of an action without any fear of erring. The latter is certain only subjectively; the former is also certain objectively. Likewise, certain conscience can be certain strictly and broadly, or morally. Strictly certain conscience excludes every doubt, both prudent and imprudent. Broadly or morally certain conscience excludes only every prudent doubt. Its directive force as regards the licitness or illicitness of human acts, commanded or prohibited, is declared in the following propositions.

13. Only certain conscience is proximately directive of human acts. - Proof. "The command of one who governs has itself for binding in voluntary matters in that mode of binding which can befall the will, as bodily action has itself for binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of its coercion with the thing upon which it acts. Hence neither is anyone bound by the command of some king or lord unless the command touches the one to whom it is commanded; but it touches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept. And therefore he who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept. Nor is someone ignorant of a precept of God bound to doing the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know, and does not know, he is in no way bound by the precept. As in bodily things, a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so also in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge." St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3.

14. Therefore man is bound through knowledge, or certain knowledge, of the precept by which, however, he is properly bound. Hence the Holy Doctor goes on to say: "And therefore, just as the force by which touch acts and by which the power of the agent acts is the same, since touch does not act except by the power of the agent, and the power of the agent acts only through the mediation of touch; so it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except through the power of knowledge, nor does knowledge bind except through the power of the precept. Hence, since conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to an act, it is clear that conscience is said to bind by the force of the divine precept. Therefore it must be said that man does not make a law for himself, but through the act of his cognition, by which he knows the law made by another, he is bound to fulfilling the law." But this act of cognition, according to St. Thomas, is nothing other than knowledge of the law, or certain cognition of the law. Any other uncertain cognition manifests not the law, but a doubt about the law, by which certainly the will cannot be bound.

15. According to the same Angelic Doctor, someone is bound by a precept in two ways: either because he has knowledge of it, or because he is bound to know it. But when, with moral diligence applied, the precept is not established, then neither is knowledge of the precept lacking, nor is he bound further to know it, since by hypothesis the diligence necessary for knowing it has already been applied, and it could not be known. Wherefore then knowledge of the law is lacking, and no obligation of the will can be had.

16. It is unlawful to act without conscience subjectively certain concerning the honesty of an action. - Proof. He who acts without this conscience wills an action concerning whose honesty or turpitude he is uncertain. But to will an action concerning whose honesty or turpitude one is uncertain is nothing other than to will it whether it be good or evil. But again, to will an action whether it be good or evil is illicit, for this is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. Moreover, the saying of the Apostle to the Romans is well known, 14:23: All that is not of faith is sin. That is, what is not from a certain persuasion that it is licit is sin. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 3, 5; Quodl. 3, a. 27, ad 2; Quodl. 8, a. 13; L. I, n. 3; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 3.

17. Sin does not have a special malice precisely from this, that it is against conscience, unless it is done in order that conscience may be overcome. The first reason is that this is intrinsic and common to every sin, that it be against conscience. The second reason is that there is then a directly willed contempt of the rule of every good operation, and thus one exposes himself to the danger of all crimes, which, as is clear, is a special and indeed most grave disordering of the will, against the natural inclination of the will toward good. - Lessius on q. 19, a. 6, d. 3; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 14, aa. 1, 4.

18. Likewise it is a special sin if someone sins from certain malice through contempt, casting away and removing that which could have impeded the choice of sin; and it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Six species of this are enumerated: despair, presumption, impenitence or the purpose of not repenting, obstinacy or the purpose of adhering to sin, impugnment of acknowledged truth so that one may sin more licentiously, envy of fraternal grace, by which someone envies not only the person of his brother, but also the grace of God increasing in the world.

19. Only conscience subjectively certain is the rule of morals. But morally certain conscience suffices. - Proof of the first part. For, as is clear from the preceding proposition, nn. 13, 16, without this conscience one cannot act. Besides this conscience, no other subjectively more perfect conscience is given. Therefore one can act with this alone; and accordingly this conscience alone is the rule of morals. Proof of the second part. 1. From the common sentence of the doctors and universal practice. 2. Because very often another certainty cannot be had, and no one necessarily sins. 3. Because, with this moral certainty standing, one acts prudently; for moral certainty, although it does not exclude every doubt, both prudent and imprudent, nevertheless excludes every prudent doubt. Therefore. - Rom. 14:23; c. Litteras 13, De Restitutione Spoliatorum; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 9 ad 2; q. 70, a. 2.

20. It is lawful to act according to certain conscience, even if it is invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who acts thus wills, as far as lies in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. But it is right to will this action. Therefore. Proof of the major: for nothing is willed unless it is first known. Therefore, with invincibly erroneous conscience standing, he who acts according to it wills, as far as lies in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. - L. I, n. 5; Elbel 126.

21. Wherefore he who is persuaded in such a way that he ought to tell a lie in order to free his neighbor from a grave evil does not sin by lying; indeed, he places an act formally good. - Although erroneous conscience materially disagrees with the law, nevertheless one is bound by it, because erroneous conscience proposes error as law. Since obligation arises from law, in the aforesaid case of erroneous conscience, obligation does not arise directly from the law that one must lie, which does not exist; but it arises from the more general natural law of doing good and avoiding evil; and the evil to be avoided in the case is apprehended as a good to be done. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 4 ad 3.

22. It is unlawful to act against certain conscience, even if it is invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who would act thus would will an action which he judged prohibited; he would refuse one which he judged commanded. But it is unlawful to have this will, because it is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. "It must be said that, simply, every will disagreeing with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 5; 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3; Quodl. 3, a. 27; L. loc. cit.; Cajetan on I-II, q. 19, a. 5; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 4.

23. Wherefore he who believes himself bound to tell a lie in order to free his neighbor from grave evil sins by not lying.

24. It is lawful to act according to certain conscience, although it is vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because when an action is judged honest or base with certainty, the will acting according to this conscience pursues the honest and flees the base, which is wholly lawful. But that this conscience is vincibly erroneous does not make it that, when someone actually acts according to it, he sins; rather this makes it that the fault is only in the cause. Hence also the judgment concerning its gravity or lightness must be made not from the grave or light effect, but from the grave or light negligence in inquiring into the truth. Now when someone actually acts, if in no way does he attend to the erroneous conscience which he has, and has no suspicion concerning it, since by hypothesis there is here and now a certain conscience, he already acts not from a vincibly erroneous conscience, but from an invincible conscience. - La-Croix, l. 1, nn. 42, 43, 757, 760; Kenrick, 2nd ed., Mechlin, 1860, n. 36.

25. Wherefore he who here and now judges himself bound to commit theft in order to help a poor person does not sin by stealing. But those who are habitually of lax conscience ordinarily sin gravely by transgressing a grave precept, because ordinarily speaking they have at least some confused knowledge of it.

26. It is unlawful to act against certain conscience, even if it is vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because then one would act against a certain judgment; and he would will the action which he judges prohibited, and would refuse the action which he judges commanded; which will is evil, for it is affected toward evil. Therefore. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 4; Elbel 122, 137, 138; L. I, n. 4; La-Croix, l. 1, nn. 42, 43, 757. - "And therefore it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether concerning things evil in themselves or concerning indifferent things, is obligatory, so that he who acts against conscience sins." St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, a. 27; Quodl. 8, a. 15.

27. "A sin committed against conscience has its species from the particular matter in which it is thought to be concerned, or from order to the particular precept to which it is thought to be opposed. For example, if you think a thing which you take is not yours, although in reality it is yours, it will be the sin of theft; if you think it is against the obligation of a vow, it will be the sin of sacrilege. The reason is that sins receive their species from the object either of the external action or of the will. Nor does it matter whether this object is really evil, but whether it is apprehended as evil; because the will is borne toward it as it is proposed by reason." Lessius on q. 19, a. 6, d. 3; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 5 ad 3.

28. It is no sin to act against certain erroneous conscience if liberty of acting is lacking. - The reason is clear, because where there is no freedom, there is no sin. And thus he does not sin who believes that he sins, while having base thoughts or suffering base movements, which, although he detests them, he nevertheless cannot impede.

29. Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning depraved desires and other merely internal acts, if no external action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more unlearned and less educated, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain, and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach it." St. Alphonsus says concerning this opinion, I, n. 9: "I could never consider it probable.... With other learned recent authors I consider it little probable." The reason for this sentence is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How, therefore, will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will into evil is not so evident as in a desire that is of itself efficacious. And the same also seems to be said of an inefficacious desire.

30. Can there be an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning precepts of natural law? - "It is certain that in the first principles of natural law principles, as also in proximate conclusions and in the certain obligations of one's proper state, invincible ignorance is not given, because by the very light of nature such things are known to all, except to those who close their eyes lest they see them. But on the contrary the unanimous sentence of theologians is... that in conclusions which are mediate and obscure, or remote from the principles, invincible ignorance certainly is given and must be admitted," L. I, n. 8, 170 seqq.; Struggl, tr. 3, q. 1, n. 10-13; St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, q. 36; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2; ad Rom. 2, 14-18.

31. The eternal law, existing in the divine mind, most perfectly exhibits the order of things. The natural law, which is an application of the eternal law, exists in the human mind. Wherefore the natural law, by the very fact that it is manifested through human reason, falls short of the supreme perfection of the eternal law. Hence it happens that what we think and judge, in more difficult matters, does not always answer to the rules of the divine mind, and remains obscure and unknown to us. Hence that thing, although materially and in itself it pertains to natural law, nevertheless does not pertain to it formally and as regards us, since it has not been sufficiently promulgated to us by the natural light.

32. Can boys invincibly be ignorant of the malice of pollution? - Reply. Affirmatively, speaking absolutely, at least in some rare case, and at the beginning of a depraved custom. The reason is that the fact that an immodest look or touch, or the seeking of pleasure from pollution procured, or even naturally arisen, etc., is morally evil and illicit, is not made known so evidently from the very comprehension of the first principles; rather, reasoning is needed in order to detect their malice. Therefore their malice can, at least for some time, be inculpably unknown. From this the prudent confessor will easily conclude that, in such a contingency of fact, one must proceed cautiously and prudently; and this caution and prudence, if it is to be observed with all especially in the matter of chastity, is to be observed most of all with boys and girls. - Elbel 128; Struggl, loc. cit., n. 13.

33. "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying upon a probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex or concomitant principles, for acting licitly." L. I, n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius the confessor, relying upon a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then indeed he says, and this is the reflex principle: But, with jurisdiction truly probable standing, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience, I can validly and licitly absolve in the case; and he absolves.

34. "Various species of probabilities are given... An opinion slightly probable is one which rests upon some foundation, but not such as has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man... Probable is one which rests upon a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or of extrinsic authority, which has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is one which rests upon a weightier foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary also is judged probable. Most probable is one which rests upon a most weighty foundation, on account of which the opposite is judged either slightly or doubtfully probable... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally, a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning. Safer, however, is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest upon firmer reasons." L. loc. cit.

35. But St. Alphonsus speaks more exactly of a most probable opinion, H. A., tr. I, n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not slightly probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But slight probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with itself a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not one wholly certain and stable." Cf. Sporer, Op. Mor., I, n. 185.

"Truth known without fear is called certainty. But truth probably known is called opinion. The adversaries wish that a truly probable opinion be only that which, after all things have been weighed on both sides, is known to be true, so that the opposite seems certainly false. But they err in terms; for this must be said of science, or of moral certainty, but not of probable opinion, which of itself carries with it that it be fallible, and that its contrary also be probable, that is, probably true"; St. Alphonsus, Scholastico-moral Dissertation, year 1749.

36. Now from probable conscience which is to be followed practically, probabilism arises. Probabilism is reduced to one proposition applied to human action, as regards its licitness, in a case of doubt: A doubtful law does not oblige. Behold what probabilism is, and it is nothing else except this. It is called probabilism because whenever there is against the law a truly probable opinion, the law is doubtful, and consequently does not oblige. Hence probabilism is also called the moral system by which, in doubtful matters, it is simply lawful, as regards the licitness of acting, from some reflex principle, to follow a truly probable opinion against the law.

37. It differs altogether from the other moral systems. It differs from rigid and mitigated tutiorism, because the former states: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter states: it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable.

38. It differs from laxism, which is also called broad or lax probabilism, because lax probabilists say: it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. Probabilism simply so called, or moderate probabilism, wholly excludes an opinion slightly probable and doubtfully probable, because these opinions are not truly probable. A truly probable opinion is only one which is gravely and certainly probable. For this alone is able prudently to move a prudent man to assent, in the doubt of some grave matter; and this alone truly rests upon a grave motive.

39. It differs from probabiliorism, because probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is more probable. - It differs from equiprobabilism, because equiprobabilists affirm that it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty when the contrary opinion for the law is equally probable or a little more probable; but not at all when the contrary opinion for the law is certainly and notably more probable.

How manyfold is the acceptance of conscience? - Conscience can be taken in two ways, physically and morally. Conscience physically considered pertains to Psychology and to Logic, according as it is considered either precisely insofar as it is a cognitive faculty of returning upon its own acts, or precisely insofar as it is an instrument of attaining truth. But conscience taken morally belongs both to Moral Theology and to Moral Philosophy. Therefore here the discussion will be only of conscience morally considered. We shall speak first of the intrinsic nature of this moral conscience, then of its various divisions.

What is the intrinsic nature of moral conscience? - Law regulates human actions in order to their moral honorableness or shamefulness by means of conscience. For in order that it regulate them, it must be applied to the action to be effected here and now, so that it may be seen whether such an action is commanded, prohibited, permitted by law, or counseled; from which application a judgment is then formed concerning such or such an action, to be effected or omitted here and now, and this practical judgment is conscience. Therefore conscience is nothing other than the practical judgment by which we pronounce a thing to be done or omitted here and now as good or evil; and this after the manner of a precept, or counsel, or simple permission.

Therefore in order that we may form this conscience, we make a syllogism. In this syllogism the major proposition states the law generally. But the minor proposition of the same syllogism compares the action which we wish to do here and now with the law. Finally the consequent, from the conformity or deformity of such or such an action with the law affirmed in the premises, pronounces that such or such an action is to be effected here and now as good, or to be omitted as evil; and this judgment or dictate is called conscience. Dictate, for to dictate is to command, to ordain; and conscience is like an interior law which binds man. Judgment, since as dictate it concerns only those things which ought to be done or omitted, but as judgment it also concerns those things which can be done or omitted. Therefore conscience differs altogether from synderesis, which is the natural habit of the first principles of things to be done, which natural principles are of natural right. S. Th. 1. p. q. 79. a. 12. 13, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1, De Verit. q. 16. a. 1, q. 17. a. 1. 5, 2. D. 24. q. 1. a. 4, q. 2. a. 4; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 1; L. 1. 1. n. 1. 2.

What are antecedent and consequent conscience? - Moral conscience, whose nature we have already described, and about which we are speaking at present, is called antecedent conscience, to be distinguished from another moral conscience, which is called consequent; and this is the one which reports that an action already done was morally good or evil. But to avoid cavils about that former conscience, namely that it should not be called conscience, since it bears judgment about a thing not done but to be done, for conscience reports internal facts, we briefly note that usage has already obtained that it be so called. But usage in this matter is a sufficient reason. Now the formal goodness or malice of human acts is to be taken not from consequent conscience, but from antecedent conscience. Hence those who study moral theology are sometimes deceived, because they think that after gaining knowledge they had sinned in many things; since they lacked that knowledge when they acted, and were then acting in good faith. The same should be said of the uneducated and all others who, after hearing a sermon, after reading a pious book, begin to be involved in anxiety as regards past operations. - S. Th. 1. p. q. 79. a. 3, De Verit. q. 17. a. 1. 2.

What are the divisions of moral conscience? - If in that syllogism which must be formed in order that conscience may be had, the major proposition, or law, always stood with evident certainty, and the minor proposition, or that this or that action is contained in the law, also always stood with evident certainty, there would be only one conscience, certain and right conscience. But since both the law and the application of the law often must be gathered by the force of difficult reasoning, hence there are various species of conscience.

Therefore it is divided: 1. Into right and erroneous conscience. Right conscience is that which dictates what is true; erroneous, that which dictates as true what is false. Erroneous conscience is either vincibly or invincibly such, according as the error morally could and ought to have been avoided, or morally could not have been avoided. 2. Into certain, probable, doubtful, strict, lax, and scrupulous conscience, according as it is founded on a certain, probable, doubtful, stricter, laxer, or altogether empty motive. Conscience only subjectively certain, namely one which is thought to be such, and therefore with certainty taken more broadly, as also probable and doubtful conscience, can be objectively right or erroneous. But scrupulous, strict, and lax are brought back to erroneous conscience. For without sufficient reason, the scrupulous conscience fears sin where there is no sin; the lax bends judgment in favor of liberty, either to avoid the law simply, or to lessen its obligation; but the strict affirms either an obligation which is not present, or one more grave than actually exists. Suarez t. 3. d. 12. s. 2;

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3, a. 6 ad 2, Quodl. 3. a. 26.

What is certain conscience; and what is its directive force? - Certain conscience properly is that conscience which rests upon a certain motive; and consequently judges concerning the honorableness or shamefulness of the action to be done without fear of erring. Less properly, however, it is that which judges simply without any fear of erring concerning the honorableness or shamefulness of an action. This latter is only subjectively certain; the former is also objectively certain. It can likewise be certain strictly and broadly, or morally. Strictly certain excludes every doubt, both prudent and imprudent. Broadly or morally certain excludes only every prudent doubt. Its directive force is declared by the following propositions.

It is unlawful to act without conscience subjectively certain concerning the honorableness of the action. - Proof. He who acts without this conscience wills an action concerning whose honorableness or shamefulness he is uncertain. But to will an action concerning whose honorableness or shamefulness someone is uncertain is nothing other than to will it whether it is good or evil. But again, to will an action whether it is good or evil is illicit; for this is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3. 5, Quodl. 3. a. 27 ad 2, Quodl. 8. a. 13; L. 1. 1. n. 3; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 3; E. M.

Note: 1. Sin, precisely because it is against conscience, does not have a special malice, unless it is done so that conscience may be conquered. The first reason is because this is intrinsic and common to every sin, that it is against conscience. The second reason is because then there is had a directly willed contempt of the rule of every good operation, and thus someone exposes himself to the danger of all crimes, which, as is clear, is a special and most grave disorder of the will, against the natural inclination of the will toward good. - Lessius on q. 19. a. 6. d. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 1. 4.

2. Likewise it is a special sin if someone sins from certain malice through contempt, by casting aside and removing that which could impede the election of sin; and it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. - Six species of this are enumerated: desperation, presumption, impenitence or the resolve not to repent, obstinacy or the resolve to cling to sin, attacking acknowledged truth so that one may sin more licentiously; envy of fraternal grace, by which someone envies not only the person of his brother, but also the grace of God increasing in the world.

Only conscience subjectively certain is the rule of morals. But morally certain conscience suffices. Proof of the 1st part. For, as is clear from the preceding proposition, n. 100, without this conscience no one can act. Besides this conscience no other subjectively more perfect conscience is given. Therefore with this alone can someone act; and therefore this conscience alone is the rule of morals. Proof of the 2nd part. 1. From the common opinion of doctors and universal practice. 2. Because most often another certainty cannot be had; and no one necessarily sins. 3. Because, while this moral certainty stands, someone acts prudently, for moral certainty, although it does not exclude every doubt, both prudent and imprudent, nevertheless excludes every prudent doubt. Therefore. Rom. 14:23; C. Litteras 13 de Restit. spoliat.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 70. a. 2.

It is lawful to act according to a certain conscience which is nevertheless invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who acts in this way wills, as much as is in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. But it is right to will this action. Therefore. The major is proved, for nothing is willed unless first known. Therefore, while an invincibly erroneous conscience stands, he who acts according to it wills, as much as is in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. - L. 1. 1. n. 5; Elbel 126.

It is unlawful to act against a certain conscience which is nevertheless invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who would act in this way would will an action which he judged prohibited; he would not will one which he judged commanded. But it is unlawful to have this will, because it is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. "It must be said that simply every will discordant from reason, whether right or erring, is always evil." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5, 2. D. 39. q. 3. a. 3, Quodl. 3. a. 27; L. l. c.; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 4.

It is lawful to act according to a certain conscience, even though vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because when the action is judged honorable or shameful with certainty, the will acting according to this conscience pursues the honorable and flees the shameful, which is altogether licit. But that this conscience is vincibly erroneous does not make it so that, when someone actually acts according to it, he sins; rather, it makes it so that the fault is only in the cause, whence also it is that judgment about its gravity or lightness must be made not from the grave or light effect, but from the grave or light negligence in seeking the truth. Now when someone actually acts, if in no way does he attend to the erroneous conscience which he has, and has no suspicion about it, since by hypothesis the conscience is certain here and now, he is already acting not from a vincibly erroneous conscience, but from an invincible conscience. La-Croix l. 1. n. 42. 43. 757. 760; Kenrick ed. 2. Mechl. 1860. n. 36.

It is unlawful to act against a certain conscience which is nevertheless vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because then someone would act against a certain judgment; and would will the action which he judges prohibited, and would not will the action which he judges commanded; which will is evil, for it is affected toward evil. Therefore. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5. 6; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 4; Elbel 122. 137. 138; L. 1. 1. n. 4; La-Croix l. 1, n. 42. 43. 757. "And therefore it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether in things evil per se or in indifferent things, is obligatory; so that he who acts against conscience sins." S. Th. Quodl. 3. a. 27, Quodl. 8. a. 15.

Note: "A sin committed against conscience has its species from the particular matter in which it is thought to be concerned; or from order to the particular precept which it is thought to oppose. For example, if you think the thing which you take is not yours, yet in fact it is yours, it will be the sin of theft; if you think it is against the obligation of a vow, it will be the sin of sacrilege. The reason is that sins receive species from the object either of the external action or of the will. Nor does it matter whether this object is evil in reality, but whether it is apprehended as evil, because the will is borne toward it according as it is proposed by reason." Lessius on q. 19. a. 6. d. 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5 ad 3.

Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience as regards depraved desires and other merely internal acts, namely if no exterior action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more uneducated and less instructed, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain; and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach this." This opinion, says S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 9, "I have never been able to judge probable.... With other learned recent authors I judge it little probable." The reason for this opinion is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How then will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, that invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will toward evil is not so evident as in desire efficacious of itself. And the same also seems to have to be said of inefficacious desire.

Can there be an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the precepts of natural law? - "It is certain that in the first principles of natural law, as also in the proximate conclusions and certain obligations of one's own state, invincible ignorance is not given, because by the very light of nature such things are known to all, except to him who closes his eyes lest he see them.... On the contrary, however, the unanimous opinion of theologians is... that in mediated and obscure conclusions, or those remote from the principles, invincible ignorance is indeed given and must be admitted." L. 1. 1. n. 8. 170 seq.; Struggl tr. 3. q. 1. n. 10-13; S. Th. Quodl. 3. a. 36, De Verit. q. 17. a. 2; De Malo q. 3. a. 8; Rom. 2:14. 15. In the first principles of natural law, for example: good is to be done, evil avoided; the highest good is to be loved, evil detested; what you do not wish for yourself, do not do to another; thanks are to be given to benefactors, etc. In proximate conclusions, for example: God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, theft is not to be committed, etc. In remote conclusions, for example: private revenge is not to be exercised, abortion is not to be procured, etc. Eternal law, existing in the divine mind, most perfectly exhibits the order of things. Natural law, which is the application of eternal law, exists in the human mind. Therefore natural law, by the very fact that it is manifested through human reason, falls short of the highest perfection of eternal law.

Hence it happens that not always what we think and judge, in more difficult matters, corresponds to the rules of the divine mind, and remains obscure and unknown to us. Whence that thing, although materially and in itself it pertains to natural law, nevertheless does not pertain formally and as regards us, since it has not been sufficiently promulgated to us by the natural light. - Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 1. a. 3.

Can children invincibly be ignorant of the malice of pollution? - R. Affirmatively, absolutely speaking, at least in some rare case, and at the beginning of a depraved habit. The reason is that the fact that an immodest look or touch, or the capturing of pleasure from procured pollution, or even from that which has naturally arisen, etc., are morally evil and illicit, is not so evidently made known from the very comprehension of the first principles, but discourse is needed to detect their malice. Therefore their malice can at least for some time be inculpably unknown. From this a prudent confessor will easily conclude that in such a contingency of fact one must proceed cautiously and prudently; and this caution and prudence, if it must always and with all be observed, especially in the matter of chastity, must be observed most of all with boys and girls. Elbel 128; Struggl l. c. n. 13.

What is probable conscience; and what is its directive force? - "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying on some probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex, or concomitant, principles for acting licitly." L. 1. 1. n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius, a confessor, relying on a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then, however, he says, and this is the reflex principle: But while jurisdiction is truly probable, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience: I can validly and licitly absolve in this case; and he absolves. Its directive force is declared by the following propositions.

Note: 1. "That diverse species of probabilities are given.... A tenuously probable opinion is one which rests on some foundation, but not such as avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.... Probable is that which rests on a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority, which avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also judged probable. Most probable is that which rests on a most grave foundation, and for this reason the opposite is judged either tenuously or doubtfully probable.... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning; but the safer is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest on stronger reasons." L. l. c. But S. D. speaks more exactly about a most probable opinion, H. A. tr. 1. n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not tenuously probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But tenuous probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with it a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not altogether certain and stable." Cf. also Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 85. But lest there be quibbling about words, as far as concerns us, we recognize no opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability except the probable opinion, the more probable, and the most probable. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; but mediately to the most probable; and likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable, unless someone wishes really to confuse the most probable with the certain.

2. Various moral systems: Tutiorism: A moral system which establishes that in doubt the safer part is to be followed practically. One kind is absolute, and is Rigorism, which establishes that the safer part must always be followed. Another is mitigated, which establishes that the safer part must be followed unless the other part favoring liberty is most probable. Probabiliorism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty only when it is more probable than the opposite favoring the law. Therefore according to this system a doubtful law obliges, against the most common opinion and against reason. Equiprobabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally or almost equally probable as the opposite. It is indeed a right norm of acting, but not to the exclusion of probabilism, which is a moral system containing an altogether right norm of acting, embracing all the cases of a true probable opinion favoring liberty, when the question concerns merely the subjective honorableness of an action. Probabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty, although the opposite in favor of the law is more probable, whether a little or much more probable, where nevertheless the question concerns only the liceity of a human action. The reason is that when there is a truly probable opinion against a law, the law is doubtful, and a doubtful law does not oblige. Laxism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion even doubtfully and tenuously probable against the law. It was condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

With a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs the action really to be placed here and now, it is altogether unlawful to operate. - For only a subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And in this sense that saying is consequently false: He who acts probably, acts prudently. L. 1. 1. n. 58. 69. 80. Therefore the whole question here concerns a speculatively probable conscience, which only remotely directs the action, stating the probable existence of a law: namely whether by means of some reasoning we can lawfully make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience, or, what is the same, whether, while a probable opinion stands concerning the honorableness of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honorableness of such an action in a particular and individual case, and thus licitly follow in practice a speculatively probable opinion. To resolve this question we establish the following propositions.

It is not licit practically to follow a tenuously probable opinion, the safer one being left aside. - The proposition is against lax probabilists. This is clear first from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI. Moreover, a tenuously probable opinion is an opinion resting on a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a serious or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed that opinion is called truly probable which rests on such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to judgment about the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the liceity of the action. L. 1. 1. n. 40; E. M.

You will resolve: From the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI, both because it deals with even tenuous probability, and because it asserts too generally that we always act prudently when, trusting in probability, we do something, nothing can be drawn against probabilism. For tenuous probability is not true probability. Nor indeed is probabilism extended to a case where the question concerns the truth of a thing and an end to be obtained absolutely. Nor indeed is it licit practically to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. For a doubtfully probable opinion is an opinion resting on a doubtful motive, namely one about which it can prudently be doubted whether it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But it is an evident thing that a prudent man in matters of grave moment does not rely on a motive of this kind; whence, if the matter does not in fact turn out well, all would rightly and deservedly accuse him of imprudence.

But the moral goodness or malice of human acts is a graver matter than any other temporal business. Moreover, while this doubtful probability stands, it is impossible to form for oneself a morally certain practical dictate concerning the liceity of the action. Therefore to an opinion tenuously probable is opposed an opinion gravely probable, or simply probable; to an opinion doubtfully probable is opposed an opinion certainly probable, or simply probable. There are not lacking those who confuse a doubtfully probable and a tenuously probable opinion with each other. Practically indeed they are often confused; but speculatively, given the nature of the thing, they are altogether distinguished from each other. Cf. 112; La-Croix l. 1. n. 126.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion concerning the objective truth itself of the thing, where the question concerns an end to be obtained absolutely, the safer one being left aside. Proof. He who is absolutely bound to the end is bound to choose those means which in no way bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end to be obtained absolutely. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion concerning it is probable but false. Therefore. L. 1. 1. n. 42. To be obtained absolutely, "namely when someone is bound from justice or charity to avoid damage which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud S. Alph. Op. Mor. ed. Rome, 1757, l. c. n. 33, or the danger of it. Then indeed "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5 de Cler. exc. The case must likewise be added in which someone is bound to the safer thing from some special positive law or precept, or contract, or vow. Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 8, s. 6. n. 10; L. 1. 2. n. 10, l. 6. n. 918 p. ult.

You will resolve: It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but we must altogether choose the safer one in all those things which are necessary with the necessity of means for salvation, where the fact itself, or the truth of the thing, alone is attended to. Hence we must embrace the safer religion. Prop. 4 condemned by Innocent XI; L. 1. 1. n. 43. In the conferral of the sacraments, the minister is bound to follow the safer opinion, unless necessity is present or the Church supplies; for here again the question concerns the truth of the thing. For sacraments would not be had unless those things were really placed which Christ instituted for their validity. Prop. 1 condemned by Innocent XI.

Unless necessity is present; "for in extreme necessity we can well use any opinion, not only probable, but even tenuously probable, for the value of the sacrament... provided the sacrament is conferred conditionally: because the condition sufficiently repairs the injury of the sacrament, if perhaps it is conferred invalidly, and on the other hand necessity is a sufficient and just cause for conferring the sacraments conditionally." L. 1. 1. n. 49. Unless the Church supplies; for "we can licitly use a probable opinion where the Church is presumed to supply, as can happen in the sacrament of matrimony to validate a contract only probably valid, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying, and in the sacrament of penance to supply the jurisdiction of the confessor, if perhaps it is lacking."

L. 1. 1. n. 50. A physician is bound to apply the safer medicines which can be had in the case; for here the question concerns the objective effect itself, that is, the health of the sick person, to be obtained absolutely. And certainly the physician is bound not only from charity, but also from justice, by reason of his office and tacit contract, to provide in the better way for the health of the sick person, from whom he receives a stipend. L. 1. 1. n. 44. A judge cannot judge according to the less probable opinion; for he is bound by divine and human precept to render to each his right. Prop. 2 condemned by Innocent XI; L. 1. 1. n. 47.

A hunter who probably judges that an object hidden in the woods is a man cannot strike, although he judges more probably that it is a beast. For on the one hand the neighbor has a certain right to his life; on the other hand greater probability does not make it so that, if it really is a man, he will not perish by the blow. L. 1. 1. n. 52, H. A. tr. 1. n. 33. When scandals and more grave evils threaten, the safer part is to be chosen, by which they may be avoided, so that the utility of all may be consulted. C. Illud 5 de Cler. exc. - Generally the safer things are to be chosen when, as regards charity, the danger of sinning formally must be avoided, and as regards justice, the damage must be avoided of him who is in certain possession of his certain right. E. M.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable, the safer being left aside, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action. - The proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The honorableness of the action, about which the question here concerns, is quite diverse from the effect itself of the action, or from the truth of the thing, about which in the preceding proposition. The honorableness of a human action depends on the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends on the very fact of the action. The former is subjective, the latter objective. Proof of the 1st part from proposition 3 condemned by Alexander VIII in 1690: "It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probables"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnich (+ Oct. 8, 1666), a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists had already been reproved by the Church. And certainly no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given always to forestall the danger of materially sinning, nor can it be given, for this would be morally impossible; only the obligation is present to avoid the danger of formally sinning.

Proof of the 2nd part. If it were not licit practically to follow an opinion in favor of liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken as morally certain, or, as the word sounds, as probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into false doctrine against the Apostle saying that all that is not from faith, that is, from a certain persuasion of honorableness, is sin, Rom. 14:23. Thus among the milder rigorists are counted Antoine, De Consc. c. 4. q. 4, Gazzaniga, De Consc. prob. n. 140. 141, requiring for operating direct truth, or an opinion certainly and very probable, and much more probable, or more probable by many degrees, and far excelling. Proof of the 2nd part by the same reasons as the following proposition. - L. 1. 1. n. 40. 54; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 6. n. 8; E. M.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

Is the proposition established above, n. 116, some exception to probabilism, as though a true case of probabilism? - R. Negatively. For if probabilism is true, it must always be true, and must be verified in every case. And certainly probabilism regards the formal or subjective honorableness or shamefulness itself of an action; by no means the objective or real existence or non-existence of the effect of such an action. Now that thesis precisely regards this objective effect to be obtained or not obtained.

Therefore if someone in that case, in which the effect must be obtained absolutely, uses a probable opinion, he will certainly sin; but he will not sin precisely because he uses a probable opinion concerning the liceity of the action, but because he uses a probable opinion concerning the validity of the act, exposing himself to the danger of frustrating the effect to be obtained absolutely.

Then this would be a case of probabilism, when there were a probable opinion that it is licit by one's action to expose to danger an effect to be obtained absolutely; but that is not a probable opinion, but a false and erroneous one. And thus, for example, a minister of the sacraments who follows in their administration a probable opinion as regards their value indeed sins, certainly not because he follows a probable opinion as regards the liceity of the action; rather on the contrary, because he follows an altogether improbable opinion as regards the liceity of the action; because, since the effect of the sacrament certainly to be obtained, namely remission of sins and infusion of grace, depends on true matter and true form, someone using doubtful matter or form exposes it to the danger of lacking such effect, and therefore inflicts harm on his neighbor, and consequently sins. - L. Op. Mor. ed. Rome, 1757, l. 1. n. 33; Laymann l. 1. tr. 1. c. 5. § 2. 3; Lugo De Iust. et Iure d. 16. n. 97; D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 266.

Note: An exception, and a true and illogical exception of probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Therefore, they say, a doubtful law, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not indeed oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction.

But thus to admit probabilism halfway concerning the existence of the law, and not concerning the cessation of the law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. Now the law is as doubtful in doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the existence itself of the law becomes doubtful. But the law obliging is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it the law which exists in the abstract, but one which binds us in the present by its certain obligation.

But if a probable opinion is had concerning the cessation of the law, however that may be understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely again, not the very existence itself of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. 1. 1. n. 63. 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and at some time existed, if you probably satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as it once existed, becomes doubtful insofar as it binds you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige.

Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses is shown by possession itself, or at least is presumed, to be the owner of the thing which he possesses. But how can that be either demonstrated or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which alone can constitute a prevailing right. For if the fact alone of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's property by the prevailing right of possession. Cf. 157. 4; Troplong, Della Prescrizione c. 2 del Possesso a. 2228; D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 260. 268.

The material fact itself of possession by no means constitutes a prevailing right in the internal forum, as regards the very right of dominion and ownership of the thing, but only as regards proof in the external forum, which must be instituted by the plaintiff against the possessor, because of the aforesaid presumption of dominion. But presumption yields to truth. Hence if someone has possessed in bad faith, even for a very long time, he must restore the thing even spontaneously and without proof or petition by the plaintiff. D'Annibale himself, who ed. 4. p. 1. n. 264 seq. follows the rule of possession, asserts n. 256 note 5: "Justice forbids giving damage to him who is in certain possession of his right....

I said, who is in certain possession of his right; for if the right of another is uncertain, either the condition of the possessor will be better, or at least because no certain right of another is violated, there will be no obligation of restitution." Behold how D'Annib. himself requires certain and legitimate possession, so that it really constitutes a prevailing right. And the same D'Annib. l. c. n. 259 note 18 also asserts: "Namely, certainty against true probability is not given." How therefore will the obligation of the law be certain, if it is probable that that obligation already ceased long ago?

See also ibid. n. 169. 181. 203. - Cf. 143. S. Alph. l. 3. n. 112 par. Secundo says: "When it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption in favor of the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism through the principle of possession is finished; and from S. D. also, it has no value except from presumption. S. D. joins indifferently the two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished, and when each is probable, from S. D. the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise n. 290 he says that probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold again, no account is taken by S. D. of possession of the law.

And then, distinguishing well altogether between doubt and probability, he says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation must be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that custom is present." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 325, par. Infirmi, n. 483, l. 4. n. 47. Besides, D'Annibale asserts the law of possession in a threefold case, namely in doubt 1. whether it receives a restrictive interpretation, 2. whether it is just, 3. whether it has ceased. P. 1. n. 262. And in the preceding n. 261 note 30 and n. 263 note 1, he affirms that S. Alphonsus perpetually used this rule of possession. - Now D'Annibale himself, cited n. 262 note 35, says: "except the 2nd case, in which all agree, Cf. here 157, in the others even those who seem to profess it depart from our rule."

And among these he expressly cites and reports only S. Alphonsus! And while the praised author notes this against Probabilism, that it must use exceptions which his rule of possession does not need, l. c. n. 266, he then candidly admits that his rule is not perpetual, and that it fails in several cases which he enumerates, l. c. n. 269 note 30. - But the alleged exceptions of Probabilism, namely when the question concerns not only the honorableness of an action, but an end to be obtained absolutely and the objective truth of the thing, l. c. n. 266, 256 note 5, are not really exceptions.

Cf. here 120. What he likewise says, l. c. n. 267, that the probabilist is forced to give contradictory responses, is in no way true. Cf. here 128. And it is certainly surprising that the learned theologian found a contradiction, cited n. 267, as regards that same case in which he himself had expressly affirmed a little before, namely n. 263, that it is licit to follow each of two contrary probable opinions. - Finally he asserts n. 264 that that rule of possession enjoys a better right, and n. 269 that it is better than the others not only as to the truth of the thing, but also as to practice; but in the following n. 270, immediately afterward, he affirms that it is licit to follow opinions truly and gravely probable; and n. 263, after he has set forth the various systems and also established his own rule n. 262, he says, let it be licit for each one to choose what pleases him more.

Perhaps to avert contradiction it can be said that the illustrious D'Annibale regarded that rule of possession not for the case of true probability, but for the case of doubt, which he seems sufficiently to suggest n. 269; and thus it is altogether true that theologians most commonly teach that rule, n. 268, and in this sense we also admit it and diligently explain it. Cf. here 143 seq. And certainly that rule is stated in doubt.

What is the force of extrinsic probability? - There is no doubt that extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly and sufficiently gravely probable. "Someone of small knowledge," says S. Th. 2. 2. q. 4. a. 3, "is made more certain about that which he hears from some learned person than about that which seems to him according to his own reason." This probability therefore has force, because someone is not judged to speak without grave foundation. L. 1. 1. n. 79. Hence, if someone does not rest in authority alone, but weighs this foundation, then extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. But sometimes this extrinsic probability itself constitutes intrinsic probability, namely when the question concerns a matter which greatly depends on the estimation of the wise, L. 1. 3. n. 1032, namely a matter rather of fact than of law, for example, what is grave matter in the canonical hours, in fasting, etc.

An extrinsically probable opinion is usually designated by common, more common, most common opinion. Concerning these Sanchez, De Matr. l. 3. d. 44. n. 3, has these things, from which one can make a judgment about a common, more common opinion, etc.: "That opinion is not called common which has many doctors asserting it, with no preceding discussion, but superficially, and as they say, following it in passing....

Therefore Navarrus very well says that he regards as more common an opinion approved by six doctors treating the matter professedly, than by fifty who are led almost by the authority alone of the former. To these add Ioannes Lupus... saying that doctors are not to be believed, however much they excel in doctrine, when they lack foundation." - La-Croix l. 1. n. 164. 165; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1806, p. 21 seq.; E. M. 122. 131.

Note: From the common opinion of theologians "one must not easily depart in a practical matter." Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 16. n. 106. Yet this must not be taken too scrupulously, and much less extended. Hence S. Alph. does not hesitate to affirm that he "departed from the opinions of many grave authors," l. 3. n. 547, and ibid. below he says: "Where reason convinced me, I did not refuse to go against several authors." Cf. also l. 6. n. 257. 427, where S. D. departs even from the most common opinion. Indeed an opinion is not therefore probable because it is taught by several authors, if they do not bring to it a grave reason. La-Croix n. 136 seq.; L. 1. 6. n. 657.

You will resolve: Therefore we make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience by the following reasoning. What is forbidden by no certain law is licit. But such or such an action, which truly probably is prohibited by no law, is by that very fact forbidden by no certain law. Therefore such an action is licit. Since the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion too will be certain. And hence again it is clear that an opinion both tenuously and doubtfully probable is altogether excluded from probabilism. But the conclusion contains the judgment or dictate of conscience. The same transition can be made by force of another reasoning. He who acts according as prudence dictates, acts honorably. But he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts according to the dictate of prudence. Therefore, he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts honorably. Since again the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion will also be certain. L. 1. 1. n. 67. 68. 69. 84; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.

Does the authority of one doctor suffice for the probability of some opinion? - R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking. The reason is that if it is of some ancient author and has been deserted by all, by this very fact it ordinarily lacks a sufficient foundation. But if it is of some more recent author, either he brings a grave reason, or not. If the first, his opinion is ordinarily handed down also by others. If the second, he cannot render his opinion probable to others, since he brings no sufficient reason for this. Ordinarily speaking: for if some grave author treats some question which others have not treated, and brings a grave reason, or if he sustains an opinion against the common opinion, but sustains it by some new reason unknown to others, nothing prevents him, even alone, from rendering his opinion probable; but soon several others will adhere to it, if that doctrine is publicly spread. And thus "the Salmanticenses, etc., note that the statement of an excellent doctor, even a modern one, asserting that a law has been abrogated, suffices so that we are disobliged from the law." L. 1. 1. n. 107. And certainly the Holy See expressly declared that a confessor is not to be disturbed who follows the doctrine of S. Alphonsus on account of his authority alone, without having weighed his reasons. S. Poenit. July 5, 1831; E. M. 131.

Note: Proposition 27 condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable," was altogether rightly condemned, because the proposition is general, and can be understood of any author whatever, even of humble reputation, and affirms an opinion to be probable by the very fact that it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable. E. M.

Is there an opinion speculatively, but not practically, probable? - R. Negatively, speaking per se; for the reasoning established above, n. 124, can always be made if the opinion in itself, or speculatively, is truly probable, by which we may advance to practical conscience itself. - R. Affirmatively, accidentally, namely if, when that opinion is brought into use, there is always or almost always some extrinsic circumstance which renders the use of such an opinion illicit, for example, danger of fall, scandal, hallucination, etc. - Pignat. Cons. Can. t. 8. cons. 15; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3, De Iust. et Iur. d. 10. n. 165. 189.

Can someone licitly follow in practice diverse probable opinions favorable to himself, although those opinions are opposed to each other? - No one is prohibited from using now one probable opinion, now the contrary also probable one. For if it is licit for you to follow one, and for me the other, it will also be licit for each of us to follow each; for by no means does the fact that someone has used one make the other cease to be probable and safe. In one and the same matter it is not licit to follow the probable opinion where it benefits; but where it harms, not that one, but the contrary. For, as is clear, it is an open contradiction. And thus, for example, since some affirm that a testament lacking legal formalities is valid, and others deny it, he would act illicitly who, on account of this twofold opinion, wished to acquire an inheritance for himself from a less solemn testament, and did not wish from the same testament to provide the legacies. It is not licit to use at the same time a twofold probability of the non-existence of a twofold precept, when the transgression of either one is certain. And thus, for example, the law of abstinence urges today; I wish tomorrow to approach communion; but it is probable that midnight has already elapsed, and the opposite is also probable; certainly it is not licit to eat meat and at the same time to approach holy communion. - Elbel De Act. hum. 190 seq.

Is it expedient to prefer stricter opinions to more benign ones? - "Where the question concerns removing the penitent from danger of formal sin, the confessor ought, generally speaking, and insofar as Christian prudence suggests, to use benign opinions; but where benign opinions render nearer the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, as regards avoiding proximate occasions, and others of this kind, then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he, as a physician of souls, is bound to use the safer opinions which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace." L. 1. 1. n. 87, l. 3. n. 547.

Where the penitent is prepared to follow the dictate of the confessor, whatever it may be, then "it belongs to the prudence of the confessor to weigh whether the use of the safer or less safe opinion will be profitable to his penitent... because although that is of itself safer and more perfect, nevertheless it will be more dangerous to impose on many the obligation of always acting according to the stricter opinions." L. 1. 6. n. 605. - Generally in practice, as far as can be done, the confessor ought rather to be benign than rigid with penitents. L. l. c. The same is clear by the authority of the Fathers and theologians, whom you have cited apud S. Alph. l. c. and l. 1. n. 86 par. Ego, and n. 89 toward the end, Praeterea res, H. A. tr. 1. n. 79.

Must a confessor know all probable opinions? - "A confessor is not to be obliged to knowledge of all probable opinions, but to that knowledge which the moderately learned commonly have; just as an advocate, judge, physician, or artisans also are not obliged to the highest and exquisite knowledge and skill in their profession, but to moderate knowledge according to the degree of their office and condition... thus a penitent ought not to require from an ordinary confessor anything except common knowledge about common sins and common opinions also; but if he desires subtler remedies, let him approach a more learned confessor." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 2.

Since the authority of S. Alphonsus is very great in moral matters, and several more recent authors deny that S. D. stands for probabilism simply so called, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and rejects probabilism as lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question about the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his opinions and even his words to establish the doctrine of probabilism.

E. M. Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully set forth the mind of S. D., we take his doctrine from the tract on Conscience in his work H. A., which he himself there, n. 79, declares that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in n. 33. 77: "The third opinion, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, without doubt it can be followed licitly.... Here it is necessary that I warn something concerning my system, which must altogether be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case, the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful. For then, although some greater probability for the law might be present, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so slight and minimal that it must be counted for nothing before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reputed as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain, because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said from the beginning, the law is already morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."

Two things must be investigated here. The first is what S. Alph. understands by an opinion evidently and certainly much more probable. For if he understands an opinion truly and properly probable, he is against us; but if he understands an opinion which passes beyond the limits of probability and reaches certainty, he will be for us. The other is what S. D. again understands by an opinion equally probable or a little more probable. For if that "a little more probable" denotes a slight excess of probability, as distinguished from a greater excess of true probability, again S. D. is against us; but if it denotes simply an excess of probability, S. D. will be for us.

As regards the first, the holy Doctor refers himself back to those things which were said at the beginning. At the beginning, n. 31, these things are had: "But whether it is licit to operate with a probable opinion, there are three opinions, the first of which is that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable in favor of liberty, although the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable. Authors of the past century held this opinion almost commonly, but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced. The reason is that when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable, then the law is no longer doubtful by a strict doubt, as happens, as we shall explain later, when the opinions both in favor of the law and in favor of liberty are equally probable; but it is morally certain, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true, whereas on the contrary the less probable opinion, which favors liberty, has such a foundation that it is not true, so that it remains tenuously, or at least doubtfully, probable before the safer opinion; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to follow it. For when it certainly appears to the intellect that the truth stands more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault follow the less safe part: for then it would not operate from its own judgment, or its own belief, but from a certain effort which by its will it will make upon the intellect, removing it from that part which seems truer to it, and bending it toward that part which not only seems to it not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true."

Now from these things it is openly clear that S. D. by an opinion certainly more probable really understands an opinion morally certain. For he says that then the law 1. is not doubtful by a strict doubt, but is morally certain; 2. that the same law then has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true; 3. again, that the said law has against itself only an opinion which has such a foundation that it is not true; 4. that the less probable opinion opposed to the law is tenuously or doubtfully probable; so that it is imprudence to wish to follow it, and that it not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true.

Now a tenuously probable opinion is not a truly probable opinion; and the same S. Alph. teaches this, n. 65: "tenuous probability is not true probability, but is only a certain false or vain appearance of probability." Likewise a doubtfully probable opinion is not truly and properly probable, which we contend it is licit to follow even in concurrence with the more probable. For if it is doubtfully probable, it participates in the nature of doubtful probability, and therefore properly speaking is not probable. And certainly a truly and properly probable opinion is defined by the same S. Alph., l. c. n. 21, as "that which rests on some grave foundation apt to incline the assent of a prudent man." Therefore a doubtfully probable opinion will be an opinion which has a doubtfully grave foundation, and therefore does not merit the assent of a prudent man, who would be exposed to the danger of acting imprudently. "Doubtfully probable," says S. Alph. l. c. n. 65, "which no one can follow, but if it is not probable, it has only some prudent reason that it is true... the doubtfully probable has some prudent reason, although not altogether stable, that it is probable."

And hence it is clear that that opinion which it is imprudence to wish to follow, and which not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true, is not a truly and properly probable opinion. Therefore if the less probable opinion opposed to the certainly more probable is not truly and properly probable, the certainly more probable opinion by no means remains within the limits of probability, but already reaches certainty. The same is confirmed from the Dissertation inserted in Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 55 of the sixth and seventh editions, and related in the edition of P. Gaude p. 25 as a commentary on the doctrine of S. Alphonsus in the text, and in the Turin edition of 1846, where he thus explains that phrase "certainly more probable." "I said," he says, "certainly more probable, because when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand concerning doubt strictly taken... Cf. here 138), but is morally or quasi morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either tenuously or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to embrace it," etc.

Note first that from S. D., if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is notably more probable, because a small excess either is not perceived by the intellect, or is not perceived without fear of erring. Hence, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is also notably more probable. - Then note as regards that phrase, quasi morally certain, that to the holy Doctor in this matter, where the question concerns a certain moral estimation, a little is reputed as nothing. Moreover S. D. is not speaking of any probability whatever, but of that which appears certainly to the intellect, and he is speaking of one who, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment through a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience; to whom he therefore applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Ibid. and H. A. tr. 1. n. 31. Finally S. D. calls that opinion lax which defends even a less probable opinion in favor of liberty without any distinction, namely one which has only some foundation of reason and authority; and therefore he distinguished by saying that someone cannot follow this less safe opinion when there is a great and certain preponderance in favor of the safer. Apolog. cont. il P. Patuzzi anno 1765. But the true doctrine of probabilism, which we follow, does not defend any probable opinion indiscriminately, but one certainly and gravely probable, which alone is truly probable. Likewise S. D. calls that doctrine lax which authors of the past century almost commonly handed down, namely in the latter part of that century, in which several lax opinions of probabilists were condemned by the Holy See; but certainly not Sanchez, Suarez, Lessius, Palaus, Laymann, Lugo, Pallavicini and very many others, whom S. Alph. himself, not only in his Moral Works, but in that very Dissertation on his moral system, approves and praises for his opinion. He himself defends this and repeatedly champions it, not against probabilists, but against rigid tutiorists, and affirms that for a series of many years it had without doubt been common among all. Breve Dissertaz. dell'uso moderato dell'Opin. Probab., Naples 1762, p. 48; Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 59. 68-73. 84.

As regards the other point, it is an evident thing that if S. D. by an opinion much more probable understands an opinion morally certain, or quasi morally certain against a tenuous or doubtful probability, by an opinion a little more probable he understands simply an excess of mere probability. For otherwise the holy Doctor himself could certainly not admit that a probable opinion can sometimes retain its probability and that someone can follow it, although the opposite is notably more probable, as he himself really admits several times. Cf. Comment. de Consc. et de Probabilismo n. 104 seq. But if it is asked why S. D. then designates that excess by saying "a little more probable," and not simply by saying "more probable," the reason is that S. D. considers the matter practically rather than speculatively, given the nature of the thing and the principles, and also the rigor of words, and thus distinguishes between a small and a notable excess of probability. A notable excess, truly such, of probability is had when it is evident and certain; and then, from S. D., probability reaches certainty. And this is indeed so, at least practically and regularly speaking; for such probability, at least practically, is confused with moral certainty, which in a certain broader sense is certainty. And in fact S. D. is speaking of a much greater probability that is certainly and evidently such. Certainly and evidently to whom? Not only certainly to the one opining, since all know well that one and the same opinion appears less probable to one and more probable to another, indeed even to the same person in diverse circumstances; but to all, or by the common judgment of the wise. And in fact if a proposition is much more probable certainly and evidently to all, or by the common judgment of the wise, it already really is, practically speaking, morally certain. For in things to be done we often use most probable and more probable opinions as though true, and as though morally certain, when greater certainty cannot be had. Every other excess, although perhaps notable, nevertheless if it is not so evident and certain, really cannot properly be called notable, since then there is doubt concerning such a notable excess, and the proposition which to one seems much more probable to another perhaps, indeed perhaps even to the same person, the matter having been weighed better, as S. Alph. himself confesses of himself, l. 1. n. 86, H. A. tr. 1. n. 78, appears much less probable. Therefore, if that notable excess of probability is so evident and certain, then it already reaches certainty, and by right and deservedly the opposite can only be tenuously or doubtfully probable. But if, although notable, it nevertheless is not so evident and certain, that excess really cannot as regards us be held as notable, but remains within the limits of equal probability or of a little greater probability. Certainly, if to the one opining alone a sentence seems notably more probable, or if doctors fall into various opinions concerning it, can it prudently be held as certainly and evidently more probable? Certainly not. Hence again it is clear that by that "a little greater" excess S. D. really understands simply an excess of probability.

Not only to the one opining. "Such an appearance (of greater probability)," says S. D., "cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which will appear more probable to someone will appear less probable to another; indeed to the same person an opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." Therefore that opinion which appears more probable to someone cannot be a true rule of acting, because "the law would be particular only for him to whom that opinion appears more probable. But this would certainly be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people, who are bound to observe it, be frequently divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions and according to his own sense, would often instruct the faithful." Nor is it of force to say that by following the benign sentence (namely the probable even in concurrence with the more probable in favor of the law), disparity can also intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that, when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests on a certainly grave foundation, it will be regarded as probable among the greatest part of the wise. And this will already be enough to preserve the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person that opinion is not probable; for that which happens rarely does not take away universal conformity. Yet this does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions, because since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on the judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely but commonly that what appears stronger to one appears weaker to another.... But that we become certain that some opinion... is truly more probable or has the required preponderance, this is morally impossible. For either that preponderance is small, and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is moderate, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great, and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the opposite is judged false or tenuously probable? And thus we would always have to act with practical doubt. Either I am bound to follow opinions more probable in themselves, and then when shall I know which opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on each side? Or opinions more probable to me, and the straits would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be probable against another opinion of several wise men. And then who will render me safe that my opinion is certainly more probable and more notable, with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How shall I become certain that I have understood the opposed reasons well and solved them well? that the dictate of conscience which I have formed for myself is sufficiently certain and safe? that I have not been deceived by my own sense, so that if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?" S. Alph. Dissertation anno 1755, n. 3. 17. 42. 43. 48. 50.

And if it is asked why S. D. made this distinction between a little more probable and notably, much, evidently, certainly more probable, the reason is that S. D., as is clear from l. c. H. A. n. 31 and from the Apologia contra Patuzzi 1762, wished to oppose himself to those probabilists who extended probabilism even to tenuous and doubtful probability, and therefore contended that it is licit to act when any apparent reason is present, but not firm reason, or authority. Hence from the opposite S. D. established that someone must then follow the opinion certainly, evidently, notably, much more probable, which, as is clear, in comparison with the tenuously or doubtfully probable is by right and deservedly called morally certain by S. D. Therefore, since S. Alph. designated such an opinion in comparison with the doubtfully and tenuously probable by "notably more probable," what remained was that he designate any other more probable opinion in comparison with the truly probable by "a little more probable." Cf. Breve Dissertaz. etc. cited above at the end of n. 133, p. 51, Op. Mor. ed. Rome 1757, l. 1. n. 33. Behold the words of S. D. in the Apology of the year 1765: "I did not contend nor do I contend to found new systems, and I know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine hands down as licit the use of a tenuously or doubtfully probable opinion. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is licit to follow a less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, establishing that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion when the excess of probability in favor of the safer is notable and certain, because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable."

Florus, making a general confession, accuses himself that, while still a boy, he once or twice had had pollution, and had never confessed it, because at that time he did not think it a sin. He adds besides that, now as an adolescent, he shamefully looked at and touched his cousin, and that he confessed this only generally, omitting the circumstance of the cousin, which he did not think necessary. Moreover he says that he often nourished evil thoughts in his mind, but he did not confess them either, thinking for a long time that sin existed only in the work. Likewise he confesses that, having been called into court, although he had given an oath to tell the truth, he told a lie, yet he judged this altogether necessary for saving a friend from a long and hard imprisonment. Lastly, he confesses that, laboring under a grave illness for a year and more, he omitted Mass and did not observe abstinence and fasting.

Q. 1. What is erroneous conscience, and can one follow it? 2. Whether and how did Florus sin?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 98 seqq. To the second: Florus could absolutely, in boyhood, have been ignorant at first of the malice of pollution. Therefore, if in good faith he did not confess that sin because he had no consciousness of sin, he does not seem to be disturbed. I. M. 110.

Likewise he does not seem to be disturbed on account of the omitted circumstance of the cousin, whose special malice of incest he could more easily have been invincibly ignorant of. But this circumstance changes the species in itself with respect to touches, by no means with respect to looks. I. M. 784.

With respect to evil thoughts, good faith and invincible ignorance are admitted with more difficulty. Nevertheless, if Florus affirms that he was ignorant of this sin of thoughts, the confessor must indeed attend and investigate what kind those thoughts were, and whether Florus believed that from a culpably or inculpably erroneous conscience. For if, after prudent investigation has been made, from the rudeness of Florus his good faith appears, he does not seem to be disturbed in this either with respect to past confessions; but he is only to be instructed if he is still in error. For this must besides be attended to here, that good faith and ignorance can also be rather in fact than in law, that is, it can rather be concerning the consent given to the thoughts than concerning the very malice of evil thoughts, if consent accedes to them. I. M. 108.

From the fact that Florus judged a lie necessary for saving his friend, it does not truly follow that he erred in good faith and by invincible ignorance. Therefore Florus is to be questioned further, since it is a matter of grave perjury because of the added oath: whether in fact he thought that he could then lie, indeed perhaps even that he ought to because of the enormous danger in which his friend was placed.

Lastly, Florus did not sin by omitting Mass while held back by grave illness, since a necessity of sinning is not given. The same must be said of abstinence and fasting not observed for the same reason of infirmity; and although perhaps he omitted Mass and abstinence and fasting when he was already beginning to recover, it indeed seems difficult that he truly persuaded himself that he sinned gravely in this matter, if he had still not in fact recovered sufficiently. - Elbel 124-133; G. 37-42; I. M. 98 seqq.

1. Clemens, a learned theologian, thinks that the Probabilists favor liberty too much. Therefore he says that, when there is a concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable for the law, it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion for liberty. For this is clear, first, from the authority of Clement III, c. Capellanus, De Feriis, where he declares that the opinion is to be followed "which rests upon the better and more subtle reason." But where the probability is certainly greater, there without doubt the reason is better and more subtle. Therefore. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth agrees: "In obscure matters we look to what is more likely." The same is clear, secondly, from the authority of the Probabiliorists, and of all the Probabilists of better note, who defend equiprobabilism in substantial matters. Before the rest let Suarez be heard, De Legibus, l. 8, c. 3, n. 19: "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain." Muzzarelli says the same, Opusc. de Regul. moral. opin., in Migne, Cursus Theologicus XI, 1309: "Some excess of reasons for one side against the other, unless it is notable, does not remove doubt. But when it has been notable, the weight already preponderates for one side, we are already determined to one, and in it we stand." The same is clear, thirdly, from the authority of St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 56: "Whenever," he says, "it certainly appears to the intellect that truth stands much more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault adhere to the less safe part; since in that case the man would not act relying on his own judgment, or on his own belief, but rather by a certain effort which by his will he would bring upon the intellect, so that he might be removed from the part which appears to him far more likely, and be bent toward the part which does not appear true to him, indeed which seems not even to have a certain foundation by which it could be true. And to this pertains that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 14:23: Everything that is not from faith is sin." Ioannes-Petrus and Antonius, themselves also learned theologians but probabilists, hear these things incredulously. Cf. Marc. Instit. Moral. Alphons., n. 100, 101, second ed. 1886.

Q. 1. What is Probabilism? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the whole doctrine of Probabilism can be reduced in few words to two assertions.

The first is the certain principle, admitted by all, especially by St. Alphonsus: an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation; a doubtful law does not oblige. It is a certain principle, because law does not bind the will except through knowledge of itself. The other is that when against the law there is a truly probable opinion, the law becomes uncertain and doubtful. Likewise a certain principle, because certitude is incompatible with opposite probability. Therefore it matters little for the true doctrine of Probabilism whether the opinion for the law is equally probable, or a little more probable, or much more probable, or simply more probable. For the question is this and no other: namely, whether the opinion against the law is truly probable; for then, whatever may be the case concerning the opinion for the law, it is impossible that the law be certain and evident, binding the will through knowledge. I. M. 111 seqq.

To the second: the reasons brought forward for holding Probabiliorism prove nothing indeed. For first, in c. Capellanus 4, De Fer., Clement III defines by his authority a particular question in which there were two opinions, choosing one among them. The matter is of the three weeks during which the canon forbids marriages to be made before the feast of St. John the Baptist; and "some," says the Pontiff, "understand those weeks without interruption. But others, wishing to make an interval between the feast and the weeks themselves, understand that it was established out of reverence for the festivity of Pentecost, which is sometimes accustomed to intervene in those weeks; and thus, beginning from the three days of Rogations before the Ascension of the Lord up to the eighth day after Pentecost, those weeks being counted, they do not permit marriages to be celebrated in that space of time alone, in no way forbidding their celebration from that point." The question having been so proposed, the Holy Pontiff, thus interpreting the canon authentically, resolved it by his own authority: "Therefore, since we were consulted as to which of these opinions might seem stronger, it appeared to us and to our brothers that, although it is the custom of the Roman Church that, at whatever time marriage may be contracted, legitimate consent intervening in the present; yet because marriages are not permitted to be celebrated from Septuagesima until the seventh day after Pentecost, and afterwards they are also celebrated for three weeks or more before the festivity of St. John without distinction, the latter opinion rests upon the better and more subtle reason; and whether according to the canons marriages are suspended from Septuagesima until after the octaves of Easter, or according to the custom of the Roman Church until after seven days of the feast of Pentecost, which lacks octaves, on the Sunday which follows, and thereafter, they can be licitly celebrated." Therefore Clement III by no means defines that where there are two probable opinions, of which one is probable and the other more probable, or certainly much more probable, the latter is altogether and always to be held; but he says only that of the two proposed opinions the second is better and more subtle. Whence certainly nothing is drawn out for Probabiliorism. Indeed, what is the chief point, Clement III defines the matter not relying on a certainly much more probable opinion, but relying on a certain canon and a certain custom.

2. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth does not properly regard probability, but doubt, which is quite different. Cf. I. M. 137, 138. Whence probability is almost excluded by that Rule, since it is said that we look to what is more likely, which properly bears before itself not probability but presumption. Indeed, the whole Rule is of the following tenor: We look in obscure matters to what is more likely; or to what for the most part is accustomed to happen. Namely, in obscure matters, that is, in those in which the truth does not even probably appear, which certainly is not the same as in probable matters. What is more likely, that is to say, what, with all the circumstances of the matter itself having been attended to, has a presumption founded in likelihood. Or what for the most part is accustomed to happen, that is, when the aforesaid presumption is lacking, that must be held which commonly and ordinarily is accustomed to happen, for then presumption stands for that. It is moreover useless to advert that this Rule, like other similar Rules, pertains rather to forensic judgments and to judicial sentences. Cf. Reiffenst. in Reg. cit. But now, from the fact that in those matters in which probability is even lacking, that is to be held, and indeed in judgments and in matters of justice, for it is a question of a Rule of Law, which, all the circumstances of the matter weighed, appears more likely; or which, this presumption lacking, is rather presumed from things commonly and ordinarily occurring; or finally, if not even this can be had, the least is to be followed and held, as Rule 30 in the Sixth has it; from this it certainly does not follow that, probable and more probable opinions standing against the law and for the law, the law certainly obliges. And indeed Canon Law does not contradict itself. Moreover, the remaining things now being passed over, in c. Cum iure 31, De Off. et Pot. Iud. Deleg., it is said: "Unless you have become certain of the mandate, you are not compelled to execute what is commanded." The same is had in c. Sicut quaedam, d. 14, where St. Leo writes these things: "In those matters which have been doubtful or obscure, let us know that this is to be followed, which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts, nor opposed to the decrees of the holy Fathers." And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat., adds this commentary: "This has place insofar as it can be asserted that some action is not gravely illicit. But, in order that it be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice; nor even a more probable one."

3. Suarez certainly was not a probabiliorist, nor is it necessary to demonstrate this, since it is conceded by the adversaries themselves. Cf. Marc. l. c. 92. Therefore his saying only has to be explained, and it is easily explained. It certainly happens sometimes that for some truth a greater absolute probability is had, and the excess of probability is so certain that the opposite opinion is scarcely probable, or enjoys only a certain slender probability, so that the probability of that opposite opinion is uncertain and doubtful. In such a case that greater probability, with such a certain excess of probability, is equivalent to a certain moral certitude. But in such a case, as is clear, it is no longer a matter of two truly probable opinions, although one is more probable than the other. Therefore nothing is drawn from the saying of Suarez for Probabiliorism.

4. The same must be said of Muzzarelli's affirmation. For he is treating of such a notable excess of probability that the doubt of the opposite side is removed, we are determined to one, and in it we stand. But in such a case we are already outside the limits of true probability, and we are found at least in moral certitude. Muzzarelli has these words in the cited Opusc., Roman edition, 1807, page 19: "If the excess is of great or notable moment, then I say that in practice ordinarily there does not subsist before the intellect a persuasion of reasons for the contrary opinion; and therefore that case has always seemed to me very rare in practice. For a great or notable preponderance of reasons for one opinion removes before the intellect the weight for the other, and makes it before the intellect not only less weighty, but even LIGHT and IMPROBABLE." But that Muzzarelli is not a probabiliorist but in reality simply a probabilist is clear from the Rule of acting which, after Benedict XIV, he established in the aforesaid little work. For this generally is it, namely that in obscure and more difficult matters we embrace that opinion which reason advises and authority confirms. "Which reason advises," that is, which reason proposes as true or likely in such a way that it induces a prudent man to give assent to it. For in this stands the force of reasonable persuasion; whence an opinion in which the reason of a prudent man cannot rest, although sometimes it bears before itself some apparent truth or likelihood, is nevertheless altogether to be refuted. It follows: "and authority confirms." For the authority of learned men is the greatest hinge by which the weakness of the human intellect is ruled, so that for the ignorant and unlearned authority of this sort almost always stands in place of reason.... God does not require from us that we always act with metaphysical or physical evidence concerning the material honesty of our action: for this is above the powers of human nature for this state of life; but he requires from us only that we never act without a firm and prudent persuasion that our action here and now to be posited is not sinful, but licit.... But he who in obscure and disputable matters finally executes that which, all things having been seriously weighed, reason advises him and authority confirms, follows that which prudently appears to him true and honest.... As soon as in controversial matters, after diligent examination and all things seriously weighed, I find an opinion which right reason advises to me, and several classical authors confirm, now I have no need to inquire further, and to search out all the doctors, to compare each of their reasons and authorities, and to judge concerning their inequality and preponderance, which would be a morally intolerable burden, as entangled in innumerable scruples and liable to dangers of erring." And hence it is more than sufficiently clear, not only that Muzzarelli in reality simply defends probabilism, but also that he excludes equiprobabilism and probabiliorism; whence below he asserts still more clearly: "But if it should sometimes happen that there is at the same time a greater notable persuasion for the respectively contradictory opinion, I would not indeed dare to add anything to the rule of Benedict XIV, who simply counsels following that which reason advises, not that which advises more....

Most prudently Pontiff Benedict XIV abstained from these comparative preeminences, and prescribed only that we descend to the opinion which reason advises and authority confirms." And this opinion indeed, in obscure and disputed matters, is indeed an opinion which is truly probable, whatever may be the degree of its probability, concerning which it is so difficult a matter to judge that, as the same Muzzarelli says, "it is not to be presumed that God willed, when it is a question of the observance of law necessary for salvation, to cast us into so many difficulties and ambages, from which we cannot extricate ourselves, and by which we are almost driven into despair."

5. The mind of St. Alphonsus is also the same; since the holy Doctor openly says that, when an opinion certainly much more probable for the law stands, the will cannot prudently adhere to the less safe part. Therefore this part, if it is such that the will cannot prudently adhere to it, is already not truly probable, and the opposite is already morally certain. And indeed the holy Doctor established this in order to retain Probabilism within the limits of true probability, and consequently to remove from it slender and doubtful probability. Hence in the text brought forward in the case, the holy Doctor does not speak of any probability whatever, but of that which plainly appears to the intellect of the one judging; who consequently, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment by a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience, to which therefore he applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Hence the holy Doctor taught most constantly: "That there be no grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had; I understand that which rests on a foundation NOT SLENDER, so that safely, according to the common opinion, the question of the more probable and the less probable being set aside, it can be held and taught." Op. Mor. l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat. And the holy Doctor indeed opposes and calls lax that opinion which defends even the less probable for liberty WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION between grave and slender, between certain and doubtful probability. Apol. cont. il P. Patuzzi, year 1765. Cf. I. M. 131 seqq. And l. 3, n. 547, St. Alphonsus establishes and develops this assertion: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it." And this, as far as pertains to us, is truly the Probabilism which we defend, with every question set aside concerning the more probable and less probable, concerning the much more and the little more probable, and the equally probable. Probabiliorists simply assert that one must stand for the more probable, the less probable being left. Equiprobabilists affirm that one must stand for the much more probable, the much less probable being left; but they concede that someone can hold the probable, the other equally probable or a little more probable being left. Probabilists say that it is licit to follow an opinion simply probable, provided it is truly probable, the other being left although it is more probable and much more probable. Therefore we defend this system with St. Alphonsus and with St. Thomas, and no other: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it," l. 3, n. 547; "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept," Quodl. 14, De Verit., a. 3. - G. 46, 47, 56-64.

2. Probus the theologian does not approve Probabilism, but Probabiliorism; because, he says, the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible. What concerning Probus?

R. That which Probus affirms, that our intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, can be taken in two ways. First indeed for the objective truth of the thing, or for the effect of some action of ours, to be obtained absolutely. But in this sense the reason of Probus proves nothing against Probabilism. For when it is a question of that objective truth and objective effect to be obtained absolutely, the probabilists themselves say that it is neither probable nor licit to follow the less probable and less safe opinion. Therefore in such a case it is not licit to follow that probable opinion about the thing itself, not because it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but because it is not licit to follow a false opinion. For it is not probable, but false, that it is licit to follow a probable opinion about the thing itself when the thing itself must be obtained absolutely. In the other sense, however, the assertion of Probus can be taken for the merely subjective truth of the liceity of some action, in the speculative order, which ought to be, in the practical order, that from which the practical dictate of conscience would be taken for acting, so that our action would become licit and honest. And in this other sense the assertion of Probus is altogether false.

For then the question is not whether the intellect ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is, or rather appears, nearer to the truth. But the question is whether the will ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is then bound by law. But it is not only not nearer to the truth, but altogether alien from the truth, that the will is then bound by the law; for then the law, if it has against itself a truly probable opinion, although it has for itself a more probable one, is doubtful, and it is an axiom that a doubtful law does not oblige.

Only then could the obligation of the will from the probability of the greater opinion have place, when, where there stood, for example, a more probable opinion for the law, the law would thereby become certain, and knowledge of the law would then be had. For the will is not bound except by a certain law, and by a certain law through knowledge of the law itself. But an opinion, although more probable, exhibits neither certitude nor knowledge. Therefore from the reason of Probus the contrary follows, namely, that if the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, the intellect cannot impose on the will the obligation of a law while its doubt stands; which Probabilism declares. Therefore from the fact that the intellect embraces what appears more probable, it does not follow that the will ought to follow what the intellect has judged more probable. For it is altogether one thing that this or that is speculatively more probable; another thing that consequently it is more probable that, that greater probability standing, notwithstanding the opposite probability, the law is certain and certainly obliges. This is not only not more probable, but not even probable, since the principles are admitted by all: Probability excludes certitude; a doubtful law does not oblige.

3. Titius, a confessor and probabilist, says: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. Hence he does not hesitate to assert that Probabilism ought consequently to be extended even to the sacramental seal. But Titius adds: what is true speculatively is also true practically. Therefore without any scruple he is accustomed to speak in a rather free manner about things heard in confession. And if at any time others wonder at this manner of speaking, he says: they are ignorant; so much the worse for them.

Q. What as to the case?

R. It is true what Titius affirms: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. The reason is, first, because the truth of a universal proposition must be verified in every other particular proposition contained under it; secondly, because in every true case of probabilism the axiom holds on which probabilism rests: a doubtful law does not oblige. Therefore if this axiom is once false, the foundation of all Probabilism is destroyed. - But the conclusion of Titius concerning the extension of probabilism to the sacramental seal of confession is not legitimate. The reason is that probability here does not regard the subjective liceity or illicitness of the action, which probabilism alone touches, but regards the very objective truth of the matter: whether the sacramental seal is manifested. For if it is probable that by speaking or acting in this or that way the sacramental seal is manifested, now it is not probable that it is licit to speak or act in this or that way, but it is certain that it is not licit. The reason is that the sacrament of penance is certainly rendered odious, and the faithful are removed from it; and moreover that probability does not make it so that, if in reality by that speech or by that action the sacramental seal is violated, the penitent is not thereby defamed, to which he has a certain right in whatever case, as much as is by force of the sacramental seal. And he has a certain right not to be exposed, by force of sacramental confession, even to a probable danger of infamy. Each has place, as is clear, both in probability of fact and in probability of law, which many wrongly distinguish in this matter. G. Comp. v. 2, 650; Cas. v. 2, 749; I. M. 116, 117, 120, 121. But what Titius adds, that what is true speculatively is also true practically, contains truth in the abstract, not in the concrete. For in the concrete, extrinsic circumstances can be superadded which render a matter licit in itself, although accidentally, illicit in practice. But in the case of Titius speaking in a freer manner about things heard in confession, according to his doctrine about probabilism, the matter is illicit not only extrinsically because of the wonder and scandal of others, but also intrinsically. Therefore not the others, but Titius himself, is ignorant, and for him the matter stands altogether badly.

4. Antoninus remembers that long ago, to avoid very frequent relapses against chastity, he most firmly brought into his mind that henceforth he wished to abstain from every sin against the angelic virtue, and that he had indeed often promised this to the confessor before receiving sacramental absolution, and that he had often renewed the same will immediately after receiving Communion. Hence Antoninus is anxious whether, by reason of a vow made, he ought to abstain from entering marriage. But he remembers that, in order to fulfill in deed what he had resolved in mind, on the feast day of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus he vowed several fasts to be performed, and several rosaries to be recited. But he does not now know whether he ought to do this on each Friday and Saturday, or only on the first Friday and Saturday of each month. He doubts besides whether he ought to do both on Friday and Saturday, or to fast on Friday and say the rosary on Saturday, and whether the whole rosary, or only a chaplet or third part of the rosary, since he himself did not distinguish sufficiently between the one and the other.

Q. Whether and how is Antoninus bound by the aforesaid vows?

R. Antoninus is not held by a vow of chastity; for a purpose of chastity, although most firm, which he most firmly brought into his mind to be observed, is not a vow. Nor is a promise often made to the confessor in confession and before sacramental absolution a vow. For a vow is a promise made to God alone. Nor likewise does that renewal of purpose and promise immediately after Communion have the value of a vow; for renewal is of the same will, which contained no vow. And, if Antoninus had truly emitted a vow of chastity, as he now well remembers that he vowed fasts and rosaries, so certainly he would also well remember that he vowed chastity. But as far as fasts and rosaries are concerned, after the matter has been weighed and the doubt remains, he is obliged only to the minimum. Therefore he must fast only and recite the rosary on the first day of Friday and Saturday each month; namely, fast on the first day of Friday, and recite the rosary on the first Saturday day, which seems more likely. And if there is also serious doubt about reciting the whole rosary, it suffices that he recite the chaplet, namely if, not sufficiently distinguishing between rosary and chaplet, he had in mind and vowed the rosary as he was accustomed to recite it in his family, and as it is also commonly accustomed to be recited. - I. M. 570, 572, 577, 586, 592, 593; Elbel 156 seqq.; G. 44.

5. Leofridus the confessor, following a probable opinion, imposed on his penitent an obligation of restitution from which he had already been freed by another confessor, who had also embraced a probable opinion in favor of his penitent. Hence, when the penitent refused to restore, Leofridus says: it is a matter of justice, in which probability has no place. For it belongs to justice to preserve equality; therefore, when doubt and probability stand, restitution must be made at least according to the proportion of the doubt and probability. - But although he himself was certainly persuaded about the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, nevertheless he did not hesitate to absolve a certain noble man who, on the contrary, thought the fire of hell to be metaphorical. For there are not lacking, he said, theologians, both old and also more recent, who think the matter doubtful, and the Church has as yet defined nothing about this matter. But a confessor does not have the right of imposing his own opinions on a penitent, since there are others who think the contrary.

Q. 1. Can the confessor impose on the penitent, at least a rude and ignorant one, his own opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 119. To the second: first, Leofridus, in itself, is held to restitution toward his penitent. For since the penitent had for himself a truly probable opinion, Leofridus unjustly obliged the penitent to restitution, and so was an efficacious and unjust cause of the penitent's damage. But his general doctrine is false, that probability has no place in justice, as is seen everywhere among the doctors, and especially in St. Alphonsus. Likewise his reason is false, for it indeed belongs to justice to preserve equality and to restore it when injured; but restitution is to be made, from the same justice, by rendering to each one his own right, where it is certain concerning such a right. But where the right of another is doubtful, the very equality of justice to be preserved requires that the right of the possessor prevail, and that the possessor in good faith not then be despoiled of his own thing. G. 62, 70; L. 1, 6, n. 547.

Secondly, since Leofridus was certainly persuaded concerning the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, he could not give absolution to the noble man thinking otherwise. Nor indeed does his reason avail, namely that no definition of the Church has yet come forth on that matter, nor are there lacking some theologians who do not admit real fire of hell, but metaphorical fire. For first, if these things did not destroy the certitude of his intellect concerning the truth of the fire of hell, he could not form a conscience for himself by some reflex principle for absolving; for it is impossible that someone be directly certain concerning some truth, but reflexively doubt concerning the same. Then, in fact, it is not a matter here of something disputed among Catholic doctors, but of the common opinion of Catholic doctors, which Suarez affirms to be certain and Catholic. Cf. Suarez, De Angelis, l. 8, c. 12, n. 9; Petavius, De Angelis, l. 3, c. 5, n. 7; Toletus on I p., q. 64, a. 3, etc.; G. 71. But what Leofridus asserts in excuse of himself by no means excuses him. For from the fact that the Church has defined nothing, it does not follow that therefore the opposite opinion can be held as probable, or at least not improbable. Likewise from the fact that theologians are not lacking who hold the contrary opinion, this opinion cannot therefore be held as extrinsically probable, or at least not improbable. Extrinsic probability cannot be invoked if no probable reason is brought forward by the theologians; for extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. And only then can extrinsic probability be invoked, abstracting from intrinsic, when it is a question of some matter entangled, obscure, involved in difficulties, not in reality sufficiently clear among doctors. Lastly, it is true that a confessor cannot impose his own opinions on his penitents when the opinion of the penitent is probable, or at least does not appear certainly improbable; but he cannot approve that the penitent follow false and erroneous opinions in a practical matter which pertains to faith and morals. L. 1, 6, n. 604; G. 69, 71-74. The present resolution is confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 30 April 1890.

6. Sigismundus admits a testament made in his favor, but destitute of legal formalities, because, he says, it probably avails. But he refuses to pay certain pious and profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says, they are probably null. The same Sigismundus juridically asks that another testament made in favor of Caius his blood-relative be annulled, since it is destitute of due formalities. He obtains the annulment of this testament. Likewise he refuses to pay certain profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says again, they are null, as having been inscribed in a null testament.

Q. 1. Can one change a probable opinion once accepted, by acting according to the opposite probable opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 128. To the second: Sigismundus, first admitting the testament, follows a truly probable opinion, and cannot be disturbed. Cf. I. M. 1029. But he cannot not pay the pious and profane legacies inscribed in it; since, accepting the testament as valid from a probable opinion, by that very fact he both acquires the right as to the advantage of the testament and at the same time contracts the obligation of the burden of the legacies, according to Rule 55 of Law in the Sixth: "He who feels the advantage ought also to feel the burden."

But if a testament lacking formalities is for a pious cause, it is certainly valid indeed, if from elsewhere the will of the testator is certainly established. I. M. 1030, 1031. But whether profane legacies contained in it are also valid is disputed. The reason for denying is that a testament of this sort does not avail except from the will of the Supreme Pontiff and from Canon Law, which does not involve itself in profane causes; and so profane legacies do not avail, but consequently by right of accretion they will pertain to the pious cause itself. The reason for affirming is that, since the pious cause suffers no damage from the defect of solemnities, equity at least requires that from the same defect, against the will of the deceased, it not take an advantage. But, on the contrary, since the heir is the pious cause itself, because the will of the deceased is certainly established by natural law alone, when by the same natural law the will of the deceased is certainly established as to the legacies, it is necessary that the pious cause execute this certain will of the testator. - Lugo d. 22, n. 274; L. 1, 3, n. 922.

Sigismundus, having recourse to the judge concerning the other testament, relying on a probable opinion concerning its invalidity, acts licitly, and uses his right, which a just law concedes to any citizen. But once the nullity of the testament has been declared by the sentence of the judge, consequently the profane legacies inscribed in it are null. For the law renders such testaments destitute of due formalities simply liable to nullity, no distinction being made between the testamentary disposition itself and the legacy. C. I. 804; C. G. 1001. - G. 75-78; I. M. 936.

Ferdinandus, on a certain day, doubtful whether he had drunk after midnight, although he had certainly drunk that night, received Holy Communion. In doubt, he says, the condition of the possessor is better. When again on another day he was about to receive Communion, he inadvertently brought a small piece of sugar to his mouth, but, immediately adverting to the Communion to be received, as quickly as possible he spat out whatever was in his mouth. Nevertheless, doubtful whether he had swallowed anything of the sugar, he nonetheless approached the sacred table, saying again: in doubt, the condition of the possessor is better.

Q. 1. What is doubtful conscience, and can it be a rule of morals? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 137 seqq. To the second: if the matter happened involuntarily, Ferdinandus reasoned rightly, and he cannot be deprived of the right which he certainly possesses of approaching Holy Communion in each case. Cardinal Lugo, De Sacr. euch., d. 15, n. 43, distinguishes case from case. He concedes that in the latter case Communion can be received, but denies it in the former. His reason is that "he who admits eating must prove a new day after eating, in order that he may have a right to Communion; meanwhile he will be rejected on this title, that he ate, and he does not have the right until a new day begins after the eating. This reason does not proceed in the case when there is doubt about the eating itself; for nothing can be opposed to this man by which he has lost the right to communicate on the same day, since eating cannot be opposed to him, concerning which it is not established." But, if this man has a right to communicate because eating cannot be opposed to him, that man also has a right to communicate, because eating after midnight cannot be opposed to him. For he is deprived of the right to communicate not by eating, but by eating after midnight. But in order that he be deprived of this right, which he certainly and legitimately possesses, the fact of eating after midnight must be proved. Aptly St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 39: "Therefore, if, in order that they cannot communicate, the fact that they have taken something must be proved, the fact that they took it after midnight must also be proved." Thus also G. 67, 68; La-Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 565-567, and many others. Cf. Gur.-Ball., Comp., t. 1, n. 79, q. 5.

If the matter is done voluntarily, Eusebius Amort rightly says, tom. 2, diss. 5, quaestiunc. in fin., § 4, q. 4, 5, that "he would sin at least venially who, for the sake of merely pleasurable drinking, would thus traffic around the laws of the Church, exposing himself to the danger of at least material transgression; and if he does this from custom, or from a purpose of always acting in this way, with no other reasonable cause concurring, for example thirst, infirmity, etc., he will also sin mortally. Because such a purpose argues an interpretative contempt of the laws, and a defect of charity toward God and the Church, whose comeliness he defiles." - Elbel 165 seqq.

36. • DEFINITION. Conscience is the practical dictate of reason, or a practical judgment by which we judge that something can or ought to be done, because it is good or commanded, or that it must be omitted, because it is evil ¹. - Hence it differs from synderesis, which dictates only general principles.

¹ The necessity of some conscience, that is, of a judgment about the honesty or dishonesty of an action, for moral good or evil is manifest. For an act cannot be imputed to a man of which he is not master. But man is master of his own acts through free will, by which he determines himself. But there is not nor can there be any will of that honesty or dishonesty which the agent does not know, since the will is not borne into the unknown. Therefore no honesty or dishonesty (understand formal, not merely material), or no moral good or evil, can be present in acts unless and insofar as some judgment of reason concerning their honesty or dishonesty precedes them. And thus indeed according to the first and best-known elements of philosophy and moral theology, indeed also of the sense common to the human race. Although these things are most manifest, nevertheless there was reserved to Italy in our age this most unhappy distinction, that, dressed in a philosophical mantle and as though restoring collapsed moral science, a doctrine should range through it with impunity, by force of which moral acts without any conscience must be admitted, and indeed acts which are to be judged not only morally good or evil, but also meritorious or demeritorious, and yet were elicited without any otherwise preceding judgment concerning their honesty or dishonesty! In what way these things cohere with Catholic dogma, others certainly may see; as to the philosophizing, let this for the present be sufficient for us to oppose to it: How empty it is in things!

Division. Conscience is distinguished:

1. Right, or erroneous, according as it dictates the true or the false ².

² Some wish to oppose true rather than right to erroneous; because they contend that right conscience is present also in those who act from invincibly erroneous conscience. The matter, as is clear, is about a manner of speaking.

2. Certain, or doubtful, according as the mind firmly judges that something is good or evil, or, on the contrary, suspended, hesitates concerning the honesty of an action.

3. Scrupulous, or lax, according as either from an empty motive it apprehends sin where there is none, or on the contrary, for a slighter cause, presumes sin to be absent, or holds as light what is grave.

4. Probable, or improbable, according as from a grave or weak motive the mind is inclined to opine ³. - Of each separately ⁴.

³ Common usage has it that probability or improbability be said of opinion rather than of conscience.

⁴ A distinction must not be omitted which recurs everywhere among the Authors, namely, that conscience is called either antecedent or consequent, according as judgment concerning the honesty of the act either precedes the act itself or follows it. On this matter the Christian people must certainly be taught that the formal goodness of acts

Beautifully St. Thomas (I, q. 79, art. 13) thus describes the offices of both antecedent and consequent conscience: Conscience is said to testify, to bind or incite, or also to accuse, or also to bite back or reprove. And all these things follow upon the application of some cognition or knowledge of ours to those things which we do. This application indeed happens in three ways: in one way according as we recognize that we have done something or have not done it...; and according to this conscience is said to testify (here you have consequent conscience, although not moral). In another way it is applied according as through our conscience we judge that something must be done; and according to this conscience is said to bind or incite (this pertains to antecedent conscience). In a third way it is applied according as through conscience we judge that something which has been done was well done or not well done; and according to this conscience is said to excuse or accuse, or to bite back (which things pertain to consequent conscience).

or malice is not taken from consequent conscience, but from antecedent. For the uneducated are often deceived, who, while they either read books or hear sermons, judge that they have sinned in certain things, when during the act they had never thought about the malice of those acts, or certainly about some gravity of fault, nor had suspected it.

349. In order that we may be able to tend to the ultimate end, laws are not sufficient, by which the way to be followed is shown in a general mode; but it is required that laws of this kind be applied to each action in particular. Now that application of the rule of morals, in individual cases, is made through the practical reason of each man, which bears judgment concerning the morality of this or that act, all circumstances having been considered, and is, as it were, the proximate and subjective rule of morals. But this practical reason is called conscience. - In the present Treatise, we shall discuss:

I. Concerning the concept and species of conscience.

II. Concerning certain conscience, insofar as it is the proximate rule of morals.

III. Concerning doubtful conscience, and the means of removing doubt.

350. The word conscience, which is derived from knowledge,² designates several things, but especially: (a) the intimate sense, by which we perceive and discern internal sensations; (b) psychological conscience, by which we apprehend our spiritual operations, namely acts of cognition and volition; (c) moral conscience, by which we judge concerning the morality of our acts. Now the intimate sense, which is concerned with sensible things, is something altogether distinct from conscience properly so called, which perceives spiritual things. But psychological and moral conscience are not two distinct faculties, but one and the same faculty, namely reason (or intellect), which, insofar as it is conscious of spiritual operations, is called psychological conscience, - and insofar as it judges concerning their morality, is called moral conscience.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia, q. 79, a. 13; Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 5; Qq. disputatae, de Veritate, q. 17; Quodlibet., III, a. 26-27; Suarez, in Ia IIae, tr. III, disp. XII, n. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XX, cap. 7; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum casuum conscientiae, Venetiis, 1618, lib. I, c. 2-5; Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. V; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 2-19; Brocardus, Tr. de Conscientia (Migne, Theol. Curs., t. XI), q. II, art. 1-5; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. I, n. 1-30; Elbel-Bierbaum, P. I, n. 113-141; Ball. P., t. I, n. 130-159; Lehmkuhl, n. 41-66; Muller, § 71-74; Bouquillon, n. 253-282; Bautain, La Conscience, Paris, 1869, ch. 13-14; Didiot, n. 233-253; F. Bouillier, De la Conscience en psychologie et en morale, Paris, 1872.

² Cf. Bréal and Bailly, Dict. etymol. latin, Paris, 1898, p. 327-328, where he also notes that the word scire (from which scientia is derived) primarily signifies the same as to discern, or to judge.

Moral conscience is sometimes considered as a habit, insofar as it inclines us to pronounce concerning the liceity of actions; more often, however, as an act, insofar as it brings forth a judgment. But it is an act of the intellect, not of the will; and in this it agrees with psychological conscience; but it differs from it because it is not a mere apprehension of the intellect, but a true judgment or dictate concerning the liceity of an act, or concerning its relation to the rule of morals: whether it is licit or prohibited, whether there is an obligation of placing it or merely a counsel, whether under grave or under light obligation. Nor is it a speculative judgment, but practical, because it does not regard the liceity of an action in general and in the abstract, but in particular and in the concrete; indeed it is a proximately practical judgment, because it is borne concerning an action to be placed here and now, and therefore expresses an order to acting.

351. Moral conscience is therefore distinguished: (a) from synderesis, which is usually defined as the habit of the first moral principles, or a certain innate promptitude of reason for easily knowing the first moral principles, such as these: good is to be done, - what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, etc. (above, n. 221); (b) from science, which is knowledge of general conclusions deduced from first principles; (c) from prudence, which is the right estimation of all the circumstances regarding the morality of some action. - Yet it depends on these three: for it uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions, and also the prudent consideration of all circumstances, for judging whether this action in particular, all things considered, is licit or not.

Many say that the judgment of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of some prosyllogism. Namely the major is some general principle, proposed by synderesis, for example, every evil is to be avoided; the first minor declares that such a genus of action is comprehended under the general law, for example, theft is evil; from this moral science infers that theft is to be avoided. Then prudence adds: but the action which is here and now proposed as to be done, all things considered, falls under the concept of theft; and the last conclusion is the practical judgment of conscience: therefore here and now one must abstain from that theft. - For the most part, however, conscience does not explicitly syllogize, but, with all adjuncts considered, by a simple judgment, without any reasoning, decrees that this or that action is to be done, or omitted.

352. Therefore conscience can be defined as a practical judgment concerning the morality of an action to be placed here and now.

This is conscience properly so called, insofar as it is the rule of morals. Yet under the name conscience also comes the judgment which our reason bears concerning the morality of a past act: when it approves this, it is called the testimony of a good conscience; but if it reproves it, it is called remorse or the worm of conscience. Here we treat of conscience properly so called.

1. Many moderns do not distinguish the intimate sense from conscience; Rabier reports their various theories concerning the nature of conscience, Psychologie, ch. 6, p. 52-79. - Some think that conscience is a special faculty distinct from the intimate sense and the intellect: thus Reid, Garnier, Fabre, apud Bouillier, op. cit., p. 54-59.

353. State of the question. Conscience is divided from a manifold head.

(a) By reason of the obligation which it manifests, conscience, like the law itself, is called commanding, forbidding, permitting, according as it commands, prohibits, or permits certain acts (above, n. 208).

(b) By reason of the mode in which it enunciates the judgment, it is certain, when, without prudent fear of erring, it judges that some act is good or evil, and therefore to be done or avoided; doubtful when it hangs suspended concerning the liceity of an action,¹ or at least pronounces not without prudent fear. We shall speak below concerning each.

¹ That suspension of soul is not properly a judgment, but it implicitly supposes the prior conscience that one must abstain from pronouncing concerning the liceity of the action.

(c) By reason of conformity with the objective rule of morals, conscience is true,¹ if it agrees with truth, that is, with divine goodness and reason, or law; erroneous, if it differs from the same. But erroneous conscience is lax or scrupulous: lax, when someone, from a lighter cause, judges something to be licit which truly is not licit, or something light which is grave; scrupulous, if someone, from a futile cause, judges something to be illicit which in fact is licit, or something grave which is light.

¹ Often true conscience is called right; yet there is some distinction between each: right conscience is that which is formed according to the rules of prudence; but sometimes conscience is true, although imprudently formed. But for the most part these two words are taken interchangeably.

From this it is clear that certain conscience differs from true conscience: the former regards the subjective judgment which is borne concerning the morality of an action; the latter the objective conformity of this interior judgment with truth. Wherefore conscience can be certain without being true, such as invincibly erroneous conscience; likewise true conscience can remain doubtful, namely when truly probable arguments are present for the liceity and against the liceity of some action.

Whether and in what sense erroneous conscience is a rule of acting, we shall explain below; but a few things must be pre-noted concerning lax and scrupulous conscience, so that it may be better understood how a right conscience is formed.

354. 1. Notion. Here we treat of lax conscience, especially insofar as it denotes a habit, or a disposition of soul which inclines reason to diminishing or denying moral obligations, and therefore to extending liberty too much. By force of this habit, in a particular case, conscience judges, without sufficient reason, that something which is truly prohibited is licit, or that what is grave is a light sin. - Sometimes, from a long-standing habit of sinning, the moral sense is so clouded that conscience thinks little or nothing of even very grave sins, calling evil good, and drinking iniquity like water:¹ then it is called seared.²

² Bourdaloue excellently explains its causes and dangers, Sermon pour le 3e Dim. de l'Avent, sur la fausse conscience; cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 737-743.

¹ Isa., V, 20; Job, XV, 16.

² 1 Tim., IV, 2.

355. 2. Causes. Among the causes which form a lax conscience, these can be numbered: (a) depraved education: for those who from infancy have been instructed not in the law of the Lord, but in worldly corruptions and false opinions, and have had before their eyes examples of all vices, easily are ignorant of not a few precepts of the natural law, and judge as indifferent certain acts shameful and dishonorable in themselves; (b) defect of consideration and counsel: those who do not think before acting, and in more difficult matters do not seek the counsels of the wise, are often deceived, and hold as good or at least indifferent what is truly evil; (c) the impulse of desires: namely, when various passions urge, reason is not rarely clouded: what we vehemently desire appears licit; whatever we will is good, and whatever pleases is holy; movements of anger seem to be nothing other than pious indignation, - unbridled ambition nothing other than noble emulation, - avarice is held as legitimate foresight, - commercial frauds are judged an exhibition of industry, etc.; (d) the habit of doing evil: for, sins having been multiplied, the moral sense is dulled, fear of God and reverence for law gradually vanish; hence those things which at the beginning were judged very grave crimes are soon considered as light or no delicts; (e) presumptuous trust in God: God, they say, good and merciful, will forgive us; for He has known our frame and the infirmity of human flesh; wherefore He is much more inclined to benignity than theologians and preachers, nor does He so strictly reprove what moreover is done by most.

356. 3. Harms. Lax conscience, like the ignorance upon which it rests, can be vincibly or invincibly erroneous, according as it can be corrected by moral diligence having been applied or not, according to what was said above, n. 90-98: yet each is full of dangers.

(A) Even when conscience is invincibly erroneous, it induces many evils;¹ for it is the cause why many acts sinful in themselves and objectively are perpetrated. Now an objectively evil act: (a) is a disorder, since it is opposed to the law which is an ordination of reason, and therefore of itself, without the formal malice of the agent, gradually depresses the moral sense, and, when it is often repeated, generates habits evil of themselves and very harmful; thus he who, even from ignorance, often acts against truth or chastity, even if he does not formally sin, commits something shameful and dishonorable in itself, which gradually dulls his moral sense; (b) it gives scandal: for many, seeing evil acts often committed by others, from this take occasion of sinning, and easily persuade themselves that those acts are not very depraved, indeed perhaps even licit, since they are done daily by so many men; from this, gradually and imperceptibly, morals are corrupted, with great detriment to private persons and to the whole of society; (c) it induces the danger of sinning formally: for by acts against the law often repeated, even ignorantly, habits of themselves vicious are soon acquired; and, when afterward conscience awakens, and their malice clearly appears, they are not easily eradicated; thus one incurs the danger of formally consenting to acts which are now apprehended as evil.

¹ This is clearly explained by Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, t. XXI, 1899, p. 1169-1175.

357. (B) But often lax conscience is vincibly erroneous, and therefore culpable, because it was voluntarily formed, insofar as the agent, entangled in the snares of the passions and burning with pleasure, desired and suggested to himself, while conscience resisted, that this or that action was not prohibited, and afterward suffocated the remorse of conscience; or because, doubting or at least suspecting that the matter was evil, nevertheless he was unwilling to take counsel, lest perchance he discover the truth and no longer be able to enjoy the intended pleasure.² Then indeed he sinned formally, and indirectly or in the cause willed the depraved effects which he foresaw would follow therefrom (above, n. 97 and 171-174).

² If it is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not certain, and therefore not to be followed, as is declared below.

Moreover if, at the very time at which he acts, someone doubts or suspects that the matter is evil, and moreover knows that his conscience is lax, he cannot follow it, because he is conscious that it is not a right rule of morals, but is held to reform it by the means soon to be set forth. Wherefore by following it he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and therefore actually sins.

By these grave sins often committed the way is prepared for blindness of mind and hardness of heart: for the intellect is clouded insofar as it has become accustomed to approving false things as true, evil things as good; and the will is hardened in evil, insofar as, by indulging pleasure, it acquires a vehement propensity toward depraved acts, so that it obeys conscience only with difficulty.

358. 4. Remedies. As soon as someone becomes conscious that he has entered the way of laxity, he ought seriously to strive, under the guidance of a prudent confessor, to reform his conscience.

(a) First of all he will have recourse to prayer, so that, helped by divine light, he may attain practical knowledge of the rule of morals, - and, relying on divine help, may be able not only to hear, but also to follow the voice of right conscience, notwithstanding human infirmity: "Give me understanding, and I will search your law, and I will keep it with my whole heart."¹ (b) Afterward there is required the agent's own consideration before acting, with a sincere will of knowing and doing what is honorable, and not what pleases; but to discover the truth more easily, let the counsels of skilled and honorable men be sought, and not those of men who are easily deceived by the fallacies of the age; (c) finally let the impediments be removed, namely disordered passions and vicious habits, by which conscience is frequently clouded.

¹ Ps. 118, 34.

But the confessor should receive with paternal affection those who seriously wish to be amended, even if for a long time they have walked in broad ways; and he should instruct them rather than rebuke them, - he should add courage to them, and persuade them that the reformation of conscience, although difficult, is in no way impossible, provided that prayer is joined to good will and assiduous efforts.

359. 1. Notion. Here likewise we treat of scrupulous conscience, insofar as it is a habitual disposition,³ by force of which the agent, from a futile foundation which he thinks solid, believes or doubts that something is illicit which in fact is not, and therefore with anxiety fears lest he frequently sin, and indeed mortally. For the most part this vain trepidation is accompanied by a certain sensible impression or commotion, arising from vivid imagination, which more or less disturbs judgment and vexes the mind with anguish.¹

² Besides the authors alleged, see Scaramelli, Director. asceticum, Augustae Vindelicorum, 1770, tr. II, n. 421-467; Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, Ratisbonae, 1870, n. 255-274; Schram, Instit. theol. myst., Parisiis, 1868, t. I, § 73-83; Lombez, Paix intérieure, 2e p., ch. 7; Dubois, l'Ange conducteur des âmes scrupuleuses, Lille et Paris, 1901; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 673-678.

³ A judgment brought by scrupulous conscience is sometimes certain and sometimes doubtful: in the former case, conscience is said to be informed by scruples, and its dictate must be followed, from what will be said below concerning certain conscience; in the latter case, conscience is agitated by scruples, and concerning it we treat here; this is not to be followed, but the doubt is to be put aside by force of a reflex principle handed down by the confessor (n. 364).

¹ The word scruple (scrupulus or scrupus) literally signifies a little stone (pierre pointue); for just as this, inserted between the foot and the shoe, torments the one walking, so scruple vexes the soul.

(A) The principal signs by which scrupulous persons are recognized are these: (a) fear of sinning in all things, even indifferent and honorable things, or the vain apprehension that fault otherwise light is grave; (b) excessive anxiety concerning past confessions, and consequently the desire of making general confessions again and again, especially when from these doubts and anxieties increase; (c) lengthy accusations of circumstances which do not pertain to the matter, even if the confessor has several times said that all these things are useless; (d) pertinacity of judgment, which does not wish to acquiesce in the decisions of the confessor, but to seize upon the counsels of others: from which greater anguishes of soul are born; (e) frequent change of opinion on account of light reasons, and the greatest disturbance of soul in acting, which is sometimes exhibited by ridiculous gestures.

360. (B) Scruples are sometimes concerned with all things and sometimes with one or another object, especially (a) concerning past confessions: whether due examination was premised, and all circumstances rightly declared; whether contrition was had, and indeed at the very time of absolution; whether a good purpose was efficaciously elicited, etc.; (b) concerning depraved thoughts against chastity, or doubts against faith, to which they assert that they have given full consent, or intentions which they suppose to have been evil; (c) concerning scandal which perhaps they gave to others; (d) concerning a habit of acting with serious doubt whether the action is licit, from which it happens that most of their actions are sins, etc.

Scrupulous conscience differs from tender, or delicate, conscience, which perceives the smallest defects, and, on account of love of God, wills to amend them, well knowing that they are not grave, but harm perfection; this disposition indeed is laudable.

361. 2. Causes. Some are natural, others supernatural.

(A) Natural causes are physical or moral. (a) Among physical causes are especially numbered: a melancholic disposition, which often arises from temperament, and injects vain fears; and a certain morbid inclination to despair, arising from character, sickness, or various misfortunes; - excess in labors, abstinence, fasts, vigils, and other austerities, which, by diminishing the strength of the body, depress the strength of the soul; and also long-standing flight from all human conversation and honorable recreation, from which arises an assiduous and morose investigation of one's own conscience. (b) Among moral causes are numbered: weakness and inconstancy of soul, which follows the impressions of a vivid imagination rather than mature judgment; and from this head, more women than men are prone to scruple; - defect of science, whether speculative or psychological, by force of which the extent of duties is exaggerated, or impression is confused with consent; this defect is sometimes increased by the ignorance or imprudence of certain confessors; - excessive fear of divine justice, proceeding from this, that God is held not as a merciful Father, but rather as a severe Judge, scrutinizing and punishing all things strictly; - hidden pride, by which the scrupulous person tenaciously adheres to his own judgment, and does not consent to obey a spiritual director.¹

¹ To these causes, which hold themselves on the part of the subject, external ones are sometimes added: conversation with scrupulous persons, - reading of books favoring rigid opinions, - counsels of a director who is ignorant, or lacking discretion.

(B) To these sometimes supernatural causes are added: (a) namely God indeed does not send false concepts into conscience, but sometimes withdraws His light for a time even from the just, and permits them to be vexed by scruples, so that, by patient tolerance of this trial, they may satisfy more perfectly for past sins, and, by detesting them more efficaciously, may withdraw more vigilantly from dangerous occasions; - and also that, conscious of their own infirmity, they may have recourse to God with greater confidence and obey a spiritual director with more sincere humility.

(b) The devil can also act upon our sensitive faculties, especially upon the imagination, for exciting or increasing vain fears; or, when the soul is already held by sadness, he strives to suggest despair by various persuasions; or, if the conscience is delicate, "he strives to make it much more delicate also, and to drive it into a certain extreme degree of anxiety, so that thus, being miserably disturbed, it may finally fall away from spiritual progress."²

² St. Ignatius of Loyola, Exercitia spiritualia, ed. Roothaan, Romae, 1854, Rules concerning scruples, p. 160; P. Jennesseaux, S. J., rendered it in French, Paris, Poussielgue, 13th edition, 1891, p. 323.

362. 3. Harms. Scruples to which consent is given, from whatever cause they arise, can induce the greatest harms, temporal and spiritual at the same time: -

(A) Temporal indeed; for, when they last for a long time, (a) they weaken or disturb the brain and nervous system: for by force of the intimate union between body and soul, vain fears, sadness, anguishes, and other things of this kind, to which scrupulous persons are liable, lessen physical strength and greatly harm health. (b) The powers having been weakened, the way is prepared for neurasthenia, hysteria, and other illnesses described above, n. 130-133. (c) Indeed, as anxieties increase, sometimes reason itself is dulled, and falls into dementia, if the scruples are universal, or into monomania, if they are concerned with one object.

(B) Spiritual harms: they break the powers of the soul, and gradually turn virtues once acquired into vices: (a) they weaken hope: scrupulous persons, thinking themselves to be in the state of mortal sin, regard God as a most severe exactor and flee from Him. (b) Wherefore they cannot pray: too solicitous concerning the state of their own conscience, and fearing God too much, they do not dare to remain in His presence and be united to Him. (c) From this they lack fortitude: for since they retain only slight confidence in God, and moreover exaggerate their own infirmity, and do not trust their spiritual director, they undertake nothing great, but waste time uselessly in vain anxieties. Hence they are rendered unfit for acting fruitfully for the usefulness of others, and for diligently fulfilling the duties of their state; indeed they are usually burdensome to themselves and to others. (d) They also easily incur the danger of sinning gravely: for, their powers weakened, and exhausted by assiduous efforts against natural inclinations, they sometimes slip into despair, and, for the sake of consolation, loosen the reins to their desires; whence not rarely they fall into extremes, today indulging excessive mortifications, but tomorrow pleasure: for human nature cannot long resist such cruel torture.

363. 4. Remedies. (A) The primary and most efficacious remedy, to which the others are subordinated, is perfect obedience to be shown to a prudent confessor. For a scrupulous person, since he is destitute of the right dictate of conscience, cannot form a right judgment concerning things to be done; and therefore there is no other mode of rightly operating available to him than to submit himself to the judgment of a prudent man, by whose aid he will gradually put aside vain doubts and erroneous judgments. But the prudent man in question can scarcely be anyone other than the spiritual director, to whom the secrets of the heart are trustingly opened.

(a) But the confessor, as soon as he knows that some penitent is agitated by scruples, will strive to win his confidence by paternal benignity, and afterward will address him in these or similar words: I can and will, with God's help, restore peace of soul to you, provided, however, that you will open all things sincerely to me, and obey in all things, having set aside your own judgment for a time; if you promise this, you will certainly be freed from all doubts and anxieties at the opportune time; otherwise, you will be vexed perpetually. For a scrupulous person cannot act rightly by his own counsel,¹ but ought to follow without hesitation the counsel of a prudent man; practically, he never errs who obeys a wise director.

¹ Often he will not acknowledge that he is scrupulous; but the confessor will affirm that the matter is clear from the doubts, fluctuations, and anxieties set forth by the penitent.

(b) The first time, let him allow the scrupulous person to set forth his doubts fully; if he wishes to make a general confession, this can be permitted once, provided that he has not made such a confession to another a little before: let him kindly help him in the examination of conscience and in eliciting the act of contrition; but once this confession has been duly completed, let him no longer be permitted to repeat confessions. If nevertheless afterward he says that he did not confess all things, let the confessor order him to swear that he certainly remembers some sin certainly mortal and certainly never declared in a valid confession: if he fears to swear, let him not be heard; if he swears without hesitation, let it be permitted to him to declare this sin.

364. (c) The confessor will strive to know the cause and object of the scruples, so that he may be able better to hand down practical rules of acting to the penitent. If the cause is physiological, proceeding from weakness of the brain or disturbance of the nerves, he will send him to a wise physician, yet without omitting spiritual remedies. - If the cause is doubt concerning the liceity of such or such an action, he will inculcate in him the rule which is valid at least for the scrupulous: a doubtful law is no law; if, after the action has been performed, he doubts whether he sinned gravely, in practice he ought to act as if he had not sinned gravely, and therefore not abstain from Holy Communion: for he ought not to hold as mortal sin except that which he can swear to be certainly mortal. - He ought to take care that the scrupulous person absolutely obey the rules handed down; whence even if with tears he asks to repeat confessions, or wishes to be absolved from doubtful sins before communion, let him be sweetly but firmly repelled: this severity is the highest clemency. - Nor let him permit him to spend a long time in examination of conscience (which increases scruples), but let him set a brief time, which he should never exceed; the same must be said concerning the act of contrition, about which scrupulous persons are greatly tormented.¹

¹ For theologians deservedly teach that one of the privileges of scrupulous persons is situated in this, that they are not held to examine their conscience with the same diligence as others, nor to accuse all sins, but only those which, after a brief examination, they evidently know to be grave (De Paenitent., n. 204 and 192).

The scrupulous person sometimes objects: the confessor does not know my intimate dispositions well; I myself know them better, and I would not wish to die in this uncertain state. - The director will respond: Unless your conscience had been sufficiently known to me, I would not have prescribed a manner of acting; since you are agitated by scruples, you cannot form a right judgment concerning your own dispositions, but you ought to obey the judgment of the wise, even in the article of death; nor can God damn him who has trustingly submitted himself to a superior.

In all these things let the confessor not speak as one opining and hesitating, but as one certainly knowing and having authority: let him adduce either no reasons, or only very brief ones; otherwise, the discussions will be interminable. - Yet firmness of soul should be tempered by charity, so that the scrupulous person may understand that the confessor is a most devoted friend.

365. (B) Other remedies, besides obedience, to be employed are: (a) fervent prayer to God, as a kind and merciful Father, by which light may be trustingly obtained for seeing the way clearly, and strength for following it assiduously; (b) contempt of scruples, by acting strenuously against them, according to the prescriptions of the confessor; (c) Christian mortification, especially that which consists in immediately expelling vain phantasms, impressions, thoughts, and anxieties: hence assiduous and strenuous labor, and the faithful observance of the duties of one's state are especially useful; for thus the mind is efficaciously turned away from torturing doubts; but the scrupulous person should be warned never to hesitate long, but, after brief consideration, to act deliberately according to the counsels given or presumed of the confessor; (d) right formation of conscience, by which gradually, according to the general rules handed down by the director, he will prudently bear judgment concerning his own actions, as if they were the actions of another.

366. Corollaries. (A) Concerning perplexed conscience. Sometimes a scrupulous person, placed between two precepts, believes that he will sin, whichever part he chooses: then his conscience is called perplexed;¹ such is, for example, one who, assisting a sick person on Sunday, thinks that he sins if he leaves him, and likewise sins if he omits Mass.

¹ Sometimes, however, someone can be perplexed from mere ignorance, because namely he does not know how to form his conscience in the conflict of two obligations: then it suffices to instruct him.

In this case, (a) if the matter admits delay, and is of grave moment, he is bound to defer the action until he can obtain the counsel of a prudent man: for each one ought to avoid what he thinks is sin.

(b) But if the matter does not admit delay (which for the most part happens) or is of slight moment, he ought to choose that which seems to him to be the lesser evil, and therefore rather to transgress a positive law than a natural law. But if he cannot discern the lesser evil, and remains perplexed, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin: for he lacks that moral liberty which is required for sin.

Therefore penitents of this kind are rightly to be instructed so that, laying aside vain anxieties, they may learn that in no case does there exist a necessity of sinning.

(B) Concerning pharisaical conscience. Sometimes also, on account of ignorance or prejudices, conscience is lax in matters of great moment, pertaining to natural or divine right, while it is too narrow and scrupulous in matters of lesser moment, especially those pertaining to merely positive right: then it is called pharisaical, because it imitates the morals of the Pharisees, of whom Christ said:² "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who tithe mint, and anise, and cumin, and have left the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith... straining out a gnat, but swallowing a camel." - From this vice today they do not sufficiently depart who are too anxious about many devotions, and, on the other side, neglect fraternal charity or the duties of their state. These are to be diligently instructed so that, putting aside superfluous devotions, they may assiduously cultivate the Christian virtues congruent with their condition.

² Matt. 23:23-24; the whole chapter should be read.

We shall set forth two things: 1. what certain conscience is; 2. whether and in what sense it is the rule of morals.

367. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning certitude. Certitude in general is the firm adherence of the mind to some notion or fact, without fear of erring. By reason of the foundation on which it rests, certitude is distinguished as threefold: (a) metaphysical, which is founded in the very essence of things and ideas; thus we are metaphysically certain that the whole is greater than its part, because the truth of this proposition clearly shines forth from the very comparison of the ideas; (b) physical, which is founded in the constancy of natural laws; thus we are physically certain that fire burns, because from constant experience it is established for us that there is in fire the power of burning; (c) moral, which rests on the constancy of the laws of the moral order, or on the common manner of acting of free beings. This is: speculative, if it concerns abstract truths or the liceity of an action in general; and practical, if it concerns the liceity of an action to be placed here and now.

368. 2. Concerning the certitude which belongs to conscience. (A) Now the certitude which belongs to the practical judgment of conscience is moral and practical certitude: for since it pronounces concerning the liceity of such or such an action, not in general and in the abstract, but in the individual and in the concrete, with attention given to all the circumstances, the judgment brought forth is not infallible, but rests on human prudence,¹ which can be mistaken.

¹ Not a few theologians say that conscience sometimes enjoys absolute certitude, because it is founded on a motive altogether infallible; such, they say, is the certitude which is had concerning the precepts of the Decalogue and their proximate conclusions. - But in speaking thus they confuse synderesis or moral science with conscience: for this latter does not judge concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, but concerning the practical question whether such or such an action, in these or those circumstances, is prohibited by the Decalogue or not.

(B) Practical certitude itself admits several degrees: (a) sometimes it excludes every doubt and every fear of erring, and is called strict moral certitude; this can be had with regard to practical judgments altogether evident, for example, here and now I ought to abstain from such a theft; (b) sometimes, however, there is had only practical certitude broadly so called, or prudential certitude, which does not exclude every doubt, but only prudent doubt; thus, for example, we are not absolutely, but only prudently, certain concerning the validity of baptism or of orders received: for it can happen that the minister lacked the required intention; wherefore we have some fear of erring, but that fear, as being slight, does not destroy prudential certitude. This suffices in the moral matter, since often we cannot have another; now reason itself dictates to us that that certitude suffices which is accommodated to the infirmity of human nature; otherwise man would frequently remain perplexed, not knowing what was to be done.

369. (C) But this practical certitude, taken strictly or broadly, can be acquired in two ways, directly or indirectly: (a) directly, when, from the very comparison of the action with the law, we come to a morally certain conclusion; thus, given the law of hearing Mass on a feast day, unless a grave inconvenience is present, I judge morally certainly that I am held by that precept, because I see here and now that in my case there is not a grave inconvenience; (b) indirectly, that is, either from authority, or from an external, or reflex, principle, as they say, when we cannot come to a certain conclusion unless a certain principle extrinsic to the thing itself is called into the middle; thus a judge, after attentive consideration of the proofs brought forward in a criminal case, sometimes doubts whether the accused is truly culpable; then he has recourse to an external, or reflex, principle: in doubt, favor is to be shown to the accused; and therefore practically and morally certainly he concludes: this accused man, all things considered, is to be absolved. - That external principle can be the judgment of a prudent man, and especially of a confessor.

370. (D) Certain conscience is not always true, as we have already noted, but can be erroneous, since one can err even when he prudently judges concerning the liceity of some action: then it is called invincibly erroneous, according to the things said above, where we treated ignorance, n. 92. If conscience is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not morally certain; for in this case the agent can expel the error, or at least prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action here and now to be performed. But it must be said otherwise of conscience previously vincibly erroneous, but which at present is actually invincibly erroneous, because namely the agent does not think about the necessity of inquiring: for this is now morally certain, because, although previously he had thought about the necessity of investigating the truth, now he prudently thinks the action to be licit, without suspecting that the matter must be further investigated. Thus a seminary student, while he was studying theology, foresaw that from his negligence he would give certain erroneous decisions: then his conscience was vincibly erroneous; afterward, however, having forgotten this negligence, he brings forth a false judgment concerning a matrimonial case, without at that instant suspecting that he errs: his conscience is invincibly erroneous, and subjectively morally certain.

371. 1. Principle: Conscience morally and practically certain, and indeed it alone, is the proximate rule of morals.

(A) Conscience morally and practically certain is the proximate rule of human actions. For conscience morally and practically certain, in whatever way this certitude has been acquired, is that which, without prudent fear of erring, judges that some action is licit or illicit, obligatory or permitted; but it cannot happen that he sins who is prudently certain that the action which he does is honorable, or that the one which he omits is illicit. For no action or omission is imputable to anyone unless it is voluntary; but the malice of an action is not voluntary unless it is apprehended as such by the intellect; therefore he does not sin, but acts rightly, who follows a morally certain conscience; therefore this is deservedly called the proximate rule of morals.

372. (a) Concerning this there is assuredly no difficulty when certain conscience is at the same time true: for then it is altogether consonant with the ultimate rule of morals, namely divine reason. - But the same thing must be said even when certain conscience is invincibly erroneous, because, although it disagrees with the law, the defect of conformity is not imputed to the agent, because it is invincibly unknown by him; and therefore an act elicited according to an invincibly erroneous conscience is objectively and materially evil, as often as namely it is opposed to a law commanding or forbidding, - but subjectively and formally good, because it is apprehended and intended as such. - The same thing must be said of conscience here and now invincibly erroneous, which antecedently was vincibly erroneous. For an act placed according to such a conscience not only is materially evil, but can also be called formally evil in its cause (above, n. 97). Nevertheless it is not in itself actually evil: for it is elicited in good faith, and is not apprehended nor intended as evil: "Every human act has the character of sin or merit insofar as it is voluntary; but the object of the will according to its proper character is the apprehended good: and therefore a human act is judged virtuous according to the apprehended good toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act."¹

¹ St. Thomas, Quodlibet., III, a. 27; cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 7; q. 76, a. 3.

This can be confirmed from proposition 28, condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, at least as rash:² "Although invincible ignorance of natural right be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the one acting from formal sin itself"; therefore invincible ignorance, and consequently invincibly erroneous conscience, excuses from formal sin.

² Denzing., n. 1159.

373. (b) This holds even when moral certitude is only prudential, and was had by the aid of a reflex principle. For since the question is concerning things to be done, that certitude suffices which can be obtained in practice; now, when the question concerns performing or omitting such or such an action, not rarely only prudential certitude can be acquired. Sometimes speculative doubts arise which it is impossible to solve directly; from another side the necessity of acting presses; therefore nothing remains except to solve the speculative doubt practically by the aid of some reflex principle (above, n. 369). Thus he who, after all things have been diligently weighed, follows the prudent dictate of conscience, acts rightly before God.

374. (B) Certain conscience alone, morally and practically certain, is the right norm of actions. For he who acts with conscience which is not practically certain, by that very fact voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, since he prudently and practically doubts whether the action, here and now to be placed, is licit; moreover, he who voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, while he can easily avoid it, by that very fact implicitly wills to sin. Therefore he who practically doubts concerning the liceity of an action here and now to be performed cannot, while the doubt stands, proceed further, but ought to form for himself a practically certain conscience, by the aid of a reflex principle, according to the manner to be explained below.

375. Corollaries. (A) Conscience here and now vincibly erroneous is not a legitimate rule of acting. For, from one side, that conscience is not consonant with the objective rule of morals; and from the other, that defect, as being actually voluntary, is imputable to the agent; since, in this case, the agent prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action, and therefore ought to inquire further, if he can, and put away the error. - But if he cannot, and from another side the necessity of acting presses, he ought to choose that part in which evil, or the greater evil, is more safely guarded against; for by acting thus, he puts aside the practical doubt, and the error is not imputed to him unto fault. But if he chooses that of whose liceity he practically doubts, by that very fact he sins, by rashly exposing himself to perpetrating evil.

376. (B) To discern whether the conscience of the penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, the confessor will ask: (a) whether the penitent perceived some indecency in the act, or at least doubted concerning its liceity; (b) whether conscience dictated to him that the confessor or another prudent man was to be asked, and he voluntarily neglected the occasion of inquiring. If he sincerely denies both, the error was invincible; if he affirms either, the error must be called vincible. - But the nature and gravity of the sin committed from vincibly erroneous conscience depends on the very disposition of the agent at the time when he acts: if he apprehends the matter rather clearly as of great moment, and as contrary to this or that virtue, he sins gravely against that same virtue; but if the matter seems to him of slight moment, or its malice appears only confusedly, the sin will be venial. - From this it is clear how necessary it is for confessors kindly and prudently to explore the conscience and character of each penitent, so that they may form a true judgment concerning the sins committed by him.

377. Hence penitents are deceived who, after they have acted in doubt, seek in books or from a prudent man whether the action is licit, and lay aside every anxiety if they learn that the matter is not objectively evil: the morality of an action depends on the dictate of conscience brought forth at the very instant at which the action is completed, but not on the judgment which is afterward brought, when the matter has been better investigated. Whence that investigation will indeed be greatly useful for the future, but by no means for the past time.

To certain conscience is opposed doubtful conscience, concerning which we shall set forth two things: 1. what it is and how it can be rendered practically certain; 2. what are the various systems devised for solving practical doubt.

¹ Suarez, Tr. de Actibus hum., disp. XII, sect. 5-6; St. Alphonsus, n. 20-54; Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. V, art. 6; Lehmk., n. 48-51; Ball. P., n. 160-168; Muller, § 73; Bouquillon, n. 267-291; Noldin, n. 196-201; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 369-374.

378. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning doubt and probability. (A) When the mind cannot judge morally certainly concerning the liceity of some action, it can comport itself in a twofold way: either it adheres to neither part and suspends assent, or it assents to one part more than to another, yet with a prudent fear of erring; in the former case, doubt is called strict; in the latter, it is called broad, or opinion.² But opinion is distinguished from suspicion, which is a certain initial adherence, or propensity toward judging, but not a true assent.

² Here opinion is treated insofar as it is a subjective judgment of the mind; the same word often signifies the proposition itself to which the mind adheres with fear of erring, or opinion objectively taken.

379. (B) Sometimes opinion is taken objectively; then it can be more or less probable. Probable, according to the force of the name, is said of that which can be proved; but, from common usage, it signifies that which, although not manifestly true, bears before itself certain signs of truth which can move a prudent man to assent to it. But the degrees of probability depend on the greater or lesser verisimilitude which the opinion seems to have; thus that opinion is called more probable which rests on graver motives than the contrary opinion; on the contrary, the one which is supported by lighter arguments is called simply probable, or less probable; again, an opinion is notably more probable, or most probable, if the excess of probability is very notable: then the opposed opinion is slenderly or doubtfully probable.

(C) This probability indeed is called intrinsic or extrinsic: the former rests on reasons drawn from the very nature of the thing, the latter on the authority of learned or wise men. Often, however, each is joined, and the authority of doctors is worth the more, the greater is the weight of the reasons which they bring forward.

380. (D) Again probability is absolute or relative: absolute, which is supported by those reasons by which the mind of a prudent man is accustomed to be moved; relative, which does not bend all minds, but a certain one in particular, because of his special character, or the special circumstances in which he is placed. For in matters which are not evident of themselves, the will can command the assent of the intellect, because of extrinsic motives, whether legitimate or more or less dishonorable; thus in doubts, those who are right of heart adhere to the part which more favors the divine honor, the good of neighbor, or the peace of the community; on the contrary, those who are prone to laxity not rarely adhere to the part which favors pride or pleasure.

(E) Finally, doubt is speculative or practical: speculative, or remote, which concerns the law considered in itself, or its application in general - namely, whether such a law has been sufficiently promulgated, or has been abrogated by custom, - whether to paint on a feast day is a prohibited servile work, etc.; practical, or proximate, which concerns the liceity of such or such an action in particular, for example, whether it is licit for me to paint on this feast day.

381. 2. Concerning doubtful conscience itself. Merely speculative doubt does not directly affect conscience itself, but pertains to moral science, which weighs those questions; nevertheless often it indirectly affects conscience, by rendering it uncertain concerning the liceity of such or such an action in particular to be placed here and now by the agent; thus, for example, if it is doubted whether painting is a servile work, by that very fact a practical doubt will frequently arise whether Peter can here and now paint on this Sunday.

But here we treat only of practical doubt,¹ and therefore doubtful conscience is called that which either remains suspended concerning the honesty of some action in particular, or pronounces concerning the same not without a prudent fear of erring. - But this state of mind can be induced from the fact that on both sides reasons are present which are equally probable; or because on one side there is a more probable reason, which nevertheless does not remove the probability of the adverse opinion, or a reason only merely but solidly probable. - But for conscience of this kind merely negative doubt does not suffice, which rests on reasons so slight that they would not move a prudent man; for notwithstanding merely negative doubt, we judge concerning the liceity of the action without prudent fear of erring; - hence positive doubt is required, resting on grave arguments, which are accustomed to move a prudent man.

¹ For concerning speculative doubt we have already said something in the Treatise on Laws, and it is treated in the whole course of Moral Theology, by setting forth what opinions are more or less probable.

382. 3. Concerning the manner of solving practical doubt. (A) From what has been said above, n. 374, it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, but doubt must be shaken off by diligently investigating the matter.

For man ought to try, insofar as he can, to attain truth, and therefore, in a moral matter, to investigate the law and its genuine sense, and also attentively to consider all the circumstances, so that, in the best way that can be done, he may conform his actions to the law, which is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. Therefore he who, laboring under practical doubt, does not wish seriously to weigh the matter, acts rashly, and voluntarily and culpably exposes himself to the danger of sinning against the law. But, on the contrary, he who uses moral diligence to shake off doubt acts prudently, and the error into which perhaps he involuntarily falls is not imputed to him.

But that examination ought to be more or less diligent according to the gravity of the matter, and the quality or duties of the person; thus, if the question concerns a matter of slight moment, a prolonged investigation is by no means necessary. But this is required if the matter concerns a grave precept, especially concerning the strict rights of another person, or if from office an obligation lies upon some person to solve a doubt which concerns not only his own good, but also the common good.

383. (B) To perform rightly an examination of this kind, that natural prudence which is called right judgment (bon sens, common sense) is indeed required, but it does not suffice; rather, in those who are able to devote themselves to study, there is desired competent knowledge of the principles of moral theology, and in others recourse to prudent men, by whose counsels they may be able rightly to form their conscience. For when the question concerns not only positive right, but also many conclusions of natural right, some aspect often escapes the mind which, if it had been known, would have greatly helped conscience to form a right judgment. For although knowledge of principles pertains directly to synderesis, nevertheless it is especially useful for rightly forming the dictate of conscience: the better the sense of the law becomes known, the easier its application to a particular case becomes.

384. Confessors especially are held to devote themselves to study of this kind, as we have proved elsewhere.¹ Wherefore Benedict XIV admonishes them,² "that in a doubtful matter they should not rely on their own opinion, but, before they decide the cause, should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid, and then should descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." (a) Namely, they should not rely on their own opinion, which is often fallacious: for more wisdom is found in the judgment of many than in the judgment of one. (b) They should consult very many books, in order more easily to guard against the same inconvenience; for what could have escaped one author will not so easily escape many, especially if they do not belong to the same school, but to diverse schools: for experience shows how easily authors of the same school, without further examination, confidently repeat the opinions and arguments of their predecessors! (c) But they should choose those books whose doctrine is more solid, those namely which, by knowledge, prudence, and piety, have acquired a greater reputation for themselves, and have weighed the matter expressly, not incidentally: nor are the authors whose works are read to be so much counted as weighed. (d) Let them descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Hence, insofar as can be done, attention must be given both to intrinsic reasons and to extrinsic authorities: the arguments brought forward should be critically weighed, with attention given to the circumstances of times and places, and, generally speaking, the authority of theologians should not be estimated at more than the weight of the reasons which they bring forward. Nevertheless, if some conclusion is confirmed by the common doctrine of all schools, by that very fact it has great probability, even independently of the arguments brought forward; nor should one depart from it unless a new reason which up to this time was unknown is brought into the middle.

¹ Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenit., n. 370-374.

² Benedict XIV, Apostolic Constitution Constit. concerning preparation for the Jubilee, year 1750, § 21.

385. (C) After all these things have been weighed, if conscience cannot bring a morally certain judgment, it remains that we have recourse to a reflex principle, by whose aid the practical doubt may be converted into moral certitude. Now, among reflex principles, some are universal, because they can be applied in any doubt concerning the liceity of an action for forming a practically certain conscience; such are: a doubtful law does not oblige, - in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and others which we shall soon explain in the critical exposition of the systems; others, however, are particular, which can be applied only in certain matters, for example, in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be proved, - in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, - in doubt the presumption stands for the superior, etc.; these indeed are explained in the various Treatises. By their aid doubt is shaken off, and a morally and practically certain conscience is formed. If someone, for example, after mature investigation of the matter, has judged that the law of fasting in such a case is truly doubtful, because of grave reasons, and at the same time admits the truth of the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige," he can immediately conclude: a law of this kind does not oblige me in this case; and this judgment indeed is morally and practically certain. For, from one side, probabilists hold as morally certain the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige"; from another side, it is morally certain that in this case the law of fasting is doubtful; therefore it is morally certain that this law does not oblige me.

386. But the uneducated, who have not explicitly learned the use of a reflex principle, nevertheless form for themselves a practically certain conscience, because, rightly using moral sense, they judge that they act prudently, since such or such an action does not seem, all things considered, clearly and certainly prohibited;¹ but if doubt tortures them too much, they approach a prudent man, especially the pastor or confessor, and ask from him what must be done.

¹ Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 753-758.

The existence of conscience is a fact known to every man through his immediate consciousness.

The terms conscience and consciousness, though much alike, have distinct meanings. “In English,” says Father Rickaby, "we have done with a Latin word what neither the Latins nor the French have done: we have doubled the term, making 'conscience' stand for the moral department and leaving 'consciousness' for the universal field of objects about which we become aware." ¹ When, therefore, we say that the existence of conscience is attested by consciousness, we mean that every man is immediately aware of the fact that he has a conscience. This is true of uncivilized and barbarous as well as of civilized human beings. By all, conscience is acknowledged as a moral power and one of the mainstays of the social order. Cicero, Seneca, and other pagan writers extolled it as the rule and guide of life, though their conception of it was crude and not altogether correct.

¹ Jos. Rickaby, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, p. 268.

The existence of conscience is taken for granted throughout the Old and New Testaments.² The former speaks of conscience as heart (καρδία), and devotes special attention to the pangs of an evil conscience. The name συνείδησις (conscientia) itself occurs only once in the Old Testament; ³ in the New it is used repeatedly, though never by Christ Himself. St. Paul expressly distinguishes conscience from the natural law, of which it gives testimony, and describes it as the unconditional rule of morality.⁴

² Cfr. J. L. Mosheim, Sittenlehre, Vol. III, Helmstadt 1743, pp. 210 sqq.

³ Wisd. XVII, 11.

⁴ Rom. II, 14-15; XIV, 23; cfr. 2 Cor. I, 12. —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 56, n. 14: "Did the persecutors [the pagans] conquer, and were the martyrs conquered? Far from it. Seek the glory of the martyrs with God; seek the pit of the pagans in their stricken conscience: for there is the pit into which the impious man falls—in an evil conscience." (Migne, P.L., XXXVI, 670).—IDEM, ibid., II, 30, s. i, n. 8: "You can flee whatever you wish, O man, except your conscience. Enter your house, rest upon your bed, enter into your inmost parts: within you can possess nothing to which you may flee from your conscience if your sins gnaw at you." (P. L., XXXVI, 234).

Conscience, being common to all men and inborn in all, must be part of human nature, and, therefore, created by God,⁵ not, as the Materialists maintain, evolved by education, training, habit, environment or economic causes.⁶ For the same reason conscience is not autonomous. Its voice, says St. Thomas, is nothing else than the manifestation of the divine law to man.⁷ The inspired account of the temptation of our first parents proves this.⁸ "The idea of good and evil," says a modern non-Catholic writer, "was given to man before the fall. It is a prerequisite of free-will, which could not perform its functions without that concept. An ancient tradition aptly places the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in Paradise.⁹ Good and evil existed before man was seduced. Conscience began to speak in him the moment he became aware of his liberty, for from that moment he was able to judge himself and his actions as being either good or bad." ¹⁰ What we call a guilty conscience (i. e., evil concupiscence) did not, of course, exist before the fall of our first parents, but is a consequence of original sin which still affects their descendants, though its malign influence is largely offset by grace and the blessings of the atonement.¹¹

⁵ Cfr. Tertullian, Adv. Marcionem, I, c. 10: "The soul is earlier than prophecy; for from the beginning conscience is God's gift to the soul, the same and no other among Egyptians, Syrians, and the people of Pontus." (Ed. Leopold, Vol. III, p. 52).

⁶ Cfr. Th. Elsenhans, Wesen und Entstehung des Gewissens, Leipsic 1894, pp. 149 sqq., 204 sqq. —G. Carring, Das Gewissen, pp. 40 sqq., 64 sqq.

⁷ St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 3: "Since conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to an act, it is evident that conscience is said to bind by the force of a divine precept." — Ibid., art. 4, ad 2: "A dictate of conscience is nothing other than the arrival of a divine precept at the person who has conscience."

⁸ Gen. III, 1-4. Cfr. F. Delitzsch, System der biblischen Psychologic, 2nd ed., Leipsic 1861, pp. 133 sqq.

⁹ Gen. II, 9.

¹⁰ R. Seeberg, Gewissen und Gewissensbildung, Erlangen 1896, p. 15; cfr. p. 71.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Gencsi ad Liter am, XII, c. 34, n. 65: "Not only the third heaven, whatever that may be—which assuredly is something great and sublimely glorious—but also within man himself a certain joy of a good conscience is paradise." (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 482). —IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 45, n. 9: "Deo sedes est conscientia piorum.'' (P.L., XXXVI, 520). —IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 53, n. 8: "As conscience is a great punishment of the impious, so conscience itself is a great joy of the pious. For this is our glory, says the Apostle (2 Cor. I, 12), the testimony of our conscience." (P. L., XXXVI, 625).

READINGS.—St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 16 and 17.—P. Ewald, De Vocis συνειδήσεως Vi ac Potestate Commentatio, Leipsic 1883, pp. 20 sqq.—I. Jahnel, Ueber den Begriff Gewissen in der griechischen Philosophie, Glatz 1872.—IDEM, De Conscientiae Notione, Berlin 1862.—Th. H. Simar, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1902.—L. Lacotte, Traité de la Conscience, Paris 1905.—E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. II, pp. 217 sqq.—J. H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, pp. 104-118.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., art. “Conscience” in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 268 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium Theologia Moralis, 27th ed., pp. 35 sqq.—A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 315 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, 11th ed., Vol. I, pp. 73 sqq.—J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 131 sqq.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 270 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 289 sqq.

The concept of conscience, being inseparably bound up with that of soul, could not be fully developed until psychology had attained a certain degree of scientific precision. 1. NOMINAL DEFINITION. —The word conscience is derived from the much wider term conscientia, which signifies the state of being aware of one's own actions. Popularly, conscience is often called the voice of God or a manifestation of His will in the hearts of His rational creatures.¹ This conception is substantially correct because conscience acquaints man with the dictates of the divine law, which is a power he may not contemn. But conscience is not always the voice of God. Like any other human judgment it may be erroneous. History proves this without a doubt. As men have at various times held erroneous opinions in other matters,² so one may (by false training or for other reasons) hold erroneous opinions in moral questions. A pagan involved in invincible and therefore pardonable error concerning the secondary precepts of the moral law, might worship idols and torture his foes with a perfectly clear conscience.³

¹ Cfr. St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 39, art. 1, qu. 3, ad 3: "Conscience is like God's herald and messenger. What it says, it does not command of itself, but commands as though from God, like a herald when he publishes the king's edict; and hence conscience has the power of binding in those things which can in some way be done well." (Opera Omnia, Vol. II, p. 907).

² Cfr. R. Seeberg, Gewissen und Gewissensbildung, pp. 6 sqq., 22 sqq.; T h. H. Simar, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit, pp. 13 sqq.

³ Cfr. Rom. XIV, 23; John XVI, 2.

2. REAL DEFINITION. —The first real definition of conscience is found in the writings of the Scholastics,⁴ especially Blessed Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas.⁵ a) Aristotle taught that the soul has two faculties, intellect and will, of which the latter is subject to the former. The Schoolmen adopted this theory and defined conscience as an act of the intellect or understanding.⁶ Distinguishing between the speculative and the practical intellect, they assumed a double conscience.

⁴ Cfr. Th. H. Simar, Die Lehre vom Wesen des Gewissens in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts, I, Freiburg 1885, pp. 5 sqq. —A practical meditation on conscience by a 12th century writer is contained in the anonymous Libellus de Conscientia, reproduced in Migne's Patrologia Latina, CCXIII, 903 sqq. —See also the Liber de Conscientia ad Alcherum of Peter Cellensis (P. L., CCII, 1083 sqq.) and the Tractatus de Interiori Domo sive de Conscientia Aedificanda of an unknown contemporary of St. Bernard (ibid., CLXXXIV, 507 sqq.).

⁵ Albert the Great, Summa de Creat., P. II, De Homine, qu. 69-70; IDEM, Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 5, art. 6; dist. 24, art. 14. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 79, art. 12-13; 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 5; De Veritate, qu. 16-17; Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 24. —Cfr. H. Appel, Die Lehre der Scholastiker von der Synteresis, Rostock 1891, pp. 28 sqq.; A. Strobel, Die Lehre des Albertus Magnus über das Gewissen, Sigmaringen 1901, pp. 2 sqq.; F. J. Bruck, Die Lehre vom Gewissen nach Antonin, Freiburg 1909.

⁶ In opposition to the Dominican school, which regarded conscience as an act of the intellect only, the Franciscan theologians, led by Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, conceived it as a moral faculty, based upon the appetitive powers as well as upon the understanding. (Simar, Die Lehre vom Wesen des Gewissens in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts, I, p. 7; cfr. pp. 10 sqq.).

The speculative conscience (synteresis)⁷ they defined as a habit by which the soul perceives the general principles of right conduct.⁸ In other words, "synteresis is an habitual hold upon primary moral judgments, as, that we must do good, avoid evil, requite benefactors, honor superiors, punish evildoers."⁹

⁷ On the much-discussed term συντήρησις cfr. J. Jahnel, "Woher stammt der Ausdruck Synteresis bei den Scholastikern?" in the Theologische Quartalschrift of Tübingen, 1870, pp. 241 sqq. It owes its existence to a corrupt passage in St. Jerome's Commentary on the Prophet Ezechiel (I, c. 1, n. 10): "The Greeks call it synderesis, that spark of conscience which is not extinguished even in Adam's breast after he was cast out of paradise, and through which ... we perceive that we sin." (Migne, P. L., XXV, 22). The correct form of the word is συνείδησις.

⁸ "Speculative knowledge of universal principles for living well."

⁹ Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, p. 137.

The practical or so-called individual conscience is a judgment or dictate of practical reason deciding that a particular action is right or wrong.¹⁰ It is an application of speculative knowledge to concrete facts.¹¹ The process by which reason arrives at the judgment called practical conscience is essentially syllogistic. The major premise (iudicium iuris) is a judgment of the speculative conscience. The minor (iudicium facti) is its application to the particular case in hand. The conclusion is the final judgment as to the moral character of the act under consideration, i. e., the practical conscience itself.

¹⁰ "A judgment or practical dictate of reason by which we judge what here and now is to be done as good or avoided as evil."

¹¹ "The application of knowledge to a particular act."

For example:

Major: To lie is sinful; Minor: To speak so and so would be to lie; Conclusion: Therefore it is sinful to speak so and so; or:

Major: Adultery is forbidden; Minor: What I am about to do is adultery; Conclusion: Therefore what I am about to do is forbidden; or:

Major: I must obey all who command me with lawful authority; Minor: X. commands me here and now with lawful authority; Conclusion: Therefore I must here and now obey X.

This theory is not, however, quite satisfactory. For, in the first place, the operation of conscience does not entirely coincide with that of practical reason. On the contrary, the two are often disproportionate. A man may have a highly developed mind coupled with a dull and unresponsive conscience. Vice versa, the conscience is sometimes very active and delicate in a mind that has little more than the rudiments of intellectual culture. Another defect of the Scholastic theory is that it does not account satisfactorily for the characteristic phenomenon called good or bad conscience, which is a mere sentiment preceding the judgment of reason and causing it to reflect about what it has done or is about to do. b) To remedy this defect, the Scholastics drew a distinction between conscientia antecedens and conscientia consequens. Antecedent conscience is a dictate of practical reason preceding action; consequent conscience follows an action, approving it as right or condemning it as wrong. According to this explanation, what men call bad conscience is simply a judgment of reason condemning an illicit act and its consequences; in other words, it is the perception of, and regret for, a false conclusion and a foolish act based thereon. In matter of fact, however, the so-called pains or qualms of conscience are something more than mere regret over a wrongly drawn conclusion. Nor can the underlying difficulty be removed by conceiving the conscientia antecedens as an act of the understanding and the conscientia consequens as a mere sentiment, for to divide conscience into two essentially different faculties would destroy its unity.

The Scholastic theory of conscience was complemented and perfected by the medieval mystics,¹² who held that deep down in the innermost recesses of the human soul there is a spark of eternal light (scintilla animae), which God Himself has put there to preserve the soul from destruction.¹³ Intellect and will, according to this theory, can be made serviceable to evil; not so the scintilla animae, in which God Himself dwells as the object of mystical contemplation. It is this spark of divine light in the soul that the mystics regard as the true seat of conscience.

¹² Cfr. J. Jahnel, De Conscientiae Notione, pp. 81 sqq.; W. Schmidt, Das Gewissen, pp. 225 sqq.

¹³ Cfr. John V, 18. —St. Thomas, Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 24, qu. 2, art. 3, ad 5; De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 2, ad 3. —St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 39, art. 2, qu. 1, ad 3. —M. Grabmann, "Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Scintilla Animae," in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, Paderborn 1900, pp. 413 sqq.

A strictly adequate definition of conscience is impossible because we do not understand the mysterious nature of the soul. But such a definition is not necessary for our purpose. We can obtain a sufficient knowledge of the nature of conscience by studying its manifestations (a posteriori). Observation teaches that every dictate of conscience is first a judgment of reason concerning the moral character of an act, and secondly a stirring of the will, in the form of a command, admonition or warning, especially an impulse of sentiment in the shape of a reproach or pain. Hence conscience is more than an act of the understanding. It engages all the faculties of the soul, and consequently is not a separate and distinct faculty, but something which lies beneath all faculties, at the very basis of the soul.

We may therefore roughly define conscience as a habit or capacity (habitus) of the three faculties of the soul —intellect, will, and feeling, —by which man is bound to the moral order of the universe, i. e., the will of God; or, in other words, the capacity of applying objective laws to subjective conduct or of regulating man's actions in accordance with the law.

Thus defined, conscience appears as a moral and religious faculty or disposition placed in the soul by God, and developed together with its other faculties. The fact that conscience depends upon the faculties of the soul and is subject to many internal and external influences, explains why it acts differently in different individuals. Conscience itself is never mistaken, but it sometimes makes a wrong application of the primary precepts of morality to individual cases. In its innermost essence conscience, therefore, is "the internal and proximate rule of human conduct," ¹⁴ and to act deliberately against its dictates is always sinful, because such conduct involves a denial of ethical personality, —a sort of moral self-annihilation.

¹⁴ "Regula interna, proxima, sive formalis actuum humanorum."

The first principle of morality, therefore, is this: Always obey your conscience, for to act against its dictates is invariably a sin.¹⁵

¹⁵ "Omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est." Rom. XIV, 23. — Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. I, n. 55 (ed. Gaudé, I, 25); J. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 954 sqq.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 16 and 17. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 57 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 135 sqq. —IDEM, art. "Conscience" in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 268 sqq. —R. Hofmann, Die Lehre von dem Gewissen, Leipsic 1866. —M. Kahler, Das Gewissen, Vol. I, Halle 1878.—M. R. Kabisch, Das Gewissen, sein Ursprung und seine Pflege, Göttingen 1906. —Th. H. Simar, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit, Freiburg 1874. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 448 sqq. —F. Katzinger, S.J., Inquisitio Psychologica in Conscientiam Humanam, Innsbruck 1924.

To be entirely reliable, conscience must be right, certain, and watchful. Hence the three conditions for the normal functioning of conscience enumerated by the Schoolmen: rectitudo, certitudo, vigilantia. i. In order to be right (recta s. vera), conscience must accord with the eternal law. Every man is in duty bound to follow his conscience when it prescribes an act as commanded or forbids it as unlawful.

Conscience is called erroneous (conscientia erronea) when its dictates are not in harmony with the moral law.¹ The mistake may be owing to a false conception of the law (error iuris), or to a wrong application of its provisions to a concrete fact (error facti), or to a faulty conclusion formed with regard to the latter (iudicium facti).²

¹ Cfr. Rom. XIV, 23; 1 Cor. VIII, 7; X, 25 sqq.; John XVI, 2.

² Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 2: "Conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to some particular act. In this application error can occur in two ways: in one way, because that which is applied contains an error in itself; in another way, because it is not applied correctly. —Cfr. 1 Cor. VIII, 1-13.

If a mistake is made that could have been avoided, the conclusion is said to be vincibly erroneous (error vincibilis). In this case an act may be sinful, not because the agent has obeyed his conscience, but because the error was willed in the cause (voluntarium in causa). An er roneous conscience is invincible (error invincibilis) if the mistake committed was absolutely unavoidable. To follow the dictates of an invincibly erroneous conscience is no sin, even when the act performed is objectively evil. On the contrary, it would be sinful to act against one's conscience, even if, in acting against it, one would be objectively in the right. Of course, the mistake must be corrected as soon as it is realized.

2. Conscience is called certain (conscientia certa) if it declares without hesitation that an action is right or wrong. Where uncertainty exists, it is a duty to obtain certainty as soon as possible. When a man finds himself unable to form a certain conclusion with regard to the moral character of an act, he will either suspend judgment or assent to one of two contrary propositions, though conscious that the other may be true. In the former case, i. e., if no sufficient reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if equally important reasons speak for the one and for the other, conscience is said to be doubtful (conscientia dubia). A doubtful conscience, if it bases its action on good and solid grounds, is called probable (conscientia probabilis).

A doubtful conscience may, therefore, be defined as a suspension of judgment with regard to the lawfulness of an act.

Theologians distinguish between positive and negative doubt. When there are no reasons, or very slight reasons, on either side, there is a negative doubt. Such doubts, which calm consideration generally shows to be unfounded, must be treated like temptations. When there is an apparent equality of reasons, and the mind cannot arrive at a decision either one way or the other, the existing doubt is positive. When positive doubt has reference to the morality of an action it is not lawful to perform that action.³ While conscience is in this state, one may abstain from action, or, if the decision cannot be postponed, one must do what would be licit in any case. Thus, in doubt whether an action be permissible, when it is certain that such an action may be omitted, the action is to be omitted, and vice versa. This is what is meant by the Scholastic axiom, "In dubiis pars tutior est sequenda.

³ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. I, n. 22 (ed. Gaudé, I, 11): "We say that it is never lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience; and in the event that someone acts, he sins, indeed with a sin of the same species and gravity concerning which he doubts, because one who exposes himself to the danger of sinning already sins, according to the saying: He who loves danger shall perish in it (Ecclus. III, 27). Therefore, if he doubts whether it is mortal, he sins mortally."

From what has been said it follows that every man is in duty bound to rid himself of doubts and to acquire a certain conscience (bona fides). Whoever makes a sincere effort to solve his doubts by observing the conduct of conscientious people situated in similar circumstances, consulting an experienced guide, praying for light and trusting in Providence, will not sin, even if his final decision should happen to be wrong.⁴

⁴ Indirectly, according to Lehmkuhl, one may resolve a doubtful case by these reflex principles: (1) In doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better; (2) It must be seen upon whom the burden of proof falls; (3) For a certain law outside the matter of justice to be satisfied, a probable fulfillment positively proved suffices; (4) In doubts, one must stand for that for which the presumption stands; (5) In doubt, judgment must be made from what ordinarily happens; (6) A fact is not presumed but must be proved; but what by law ought to have been done is presumed in doubt to have been done, or done rightly; (7) In doubt, favors are to be enlarged and burdensome things restricted, that is, the more benign course is to be preferred; (8) In doubt, that which is least is to be held; (9) In doubt, the safer part is to be followed. —For an explanation of these rules, and some useful hints as to their application, see A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 122-126.

3. A watchful conscience (conscientia vigilans) is one which asserts itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. The quality of watchfulness is enhanced by a conscientious observance of all the commandments, by careful attention to the inner workings of conscience, and especially by regular daily examinations.⁵ A conscience thus trained becomes tender (conscientia tenera) and makes its possessor a conscientious man.

⁵ Cfr. Gal. VI, 4 sq.; Eph. IV, 26.

Continued disregard of the laws of God renders the conscience obtuse (cauteriata) and finally lax.⁶ a) A blunt or obtuse conscience fails to protest even against grievous sins. It is called sleeping, not dead, because conscience never dies, but always awakes again, even in the greatest criminals, either of itself or under the influence of grace, though often too late.⁷ Needless to say, every man is bound to keep his conscience from going to sleep. b) A lax conscience (conscientia laxa s. lata) is characterized by a tendency to deny or diminish obligations. It results from harboring wrong principles and leading a sinful life, and may be described as a frivolous conception of life and its duties.⁸ When a man's conscience has grown lax, his actions are morally equivalent to those performed in a state of vincible ignorance. A lax conscience is very hard to cure.⁹ There is really but one effective remedy for it, viz.: a thorough-going change of life. This is a drastic medicine, but unless it is applied promptly, the patient will succumb to delusions, grow impenitent, and incur eternal damnation.¹⁰

⁶ Cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 2.

⁷ Cfr. Mark IX, 43.

⁸ Cfr. Matth. XXIV, 38.

⁹ Cfr. Apoc. III, 15 sq.

¹⁰ Cfr. Ecclus. III, 29: "The sinner will add sin to sin."

READINGS.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 59 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., pp. 35 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 319 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 203 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 188 sqq.

Scrupulosity or scrupulousness is a peculiar irregularity by which the conscience is led to exaggerate obligations or to regard harmless actions as sinful. A scrupulous man is harassed by groundless doubts and worries, which sometimes cause desperation or religious dementia.

Scrupulosity is often simulated by penitents for egoistic ends, e. g., to make a good impression on the confessor. A prudent confessor will therefore treat such cases with great caution, especially when women are involved. What appears to be a scrupulous conscience is sometimes mere hypocrisy, which, after the manner of the Pharisees, strains at gnats and swallows camels, i. e., pretends to worship the letter of the law without regard for its spirit, and loads down others with burdens which it declines to assume itself.¹ Such a conscience is called conscientia pharisaica, and is almost impossible to cure because it springs from that most tenacious of all vices, —pride.

¹ Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 2 sqq., 13 sqq.; John XVIII, 28.

A scrupulous conscience, on the other hand, can usually be cured by the timely application of suitable remedies.

a) The first step to take is to determine the cause. In the majority of cases the confessor will discover a pathological condition of either the body or the mind. The penitent must be enjoined under strict obedience to remove the cause of his scruples by applying the remedies suggested to him. There is no other cure because the victim of scrupulosity nearly always seeks the cause of his disorder outside himself. Where scruples are merely a trial of the soul, or a penalty for previously committed sins, or a test of virtue, they may be regarded as a disposition of Providence, and the penitent should be admonished to be patient, humbly put his trust in God, and use his affliction as a means of acquiring greater perfection.

If scrupulosity is the result of diabolical obsession and the confessor decides to perform an exorcism, he should not let the penitent know anything about it.

A second reason for enjoining strict obedience to the directions of the confessor is the inclination of scrupulous persons to reject the advice of others and obstinately adhere to their own notions. Such people need, and generally desire, a firm guide, and it is safe to say that a scrupulous penitent will never sin if he follows the advice of his confessor. For the same reason a prudent confessor should inexorably send a scrupulous penitent back to his former confessor, or, when this is impossible, accept him only on condition that he promises strict obedience, Priests do well to be lenient toward scrupulous penitents in all other things, but they should punish disobedience with firmness, even by denying absolution. b) The specific remedies indicated in each individual case must be applied after a careful consideration of all the symptoms. When a scrupulous person is haunted by temptations against purity, or by the fear of consenting to blasphemous thoughts, he should be instructed to accuse himself of such things only if he can make oath to the effect that he has consented. Men and women who have a tender conscience do not usually commit a grievous sin without being aware of the fact. Where scruples have reference to past confessions, they are generally caused by a false notion of the requirements of valid confession or by the apprehension of losing the right disposition at any moment. In such cases it may be advisable to instruct the penitent regarding the necessary requisites of confession. If a general confession is likely to afford relief, let it be suggested or permitted, on condition that the penitent confess no sins of his previous life, unless he is ready to take an oath that he actually committed and never confessed them before. As a rule scrupulous penitents should be dissuaded from brooding over or mentioning past sins. This is a wise rule to follow, because, even though something serious may occasionally be left out, the preservation of bodily and spiritual health is a higher duty than the material integrity of sacramental confession.

Another class of persons labor under the fear of committing a sin every time they act. These should be advised to disregard their apprehensions and to go ahead resolutely without trying to solve their doubts, because no one who earnestly strives to serve God is likely to commit a grave sin without being aware of the fact.

The rule bidding men to abstain from acting as long as their conscience is in a state of doubt, does not apply to the scrupulous. If it did, they would never act at all, as they are never free from doubt. Such persons should be taught to disregard the maxim, "In dubio pars tutior est sequenda," and they will rarely sin, except in a material sense, because they will not act against conscience, but merely against unreasonable fears and scruples.

Finally, scrupulous persons should be forbidden to repeat prayers, penances, etc., which they think they have performed imperfectly. Of course, where harm has resulted to another by an incomplete performance of duties, even the scrupulant can not be dispensed from repetition, e. g., if a scrupulous priest had mispronounced the formula of absolution, he would be bound to repeat the same. Usually, however, scrupulous persons only think they have erred in such cases, and since their doubts are unfounded, there is no obligation to repeat. E. Boyd Barrett, S. J., pleads “for a frank recognition of the fact that 'scruples' is a mere nerve disease, though concerned with facts of the moral order. The central interest of the pious man or woman,” he says, “is his state of soul. The obsession that grips his exhausted or weakened mind deals naturally with the chief interest of his life, religion, and hence the 'content' of the obsession of a pious person concerns sin.” (The New Psychology, N. Y. 1925, p. 118).

READINGS.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 76 sqq.—IDEM, Questions of Moral Theology, New York 1915, pp. 329 sqq.—J. F. Delany in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. III, pp. 640 sq.—Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., New York 1919, pp. 39 sqq.—De Lehen, S.J., The Way of Interior Peace, New York 1888, pp. 268 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, 11th ed., Vol. I, pp. 76 sqq.—A. Konings, C.SS.R., Theologia Moralis, 2nd ed., Vol. I, New York 1876, pp. 19 sqq.—Fr. a Barbens, O. M. Cap., Introductio Pathologica in Studium Theol. Mor., Tarracona 1917, pp. 121 sqq.—Aug. Gemelli, O.F.M., De Scrupulis, Florence 1913.—A. Eymieu, Le Gouvernement de Soi-même, Essai de Psychologie Pratique, 2 vols., esp. Vol. II, Obsessions et Scrupules, Paris, 27th ed., 1922.—A. Poulain, S.J., The Graces of Interior Prayer, tr. by S. Yorke Smith, 2nd ed., London s. a., pp. 420 sqq.—N. Turco, Il Trattamento “Morale” dello Scrupolo e dell’ Ossessione Morbosa, 2 vols., Turin 1920.—L’Ange Conducteur des Ames Scrupuleuses ou Craintives, Bruges 1905.—E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., The New Psychology, N. Y. 1925, pp. 103 sqq.

Usefulness. The treatise of the greatest moment concerning the proximate rule of human actions must be introduced by a few notions, which prepare a distinct solution of questions not so plain and at the same time very practical, which are to be proposed in this treatise.

— I. What conscience is. Conscience, properly so called, is the knowledge which we have of several acts of our life, whether sensible or rational. For the functions of vegetative life lie hidden from our direct consciousness. Therefore it can be described thus: Cognition or attestation of one's own internal fact.

And this is psychological conscience, or conscience properly so called. But at the same time there accompanies us a judgment concerning the moral value of those same acts of ours. That is, spontaneously, according to moral principles, we judge concerning our action. This is called moral conscience. As, therefore, we distinguish psychological and moral liberty, so we distinguish psychological and moral conscience. St. Thomas treats of each conscience, De veritate, q. 17 art. 1.

Moreover judgment concerning our action is made according to moral principles. But the most universal moral principles - good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; precepts are to be fulfilled, promises are to be kept - become known to us most easily because of the inborn habit which, from a Greek word, the Scholastics call synteresis. Therefore synteresis is the natural habit of the first moral principles. And we call moral principles general dictates concerning things to be done, in order to the end of human action.

Therefore moral conscience itself is described: a moral judgment concerning our particular action to be done or done, to be omitted or omitted, according to moral principles.

— Conscience is the rule of morals. Human acts do not find their proximate rule in conscience in the same way in which they find their remote rule in law. Law is an act of a Superior; conscience is an act of a faculty belonging to the subject: law establishes the order, conscience knows the established order and consequently presupposes it; law commands, conscience intimates the precept of the law. Therefore conscience is the herald by whose mediation the laws of our actions are applied to us.

But that conscience is in this way the proximate rule of our human actions is clear from this, that the will is a rational appetite, whose object is not the thing as it exists outside us, but as it is present intentionally (or in the expressed species) in our intellect.

— II. How many kinds of moral conscience there are.

1. The moral judgment concerning our human action precedes and accompanies our act, or follows our act. Hence there is distinguished antecedent conscience, concerning an action or omission at hand, and consequent conscience, concerning an action or omission done.

2. According to the varied conclusion of its judgment, antecedent conscience is obliging, counselling, permitting, forbidding, according as the appetible thing presented is pronounced by it necessary, desirable, of free option, or to be rejected.

But consequent conscience testifies what we have done morally, and, according to the moral nature of the action, approves it, praises it, excuses it, condemns it. Here the appetitive faculty naturally inserts itself, of itself content concerning a good action, afflicted concerning an evil one, so that there is a testimony pacifying and quieting; and remorse, of itself penal.

3. Conscience, like every judgment, of itself is right, or speculatively true, insofar as it dictates what is true. Yet by accident it will be erroneous, and that either vincibly or invincibly. But conscience which errs invincibly is nevertheless called right in a qualified way, i.e. in relation to the agent.

4. Conscience can be certain or doubtful. Certain conscience judges without fear of the opposite. Doubtful conscience of itself does not judge concerning the action, or reports nothing else except that the action is of doubtful honesty. But by the command of the will (which is moved by some perceived reason of good, v.g. of quiet itself from laborious investigation), doubt or suspension between each part can be converted into an opinionative judgment, at least on that side on which some motive of deciding appears. That judgment is made with fear of the opposite. But since that inclination of the intellect is made from the command of the appetitive faculty, there is not more of truth in opinion than in doubt properly so called.

5. Since conscience properly so called regards our action as such, of itself its certainty or doubt is practical. Nevertheless speculatively and practically certain or doubtful conscience is distinguished. The former is concerning the quality of the action considered in itself; the latter concerning the action as it will be done by me in the concrete.

What certainty is considered here. But observe that in our present condition we must be content, in practical matters in which principles must be applied to contingent facts, with a certainty less strict than that which is proper to speculative science. This certainty is called moral, because, according to the common estimation of men, it is sufficient for acting. "When I say conscience," says St. Thomas, "I do not say or imply knowledge only strictly accepted, as it is only of truths, but knowledge accepted in a broad way, for any cognition whatsoever, according as, in the common use of speaking, we are said to know everything which we know" ¹. Thus we say that we know what one upright man tells us is established to him; thus we think ourselves certain concerning validly received baptism, etc.

6. Since what is reported to us is not the habitual state, but the present fact of our life, conscience properly so called always signifies an act. There is no habitual conscience. Yet for rightly judging we are aided by habits. Hence, besides actual conscience, there is also distinguished habitual conscience, which is a habit or inclination, partly acquired, toward making moral judgments. Improperly, however, conscience is sometimes called the very potency or faculty of eliciting moral judgments.

¹ De veritate, q. 17 art. 2 ad 2.

— How many kinds of habitual conscience there are. Taken for a habit, conscience is called tender or timorous, which with outstanding rectitude discerns slight reasons of good or evil.

Scrupulous is that which is agitated in its judgments by illegitimate fear.

Lax is that which is accustomed to be deceived by false excuses. It can also be called harder, insofar as, when the reason of evil has been perceived, it is moved with greater difficulty.

Strict, on the contrary, or rather rigid, is that which cannot use an equitable tempering of obligations, or epikeia: therefore it is incomplete.

Pharisaic is that false conscience which the Lord noted in the Pharisees: these, strict in the smallest matters, were found lax in greater duties, or also by a certain graver hypocrisy were disguising those things from themselves and others (Cf. St. Matt. 23, 23-24 [printed: 24, 24]).

Finally, cauterized is the false conscience which is almost lacking in the very sense or appetite of honesty. The name is taken from 1 Tim. 4, 2.

The distinction of conscience into actual and habitual divides the treatise into two titles, one concerning actual conscience, the other concerning habitual conscience.

First we shall speak of conscience as it is an act, then of the habit.

— Conscience properly means knowledge or immediate relation concerning our internal facts. This is psychological. In moral theology it is the moral judgment which, according to principles of things to be done, we elicit concerning our action. It is distinguished as antecedent and consequent, according as it precedes or accompanies and follows action; right or erroneous, according as of itself it judges according to truth, or by accident errs, whether vincibly or invincibly. It is also certain or doubtful, and that speculatively, concerning the action considered in itself, or practically, concerning the action as it will here and now be posited by the agent. With the appetitive part intervening, there is the quieting testimony of a good conscience, and the remorse of consequent evil conscience.

As the herald by whose mediation the laws of our actions are applied to us, conscience is the proximate rule of our actions.

Because of the moment which is in habits, besides actual conscience, habitual conscience is also distinguished; this is a habit, partly acquired, of making moral judgments. Habitual conscience is called, according to its varied quality, tender or timorous, scrupulous, lax, strict or rather rigid, pharisaic, cauterized.

Usefulness. - This whole title is most necessary in moral theology, since it explains the proximate rule upon which every moral judgment must rest.

— Practically certain conscience is always to be followed. Wherefore whether it be speculatively true or erroneous, the action will in reality have the goodness or malice which conscience proposes.

This is clear from Genesis 20, 4-7, where the excuse of his ignorance which Abimelech alleged is approved by God, and from the passage of the Apostle, Rom. 14, 14. 22. 23, compared with 1 Cor. 8, 11, where St. Paul teaches that conscience is polluted because of an action which is falsely thought illicit. And the reason is, because by the will by which a Superior wills something to be observed, by the same will he wills that obedience be given to the one herald, designated by him and faithful of himself, through whom alone his commands are intimated. But conscience performs the function of such a herald. For the rest, since the object of the will is the action as it is proposed by the intellect, the act receives its species from the object, "not according to the matter of the object but according to the account of the object" (St. Th. Quodl. 3, art. 27).

Wherefore the sin committed against a right conscience and the sin committed against an erroneous conscience do not differ in species.

Yet the act must always be supposed human. Wherefore involuntary distractions will not be imputed to him who erroneously thinks those same things to be sins.

— What if the conscience of ignorance or error has been culpable?

If while acting, the unskilled man does not advert to his ignorance, he has an actually invincible conscience, which by following he cannot actually sin. Yet he will bear the consequences of the harmful action, if any were sufficiently foreseen in the prior fault.

If while acting he was mindful of his ignorance, he ought to have inquired concerning the matter or abstained from the action.

Yet what if the action is necessary and the opportunity of inquiring is lacking: suppose an ignorant priest, who alone comes upon a sick man for whom death is imminent. Then his ignorance is reduced to invincible, nor will the error be imputed to him, unless, from the office which he bears, he could easily have foreseen that these circumstances would occur.

If, with inquiry omitted, he does not abstain from the action, the ignorant man will sin whether he acts according to or against the dictate of his conscience. And by acting according to the dictate, he will sin by his negligence and will be guilty of the evils which he foresaw confusedly. But by acting against conscience, he will besides sin by the sin apprehended through actual conscience.

A vincibly or invincibly erroneous conscience will be judged both from the presumptions which the matter and the person permit (with attention paid to his piety and learning), and from fitting interrogations of the agent: a) whether he adverted to any indecency in the act; b) whether he doubted concerning the liceity of the action; c) whether conscience warned him concerning a grave or light obligation of inquiring.

— Practically certain conscience is always to be followed, with the imputation of error culpable in its cause nevertheless saved. Even one guilty of conscious negligence will sin more by acting against conscience commanding or forbidding than according to it. But a vincibly or invincibly erroneous conscience must be prudently estimated.

— He who practically doubts concerning the honesty of his action, by acting sins with a sin of the gravity and species concerning which he had prudent suspicion. For he hypothetically consents to the violation of law, and consequently has an affection inclined toward the violation of the law obliging him: which is forbidden by divine natural law, which urges the fulfillment of individual laws. Therefore he acts against a certain conscience, although a confused one, by which even an unlearned man detects that an action of suspected honesty is not permitted to him ¹.

And although he doubts concerning a merely human law, he makes the action intrinsically dishonest: for he sins against the natural law.

¹ Insofar as he doubts, conscience does not judge concerning the matter. Wherefore a doubting conscience is not the rule of action.

— Obligation of one practically doubting. He who practically doubts concerning the honesty of his action must, if he can, embrace the safer parts or put away the doubt by sufficient inquiry, according to the rules to be handed down later.

Moreover that investigation will be sufficient which is accommodated to the moment of the matter and to the capacity of the agent. Thus the more learned man, in a grave matter, will not be able to trust a simple priest, but must examine the matter by himself, while the unlearned man will not be able to trust himself, but, v.g., will have to ask his priest or someone whom he judges fit. Yet the very narrowness of time will be able to dispense from a fuller investigation which otherwise would have to be made, when proportionate harm is to be feared from the delay itself. For since then there is not the moral opportunity of greater diligence, the ignorance which remains will be able to be held as invincible. Wherefore even an unlearned man will then be able prudently, according to his measure, to solve the case by himself.

— Sin of one neglecting. Does he who acts by neglecting a founded but confused suspicion of malice sin gravely or lightly?

The matter seems to be judged from the concrete circumstances. If the man has been of a timorous conscience, or the object of itself has appeared light, it can be presumed that there was no doubt concerning grave sin, except perhaps an empty fancy. On the contrary, you will pronounce more severely if the matter at first appearance spontaneously seems grave, and the agent does not seem alien from grave sin. The matter will often have to be committed to divine judgment. Cf. Laymann, l. I, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 7.

— On a perplexed case. A perplexed case is said to be one where sin is practically feared on every side, whether by acting or by not acting. Of itself, indeed, then the lesser evil must be chosen; wherefore a natural precept must of itself be preferred to a positive one, and a divine precept to a human one. But if the gravity has appeared morally the same on each side, the very supply of free option is not had. For which reason, however you bear yourself, you will not actually sin, even if the perplexity has arisen from culpable negligence. And they observe that there will be only a light sin of him who, since he does not discern a notable excess, has made the choice of the part which is feared to be worse.

— Practically doubtful conscience, as such, judges nothing, and consequently cannot be a rule. One practically doubting concerning the honesty of his action makes the matter intrinsically evil. Nevertheless a human duty of inquiring is imposed upon us; and, in a perplexed case, one does not sin by choosing for either part which seems to him to be of almost equal danger, or for the part which he estimates to be of lesser danger or moral evil.

Order of speaking. In order that we may procure for ourselves a distinct knowledge of a matter which, both on account of many applications and on account of controversies, has become sufficiently encumbered and confused, greater care must be taken for the due order in our exposition. Wherefore we shall divide this chapter first into two articles, of which the former will be assigned to positively doubtful conscience, the latter to negatively doubtful conscience. But in the former article, in various paragraphs, we shall successively hand down notions; systems or opinions; the demonstration of the true doctrine; the right use of the demonstrated doctrine; the question concerning the probability of fact. Finally in the other article we shall treat of negatively doubtful conscience.

— I. On moral certainty. Certainty in general is defined as the assent of the mind without fear of the opposite. As metaphysical certainty is founded in the immutability of a metaphysical principle, and physical certainty in the constancy of the physical order, so moral certainty rests upon the constancy of the inclinations and morals of men. An exception, indeed, in a particular application is not demonstrated to be impossible; but where there is no reason for suspecting it, to fear an exception is alien equally from reason and from the custom of prudent men. It is alien from reason, because the possibility of error does not create a danger of error, which danger would give a legitimate cause of fear ¹. It is alien from the morals of men. With Aristotle ² and St. Thomas (3) all easily understand this: "Certainty is not to be sought in the same way in every matter." And they call morally certain that which, although it is not strictly demonstrated, nevertheless is assailed by no serious reason and is supported by reasons persuasive in a human way, under which, nevertheless, in some case, falsity can lie hidden. Thus we are certain concerning the baptism which the priest, the minister, testifies that he conferred upon us.

Hence, under another respect, moral certainty can be called that with which men are accustomed to be content in acting. St. Thomas, in the place cited, calls that certainty probable, i.e., such "as for the most part attains truth, although in fewer cases it falls short of the truth" ¹.

But if it is established, in a particular application, that an exception is excluded by a certain argument (v.g., in the demonstration of the Catholic religion, or in certain points historically proved by several witnesses), there will be moral certainty more strictly than when simply the reason of exception does not appear.

Moral certainty excludes not every fear, but only prudent fear.

But by an extended name, a judgment is called morally certain which, although in itself it is only probable, so that it can found only opinion, nevertheless practically permits the application of a certain moral principle, such as this one is: in doubts one must answer in favor of liberty (cf. Schiffini, Princ. n. 34, obj. 4).

Certainty then, in this latter case, is only practical, while that which is properly called morally certain is speculatively certain.

To this also belongs the case of a proposition which is urged only by a probable argument, to which nevertheless no positive argument is opposed. That opinion will be called morally certain insofar as it is certainly permitted to act according to it.

Therefore that is called morally certain equivocally which is demonstrated by convincing reasons from the morals of men, and that which merely rests upon a probable reason to which there is no contradiction. The former certainty also has a place in the logical part of philosophy; the latter is proper to the moral discipline.

Finally, by a different use, all certainty which is to be attributed to the command of the will is called moral.

¹ Schiffini, Principia philosophica, n. 232.

² Ethic. Nicom. L. I, c. 1 and c. 3. - (3) 2, 2, q. 70, art. 2.

¹ For this reason Aristotle was able to define (I Top., c. 12) a probable opinion: "that which seems true to all, or to most, or to the wise, and either to all, or to most, or to the most notable."

— II. On doubt and probability. 1. Even after the diligent inquiry which is prescribed has been made, according to the merit of the cause and the abundance of investigation, we do not always arrive at certainty, even moral certainty; but, after the reasons for and against have been weighed, the intellect of itself remains doubtful, or, at the command of the will, assents to one part with a reasonable fear of the opposite: "it indeed accepts one part, yet always doubts concerning the opposite" ¹. Then it is found in the state of one opining ².

When assent is suspended, the state of mind is called strict doubt. Strict doubt is also had when reasons appear for neither side (v.g., whether the stars are even in number). Yet this much differs between the two cases: when reason is lacking, the state of strict doubt is incurable; while, when there are positive reasons, the very suspension of mind can be removed by bringing in the state of opinion or of an opinative judgment. This state is called broad doubt. In it, nevertheless, as we noted above, n. 340, no greater truth is perceived than in strict doubt.

2. Moreover, "a probable opinion is generally considered to be that which rests upon a grave foundation, although not altogether certain, and at the same time has against itself no convincing reason" ³. But a grave motive is that which, not only simply or separately, but also comparatively, or with the opposing reasons looked through, inclines a prudent man to assent, although it does not determine assent ⁴:

a) From the object, probability of law and probability of fact are distinguished, in the same way in which, n. 55, we separated ignorance of law from ignorance of fact;

b) From the source whence it is drawn, intrinsic or extrinsic probability is distinguished, according as the motive of assent is taken from intrinsic reasons or from the authority of doctors. It would be better to say probability known from within or from without;

c) From the varying degree of probability, two opinions which are compared with each other can be equally probable, on behalf of which motives of equal or almost equal weight contend; one can be more probable, the other less probable, when one rests upon motives which are not moderately stronger than the motives of the other, although they do not remove the hesitation of the mind.

¹ St. Th., De veritate, q. 11, art. 1.

² Schiffini opportunely notes, Princ. n. 221, that fear of the opposite can nevertheless be excluded because the mind does not advert to the danger of falsity: which is often the case of the unlearned. He calls this the state of "unperturbed opinion."

³ Reiffenstuel, Theolog. mor. tr. I, q. 4, n. 41.

⁴ We think that what is often written must be explained or corrected thus: that a probable opinion is that which rests upon a motive which moves a prudent man to assent. For since a motive does not move the intellect except by its evidence, it would follow that no opinion could be probable unless it were estimated by learned men to be certain.

— Which opinions are to be judged probable?

Preliminary warning. 1. As those things teach us which we weighed in n. 350 concerning the moral certainty with which practically we can and ought to be content, a law or obligation cannot be called doubtful on account of any reason whatever that has been thought up or alleged; rather it is necessary that, all things having been sufficiently looked through, this reason be grave and solid and remain.

Remain, I say. For since probability implies obscurity (insofar as it denies certainty looked through), this obscurity can be expelled, not only by decrees given authoritatively, but also by the approved studies of doctors. Moral science does not ignore progress. And many things which formerly, for some time, were probably put forward, would today be affirmed only rashly.

Thus St. Alphonsus ¹ was able probably to assert that excommunication is not incurred by a priest who feigns that he absolves an accomplice: which today, even before the Code, has been wholly exploded by responses of the Holy Office. Thus also that opinion which, because of error, exempts from restitution him who voluntarily applies fire to another's house but which he thought to be that of Caius, while it was that of Titius, seems to us exploded by the very protests of common sense; yet C. de Lugo ² defended it, and St. Alphonsus (3) judged it probable. Nor do we any longer hold as intrinsically probable the opinion which exempts from injustice a priest who secretly retains for himself part of the stipends of manual Masses whose burden he transfers from himself to others. For the reason for doubting, already well solved by St. Alphonsus (4), is shown to be clearly vain by the excellent and ample dissertation of Fr. Arendt, S.J., "On the Injury to Commutative Justice in the Stipend of a Manual Mass Diminished for Another Celebrant."

Wherefore the present state of the controversy must be attended to.

2. Confusion must be avoided. Once this preliminary warning has been made, lest the answer to be given to the question be wrongly understood, a judgment concerning the probability of opinions must be accurately separated from a probable judgment concerning a thing or action. Concerning many things even the unlearned probably judge; concerning the honesty of an action all can and ought to have at least a probable judgment, although it is obtained in one way in one person and case, and in another way in another. Cf. what is to be said below. But here the matter is about the opinion itself by which, v.g., a certain action is predicated as probably honest.

3. The estimation concerning the intrinsic probability of an opinion requires an examination of the reasons and difficulties: which examination belongs only to experts in theology or in the science upon which the solution depends. Wherefore not even for every priest or confessor is that judgment accessible. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri ¹. And if the doubt turns upon the interpretation of law, the theologian will not rarely be compelled to borrow light from the jurist.

An opinion is called extrinsically probable to which five or six authors of good name adhere, who have examined the matter and have not merely copied one another without examination. Concerning this probability even the moderately learned can judge, who, once the state of the question has been understood, find probability admitted among several expert and prudent authors who have considered the matter from within.

Indeed, from the authority of one man an opinion can be estimated as probable, although he departs from the common opinion, "whenever, namely, the author is beyond every exception, that is, very skilled in law both natural and positive, who besides has been accustomed to strengthen his conclusions by firm and valid reasons, who is judged a lover of truth rather than of novelty, and finally who has plainly discussed and weakened the arguments of others" (2). Here therefore, as often, probability coalesces from reasons partly intrinsic, partly extrinsic. Cf. B.P. I, n. 185. The more the matter is estimated as doubtful or difficult, and therefore the less there is in that matter a certain common opinion, as, v.g., the question concerning the grave violation of the vow of poverty, the more easily the authority of a prudent and learned man will suffice for the opinion to be judged probable.

But observe this: since authors are not legislators, the whole force of extrinsic probability must be derived from a presumed intrinsic reason.

Yet a distinction must here be observed between an immutable law, such as the divine law is, and laws which can be changed by human authority. Since the Church herself recommends that we follow approved authors, even he for whom the falsity of some interpretation which grave authors defend has been looked through is not prohibited from acting according to their opinion. And after some time received opinions found a usual interpretation concerning which this holds: "Custom is the best interpreter of laws" (c. 29). And in vain then, from monuments, you will have demonstrated another signification of the law, since according to those received opinions the law must be judged to have been tempered. Thus the Code itself, c. 6, 2°, wills that canons which reproduce the old law in full be estimated from the interpretations received among approved authors. Thus, even if you should prove, with attention paid to the first decrees, that all jurisdiction over an accomplice, also in order to other sins, has been taken away from the confessor, nevertheless, since the contrary opinion is that of many approved authors, jurisdiction over the other sins remains probable and therefore practically certain.

¹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 556. - (2) De iustitia et iure, d. 17, nn. 75. 76. - (3) Op. c. l. 3, n. 628. - (4) L. 6, n. 322.

¹ Op. theol. I, tr. 2, n. 191.

² Ball.-Palm. I, tr. 2, n. 186.

— Probable judgment concerning the honesty of an action to be done. 1. In order that he may obtain for himself a probable judgment concerning the honesty of his action, an unlearned man who doubts or hesitates usually must be led by another's authority; and commonly he can also stand by the judgment of one man whom he rightly holds to be instructed. Thus those unskilled in theology can acquiesce in the parish priest or confessor, unless they have a positive cause for suspecting their ignorance or rashness in certain matters; or unless they themselves, in certain arguments, for example in knowledge of law, are more versed.

2. Nor are they prohibited from approaching several upright confessors or doctors, if perhaps the first one questioned has answered too severely. But if they have obtained truly contrary responses from expert men, they will be able of themselves to estimate the matter as positively uncertain, so that they preserve free option.

3. Theologians themselves who are not so learned can trust the authority of a prudent writer who reports an opinion as extrinsically probable. Yet they will have to dissolve a positive suspicion of error according to the merit of the cause and according to the abundance which they have. Indeed, concerning an author of the gravest and most approved authority, such as St. Alphonsus, it has been answered that it is permitted for a priest confessor to follow his opinions simply, with no other selection made. This, as is clear, must be taken insofar as either a decree of the Holy See or a changed law has not clearly taken away the probability of the opinion. Cf. resp. S. Paenitentiariae, 5 July 1831. A.S.S. I, 497, or Bucceroni, Enchiridion, 4, p. 9.

3. Nor is a learned theologian obliged to examine all things by himself; but he himself can work according to an opinion which learned men defend as probable and safe. And it belongs to a prudent man not so to trust, at least in graver matters, his own judgment, that he neglects to confirm his own persuasion or opinion by consultation with or questioning of others.

— On a safe and a safer opinion. This must carefully be observed: an opinion is called safe and safer under a diverse respect. An opinion is called safe with respect to formal sin, which you can follow without fault; while it is called safer with respect to material sin. That opinion is safer which, whether it is more or less probable, nevertheless removes more every danger of material sin. Therefore it is the opinion for the law, for the obligation. Hence Titius can embrace the safe parts even when he follows the less safe opinion.

— The ineluctable necessity of a moral system. When, after a congruent investigation, the conclusion concerning the honesty of a future action or omission remains uncertain (we are solicitous in moral theology about this respect alone), by an ineluctable necessity the question is imposed upon us to be solved: by what certain practical judgment will our action be ruled? By a judgment, I say, practically certain, since a practically doubtful conscience cannot rule a human action, as we have seen, n. 346.

In vain would we try to decline that necessity. As vainly as if we wished to obtain for ourselves direct certainty concerning every matter.

Moreover practical certainty, which directly is lacking, will not be able to be obtained except indirectly, by appealing to some universal principle as the major of a syllogism, and by composing it with the speculatively doubtful judgment of conscience, and finally by collecting the syllogistic conclusion: Therefore I shall have to abstain from that action, or I can safely do it.

Let us suppose the principle of tutiorism, today to be deserted by all: The safer opinion must always be chosen. With this major let this minor proposition be joined: But the honesty of such an action is only probable, and therefore the opinion forbidding it is safer; this conclusion will follow: Therefore I must certainly abstain from this action.

In this way, where direct certainty was lacking, we obtain for ourselves reflex certainty, on account of which the very principles by which it is obtained are called reflex principles. But which principles are to be so called has come into controversy. And moral systems are called the diverse ways proposed in order that we may arrive from a speculatively doubtful judgment at a certain dictate concerning the honesty of an action. The name was perhaps given from this, that those opinions dominate the whole discipline of morals.

— Various moral systems. I. Rigorists, or antiprobabilists, or tutiorists, condemned every action unless its honesty was demonstrated to be at least most probable. Thus the milder ones opined, such as Fagnani and Habert, who wrote after Alexander VIII, on 7 Dec. 1690, among the propositions condemned and prohibited respectively as rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic, and heretical, reproved this third proposition of the Baianists and Jansenists: "It is not permitted to follow a (probable) opinion, or among probable opinions the most probable" (Denz. n. 1293). Before, the stricter ones required an action certainly licit according to itself. The reason of the system was taken from the moral obligation, which they imagined, of avoiding every danger even of material transgression of the law. That system now has no Catholic defenders ¹.

II. Probabiliorists contend that the safer opinion must be followed, unless the speculative liceity of the action is manifestly and solidly more probable. They too argue from the necessity of avoiding the danger of violation of law even when not conscious. Yet they temper this principle of rigorism by this other reason: that an opinion certainly more probable is morally certain, because contrary probabilities mutually destroy one another, so that only the excess remains as a positive motive for deciding. They also call upon this reason: that it is consonant with the law of our intellect that, when evidence is lacking, we embrace that which is more like the truth. Billuart ² and the more recent school of the Friars Preachers defend probabiliorism; nevertheless several of our contemporaries of the same Order recede from it.

III. Equiprobabilists, who sometimes call themselves moderate probabilists, besides the use of a certainly more probable opinion, which they always concede, also allow, where the question is not about the cessation of a law or obligation but about its first existence or about the beginning of the obligation, the use of an equally probable opinion ³. They themselves rely upon the mutual destruction of contrary probabilities; but, when the probabilities are morally equal so that no positive reason, according to them, remains, then they say that the principle of possession must be used, so that you answer for the law or for liberty according as the law or liberty possesses. But the law is in possession when there is question of the cessation of the law, and by no means when there is question of its beginning. They add also that it is consonant with natural equity that, with equal balance, sometimes answer be made for law, sometimes for liberty ¹. The Fathers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Simar, C. d'Annibale, and some Fathers of the Order of Preachers defend equiprobabilism.

IV. The system of compensation or of sufficient reason, whose origin is ascribed by C. d'Annibale ² to Father Potton ³, O. Pr., does not permit the use of the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, simply, but only then when a cause excusing from the obligation of the law is proportioned to the gravity and probability of the law: the more probable and the graver the law is, the greater cause is required in order that you may permit the danger of material transgression; that danger is an evil which can be permitted on account of a proportionate good effect, but not otherwise. Or otherwise: to a certain law corresponds a perfect obligation, but to an uncertain law an imperfect obligation, which is ended or terminated by the gravity of the motive for acting. Many in France adhere to this more recent system; R. P. Prummer, O. Pr., Manuale Theologiae moralis, I, nn. 351. 352, also favors it.

V. Pure or absolute probabilists affirm that an action is practically safe whose liceity, all things weighed, is demonstrated as solidly probable speculatively. By adversaries they are sometimes called broad, laxer, and more recently "minus-probabilists." Thus the Order of Friars Minor, thus formerly many Friars Preachers, thus now writers of the Society of Jesus.

There were those who, moved by excessive benignity or rashness, proposed opinions doubtfully, slenderly probable as practically safe. These have the name of laxists.

Yet no one professes laxism; but the Holy See, by proscribing these two propositions, proved herself alien from sayings which provide an occasion of laxity. They are: prop. 27, condemned (at minimum as scandalous) by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665: "If the book is of some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable" (Denz. n. 1127); prop. 3, by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679: "Generally, while relying on probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we always act prudently" (Denz. n. 1153).

Today most writers or professors in Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy teach simple probabilism, which Harnack in his Dogmengeschichte ¹ attacks sharply but ineptly: ineptly, I say, because the learned man did not even grasp the signification of the words in this matter.

The Friars Preachers have not formally deserted probabiliorism. But since, after the solemn approvals of the Holy See given to St. Alphonsus, that cause can be called desperate, they began to favor the equiprobabilists sufficiently, as is clear from the essays which appeared in the Revue Thomiste. Indeed, in his work La phil. morale de S. Thomas, R. P. Sertillanges simply rejects probabiliorism, and in c. XVI concludes in these words: "Equiprobabilism well understood can therefore pass by good right for a Thomistic solution."

We shall not discuss the very mind of St. Alphonsus. Several writers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, v.g., Aertnys, though not all, admit that he, after he had used probabiliorist teachers, through part of his life gave his vote to pure probabilism; and indeed, at the very mature age of 53 and 59 years (1749 and 1755), he wrote two dissertations in which he very openly and with many arguments defended simple probabilism. Then there were those difficulties of the times which seemed to advise verbal changes of the system, less clear formulas; but the Holy Doctor himself was of such humility that by the very attacks he could have been led to temper or soften his opinion.

Wherefore C. d'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 10, seems to us to have better followed the mind of the Holy Doctor, where he writes that moderate probabilism, such as Suarez, Lessius, Laymann, Bonacina... de Lugo defended, whose doctrine for the Holy Doctor (§ 4, n. II) "how great it is, is perfect from every side," was never attacked by St. Alphonsus. "And the things which afterward he wrote and discussed for defending equiprobabilism, from the years 1748 and 1755 (V. § 11) up to the end of his life, those were written chiefly to defend moderate probabilism against broad probabilism"; - and likewise R. P. Aertnys, C.SS.R., De Conscientia, n. 94: "In his first dissertations St. Alphonsus strenuously defended against the Probabiliorists the thesis of Probabilism, 'It is permitted to follow a probable opinion for liberty, the more probable for law having been left aside.' From this opinion the Holy Doctor never receded; but, to avert from probabilism the danger of laxity, afterward he judged that this moderation should be added as part of his system: 'It is not permitted to follow the benign opinion, when the opinion for law is certainly and notably more probable,' because an opinion of this sort is already, as we have declared, morally certain, and the other is not truly and solidly probable but only doubtful or slight... That the distinction between an opinion a little more probable and much more probable must be ascribed to that motive which we brought forward above, St. Alphonsus clearly sets forth in his Apologia of the year 1765 in these words: 'I have never contended nor do I now contend to establish new systems; I know well that no Probabilist of solid doctrine holds as licit the use of an opinion slenderly or doubtfully probable. But because many Probabilists indiscriminately say that it is permitted to follow the less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, saying that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion when there is much and certain preponderance on the side of the safer opinion; ... because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable' ¹. Therefore he distinguished with this counsel, that he might define the limits of certain probability and of moral certainty, and in that way preclude the use of opinions which are not true and solidly probable... From all these things I infer that Probabilism thus moderated, rather than accepted in the laxer sense, must be called common." Cf. more in d'Ales, Dictionnaire d'Apologetique, word Probabilisme, where a historical inquiry will be found, written by Fr. de Blic, S.J.

Finally this must be observed: approved writers of various schools today disagree less materially than formally. Thus C. d'Annibale proclaims safe in conscience the use of pure probabilism. Thus, from the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Aertnys (l.c. n. 94. 95) professes that practically he thinks with several writers of the Society; but Marc, of the same Congregation, declares himself by no means hostile to the moderate probabilists of the Society (he calls such Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Laymann, Lugo) ¹. And R. P. Sertillanges, of the Friars Preachers, while he recently wrote these things: "Supported by this, that action cannot attain evidence; that prudence is preserved at a lesser price; that the criterion of the obscure is the probable; and that Providence, having cast us into the probable, must be content with it on our part, arguing thus, explicitly or implicitly, the mind finds it good to adhere to the opinion called prudent; the will follows, and finally determines adhesion" (2); while, I say, he was writing these things, what was he doing except repeating that celebrated saying of the probabilists, "He who acts probably acts prudently"? But they added that it suffices for honesty that we act prudently.

On their own part, however, the Wirceburgenses were already writing, De actibus humanis, n. 240: "Scarcely any prudent theologian will affirm his opinion to be manifestly and notably more probable, as long as he recognizes the opposite as truly and theologically probable; but if it ceases to be such, the question also ceases." Hence, although theoretically, or in the abstract, it is true that the solid probability of one part is not excluded by the greater probability, even in a notable degree, of the opposite part, nevertheless, psychologically, perhaps these two things will not be affirmed at the same time.

Wherefore we think that today, among approved theologians, scarcely anyone is found who would oppose this formula of conclusion: Whenever the question is immediately about the liceity of our action alone, he acts safely who embraces a solidly probable opinion. If in this way we practically agree, then also more easily, according to sound principles of philosophy, the concord of theologians, which Jansenism destroyed, now that this plague has been routed, will be restored.

¹ He finds a non-Catholic one in Habsack; cf. below here. Some in France and Germany (v.g., those who taught at the University of Tubingen), having repudiated any moral system, proposed to solve all cases by direct reason. These then either must be rigorists, or, for one moral system, invent as many systems as there are diverse ways by which they think they can arrive at certain moral conclusions.

² Dissertation VI, De actibus humanis.

³ I probably recited the breviary, probably not: since I was certainly obliged, I am still bound by recitation. Midnight has probably passed; probably not. If between Thursday and Friday, I can eat meat, because the doubt is about the beginning of the obligation; I cannot, if the doubt arises between Friday and Saturday, since the matter is about the cessation of the obligation. One doubting concerning his age of 21 years is not bound to fast; one doubting concerning the age of 60 years is bound.

¹ Thus d'Annib. I, 201. - (2) Cf. d'Annib. I, 263, note 1.

³ De Theoria Probabilitatis, Paris, 1874.

¹ Tom. III, 1910, pp. 748-756.

¹ Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I, 60.

¹ Institutiones morales I, 864.

² La philosophie morale de S. Thomas, c. 16, III, p. 549.

— We shall proceed in this way: after the other systems have been briefly excluded, we shall show that the system of pure but moderate probabilism is true.

I. Neither Tutiorism, which no Catholic now admits, nor Probabiliorism, nor Equiprobabilism, nor the system called from compensation can be admitted speculatively or theoretically.

We say speculatively or theoretically; because, if by these various names they merely contend to obtain that, in the moral discipline of Catholics, that moderate probabilism alone should flourish which Suarez, Lugo, and other outstanding doctors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cultivated, then the things said concerning the practical concord of most Catholic writers of our age return. Therefore:

1. Tutiorism labors under this fundamental defect: since it does not distinguish between facts of the physical order and facts of the moral and juridical order, it wholly passes over this, that it can happen that because of the doubt itself the condition necessary for the law to exist or to be applied to the subject ceases. But then there remains no danger of violation of law whence the Tutiorists were taking their argument, while the danger of a physical fact is by no means removed by my doubt concerning the event. Cf. the positive demonstration of probabilism.

2. Probabiliorism needs this principle: probable reasons which incline toward contradictory parts mutually destroy one another, so that, if they are equal, no probability remains; if they are unequal, the excess of the greater probability remains as the only motive for assenting, so that only one prudent conclusion remains: that which is founded upon that excess ¹.

But it is so far from being the case that that mutual destruction is necessary, that you will scarcely find a case where it is demonstrated to occur ². The reason is that most often motives are drawn from diverse sources. Since they are disparate, they can very well stand together. Thus, v.g., is there, from natural law, an obligation of restoring to the poor what, having been unjustly acquired, you cannot return to the owner? Those who deny argue from this, that natural law commands this one thing, that the owner unjustly harmed be restored from the damages; those who affirm contend that that unjust possession cannot be sanctioned by natural law. Does he sin who omits a more perfect action to which he is clearly invited? Those who deny rely upon the distinction between works of counsel and precepts; those who affirm call upon man's charity toward himself and the necessity of acting reasonably. How, they say, can the choice of the less good part be reasonable? But who does not see that to both reasons their own proper force is preserved, and that motives of this sort can by no means be compared with weights placed in the two pans of one balance? Indeed, if five witnesses, otherwise approved, do not agree concerning some matter, but two narrate the fact in one way and three in another way, it will indeed be doubted in what way the matter truly happened, but a positive reason for each narration will remain.

But when the distinguished Marc, Institutiones, I, n. 74, conceding that it rarely happens that the motives themselves destroy one another, nevertheless contends that their force is relatively and practically destroyed, insofar as, because of the equality of the motives, the intellect can now be moved to assent by neither, so that, moved by the will alone, it adheres to one part, he offends against sound philosophy. For this teaches us that it is repugnant to the nature of the intellect to adhere to some part by the will alone, without any reason; then, that the intellect by itself is not determined to assent except by the evidence of the thing, so that even if there is only one probable motive, it needs the command of the will in order to arrive at opining. Finally, as will soon appear better, it is not even necessary, for the right use of probabilism, that the intellect adhere to either part as true.

But if, besides, the probabiliorists contend that this is the law of our reason, that, when evidence is lacking, we adhere to the part more like the truth, this cannot be admitted, at least universally, either speculatively or practically. Not speculatively: for it is enough for the intellect to testify to that which it truly sees, i.e., that the matter is doubtful but more like the truth; indeed of itself it does not receive except what it sees. Not practically. Even in the external forum a defendant is absolved who is more likely to be culpable. In a civil judgment, if discretion is left to the judge, in the sentence he will have regard to the probability of the opposite side, at least in computing expenses. Only then, when there is a necessity of awarding the whole matter to one or the other litigant, will the judge pronounce right according to the things more like the truth. But in our private action, sometimes we shall prudently have to abstain from an action whose happy outcome is much more like the truth; it also happens, if from the less probable part a far greater profit is hoped, that a merchant prudently tries his fortune by this less safe way. Therefore we are never moved by what is like the truth as by what is certain, far less can it be said that, when certainty is lacking, likeness to truth is perpetually present to us as guide.

Why therefore, in the internal forum, where, when certainty is lacking, the very condition of obligation can be lacking, do you impose the rule of following parts certainly more like the truth, a rule which cannot even be called constant in the external forum and in exterior matters?

Add that, in this distinction of degrees, much must be attributed to subjective inclination, so that what one will call more probable another will hold as equally or less probable. And, as R. P. Prummer, O. Pr., says, Manuale Theol. mor. I, n. 346, probabiliorism is almost impossible in practice. For the common opinion holds that a penitent must be absolved who, having left aside the more probable opinion, wishes to follow the probable opinion, so that a probabiliorist confessor is sometimes compelled to act against his own system. "Whence today perhaps I think there is no confessor who applies all the logical consequences of Probabiliorism in the practice of the tribunal of penance" (Prummer, l.c.).

3. Equiprobabilism, in the part in which it agrees with that system, sins by the common error of Probabiliorism. Besides, it employs that fictitious possession of law or liberty which we demonstrated in the introduction itself to pertain least of all to the matter. R. P. Prummer, op. c. I, n. 348, can say thus ad hominem: "If the law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons urge its obligation or deobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Whence, in that case, to distinguish between the cessation of law and the existence of law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable."

4. As to the system of compensations: 1. Since the conscious violation of an obliging law is a sin not only material but truly formal, while the "compensators" merely object to the probabilists the permission of material sin, they freely admit that no obligation arises from the merely probable law itself, but tacitly appeal to a higher law which would forbid the permission of material sin made without proportionate cause: which law remains to be demonstrated by them. 2. Nor must material sin always be apprehended. For since an objectively obscure law has not been promulgated, often the very foundation of material sin will be lacking: a law which is unconsciously violated. 3. Even when material sin can be present, either the matter concerns positive law, and then, scandal being excluded, its non-culpable violation is harmful to no one; or the matter concerns natural law, and then a grave reason of answering in favor of the least obligation will always be present as excusing. For questions of this sort are not raised except when some serious utility of the present order, at least temporal, renders the observance of the doubtful law difficult. 4. Nor ever, if we speak strictly, is material sin properly permitted. For that effect is properly permitted which is foreseen as going to follow. Here it is not foreseen except perhaps as going to follow. Therefore rather the danger of material sin is permitted. How will they ever demonstrate that permission of this sort is forbidden under grave sin without proportionate cause, if of itself there is only a light obligation of warning him who materially but certainly violates natural law? 5. Finally, the system does not have universal use. For what if the proportionate cause itself is present only probably?

Concerning that system d'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 1, has these words: "The foundation (entirely new) upon which this whole edifice has been built surely totters."

But, as Bouquillon observes ¹, this can be true in fact, that we give place to some compensation. Since broad moral certainty, which is required and suffices for acting prudently, is sufficiently undefined, and sometimes scarcely exists in the lowest degree, the consideration of the importance of the law will be able to avail for affirming practically an obligation which is scarcely morally certain; and, on the contrary, the consideration of the difficulty, whether extrinsic or even intrinsic, will be able to avail for denying practically an obligation which is almost morally certain." And also, as we shall see, the dissolution of a particular law by no means absolves a man from the common duty of observing the general rules of honest action, whether they regard the object, or the motive, or the mode of honesty.

¹ Cf. Billuart, diss. 6, and Sertillanges himself, La philosophie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 552. 553.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. Theol., T. I, Tr. 2, n. 188.

¹ Theol. mor. fundament. n. 297.

— II. The true moral system is established. 1. In order to forestall the fallacies of arguments, these things must be well noticed:

a) The distinction between a manifest thing and a thing like the truth. When a certain thing is manifest, it can equally be said: the thing is seen, its evidence is perceived; but when a thing is only like the truth, the likeness to truth indeed, but by no means the thing itself, is known. Wherefore it cannot at all be said: he approaches nearer to the thing who seeks it where it is more like the truth that it will be found, since, on the contrary, it can happen that he is farther from that place than from the place where the seeker now stands;

b) We free man from no divine service. Him whom we free from some definite obligation we least of all make immune from the general divine service by which man, in every action of his, is commanded to procure the glory of God. For man is capable of constituting a certain order in things both his own and another's by his rational appetite ². And while thus, as a subordinate orderer, he disposes certain things fitly, he praises the divine Majesty, whose perfections he manifests and to whom he can also refer the free actions of his own. Therefore he serves God even who does what he is commanded to do by no divine precept. For the rest, in the end or mode of any action, some precept to be observed necessarily occurs;

c) Perfect concord between intellect and will is impossible. Concord between intellect and will must indeed be procured. But while direct conscience can affirm an obligation, deny it, or doubt concerning it, the will can only do or omit, nor can it have an act perfectly congruent with doubt. Hence, if, as often as conscience reports an uncertain obligation, you pronounce the will bound so often, you will seem to demand too much; but too little, if so often you absolve it from every bond. This discrepancy of intellect and appetite at length gives place to the question concerning a moral system ¹: that knot of it must be untied;

d) How one arrives at opinion. The intellect is compelled by the evidence of the thing alone. Wherefore opinative assent is always determined by the will ². But the will is moved by reason of good ³. Therefore, if no other good than truth offers itself as to be sought, man will incline toward the parts more like the truth. But there are other goods, other utilities also of the human order, on account of which we prudently determine that something else is to be done than the parts which are more like the truth would urge. Consider that practical distinction.

If certain ruin, certain shipwreck, certain invasion of robbers is foreseen, no prudent man would commit money to business or to a ship, or, unarmed, make a journey through ways which robbers hold occupied. But if these things are not morally established, for the sake of great utility, for the sake of attaining a great good, fortune will prudently be tried, although the hope of success is less than the hope of disaster or misfortune. The mind of the agent will turn itself to considering the contrary probability. Certainly he will not say to himself: I judge that it will happen that the ship perish, that robbers oppress me; but rather he will reason in this other way: there is a serious probability of escaping shipwreck or the hands of robbers, and the danger is redeemed by the utility;

e) No force is brought upon the intellect. He who embraces the less probable parts ought not to bring any force upon himself so that he falsely estimates them more like the truth; but it is enough that he judge them practically safe because probable.

² "Man," as Leo XIII writes most wisely, enc. Rerum novarum, 15 May 1891, "... under the eternal law, under the power of God governing all things most providently, governs himself by the providence of his counsel."

¹ We borrow this observation, which we think pertains to the hinge of the matter, from a certain professor of dogmatic theology.

² Cf. 2, 2, q. 1, art. 4, c.; q. 2, art. 9, c. and ad 2.

³ Therefore to the element which the will adds it must be attributed that contradictory opinions exist. And thus it happens that probabilities do not mutually exclude one another, as the contradictory opinions themselves do. And because no opinion necessarily infers the falsity of the opposite opinion, it also happens that no properly contradictory opinions are given, although opinions of contradictories are given. Cf. R. P. Munzi, Logica, n. 294.

— 2. These things having been premised, let this be the simple demonstration of probabilism. Every divine precept either is certainly established or is uncertain. We are bound by a certain precept, even if it is such only morally: this is undoubted. Are we also bound by an uncertain one?

If we are bound, the various degrees of doubting are distinguished in vain; but until it is morally established that a precept is absent, the parts of the precept, or the safer parts, must be embraced by us. But if we are not bound by an uncertain precept, again, every other distinction being omitted, we shall preserve free option until it is morally established that a precept is truly had.

But the reason for doubting concerning the honesty of free option is drawn from the danger alone of violating, if you act otherwise than the probable precept shall have indicated, either the divine precept which perhaps exists, or the moral order which is sanctioned by divine precepts.

But if you consider the matter more closely, no violation of precept is to be feared. For a divine precept means a will divinely intimated to a subject man and therefore of itself known. But an uncertain precept of itself is unknown. For only by efficacious proof is the thing itself, which is called true, known; but he who has learned a thing as like the truth knows not the thing itself, but merely its appearance, sometimes fallacious. Wherefore an uncertain precept must be held as none.

But, the divine precept being excluded, we ought not to be solicitous about the danger of acting against the moral order. For by the same limits by which the divine precept is contained, by the same limits the care of avoiding its material transgression is contained ¹. Whence will you demonstrate that a general law which demands more has been promulgated? Besides, we can positively add this: right order demands that, when a precept ceases, man preserve free options, by which he may make actions at least formally good. Therefore material transgression is permitted by God on account of the goodness of that human liberty ². Finally, if greater care were necessary for us, not even when an action seems certainly honest to us would we be permitted to put away anxious solicitude: for to err is human. Much less would that be permitted when the opinion of honesty is only more probable or most probable; for then positive apprehensions of material violation remain.

Hence it is also clear what must be answered to one objecting that, in the proposed case, not less than the obligation, the very permission of acting is at least directly unknown. We readily admit it. But permission of acting ought not to be demonstrated, on account of the commonly admitted principle: whatever is not prohibited is permitted. For the physical faculty of choosing, the various solicitations by which we are impelled to acting, the goodness which of itself is present in action as such ³, the very formal object (good) under which we seek all things, prove moral liberty of acting, unless there stand in the way a divine prohibition known by human reason.

Wherefore those also are mistaken who, like C. d'Annibale, think that favor must be shown equally to law and liberty, and therefore defend equiprobabilism. For if the law exists, it always prevails over the liberty which it takes away; but if it is doubtful, common sense with every law says, not that sometimes answer must be made for law and sometimes for liberty, but simply: in doubt one must answer for liberty, or: a doubtful law does not oblige ⁴.

Finally, cause yourself to advert that the order which man constitutes by his free election can be better or more sublime in itself than that whose observance would undeservedly be imposed upon him from a more severe system. For an election contrary to a probable or more probable obligation can be directed by our will to the best ends of charity, of the salvation of neighbor.

Thus far the simple exposition of the matter and yet an adequate consideration. For in reality speculative judgments concerning the honesty of an action belong to two kinds, not to more: they are either certain or uncertain.

3. But what if you wish to discern the various degrees? - Yet to those who wish to observe the various degrees by which a thing not demonstrated, if it is compared with the opposite, can be more or less or even equally like the truth, an answer can be made thus.

Certainly, at first sight, this kind of reasoning offers itself. A man studious of truth, to whom full arguments are lacking, will opine according to the things more like the truth. But if contrary arguments seem to be of almost equal weight, then he will remain doubtful, wavering, and as it were suspended in mind between each part.

But, as we have already noted, the pursuit of truth is not the only good by which we are moved to acting. And in every use of life, practical judgments indeed are directed according to properly so-called speculative persuasions; but when there is question of uncertain conclusions, often, on account of a just cause, one prudently recedes from the parts which are more like the truth. We saw examples above, nn. 358, 3; 359 d.

But in a moral matter these questions at once arise in the mind: prudent fear of error is not excluded by an opinion; therefore the obligation is uncertain, and also the honesty which are predicated as more like the truth are uncertain. Why therefore must I act in the same way whether the obligation was certain or uncertain; why will I be permitted to act in the same way whether the honesty is certain or uncertain? For only then, when the affirmation or negation of obligation is certain, does the action truly agree with the mind; but when the affirmation or negation of obligation is uncertain, the obligation seems to be imposed too severely, or relaxed too benignly.

If the state of the mind opining alone is considered, these questions cannot be satisfied; a certain argument is desired, by which it may be effected that a speculative opinion suffices so that we must or can act according to it. And thus the principles called reflex above are recalled: that no one is held by a non-promulgated law; that no one is bound by a precept of which he does not have knowledge. But the diverse principles concerning the destruction of probabilities or concerning possession have already been exploded. Moreover the former principles permit no distinction between various degrees of probability ¹. Therefore one must return to the simple and logical division by which a certain speculative judgment is separated from an uncertain one.

4. We can also use this brief reasoning. An action which practically is prohibited by no law is certainly honest and therefore practically safe. But an action whose liceity is speculatively probable is prohibited by no law. Therefore it is certainly honest and practically safe.

The major is proved. As we said above: since our liberty does not remove order, since to act is good of itself, since we seek all things under the species of good, since we are freely borne to seeking our own good, it must be held with common sense: those things are permitted which are not prohibited.

The minor is proved. An action is not forbidden by a particular law to which the action is only probably conformed: for knowledge of this law, or imputable ignorance of it, is not had; but the law itself cannot reach us except by means of certain cognition of it.

Nor is it forbidden by a general law by which whatever is only probably not against a particular law would be prohibited. For that general law is not demonstrated, and therefore has not been promulgated. R. D. De Bock reasons similarly, Tract. fundam. theol. mor. 2, n. 223.

The thesis is confirmed, a) by considering human nature and its fragility. It seems little human that fragile man should morally have to fulfill also uncertain obligations, or obligations probably null. Wherefore, concerning human law, already ancient wisdom pronounced that rights are more prompt to loosen than to bind, and that in doubts one must answer for liberty. Cf. St. Alph., diss. 1765, c. 4, n. 35.

It is also confirmed, b) by the logical necessity of choosing for probabilism or for tutiorism, which is repudiated by all. For either the principle stands: A law which after diligent investigation appears truly doubtful does not oblige; or the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, is rejected. If it is true, it demonstrates probabilism. If it is rejected, logically neither probabiliorism nor equiprobabilism can be admitted. For both systems permit that answer be made for liberty to which a less probable law, therefore a simply doubtful law, is opposed. Nor let them say: liberty is morally certain when a less probable law is opposed to it. For this is affirmed gratuitously, unless you recur to the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige. R. P. Prummer, Manuale, I, n. 346, 1, almost concedes that this is a logical conclusion.

N.B. C. d'Annibale demonstrates by many examples the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, I, § 162, note 21. But he well sets forth, § 261, that liberty precedes law. "The contrary opinion," he says, "is most alien from the nature of law... we understand that to be licit which the law does not forbid, that to be illicit which the law prohibits."

¹ He who would deny this must impute to God a moral order not sufficiently sanctioned.

² This is the direct refutation of tutiorism and of the system of compensations.

³ Cf. Sertillanges, op. c., p. 43, n. 1; p. 45, n. 4.

⁴ "In obscure matters, the minimum is to be followed." R.I. 30 in 6°. Cf. d'Annibale, Summula, I, 162.

¹ In order that we could distinguish various degrees, it would be necessary to have reflex principles by which they are distinguished; but we have only two, which do not bear that further distinction.

— Scholia. I. What St. Thomas thought. In the age of St. Thomas, those questions concerning probabilism were not being posed. Wherefore we do not wish to call upon him as a formal patron of our opinion. It has sufficiently profited us, since he formally taught our reflex principles.

For he has these things: "Promulgation itself is necessary for this, that a law have its force" ¹. "No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept. And therefore he who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of the precept of God bound to doing the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know and does not know, in no way is he bound by the precept" (2). "When I say conscience, I do not say or imply knowledge only strictly accepted, insofar as it is only of truths, but knowledge accepted in a broad way, for any knowledge whatsoever, according as whatever we know, by common use of speaking, we are said to know" (3). "That is called licit which is prohibited by no law" (4).

¹ Summa 1, 2, q. 90, art. 4. - (2) De veritate, q. 17, art. 3. - (3) Ibid. art. 2 ad 2. - (4) In 1. 4, d. 15, q. 2, art. 4, solution 2.

— II. On the uniquely probable opinion. An opinion can also be uniquely probable, which is impugned by no grave reason, and yet is not truly demonstrated. It is not permitted to follow the less safe parts against that opinion; for their election would not be prudent or rational. Wherefore an opinion of this sort is practically assimilated to what is morally certain. Cf. Noldin, Principia n. 224, 5. But, as we said in handing down the notions, moral certainty is here taken broadly.

— III. An opinion probably probable. Here it is customary to ask whether, from an opinion probably probable, a practically certain judgment concerning the honesty of an action can be gathered.

With Ballerini-Palmieri ¹ and Noldin (2), we judge that the answer depends upon the signification of the words. If, with that moral certainty broadly so called, concerning which n. 351, or because of a grave reason impugned by no contrary grave reason, you affirm that an opinion is probable, certainly the same must be estimated by you as truly probable.

But if the probability itself comes into serious controversy, and you discern serious motives on each side, the probability itself seems to us uncertain, just as a law is uncertain which is affirmed and denied by serious motives. But uncertain probability is probability not seen, which therefore is only doubtful and does not suffice.

¹ Opus Theol., I, tr. 2, n. 190. - (2) Princip. n. 235, 2.

— IV. The force of presumptions. Presumption, taken from the customary way of acting, in not a few cases produces sufficient probability why, unless a grave reason positively stands in the way, you may solve the case according to that presumption. This rule is founded in human necessity, lest we be compelled to live a life full of anxieties, and is contained in various sayings: "From things commonly occurring, a prudent presumption is made." "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act."

Wherefore he who is accustomed to be diligent in accusing sins, - in fulfilling penance, - in reciting the office, - in repelling temptations, can disregard a doubt concerning a sin accused, etc.

Likewise disregard negative doubts whether you had contrition in confession, whether you gave absolution, indeed whether you baptized well. Let the Ritual itself be heard, concerning consecration: "If the celebrant does not remember that he said the things which are commonly said in the consecration, he ought not therefore to be disturbed... But if he very probably doubts that he omitted something essential, let him repeat the form, at least under condition. But if they are not of the necessity of the Sacrament, let him not resume, but proceed further."

By a similar reason, a mandate given to you by a Superior is presumed legitimate; the wine which is offered to you in church for sacrificing, pure; an altar-stone, portable, well placed, so that, unless a special cause persuades otherwise, you can abstain from positive investigation.

— The proper place of probabilism. I. Probabilism has its proper seat where there is question of the liceity of the action alone, with consideration given to the law by which the action can be commanded, forbidden, or permitted. Then, according to the very order most wisely pre-established by God, the principles must be applied: a doubtful law does not oblige; no one is bound except through knowledge of the law ¹; and therefore, he who acts probably acts prudently, because he exposes himself to no danger of offending against an obliging law. Wherefore even then the use of probabilism is always licit or legitimate: it is confined by no exception.

But when there is question of probability of fact, no doubt of men can remove the danger of fact, as the danger of violating law is eliminated by a doubt of law. By what norms doubts of fact are ruled will soon be said below.

Therefore the exceptions sometimes brought against probabilism are only apparent, arisen from this, that probabilism is appealed to outside its proper seat.

¹ Cf. d'Annibale, I, 162.

— What is better to do. The use of the safer opinion is not always morally more perfect. It is more perfect of itself where, in order to do what is safer, one's own utility or convenience alone would have to be abandoned, but not where the less safe part is chosen for other reasons. If the obligation of restoring a sum to a man who will abuse it is uncertain, and you wish to give the same sum to an apostolic work, what prudent arbiter will estimate restitution as morally more perfect?

Indeed the use of the less probable opinion can be commanded. For obedience must be given to a Superior commanding according to a probable opinion, even if another opinion is more probable to the subject. Thus a Superior prohibits the fast by which you think yourself more probably bound: you are forbidden to fast.

— 1. Use of an extrinsically probable opinion. An extrinsically probable opinion cannot be useful to him for whom its falsity has been looked through. For presumption yields to truth. Nor does extrinsic authority have force except insofar as it founds a presumption of valid reasons. Therefore he himself is forbidden to use such an opinion. But it will scarcely happen to a prudent and not pertinacious man that he certainly judges false an opinion which commonly is held as probable.

2. Thus we say: and this concerning obligations of natural or divine law. But when there is question of human laws, it is reasonably judged that the legislator does not urge his law beyond what approved authors understand it to mean.

Wherefore, if I judge as wholly false some benign interpretation of a canon, which is sufficiently received, I myself am not prohibited from acting according to it. Thus, if we consider principles, an excuse from reservation sought from ignorance seems altogether vain. Yet in places where the bishop has not removed the controversy by formal decree, any penitent or confessor will be able to allege that excuse and admit it. For the very well-known controversy permits us to interpret the silence of the Code thus far as a toleration of the more benign opinion.

3. A confessor or another learned man can respond to one consulting him according to the probable opinion of others, with his own opinion omitted, even if this latter was more probable. Indeed he can indicate to him an opinion which other learned men defend as probable, although he himself judges it false. And a penitent who wishes to follow such an opinion has a right to absolution ¹. And even if the opinion to which the penitent adheres is only apparently probable, provided the penitent is in good faith, he will be able to be absolved: for he is disposed.

¹ This obligation of the confessor confirms probabilism. Cf. De Bock, Theol. fund. n. 231.

— The principle of the safer part. Since the danger of fact is diminished by no probability of opinion, it is said that in morals to act and to expose oneself to the danger of doing are equivalent. Therefore no immediate application of probabilism can be made to probable judgments concerning various facts. Therefore:

1. From an action which will probably be harmful to one's neighbor, one must abstain almost as from one certainly harmful, unless you can bring forward excuses of avoiding proportionately grave harm (one's own or another's). Yet in that estimation the distinction of certain danger and probable danger can be observed.

Nor can the probable honesty of an action be confused with the merely probable existence of a condition required for that honesty. This probable existence leaves the action practically doubtful, and therefore certainly dishonest. Thus a hunter is forbidden to intend the killing of a wild animal with danger to human life; nor can we throw a thing through a window with danger, even merely probable, of harming a passerby.

2. The necessity of attaining eternal salvation demands that, if the supply is had, means be chosen only which will certainly suffice (with moral certainty strictly accepted). He who is content with probable means would gravely derogate from charity toward himself. Hence no one can be content with a baptism which is only probable.

They are accustomed in this place also to allege prop. 4, reproved by Innocent XI: "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, is excused from unbelief." But the condemnation is not to be understood as if one ought to elicit an act of faith who perceives the Catholic religion only as more probable. For this is impossible, since the assent of faith ought to be certain above all things. But this is the sense. While by successive graces the unbeliever is drawn to faith, he cannot resist the inviting grace of God and cease from inquiry by alleging the probability which he then attributes to his unbelief; much less will he be able to do this if the superstition in which he was born now appears to him less like the truth. Or, to use another way of speaking, never, in no order of things, would this opinion have been probable: "It is permitted to adhere to a religion which is known to be less probable." But now it cannot happen that, for one believing, the credibility of religion is only probable.

3. The reverence owed to the sacrament, and often also an obligation of justice and charity, demand that we procure the certain validity of a sacrament by moral diligence. This moral diligence must be weighed from the necessity, dignity, rarity of the sacrament, and from the ease or difficulty of obtaining certainty. Thus the disposition of a penitent, the genuineness of wine for Mass, the truth of water for baptism, ought to be established in unequal measure. Besides, that principle is tempered by this other one: the sacraments were instituted for men. Wherefore, as often as the good of the faithful seems to have to be preferred to care for a valid sacrament, it is altogether permitted to abandon this care in order that you may procure that good. Therefore, in order wholly to avoid the danger of idolatry, it will never be lawful consciously to put forward doubtful matter for confecting the Eucharist, especially since the Eucharist does not have necessity of means; but often it will be necessary to confer a doubtful baptism, a doubtful absolution, upon one dying.

4. All physicians or surgeons who employ only probable medicines when certain ones are at hand are lacking to the debt of justice. And they will sin more gravely if uncertain medicines can at the same time be harmful. Nor, with strict harm to his own body, can a sick man renounce his right. Wherefore not even with the sick man's consent will it be permitted to try medicines for the sake of experiment, if either life or health would be much endangered thereby.

— Exceptions which permit the use of probability of fact. Nevertheless probability of fact can suffice for the honesty of an action:

1. Where the Church can and wills to supply by her authority a condition required of itself for validity. Thus, "in positive and probable doubt, whether of law or of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and the internal forum" (c. 209).

2. With a legitimate dispensation acceding, which renders the honesty certain. Thus, even when there is question of invalidating and inhabilitating laws, "in doubt of fact, the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense" (c. 15).

3. When no certain reason obliges one to forestall the danger of error, even material error: as the danger of involuntary emission of seed.

4. When, on account of various opinions concerning liceity in such and such a case, the probability of fact can be converted into probability of law.

Thus, not only when you have done a work by which a vow is probably fulfilled; when you have recited the canonical hours in such a mode or time that you have probably satisfied the law; but also if it is probable, though not certain, that the vow has in fact been fulfilled, that the breviary has been recited, a probable opinion judges that you are relieved of the burden, because the obligation does not remain except as uncertain, and it would be little human to oblige you to repeat what you have probably already performed. Therefore, because of this probable opinion, and not as if an immediate use of probabilism then offers itself, practically you will have to do nothing further.

What if there was an obligation of justice? Does he who probably paid what he owed from justice now owe nothing, or will he at least, in proportion to the doubt, have to supply what perhaps he did not pay? Although this is approved by some sense of honesty and therefore is to be urged, and appears to us speculatively truer, nevertheless the matter is disputed; and, because of the disagreement of doctors, a debtor who refuses to supply anything will be able to estimate himself safe.

And observe that practically it does not matter whether the action whence the doubt draws its origin is culpable or not. Certainly it is not permitted to use a less secure way for sending owed money to a creditor. Yet if you have done so badly, as long as it is probable that the money thus sent has arrived, the debtor will be held by no practical obligation.

— On the simultaneous use of opposite probabilities. It is customary to ask whether it is permitted or not to use contrary probabilities. And the following cases are proposed:

a) Two testaments affected by the same defect of form, so that both are probably valid, probably null. Is it permitted to Titius, on account of his own utility, to hold one as valid, the other as null?

b) A testament is formless. Can the legatee accept the legacy because the testament is probably valid, but not fulfill the burdens which are imposed upon the legatee, because the testament is probably null?

c) Two foods are set out on a day on which one or the other is certainly prohibited, but which one it is can no longer be distinguished. Is it permitted to Titius to take both ¹, or either one?

d) On a fast day, Titius, using the opinion which denies that the hour of dinner pertains to the substance of the fast, takes a full refection in the morning. Can he take another full one in the evening, because according to the more severe opinion, by the morning dinner the fast of that day has been substantially broken, so that the observance of the fast on that day has been made impossible?

e) On the night on which a feast day follows a day of abstinence (v.g., on the night between the vigil of Pentecost and Pentecost), Titius, from the diversity of clocks, estimates as probable that the feast day has already and has not yet arrived. Can he eat meat as on a feast day, and recite Compline and approach the holy Eucharist because, at the time when he ate meat, the feast day probably had not yet arrived?

Answer. - First of all, this must be observed, that these questions pertain to probabilism neither proximately nor properly. If you except the fourth case concerning full refection on a fast day, all the rest directly allege probability of fact, and suppose that the use of a formless testament, of food probably (by probability of fact) forbidden, and an estimation of days from a private clock, are permitted. This supposition being made, now the question arises: is it lawful to use contrary probabilities? For the morality of an action which uses those probabilities must be examined directly. And its goodness or malice can be certain, or can be uncertain but probable. Therefore the individual cases must be weighed.

a) The two testaments are two causes numerically fully distinct. Moreover it is established from another source that Titius is permitted, according to his judgment or utility, to hold both testaments as valid or invalid. Therefore, while he treats one as valid and the other as invalid, he makes two options which, taken separately, are honest. And because they are joined to each other by no bond, nothing hinders the honesty of each.

Yet one must abstain from a scandalous variety of option, which is commanded by motives scarcely honest. Besides, the right administration of justice demands that a judge not change his jurisprudence without reason;

b) No probable opinion permits that a legatee consider a testament at the same time as valid and as invalid. For of the two opinions brought forward in this matter, one says that the whole testament, with legacies and burdens, is valid; the other says that the whole testament falls. Therefore the legatee makes an option whose honesty is by no means probable;

c) We think it must be said thus. Probability of fact - it is like the truth that such food is the food which I know to be certainly forbidden - creates a serious danger of violating the law. Wherefore this holds: "In morals to do and to expose oneself to the danger of doing are equivalent." Wherefore, unless I am excused by proportionate inconvenience, it will be permitted to me to eat neither food. Yet the inconvenience can be taken more benignly than if food certainly illicit were set out.

Yet there will be those who think differently. Most will say that mixed dishes from both foods are prohibited, because a dish composed of meat and fish is forbidden by certain law. All also will condemn him who indeed lets the bodies be separated, but has introduced confusion among them artificially: for we are forbidden to make fraud against the law. But if the confusion has occurred by chance, some will permit partial use, others successive total use;

d) Titius could honestly choose the morning dinner under the sole account of the one refection. By that choice the other dinner was excluded. Besides, both opinions concerning fasting have this in common, that they permit only one full refection. While the more severe opinion prohibits the morning dinner under grave sin, it by no means permits another full refection to one acting according to the more benign opinion. Wherefore this cunning of Titius is defended by no probable reason;

e) The difficulty of accurately knowing the time is the cause why, when a more certain indication is lacking, it is permitted to estimate time from clocks even private ones. Hence it happens that clocks, though improperly, are said to be probable doctors ¹. Moreover the most common opinion, which C. de Lugo ¹ attempts to declare by a very subtle reason, solves the case of Titius thus. Titius could not eat meat except as on a feast day. But food taken on a feast day prohibits subsequent communion on that day. Therefore it is not permitted to him to choose both the eating of meat and communion at the same time.

Yet in reality the respects of each fast, ecclesiastical and eucharistic, are diverse and can be separated of themselves. Why must they be joined in the estimation of the day? An intrinsic argument is desired. This at most can be said: because of the material affinity of each cause and a sort of congruence, the reasonable mind of the legislator is that they be joined. This reason seems sufficiently weak to us.

Certainly Lehmkuhl himself permits this, I, 205: He who, needing food and judging Friday to have passed, therefore eats meat and renounces the right of communicating, if afterward he is warned by another clock, in which he can equally trust, that he probably ate on Friday, can, by correcting his error, change his purpose and in the morning be refreshed with the Most Holy Eucharist.

Nor shall we condemn him who, using a discrepancy of clocks, eats meat as on a feast day and recites Compline as on the vigil. Why cannot distinct probabilities be applied to distinct actions?

¹ As if he should pronounce successively concerning each food: this food is probably licit.

¹ To him for whom only one clock is available, he must follow this; nor, unless perhaps there is question of one moment, can he presume that the later hour is indicated by another good one. For when another probable doctor is absent, we must follow the only one who is present.

¹ De Eucharistia, 3, 15, nn. 47, 52, 53.

— On neutral time. Matters must also be judged more benignly where the law itself permits a varied option of time. Canon 33, § 1 permits this: "in private celebration of Mass, in private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving Holy Communion, and in observing the law of fast or abstinence, although the usual computation of the place is otherwise, one can follow the time of the place, or local time, whether true or mean, or legal, whether regional or another extraordinary time." And we have thought it consonant with the mind of the legislator that we should transfer this ample faculty also to indulgences and festive rest (Summa novi iura, n. 19. Cf. also Claeys Bouuaert, Selecta capita Codicis, n. 15).

By that disposition the legislator seems to us to have introduced, for these various actions or offices, a time almost common between two days or two parts of a day, which, as if neutral, can be attributed to either day or part of a day. Wherefore nothing prohibits that, according to true time, you recite the breviary; according to mean time, you observe the law of abstinence; and according to legal time, you attend to the eucharistic fast.

— Statement of cases. This must be well held. Insofar as the doubt is negative, no reason is had, at least no serious reason, which would found a probable judgment and therefore could prudently direct the rational appetite. Wherefore, as we saw above, n. 362, a uniquely probable opinion approaches practically to one morally certain; and negative doubts of law, whether there is question of the first beginning or of the cessation of law or of its signification, are without moral use, or are contemned. Hence we said that he is safe who from his habitual diligence has a positive argument for confession having been made integrally, for the whole office having been recited, etc., which is attacked by a negative doubt alone.

— But not rarely it happens, when the doubt is of fact, not of law, that each part is negatively doubtful. Thus it is a doubt of law: whether such a law was revoked or not; and canon 23 wisely establishes: "in doubt, the revocation of an existing law is not presumed"; but, what must be accurately observed, we are found in a doubt of fact when it is asked: is today Friday, or not, on which the law of abstinence obliges?

But now, when no reason of affirming or denying is at hand, there are those who wish to solve cases of this sort from the principle of possession. Thus Sanchez ¹, several others, and also Noldin (2), who nevertheless admits that in a negative doubt of fact it is often difficult to understand what part possesses, so that other principles are rather employed. Wherefore, as they judge, if you negatively doubt whether a day of abstinence has begun or not, you will not be held by the law of abstinence; but you will be held if you doubt whether it has ceased or not, because in the former case liberty possesses, in the latter the law. Above, we showed that appeal to the principle of possession outside the matter of justice is vain. Some solve the proposed case in the same way, because, as they say, a fact is not presumed but must be proved. Therefore in doubt concerning the day begun the obligation of abstinence must be proved; on the contrary, the cessation of the obligation must be proved in doubt concerning the ended day of obligation. Thus Laymann, Theol. mor. l. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, n. 36; Noldin, Principia n. 249.

But the reason of the saying upon which they rely is lacking here. Why is a fact not presumed but must be proved? Because a fact of itself is accustomed to leave positive indications, so that if these are lacking, it now becomes like the truth that the fact has not arrived. But in the proposed case, while time passes in an equal manner, neither the beginning nor the end of the obligation leaves peculiar traces. But, even passing this over, if you consider the matter more accurately, the beginning and end of the obligation of abstinence are not so much facts as moral consequences which are connected with a certain hour. But the true doubt is this: is it the eleventh hour before midnight, or the first hour after midnight? But thus the fact appears uncertain on each side, so that the principle, a fact is not presumed, cannot truly be applied. Moreover, whether it is the night on which the day of abstinence begins or the night on which it ceases, the doubt is altogether the same; objectively the matters bear themselves in wholly the same way, so that common sense seems to repudiate two diverse solutions.

¹ De Matr. l. 2, d. 11, n. 32. - (2) Principia, n. 218.

— Solution from the mind of the legislator. More universally, therefore, we shall say what Laymann insinuates about the eucharistic fast alone, l. cit. n. 36: that cases or doubts of law to which doubts of fact, negative on each side, give occasion, must be solved according to the mind, prudently gathered, of the legislator. But from the mind of the legislator, we judge that this distinction must be employed.

1. Where there is question of a human law merely prohibiting, and no reason of justice or charity obliges one to forestall the danger of material error (v.g., concerning the law forbidding communion to one not fasting, or the eating of meat on such and such a day), the legislator can, without inconvenience, incline toward the more benign parts. And because rights are said to be more prompt for loosing than for binding, it can prudently be judged that he truly followed those parts. Wherefore:

a) In invincible doubt whether or not after midnight you ate or drank anything, you will judge yourself not prohibited from communion. This other reason accedes in the case of communion, that, especially today, this cause is most favorable. Cf. concerning this matter St. Alphonsus, l. 1, nn. 38.39; and l. 6, n. 282.

Nor is he to be condemned who, in that doubt, invited by thirst or hunger, eats or drinks. If he had the moral means of knowing the hour, he could not honestly neglect investigation unless communion were to be renounced. But after he has sincerely done this, i.e., has renounced communion, if then reason or a special devotion urges communion upon him, he does not seem to be prohibited from access to the sacred table;

b) We by no means praise, as is clear, him who intentionally or without reason chooses a time at which he negatively doubts concerning an ecclesiastical obligation, v.g., of abstinence, for example, to eat meat.

But he who, after he has investigated the matter according to the abundance of examination which is morally at hand, doubts whether or not the twelfth hour of the night has been heard, can reasonably choose for himself the more benign parts, whether there is question of abstinence, or of fasting, or of servile labor prohibited on feasts.

2. But where some precept must positively be fulfilled, or a positive condition is prescribed for a certain office or use, it is necessary that at least by probable reason the occasion of fulfilling the precept be had, or that satisfaction can be made to the required condition. This is demanded by the common good, to which the legislator adapts his mind. Wherefore:

a) The time which is defined by a commanding law as fit for fulfilling a positive office, v.g., for reciting the canonical hours, must be at least probably present. Therefore St. Alph., in order to defend his benign solution of doubts concerning the eucharistic fast preserved, argues from this, that there is question not so much of a positive law requiring the fast as of a prohibiting law, which forbids that you approach not fasting. Cf. l. 1, n. 38;

b) He who negatively doubts concerning his age, whether or not he has completed the years by which he can receive sacred order, obtain a benefice, or celebrate marriage, is forbidden either to receive sacred order, or obtain a benefice, or celebrate marriage. For the condition positively required for orders or for a benefice or for marriage must be demonstrated by at least probable reason. For the common good demands that only fit persons receive orders, obtain a benefice, contract marriage.

3. Finally, if the legislator has bound subjects by a law once a condition has been posited, as long as that condition has not been positively established, the subjects are not held by the law. For the common good also demands that a burden not be imposed unless certain. Wherefore he who doubts whether or not he was born twenty-one years ago will not have to fast.

St. Thomas, Eth., VI, 1, 2; 3 D. 33, q. 1; 1.2, q. 19, a. 5; q. 57, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., 1; H. Ap., 1; John of St. Thomas (ed. Vives), VI, q. 31, disp. 22; Sylvius-Maurus, in Eth., VI; Suarez, in 1.2, tr. 3, disp. 12, sect. 1, 2, 4; the moral works of more recent writers: Lehmkuhl, Aertnys, Noldin, Tanquerey, Gopfert, etc.; Beaudouin-Gardeil, de Consc.; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. (ed. 3).

11. Definition. Conscience is a practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what here and now is to be done as good, or avoided as evil (I, 2).

It is called: a practical judgment, namely one which directs the one operating in acting; by which we judge, that is, by which without any fluctuation of mind we affirm; what here and now, that is, in the individual case, and with all circumstances considered; is to be done, that is, ought or can be done; as good, or avoided as evil; by these words is expressed the formal respect under which the agent exercises his judgment concerning acts to be placed. For he does not judge concerning the utility or facility of an action or omission, but concerning its relation to the moral law, namely whether it is according to it, against it, or beside it (1.2, q. 19, a. 5).

12. Division. 1. Conscience, by reason of the acts to which it is referred, is either antecedent or consequent. Antecedent conscience is that which precedes human acts, so as to compose them according to the norm of right. Consequent conscience is a judgment concerning past acts; it approves or disapproves, praises or condemns with remorse; it is not conscience properly so called.

All the more, that habit by which the one who is endowed with it promptly obeys the dictate of conscience, and is called a conscientious man, is not conscience properly so called.

Antecedent conscience obtains various names according to its various office. When it judges what is to be avoided as evil, it is called prohibiting conscience; when it judges what is to be done as a good of precept, it is called prescribing conscience; finally, when it judges that something has been left to free choice, it is called permitting conscience; and it is also named counseling conscience, when it declares a thing to be better and of counsel.

2. By reason of the object, conscience is true or erroneous; by reason of the subject, it is certain or doubtful. These will soon be explained more fully. Conscience, whether true or certain, is prohibiting, or prescribing, or permitting or counseling, as was said above.

13. That the nature of conscience may be better known, it is pleasing to note the following.

I. Conscience is an act of the practical intellect.

1. It is an act, not a power or a habit; for conscience is said as though knowledge with another, because it is the application of knowledge or notice to a particular action: but the application of knowledge to something is made by some act. Besides, conscience can be put aside and is easily changed, which cannot be said of a power (St. Thomas, P. I, q. 79, a. 13).

2. It is an act of the intellect, not of the will; for it goes before the will, and signifies to it what in a particular case is good or evil, which evidently pertains to the cognitive faculty.

3. It is an act of the practical intellect. For according to the twofold respect under which the intellect is considered, it is called either speculative or practical. The speculative or theoretical intellect is that which rests in the contemplation of its object, whether the matter concerns fact (that is, the existence, nature, properties, or effects of a thing), or right (that is, law, or its disposition, extension, or interpretation). The practical intellect is that which extends or applies knowledge to work (ibid., a. 11). Cf. Cajetan, 1.2, q. 57, a. 5; Beaudouin, work cited; John of St. Thomas, Logica, P. II, q. 1, a. IV.

From these things it is understood what, in things operable, is a speculative judgment and what is a practical judgment. A speculative judgment, when operations are in question, is that by which the intellect declares that the thing objected to it, in itself, is objectively good or evil, for example, this war is just or unjust. A practical judgment is that by which the intellect decrees that the same thing, the present circumstances considered, here and now, subjectively, can or ought actually to be chosen or rejected, for example, it is lawful for me to fight in this war.

II. Although synderesis, moral science, and prudence concur in forming conscience, nevertheless conscience differs from them.

It differs from synderesis. Synderesis is not an act but a habit naturally instilled, by which we know the first principles of things to be done, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled; God is to be worshiped; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another (St. Thomas, place cited, a. 12).

It differs from moral science. This also is a habit of the speculative intellect, but acquired, and is concerned with general conclusions deduced from first principles in this or a similar way: synderesis brings forth the first principle: evil is to be fled; science subsumes: theft is evil, and concludes: therefore it is not lawful to steal. Therefore moral science is concerned with the objective and material morality of an act; but conscience with the subjective and formal morality of the same.

It differs also from prudence. Prudence is a habit of the practical intellect, and has a broader scope than conscience. For prudence, besides those parts which it obtains in forming the dictate of conscience, especially in weighing the peculiar circumstances of the fact, also inquires into the means suitable for attaining the end. Thus, for example, when a superior must correct some guilty person, conscience indeed declares the obligation of correcting; but prudence suggests how one must proceed, that the end, namely amendment, may be obtained (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 1).

III. Conscience is a judgment concluding from two premises, whether the syllogism is made implicitly or explicitly. Synderesis or science furnishes the major premise, which declares the disposition of the law; the particular fact to which the application of the law must be made supplies the minor; prudence watches lest either be asserted rashly; the conclusion is the practical judgment which is called conscience. For example: A superior legitimately commanding must be obeyed. But this superior commands legitimately. Therefore he must be obeyed (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 2).

14. Order of things to be said. Conscience, as we intimated above, must, on the part of the object, be conformable to truth; but on the part of the subject, it must rest upon moral certitude. Whence there must be treated: 1. true conscience, and erroneous conscience opposed to it; 2. certain conscience, and doubtful conscience opposed to it. But since the question of solving doubts arising from the occurrence of probable opinions is of particular importance, it must be treated specifically. Hence: 3. probable conscience.

15. Definition. True conscience is that which dictates the truth of the thing. It rightly concludes from true principles that something is lawful or unlawful, which in reality is such. Erroneous conscience is that which dictates the false as true, whether it assumes for itself a false principle, or deduces false conclusions from a true principle (I, 3).

True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although it is sometimes used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, TRUE is that which in reality is such in itself; RIGHT is that which is done according to the rules of prudence, in other words, that which truly and really is conformed to right appetite, as St. Thomas says (Eth., VI, 1. 2). Hence right conscience can be predicated, although per accidens, even of him who labors under invincibly erroneous conscience, as will be said below. Cf. Beaudouin, q. 1, § 1.

16. Division. Erroneous conscience is either invincibly or vincibly erroneous.

1. Invincibly erroneous conscience is that whose error morally cannot be overcome or laid aside; because, a) either the thought or doubt of error in no way, not even confusedly, comes into the mind of the one acting, while he places the action or its cause; or because, b) although doubt of error has come into the mind, nevertheless, with moral diligence applied for attaining the truth, the error cannot be driven away.

2. Vincibly erroneous conscience is called that whose error man does not lay aside through neglect. Therefore he operates with vincibly erroneous conscience who a) either already notices the error in some way, or b) at least

doubts about the error, and at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it, and nevertheless does not inquire into the truth.

But diligence in inquiring into the truth is not required to be the greatest; ordinary and common diligence suffices, such as prudent men of the same condition are accustomed to apply in like circumstances.

Note. Those things which later in the various treatises, on Laws, on Sins, on Censures, etc., will come to be said concerning ignorance will explain the present matter more perfectly. See n. 22.

17. Principles. I. We are always bound to obey a true conscience, whether prescribing or prohibiting. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 14:23): But all that is not from faith (that is, from the dictate of conscience) is sin. And from Innocent III (c. Litteras, de restit. spol.): "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna." The reason is that true conscience is the right application of the law, and a manifestation of the divine will, to which it is always unlawful to resist.

St. Bonaventure very beautifully expresses this office of conscience, saying: "Conscience is like the herald of God and His messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as though from God, as a herald when he publishes the edict of the king" (L. 2 Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3).

18. II. We can obey a true conscience permitting or counseling, but we are not bound. For 1. it belongs to a permitting conscience truly and absolutely to dictate that some action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, therefore; 2. but it belongs to a counseling conscience to declare that something is better and of counsel. But this is the nature of counsel, that it indeed brings in the merit of reward in the one carrying it out, but no guilt of fault and penalty in the one omitting it. Hence that saying: "He who passes over counsel does not sin, provided contempt is absent" (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3 and 4).

19. Nevertheless it must be noted that what the law in general only counsels or permits can in the particular case be prescribed or prohibited by conscience, namely when there are peculiar circumstances which, in a special case and for a determined person, clearly manifest the obliging will of God; as will be clear from the things to be said concerning vocation to the clerical or religious state (cf. n. 1916, q. 3 and n. 2141).

20. The principal means by which the treasure of a true and right conscience is acquired are these: 1. knowledge of the law of the Lord, in which each one can progress by continual study, by reading good books, by consulting the doctors of the Church, and especially by questioning and humbly listening to the Church herself, who is the supreme mistress of consciences. 2. Mortification of vices. This mortification is absolutely necessary, because the practical judgment of reason, on account of the evil inclination of the will, often turns away from the truth. 3. Prayer, or assiduous conversation with the Divine Teacher, who speaks within without the noise of words, and raises up to Himself a docile mind in a point of time so that it grasps more reasons of eternal truth than if it had studied in the schools for ten years (Imit. Chr., l. 3, c. 43).

21. III. It is right to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience permitting; one must follow it when it prescribes or prohibits. The reason for both is that "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, quodl. 3, a. 27; St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

The first is also clear: 1. From the words of the Lord (John 15:22): If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. 2. From the saying of St. Augustine (de Lib. arb., l. 3, c. 19, n. 53): "That which you unwillingly do not know is not imputed to you as fault." 3. From the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although there be invincible ignorance of the natural law, this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin." So Baius and Jansenius (cf. Viva, on this proposition).

The second is proved: 1. From the doctrine of the Apostle (Rom. 14:22), saying that one who eats meats which he judges it unlawful to eat, as having been sacrificed to idols, truly sins, because he acts against faith, that is, conscience.

2. From reason: the will is borne toward the object not according as it is in itself, but according as it is proposed by reason. Hence St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 5): "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the same thing to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God."¹ Hence he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience (if it obliges) commits sin of the same species as if he acted against a true conscience.

It is useful to note that one acting with invincibly erroneous conscience not only does not sin, but also more probably acquires merit for himself. "The reason is that, in order to call some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Therefore, since the one acting acts prudently, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end by which he is led in acting, namely the end of the glory of God or of charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he would demerit who does a good work, but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end by which he carries out that work" (I, 6). So the doctors very commonly with St. Bernard, "who teaches that a subject obeying a prelate from a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law" (de Praec. et disp., c. 14, n. 21). Cf. I, 7 and 173, 174.

22. IV. No one can follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting, nor contemn one prescribing or prohibiting; but each one is bound to lay it aside. For 1. By operating according to a permitting conscience of this kind, a man sins, because he does what in reality is evil in itself; nor does ignorance excuse him from fault, since, as vincible, it makes his act voluntary in its cause (cf. n. 288). Thus a judge who already notices that he does not sufficiently know a case debated in court cannot cast his vote for either side; but he is bound to acquire for himself a more perfect knowledge of the matter, so that he may thus be able to render a just sentence; otherwise he would rashly commit himself to the danger of erring, and accordingly would stain himself with sin. 2. By operating against an obliging conscience of this kind, he likewise sins, because he chooses what he judges to be evil. Thus, he who erroneously judges that he must lie or steal in order to help his neighbor, and at the same time notices the obligation of further inquiring into the truth, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it (I, 4).

Yet in order that one sin by acting against erroneous conscience, his action must be free. Hence the ignorant man does not sin, even if he believes himself to sin, when, being unable, he omits to hear Mass on a feast day; when he suffers involuntary distractions in prayer, or nocturnal pollutions in sleep.

Note. That the confessor may more easily judge whether the conscience of a penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, let him ask him: a) whether he truly doubted concerning the lawfulness of the act, b) whether he attended to the obligation of searching into the matter further? If he answers affirmatively, we have one laboring under a vincibly erroneous conscience. Nevertheless the responses of a scrupulous person must be weighed according to the things soon to be said. Cf. n. 319, 337.

23. To vincibly erroneous conscience can be reduced: 1. lax conscience, which loosens obligations too much; 2. scrupulous conscience, which increases them too much; 3. perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin in both terms of a contradiction.

We shall treat of each only briefly here, because practical rules will be set forth at length below in the treatise on Penance.

24. Notion. A lax conscience is that which, from light and contemptible reasons, judges that what in reality is evil is not evil, or thinks that a grave evil is light, although either can easily be detected (H. Ap., tr. ult. 31). How great a danger threatens from this sort of conscience the Savior Himself declares, crying out: Broad is the way that leads to perdition (Matt. 7:13).

Lax conscience can be distinguished in three ways:

1. Simply lax conscience, which tends to extending liberty beyond what is fair, for example if it rests upon a slightly probable or improbable opinion.

2. Cauterized conscience, when, from a long-standing habit of sinning, it counts grave or even most grave sins as nothing, calling evil good and good evil (Isa. 5:20), and drinking iniquity as though water (Job 15:16).

3. Pharisaical conscience, when it makes great things small and conversely small things great; of which sort were the Pharisees straining out a gnat but swallowing a camel (Matt. 23:24).

25. The principles to be adapted to a lax conscience are these:

I. He gravely sins who, knowingly obeying a lax conscience, transgresses some law in a grave matter.² The reason is that he could easily overcome ignorance of this kind, as being voluntary, and therefore cannot, under the pretext of ignorance, be excused from lethal sin.

II. Indeed, he can gravely sin in a light matter, if his temerity drives him to acting after any dictate whatever has been passed over and contemned.

III. He who labors under a lax conscience ought, far more strictly than others, to apply effort to laying it aside, if a doubt about the honesty of an action arises.

26. The causes of lax conscience are: 1. a soft life, which enervates; 2. neglect of prayer, which wholly casts us down; 3. excessive solicitude for temporal things, which makes us earthly; 4. the custom of sinning, which removes the horror of sin; 5. familiarity with vicious men, to whom we become accustomed; 6. luxury, which prevents the Christian from inclining and tending toward spiritual things.

The effects are: 1. blind tranquillity of soul after sin; 2. insensibility to pious warnings; 3. mockery of pious exercises; 4. an impenitent heart treasuring up wrath for itself on the day of wrath (Rom. 2:5).

The remedies of such a conscience are: 1. spiritual retreat for several days; 2. frequent and humble prayer with meditation on the last things; 3. daily examination of conscience; 4. frequent reading of pious books; 5. diligent confession; 6. flight from the wicked and conversation with the good (Haine, Elem. Theol. mor., n. 44).

27. Notion. A scrupulous conscience, or one agitated by scruples, is that which, from a slight motive, doubts concerning the honesty of some action, and therefore often fears that there is sin where there is none (H. Ap., I, 8).

Scruple is said from scrupus, which is a rough little stone entering the shoe of one walking, whence the foot is injured and the step impeded. Therefore a scruple is a vain apprehension, or an empty specter of sin, by which the eyes of the mind are struck, as infants are terrified by apparitions. But it belongs to the malignant spirit to inject a greater anxiety of sinning than is proper, so that the soul, rushing into the abyss of despair, may no longer truly fear any sin.

Three things concur for a scruple: 1. a futile reason, whose solution does not appear; 2. a vain fear of sinning arising thence; 3. disturbance of soul (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 5).

You will infer: 1. Scrupulous conscience, as such, is not conscience, but only a shadow and likeness of conscience; for it is not the dictate of reason, but of imagination. Yet if someone were to judge firmly that sin is present where it is not, he would have a conscience formed by scruples and therefore erroneous, but properly so called. 2. It differs entirely from a tender and timorous conscience, which indeed solicitously, but wisely, according to the rules of Christian prudence, avoids every sin, even the slightest.

28. Since the present matter is to be treated elsewhere (n. 1835 seqq.) in order to practice, it suffices here to note two things:

I. To act against scruples is always licit, and often obligatory. 1. It is licit, because a scruple is not a dictate of reason, but an empty fear, as lacking a prudent and reasonable foundation. Therefore that fear does not prevent the one acting from forming for himself a practically certain conscience from extrinsic principles, especially from the authority of the confessor. Hence, to act against a scruple is not to act against conscience.

2. It is obligatory, because excessive anxiety greatly harms spiritual progress, and brings grave detriment to body and soul at once (I, 19).

II. The principal and almost sole remedy against scruples is to acquiesce in the judgment of a superior or confessor. - Thus very commonly the Doctors, and the reason is clear. For since the scrupulous, while they are agitated by scruples, cannot form for themselves a true dictate of conscience, nothing else remains except that they hand themselves over to be ruled by the counsel of others, and use extrinsic reasons rather than intrinsic ones (I, 12).

29. Notion. A perplexed conscience is that by which someone, placed between two precepts, believes that he sins whichever part he chooses. He labors under this conscience who, for example, assisting a sick person, thinks that he will sin equally, whether, on a feast day, he omits Mass, or whether he departs from the infirm person.

Rules to be observed by the perplexed (I, 10; H. Ap., I, 7):

I. If the perplexed person can defer the action without grave harm, he is held to defer it until he has consulted the wise (for example a confessor); because each one must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended.

II. If (as usually happens) he cannot defer the action, he is held to choose that which seems to him the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of natural law than of human or positive divine law; for the law of an inferior order must yield to the law of a superior order.

III. If he cannot discern the lesser evil, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because there is lacking in him the liberty necessary for formal sin, and because he himself is in invincible ignorance (cf. n. 216).

St. Thomas, de Verit., q. XIV; 2.2, q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1; q. 70, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 20-39; ed. G., I, p. 11 ff.; Mazzotta, tr. I, disp. 1, q. 3, c. 1-5; Bardi, Discept. de consc., discept. 1, c. 9; disc. V and VI; Reuter, P. I, tr. 2, c. 2, n. 75; Panzuti, Theol. mor., I, tr. 1, 3 and 4; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2), n. 125; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 119.

We shall speak: 1. of the necessity of certain conscience for acting rightly; 2. of the manner in which doubtful conscience is laid aside.

For the sake of clarity it is useful to premise the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the threefold state in which, with respect to a proposed truth, our mind can be placed: namely concerning the state of certitude, doubt, and opinion.

30. "Our intellect," says the Angelic Doctor, "with respect to the parts of a contradiction, is disposed in diverse ways. For sometimes it is not inclined more to one than to the other, either because of a defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move toward either part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between the two parts of a contradiction. But sometimes the intellect is inclined more to one than to the other, yet that which inclines it does not sufficiently move the intellect so as to determine it totally to one of the parts; whence indeed it accepts one part, yet always doubts concerning the opposite: and this is the disposition of one opining, who accepts one part of a contradiction with fear of the other. But sometimes the intellect is determined to this, that it totally adhere to one part: ... and this is the disposition of one understanding principles... of one knowing... and of one believing" (de Verit., q. 14, a. 1).

Elsewhere (3 D. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1) he has these things: "When the reason which moves toward one part neither suffices for terminating the intellect, because it does not resolve conclusions into principles known of themselves, nor suffices for terminating the will, so that it seems good to it to adhere to that part, then a man opines that to which he adheres and the intellect is not terminated to one thing, because there always remains a movement toward the contrary: for he accepts one part with fear of the other; and therefore one opining does not assent. But when a man does not have reason toward one part more than toward the other, either because he has reason toward neither, which belongs to one not knowing, or because he has reason toward each, but equal reason, which belongs to one doubting: then he in no way assents, since his judgment is in no way determined, but he is disposed equally toward diverse things." In what sense one opining does not assent, he explains there immediately afterward: "One opining has thought without perfect assent, but he has something of assent, insofar as he adheres to one more than to another." Likewise in the Summa Theologiae (2.2, q. 2, a. 1): "Some acts pertaining to the intellect have firm assent without such thought; ... but some acts of the intellect indeed have unformed thought without firm assent, whether they decline to neither part, as happens to one doubting, or decline more to one part, but are held by some slight sign, as happens to one suspecting, or adhere to one part, yet with fear of the other, which happens to one opining."

These things having been noted beforehand, without difficulty the diverse notions concerning the state of certitude, doubt, and opinion are established.

31. On the state of certitude.

Notion. CERTITUDE can be defined: the firm adherence of the mind to some proposition, without fear of erring; or also with St. Thomas: "The determination of the intellect to one thing" (3 D. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3); and in other words: "The firmness of adherence of the cognitive power to its knowable object" (ibid., D. 26, q. 2, a. 47).

Division. 1. By reason of acquisition, certitude is divided into direct or indirect certitude.

Direct certitude is that which arises from proper and intrinsic principles affecting the thing itself. Thus it is directly and perfectly certain that children owe love to parents; for the certitude of this thing is sought from the very relation of cause which parents have toward children.

Indirect or reflex certitude is that which is obtained from principles extrinsic to the thing. Thus, for example, a son invincibly doubting whether a thing commanded by his father is lawful in itself or not, can arrive at a certain dictate with respect to lawfulness if he has recourse (or reflects) to the general principle: In doubt, one must stand for the superior. See n. 38, where there are more things.

2. By reason of firmness of assent, it is divided into absolute and moral certitude.¹

Absolute certitude is the assent of the mind on account of an infallible motive. On account of this sort of motive, such firmness is present in the mind that it excludes not only every fear of erring, but even the power of deliberately fearing. The following propositions, and propositions similar to them, introduce this certitude: the whole is greater than its part; bodies are heavy; the Roman Empire once existed.

Moral certitude (such as is understood here) is the assent of the mind on account of authority or grave reasons; so that there is no founded reason for doubting or fearing concerning the truth of the object. Such certitude arises, for example, from the testimony of two men who are worthy of faith. It does not indeed remove the possibility of doubting, but it actually excludes prudent fear of error.

Broad moral certitude. From this perfect moral certitude, or moral certitude properly and strictly so called, there plainly differs imperfect moral certitude, or certitude improperly and broadly taken, by which one indeed adheres to one part, but with a certain prudent fear of error. Therefore in this state there is indeed an assent of the mind, and thus it differs from the state of strict doubt (n. 32); but that assent is not firm, but fearful; and thus it differs essentially from moral certitude properly so called, and agrees with the state of one opining (n. 33). In other words: broad moral certitude excludes prudent and strictly so-called doubt, but admits prudent fear or hesitation.

This notion of imperfect moral certitude, or broadly so called - which is of the greatest moment in this matter - plainly agrees with the doctrine of St. Thomas and of the other principal doctors.

By the Angelic Doctor this sort of certitude is called "probable certitude, which," he says, "attains the truth in the greater number of cases, although in the fewer number it falls short of the truth"² (2.2, q. 70, a. 2); likewise "certitude of prudence" (2.2, q. 47, a. 9), or "certitude of opinion" (3 D. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3, ad 1). Blessed Albert the Great agrees (In Topic., l. 1, tr. I, c. 2). St. Antoninus agrees, who calls the same "certitude of probable conjecture," and says that it arises "from gross and figurative probable conjectures disposed more toward one part than toward another" (Summa Theol., P. I, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10). Likewise Gerson, who has these things: "In morals, Aristotle says that certitude is to be taken grossly and figuratively; this certitude does not remove every probability or opinion of the other part, although it inclines more to this or to that, which suffices" (de Contr., P. 2, prop. 13).

Lugo also rightly says (de Fide, I, n. 316): "We can distinguish two grades of moral certitude. The first is of certitude which we have described, namely that which excludes every prudent fear of erring, and this is proper moral certitude. The second is of less proper certitude, which does not exclude prudent fear, but only prudent doubt concerning that object, or a prudent judgment concerning the contrary object."

Finally St. Alphonsus teaches: "For forming the moral certitude of some opinion, it is not required that the authors holding the opposite still lack every reason, even a light one; but it suffices if that opinion, with all things weighed, appears so true that scarcely any appearance of truth remains for the contrary, or that the contrary does not seem sufficiently probable" (Diss. 1755, n. 52). In the Moral Work (I, 81; ed. G., I, p. 60) it is possible to read: "A most probable opinion, which is also called morally certain, speaking broadly however, does not exclude every prudent fear lest it be false; unlike an opinion or opinion strictly certain, which excludes every prudent fear" (I, 81; ed. G., I, p. 60). St. Alphonsus also understands this imperfect moral certitude, or broadly so called, whenever he says that an opinion certainly or notably more probable is "morally or quasi-morally certain," or "sufficiently certain." Therefore several authors are mistaken who teach that broad certitude also excludes prudent and reasonable fear of error, and consequently begets firm assent.

32. On the state of doubt.

Notion. Doubt in general, insofar as it is opposed to strict certitude, is the suspension of judgment or of firm assent.

Division. Doubt is distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of assent or adherence, it is divided into strict doubt and broad doubt. Strict doubt is the suspension of all assent, or the fluctuation of the mind, on account of equal motives for either part of a contradiction. This alone is true, genuine, properly so-called, and prudently formed doubt, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas (cf. above n. 31) and of all philosophers.³ Broad and improperly so-called doubt consists in a certain prudent fear of the intellect imperfectly assenting to one part of a contradiction. This fear, which by St. Thomas is also called "doubting," namely in a broad sense, or "some doubt" (quodl. VIII, a. 13), arises either from this, that the motive existing for only one part is not plainly firm but only probable, or from this, that the motives for one part are certainly or notably graver, although for the opposite part there are also motives grave in themselves. Therefore this broad doubt accompanies the state of broad and imperfect certitude (n. 31), or the state of one opining (n. 33).

Note. Suspicion is reduced to strict doubt; it stands midway between doubt and opinion, insofar as the mind, led by a slight sign, inclines toward one part only, but by no means assents to it. So St. Thomas (above n. 31), with whom St. Alphonsus wholly agrees (H. Ap., I, 77).

2. By reason of the motive or foundation on which it rests, doubt is negative or positive. It is negative when no probable reasons occur on either side, but either none or only light ones. It is positive when for each side (doubt positive on both sides), or at least for one side (doubt positive on one side), there is present a grave motive sufficient for forming a probable conscience, although with fear concerning the opposite.⁴

3. By reason of the object, there is doubt of fact and doubt of law. Doubt of fact is concerned with the essence or existence of a thing. For it asks what is: whether, for example, such a pact has been added to a contract or not; whether such a decree has been duly promulgated; whether it has been abrogated; whether the present thing is the object or matter of the law or not: for example, whether this food placed before me is meat or not; whether I have satisfied the law, vow, penance, obligation of contract, etc. Doubt of law is concerned immediately and of itself with the law or the obligation of the law, and consequently with the honesty of the action; for it asks (although only theoretically and in general): what is to be done; whether it is lawful to confer a sacrament with such matter, to enter into a contract with such a pact, etc. (I, 41, 53; H. Ap., XVI, 142; XVIII, 35; XIX, 79; cf. VII, 67, where there are examples).

It must be noted here that doubt of law arises from some doubt of fact; for right arises either from the essence of the thing (for example, from the very nature of man), or from some positive act, for example, from a contract, from the decree of a legislator, etc.; and similarly it is removed by a fact, for example, by payment of a debt, by dispensation from a law, etc. But doubts of fact are more commonly concerned with matter falling under a law, since in these it is generally asked: whether a man is placed in such circumstances as demand the application of the law.

4. By reason of the mode in which the object is considered, doubt is speculative or practical. It is speculative when one doubts concerning the truth of a thing or proposition, concerning the objective honesty of an action: for example, whether that war is just or not; whether painting is servile work; whether Baptism conferred with distilled water is valid, and like things. It is practical when one doubts concerning the subjective honesty of placing an action, that is, when someone doubts whether in practice, and with all the circumstances in which he is here and now placed having been weighed, he can or ought to act; for example, whether it is lawful for me to serve as a soldier in such a doubtfully just war; whether on this feast day to paint; whether to baptize this boy with distilled water (I, 21, 25; Istr., I, 13; Conf. dir., I, 9).

As can be seen, speculative doubt is a doubt of science, which proximately and of itself is concerned with the true, although consequently and remotely, when a moral matter is in question, it also regards the lawful. Practical doubt is a doubt of conscience, by which it directly and immediately regards the lawful. But it arises from speculative doubt, whether of law or of fact, and always supposes it: for no one, unless he is scrupulous, can doubt whether it is lawful for him, for example, to paint on a feast day, unless he has already doubted whether painting is servile work prohibited by God. Therefore speculative doubt is about the premises, practical doubt about the conclusion (Diss. 1757, n. 54).

33. On the state of opinion.

Notion. Opinion is a weak assent by which the intellect is borne toward one part of a contradiction, esteemed as true, with fear concerning the opposite.

It is said: 1. It is assent, and thus it differs from strict doubt and suspicion.

2. Weak, and thus it differs from strict certitude.

3. Esteemed as true; for "one opining," says St. Thomas (in VI Eth., lect. 8), "says that what he opines is true," and indeed he says this with fear. Accordingly, opinion also involves positive knowledge, although imperfect.

4. With fear, that is, prudent and reasonable fear; for imprudent and irrational fear is not always absent even from the certitude of faith.

And so the state of one opining, into which someone comes after mature consideration, includes broad doubt (n. 32), and coincides with broad and imperfect moral certitude (n. 31).

34. Note. The word opinion, as is clear, is taken here for the subjective state of the mind, but not for some opinion or objective proposition, in which sense we speak of an opinion, that is, a true, false, probable, lax, safe, etc., opinion or proposition.

These things having been noted beforehand, let us approach the argument of the present article.

35. Definitions. Certain conscience is that by which one firmly and without fear of erring judges that something is lawful or unlawful for him.

It differs from true conscience as certitude differs from truth. Truth regards the object, which is apprehended as it is in itself; therefore it excludes error. Certitude regards the subject judging that something is true without fear of falsity; therefore it excludes fear of error, which nevertheless can be present in the subject per accidens invincibly. Hence it is clear that conscience can be certain without being true. Yet of itself certain conscience is always right conscience; whence the question is always made only concerning certain conscience (Beaudouin, q. 2, a. 1).

Doubtful conscience is that which suspends assent for either part of the doubt, and remains uncertain and hesitating (I, 20).

It is clear that conscience of this kind, on account of the defect of judgment, is not conscience in the true sense of the name, but is called by this name improperly, and only from the usage of the schools.

36. Principles. I. For acting licitly there is required moral certitude concerning the honesty of the action. In other words, certain conscience alone is the rule of morals, and it is never lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience (I, 55; H. Ap., I, 31). It is proved, 1. From the words of St. Paul (Rom. 14:23): Everything that is not from faith is sin. "It is said from faith, namely from the certain dictate of conscience, so that a man has persuaded himself in his conscience that by acting he acts rightly, as St. Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, and others with St. Thomas explain that phrase FROM FAITH." 2. From reason: he who acts with a conscience not certain voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and by this very fact sins. And indeed, he who, uncertain about the honesty of an action, nevertheless acts, implicitly and interpretatively says: I wish to do this, whether it is lawful or unlawful: which is a virtual contempt of the divine law, and consequently sin (cf. St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3).

But if it is asked what sin one thus doubting and acting commits, St. Alphonsus answers (I, 22): "He sins, and indeed with a sin of the same species and gravity concerning which he doubts; because he who exposes himself to the danger of sinning already sins, according to that: He who loves danger shall perish in it (Ecclus. 3:27). Wherefore if he doubts whether that is mortal, he sins mortally." Cf. however n. 337, q. 2, where there are other useful things.

37. II. For acting licitly, ordinarily strict moral certitude is not required, but broad moral certitude suffices. This is the very common opinion among the authors. Cf. Dissertation de Usu moder., 1757, n. 31.

We say ordinarily, for sometimes prudence does not permit even the slightest danger of error to be undergone: for example, when the life of a man is in question, or the validity of Baptism to be conferred, etc.; in these cases certitude entirely strict is required, as we shall say more accurately in its place (cf. n. 81 ff.).

The reason is that, since God does not command impossibilities, those dictates in the matter of morals must suffice which we can practically form. But although we have strict certitude regarding first principles and their proximate conclusions, nevertheless ordinarily only dictates of broad moral certitude are at hand for us relative to remote conclusions.¹ Whence St. Thomas (2.2, q. 47, a. 9, ad 2): Certitude is not to be sought in the same way in all things, but in each matter according to its proper mode. But because the matter of prudence is singular contingents... the certitude of prudence cannot be so great that all solicitude is removed. And in another place: Moral matter is such that perfect certitude is not fitting (1.2, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3). To the matter also St. Antoninus (Summa, P. I, tit. 3, c. 10): It belongs to the disciplined man to seek certitude in each thing according to the exigency of the matter. Recall what we said above (n. 31). Cf. Suarez, de Lege, l. 8, c. 3, n. 19; de Relig., tr. 6, l. 4, c. 5, n. 5; Valensise (super syst. Theol. mor. disquisitio), where he treats the mind of St. Thomas concerning the sufficiency of probable certitude in moral judgments.

Note. Arguments of this kind, which establish the sufficiency of broad moral certitude, can be called concomitant principles. For they accompany, at least implicitly and in exercise, the direct arguments from which firm security cannot be had, so that they may render it plainly firm and perfect.

Nor is there an obstacle in the fact that in broad moral certitude there is still a certain prudent and founded fear of error (n. 31), for this remains only in the speculative order; but practically the fear of sinning is excluded by those same concomitant principles, which for this reason are also called by others indirect and reflex principles. Cf. Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 125; Beaudouin, p. 44.

38. III. For acting licitly, reflex certitude sometimes suffices.

It is said: sometimes, namely if, while an invincible speculative doubt remains, direct certitude cannot be had. For before all things direct certitude is to be sought; that is, before all things diligent inquiry into the truth is required, because, as the doctors say: "The law of acting imports the law of knowing." But if, after sufficient inquiry, direct certitude cannot be obtained, indirect or reflex certitude suffices (I, 25).

It is proved, 1. From authority. "It is certain and commonly explored among all the doctors," says St. Alphonsus (I, 64), "that the moral certitude of some opinion, if it is not proved from some certain direct principle, is nevertheless proved from another reflex principle, likewise certain, as is proved from can. 4: Quid culpatur, caus. 23, q. 1, where St. Augustine writes: A just man, if perhaps he serves as a soldier even under a sacrilegious king, can rightly wage war when that king commands, if, preserving the order of civil peace, either he is certain that what is commanded him is not against the precept of God, or he is not certain whether it is." Therefore, although a subject is doubtful concerning the justice of a war, nevertheless he can licitly serve as a soldier at the command of his prince - and by what reason? relying on the reflex principle that the prince has a certain right, so that always, and so long as the injustice is not established, he be obeyed.²

2. From reason. Because he who acts thus prudently judges that in these circumstances he acts lawfully and honestly: since the judgment concerning the honesty of his act rests no longer on weak reasons of probability, but on a most firm supervening, that is, reflex principle. Cf. n. 44 and 57 ff.

39. As Beaudouin, O.P., excellently explains (de Consc., p. 42 ff.): When doubt stands in the principles, the intellect is determined by the will, which chooses to assent determinately to one part, on account of a motive which is sufficient for moving the will but not the intellect, as being that it seems good and fitting to assent to this part. Therefore from the end of virtue the will is rectified; by the reflex principle reason is certified.

As regards obtaining certitude, surely the reflex principle cannot do more than the direct principle, if the discussion is about the truth of the opinion; but it can, if the discussion is about its use. For the truth of an opinion must always be distinguished from its use, that is, the true from the lawful. For it is one thing to ask whether this opinion is objectively true; it is another to ask whether it is lawful to use this opinion in practice, as is clear in the cited example of the soldier (I, 21).

Nor from these things does the absurdity follow, namely that concerning the same object there can be doubt and certitude at the same time; for in this case the doubt and certitude are not concerning the same object. The doubt regards the truth of the opinion in itself, or objective morality; the certitude regards subjective morality, that is, the honesty of the action in him who uses such an opinion. Thus, for example, one doubting whether a contract is usurious indeed doubts concerning the truth of the opinion affirming it; but with this doubt there well consists certitude that the contract can be honestly entered into, which certitude is drawn from this reflex principle: "A doubtful law does not oblige" (cf. n. 46).

"Hence it appears that reflex principles do not solve the particular question, but leave it uncertain; only the practice is certain, because reflex principles fix a certain rule for directing practice in that doubt." Therefore with our Holy Doctor we conclude: "For acting licitly we must have moral certitude concerning the honesty of the action, either direct, if we use an opinion morally certain, or reflex, if the opinion is only probable" (I, 23, 64; cf. Diss. 1757, n. 34, 53, 54).

40. From the things said the following rules flow spontaneously for practice:

Rule 1. He who is practically doubtful is bound, as long as he remains in such a state, to follow the safer part according to the axiom: In doubt the safer thing is to be chosen (I, 77).

The safer part is said to be that which stands for the law; the less safe part, that which stands for liberty. Therefore he who embraces the safer part, namely by omitting a work doubtfully prohibited, or by doing one doubtfully commanded, certainly fulfills the law, and does not sin even materially. But he is bound to this by the very fact that he has and preserves a practically doubtful conscience, as is clear from what was said (principle I, n. 36).

Rule 2. He who in practical doubt does not wish to follow the safer part (or cannot, for example because he must intimate the law of God not to himself, but to others), should inquire into the truth with moral diligence, and then act according to the truth found. Prudence dictates this, and justice demands it, that to each his own be rendered. For in the present case law and liberty in some way litigate with each other. Whence reason, which in man is like a judge in a city, must, if possible, hear and weigh the arguments of each litigant, and then adjudicate the cause to him to whom right in reality favors (1.2, q. 104, a. 1).

Moreover this inquiry is to be made with moral diligence, that is, with diligence which truly corresponds to the gravity of the question, the weight of the reasons, the condition of the person, and the other circumstances of things. Thus, for example, for an uneducated man, who is incapable of forming conscience for himself, it will be enough to consult the pastor or confessor, or another pious and learned man; and then to act according to the counsel received. But for the theologian and confessor, to whom by office it belongs to impose just burdens on others, greater diligence, as is clear, must be applied (I, 24; V, 4; H. Ap., III, 33).

Rule 3. If the doubt, all things weighed, is noticed to be empty, it must be held as nothing. The reason is that morals are to be composed from a prudent judgment; but a doubt which, all things weighed, remains merely negative, and is nothing other than an empty fear or suspicion, is by no means opposed to a prudent judgment. Therefore it can be laid aside without another reflection; and thus either the liberty or the obligation which existed before the doubt perseveres, and in practice is held for truth (I, 11, 24, 37; VI, 908).

Rule 4. If the doubt is founded and, the matter diligently weighed, is recognized to be strict and invincible, a practically certain dictate must be formed according to reflex principles, as was said above (n. 38).

41. Doubtful conscience, according to the diverse condition of things, is laid aside diversely. In the present matter a twofold condition must be considered: either the matter concerns only the honesty of the action, as if I doubt whether fasting is commanded today, in which case there intervenes only the danger of violating the law; or the matter concerns some end necessarily to be obtained, for example, the validity of a sacrament, as happens if someone doubts whether he can use uncertain matter in conferring Baptism, in which case a twofold danger is incurred: namely the danger of transgressing the law and of frustrating the sacrament.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 19; Quaest. disput. de verit. q. 17; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 1. The Holy Doctor rightly notes beforehand that this tract was worked out by him with special study; Brocardus a S. Nicolao, Order of Carmel, De conscientia (Migne, Curs. theol. XI 65 sqq.); Billuart, De conscientia; Reg. Beaudouin, O. Pr., Tractatus de conscientia, Tournai 1911; H. Simar, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit, 10 lectures, ed. 2, Freiburg 1902; Noldin, Sum. theol. mor. de principiis l. 4; Bouquillon, Theol. fund. n. 253-317.

After it has been said concerning laws, which are the external rule of morality, it is now necessary to treat the internal rule according to which all human acts ought to be directed, namely conscience, which is the application of laws to particular cases. The old scholastics of the thirteenth century treated this matter very briefly. But after disputes concerning Probabilism arose, the tract on conscience was amplified by no small amount. We shall proceed in the following order: 1. concerning the notion and division of conscience; 2. concerning true and erroneous conscience; 3. concerning lax conscience; 4. concerning perplexed and scrupulous conscience; 5. concerning certain and doubtful conscience; 6. concerning the various moral systems; 7. concerning the education of conscience.

On The Education Of Conscience.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Tract. de interiori domo seu de conscientia aedificanda among the spurious works of St. Bernard (Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 507 sqq.). Cf. concerning the education of conscience Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. n. 422 sqq.; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 280; H. D. Noble, O.P., La conscience morale, Paris 1923, Second part, Les perfections naturelles et surnaturelles de la conscience morale.

353. Since conscience is the proximate rule of our moral acts, and since from our acts well regulated the whole happy eternal life depends, it matters greatly that our conscience be a right rule and a faithful guide on the way to eternal happiness. As is clear from what was said above, conscience is an act of practical reason. But in order that practical reason may always be able to elicit right and perfect acts of this sort, it needs special education and formation. Synderesis, indeed, or the habit of first practical principles, is like a little spark in our mind kindled from divine light according to that saying of the psalm: "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us";¹⁶¹ but it touches only the general principles of moral life. Therefore it is necessary that conscience founded upon synderesis be cultivated, so that it can rightly extend itself to all particular acts of moral life. For obtaining this, natural and supernatural means are at hand.

¹⁶¹ Ps. 4, 7.

354. On the natural means. 1. The first and most efficacious means for acquiring a good conscience is a good education had from infancy. It is of great importance that the distinction between good and evil be inculcated upon children again and again, that children become accustomed to doing good from intimate conviction, and not only for obtaining reward or praise, or for avoiding punishment. Likewise it must be inculcated upon boys and girls that they lend attentive ears to conscience, which is nothing other than the voice of God. But in doubt whether something is licit or illicit, let them approach experienced and honest men, not however imprudent and depraved men, for the sake of taking counsel. The good example of parents and teachers also contributes much to right education, while on the contrary their evil example produces the worst effects.

2. The second means for cultivating conscience is the perfect sincerity of a man with himself, which is obtained by faithful, continual, and candid scrutiny of one's own conscience. On this matter St. John Chrysostom writes most beautifully:¹⁶² "Do you not have at home a book in which you write daily accounts? Have likewise a book in conscience, and write down daily sins; for example, when you are lying in your bed and no one is making trouble for you, before sleep creeps in, bring the little book into the midst and reckon your sins with yourself, saying to yourself: Have I sinned today either by speech or by deed? ... And when you reckon these things, suspend your soul, lacerate it, open it with fear of gehenna, ... so that on the next day you may approach the perpetrating of sins more sluggishly." In reality, the daily examination of conscience greatly serves not only for right knowledge of oneself, but also for living rightly. Hence it is to be commended as much as possible.

¹⁶² In Ps. 50 hom. 2, n. 5 sq. (Migne, Patr. graec. 55, 581). It is to be counseled that the examination of conscience not be made in bed, but before one goes to bed.

355. On the supernatural means. 1. For having a candid conscience, the first and most efficacious means is fervent prayer to God, the Father of light, that he may wish to illuminate our darkness. Since conscience is the voice of God speaking in us, it is easily understood why frequent and fervent elevation of the mind to God through prayer renders us apt for clearly perceiving this voice and for faithfully obeying it once perceived. Therefore one must often pray: "Give me understanding, [O Lord], and I shall learn thy commandments";¹⁶³ or: "With heavenly mercy, O Lord, we beseech thee, accompany the vows of thy supplicating people, that they may both see what things are to be done and grow strong for fulfilling the things they have seen."¹⁶⁴

2. A strenuous fight against disordered passions with the help of divine grace is the second means for obtaining a right and candid conscience. The reason is obvious: the passions often are disordered in us on account of the tinder of original sin and on account of our inconstancy. But such disordered passions cloud reason; for they are like a dense smoke rising up and intercepting the clear rays of reason. For this reason daily experience proves that men captive under the yoke of disordered passions have a lax or even cauterized conscience; on the contrary, those strenuous victors over the passions, who daily exercise virtues, rejoice in a very tender conscience.

3. Sacramental confession and obedience rendered to a prudent spiritual director is the third and very good means for having a tender conscience. The reason is again very obvious. For it is necessary that diligent examination of conscience precede sacramental confession, whose usefulness has already been declared above and which the old pagans already acknowledged, establishing the loftiest principle of moral life: Know thyself. After examination of conscience has been diligently performed and confession has been made to a prudent confessor, the spiritual director, aided by divine light, can impose the best rules for leading a right moral life. If any doubts occur, the spiritual director, endowed with greater knowledge, experience, and grace annexed to his state, can safely solve them. Hence it happens that after a good confession and obedience rendered to a good spiritual director, all remorse of conscience usually ceases; which is a sign not at all obscure that the soul is in a good state and pleasing to God. Obedience must be rendered to the confessor or spiritual director not only by the uneducated and those ignorant of Moral Theology, but also by anyone most learned. The reason is twofold, one natural, the other supernatural. The natural reason is the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of judging in one's own case. Hence also the common adage says: "Let no one be judge in his own case." For on account of excessive love of himself, a man is easily deceived in judgment concerning his own acts. The supernatural reason is the institution of the sacrament of penance, which is necessary for all sinners. But in the tribunal of penance the confessor is the judge, to whom whoever desires to receive this sacrament is bound to submit himself. Hence examples are at hand where even emperors and kings had to obey a spiritual superior by doing penance for excesses committed and by instituting a new moral life.

These are the chief means for cultivating conscience, so that it may be conformed to divine reason and law, and therefore a safe norm of acting.

¹⁶³ Ps. 118, 73.

¹⁶⁴ Prayer of Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany.

Since conscience is the proximate rule of human (moral) acts, logically discussion of it is made before law is treated, which is the remote rule of those same acts. For law indeed binds all subjects in first act; but in second act, or by reason of imputability to fault, only those who have knowledge of the same. Hence St. Thomas:¹ "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the good apprehended, toward which the will is borne, and not according to the material object of the act." But the treatise on conscience follows the treatise on human acts in right order, since in the former the matter is of the human (moral) act considered abstractly, but in this treatise of the same act taken concretely.

32. Definition. - Conscience is the judgment which someone makes concerning the formal morality of an act to be placed or omitted by himself here and now. - It is said:

1° Judgment, namely an act by which the mind affirms or denies something; and hence conscience is not a habit, nor an act of the will. - a) It is not a habit. Yet he who ordinarily affirms well or badly is said to have, as if by habit, a good or bad, true or false conscience. But conscientiousness (conscientiousness) is the habit of executing the dictate of conscience with a prompt mind; - b) nor is it an act of the will. Yet it is exercised under the command of the will, and therefore it will be able to be prudent or imprudent, according as one neglects or does not neglect the rules of prudence in affirming or denying.

2° Concerning morality. Wherefore it differs from psychological consciousness. Nor does conscience judge concerning utility, facility, etc. (Syllab. pp. 58, 64, p. XLV), but concerning the relation of some action or omission to the moral law, namely whether it is alongside it, against it, or outside it.

3° Concerning formal morality, and therefore it differs from science, which judges concerning material morality, as will be clear from the things to be said concerning erroneous and doubtful conscience. See n. 35. 49.

4° Of an act, namely adequately taken, i.e. considered by reason of the object, circumstances, and end of the one acting, or not abstracting from the end of the one acting. For acts in the individual, or formally, indifferent are not given, chiefly because in them abstraction cannot be made from the end of the one acting (n. 24).

5° By himself; yet this does not prevent you, in forming this judgment, either from helping another or being helped by another. Indeed, it is sometimes permitted to adopt another's judgment without discussion, although it must necessarily become one's own, since the formation of conscience is essentially personal. Thus an uneducated person rightly forms his conscience from the judgment of his pastor, and anyone from the judgment of St. Alphonsus; but in doing so he does not cease to judge personally, or by himself, presuming, namely, that he can safely follow the judgment of the pastor or of St. Alphonsus.

6° To be placed or omitted here and now. Hence conscience:

a) Differs from synderesis (conservation), which is a habitual speculative judgment of general principles, for example that sin must be avoided, virtue must be loved, etc. But conscience is an actual practical judgment by which a general principle is applied to an action to be placed or omitted here and now. Wherefore Sporer¹ rightly calls the judgment of conscience the particular conclusion of a syllogism whose "major premise Synderesis places (for example, evil must be fled), whose minor premise reason submits (theft is evil), whose universal conclusion moral science infers (theft must be fled), but whose particular conclusion, or conclusion concerning here and now, prudence and conscience infer (therefore this or that, because it is theft, is not permitted)."

b) As the rule of morals it regards the morality of a present action only (and this is called antecedent conscience); but if it regards the morality of a past action (consequent conscience), it is the rule of actions only in a broad sense.

For it belongs to the former alone to direct one to acting, since it impels, permits, or turns away; but it belongs to the latter to weigh the act, or that which has already been done; namely it approves, praises, accuses, or bites back. Hence antecedent conscience alone is conscience properly so called, or the rule of morals; for consequent conscience can indeed manifest that some action was good or evil, but cannot make it that that action was good or evil. Hence they err who, after an act has been placed, before, for example, they approach Confession, inspect books or inquire whether this and that which they have done is a sin, and whether therefore they must confess it; for an opinion of this sort formed afterwards will be able to have no influence upon the preceding action. Likewise, in vain do some ask the confessor whether by doing this and that they have sinned; for this depends on the conscience which they had while they were acting; but they themselves will know this, and the confessor will learn it from them. But such things are rightly asked for other ends, namely for better directing actions in the future, for avoiding scandal, etc.; and therefore consequent conscience can be called conscience in the sense given, as I have said.

I. Conscience has one object, namely the formal morality of the act to be placed or omitted by you here and now, and considered in the concrete and in the individual, i.e. a) in its single elements, namely in object, circumstances, and the end of the agent, and b) in these taken together; for good is from an integral cause; evil, from any defect whatsoever. - Hence:

II. Only the practical question in the strict sense, or the practically-practical question, namely that which is resolved through the particular conclusion of the syllogism [above 6° a)], is that to which answer is made through the dictate of conscience. - Hence:

III. The remaining questions, although more or less connected with this one question, are only questions preliminary to it. But among these preliminary questions:

1. Some are such in themselves, others per accidens. In themselves, for example, the question concerning the existence of a law, concerning the validity of a vow; for, in order that the question, for example, whether this or that is permitted to me, be resolved, the very nature of that question demands that the question whether there is some law by which it is prohibited first be resolved. Thus likewise, in order that the question whether I am bound to furnish that which I promised by vow be solved, it is required in itself that the question whether my vow was valid be previously decided. - Per accidens, for example, the question whether the fluid flowing from a vine, with which an infant is to be baptized, is natural water or not; for this question is not in itself to be raised when Baptism is administered, but when the case occurs in which necessity urges and certainly natural water is not present.

2. Some are proximately preliminary, others remotely preliminary. - Proximately, the major and minor premises of the syllogism about which above, 6° a); remotely, all those things which must be discussed before the major or minor premise is established. Let the following be an example. There is an obligation of repeating an invalid Baptism (major premise); but Paul was invalidly baptized (minor premise). Therefore, he must be rebaptized. In this example, questions concerning the invalidity of the matter or form, or concerning a defect of intention in the minister, are remotely preliminary to the conclusion or practically-practical question; for these questions must be resolved before the minor premise can be established.

3. Some are of law, others of fact, concerning which see n. 48 under 2.

IV. Conscience is:

a) Commanding, when it judges that an act is to be placed as being of precept.

b) Counseling, when it judges that an act, although by no law to be placed or omitted, is more rightly placed or omitted, as being consonant with or dissonant from a counsel intimated to me here and now either by divine inspiration, or from the dictate of reason soliciting to more perfect things, or from the directive ordinance of a Superior.

c) Prohibiting, when it judges that an act, as repugnant to a negative law (n. 125. IV), is to be omitted.

d) Permitting, namely if it is taken inadequately, or insofar as it judges concerning the object and circumstances only, abstracting from the end of the one acting. For a merely permitting conscience can never be given if it is taken adequately, namely with the end of the agent also included, as is clear from what was said in n. 24. R. 2°, where we proved that indifferent acts in the individual are not given, since these have their morality chiefly from the end of the one acting.

e) True, false, perplexed, scrupulous, lax, certain, doubtful, probable, improbable, concerning which in what follows.

The question concerning the obligatory force of conscience is that in which it is discussed whether and which of the consciences just enumerated one either ought or may follow. Hence this question is set forth: 1) concerning true, false, and perplexed conscience; 2) concerning scrupulous and lax conscience; 3° concerning certain and doubtful conscience; 4° concerning probable and improbable conscience, and concerning all these insofar as conscience is commanding, counseling, prohibiting, or permitting.

33. Definition. - True conscience is that which from true principles rightly concludes that something is lawful or unlawful, which truly is such; as if someone from this true principle: it is not lawful to obey parents commanding sin, should infer: therefore it is unlawful for me to perpetrate this theft which they command me. - True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although sometimes they are used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, true is that which really in itself is such; but right is that which is done according to the rules of prudence. Hence right conscience can be predicated even of him who labors under an invincibly false conscience; for he acts prudently, since he acts from an intimate and insuperable persuasion. You have an example in him who, from invincible error, thinks that it is not a fast day when it truly is. His conscience is not indeed true, but nevertheless is right.

34. - False (or erroneous) conscience is that which dictates as true and lawful that which nevertheless in itself is false and unlawful.

A twofold false conscience is distinguished: invincible and vincible. Invincible is that which morally cannot be overcome, since no thought or doubt of error, not even in the confused, comes into the mind of the one acting while he places the action or its cause. But vincible is that which the one acting can and ought to overcome, because a) he has already noticed the error, or at least doubts about it, and b) at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it; nevertheless c) he neglects to overcome it. Thus conscience is invincibly erroneous in him who, not even confusedly noticing that it is a fast day, eats meat; but vincibly erroneous in the same person if, suspecting that it is a fast day, he notices the obligation of inquiring about the matter, and nevertheless neglects to inquire.

35. Principles. - I. True conscience, commanding, must always be followed. For conscience is the herald of law, or of God, in the case truly commanding; therefore he who refuses to obey true conscience refuses to obey God Himself.

II. Invincibly erroneous conscience, whether commanding or prohibiting, must likewise be followed in every case. It is proved: a) From Sacred Scripture: Everything that is not from faith (according to the dictate of conscience) is sin.¹

b) From reason. For the object of the will is good and evil, not in whatever way, but formally insofar as it is in the apprehension of the intellect; whence, when the intellect apprehends something as a moral good that is necessary and commanded, although in reality it is not good nor commanded, indeed is evil and prohibited, the will, by rejecting it, consents to a transgression of law. Again, if the intellect apprehends something and proposes it to the will as morally evil and prohibited, although in reality it is not evil nor prohibited, indeed is good or permitted and even commanded, the will, by embracing it, consents to an evil and prohibited object, and therefore sins. Thus he who thinks that there is a fast when there is not, on account of erroneous conscience sins against the precept if he does not fast.

III. Invincibly erroneous conscience permitting exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin where no malice is apprehended. Thus he does not sin who lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, invincibly thinking that this is lawful for him in the case.

IV. It is not permitted to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience, whether permitting or commanding, because, since by hypothesis the error is vincible, whoever acts with such a conscience errs voluntarily. Nor is it permitted to act against it when it is commanding or prohibiting, because by acting thus he does that which he judges prohibited, and therefore sins.

Therefore before the action that conscience must be laid aside through inquiry into the truth. Thus he who with some doubt thinks that he must lie or steal in order to assist his neighbor cannot follow such a conscience nor act against it; but he must, if he can, inquire, lay it aside, and afterwards act; for such error is vincible.

Nevertheless, one acting against a vincibly erroneous conscience does not incur penalties latae sententiae against transgressors of that law against which by error he thinks that he is acting; because penalties are inflicted on transgressors of the law truly, not putatively. Thus, for example, he who strikes a layman, thinking him to be a cleric, does not incur excommunication.

36. Practical admonitions. A) A confessor will be able more easily to judge that the conscience of his penitent was invincibly erroneous:

1° If the thing ignored is not concerning the first moral principles, or concerning conclusions proximately connected with them; for these are inscribed by nature itself in the hearts of all. Hence, if someone admits that in his past life he perpetrated openly dishonorable things, but did not have them as sins, do not easily believe him, unless the matter is of a sin committed by a child or an uneducated person, or with some circumstance apparently making it honorable, and not prolonged for a longer time.

2° If it is not concerning the obligations of one's own state; for this ignorance is ordinarily culpable in its cause. Hence St. Thomas teaches that a judge who errs in passing sentence is not excused on the ground that he is ignorant of laws which, by reason of his office, he was bound to have learned.¹ - But by length of time vincible ignorance can become invincible. For just as it happens that you forget those things which you once learned, so a fortiori it happens that the memory of your ignorance entirely slips away from you; in which case, indeed, new errors and errors of good faith will not be culpable in themselves, but in the cause, or as effects of culpable ignorance, so long as the cause itself has not been retracted, at least indirectly, through penance.

3° If the penitent is sufficiently diligent and accurate in fulfilling those things which are wont to be performed by others of the same condition; or, if noticing that through ignorance he has violated a precept, he grieves and is saddened; for through these things his good faith is rightly presumed.

B) Erroneous conscience can in no way bind unless the matter is placed in the free choice of man. Hence they do not sin who unwillingly are agitated either by obscene imaginations, or by blasphemous and heretical thoughts, although they falsely believe that they are either giving consent to these things, or even by error judge it a great fault to be touched by thoughts so horrible.

C) Great prudence is required in the theologian, preacher, confessor, instructor of boys, nurses, parents, in a word in all those who must direct others, lest by exaggerating erroneous conscience they induce it in them. Yet do not understand this in such a way as if, when preaching, it were not permitted to you with more vehement speech to censure certain things which, although they are not in themselves mortal, are exceedingly dangerous. See St. Alph. L. III. n. 55. § cum ego munus, etc.

37. - Perplexed conscience is called that by which someone thinks that he sins whichever of two incompatible precepts he neglects. Such would be the conscience, for example, in him who, assisting a sick person, thinks that he would sin both if he should leave the sick person in order to be present at Mass, and if, conversely, he should omit Mass in order to remain at home in the care of the sick person.

He who labors under a perplexed conscience, if he can suspend the action without grave harm, is bound to suspend it until he has consulted experts; for each person must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended. But if he cannot suspend his action, as ordinarily happens, he is bound to choose the lesser evil; for the will cannot tend into that which appears the greater evil, because thus it would freely choose this excess of malice. But if he cannot discern which is the lesser evil, then whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because he is indeed free physically by reason of the act, but he is not free morally by reason of sin; for there can be no sin in that which in no way can be guarded against.

38. • A scrupulous conscience is that which, resting upon slight foundations, doubts, or rather fears, that such an action is a sin, although nevertheless it is not; or that it is a grave sin, although it is only light. From these things it is clear who a truly scrupulous man is; for they err by the whole heaven who call that Christian scrupulous who, solicitous for his salvation and led by filial love toward his God, searches all his works, lest perhaps in some matter he offend God Himself: such a one is to be called not scrupulous, but God-fearing.

We shall speak briefly concerning the causes, signs, harms, remedies of scruples, and also concerning rules for scrupulous penitents and their confessors.

39. • Some are intrinsic, others extrinsic. The intrinsic are: a character very much disposed to suspicions and fears, as is the melancholic; weak health of the head, especially in women; slowness of understanding, by which someone does not well perceive the precepts of God and of the Church; hidden pride, by which someone trusts too much in his own judgment; excessive abstinence and immoderate vigils, by which, when the head has been weakened, the soul is easily disturbed.

But the extrinsic are:

1° God, who permits scruples in the just, that, being purified, they may make greater progress; in the tepid, that they may perform the duties of Christian piety more fervently; in penitents, that they may pay the penalty of past sins. Moreover, scruples are judged to be from God if those harassed by them become better.

2° The demon, who, God permitting, can move the melancholic humors in a man, through which the imagination can either err or be disturbed unto inordinate fear.¹ Scruples are thought to come from the demon if the scrupulous person feels himself being brought to tepidity, withdrawn from virtue, and especially inclined to despair.

3° The society of scrupulous persons, especially if scrupulous persons are ruled by their counsels and converse frequently with them about spiritual matters; for those with whom we associate, we imitate more easily.

4° The reading of books which are excessively strict, establishing harder precepts which the human condition cannot sustain;² for gradually and without perceiving it we assent to those opinions which we study.

40. • It is of very great importance that directors of souls discern true scrupulous persons from false ones. For often those who are not scrupulous are thought to be so, and vice versa; and from this great errors in direction flow, with no slight danger of spiritual harm: therefore much circumspection is needed here. Now the chief signs of scruples are:

1° Pertinacity of judgment, by which someone refuses to obey the counsels of the confessor, or of wise men; and while he consults various persons, he acquiesces in the judgment of none; indeed, the more persons he hears, the more he becomes entangled.

2° Frequent change of judgment from slight motives, whence there is frequent inconstancy in acting, and continual disturbance of mind.

3° Fear of sinning in all things, joined with pertinacity of mind against the judgment of the confessor, of prudent men, or even against one's own judgment; whence follows frequent questioning about the confessor's answers, and repeated inquiry whether, in acting according to the counsel given, the conscience can be free from fault.

4° Impertinent reflections about circumstances which were present in the action or could have been present, and certainty anxiously sought in all things.

5° Obstinacy in always repeating the same sin in confession, or in holding as a sin that which has already several times been declared by the confessor not to be such.

6° Continual anxiety about past confessions, notwithstanding the judgment of the confessor, or the repetition of confessions.

7° If he makes no end of examining his conscience, and explains the most minute things.

8° If he uses ridiculous signs, gestures, and other similar things to drive away temptations; for example, suddenly closes his eyes, contracts his eyebrows, nods and shakes his head, mutters to himself: I do not will; depart, devil.

But he cannot, at least immediately, be judged scrupulous, 1° who is moderately solicitous, or anxious, lest he offend God; 2° who, after a life spent in sins, is still distressed, nor after confession seems to have satisfied his obligation, but wishes to confess again and expiate his sins; 3° who deliberately still consents to grave sins, although after the sin has been committed he is greatly troubled and confesses anxiously, for there is a just cause of anxiety, at least moderate: nevertheless even in this case there can be a true scrupulous person; 4° who in only one or another case has a passing scruple.

Moreover, it sometimes happens that the confessor, after hearing the penitent the first or second time, cannot at once determine whether he is scrupulous, even if he appears anxious about many things; for some just and reasonable cause of anxieties can be present. Much less can a scrupulous confessor easily judge whether the penitent is scrupulous or only fearful.¹

41. • Scruples generally draw with themselves grave inconveniences and spiritual harms, and often also bodily harms, provided they have not been sent in by God, but persevere from man's fault. The principal ones are these:

1° They harm the body; for through continual anguishes they constrict the heart, corrupt the blood, consume the vital spirits, and weaken the head.

2° They render the scrupulous person unfit for fruitful action with his neighbor; for many scrupulous persons are severe, and no less peevish toward those of their household than toward strangers.

3° They harm obedience, or even totally impede it; since the scrupulous person rather follows trifles and the mockeries of his own fantasy, and thus is impelled to act against the will of God, which is manifested to him through his spiritual father or director.

4° They weaken the pursuit and love of prayer, or even take them entirely out of the way; because they enervate the force of the mind, distracting it by leading it to trifles, fill the soul with anxieties, and make it unfit for union with God. Hence follows not only spiritual profit ceasing, but also great emerging harm.

5° They break fortitude: for what great thing will he dare, who is wholly occupied in trifles and, neglecting the assault against his passions, is so easily cast down in soul?

6° They greatly diminish hope, or even destroy it, because the matter is finally brought to this point, that, confidence in God having been lost, he declines into laxity. For how will he duly trust God, who always beholds Him as a most severe exactor? Therefore the scrupulous person, unless he fights strongly against scruples, will shortly be driven by them, while vexed, into despair, and will loosen the reins to his desires, or at least will lead a most miserable life and one with great danger of damnation.

If scrupulosity is found in a confessor, it is even more harmful; for that someone is scrupulous with himself is an infirmity: that he is so with others is a contagion. Moreover, this cannot exist without the derision of the ministry and the despair of penitents. Therefore let the confessor guard as much as possible against scruples, if he wishes to exercise usefully the parts of his office: whence, if they arise in him from ignorance, let him devote himself to studies; if from excessive subtlety, let him not be wise more than is necessary, knowing that he acts not as a mathematician, but as a moralist; but if from a certain, so to speak, perverseness, by which he wishes all to think that very thing which he himself thinks, let him know that each one has his own gift, and one indeed in this way, another in that, and therefore let him seek what is just, not what is his own.¹

42. • I. To commend oneself earnestly and confidently to God, who consoles us in all our tribulation.²

II. To attack the causes of scruples which are in man's power, so that their effect may cease. Therefore let the proud man not lean upon his own prudence; let the pertinacious man break his own judgment; let the unlearned man be instructed; let the idle man work; let the timid man meditate on the goodness of God; let the melancholic man take solace; let the infirm man be cured; for sometimes the evil proceeds from inflamed blood, etc.

III. To commit oneself wholly to the judgment of one's own director; for it is written: an obedient man shall speak victory.³ Indeed, this alone must be called the remedy of scruples. For since the reason of scrupulous persons is plainly powerless, nothing else remains except that they be governed by another's reason. In this matter no temperament is admitted.

43. • 1° In moral matters certainty is not to be sought in all things. This must be applied to all, but especially to the scrupulous person.

2° Supreme and blind obedience must be rendered to the confessor, and one must proceed in all things with great humility and confidence.

3° A doubt which could seem reasonable in others is to be entirely spurned in scrupulous persons.

4° It is lawful, indeed often obligatory, and sometimes under grave obligation, to fight against scruples.¹

5° Confession is never to be repeated unless it was certainly invalid; nor is the examination of the last confession ever to be renewed, even if a doubt about a grave sin omitted seems to arise.

6° Scruples are to be contemned; nor must scrupulous persons ever dispute with themselves about them.

44. • I. With scrupulous persons let him be patient, discreet, prudent, brief.

1° Patient and full of charity; for since the care of scrupulous persons is long and difficult, and their condition most miserable, and unless they obtain a faithful friend, they are exposed to so many and such great dangers, they very greatly deserve our compassion.

2° Discreet, so that he may duly know what the origin of scruples is in the penitent; also whether he is scrupulous in all things, or in one thing only, so that he may be able to remedy the evils fittingly.

3° Prudent, namely in prescribing rules, which indeed ought to be general; for scrupulous persons are almost never able to accommodate themselves to particular rules, because they cannot apply them to themselves. Indeed they always doubt whether the case was sufficiently well explained and perceived, and whether the rule prescribed to them is well accommodated to that case.

4° Brief and peremptory in his answers, and, so far as can be done, let him define all things promptly and firmly; otherwise the penitent would be confirmed in his anxiety by the authority of the confessor himself.

II. For the various objects of scruples let him keep the following things before his eyes.

1° A scrupulous person concerning the hearing of Mass:

a) Let him not be distressed about intention; for this is present as long as it is not openly certain that he went to church solely from another end; nor b) about attention, since that external attention is sufficient which voluntarily admits nothing incompatible with advertence to those things which are carried on at the altar; c) let the confessor take care not to permit him to hear another Mass for the purpose of satisfying his scruple about Mass already heard, and let him take the same care with him who [source text breaks off after Latin: qui].

2° A scrupulous person is concerned about prayers to be recited by obligation, such as the divine office and sacramental penance. For the scrupulous person with regard to the divine office, - if a) he is anxious about intention, let it be said that the intention of satisfying the ecclesiastical law is not required, but that the intention of reciting is sufficient, even implicit and virtual, which he already has who takes the breviary in hand and in fact recites the office. - If b) about attention, let him openly say with St. Alphonsus¹ that he is not bound to repeat anything, unless he is certain that he rejected the intention of praying. - If c) about accurate pronunciation of the words, it should be advised that he not stick while reciting, but proceed without any anxious solicitude, without compression of voice, mouth, or chest, without motions of impatience or sadness. Finally, by whatsoever cause he is distressed, let him forbid repetition to him, and, if he suffers grave anxieties, even the recitation of the office.² With regard to sacramental penance, let him hold the same, with due proportion observed. Moreover, it will help to impose on him only easier penances, and to tell him that his own mind (namely, the confessor's) is once for all that he recite the imposed prayers only materially and mechanically, so that he satisfies even though he pronounces them with voluntary distraction.

3° A scrupulous person concerning past confessions. If the anxiety regards - a) preparation for the sacrament, let him render him secure, teaching that nothing is required except ordinary diligence and preparation. - If b) the confession itself, namely that he does not know whether he confessed certain things, or confessed them integrally, let him order him to be wholly silent about past things, especially if he has already made a general confession; for all sins innocently omitted have been taken away indirectly, by the force of the absolution already given, nor is anyone bound to search past things with so much inconvenience to himself, so that individual sins may be remitted directly. But if nevertheless he continues to be distressed, and affirms that he knows certainly that he has forgotten something, let him order him to confirm these three things by oath: 1° that the sin was certainly committed; 2° that it was mortal in his mind when he committed it; 3° that he certainly forgot it in confession. If he swears promptly, let him hear him; otherwise, if he hesitates. - If c) contrition and consequently the efficacy of absolution, let him teach him that confessions are not to be repeated unless it is certainly clear that they were invalid.

4° A scrupulous person concerning consent given to evil thoughts against chastity, faith, or charity should be ordered to despise these thoughts as mere phantasms, and, unless he can swear that he certainly and truly consented to them, to abstain from confessing them.

5° To scrupulous persons who in almost all actions are distressed by fear of sinning, it must be enjoined that they act strenuously against scruples, and abstain from confessing them, unless they are most certain that sin is present there. For although, in acting thus, they sometimes sin materially, they will not sin formally, by reason of the obedience which they must render to the confessor.¹ Nor does it matter that they act with an actual fear of sinning; for they do not therefore act against the dictate of conscience, but only against a vain apprehension, which vain apprehension cannot remove the judgment about the honesty of the action, previously formed from the judgment of the confessor or in some other way.

Notes to preceding text.

1 L. I. 17.

45. • A lax conscience is called that which, from a lighter reason, judges that what is illicit is licit; or finds only a venial sin where there is mortal sin: namely, that which, without sufficient reason, bends judgment in favor of liberty, either to avoid the law, or to diminish the gravity of fault.

Such a conscience is very greatly dangerous, as is easily clear to one attending to it; for it casts souls into the broad way, which leads to perdition.

It can be distinguished in three ways, namely: 1° a conscience lax simply, which tends to extend liberty more than is just, relying upon an opinion slightly probable or improbable, or even, according to St. Alphonsus (nn. 71-73), upon the less probable for liberty when the certainly more probable for the neglected law stands; 2° a cauterized conscience, which, from a long-standing habit of sinning, accounts grave sins, indeed even most grave sins, as nothing;¹ 3° a pharisaical conscience, which makes great things small, and conversely small things great. It takes its name from the Pharisees, who spurned the most grave commandments of the law, while they would have judged themselves guilty of great sin by eating with unwashed hands, or by passing over empty traditions.

46. • The things which generally pertain to a lax conscience can be comprised in these few words.

I. He sins gravely who, knowingly obeying a lax conscience, transgresses some law in a grave matter. And indeed ignorance of this kind, as being voluntary, can easily be overcome; therefore he cannot be excused from lethal sin under the pretext of this ignorance.

II. Indeed he can sin gravely in a light matter, if his own rashness impels him to act while any dictate whatsoever has been omitted and contemned.

Quest. What are the causes, effects, and remedies of a lax conscience?

Resp. to the first. The causes are: omission of prayer; tepidity of soul; excessive solicitude for temporal things; familiarity with sinful men; a custom of sinning, which removes the horror of sin; a soft life, which enervates the heart and turns it away from spiritual things.

Resp. to the second. The effects are blindness of mind; hardness of heart, which is scarcely wont to be moved by any means; obduration in evil, which induces the greatest danger to salvation, according to that saying of the Apostle:² According to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath.

Resp. to the third. The following remedies, among others, can be proposed: humble and assiduous prayer; sacred exercises; pious meditation on the last things, according to that saying: Remember thy last things, and thou shalt not sin forever;³ frequent reading of pious books; daily examination of conscience; frequent recourse to the Sacrament of Penance; flight from the wicked and conversation with the good; to adhere to the principles and opinions of St. Alphonsus, and frequently to handle his ascetical works; for the writings of the Most Zealous Doctor possess very great force for moving the soul, and for turning the mind away from secular and carnal desires and leading it back to God, as the experience of those proves who have read through them for some notable space of time.

47. Definition. - A certain conscience is that by which someone firmly and without fear of erring judges that something is good or evil.

Now certainty, or the certain generically, is that which determines the mind to assent. Certainty is divided in many ways; there is certainty of the supernatural order and certainty of the natural order. This latter is subdivided into metaphysical, physical, and moral certainty.

That is metaphysically or mathematically certain which is so essentially disposed that in no other way and by no power can it be or be conceived. That is physically certain which, although it does not have it from its essence that it cannot be otherwise, and therefore absolutely could be otherwise, nevertheless according to ordinary power cannot be otherwise. These things having been premised:

Moral certainty generically (for there are several species of it, as we shall see below) is that which neither by its own nature (and thus it differs from metaphysical certainty), nor from the ordinary course (and thus it is distinguished from physical certainty), has it that it cannot be otherwise, but is so disposed according to the estimate of the inner sense. More briefly it can be defined: that which is ruled by the laws which men use in their acts, or also: that which rests upon the estimate of the inner sense.

Moral certainty in species. - There are four species of moral certainty: direct and indirect; perfect and imperfect.

Direct moral certainty is that which is sought from direct principles, or which is obtained by reasons sought from the very nature of the thing. Thus it is directly certain that children owe love to parents; for the certainty of this matter is sought from the very relation of cause which parents have toward children.

Indirect or reflex moral certainty is that which is obtained by a reflected act of the mind, or which is sought from reflex or concomitant and indirect principles. Therefore this is not borne immediately upon its own object as direct moral certainty is, but mediately, namely through principles adduced from elsewhere. Similarly it does not have the ultimate reason of assenting in the object itself, as direct certainty does, but in something else, upon which the mind or intellect reflects. Thus, when there is a probable opinion concerning the non-existence of a law and another equally probable concerning its existence, then the non-existence of the law is not directly certain, but doubtful. But (and this is the reflex principle) a doubtful law does not oblige. Therefore, when it is equally probable that the law does not exist as that it exists, then this law does not oblige. And since the aforesaid reflex principle is certain, the conclusion also is certain.

Perfect moral certainty, which is also called absolute and strict, is that which is so founded upon moral laws, that is, those by which men are governed in their acts, that it is clearly perceived that the proposition cannot be false, for example, parents are to be honored.

Imperfect, or broadly so-called, certainty is that which belongs to those propositions in which it is not absolutely repugnant that there be error, although this can happen very rarely. This alone is understood when Moralists call something morally certain, and it admits various grades; namely, it is called highest when against it possibility alone militates; ordinary, if, besides possibility, certain slight moments militate against it, which, all things weighed, are reasonably contemned.

Note. - Not even an opinion certainly more probable enjoys this imperfect certainty, if it is considered speculatively and in itself. Wherefore St. Alphonsus must be understood in a comparative and practical sense when he calls an opinion of this kind morally certain; for this reason also he calls it quasi morally certain. In the same way, an opinion solitarily probable, which is also called probable certainty, is practically held as in the place of morally certain. More broadly on these matters, nn. 52, 53, 68.

Principle I. - Conscience cannot be a legitimate rule of operating unless it is certain; namely, the practico-practical judgment or conclusion of the particular syllogism (n. 32, Cor. II) must be so firm that the agent in no way doubts concerning the formal licitness of his action, but without fear of erring judges that he, in acting thus, does not sin, or that this is licit for him here and now. The reason is 1° because everything which is not of faith is sin (n. 35, II); 2° because he sins who deliberately commits himself to the danger of sinning; but he commits himself to such danger who operates uncertain whether he acts rightly and honestly; therefore, one operating thus sins. And indeed he who, uncertain concerning the goodness of the action, nevertheless acts, implicitly and interpretatively says: I wish to do this whether it is licit or illicit; which is a virtual contempt of the law. Likewise, he who, uncertain whether this or that is mortal, nevertheless operates, is so disposed in soul that he as it were says: even if to do this is a mortal sin, nevertheless I shall do it; which certainly is a grave delict. - Wherefore he who acts probably does not for that reason act prudently.¹

II. For the formal honesty of an action, imperfect moral certainty, even ordinary certainty, suffices, nor is the highest required.² This is the most common doctrine. - It is proved: 1° Because imperfect certainty, although only ordinary, is true certainty with respect to things to be done; and therefore one operating from such a conscience truly operates from faith; for from such certainty prudent men act, even in matters of grave moment. 2° Because perfect certainty, or even the highest imperfect certainty, generally cannot be had in particular moral actions; therefore, since God does not command impossibilities, imperfect certainty suffices.

III. For formal honesty, indirect certainty suffices, as will be proved below.

IV. It suffices that someone be certain, in act, concerning the licitness of his action; namely, it is not necessary that he judge reflexively that he is certain; it is enough that the operation be done as indubitably licit, or that no danger of formal sin appear. This is plain in itself.

48. Definition. - A doubtful conscience is a suspension of judgment concerning the goodness or malice of some act in particular. This happens, namely, when conscience suspends its assent for each part of the doubt, and remains uncertain and hesitating concerning the morality of its action. Moreover, since conscience is a practical judgment of reason, and here there is had only a suspension of judgment, it is clear that a doubtful conscience is not conscience in the true and proper sense of the name, but only improperly and in the usage accepted by the Schools.

Division. - Doubt is divided:

1. Into positive and negative. Positive doubt is either strict, and exists from equal or almost equal reasons for each part (which coincides with a probable opinion), or broad, when for one part alone there is present a grave motive, or a certainly graver one than for the other. Negative doubt is when reasons are supplied from neither part, or only very slight ones; and this also is deservedly called strict, for as a balance, so also the mind stands in equilibrium, whether there are no weights on either side, or equal ones.

2. Into doubt of law and doubt of fact. Doubt of law is when there is doubt either about the law, for example, whether fasting on such a day has really been prescribed in the law; or about its obligation, for example, whether the law of fasting obliges in such a case or not; or about the legitimate authority of the legislator, for example, whether he can prescribe fasting in such a case. Doubt of fact is when there is doubt about some fact, for example, whether the medicine which I am about to take is healthful or poisonous; whether he who lies hidden in the woods is a man or rather a beast.

3. Into speculative and practical doubt. Speculative doubt is when there is doubt concerning the goodness or malice of an action in itself, abstracting from the execution of the action itself: for example, whether to paint on a feast day is a servile work or not. Practical doubt is when there is doubt whether a singular action, with its circumstances and in order to the end of the agent, may lawfully be given over to execution; for example, whether it is licit for me, constituted in these circumstances, to do a servile work on a feast day; whether it is licit for me, a servant, to obey my master commanding me in this matter. Wherefore between each doubt there intervenes the same distinction (which indeed intervenes very widely) as between true and licit. For speculative doubt, although obliquely and secondarily, or consequently, it regards also the licit, nevertheless directly and principally regards the true. But practical doubt directly, immediately, and primarily regards the licit itself. According to this twofold species of doubt, even doubtful conscience itself can, indeed must, with St. Alphonsus, be divided in two ways, namely into a speculatively doubtful conscience and a practically doubtful conscience.

49. Principles. - I. A merely negative doubt is to be held as nothing, because it is founded upon absolutely no reason, or upon a very slight one: therefore, even if it remains, the obligation still urges, or liberty stands, according as it existed before; nor can it effect that the moral certainty of the opposite be overturned. But if a prudent suspicion of error arises for you, you are bound to inquire. And so, when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, you will easily solve them, once this rule has been established; and therefore we shall attend only to positive doubt.

II. It is never lawful to operate with a practically doubtful conscience, but the safer part must be followed. The reason is clear from what has just been said concerning certain conscience, principle I, n. 47. - But sometimes it is lawful to operate with a speculatively doubtful conscience, namely when, the practical doubt having been laid aside from a practically certain dictate, or from certain reflex principles, conscience is formed, as we shall soon say when treating of Probabilism.

50. Resolutions. - 1° As often as someone doubts whether an act which he is going to perform here and now is licit or not, he is bound to employ diligence in seeking the truth, congruent with the gravity of the matter and the condition of the person and place; namely, to consult upright and expert men, to investigate their practice, and to weigh the reasons with the sole pursuit of truth: otherwise he exposes himself, by negligence of inquiry, to the danger of violating the law, and sins in that very thing.

2° If he cannot inquire, nor is able of himself to weigh the reasons of each part, nor in another way, for example, through reflex principles, to free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical doubt, that is, with a truly doubtful conscience, and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3° He who, after diligent and sufficient inquiry has been made, still doubts whether there is present a law commanding or prohibiting, is not bound to obey this law; because he can form for himself a conscience from a reflex principle, namely that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where Probabilism is treated.

51. Questions. - Quest. 1° Does one sin gravely when operating with practical doubt concerning the gravity of sin?

Resp. Affirmatively. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to common principles, sins with that species of sin, both moral and theological, concerning which, practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he violates a certainly grave obligation of taking precautions lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of law which can be grave.

Quest. 2° Does he sin gravely who knows that his action is evil, but does not attend to its gravity?

Resp. It is disputed; but for St. Alphonsus¹ the sentence of those who say that such a one, of himself, sins only venially is sufficiently probable. The reason is that for sinning mortally it is required that someone consent directly or indirectly to what is mortal; but he who in no way thinks of or suspects what is mortal can in no way be said to consent to what is mortal. Therefore. Yet I have said: of himself, that is, supposing a) that he does not apprehend, at least confusedly, the danger of sinning gravely, or the obligation of investigating the matter; b) that the object is not certainly of itself a grave sin, of which kind, for example, it is in external sins whose gravity is known of itself to all, such as homicides, adulteries, thefts in grave matter, concerning which no one prudently supposes that they can be committed without advertence to grave malice, or at least without doubt about it, or without notable remorse of conscience; c) that the agent is of a fearful conscience; for otherwise, at least indirectly, he must be judged to consent to what is mortal.

52. • An opinion is called probable which rests upon a grave foundation, whether intrinsic, of reason, or extrinsic, of authority, so that it is able to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of error.

Probability, therefore, 1° adds something to opinion, namely a solid motive, but does not take away fear, and that a prudent fear, lest the contradictory be true. - 2° Between a probable and a certain opinion this distinction intervenes, that the latter excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite sentence is reputed altogether improbable.²

Various species of probability. Probability is distinguished in various ways:

1° By reason of the object, one probability is speculative or of fact, which is concerned with the truth of an opinion, for example, whether to paint on a feast day is a servile or liberal work; whether a contract entered upon with such a condition is usurious or not; whether a sacrament conferred with such matter is valid or null. - Another is practical or of law, which is concerned with the licit use of a probable opinion, or with the formal honesty of an action, for example, whether it is licit to paint on a feast day; whether to enter into a contract with such a condition; whether to confer a sacrament with such matter. Cf. n. 48, 3.

Therefore, as we have already said above, the true must be carefully distinguished from the licit; for a speculative doubt, although mediately and consequently it regards the licit, as is clear from the examples brought forward, nevertheless immediately and principally regards the true; but a practical doubt entirely regards the licit.¹

2° By reason of the foundation: a) one probability is intrinsic, which rests upon a grave reason sought from the very nature of the thing; another is extrinsic, which rests upon the authority of grave Doctors; b) an opinion is certainly probable when it rests upon a certainly grave motive; doubtfully probable, when upon a doubtfully grave one; slightly probable, when upon a slight one, namely one of such a kind that it is not able to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.²

Slight probability is not true probability, as is clear from the definition itself; just as slight fortitude or slight skill cannot be called true fortitude and true skill, but rather must be called weakness and lack of skill. Therefore it is nearly equivalent to possibility, which is not to be esteemed, because little is reputed as nothing, and consequently the slightly probable is equated with the improbable.³

3° By reason of degree, it is distinguished as solitary, sole, or not impeded, to which no probable opinion or reason is opposed; and comparative, to which an equally, less, or more probable opinion is opposed, according as this latter rests upon reasons equally, less, or more solid than the opposite.

Moreover, a more probable opinion is one thing when it is a little more probable, and this is called by St. Alphonsus that which rests upon a foundation a little graver than the contradictory, but at the same time with a prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contradictory also is judged probable. Therefore two opinions of this kind are almost equally probable; but little is reputed as nothing, since a small excess is fallacious. Another is evidently and notably more probable, whose foundations are certainly graver; or most probable, whose foundations are most grave, so that the sentence opposed to these is judged doubtfully or slightly probable. The notably more probable and the most probable are practically equated, because they differ little from each other.¹

Note. - The word most probable can be used in a threefold sense; for it signifies either 1° the most probable of all opinions in general; or 2° the most probable of the opinions which in a particular question are subjected to examination; or 3° the most probable in itself and absolutely taken (very probable). In this third sense it is regularly employed by St. Alphonsus; but the Holy Doctor very rarely uses this ambiguous word in weighing sentences.

53. Comparison of the probability of opposed opinions, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus. - After we have reviewed the various grades of probability, it will not be beside the matter to append a schema by which the reader will perceive at one glance how, according to St. Alphonsus, diverse opinions are opposed to one another. They are opposed thus:

1° To a true sentence, - morally certain: -

An improbable opinion (altogether).

2° To an opinion more true, - most probable, most grave, - more probable (notably, certainly, truly, absolutely): -

Not solidly probable (slightly, doubtfully).

3° To an opinion more probable (a little, doubtfully), - very probable, - probable (truly, certainly, gravely, solidly, absolutely): -

Probable (equally, almost equally, sufficiently).²

54. • It must be noted in this place that probability and the safety of opinions differ greatly. Probability is sought from the appearance of truth; safety, however, from the removal of the danger of sinning; but according as it removes that danger either altogether or more or less, the opinion is called safe, safer, or less safe. Moreover, the danger of material sin and the danger of formal sin can be considered here; and by this reason an opinion less safe with respect to the danger of material sin (as is generally considered in this question) can be altogether safe with respect to the danger of formal sin, which alone is imputed unto fault, as we shall prove below. Finally, although the opinion which stands for the law is safer, but that which stands for liberty less safe, it is clear that the more probable opinion is not always the safer; since the greater probability can be in favor of liberty.

55. • Reason alone constitutes the probability of opinions. Nevertheless, the authority of Doctors is of such great strength that it is sometimes equated with intrinsic probability, insofar as the Doctors are presumed to have diligently weighed the opinion which they hold and to have taught it on account of good reasons. Hence extrinsic probability is to be esteemed more from the merit and erudition of the Doctors, and also from their study and diligence in investigating the truth of the matter, than from their number.¹

Wherefore, for judging the probability of opinions, the following rules should be attended to.

56. • Who can judge concerning the probability of opinions.

1° Concerning intrinsic probability, only learned men and those versed in moral matters can judge; for many times to men indeed talented, but little instructed in moral science, that will seem evident which experts judge false.²

2° Concerning extrinsic probability, a moderately learned man can judge, if, rightly understanding the state of the question, he finds the asserted opinion as probable from Doctors greater than every exception, that is, entirely approved among theologians.

3° The unlearned, who are not able of themselves to consult Doctors, can stand by the testimony of preachers and confessors whom they judge upright, prudent, and learned.³

57. • When an opinion is to be held as probable.

1° Unless a certain and convincing reason militates against some opinion, certainly probable is to be held both that which, the Church tolerating it, is commonly asserted as probable by theologians generally or by most theologians; and that which five Doctors strong in authority simply teach, or which some Doctor of the Church holds; and then finally that which some great theologian testifies to be probable. Now he is esteemed a great theologian who possesses the greatest authority among theologians on account of his distinguished doctrine, prudence, and probity. Such are: Suarez, Soto, Azor, Cano, Sylvius, Cajetan, Bannez, Navarrus, Paludanus, Toletus, Sylvester, Lessius, Sanchez, Angelus, Vasquez, Armilla, Valentia, Laymann, Molina, de Lugo, Castropalaus, Bonacina, Emmanuel Sa, Pontius, Cabassutius, Collet, Roncaglia, the Salmanticenses, Petrocorensis, Abelly, Cardenas, Coninck, Gamachaeus, Isambert, and others, whose learning, how great it is, is known everywhere; besides St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, or Scotus, whose authority indeed must be preferred to others.¹ To these, mentioned in the last place, St. Alphonsus must be added, whose authority alone is so great that an opinion which he holds as probable must be held as extrinsically such.

2° The authority of a few Doctors who discuss some question expressly is to be preferred to the sayings of many others who write about it in passing. Indeed, sometimes, although rarely, the authority of one Doctor will be able to constitute an opinion probable, and even more probable, against the common opinion of others, if that author is very learned, upright, prudent, free from party zeal, and not a lover of novelties, and if he brings forward a valid reason which the others have not considered or have not sufficiently solved, while he himself conveniently solves the opposed reasons.

3° "Of Casuists who wrote after the condemned propositions, greater account is to be had than of the more ancient, in those things which regard the very opinions branded, or which are akin to them."²

4° Concerning particular cases not discussed by theologians, for a learned and God-fearing man that opinion is sufficiently probable which he knows that he himself has diligently examined, both by carefully weighing the reasons and by consulting the learned, and which he judges, without inordinate affection, to be such; for probability is not to be restricted to public doubts.

For the rules for discerning the judgment of St. Alphonsus concerning the value of sentences, see p. LXXXVIII sq.

58. • The controversy of theologians concerning the licit use of a probable opinion can be moved only when the question is about the honesty of the action alone, but by no means where there intervenes the danger of some evil that will follow, distinct from the honesty of the action. For all theologians, at least the more recent, agree that it is illicit to follow a probable opinion whenever from its use some evil is feared to be going to follow, which cannot be averted by the dictate of conscience and which we are bound to avoid.

For the understanding of this saying, it must be observed that the evil which is feared to be going to follow from some action can be either one only or manifold, namely either the lesion of honesty alone, or sin, or besides this some other temporal or spiritual evil distinct from the former. Thus, for example, homicide comprises both moral evil, or sin, and physical evil, or grave harm of the neighbor through privation of life.

Therefore, before we expound the systems of theologians concerning the choice of opinions which we can licitly follow, we must set aside the matter which is not their object.

59. Proposition. - Where there is present danger of an evil which does not depend upon conscience and which we are bound to avoid, the safer part must always be followed in doubt.

It is proved. When a man is bound to avoid some evil, he is also bound to avoid its danger; for in morals this is equivalent. But in speculative doubt concerning the honesty of the action alone, the danger of sin can indeed be removed; while in a doubt of this kind concerning an evil distinct from the morality of the action, the danger of this evil cannot be removed. Therefore in the former case, the danger having been removed, it is lawful to act with speculative doubt, but not in the latter.

The minor is proved. For in the former case conscience is the proximate and formal principle of the honesty of the act; but in doubt the reflex principles of Probabilism form the ultimate certain dictate of conscience concerning the honesty of the action, as we shall prove below: therefore the danger of formal sin is then altogether taken away. But the contrary obtains in the latter case. For an evil of this kind depends in no way upon the dictate of conscience, but upon what is true on the part of the thing. Therefore it can equally happen, whatever the conscience of the agent may be. Therefore unless we follow the certain or safer way, we do not avoid the danger.

It has been said: which we are bound to avoid; for sometimes there is a just cause for permitting an evil, and therefore its danger, either because between two evils the lesser must be chosen, or because the safer way is judged morally impossible. Therefore in a case of this kind it will be lawful to leave the safer way and to choose the less safe.

60. Corollaries. - From the proposition proved it follows that the use of an opinion, however probable, is prohibited by the precept both of religion and of charity and justice; but that the safer, or morally certain, sentence is to be followed where the question is about the validity of a sacrament, about danger to one's own soul, or about the spiritual or temporal harm of the neighbor.

And so the use of a probable opinion will be illicit:

I. In the administration and (practically) reception of the Sacraments, with regard to essentials; for the virtue of religion prohibits that they be exposed to the danger of frustration. - But that danger is not to be feared if either 1° the necessity of administering the Sacrament urges, provided that then it is conferred under condition; or 2° the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply, in which case it must be conferred absolutely: this indeed can be presumed in two Sacraments, namely a) in the Sacrament of Penance, if from a just cause it is conferred with jurisdiction probable in law; b) in the Sacrament of Matrimony, if there is present an ecclesiastical impediment doubtful by a doubt of law.¹ See proposition 1 among those condemned by Innocent XI, p. XV.

Note. - With regard to the matter of each Sacrament, the same degree of certainty is not required. LL. VI. 57, 461.

II. In danger of one's own harm (at least spiritual) or of the neighbor:

1° In things necessary for salvation by necessity of means; therefore, for example, in the matter of faith the safer religion must be followed. For in things absolutely necessary for salvation, the dictate of conscience does not take away the danger of damnation; therefore in these the axiom must be followed: "No security is excessive where eternity is endangered." Add that here the truth will most certainly offer itself to the one inquiring. For this reason proposition 4 was condemned by Innocent XI: "An infidel, not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity."

Similarly, it is wrong to follow several opinions which are indeed speculatively probable, but which, translated into practice, taking account of the common or special fragility of the operator, are certainly joined with probable danger of lapse into sin, as we shall say more broadly later.

Likewise, on account of scandal of the neighbor, a law must sometimes be observed which probably does not exist.¹

2° Physicians, surgeons, etc., from a pact even tacit, are bound to the safer means. Nevertheless, when the health of the sick person is despaired of, it is lawful to apply a dangerous means probably going to be useful, but also probably going to be harmful; because in that desperation of affairs some hope of life is to be preferred to the danger of hastening death. But it is not lawful, for the sake of experiment only, to apply remedies altogether uncertain and unexplored to the sick, even the desperate, with danger of gravely harming; for this is, as someone says, to seek medicines through deaths.²

The same holds in other similar cases. Therefore, for example, offensive war is illicit in doubt of law; the discharge of a gun is illicit in doubt of fact whether that at which one aims is a beast or a man, etc.³

3° A judge, from a pact with the republic, in a civil cause where neither party possesses in good faith, is bound to follow the more probable opinion, by rendering judgment in favor of that party for whom the more probable opinion stands. The reason is that justice obliges the judge to render to each one his own right according to the merits of the cause and the weight of the reasons which favor each one. Hence proposition 2 was condemned by Innocent XI: "I probably judge that a judge can judge according to the less probable opinion."

But if the cause of each litigating party is equally probable, the judge is bound to reconcile the parties through a settlement (what a settlement is, see n. 1051), by dividing the controverted thing, if it is divisible, or, if it is not divisible, its price between the parties. The reason is that in judgments there must be no respect of persons, which would be had if in such a case he favored one rather than the other. Hence the opposed doctrine was condemned by Alexander VII, proposition 26, p. XIV.

I have said: 1° where neither party possesses in good faith; because possession makes the reasons preponderate for the possessor, so that his condition becomes the better; 2° in a civil cause; because in criminal causes, where the question is about inflicting punishment, especially capital punishment, between opposed probable sentences the opinion favoring the accused must always be followed, even if it is less probable, according to the rule of Canon Law 11 in Sexto: "When the rights of the parties are obscure, the accused is to be favored rather than the accuser."

The same holds in other similar cases, whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right. For this reason, for example, hidden compensation is illicit unless the debt is certain.¹

198. Object of the treatise. - After the consideration of the end and of human acts in themselves (according to the material and formal element), there must be treated 1) the rules of acts according to which they must be directed (the exemplary cause), and 2) their principles (the efficient cause). The principles are the powers of man, concerning which philosophy treats, and habits, whether good or evil, concerning which there is discussion in the treatise on habits and virtues. But the rules are two: remote, objective, and extrinsic, which is law; and proximate, subjective, and intrinsic, or immediate, which is conscience. Hence after the treatise on human acts there logically follows the treatise on their proximate rule, conscience. For just as an archer must know the rules according to which he ought rightly to tend toward the target, so man must know the rules according to which his acts are orderable to the ultimate end.

Now general morals regards conscience only in general, as it ought to be in order that it be the rule of our acts and have for this the required qualities; in no way, however, does it consider the individual particular states or all the species of conscience, nor the modes of prudently forming conscience or of sinning against it: for all these things now pertain to special moral theology, and indeed to the treatise on the cardinal virtue of prudence, whose act is a right and well-formed conscience. Therefore in the present treatise we shall speak of three questions:

1. For the general part of the doctrine on Conscience, cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, 5, 6; Q. D. De Ver. 17; II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4; d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, 2, 3; Quodlibet III, 26-27; VIII, q. 16, a. 13; St. Antoninus, in Summa; St. Alphonsus, in Th. Mor.; Billuart, Bouquillon, Raphael of St. Joseph, Theol. Mechliniensis, Haine, in o. c.; Beaudoin, Tractatus de Conscientia; Noble, La conscience morale; Dumas, Theologia moralis thomistica, I.

1. of moral conscience according to itself (physical or psychological being);

2. of conscience as it is the rule of moral acts (moral being), or of the qualities required for moral conscience, namely, a) of its truth and rectitude on the part of the object; b) of its certitude on the part of the subject;

3. of conscience as it is the rule of supernatural acts (supernatural being).

205. Principle. Conscience is the rule of human acts in such a way that we never licitly act against it when it commands or prohibits; but we always licitly act according to it if it has the due qualities.

It is proved: to operate against conscience includes an evil will, for it is nothing other than to do that which is judged to be prohibited by God or to omit a precept (Rom. XIV, 23). Hence the axiom: Whatever is done against conscience builds unto Gehenna. This must be understood of conscience commanding or prohibiting, but not of conscience counseling or permitting, because the latter does not obligate. On the contrary, to act according to conscience is to do what we judge to be commanded by God or at least permitted. But to do what we judge to be commanded or permitted by God of itself includes the will to conform itself to the law and will of God. Therefore it is licit per se; namely, provided that that judgment of conscience have the due qualities, concerning which we are now going to speak.

But they are two: on the part of the object truth and rectitude must be present; on the part of the subject or assent, certitude. For conscience is the rule and measure of human acts. But every measure must be adequate, that is, true and right, not falsified; and certain, not ambiguous. Hence conscience must be true and right on the part of the object, and certain on the part of the subject.

216. What supernatural conscience is. - In the supernatural order, there must also be a supernatural conscience, which judges the supernatural quality and value or supernatural morality of our acts. It can be defined: a judgment or dictate of the practical intellect affirming that an act in particular, to be placed here and now, is supernaturally good or also meritorious of eternal life, or is not.

1. Cf. Noble, La conscience morale.

It differs from natural conscience:

a) in object: natural conscience regards only the natural goodness of the act; supernatural conscience also regards supernatural goodness; namely, it further asks whether the act tends to the supernatural end, or does not tend to it, or even turns away from it;

b) in end or motive: natural conscience proceeds from love of natural honesty, and intends to conform acts to reason; supernatural conscience also proceeds from a certain love of God Himself, at least initial and imperfect, and intends to conform acts to divine life begun or consummated, and to avoid the loss of that life and of God Himself for eternity;

c) in the law of which it is the application: natural conscience applies natural law, or also human law which perfects and determines it; supernatural conscience also applies the positive divine law, or also ecclesiastical law which determines and completes it.

217. Relation between natural and supernatural conscience. - Supernatural conscience does not exist separately and independently from natural conscience, so that in the faithful there would be two disparate and collateral consciences alternating with one another (for example, the philosophical conscience of a Stoic and the Christian conscience of a faithful man); but supernatural conscience includes natural conscience and subordinates it to itself, so that there is harmony and unity in the whole life and activity of man, and this whole life, with all its acts, is ruled by supernatural conscience. Hence in the faithful natural conscience is transformed and becomes supernatural; but once made supernatural, it includes natural conscience but exceeds it, so that the faithful person is bound:

1. to act also as man, and beyond this as a son of God;

2. also to act honorably in the natural life, but also more, namely, to act supernaturally in the divine life;

3. to observe the natural law, but also the new and positive precepts of God and of the Church relative to the sacraments, penance, religious piety toward God, and divine friendship;

4. to do good and cultivate virtue according to the measure of reason, but also according to the more excellent measure of divine law, in order to the more excellent divine life according to the exemplar of Christ Jesus humbling Himself, suffering, and obedient even unto death.

In one word, supernatural conscience does not destroy but perfects natural conscience, just as grace does not destroy but perfects nature.

218. Formation of supernatural conscience. - Supernatural conscience does not follow a process other than natural conscience, since grace does not destroy but perfects nature, but it is ordered to human acts of greater excellence. Whence it is the conclusion of a ratiocination. For just as natural conscience is founded on the first principle of synderesis: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, and on the natural inclination of the will to the honorable or rational good; so supernatural conscience is founded a) on the first practical principles of faith, for example, One must tend to God the supernatural end, or: The Supreme Good, to be possessed in itself by beatific vision, must be loved above all things, or: Happiness which consists in the vision of God must be procured, or: God destining us to His friendship and the fellowship of His life must be obeyed; and b) if it is perfect, on faith formed by charity, which inclines to the divine good, and on grace making one pleasing.

The major is not from synderesis alone, but principally from faith, informing and elevating and subordinating reason and synderesis; but in the just man faith obtains aid from the gifts of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom under the influence of the indwelling and moving Holy Spirit;

the minor is from reason under the influence of grace inspiring supernatural prudence with its annexed virtues; but in the just man it is under the influence of the habit of infused prudence (with the annexed virtues), and also sometimes under the influence of the gift of counsel through the Holy Spirit: for just as, for living life honorably, we seek counsel among the wise and prudent, so, in place of human counselors, the indwelling Holy Spirit Himself deigns to become our counselor in order to eternal life;

the conclusion is enunciated under the influence of supernatural prudence with its annexed virtues.

The immediate principle, therefore, of supernatural conscience is infused prudence with the annexed virtues; the mediate principles are the theological virtues and the gifts of the indwelling and moving Holy Spirit, so that God Himself has immediately bestowed all the powers of this conscience. Christian conscience, namely, in its origin, progress, and perfection, is the work of divine grace.

1. Faith informs reason and synderesis, elevates them, and subordinates them to itself; whence consequently, under the light of faith, synderesis can enunciate the first supernatural practical principles. And indeed, supposing that faith teaches that God has elevated us to a supernatural end, and that our highest good is only in the beatific vision of God Himself, reason now sees that one must tend to that end, and that the supreme good possessed in this way must be loved in all acts. Nor should you say that synderesis does not have the idea of a supernatural end; for synderesis is not given for conceiving ideas, but, ideas having been supposed, it sees and with facility enunciates their fittingness or unfittingness. Nor let it be said that this is against the doctrine of St. Thomas, q. 62, a. 1 and 3. St. Thomas does not expressly speak of supernatural conscience, but everywhere says that the Major is posited by synderesis in conscience; but he speaks not only of the conscience of philosophers but also of the conscience of the faithful. Therefore.

2. II-II, q. 52, a. 2, ad 3.

219. Corollaries.

1. Therefore supernatural conscience is more perfect than natural conscience and perfects it, for a) it exceeds it, as was said in n. 217; b) it is clearer, because it rests upon the principles of faith, is illumined by faith, and is formed under the aid of grace; c) it is more certain, because divine revelation, upon which it is founded, is more certain than human reason, as given to us by the infallible authority of God and proposed by the infallible authority of the Church, and because it has security from the light of the Holy Spirit.

2. Since Christian conscience includes natural conscience, in order that it be the rule of acting honorably, it must have the same qualities, namely, rectitude and certitude.

3. Yet in order that conscience be the rule of supernatural acts, that invincibly erroneous conscience by which, namely, in good faith someone would think an act to be supernatural or meritorious of eternal life does not suffice. Good faith can suffice for honesty, because honesty depends upon conscience or our judgment, but not so the supernatural value of the act. For the judgment of reason or conscience cannot make an act supernatural and proceeding from grace, nor make it efficacious for obtaining eternal life. The question, namely, is not of honesty alone but also of the validity of the act and the efficacy of the means to the end (n. 215, 3).

46. Object of the treatment. - The virtues joined to prudence are given for forming a right judgment concerning particular operations; here chiefly the judgment of moral conscience comes to be attended to. Good counsel (of eubulia) is ordered to right practical judgment (synesis or gnome), through which it is terminated, just as judgment is ordered to command or precept, which judgment commits to execution. Therefore, just as command is the proper and chief act of prudence itself, so the right judgment of conscience, which is formed from the counsel prerequisite and according to which command must be made, is a certain proper or chief act of the annexed virtues which prudence uses for its own proper end. Whence, after we have spoken of prudence itself, now one comes to speak specifically of the virtues annexed to it, considered in the practical formation of conscience.

1. Thus John of St. Thomas, on I-II, q. 18-21, disp. 12, n. 14 and 16; Suarez, on I-II, disp. 12, n. 8; Laymann, Moral Theology, on conscience, c. 2, n. 3; Mercorus, Basis of the Whole of Moral Theology, a. 1; Contenson, Theology of the Mind and Heart, diss. 3, spec. 1, q. 1; Gotti, Scholastic-Dogmatic Theology, on conscience, dub. I, XV, and 2; Billuart, Theology, on human acts, diss. 5, a. 1; Patuzzi, Moral Theology I, on conscience, a. 1, VI; and among more recent authors: Beaudoin, Treatise on Conscience, p. 9; Prummer, Moral Theology I, n. 303; Aertnijs-Damen, Moral Theology I, n. 48bis; Garrigou-Lagrange, in Revue Thomiste, 1925, p. 346; Dumas, Moral Theology I, thesis XX, B.

2. St. Thomas does not treat specially of the virtues annexed to prudence; nevertheless he is accustomed to do this for the virtues pertaining to the other cardinal virtues. This perhaps can be explained from the fact that they are ordered to operating together with prudence, and not to exercising offices separately; also from the fact that they are immediately concerned with particular and contingent things, and therefore pertain less to science but more to a certain art of directing life. But since special questions about conscience and its formation have now obtained a great place in practical theology, therefore they must be specially attended to and specifically considered; and indeed in the treatise on prudence and the virtues annexed to it, to which they pertain as to their proper place. Cf. those things which we wrote in Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 1926: What place must be assigned to the treatise on Conscience?

But it is sufficient to consider antecedent conscience concerning things to be done in the future, nor is it specially necessary to regard consequent conscience concerning past deeds: for from antecedent conscience an act is easily judged after it has been done, because according to the same habits and according to the same principles an examination is made concerning deeds already done, and counsel and judgment concerning things to be done.

47. What we suppose known from the general part of moral science. - From the general part of moral theology, which treats of moral conscience in general, we have already learned several things, to be briefly recalled in the present place, namely:

1. What antecedent moral conscience is. It is a proximately practical judgment concerning the honesty of an action, that is, a judgment of the practical intellect dictating concerning the goodness or malice of those things which here and now, that is, in the individual, all circumstances considered, are to be done; or affirming that an act in particular and in the concrete is licit or illicit and therefore to be placed or omitted by us. Therefore conscience is a judgment not merely speculative concerning the truth of the thing alone, but practical concerning the honesty of the action, and indeed proximately practical, so that it may shine before the operation here and now to be placed and direct it, that it may be honorable.

2. That conscience, since it is a judgment, is an act, not a permanent habit, and therefore is distinguished:

a) From synderesis (sens des évidences; bevattelijkheid der grondbeginselen of grondregels), which is the habit of first practical principles (for example, Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided), and from moral science (kennis der zedeleer), which is the acquired habitual cognition of general conclusions deduced from first principles concerning the goodness and malice of acts in the genus and in the abstract (for example, theft is evil); conscience is an actual judgment, namely a particular conclusion deduced from first principles concerning the goodness and malice of an act in particular and in the concrete, such as it is here and now with the end and all circumstances to be placed by the agent (for example, this act is theft and now is to be avoided by me).

I. Scruple is said metaphorically from scrupus, which is a rough little stone hidden in the shoe of one walking, yet bringing annoyance and impediment in walking; and therefore in morals it is a spiritual stumbling-block which impedes a man from proceeding with unoffending foot and free step in the way of truth and Christian practice. Hence an empty apprehension, and the fear and anxiety arising from it, that there is sin somewhere where there is none, or that it is greater than it is, is thus called. A certain mental obsession (kwelgedachte) and hyperesthesia of sin is accustomed to accompany this apprehension; and thus scruple is now a mental disease, and indeed of the moral order: a morbid anxiety of soul concerning an obligation to be executed, or concerning sins committed or to be committed.

Therefore three elements are required for it: first, of the intellectual order, a futile reason which besets the mind and whose solution does not appear, arising indeliberately after the manner of a fixed idea, violently intruding itself, pertinaciously recurring; second, of the affective order, empty fear of sinning arising from this, which holds the attention fixed and impedes the will from turning the mind away from it and determining it to firm assent; third, the effect proceeding from both, agitation, disquiet, and disturbance of soul. It can concern the past, as if someone from a futile reason fears that he omitted some sin or circumstance in confession, that he examined himself insufficiently, that he consented to temptation; or concerning the present or future, as if someone from a similar reason fears that what he does or is going to do is sin.¹

¹ Concerning scruples cf. Pitres and Regis, Les Obsessions et les Impulsions; P. Janet, Les Obsessions et la Psychasthenie; les Nevroses; Dr. Raymond, Nevroses et Psychonevroses; Eymieu, Le Gouvernement de soi-meme, 2nd vol.; Grasset, Demi-fous et demi-responsables; Le Psychisme inferieur; Gemelli, De Scrupulis; d'Agnel and d'Espiney, Psychotherapie des troubles nerveux; Le Scrupule. Likewise Scaramelli, Directorium asceticum; Reuter, Neo-conf., nn. 255-274; Billuart, de Conscientia; St. Alphonsus, Th. M., I, nn. 11-19; Praxis conf., nn. 95-98; Raphael of St. Joseph, Institutiones fundamentales Theologiae moralis, de Conscientia; Durois, L'Ange conducteur des ames scrupuleuses; Pere Raymond, Le Guide des Nerveux et des Scrupuleux; Grimes, Traite des Scrupules; Beaudoin, Tr. de Conscientia; and other authors in this treatise, as Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mechl., Prummer, and Vermeersch; Leroux in the periodical Revue Eccl. de Liege, May, June, and Nov. 1912; Legrand in the periodical Coll. Brugenses, Nov.-Dec. 1922, March-April 1923.

II. Scrupulous conscience. - From what has been said it is now understood what scrupulous conscience in the proper sense is: namely, it is a dictate of the practical intellect founded on scruples; hence it is a conscience which with anxiety doubts, suspects, or probably thinks and fears, on account of light and contemptible reasons, that a work here and now to be placed is evil, when it is not, or that it is worse than it is, e.g., that it is mortal when it is venial.

Therefore from scrupulous conscience properly so called, or formed by scruples, must be distinguished:

a) scrupulosity, that is, a habit or state of so irrationally fearing sin, which nevertheless they often call, but in an improper sense, scrupulous conscience. For it is not conscience, that is, an actual judgment of the intellect, but a habitual disposition by which we are inclined and prone to scruples and to having a scrupulous conscience;

b) a conscience agitated by scruples, or tortured and vexed, which judges an act to be licit, although from light causes it fears somewhat and is anxious lest it be illicit: mere scruple or apprehension, imagination, and anxiety of itself is not conscience or a dictate of reason, but a shadow and likeness of conscience, and can remain while the judgment of a certain conscience despising scruples stands;

c) a fearful conscience, which reasonably with tranquility fears sin from filial fear by which it would not wish to offend God even in the least thing;

d) a tender or delicate conscience, which adverts and judges the smallest defects, but according to the norm of truth.

III. The signs and manifestations of a scrupulous conscience are: 1) pertinacity in the argumentation of one's arguments and in judgment, by which someone out of fear of sin acquiesces in the judgment of no one; - 2) on the contrary, timidity at the same time in conclusions, and therefore frequent change in judgment from a light appearance, so that he is unable to pronounce definitively; and distrust of self, by which someone suspects defects either of the intellect in grasping or interpreting responses, or of words in proposing difficulties, or of memory in retaining counsels given or positive precepts, indeed or even of his own facts, so that he doubts concerning a door closed by himself, concerning a light extinguished, concerning hours recited, concerning Mass heard; - 3) desire of consulting books or asking new confessors; - 4) reflections, accusations, or impertinent, prolix, or repeated questions concerning several circumstances which were present in the action or could have been present, or concerning the response of the confessor; - 5) disturbed and inordinate manners and gestures in avoiding sins or handling affairs, and a manner as if coerced of rushing into an action concerning which he was anxiously inquiring, and as if blind of proceeding in external works; - 6) fear of sin in those things which by all are held as licit; - 7) excessive disquiet and anxiety concerning past actions, e.g., confession, recitation of the breviary, made with moral diligence, and consequently the will of repeating the same again and again; - 8) inconstancy and defect of firmness in the purpose of preserving peace, being silent concerning scruples, omitting a new inquiry into the matter, or simply obeying.

IV. Causes of scruples are all those things which weaken the nervous system and diminish the energy of the soul.

1. Internal causes: a) mediate on the part of the body: a melancholic disposition or temperament prone to suspecting evil and to sadness, which can also come from heredity or from a certain degeneration;² solitude or flight from every human conversation and recreation; and weakness of the head, even arising from immoderation in abstinences, vigils, and studies; or from a weak and infirm constitution, insufficient nutrition and disturbance of nutritive functions, depressing emotions, bodily disease gravely weakening, or also psychasthenia, which scarcely permits a more intense attention of the soul for forming an equitable judgment concerning practical matters;

² Melancholy is numbered among the causes because melancholics everywhere are sharp in talent and suspicious by nature, and tenacious of the things which they apprehend; thus they are prone to every suspicion of evil, wish to scrutinize even the smallest things, and with difficulty acquiesce in others; all these things predispose to scruples.

b) immediate on the part of the soul, whether in the intellect: subtlety of talent which easily finds reasons for doubting, or in all things seeks mathematical certitude; weakness of mind and defect of judgment, women are more often scrupulous than men; weakness and inconstancy of soul by which it follows vivid imaginations rather than mature judgment; - or in the affection: hidden pride tenaciously adhering to its own judgment; pusillanimity which does not know how to contemn fears and casts down the soul.

Therefore there is a twofold genus of the scrupulous: some are rather intellectual, others excessively sensitive and timid from a certain phobia. In each case there is a defect both 1) of practical judgment or prudence in estimating particular circumstances, and 2) of energy or fortitude, perseverance, or constancy of the will, which does not command the intellect to be content with practical certainty and certainty improperly so called, or does not moderate the imagination and sensitive appetite and thus does not move to a serene examination free from the influence of imagination and anxiety.³

³ Some, such as Grasset and Leroux, reduce scruples to diseases of the will; nevertheless their first cause seems to be defect of practical judgment which precedes the exercise of the will. Grasset himself confesses: "The fixed idea takes over the will an unjust and undeserved dominion, uncoercible, irresistible, disproportionate, senseless." Moreover there does not seem to be a sickness of the will which does not depend on a mental sickness, since the act of the appetitive power follows cognition and is essentially proportioned to it. Cf. Vermeersch, Th. M., I, n. 34, citing St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 1. But if sickness of practical judgment is called sickness of the will, the speech is not correct, but the question will be about the name.

2. External causes are: a) God, by not granting light or strength, permitting scruples as a punishment of sin, amendment of conscience, liberation from tepidity, exercise of humility, greater generosity of soul, exercise in virtue and confidence, horror of sin, increase of merit, mystical probation, etc.; or even on account of the good of others, that we may learn to direct the scrupulous;

b) the devil exciting scruples in the imagination and sensitive appetite for torturing the pious, especially by nourishing sadness, so that they become weary in virtue, seek external consolations until they are led to desperation concerning salvation, by which they decline to laxity, indeed to all vices, or even inflict death on themselves;

c) education too constricted or harsh, or too soft, conversation with the scrupulous and reading of rigid books, or of books treating of the moral matter, by one who does not know how to judge them rightly.⁴

⁴ Concerning the distinction of scruples, whether they are from God, from the devil, or from the corruption of nature, see Reuter, o. c., nn. 258-260.

V. Harmful effects of scruples. - The harmful effects are many, and very great temporal and spiritual damages can come from scruples to which consent is given, from whatever cause they arise. And indeed:

1. in bodily life, agitation and anxiety attenuate the powers, exasperate the nerves, weaken and disturb the nervous system, and prepare the way for neurasthenia, hysteria, and other diseases;

2. in intellectual life, they disturb rectitude of judgment; indeed they lead to insanity if they are universal, to monomania if they turn about one object;

3. in social life, they diminish consideration of the neighbor, take away aptitude for exercising social relations authoritatively or mercifully, and render one gravely troublesome to others;

4. especially in spiritual life, they cause loss of time in attacking empty phantasms, negligence and inequality for the duties of state, dry up devotion and turn one away from prayer and reception of the sacraments, excite distrust toward God and pusillanimity of spirit, whence sadness, dejection of soul, and desperation arise, which sometimes leads to suicide or unbridled lust.

VI. Remedies of scruples are: 1. To remove or diminish their internal causes: melancholy and solitude by comforts and cheerful recreations; weakness of the head by the counsels of a wise physician; defect of judgment by practical instruction of conscience; pride by humility and submission of judgment; inconstancy and weakness of soul by exercise and strengthening of the will; timidity and pusillanimity by meditation on the goodness of God and confidence in God, etc.

In species, intellectual scrupulous persons should be persuaded that in moral matters mathematical certitude is not to be sought, that attention is not to be given to all things which can happen, but only to those which likely occur, and that anxiety of the appetite is to be carefully discerned from the judgment or state of the intellect. But the timid should learn to act firmly in every matter, strongly neglect the anxiety which they experience in acting, trust in the goodness of the divinity, and keep in mind and often renew a firm purpose of sharp struggle against scruples.⁵

⁵ Thus for strengthening the will; concerning this cf. Eymieu, who methodically describes the process of cure according to which 1) sensations not only sad but merely passive and emotional are to be avoided; 2) physiological care is to be instituted from the things sought: rest, sleep, distractions, placid tranquility without fatigue, and leaving behind the environment in which ordinary life is turned; 3) activity is to be exercised and the will educated by various means by which the scrupulous person learns to will, to consent, to attend to physical or intellectual labor, to apply efforts, and to will strongly, firmly, and constantly under uniform and unconquered discipline, malgre tout.

2. To avoid external causes, namely scrupulous persons or writings which are an occasion for them, and excess of intellectual labor.

3. To flee idleness and carefully apply oneself to labor, especially that which delights more, namely for avoiding empty thoughts.

4. To act with a great and mortified soul against scruples, repelling them as evil and harmful thoughts, especially indirectly, by contemning them and applying the soul to other things, and never consenting to them, not even once.

5. To act as other pious and God-fearing men act.

6. Especially: to obey the superior or confessor, who is to be chosen not as scrupulous, but prudent, even rather than holy, in a humble, blind, and perfect manner, and rather often to ask this obedience from God with great confidence; this is almost the only efficacious remedy.

VII. Special principles according to which the scrupulous are to be directed:

1. The scrupulous person cannot be ruled by his own judgment, because his reason is powerless for this; therefore nothing remains except that he be governed by the reason of others, e.g., of the superior or confessor, who should say that he is scrupulous and in what matter,⁶ and that in this matter he can and must follow the judgment of the superior, and that by obeying he cannot sin, unless he is altogether certain both that sin is present and that the judgment of the superior cannot be applied here and now; indeed even if he is certain, or if he says that he everywhere has evidence of obligation and sin, provided it is established that he is so scrupulous that phantasy fashions for him that he is certain. For although by acting thus the scrupulous person may sometimes err, nevertheless he will not sin by reason of the obedience which he owes to the superior or confessor.

⁶ For in other matters he is rather often lax. "From pusillanimity it follows that someone is drawn back from works of virtues on account of fear of sinning. Indeed sometimes for avoiding light sins he is carried to graver ones. This happens especially to one laboring under a scrupulous conscience concerning a special matter, for example concerning the recitation of the Hours, celebration of Mass, etc. For often other things are reputed as nothing, and with a scrupulous conscience a lax one is nourished. It is no wonder, since they proceed from the same root, namely from smallness and lightness of soul; e.g., not rarely it happens that one who anxiously repeats the words of consecration does not care concerning the cleanliness of vessels or corporal, nor look to other duties of his office." Beaudoin, Tr. de Conse., q. 4.

Namely the presumption stands for the confessor as for the superior, who must be obeyed unless it is certainly established that he errs in prescribing a rule and cannot impose such a rule, and that obedience is illicit. And the scrupulous person can follow such a universal rule, as morally altogether necessary to his sound life, even if from this in a particular case error or material sin can follow. That effect can be considered as accidental and legitimately permitted on account of a proportionate cause. For he has the right of applying efficacious means which of themselves are honorable for being healed.

2. The scrupulous person easily exaggerates or fears sin; hence with him a grave doubt, which in others would be reasonable, "that in the case sin is present," is judged empty and to be spurned; and a light doubt "that in the case there is not sin" is judged founded.

Let him not carefully examine these doubts so that he may arrive at certitude: for he cannot arrive at this, and no one is bound to the useless. Hence he must be told that he can act freely unless he is altogether certain that sin is present; indeed if he is certain, provided it is established that he is so scrupulous in this or that matter that phantasy fashions for him that he is certain.

3. A positive obligation, namely of an affirmative precept, e.g., of confessing sins integrally, examining conscience, saying the Hours, making fraternal correction, does not oblige with great inconvenience; hence the scrupulous person can more easily be exempted from it.

VIII. A scrupulous conscience is not a rule of acting prudently, both because it is uncertain and because it is vincibly erroneous; but it is to be put aside, at least by a judgment from indirect principles handed down by the confessor, e.g., in the following manner: Whatever may be the case concerning the material liceity or illicitness of this action, it is certain that in such doubts one must obey the confessor; that I can and must act as the confessor said; that I can neglect my doubt or judgment; that by obeying I cannot sin, etc. But in the case such a doubt or such an apprehension is present. Therefore...⁷

⁷ You will find this proposed among theologians in various formulas. Thus, for example, Lessius: "Although I, as regards myself, would rather judge this to be sin, nevertheless because my confessor says the contrary, I can and will do this which he told me, since he is for me the interpreter of the divine will." And Reuter, o. c., n. 263, remedy 2: "Although I judge this to be sin, nevertheless because my judgment is fallible, and the confessor told me that this is licit for me, I can and will do what he told me must be done, and I am certain that I do well, because God wills that I obey him"; and remedy 7: "In rightly forming conscience there is no difficulty or danger. Only think: 1) that it is the will of God that I contemn scruples; theologians indicate this to me..., my confessor who bears the place of God; but by following the will of God I cannot sin, and if it should happen that I erred materially, this cannot be imputed, since I follow directors given by God. 2) Besides, by yielding to scruples I harm body and soul, I render myself inept for God's service and become burdensome to the neighbor: I will live in perpetual torture... God does not oblige me to these things. For what brings excessive difficulty is morally impossible, nor does God oblige to it... 3) What I see prudent and upright persons do or contemn as trifles, this is licit also for me; I see prudent and upright persons do this or contemn it as trifles; therefore, etc."

Hence, although to act against a scrupulous conscience is not licit, nevertheless one can act against scruples; indeed, lest he incur grave damage, sometimes he is bound to do so even under grave obligation. Not indeed if he remains in full doubt, for to act with a doubtful conscience is illicit, but provided that he in some way puts this aside and forms for himself a certain conscience, by judging, e.g., from the judgment of the confessor, that it is a scruple and by contemning it. For a scruple, because it is an empty apprehension of phantasy, does not render the doubt serious, and does not impede the judgment of conscience previously formed from being practically certain. Lessius, de Prud., c. 1, n. 2, is to the point:

"Prudence is not always able to exclude scruple totally. For this often perseveres with the judgment of prudence; nevertheless in order that then the judgment be prudent, it must be reputed a scruple, and thus prudence also in a certain way excludes the scruple. For although the imagination of sin perseveres with a certain anxiety, nevertheless through prudence it is reputed a shadow, not truth."

But one need not always actually remember the principles and rules handed down above and by them form for oneself an actual dictate concerning the honesty of the action, because this is often morally impossible for the scrupulous person. As St. Alphonsus says, Th. M., l. I, n. 19:

"Nor is there need that in each particular act he form this judgment... for it is enough that from the judgment once formed he act against the scruple; because on account of past experience that judgment exists virtually or habitually in his conscience, although obscured by darkness. Moreover while the scrupulous person operates in that confusion, often he does not operate with scruple or deliberate fear, for ordinarily he would not wish to omit what he knew to be pleasing to the divine will."

From this certain conclusions for practice can be noted with Fr. Vermeersch, Th. mor. I, n. 382:

Conscience can be defined: a judgment concerning the honesty or dishonesty of an act to be placed here and now. It is called, 1st, a judgment, for conscience is not some special faculty, but the intellect itself insofar as it actually judges. It is called, 2nd, concerning the honesty or dishonesty of an act, because this judgment does not regard the utility, fittingness, or facility of the act, but only its morality, or its relation of order or deformity to right reason. It is called, 3rd, to be placed here and now, for that judgment regards the action at hand which it ought to direct, but not a past action. Hence conscience differs from synderesis, which is: a habit of first principles concerning things to be done. Cf. St. Thomas, p. 1, q. 79, arts. 12 and 13. - St. Alphonsus, n. 2. - Bouquillon, n. 248.

Conscience is distinguished in many ways, for it is:

1st. Right or erroneous, according as it dictates what is true or false.

2nd. Certain or doubtful, according as the mind firmly judges something to be good or bad, or, on the contrary, remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action.

3rd. Scrupulous or lax, according as, either from an empty motive, it apprehends sin where there is none, or, on the contrary, from a lighter cause, presumes sin to be absent, or holds as light what is grave.

4th. Probable or improbable, according as the mind is inclined to opine from a grave or from a weak motive. Concerning each separately.

DISSERTATION V

ON CONSCIENCE

In a twofold way we can conform to conscience: negatively, by not acting against it; positively, by acting according to it.

I say 1°: It is never licit to act against conscience, whether prohibiting or commanding, whether true or erroneous, even if it err vincibly; so that, if conscience dictate something to be prohibited, that cannot be put into act, and if it dictate something to be commanded, that cannot be omitted.

This is common opinion with the Author¹. ¹ Here q. 19, a. 5, c.; Ia p., q. 79, a. 13, c.

It is proved 1° from that of the Apostle ad Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. For by faith the holy Fathers and interpreters commonly understand conscience.

It is proved 2° by reason². 1° Conscience is the proximate and immediate rule of human acts, namely inasmuch as it intimates or applies the law here and now commanding or prohibiting, whether because by force and name of law it prohibits or commands this act, although perhaps the law neither prohibit nor command it. Therefore to act against conscience is to act against the law actually binding, at least judged such; which cannot come to pass without contempt of law. 2° He sins who wills sin and is allured by it³. But he who acts against conscience, even erring, wills sin. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. He wills sin who does what he judges to be sin. But he who acts against conscience does what he judges to be sin. Therefore. ² Ibid. ³ Quodlib. 3, a. 26, c.

I say 2°: We are bound not only not to act against an invincibly erroneous conscience, but we are bound absolutely to act according to it, while it dictates something to be done as of precept¹. ¹ Here q. 19, a. 6, c.

It is proved: 1° Because omission of the act which invincibly erroneous conscience dictates to be of precept is no more from faith than the doing of the act which it dictates to be prohibited. 2° Because not to act according to invincibly erroneous conscience commanding something is to act against it: thus, e.g., if conscience dictate to thee invincibly that thou must lie in order to save the life of thy neighbor, if thou act not according to it by lying, by this very fact thou actest against it. But from the preceding conclusion it stands that it is not licit to act against an invincibly erring conscience. Therefore.

[ Not only he who acts with an invincibly erroneous conscience does not sin, but also, more probably, acquires merit. The reason is, that to pronounce some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Since therefore one who acts prudently acts, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end which he intends and by whose power he acts, namely the glory of God or charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he demerits who does a work materially good but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end unto which it is directed. This is drawn from this principle, that, if integrally or adequately, that is materially at once and formally, acts are specified by object and end; nevertheless, under the latter respect, their morality is determined by end alone, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3, c.: « Moral acts properly take their species from the end. » Whence he concludes, Quodlib. II, a. 27, c.: « A human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the good apprehended, into which the will tends, and not according to the material object of the act. » And herein he consents to Augustine saying lib. II de Moribus Ecclesiae et Manich., c. 13, n. 27: « If the end to which the things we do are referred, that is for the sake of which we do whatever we do, have been not only blameless but also laudable, then at length our deeds also are worthy of some praise. » To which accords Bernard in lib. de Praecepto et Dispensat., c. 14, n. 41: « And indeed, he says, I should call worthy of praise pious intention alone, nor shall good will itself be plainly defrauded of due recompense even in a work not good. » ]

I say 3°: More probably we are bound to act according to a vincibly erring conscience commanding something to be done, not absolutely, but conditionally and on the hypothesis that it be not laid aside, as it can and ought to be laid aside. It is the opinion of John of St. Thomas, Serra and many others, against Sylvius and many others.

It is manifest by the same reasons: both because omission of the act which erroneous conscience dictates to be of precept is not from faith; and because not to act according to a vincibly erring conscience commanding something to be done is to act against it, as I was just now saying of invincibly erring conscience. Therefore.

You will say: One can and is held to lay aside that conscience. Therefore he is not held to act according to it. Indeed he can and is held to lay it aside; but, if he lay it not aside, what must he do? In this supposition alone our conclusion runs. And we say that he is held to follow it, because he cannot act against it; but he would act against it if he did not follow it. — Thou wilt infer: Therefore he will be bound to sin, because he sins by following it. So it is. He will be bound to sin, not absolutely, but from a supposition voluntary on his part, which he can take away by laying aside his conscience. Which is not inconvenient.

You will ask 1° how he who labors under vincibly erroneous conscience ought to lay it aside.

I answer. that he ought to lay it aside with prudence and maturity, lest, if he lay it aside rashly, and perhaps the conscience which he suspects to be erroneous be not erroneous, he expose himself to danger of doing ill what conscience prohibited, or omitting ill what it commanded. He ought therefore to employ humble prayer to the Father of lights, examine the whole matter exactly, consult books or learned men, and employ such diligence as prudent and upright men are wont to employ in weighty affairs. Speaking regularly, however, there suffices for the unlettered, indeed also for scrupulous lettered men, the judgment of pastor, confessor, or superior, saying that the conscience is erroneous; because by right it is presumed that God denies not to those whom he has set as rectors of others the light necessary for ruling them, while they themselves lack it.

[ These things indeed are true regarding him who here and now in any way advertises or suspects the necessity of inquiring into the licitness of an action before he put it into act. But it can happen that, even if the error be truly vincibly contracted, because it was formerly incurred culpably, the agent in the present neither adverts to it nor suspects it. This happens to a confessor who once cultivated theology insufficiently, or too long neglected its study through negligence. Of such a confessor St. Thomas most rightly says, q. 17 de Veritate, a. 8, ad 8, that « he is never excused from sin, » whether he act according to conscience or against it. And the reason of this decision is evident, because there remains the sin, however old it be supposed, of culpable ignorance of those things which one is held to know, that he rightly fulfill the duties of his own state. This guilt is indeed not incurred at the instant at which one is about to act, but it is a fault of diligence formerly omitted and independent of present action. Whence the gravity of this sin is not drawn from the action now to be put forth, but must be estimated from the common principles concerning sins of ignorance. Hence is also seen why, in this case, he is more guilty who acts against conscience than he who acts according to it. For the latter has only the aforesaid guilt of ignorance; the former truly, besides this, adds now another guilt of an action put forth against conscience, from the principle enunciated by the Apostle, Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. — If he who labors under such ignorance retract the admitted fault through congruent penance and added diligence, as is fitting, he is to be equated with him who lives in invincible ignorance. ]

You will ask 2° whether a subject can obey a superior against conscience dictating that it is illicit here and now to obey him.

I answer. in the negative; because, as was said, it is never licit to act against conscience, and it binds by force of divine precept, which outweighs the precept of man. Yet if it be vincibly erroneous, the subject ought to lay it aside and obey.

Yet beware lest here thou confuse conscience about the liceity or illicenity of obedience to be rendered here and now to a superior, with doubt or speculative judgment about the injustice of his precept, as certain men seem here to confuse, and therefore treat and resolve this question very perplexedly. These things are wholly diverse, and a subject can doubt, or even judge more probably speculatively that the superior commands ill, and nevertheless practically judge himself held here and now to obey him. That this may be explained,

You will ask 3° whether a subject doubting or judging more probably the precept of a superior to concern something illicit, can and ought obey him.

I answer. A subject who is not certain, but doubts, or even judges more probably the precept of the superior to concern something illicit, speaking regularly, can and is held to obey him, forming for himself a morally certain conscience of the liceity of his obedience from the following principles.

1° The holy Fathers teach that one must obey a superior when it is not certain that what he commands is against God. Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 75: « A just man, he says, if perchance he serve as soldier under a king, even a sacrilegious one, could rightly, at his command, wage war, observing the order of civil peace; of which it is certain either that what is commanded is not against the precept of God, or that it is uncertain whether it be. » St. Bernard., lib. de Praecept. et Dispensat., c. 9, n. 21:

« Whatever man commands in God's stead, provided it be not certain that it displease God, is altogether to be received no otherwise than if God command it. » St. Bernardine of Siena, in the dialogue on Obedience: « A subject reasonably doubts whether what is commanded be sin: is he then not held to obey the prefect? »

2° The superior has certain right of commanding, nor is he stripped of his right on account of the subject's doubt. Therefore the subject is held to obey him; for right of commanding and obligation of obeying are correlates.

3° From denial of obedience, while manifest cause cannot be assigned, authority is enervated in superiors, obedience perishes among subjects, quarrels and contentions are born between superiors and inferiors, and thus government is impeded in many things, with scandal of others.

From these principles therefore, although there remain a speculative doubt or more probable judgment about the dishonesty of the precept, which I suppose invincible, the subject can form for himself a morally certain conscience about the honesty of his obedience, thus discoursing: I can and am held to obey a superior when I am not certain that what he commands me is against God. But I am not certain that what he here and now commands me is against God. Therefore I can and am held here and now to obey him. The major is morally certain, from the principles posited. The minor is physically certain, and therefore also the conclusion, which is conscience, is morally certain.

I said, « speaking regularly; » because the conclusion admits exception, if namely from obedience there follow a graver inconvenience than from disobedience. For a superior is not judged prudent to will binding in these circumstances, otherwise he would abuse his right. And if he insist, ignorant perhaps of the inconvenience, the subject is understood to obey as much as he can and ought. Nor can it be said that he has certain right of commanding in these circumstances, but rather on the contrary it seems certain that he has it not.

I say 1°: To act against conscience, whether right or erroneous, is not of itself a special sin; because the precept of acting according to conscience is not a special precept, but general, such as the precept of obeying the law. Whence that it be against right conscience, e.g., to steal, conscience remorsing, it retains the species of the sin committed, namely theft; but that it be against erroneous conscience pertains to that species of sin which conscience dictates against which one acts ¹ : as, if conscience dictate that one must lie to save the life of his neighbor, not lying pertains to sin of homicide; if it dictate that to swear would be sacrilege, if he swear it will be sacrilege. The reason is, because an act is specified by its object, not as it is in itself, but as it is in apprehension. ¹ Here q. 19, a. 5, ad 3.

I say 2°: What is done against conscience, whether vincibly or invincibly erring, is mortal or venial; because as species so also quantity of malice is taken from the object, not according to itself, but as apprehended and proposed to the will ². Whence whoever acts against conscience dictating something to be mortal sins mortally; if conscience dictate it venial he sins venially. Except, unless what conscience vincibly erring dictates venial or light be in reality grave and mortal; because voluntary error, such as vincible is, does not take away essential gravity of sin. Whence whoever steals gold thinking vincibly it to be venial sin nevertheless sins mortally. ² Ibid.

I say 3°: If erring conscience dictates something to be evil, but determines it not to be mortal or venial — which happens not rarely — a distinction must be made. Either conscience proposes, at least confusedly, the matter about which it is concerned as something grave or as something light: if the first, to act against it will be mortal; if the second, venial. Always the same reason holds, because quantity of malice of will is from the object apprehended through reason. But if in no way, nor even confusedly, it advert to gravity or lightness, it seems more probable that then to act against it is mortal sin; because thus the agent exposes himself to peril of sinning mortally, and wills to commit the sin whatsoever it be. — It is confirmed. Whoever is ready to swear anything whatsoever, whether true or false, if not advertent to true or false he swear, sins mortally by swearing, even though he swear truth. Ergo similarly.

Moreover for some modification of this resolution, for tranquillity of consciences, we judge with Sylvius, that if anyone were so disposed in mind, that if there came into his mind what he does to be mortal, he would nowise will to commit it, he would be excused from mortal; because from that habitual disposition it is presumed that he does not apprehend as mortal what he does.

I. Several difficulties requiring examination are contained in the proposed question. For the doubt regarding the matter of a vow can be manifold. First, you can doubt whether you made the vow, or not. Second, when you are certain that you made it, you can doubt whether you have fulfilled it; you can also doubt about the quantity of the thing promised by the vow. The more celebrated controversy among authors is whether, when the doubt concerns the very making of the vow, the one vowing is bound. And the resolution of this question depends on that never-sufficiently-lamented invention of Probabilism. Much would therefore need to be said here pertaining to that treatise, which, God granting, we shall handle according to its importance, yet within the limits of our own slight ability.

II. Before I approach the matter, I must first set forth the distinction between doubt and light suspicion, or scruple, that is, imprudent doubt. Our discussion here, then, does not concern doubt resting on no probable foundation, which is not a true doubt, but an imprudent suspicion of an anxious mind, or a scruple; and that this is to be rejected, all teach. Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and other Probabilists soon to be cited, omit this distinction here, and speak absolutely of "doubt," in the sense of the true opinion; whereby a not inconsiderable disservice is done — since, when many inept and irrational doubts occupy the mind, and torment the conscience of certain scrupulous people, the less experienced reader easily persuades himself that the one vowing, doubtful about the making of the vow, is absolutely not bound.

III. Now, then, we speak not of empty doubts, not of scruples and suspicions, but of true doubt, which, on account of probable conjectures on either side, leaves the intellect so suspended and undecided that it cannot form a judgment on either side: it is concerning this true doubt, I say, that there is controversy among authors. Some teach that no one is bound to fulfill a vow whose very making the one vowing doubts. Sánchez (Bk. II, on Marriage, disp. 40, sect. 6, n. 14), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 25), Henríquez (Bk. XI, ch. 11, n. 9), Egidio de Coninck (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 16), Suárez (Vol. V, disp. 34, dub. 10, n. 26), Malder (in III, I-II, q. 19, art. 7, disp. 87), Layman (Bk. II, tract. 1, ch. 5, §4, n. 31), Filliucci (tract. 21, ch. 4, n. 165), Del Bene (tract. 3, on conscience, dub. 3), Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, §1), Medina (Bk. I, ch. 14, §7), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 2), Tamburini (Bk. II, ch. 3, §7, near the end, n. 2), Cardinal Diana (Vol. VIII, tract. 12, resol. 18), Sporer (tract. 1, preamble, ch. 1, §1, n. 145), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 84), and Probabilists commonly, resting on the principle: "The condition of the possessor is the better one" — the one vowing is in possession of some liberty against the vow, since it is certain that a man is free, but doubtful whether he has bound himself by a vow.

IV. The contrary opinion is upheld by almost all the ancient theologians, and by all those, among more recent ones too, who have declared a righteous and just war on Probabilism. First, I will produce the testimonies of some holy Doctors. St. Thomas, in express words, teaches that in a doubtful vow the safer part is to be chosen (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, ad 3): "If, however, he doubts how he behaved in vowing, he ought to take the safer way, lest he commit a wrong." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5, before §6): "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it must be said that, since one is in doubt whether one can, or cannot, fulfill it, it is safer to do so, lest that day be prolonged, or transferred to some other good thing." Likewise §10, near the end: "In the third case, however, when there is doubt, since one who exists in doubt whether he transgresses the vow, and consequently sins mortally, is bound to place himself in a safe position — namely, that he not transgress the vow." The reason for this is drawn by these Doctors from the sacred canons; for Pope Eugene I, in a certain decree (Bk. IV, tit. 1, on betrothal and marriage): "In matters that are doubtful, what we consider more certain, we ought to hold." And Innocent III (ch. Illud, on excommunicated Clerics): "In doubtful matters, the safer path is to be chosen." And Clement III (ch. Ad audientiam, on voluntary or accidental homicides), says: "In doubtful matters we ought to choose the safer opinion." Nearly all the more ancient theologians agree with these Fathers — the Summae of Rosella, Trovamala, Pisanella, Sylvestrina, Armilla, whose texts, when we treat of doubt, we shall give in their own express words, for all of them may be read at the source. I will now indicate some among the more recent ones. Vázquez (I-II, q. 1, art. 6, disp. 65, ch. 3, and disp. 66, ch. 1), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 4), Salas (unique treatise, sect. 17), Turrianus (q. 49, q. 2), Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, art. 21, and disp. 66, ch. 2, q. 21, tract. 8, n. 162), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 9 and 36), Luiz (Vol. II, disp. 25, q. 21, n. 6), Basile de Marriage (Bk. X, ch. 15, n. 3), Pérez (in Laurea Salmanticensis, cert. 10, dub. 1), Montefinos (I-II, disp. 29, q. 4, §3, n. 121), Pedro Cornejo (in St. Thomas, tract. 8, q. 19, disp. 4, ch. 1), Pontas (s.v. Votum, dub. 3, n. 6), Gonet (tract. 11, on the first precept of the Decalogue, q. 8, dub. 2, n. 1), Antoine (tract. on the virtue of religion, ch. 3, q. 5), and all the other rigorous Probabilorists.

V. The reason for this opinion rests entirely on the sacred canons, which prescribe that in doubtful matters the safer opinion is to be chosen. What of the fact that the very light of rational nature prescribes, in all matters of every kind — whether pertaining to obtaining bodily health or avoiding temporal loss, or acquiring goods — that the safer course be embraced in doubtful matters?

VI. The theologians of Salamanca, and Probabilists commonly, respond that the sacred canons, St. Thomas, and other Doctors, must be understood of practical doubt, but not of speculative doubt. A charming, and quite empty, response indeed! What, I ask you, is this "speculative doubt"? The canons, and the aforesaid Doctors, speak of a doubt of fact — namely, whether the vow was made or not. What speculation is there here? They speak of a doubtful conscience, which has probable reasons for asserting the making of the vow, and equal reasons for denying it — and it is therefore called doubtful because the mind cannot form a judgment on either side, since it hesitates because of equal reasons on either part. If you call this "speculative," all doubts will be speculative. They perhaps understand a "practical doubt" as that which occurs while one must act: for then the agent doubts practically, whenever, while acting, he doubts. But this speculation is vain, and quite ridiculous: for it is necessary that the agent always doubt whenever, while acting, the intellect, on account of equal reasons on either side, remains suspended.

VII. You are mistaken, they say. For there are given principles by which the doubt is laid aside, and a judgment is formed which is called "practically practical." By this judgment, which is also called the "reflex," the clouds of any doubt whatsoever are dispelled. What, I ask you, are such principles, which, the doubt having been dispelled, induce moral certainty? They are, they say, hidden in the depths of human liberty, which cannot be dislodged from its possession except by certainty — since the condition of the possessor is the better one. But this rule holds only in matters of justice, to avoid disputes and confusion in civil society, as jurists themselves, and the Doctors, explain. In other doubtful matters, however, that rule by no means holds — especially in the matter of eternal salvation, which must be preferred to human life, let alone liberty. But more on this invention in its proper place. For now let it suffice to have stated the true opinion concerning the doubtful vow alone.

VIII. I will only point out this: that the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 144), following Diana, Trullench, Palao, and the other Probabilists, have descended into such laxity as to teach that the one vowing is free from the vow, even if, being in doubt, he leans more toward favoring the vow — since he has stronger reasons on this side — because, they say, although stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, if these are nonetheless not so efficacious as to generate a certain assent for that part, but still leave the matter doubtful, then the certain possession of the other side must outweigh that inequality, and a prudent judgment must pronounce in its favor.

IX. Two things here I would have you weigh carefully. The first is that, by the adversaries' own admission, our discussion concerns a doubt not light, empty, founded on scruples and inept conjectures, but resting on grave reasons on either side. The second is that, in the aforesaid doctrine, the whole deadly poison of Probabilism lies hidden. Even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow's having been made, the one in doubt will still be free of the vow! Without doubt. Why? Because the certain possession of liberty can be dislodged from its place not by stronger, and weightier, reasons, but only by the most evident, and most invincible ones. But tell me, first of all: do these stronger reasons render the doubt merely speculative, and not practical? They incline the intellect, at least, more strongly in favor of the vow. The doubt, then, will be direct and practical, not merely reflex. Nothing could be clearer, or more significant, for the integrity of evangelical morals. Then, on what foundation do you assert that human liberty, in a doubtful contest, takes precedence over natural or divine right? For natural and divine right are, in fact, prior to the liberty of the one vowing; indeed, the liberty of the one vowing is born subject to natural and divine right, from which the vow shines forth in the obligation of payment. It is so, you say, when this divine right is really given. But when I doubt whether the vow was made, I doubt whether this divine right exists or not; and, on the other hand, I am certain that I was free from this right before making the vow. This is precisely what we are asking. Why do they wish, when contending at the tribunal of reason between divine right against liberty, and liberty against divine right, that the judgment ought to be given in favor of liberty, even when stronger reasons press in favor of divine right? Human laws, indeed, have established a rule to remove quarrels, lawsuits, and countless other evils — that, in the possession of estates, the condition of the possessor be the better one. But what book of the sacred Scriptures, what Council, what ecclesiastical decree has issued any canon establishing that, in matters pertaining to the business of eternal salvation, the condition of human liberty in possession takes precedence over divine right, when doubts, or disputes, occur on either side — indeed, even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, or of divine right? Let them produce a single Scripture, or a single Council, or some Father, or some Doctor of eminent name and authority, who, before the fifteenth century, taught that, in doubts where mortal sin is at issue, the condition of human liberty in possession is the better one. We, on the contrary, establish from Scripture, the canons, and the Fathers, that in doubtful ways the safer is to be chosen, and uncertainties abandoned, when certainties present themselves. But, to drive our adversaries to the wall, let me reduce that rule — "the condition of the possessor is the better one" — to our own case, so that it may be seen to be true even here: natural, or divine, law is itself the will of God, or God himself. God is the first possessor. The will, or liberty, [of man] is born subject to God. Whenever, then, there is doubt about possession, possession stands for God. Better, then, is the condition of him who possesses God, through his own law. See our History of Probabilism and Rigorism, Vol. II, diss. 3, where we have explained this argument at length. But more on this in its proper place.

X. Question I. Is one who is certain of the vow, but doubtful of its execution, bound to its execution? Response: The Probabilists themselves, whom we cited above in n. 3, answer affirmatively — since, they say, in that case the possession of the vow made is certain, but its execution is doubtful: therefore possession stands for the vow. So teach, as I said, Sánchez, Filliucci, Diana, Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and almost all others. We add our own reason, drawn from the Fathers: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

XI. Question II. Is one who doubts the quantity of the thing promised — say, whether he vowed a hundred or fifty — bound to render a hundred? Response: Probabilists commonly deny this. For they say: if you doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty, you are bound only to fifty; if you doubt whether the vow is perpetual, or for a year, you are bound only for a year; if you know that you promised entrance into religious life, and doubt whether you promised the laxer, or the stricter kind, you are bound only to the laxer — since the obligation is odious, and must be interpreted toward the more lenient side, so that it obliges less.

XII. The contrary opinion, which we embrace, is upheld by the theologians cited above (n. 4), and further by Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows, consil. 20, act 18), resting on the most firm principle: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen. The reason, indeed, that the obligation is odious, and that laws are to be interpreted in the more lenient sense, is less consonant with the evangelical law, in the Probabilists' sense. For laws are to be interpreted, especially natural and divine ones, in the more lenient sense with respect to the soul, not to the flesh, and human appetites. With respect to the soul, however, the more lenient interpretation is that which places it in a place of safety, and leads it by the safer road to the port of eternal salvation — not that interpretation which, by loosening the reins further, and rendering it freer from the sweetest yoke of the evangelical law, exposes it to the dangers of eternal ruin. The one vowing, then, in the case proposed, is bound either to render a hundred, or to preserve perpetual chastity, so as to embrace the safer path; and the same, for the same reason, must be said of other similar cases in which the quantity, quality, or perpetuity of the vow is doubted. I will, however, propose some cases, so that you may attain a clearer understanding.

XIII. Question III. One who vowed to give the Church a chalice, and truly doubts of what material — silver, or gold — he had promised the chalice, is he bound to give a gold chalice, or a silver one? Response: Leander teaches, as a probable opinion (tract. 1, disp. 2, q. 3), that it would suffice in such a case to render a chalice of gilded bronze, or copper — since such a chalice too is suited to any divine use. This author, as usual, always adheres to the laxer opinions. The most common opinion, however, maintains that a golden, or at least a silver, chalice must be rendered, bronze or copper being excluded. This is the only difference among these authors: that some, such as Diana, Del Bene, Trullench, assert that it suffices for the cup to be silver, the rest being of bronze or copper. In this interpretation, however, the custom of that Church to which the chalice is promised to be offered must be considered. For if commonly the chalices of that Church are gold, or silver, the chalice must be gold, or silver, bronze or copper being excluded. So teach Azor (Bk. II, ch. 20, q. 10), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, n. 28), Villalobos (Vol. V, tract. 34, n. 54). And this is the more probable opinion.

XIV. Question IV. One who vowed not to approach a woman, but truly doubts whether this concerns fornicatory or conjugal approach — is he bound only to abstain from fornicatory intercourse? Response: Leander teaches (loc. cit., q. 11) — citing Sánchez, Del Bene, and others — that abstinence from fornicatory intercourse alone would suffice, and he judges this more probable on the basis of that principle: "possession stands for liberty." But this abuses the principle even by the Probabilists' own standards. For the one vowing is certain of the vow. Therefore, by these same Probabilists' own standards, it must be presumed that the vow was made according to the nature of its own act. Now the nature, or essential notion, of a vow is that it concerns matters which fall under counsels, or free matter — although, as we have explained above from St. Thomas, it can also concern necessary matter. Now abstinence from conjugal intercourse is a matter of counsel; from fornicatory intercourse, however, it is a matter of precept. The aforesaid vow, then, excludes both conjugal and fornicatory intercourse. This is also gathered from the chapter "Since it was pleasing" on gifts.

XV. Question V. Is one who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or before the perfect use of reason, bound to keep the vow? Response: Sotus denies this (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1), where he treats this doubt in passing, and to whom Palao, Del Bene, and Leander subscribe — who nonetheless says that the contrary opinion is most probable. It is surprising that he did not pronounce it less probable. We say, then, to this matter: he is bound. For it is established that the vow was made, and the excuse is doubtful. It should be added, moreover, that very few people make vows before the age of seven, or before the use of reason: therefore, if a vow was made, it must be presumed to have been made once the use of reason was complete. The more common opinion is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 14), Luiz (opusc. 10, ch. 6), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 2, n. 10), Faustus (tract. on Religion, Bk. I, q. 26), Turrianus (in disp. 1, dub. 1), Malder (tract. 10, ch. 1, dub. 4), and several others.

XVI. Question VI. Is one who is certain of the promise made to someone, but doubtful of his intention to bind himself, bound to fulfill the vow? Response: Although Angles denies this (s.v. Ius, 5, n. 10), yet the common opinion, even among the Probabilists themselves, holds that the vow is made valid — since words uttered externally are certain and sure signs of intention; nor is anyone presumed to say what he does not feel; for, once a fact is proven, all things that naturally accompany it are presumed to have occurred. Hence, once profession is proven, the one professing is presumed to have had the legitimate age; and the burden of proof falls on the one who denies it.

XVII. Question VII. Is one who made a vow extorted by fear to be presumed, in doubtful cases, not to have had the intention of binding himself? Response: Sánchez affirms this (Bk. I, on Marriage, disp. 9, n. 11). But the most common opinion holds that the one vowing had the intention of binding himself — since to presume simulation in one vowing, or swearing, is a presumption of a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime unless it is proven. Wherefore you favor the one vowing more, if you presume him bound by the vow, than if you absolve him from it — since you cannot absolve him from the vow unless you indicate that he sinned. So teach Sánchez, Suárez, Palao, Del Bene, Fagundez, Bonacina, Trullench, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and others commonly.

XVIII. Question VIII. If you doubt, in the aforesaid case, whether you used ambiguous, or restricted, words, are you bound by the vow, or oath? Response: That the vow does not bind in this case is affirmed by Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 33, n. 6), to whom Palao, Leander, Fagundez, Del Bene subscribe. For, they say, in this manner it is not presumed that a crime was committed, but rather it is presumed that there was a sufficient cause for prudent dissimulation. They add, however, that it is necessary for the one vowing to know the modes of equivocation and ambiguity, so that he can, with some foundation, doubt that he used such a locution. But, this opinion aside, we say that the one vowing is bound even in this case: both because in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen, and because no one is presumed to have spoken ambiguously, unless reasons occur by which this is proven.

XIX. Question IX. Is one who doubts whether he made a vow while asleep, drunk, or in a state of frenzy, to be presumed to have made his vow in a sound state of mind? Response: Leander teaches (tract. 1, disp. 13, q. 19) that the one vowing who truly doubts whether he vowed in the aforesaid circumstances is free from the vow — since then, he says, it is truly doubted whether there is a vow, or oath, or promise at all, since it is doubted concerning something essentially required for the nature of a vow; and in doubt, favor must be shown to liberty. This opinion is false, and lax beyond measure. Therefore, in fact, with the common opinion, it must be said that the aforesaid one vowing is bound by the vow — since presumption must be gathered from what commonly occurs. Now it very rarely happens that men make vows while drunk, asleep, or in a frenzy. Besides which, in doubtful matters the safer part is to be preferred. What if someone is certain that he made the vow while asleep, or drunk, but doubts whether the sleep, or drunkenness, or frenzy was full — that is, of such a degree as would remove the freedom necessary for a valid vow? Leander answers (loc. cit., q. 20) that the one vowing is absolutely not bound by the vow. But a distinction must be drawn. Absolutely speaking, the presumption favors the one vowing, since he is certain about the sleep, drunkenness, or frenzy: therefore the doubt, as inept, and resting on no valid foundation, is to be dismissed — just as is said of nocturnal pollution, which is not commonly presumed to have occurred with the full consent necessary for mortal sin. When, however, such reasons occur as would not allow the doubt to be prudently dismissed, then the rule presses: in doubtful matters, the safer part is to be chosen.

XX. Question X. Is one who, angry or disturbed, made a vow, and afterward doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, bound by the vow — especially if, once his anger has subsided, he repents of the vow he made? Response: St. Antoninus discusses this question concerning vows made by angry persons (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, before §1): "Vows, however, which are made by women in childbirth, or in illness, or by men in whatever straits of their own, or of their family, or in disturbance — if they had this intention of binding themselves to God, thinking also of the cause which moved them to vow — namely, illness, or danger — and of the end — namely, the escape from danger, to avoid which they vowed — are to be held binding." The same is taught by St. Thomas. "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it is safer that they fulfill it, according to Thomas. Note also that one who, angry at his father, or teacher, or drunk, vows, or swears, to enter religious life, is not bound — for what is done in the heat of anger ought to be reckoned as not done; which is true, if it happens so suddenly that he would not have done it after deliberation, and the judgment of reason, which does not require a great delay of time. But when, knowing what he swears, or vows, he does this, he is bound, unless he is excused by reason of a less than full deliberation — just as one who, inflamed by the heat of concupiscence, or having drunk well, though not drunk, swears to take a wife, is compelled to take her, unless he was altogether drunk." This assertion is confirmed by the following reason: just as deliberation is required for a vow, so too for a mortal sin; and although an angry, or drunk, person who kills a man is excused from the fullness of the sin, but not from its entirety, since it is still mortal, because he was not so beside himself as not to know what he was doing — even though he later repents of having done it — for to repent immediately of a sin argues well that it was not done from habit, but does not argue that it was not done from choice, although the judgment of reason was disturbed by passion. That deliberation of time, or age, then, which would suffice to bind oneself to the devil through mortal sin, suffices to bind oneself to God through a vow. It rarely happens, then, that anger, or some other disturbance, so clouds reason as to remove the liberty necessary and sufficient for sinning, and consequently for a valid vow. In doubt, then, of sufficient deliberation, it must be presumed that the necessary liberty was present. But if the doubt cannot be dismissed, then the rule must be observed: in doubt, the safer part is to be chosen. As for the second part of the question, authors commonly teach that repentance following the making of a vow is not an argument of insufficient deliberation — since it is not uncommon for men to repent even of things they did with great deliberation. Only from anger, then, or accompanying disturbance, from subsequent repentance, and other conjectures, can it sometimes be gathered that the one vowing was not perfectly master of himself, as authors commonly establish.

XXI. Question XI. When someone doubts whether the matter of the vow is dishonorable, or evil, is he bound to keep the vow? Authors commonly deny this. The theologians of Salamanca give the reason (n. 147): that the vow is not yet possessed, since there is doubt about what is necessary for its very essence. But this reasoning of "possession" is here futile. One who doubts the wickedness, or dishonorableness, of the matter is not bound to keep the vow, because he would sin by keeping it. For whoever undertakes a work about which he doubts whether it is good or evil, sins.

XXII. Question XII. When someone doubts about the condition of a vow, is he bound to fulfill the vow? Response: The theologians of Salamanca deny this (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §1, n. 145), on account of that so often rejected fallacious rule: that the vow is not possessed until the condition has been fulfilled. Now, when the condition is doubted, the vow itself is doubted. But a doubtful vow does not oblige. We, on the contrary, say that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen; and consequently that the aforesaid one in doubt is bound by the vow in the same way that one who doubts the vow itself is bound by it.

VIII. It is true, however, that the adversaries too admit that moral certainty is necessary; but in this they fail, that they teach that this moral certainty can be had by merely verisimilar conjectures, and merely probable reasons. For even granting that a probable opinion produces so much certainty as suffices as a rule of honest action, it does not, for that reason, follow rightly that it produces so much certainty as suffices for swearing that to be true which we opine to be only probable. For a greater certainty is required for an oath than for any moral opinion whatsoever. For this latter, mere true probability suffices to be a rule of honest action. But when someone swears something as true, it is not enough that it be probable; it is required that it appear true to the swearer — not through merely probable reasons, but through most weighty principles, or arguments, and certain ones. When this certainty is lacking, and only conjectures and probable reasons appear, then the swearer ought to affirm, or deny, a matter as probable, not as true.

I. Question I. What is conscience? Answer. It is the dictate of our reason, concluding from the general principles of synderesis what, here and now, all circumstances considered, is to be embraced as good, and to be shunned as evil. It is called a dictate, or judgment, of the practical intellect, not of the speculative: because it does not halt in contemplation, but directs to the execution of the work. It differs from synderesis in this, that synderesis consists in those first dictates implanted, as it were, by nature, by which we judge: good is to be done, evil to be shunned; what thou wouldst not have done to thyself, do not to another; and other like principles of this kind. Wherefore conscience is not a habit, nor a power, but an act — not of the will, as Durandus contends, but of the practical intellect, as has been said.

II. Question II. Of how many kinds is conscience? Answer. One is antecedent, which directs the operation; the other consequent, which rejoices over a good work, and is distressed over an evil one. Again, one commands, another counsels: the former prescribes the operation by way of precept, the latter by way of counsel. Furthermore, on the part of the object it is divided into true — that is, right and good — and into false — that is, evil and not right. On the part of the assent it is distributed into certain, probable, doubting, scrupulous, and erroneous.

III. Question III. Does he sin who does not follow a right conscience? Answer. Conscience is called right by relation to a right rule. The rule of operation is twofold: one remote, which is the eternal law; the other proximate, which is the reason of the practical intellect. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 5 — to whom the theologians commonly subscribe — teaches that he sins who resists a conscience proposing something as commanded under precept. This is perspicuously established from holy Scripture: All that is not of faith (that is, of conscience) is sin: Romans 14. If conscience proposes anything as prohibited under mortal sin, he sins mortally who resists it; the sin will be venial, if what conscience proposes as venial is venial. It is disputed whether he sins mortally who resists a conscience proposing something as sin without determining the gravity of the sin. Dismissing petty distinctions, I say that he sins gravely who acts against such a conscience. The reason is evident. He who with deliberate mind exposes himself to a manifest danger of sinning mortally, sins mortally, as Scripture itself testifies: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. To this danger he exposes himself who acts against the aforesaid conscience; since in that malice proposed absolutely there is contained equally a grave malice and a light one. Therefore, unless the gravity or lightness of the malice be first ascertained with due diligence, there is a grave danger of offending mortally.

IV. Question IV. Is a man bound to follow his own conscience, whether right or erring? Answer. All affirm it. For the same reason which proves the duty of following a right conscience proves also that no one can act against an erring conscience. For an erring conscience, just as much as a right conscience, proposes what is to be done as commanded by the divine Law. Both prescribe that the divine Law must be obeyed. On this matter read St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 5, ad 2. In an erroneous conscience a twofold judgment must be distinguished: one by which it is judged that something is prohibited by God which is not prohibited; the other by which it is judged that the divine Law must be obeyed. The first is false; the second is true.

V. Question V. Does he sin who does not act according to a vincibly erroneous conscience? Answer. Conscience can be erroneous in two ways. 1. Invincibly, when the error, all diligence having been applied, cannot be overcome; and in this case the conscience is without fault. 2. Vincibly, when the error, diligence being applied, can be overcome. Both these consciences oblige, with this difference: that the vincible conscience can and ought to be laid aside, whereas the invincible cannot be laid aside. Now these two things — namely, the duty of laying aside a vincibly erroneous conscience, and the obligation of following it — are by no means repugnant to one another, because they flow from diverse principles. The first arises from the principle of applying the diligence necessary for finding the truth and expelling the error; the second — namely, the duty of following the erroneous conscience — arises from the dictate of that very conscience, whereby the obligation of obeying the divine Law is proposed. Read St. Thomas, question 17 On Truth, article 4.

VI. Question VI. How should he conduct himself who, from an erroneous conscience, judges both extremes of a contradiction to be sin? Answer. If the erroneous conscience be vincible, it must be laid aside. Unless you lay it aside, you sin, whether you follow it or contradict it, as St. Thomas teaches, question 17 On Truth, article 4, ad 8: Just as in syllogistic matters, one absurdity being granted, others necessarily follow; so in moral matters, one absurdity being posited, others follow of necessity. Thus, supposing that a man seeks vainglory, whether for the sake of vainglory he does what he is bound to do, or omits it, he will always sin; and yet he is not perplexed, because he can dismiss his evil intention. And similarly, supposing an error of reason or of conscience which proceeds from an ignorance that does not excuse, it is necessary that evil in the will should follow; and yet the man is not perplexed, because he can withdraw from the error, since the ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

VII. What if the erroneous conscience be invincible, and judge both parts of a contradiction to be sin? This hypothesis I count scarcely probable. But granting it, no sin is committed, because there is no sin without liberty; invincible ignorance takes away liberty; therefore, the supposition being made that the conscience is invincibly erroneous, it cannot be said that the man sins, whichever part he follows. The Adversaries object that even in this hypothesis the man is free to omit or to perform his act. He is free with physical liberty, but not with moral liberty. But for sin, since it is in the genus of morals, moral liberty is necessary — which all Catholics, against Jansenius, confess to be taken away by invincible ignorance. A pastor assisting his flock on a feast day invincibly reckons that he sins if he omits Mass, and that he likewise sins if he abandons his flock to the incursions of wolves. This man is not morally free; therefore, whichever extreme he chooses, he will not sin. Though he is physically free to choose either of these two extremes, he is nevertheless not morally free: because he is not free to avoid acting against conscience, since in each extreme he apprehends sin.

VIII. Authors are wont to dispute whether it is graver to act against a vincibly erroneous conscience, or to follow it. But no certain rule can be assigned. Sometimes it is graver to follow it; sometimes it is less grave to act against it. Absolutely speaking, however, it is graver to act against it: since he who acts against it sins knowingly; he who follows it sins from ignorance; and ignorance, even though vincible, diminishes the malice of the sin. He who, shut up in prison, has the erroneous conscience that he sins mortally unless he hear Mass, according to the common opinion does not sin, for want of liberty: since that erroneous dictate is not the cause of the omission.

IX. Question VII. How is an erroneous conscience to be laid aside, and what diligence is to be applied? Answer. If the erroneous conscience has been formed rashly and imprudently, then it can be laid aside at will; and it suffices to advert to the falsity of the erroneous judgment, and to lay it aside by forming a contrary judgment upon the honesty of the operation. If, on the contrary, the conscience has been formed from a probable reason, then a contrary and more probable reason is necessary, to conquer the prior false persuasion. Ordinary diligence — not extraordinary — is necessary for laying aside a vincibly erring conscience. The former uses the accustomed means, namely study, counsel, prayers, pious works, by which the necessary light is implored of God. The latter applies extraordinary means: for instance, after taking the counsel of the Doctors of his own city, a man proceeds to other provinces to consult more learned men. The diligence to be applied must be gathered from the magnitude and diversity of the affairs. In unusual affairs, and those of extreme and highest moment, an unusual, exact, and utmost diligence must likewise be applied; on the contrary, in ordinary affairs there suffices the ordinary diligence which prudent and diligent upright men are wont to use. The extremes to be avoided are negligence and extraordinary diligence — for this latter fills the soul with scruples, anxiety, and disturbance. The omission of that ordinary and exact diligence which upright and vigilant men are wont to apply is, in affairs of grave moment, a grave sin.

X. Question VIII. From what indications can it be gathered that an erring conscience is vincible, or invincible? Answer. You can prudently presume the ignorance to be invincible: 1. If the thing ignored be of human, or of positive, law. 2. If the matter be most difficult even among the Learned themselves. 3. If no scruple, doubt, or any confused notion whatever has preceded. 4. If the man, on perceiving that he was deceived and violated the Law from ignorance, grieves and is saddened. 5. If the man be upright, and of an entire and well-ordered conscience. 6. If he has not been prejudiced by a false system and a depraved manner of opining. From these and similar circumstances and signs the Confessor can gather that the ignorance or inadvertence was invincible. The contrary holds if the matter be of the natural law; if some doubt has preceded; if the man be accustomed to offend, and be of a conscience entangled in crimes; if he be facile in adopting opinions which favor liberty and the appetites. For the rest, this ascertainment is difficult: therefore God must be prayed to with the Prophet David: Remember not my ignorances.

I. All theologians teach that penitents laboring under vincible ignorance must be instructed. The dispute concerns invincible ignorance alone. The precept of fraternal correction must be distinguished from the precept of giving instruction to the penitent, who is to receive the Sacrament of penance. The former, when hope of profit is wanting, does not press; but the latter binds even when the hope of amendment has been removed, on account of the reverence due to the Sacrament. All likewise teach that those penitents must be enlightened who labor under ignorance of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Eucharist, and of the supernatural sorrow necessary for sacramental confession.

II. Sanchez, Lugo, Tamburini, the Salmanticenses, and Sporer defend the position that Confessors are not bound — nay, that they ought not — to enlighten penitents laboring under invincible ignorance of the mysteries which are not necessary with the necessity of means, and of the other truths of law, whether positive or natural.

III. This opinion seems to me false. All Christians are bound by a most grave precept to learn the truths necessary for the forming of our morals. Therefore Confessors ought to manifest truths of this kind to penitents who are ignorant of them. By what reason, I ask, can Confessors dissemble the manifestation of these truths? Perhaps because they foresee that their penitents are unprepared to receive it? Then those penitents are violators of the precept of learning and finding the truth, and are therefore unprepared to receive the Sacrament. I set the matter forth perspicuously. Just as the Confessor in the tribunal sustains the person of a judge, to absolve or to bind; of a physician, to heal wounds; of a doctor, to enlighten, instruct, and teach: so penitents approach this tribunal as guilty men to be absolved, as sick men to be healed, as ignorant men to be enlightened, instructed, and corrected. If the Confessor foresees that they are so unteachable and so given over to depraved desires that he hopes for no profit from the manifestation of the truth, by what reason can he presume them disposed and prepared for the Sacrament? He foresees them unteachable, rebels against the light, and obstinate in their ignorance — and at the same time he will judge these same men worthy to receive the Sacrament of penance?

IV. The Adversaries are pressed more closely. They all teach that the truth must be laid open when penitents labor under a vincibly erroneous conscience. But when penitents are foreseen to be unprepared, and rebels against receiving the manifestation of the truth, forthwith their ignorance, which until then was invincible, becomes vincible and crass. Therefore, even according to their own principles, the Confessor sins gravely if he does not manifest the truth; and the penitents receiving the Sacrament are sacrilegious. I prove the minor. Ignorance is vincible, according to all, when a way lies open to Christians of learning the truth of which they are ignorant; in our case this way lies open; therefore, if Christians refuse to learn this truth from the Confessor, their ignorance becomes vincible and crass. All this is most luminous.¹

¹ See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, Dissertation I, chapter 4.

V. The writers cited teach that penitents are not to be admonished by their Confessors who in good faith possess the goods of others, who enter upon usurious contracts, who practice pollutions in good faith, whenever it is foreseen that the manifestation of the truth will harm, and not profit, the penitent. Nay, some add — among them Tamburini — that the truth is not to be manifested even if the penitents would make right use of the knowledge, when the remedy is most difficult and infamy or scandal is feared. If a dying man, they say, is ignorant that he has heaped up a great sum of money by usuries and unjust contracts, and it is foreseen that, if admonished by the Confessor, he will not make restitution, then he is to be left in his ignorance. Tamburini says that this doctrine is especially necessary, above all to the Confessors of Princes and of Merchants; but it must be spat out as false.

VI. They object, first: when the manifestation of the truth is foreseen to be harmful and not profitable, no just end of revealing the truth presents itself; nay, say the Salmanticenses, treatise 20, chapter 5, point 3, number 27, in that case Confessors administer poison, while they seem to apply medicine. Answer. Christ the Lord foresaw that few would receive his law, and that very many would be rebels against it: did he for that reason abstain from promulgating it? Is there no just end of revealing the truth? Is it not a just end to guard the Sacraments, lest they be profaned by the unworthy and the blinded, who refuse to open their eyes to the light that freely offers itself?

VII. They object, secondly, the authority of St. Augustine, found in the chapter Si quis, On penance, distinction 7, saying: If I knew that it would not profit thee, I would not admonish thee, I would not terrify thee. Answer. St. Augustine speaks of fraternal correction, say some. But the holy Doctor there discourses of a dying man, to whom he urges penance; and he adds that he does not know whether it will profit him. For if he knew it would not profit, he would not urge it. Ignorantly, therefore, is this authority brought against us.²

² See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, Dissertation 1, chapter 4.

VIII. They oppose, thirdly: Innocent III, in the chapter Quia circa, On consanguinity and affinity, says: Thou mayest dissemble, that he may remain in the union thus contracted, since from a separation, as thou assertest, grave scandal may threaten. Answer. Some say that the Pontiff speaks of a Bishop or a Parish priest, not of a Confessor. Leaving this response aside, the true one is presented. The entire text of the Pontiff in the place cited is this: Further, concerning the man N., for whose dispensation — that is, the indulgence of remaining with her who touches him in the fifth degree of consanguinity — to be obtained from the apostolic See, a false cause was alleged to us, namely offspring; whereas before the dispensation was obtained, the only daughter whom he had had entered the way of all flesh, as thy consultation stated: thou mayest dissemble, that he may remain in the union thus contracted, since from a separation (as thou assertest) thou seest grave scandal to threaten. It is evident that the Pontiff approves the dispensation — which otherwise, on account of the falsely stated cause, was null — in order to guard against the scandal which he foresaw would arise from the separation of the spouses. See what the Gloss teaches in the same place.³ Ineptly does Navarrus cavil at this dispensation, as has been demonstrated in the place cited by the most luminous reasons. Wherefore the Casuists named wrongly oppose to us the testimonies both of Augustine and of Innocent.

³ See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, Dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 28 and following.

IX. I sum the matter up in few words. Confessors, that they may be able to absolve their penitents, must of necessity form this judgment: namely, that they approach that tribunal with a sincere heart and a contrite soul; that they sincerely will to observe all the commandments of the Law; that they are prepared to receive instruction in all the truths which the divine law commands to be known and kept. With these dispositions Confessors must presume their penitents to be adorned. Therefore they can in no way presume them adverse and rebellious to receiving the knowledge of the divine Law and of the precepts of which they labor in ignorance. But if they presume them such, it necessarily follows that they must also judge them most unworthy of the reception of the Sacraments. See more in the place cited.

X. Bertha married in good faith. Her marriage, on account of a hidden impediment, is null. If she be admonished of the impediment, she is placed in a proximate occasion of fornicating. If she refuse to render the debt, either she is killed by her husband, or mutual enmities and infamies arise between the families.

XI. Not a few devise cases occurring either never, or most rarely, that they may extort some decision, which they afterwards apply to cases happening everywhere. The Confessor sitting before the tribunal, before he absolves Bertha, ought to admonish her. She will be placed, you say, in a proximate occasion of fornicating, because she cannot be separated without scandal. This occasion will be a necessary one, not a free one; and by opportune remedies continence can be observed, until a dispensation be obtained.⁴

⁴ See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, Dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 48.

I. The Probabilists commonly all defend the contrary. La-Croix, book 1, question 5, number 14 and following, deceived by the authority of Terillus, cites St. Thomas for this opinion; but this is a most manifest falsehood. For St. Thomas most powerfully overthrows this opinion, as is evident from his following doctrine. Behold his doctrine, I-II, question 19, article 6: Good, he says, is caused by an integral cause, but evil by single defects. And therefore, for that to be called evil toward which the will is borne, it suffices either that it be evil according to its nature, or that it be apprehended as evil. But for it to be good, it is required that it be good in both ways. What could be more luminous? And what of that which is carried about in the common proverb: Good comes from an integral cause; evil from any defect whatsoever.

II. The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor is illustrated. The will cannot be right unless it be conformed to the eternal Law of God, which is the fountain of all goodness. This is the first rule, the first exemplar, of every created will that is good and right. But a created will directed by a reason erring invincibly, which proposes lying, theft, perjury, and other crimes as good, cannot be traced back to the divine will and to His eternal Law — unless we wish to pour the crimes back upon God.

III. Fr. Claude La-Croix answers, book 1, number 24: The will of lying is not traced back to God, nor is it approved by God per se — I concede; per accidens — I deny. Have you heard? Lying, then, is approved by God per accidens. God confers a reward per accidens upon liars. That you may perceive more clearly the horror of this doctrine, recall to mind the doctrine of invincible ignorance of the natural law, which the Probabilists defend — who consequently maintain, with better right, invincible ignorance of the positive law, divine and human, and of the true Religion. This being posited as certain fact, the wills of Infidelity, of Heathenism, of Mahometanism, the wills of the followers of Arianism, of Nestorianism, of Lutheranism, of Calvinism — these wills, I say, of so many peoples, directed by invincible ignorance, are approved by God per accidens. What more? Atheism itself must be traced back to God. For God himself, according to Molina, Arriaga, and Platel, the champions of philosophical sin, can be invincibly unknown. According to these authors there can be given an invincibly erroneous conscience which reputes fornication, pollution, lying, and similar crimes to be licit. Therefore these horrendous crimes will be crowned with an eternal reward.

IV. All this is confirmed. No action is meritorious of eternal life without the benefit of divine grace. If fornication, if softness, if lying, if other similar crimes, reputed honorable through invincible ignorance, were meritorious, then divine grace would flow into these crimes. Do you shudder to hear these things? Yet the Probabilists cannot escape hence. Either they must needs confess works worthy of eternal glory without divine grace — and this is manifest heresy; or they are compelled to concede that man is aided by divine grace to fornicate, to commit adultery, to lie, and to perjure himself, whenever a man with an invincibly erroneous conscience judges it good to lie, to fornicate, to perjure himself, to commit adultery, and the rest.

V. Fr. La-Croix answers, in the place cited, number 29: Every will (he says) good per se is from God as its author — I concede; good per accidens — I deny. More than excellent! A will good per accidens is not from God? A will good per accidens signifies that the will is good not absolutely, but on account of invincible ignorance: for this is the meaning of the phrase per accidens. But this will is truly and really good: since this goodness merits, as the adversaries confess, the reward of eternal life. Therefore there is given a moral goodness, and a reward of eternal life, which is not from God. But hear Fr. Carlo Casnedi, who in Tome I, Disputation 6, section 1, § 3, number 25, page 167, writes as follows: Whenever to a morally invincible ignorance of the prohibition and of the malice there is joined an invincible error concerning the honesty of the object, or concerning a precept of the action, then the work elicited under that ignorance and error is honorable and meritorious. And more openly, in the same place, page 192, he adds: So too there is nothing absurd in Christ the Lord saying: Come, thou blessed one, receive the kingdom, because thou didst lie, invincibly thinking that in such a case I had commanded lying. Do not these things, even barely stated, instill a certain horror?

VI. The Adversaries are pressed in another way. If error possessed this prodigious efficacy, that it could fashion the form of virtue upon vices and crimes, and set round them the laurel of merit, then works honorable, directed by the light of truth, would be of the same dignity as works flagitious, covered over with the darkness of errors. If an erroneous persuasion poured goodness into a depraved operation, in the same way as true knowledge into an honorable work, then enlightenment would be superfluous — superfluous the sermons and exhortations. Finally, no work is good which is not directed by the virtue of prudence. Now between conscience and prudence there is this difference: that conscience, since it is not a virtue, is now true, now false, now right, now criminal; whereas prudence, since by its nature it is a practical intellectual virtue, either is true, or is not prudence — but a mask and specter of prudence. This prudence can never be deceived, although the prudent are sometimes deceived: for if it were deceived, it would not itself be a virtue.

VII. They object, first: he who, erring, judges a feigned pauper to be a true pauper, and succors him, truly exercises a good and meritorious act of mercy. Therefore a work proceeding from invincible ignorance is good. Peter, reputing this man to be his father, is bound to honor him; the Faithful hearing Mass are bound to adore the host, even though it were not consecrated. These and similar examples the Probabilists bring forward to throw dust in the eyes of the unskilled, though they are trifles vainer than Sicilian tales.

VIII. That you may straightway detect the sophism, distinguish the will of succoring the pauper from the will of lying, of perjuring, and the rest. What judgment, then, do you pronounce upon each? Is it not this: the first can be good; not so the second? A man, whether he be poor or rich, carries with him by his nature nothing that impedes the goodness and merit of the alms. For both the rich man, and any man whatever, can beg alms for a good end, and can make himself poor for the sake of Christ. Just as in an indifferent object, so much less in almsgiving is there any malice which impedes the goodness and merit of the act. In lying, on the contrary, in perjury, and in any action depraved by its nature, malice resides intrinsically, which wars as an enemy against goodness and merit. Now the judgment directing the will in the aforesaid case is that dictate which prescribes that the pauper must be succored; and this judgment is true. Furthermore, an act of beneficence towards a man, whoever he be, commanded by charity, is always good and meritorious; but the judgment by which this man, who is in reality rich, is judged poor, is false. Yet this judgment does not direct the will of the alms. Just as in the will there are often evils mixed with goods — not that the same act is both good and evil, for that is chimerical, but because there are found acts good and acts evil, mutually disparate — so also in the intellect false things are mingled with true; but never can a false judgment direct a right will, or an act of virtue. They press on with their quibbling: The matter of almsgiving is poverty; this removed, the virtue of almsgiving collapses. Answer: You are deceived. The object of almsgiving is a man to be relieved; that is, almsgiving looks to this, that it succor a man. If this man is truly poor, the almsgiving is altogether perfect. If this man feigns himself poor, then the almsgiving lacks this prerogative of relieving a pauper. Does it on that account cease to be a good act commanded by charity? He who honors a feigned father does not exercise filial honor, because the object — namely, paternity — is wanting; but he exercises a good act, for he honors a neighbor and an elder. He who adores an unconsecrated host commits an act of material idolatry, which is not imputed to fault, on account of invincible ignorance. But the intention of adoring God is good, nor is it infected by the materially depraved election; for only formal malice infects the act of intention.

IX. They object, secondly: When reason proposes to me anything as a precept, I am bound to execute it. Reason in this case proposes to me that I must lie, or perjure myself, for the salvation of my Neighbor. Therefore I am bound to fulfill this. Answer. All this is true, when the reason, or conscience, is invincibly erring. But whence is it inferred that acts of this kind are good? These acts are in very deed depraved; but they are not imputed to fault, on account of the invincible ignorance.

X. They insist. The lie in this hypothesis is not good. But neither is it evil. Therefore it is an indifferent work. Acts indifferent in the individual are not given: therefore they are either evil or good. Answer. That lie, that perjury, that theft, and the other works depraved by their nature, are always evil, even while they are represented as good; but they are not imputed to fault, as has been said so often, in the hypothesis that the ignorance is invincible. There are no works indifferent in the individual which flow from deliberate reason; but those are indifferent which proceed from necessity.

XI. I pass over many other sophisms, because they are all inept and vain. Read, if you will, Tome 2 of the Apparatus, Dissertation 1, chapter 5, § 2, etc., where you will find all the quibblings of Terillus overthrown.

XII. Sole Question. What is a perplexed conscience? Answer. It is a judgment by which you judge that you sin, whether you choose this part or the other. If the ignorance be vincible, you sin whichever part you choose; and, that sin may be avoided, the judgment must be laid aside, since it is erroneous. But if the ignorance be invincible, and the judgment cannot be laid aside, then that must be chosen which seems the lesser evil, and which less favors one's own liberty and appetites. But these cases are rare, and scarcely ever occur; therefore they need not be discussed at greater length.

I. Conscience is called doubting, not because the dictate or judgment is in itself doubtful — for doubt is a suspension of judgment — but the conscience is called doubting objectively, or terminatively, inasmuch as concerning the doubtful matter itself a man has various practical judgments on either side, which suspend his sentence upon that same matter.

II. Many divide doubt into positive and negative. They call the doubt positive when equal reasons for doubting present themselves on both sides; negative, when no reason for doubting offers itself. This division is chimerical. When no reason for doubting occurs, it is not doubt, but nescience and ignorance, and is so called. For I do not doubt whether the stars be even or odd in number; I simply do not know. Vain likewise is the division of others, by which they say that negative doubt turns upon light reasons, positive doubt upon grave ones. Light reasons induce not a doubt, but a scruple, or a suspicion; and they are to be spurned. No prudent man is moved to doubt by light indications, but despises them.

III. Positive doubt, therefore, which is true doubt, and of which we now dispute, exists when on both sides equal, or nearly equal, weights of reasons present themselves to the intellect. For then the mind, pressed by equal weights, hangs suspended and undecided, and withholds its judgment. Doubt properly so called, therefore, includes a suspension of assent toward both sides, on account of the equality of the reasons.

IV. Question I. Of how many kinds is doubt? Answer. Twofold: of law, and of fact. There is a doubt of law when someone doubts about a law, about a precept, about a vow, or about any obligation whatsoever — for an obligation, in respect of that thing to which it obliges, has the nature of a Law. There is a doubt of fact when it is doubted whether something has been done: for instance, whether you fasted yesterday, whether you heard Mass, whether you recited the Breviary. The same thing can be the matter of a doubt of law and of fact under a diverse aspect. Doubt is further divided into speculative and practical: the former regards the honesty of the action absolutely; the latter, the exercise of the work. You doubt whether it be licit to paint on a feast day, or whether this garment be yours. These are speculative doubts. These persisting, you doubt whether here and now it is licit for you to paint on this feast day, and to retain the garment which you possess. These are practical doubts. You doubt whether you have incurred a censure, or an irregularity. This doubt is speculative. This doubt persisting, you doubt whether it is now licit for you to celebrate. This doubt is practical.

V. Question II. Is it a sin to act with a conscience in doubt about sin? Answer. All affirm that you sin. You doubt whether that contract be licit; and, the doubt remaining, you celebrate the contract: it is certain that in this case you sin. For so long as you do not lay aside the doubt about the justice or injustice of the contract, the intellect remains undecided; and if the will undertakes the work, it is so disposed that it wills to execute it, whether it be, or be not, against the Law of God. For he who acts while doubting exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning mortally, since the sin is as probable as the absence of sin.

VI. Question III. What is to be said of the distinction which some establish between a doubt of fact and a doubt of law? Answer. Fr. Cardenas, in his Crisis, treatise 1, disputation 6, chapter 6, article 1, teaches that in a question of fact equal weights of witnesses leave the matter undecided, so that the judge cannot pronounce sentence for either side; but he contends that the opposite happens in a question of law. The first part he proves by invincible weight of reasons, and in confirmation adduces many testimonies of both canon and civil law. But these very arguments prove that the same must be said in a question of Law, as I have proved at length in Tome II of the Apparatus, Dissertation I, chapter 6, sole paragraph.

I. "Safe" is taken, first, by comparison with the opposite safe part. The religious state is safer than the lay and the matrimonial; yet each state, the lay and the matrimonial, is safe. Secondly, adversatively to the part that is not safe but doubtful: in which sense only the safer part in doubts is safe; and therefore it is commanded that the safer part be chosen. The safer part is so called by withdrawal from sin; the more probable part, by conformity to the Law and to truth. The safer part in a positive doubt is always to be chosen, as will be demonstrated below.

To Titius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, theologians seem to speak with little consistency about the obligation of following conscience and the obligation of submitting one’s own judgment to the judgment of the Church. For they say that conscience is the voice of God, the herald of God, and that a man is bound to follow conscience whether it is right or erroneous. Indeed, Cardinal Newman has these words: “That divine authority, the voice of conscience, on which in truth the Church herself is built. . . . Did the Pope speak against conscience he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting the ground from under his feet.”¹ Hence a certain modernist says: “When authority is dumb or stultifies itself, private conviction resumes its previous rights and liberties. It sent us to authority in the first instance, not by a suicidal self-contradictory act; but in basing our trust upon reasons and sentiments it thereby assigned a limit to that trust which is reached as soon as authority would seem to violate those reasons or sentiments.”² And another writer says: “To our own mental and moral conscience all doctrines and laws must make their last appeal, and we have a distinct as well as a corporate personality.”¹ But, if this doctrine is admitted, Titius does not see what is to be condemned in the Protestant theory of private judgment. Hence it is asked:

1 Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 60.

2 G. Tyrrell, A Much-abused Letter, p. 57. This was a fundamental point in the late Fr. Tyrrell’s teaching. He developed that teaching more fully in the last essay published in his book entitled Through Scylla and Charybdis. The following extracts are taken from that essay.

1 M. D. Petre, Catholicism and Independence, p. xi.

1. What is a norm of morality, and what is the norm of morality?

“We have long since not merely resigned ourselves to a silent and a hidden God, but have come to recognize our seeming loss as a priceless gain. For now we have learned to seek Him where alone He is to be found, and seen, and heard; near and not far; within and not without; in the very heart of His creation, in the center of man’s spirit; in the life of each; still more in the life of all. It is from the Sinai of Conscience (individual and collective) that He thunders forth His commandments and judgments; it is from the heights of His holiness that He looks down in pity upon our earthliness and sinfulness; it is in His Christ, in His saints and prophets, that He becomes incarnate and manifest, and that He tabernacles with the children of men.”

“Thus it is in the widest, the most enduring, the most independent consensus that we possess the fullest available manifestation of that divine spirit, partially and imperfectly manifested in our own individual mind and conscience—the spirit of Truth and Righteousness, the source of all moral power and authority—God revealed in man. Authority, then, is not an external influence streaming down from heaven like a sunbeam through a cleft in the clouds and with a finger of light singling out God’s arbitrarily chosen delegates from the multitude, over and apart from which they are to stand as His vicegerents. Authority is something inherent in, and inalienable from, that multitude itself; it is the moral coerciveness of the Divine Spirit of Truth and Righteousness immanent in the whole, dominant over its several parts and members; it is the imperativeness of the collective conscience.”

In an article contributed to the Hibbert Journal, January 1910, Baron F. von Hügel wrote concerning this doctrine of Fr. Tyrrell: “In substance he [Fr. Tyrrell] was maintaining, as to the Popes’ powers, nothing but what Cardinal Bellarmine, the greatest of the anti-Protestant theologians, and what Cardinal Newman, so emphatically a lover of authority, teach concerning conscience and the Pope—the latter in his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk—backed by countless theologians, saints, and councils.”

2. Can a conflict arise between conscience and an infallible judgment of the Church?

3. In the case of a real conflict between conscience and the Pope, which would have to be obeyed?

4. What is to be said concerning the difficulty of Titius?

1. What is the norm of morality ?

Because we are free we can choose whether we will do good or evil. We ought to do good, but how are we to know what is good? There should be some rule or norm which tells us what is good and what is evil. Catholic theologians agree that the proximate and subjective norm of morality is conscience, or a practical judgment of the reason which tells us that such a particular action must or may be done or omitted. Conscience applies the objective norm of morality which is law, and all law is based on the eternal law of God, which bids us observe right order and forbids us to violate it.

2. Can a conflict arise between conscience and an infallible decision of the Church?

No, this is not possible. For an infallible decision of the Church has for its subject-matter some truth of the faith or some rule of morality, whereas conscience is only concerned with the application of general rules to a particular action which I am contemplating here and now. The field of infallible decisions and that of conscience are different, and they can no more come into collision with each other than can two trains on different lines. It is true that conscience may conflict with a particular command of a Pope, but the Pope is not infallible when he gives a particular command.

3. In case of a conflict between the Pope and conscience, which must be obeyed?

All Catholic theologians agree that in case of a real conflict when a certain conscience tells me that what a superior commands is wrong, I must obey conscience and disobey the superior, whoever he may be.¹ Of course before disobeying the command of a lawful superior in such a case I must make sure of my ground. I must use all available sources of information so that I may be sure that my conscience is right and not erroneous. If this is done, conflicts between the Pope and the individual conscience will very seldom occur.

1 St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 5.

4. What is to be said about the difficulty of Titius?

From what has already been said it will be clear that theologians by no means contradict themselves when they teach that conscience is the voice of God and that it must be obeyed as such, and at the same time insist on the duty of submitting one’s own judgment to the authority of the Church. Conscience is indeed private judgment, but its sphere is not that of ecclesiastical decisions. Private judgment is supreme when it tells me that this particular action must be done or not done. On the other hand the Pope is supreme for Catholics when he teaches from the chair that some doctrine belongs to Catholic faith or practice. Conscience says nothing about the truth or falsehood of such propositions as constitute the sphere of infallible decisions; it is restricted to questions whether this particular action which I am contemplating is to be done or not, and with this the Pope’s infallible authority can not conflict. What Cardinal Newman said is true; if the Pope spoke against conscience, he would speak against God, from whom all his authority is derived, and thus he would cut the ground from under his feet. The modernist doctrine is pure Protestantism, inasmuch as it asserts that private judgment is the final court of appeal in matters of Catholic faith and practice, and not the Church. It is plain that the authority of Cardinal Newman can not be invoked for this Protestant theory.

A recent author proves, as it seems to him, that probabilism is opposed to the judgment of the Church given by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Innocent XII, and Clement XI, and indeed is opposed to reason, insofar as I must sincerely strive for the agreement of my action with the objective morality of that action—something I by no means accomplish when I choose a norm which, in my judgment, is more probably opposed to the aforesaid morality than in agreement with it. He thinks that by these arguments the system of probabilism has been demolished, but that it is still maintained because of men’s inclination toward that which is easier and because of the great influence which the Society of Jesus has exercised upon theological science. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a system of moral theology, and how do probabilism and equiprobabilism differ?

2. What can be answered to the arguments of that recent author?

3. Can probabilism rightly be called the distinctive doctrine of the Society of Jesus?

1. What is meant by a system of moral theology, and how does probabilism differ from equiprobabilism ? By a system of moral theology is meant a body of rules which enables a person to form a certain conscience in cases of doubt where direct certainty as to the lawfulness of an action can not be had. Thus probabilism is that system of moral theology according to which it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even against a more probable opinion in favor of the existence of a law which would forbid the action when the sole question is one about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action. Equiprobabilism only allows one to follow an opinion in favor of liberty against such a law when the opinion is equally or almost equally probable with that in favor of the law. Equiprobabilists also add to this a subsidiary rule to the effect that in case of doubt whether a law hitherto in force has ceased to be obligatory, it must be obeyed as long as it is not certain that it has ceased to be of obligation.

2. What answer may be given to the arguments of the recent author alluded to?¹

1 L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De minusprobabilismo.

The recent author alluded to confounds two very different things — the private opinion of a Pope, and a Pope’s authoritative decision, which is the judgment of the Church. As Benedict XIV explains in his classical work De Synodo Dioecesana, the private opinion of a Pope has no more weight than that of another theologian of equal learning and virtue. It is only when he gives an authoritative decision — when he acts as Pope — that he expresses the judgment of the Church. It may be conceded that the Popes mentioned were, as theologians, adverse to probabilism, but they never condemned it authoritatively. Of all the proofs of his contention that the recent author adduces, the strongest, as he confesses, is the decree of Innocent XI, and we will give here the authentic version of that decree to show what it really prescribed.

Wednesday, 26 June 1680

“After Father Laurea had made a report of the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, so that he may signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously received and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and likewise manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that, in a concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one recognized and judged as such, it is lawful to follow the less probable; and that he should assure him that whatever he shall do and write in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

“It should be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that, in a concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one recognized and judged as such, it is lawful to follow the less probable; but that he also write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he wishes, may freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and that he command them to submit completely to the command of His Holiness.”¹

1 Lehmkuhl, Probabilism Vindicated, p. 82.

There is obviously no condemnation of probabilism in this decree, neither is there any condemnation in the other documents alluded to by the recent writer.²

2 Compare Lehmkuhl, at the cited place, p. 80 and following.

The recent author’s argument from reason is weaker than his argument from authority. It amounts to this. We are under the obligation of sincerely trying to make our actions agree with the objective rule of morality. Therefore we are under an obligation of following the more probable opinion. The antecedent of this argument is true when the objective rule of morality is known. If there is no known objective rule of morality which binds me in the case in point, I am left to my liberty. The consequent is false. It gratuitously supposes that the opinion which seems to the agent the more probable is more in accordance with the objective rule of morality. What seems more probable to one is often less probable to others, and even to the same person at another time. And even if we grant that a more probable opinion is more in accordance with the objective rule of morality, it does not make that rule certain. And a certain obligation can not arise from an uncertain law else the effect would surpass its cause.

3. Can probabilism be called with truth the peculiar doctrine of the Society of Jesus?

No, it can not. As Fr. Oliva, who was General of the Society when the decree of Innocent XI was issued, asserted, there is no prohibition in the Society against defending probabiliorism or any other recognized system of morals. The long list of authors who have taught probabilism which St. Alphonsus gives in his Dissertation published in 1755 contains names belonging to all schools of theology. Probabilism was first formulated by Medina, a Dominican, and its first chief defenders were also Dominicans.

According to a certain recent author,¹ the question whether workmen may lawfully act according to a trade-union rule which is probably unjust can be resolved by comparing the injuries which would follow for the workmen if they did not act in that way with the injuries to the employers which would follow if they did act in that way. For it is lawful to choose the lesser of two evils.

1 Dr. W. McDonald, Principles of Moral Science, p. 213.

Accordingly, a certain workmen’s association forbids bricklayers to lay more than five hundred bricks daily, although they could easily lay seven hundred. If we suppose that the rule is probably unjust, and that a greater injury would come to the workmen than to the employers unless they obey the association, Titius, a priest, would like to know whether it is lawful for them to act according to the given rule recently established. Hence it is asked:

1. Is it always lawful to follow a probable opinion?

2. If it is not always lawful, how can probabilism be called a universal norm?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Is it always allowed to follow a probable opinion?

No, it is only allowed to follow a probable opinion when the only question is whether the action be sinful or not. If there is also question of an end which must be gained, or a probability of infringing the certain right of another, or if reverence for a sacrament forbids one to expose it to the danger of being null and void by using a probable opinion, the use of a probable opinion in these circumstances is not lawful.

2. How, then, can probabilism be called a universal rule?

Probabilism is a universal rule for forming a certain conscience in cases where there is no certain law which forbids the action contemplated. But there is a certain law which forbids one to jeopardize the attainment of an end which must be gained. The law which makes the attainment of the end obligatory makes it also obligatory to use safe means, not merely probable means, to attain it. And so an Anglican who thinks that Anglicanism is probably the true form of Christianity is not justified in exposing his salvation to risk by remaining an Anglican. The certain - law of justice forbids me to do anything which will probably injure the undoubted right of another. Reverence for God and for sacred things forbids me to expose a sacrament to the probable danger of nullity without necessity, and then necessity does away with the irreverence.

3. What is to be said to the case?

1. It is an axiom of the schools, that whatever is received, is received according to the manner of the recipient. We have spoken of the law that governs the world, as that law has existed from eternity in the mind of God. We have now to consider that law as it is received in creatures, and becomes the inward determinant of their action. Action is either necessary or free. The great multitude of creatures are wholly necessary agents. Even in free agents, most of what is in them, and much that proceeds from them, is of necessity, and beyond the control of their will. Of necessary action, whether material or mental, we shall have nothing further to say. It is governed by the Eternal Law, but it is not matter of moral philosophy. Henceforth we have to do with that law, only as it is received in free agents, as such, to be the rule of their conduct. The agents being free, the law must be received in a manner consonant with their freedom. It is proper to a free and rational being to guide itself, not to be dragged or pushed, but to go its own way, yet not arbitrarily, but according to law. The law for such a creature must be, not a physical determinant of its action, but a law operating in the manner of a motive to the will, obliging and binding, yet not constraining it: a law written in the intellect after the manner of knowledge: a law within the mind and consciousness of the creature, whereby it shall measure and regulate its own behaviour. This is the natural law of conscience. It is the Eternal Law, as made known to the rational creature, whereby to measure its own free acts. The Eternal Law is in the Mind of God: the Natural Law in the minds of men and angels. The Eternal Law adjusts all the operations of creatures: the Natural Law, only the free acts of intellectual creatures. And yet, for binding force, the Natural Law is one with the Eternal Law. On a summer evening one observes the sunset on the west coast; the heavens are all aglow with the sun shining there, and the waters are aglow too, reflecting the sun's rays. The Eternal Law is as the sun there in the heavens, the Natural Law is like the reflection in the sea. But it is one light.

2. It is called the Natural Law, first, because it is found, more or less perfectly expressed, in all rational beings: now whatever is found in all the individuals of a kind, is taken to belong to the specific nature, or type of that kind. Again it is called the Natural Law, because it is a thing which any rational nature must necessarily compass and contain within itself in order to arrive at its own proper perfection and maturity. Thus this inner law is natural, in the sense in which walking, speech, civilization are natural to man. A man who has it not, is below the standard of his species. It will be seen that dancing, singing—at least to a pitch of professional excellence—and a knowledge of Greek, are not, in this sense, natural. The Natural Law is not natural, in the sense of "coming natural," as provincial people say, or coming to be in man quite irrespectively of training and education, as comes the power of breathing. It was absurd of Paley (Mor. Phil., bk. i., c. v.) to look to the wild boy of Hanover, who had grown up in the woods by himself, to display in his person either the Natural Law or any other attribute proper to a rational creature.

3. We call this the natural law of conscience, because every individual's conscience applies this law, as he understands it, to his own particular human acts, and judges of their morality accordingly. What then is conscience? It is not a faculty, not a habit, it is an act. It is a practical judgment of the understanding. It is virtually the conclusion of a syllogism, the major premiss of which would be some general principle of command or counsel in moral matters; the minor, a statement of fact bringing some particular case of your own conduct under that law; and the conclusion, which is conscience, a decision of the case for yourself according to that principle: e.g., "There is no obligation of going to church on (what Catholics call) a day of devotion: this day I am now living is only a day of devotion; therefore I am not bound to go to church to-day." Such is the train of thought, not always so explicitly and formally developed, that passes through the mind, when conscience works. It is important to remember that conscience is an act of intellect, a judgment, not on a matter of general principle, not about other people's conduct, but about my own action in some particular case, and the amount of moral praise or blame that I deserve, or should deserve, for it. As regards action already done, or not done, conscience testifies, accusing or excusing. As regards action contemplated, conscience restrains or prompts, in the way of either obligation or counsel.

4. Conscience is not infallible: it may err, like any other human judgment. A man may be blind, if not exactly to his own action, at least to the motives and circumstances of his action. He may have got hold of a wrong general principle of conduct. He may be in error as to the application of his principle to the actual facts. In all these ways, what we may call the conscientious syllogism may be at fault, like any other syllogism. It may be a bad syllogism, either in logical form, or in the matter of fact asserted in the premisses. This is an erroneous conscience. But, for action contemplated, even an erroneous conscience is an authoritative decision. If it points to an obligation, however mistakenly, we are bound either to act upon the judgment or get it reversed. We must not contradict our own reason: such contradiction is moral evil, (c. v., s. iii., n. 3, p. 74.) If conscience by mistake sets us free of what is objectively our bounden duty, we are not there and then bound to that duty: but we may be bound at once to get that verdict of conscience overhauled and reconsidered. Conscience in this case has proceeded in ignorance, which ignorance will be either vincible or invincible, and must be treated according to the rules provided in the matter of ignorance, (c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27). An obligation, neglected in invincible ignorance, makes a merely material sin. (c. iii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 33.)

5. There is another element of mind, often confounded under one name with conscience, but distinct from it, as a habit from an act, and as principles from their application. This element the schoolmen called synderesis.¹⁰

Synderesis is an habitual hold upon primary moral judgments, as, that we must do good, avoid evil, requite benefactors, honour superiors, punish evil-doers. There is a hot controversy as to how these primary moral judgments arise in the mind. The coals of dispute are kindled by the assumption, that these moral judgments must needs have a totally other origin and birth in the mind than speculative first principles, as, that the whole is greater than the part, that two and two are four, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. The assumption is specious, but unfounded. It looks plausible because of this difference, that moral judgments have emotions to wait upon them, speculative judgments have not. Speculative judgments pass like the philosophers that write them down, unheeded in the quiet of their studies. But moral judgments are rulers of the commonwealth: they are risen to as they go by, with majesty preceding and cares coming after. Their presence awakens in us certain emotions, conflicts of passion, as we think of the good that we should do, but have not done, or of the evil that goes unremedied and unatoned for. Commonly a man cannot contemplate his duty, a difficult or an unfulfilled duty especially, without a certain emotion, very otherwise than as he views the axioms of mathematics. There is a great difference emotionally, but intellectually the two sets of principles, speculative and moral, are held alike as necessary truths, truths that not only are, but must be, and cannot be otherwise: truths in which the predicate of the proposition that states them is contained under the subject. Such are called self-evident propositions; and the truths that they express, necessary truths. The enquiry into the origin of our primary moral judgments is thus merged in the question, how we attain to necessary truth. ¹⁰ On the derivation of this word, whether from [Greek: synedaesis] or [Greek: syntaeresis], see Athenæum, 1877, vol. i., pp. 738, 798, vol. iii. pp. 16, 48.

6. The question belongs to Psychology, not to Ethics: but we will treat it briefly for ethical purposes. And first for a clear notion of the kind of judgments that we are investigating.

"The primary precepts of the law of nature stand to the practical reason as the first principles of scientific demonstration do to the speculative reason: for both sets of principles are self-evident. A thing is said to be self-evident in two ways, either in itself, or _in reference to us. In itself every proposition, the predicate of which can be got from consideration of the subject is said to be self-evident. But it happens that to one who is ignorant of the definition of the subject, such a proposition will not be self-evident: as this proposition, Man is a rational being, is self-evident in its own nature, because to name man is to name something rational; and yet, to one ignorant what man is, this proposition is not self-evident. And hence it is that, as Boethius says: "there are some axioms self-evident to all alike." Of this nature are all those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, Every whole is greater than its part; and, Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Some propositions again are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms: as, to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not in a place by way of circumscription;¹¹ which is not manifest to others, who do not understand the term." (St. Thos., 1a 2æ q. 94, art. 2, in corp.)

One more extract. "From the very nature of an intellectual soul it is proper to man that, as soon as he knows what a whole is, and what a part is, he knows that every whole is greater than its part; and so of the rest. But what is a whole, and what a part, that he cannot know except through sensory impressions. And therefore Aristotle shows that the knowledge of principles comes to us through the senses." (St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 51, art. 1, in corp.) ¹¹ Circumscriptive, which word is explained by St. Thos., 1a, q. 52. art. 1.

7. Thus the propositions that right is to be done, benefactors to be requited, are self-evident, necessary truths, to any child who has learned by experience the meaning of right, of kindness, and of a return of kindness. "Yes, but"—some one will say—"how ever does he get to know what right and wrong are? Surely sensory experience cannot teach him that." We answer, man's thoughts begin in sense, and are perfected by reflection. Let us take the idea of wrong, the key to all other elementary moral ideas. The steps by which a child comes to the fulness of the idea of wrong may be these. First, the thing is forbidden: then one gets punished for it. Punishment and prohibition enter in by eye and ear and other senses besides. Then the thing is offensive to those we love and revere. Then it is bad for us. Then it is shameful, shabby, unfair, unkind, selfish, hateful to God. All these points of the idea of wrong are grasped by the intellect, beginning with sensory presentations of what is seen and felt and heard said. Again with the idea of ought. This idea is sometimes said to defy analysis. But we have gone about (c. vi.) to analyse it into two elements, nature requiring, nature's King commanding. The idea of wrong we analysed into a breach of this natural requirement, and this Divine command or law. Primary moral ideas, then, yield to intellectual analysis. They are of this style: to be done, as I wish to be rational and please God: not to be done, unless I wish to spoil myself and disobey my Maker. But primary moral ideas, compared together, make primary moral judgments. Primary moral judgments, therefore, arise in the intellect, by the same process as other beliefs arise there in matters of necessary truth.

8. Thus, applying the principle known as Occham's razor, that "entities are not to be multiplied without reason," we refuse to acknowledge any Moral Sense, distinct from Intellect. We know of no peculiar faculty, specially made to receive "ideas, pleasures and pains in the moral order." (Mackintosh, Ethics, p. 206.) Most of all, we emphatically protest against any blind power being accredited as the organ of morality. We cannot accept for our theory of morals, that everything is right which warms the breast with a glow of enthusiasm, and all those actions wrong, at which emotional people are prone to cry out, dreadful, shocking. We cannot accept emotions for arbitrators, where it most concerns reasonable beings to have what the Apostle calls "enlightened eyes of the heart" (Ephes. i. 18), that we may "know to refuse the evil and to choose the good." (Isaias vii. 15.) A judge may have his emotions, but his charge to the jury must be dictated, not by his heart, but by his knowledge of the law. And the voice of conscience, whatever feelings it may stir, must be an intellectual utterance, and, to be worth anything in a case of difficulty, a reasoned conclusion, based on observation of facts, and application of principles, and consultation with moral theologians and casuists. A subjective and emotional standard of right and wrong is as treacherous and untrustworthy as the emotional justification of those good people, who come of a sudden to "feel converted."

9. It would be unnecessary, except for the wrong-headedness of philosophers, to observe that conscience requires educating. As moral virtue is a habit of appetite, rational or irrational, a formation resulting from frequent acts; and as the child needs to be aided and assisted from without towards the performance of such acts, in order to overcome the frequent resistance of appetite to reason (c. v., s. ii., n. 4, p. 71): so the springs of conscience are certain intellectual habits, whereby the subject is cognisant of the principles of natural law, and of their bearing on his own conduct, habits which, like the habits of moral virtue, require to be formed by acts from within and succour from without, since merely the rudiments of the habit are supplied by nature. Even the first principles of morality want formulating and pointing out to children, like the axioms of geometry. The mother tells her little one: "Ernest, or Frank, be a good boy:" while the schoolmaster explains to Master Ernest that two straight lines cannot possibly enclose a space. There is something in the boy's mind that goes along with and bears out both the teaching of his master and his mother's exhortation: something that says within him: "To be sure, those lines can't enclose a space:" "Certainly, I ought to be good." It is not merely on authority that he accepts these propositions. His own understanding welcomes and approves them: so much so, that once he has understood them, he would not believe the contrary for being told it. You would not persuade a child that it was right to pull mother's hair; or that half an orange was literally, as Hesiod says, "more than the whole." He would answer that it could not be, that he knew better.

10. On one ground there is greater need of education for the conscience than for any other intellectual formation: that is because of the power of evil to fascinate and blind on practical issues of duty. Cicero well puts it:

"We are amazed and perplexed by variety of opinions and strife of authorities; and because there is not the same divergence upon matters of sense, we fancy that the senses afford natural certainty, while, for moral matters, because some men take one view, some another, and the same men different views at different times, we consider that any settlement that can be arrived at is merely conventional, which is a huge mistake. The fact is, there is no parent, nor nurse, nor schoolmaster, nor poet, nor stage play, to corrupt the judgments of sense, nor consent of the multitude to wrench them away from the truth. It is for minds and consciences that all the snares are set, as well by the agency of those whom I have just mentioned, who take us in our tender and inexperienced age, and ingrain and fashion us as they will, as also by that counterfeit presentment of good, which lurks in the folds of every sense, the mother of all evil, pleasure, under whose seductive blandishments men fail to recognise the moral good that nature offers, because it is unaccompanied by this itching desire and satisfaction." (Cicero, De Legibus, i, 17.)

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a, q. 79, art. 11-13; Plato, Protagoras, 325, 326; John Grote, Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy, pp. 169, 207, 208; Cardinal Newman, Grammar of Assent, pp. l02-112.

1. The following narrative is taken from Grote's History of Greece, c. 81.:

"It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general¹² when he stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather. Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose…. All the male captives, 3,000 in number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death with indignity, as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honour. No man can read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal's life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent aspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honour as a patriot;¹³ that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses…. Doubtless, the feelings of Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations."

We may supplement this story by another from Herodotus (iii., 38):

"Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence certain Greeks who were at hand, and asked, 'What he should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they died.' To which they answered, that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent for certain Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, while the Greeks were standing by, and knew by the aid of an interpreter all that was said—'What he should give them to burn the bodies of their fathers, at their decease?' The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him forbear such language. Such is the way of men; and Pindar was right in my judgment, when he said, 'Convention is king over all.'" ¹² Hannibal, B.C. 409, therefore not the victor of Cannae. ¹³ Italics mine.

2. If any one held that the natural law of conscience was natural in the same way as the sense of temperature: if one held to the existence of a Moral Sense in all men, settling questions of right and wrong, as surely as all men know sweet things from bitter by tasting them: these stories, and they could be multiplied by hundreds, abundantly suffice to confute the error. There is no authentic copy of the moral law, printed, framed, and hung up by the hand of Nature, in the inner sanctuary of every human heart. Man has to learn his duties as he learns the principles of health, the laws of mechanics, the construction and navigation of vessels, the theorems of geometry, or any other art or science. And he is just as likely to go wrong, and has gone wrong as grievously, in his judgments on moral matters as on any other subject of human knowledge. The knowledge of duties is natural (as explained in the previous section, n. 2), not because it comes spontaneously, but because it is necessary to our nature for the development and perfection of the same. Thus a man ought, so far as he can, to learn his duties: but we cannot say of a man, as such, that he ought to learn geometry or navigation. If a man does not know his duties, he is excused by ignorance, according to the rules under which ignorance excuses (c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27). If a man does not know navigation, there is no question of excuse for what he was not bound to learn, but he may suffer loss by his want of knowledge.

3. It was furthermore observed above (l.c.), that the natural law was so called as being found expressed more or less perfectly in the minds of all men, and therefore being a proper element of human nature. It remains to see how much this universal natural expression amounts to. That is at once apparent from our previous explanation of synderesis. (s. i., nn. 5, seq., p. 139.) Not a complete and accurate knowledge of the natural law is found in all minds, far from it; but synderesis is found in all. This is apparent from Mr. Grote's own phrases, "aspirations of filial sentiment," "religious obligation," "honour as a patriot," Parents are to be honoured, we must do our duty to God and to our country: there Hannibal was at one with the most approved teachers of morality. Callatian and Greek agreed in the recognition of the commandment, Honour thy father and thy mother. That was the major premiss of them both, in the moral syllogism (s. i., n. 3, p. 135), which ruled their respective consciences. Their difference was upon the applying minor, as it is called; the Greek regarding the dissolution of the body into its elements by fire, and so saving it from corruption, as the best means of honouring the dead: the Callatians preferring to raise their parents as it were to life again, by making them the food of their living children. Hannibal, again, had before his mind the grand principle of retribution, that wrongdoing must be expiated by suffering. But he had not heard the words "Vengeance is Mine;" and mistakenly supposed it to rest with himself to appoint and carry out his own measure of revenge. Whether he was quite so invincibly ignorant on this point, as Grote represents, is open to doubt. At any rate he was correct in the primary moral judgment on which he proceeded.

Reading.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 94, art. 6.

1. Sometimes conscience returns a clear, positive answer as to the morality of an act contemplated. True or false the answer may be, but the ring of it has no uncertain sound. At other times conscience is perplexed, and her answer is, perhaps, and perhaps not. When the woman hid Achimaas and Jonathan in the well, and said to Absalom's servants, "They passed on in haste" (2 Kings xvii. 17-21), did she do right in speaking thus to save their lives? A point that has perplexed consciences for centuries. A man's hesitation is sometimes subjective and peculiar to himself. It turns on a matter of fact, which others know full well, though he doubts; or on a point of law, dark to him, but clearly ruled by the consent of the learned. In such cases it is his duty to seek information from people about him, taking so much trouble to procure it as the importance of the matter warrants, not consulting ten doctors as to the ownership of one hen. But it may be that all due enquiries fail. The fact remains obscure; or about the law, doctors differ, and arguments conflict indecisively. What is the man to do? Take the safe course: suppose there is an obligation, and act accordingly? This principle, put as a command, would make human life intolerable. It is, moreover, false, when so put, as we shall presently prove. Take the easy course, and leave the obligation out of count? This principle is more nearly correct than the other: but it needs interpretation, else it may prove dangerously lax.

2. To return to Achimaas and Jonathan and their hostess. Some such reckoning as this may have passed through her mind: "Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: but is it a lie to put murderers off the scent of blood?" To that question finding no answer, she may have made up her mind in this way: "Well, I don't know, but I'll risk it." If that were her procedure, she did not walk by the scientific lines of Probabilism. The probabilist runs no risk, enters upon no uncertainty, and yet he by no means always follows what is technically termed the safe course, that is, the course which supposes the obligation, e.g., in the case in point, to have said simply where the men were. How then does the probabilist contrive to extract certainty out of a case of insoluble doubt? By aid of what is called a reflex principle. A reflex is opposed to a direct principle. A direct principle lays down an obligation, as it would bind one who had a perfect discernment of the law and of the facts of the case, and of the application of the one to the other, and who was perfectly able to keep the law. By a reflex principle, a man judges of his own act, taking account of the imperfection of his knowledge and the limitations of his power. Probabilism steps in, only where a case is practically insoluble to an agent upon direct principles. The probabilist thereupon leaves the direct speculative doubt unsolved. He relinquishes the attempt of determining what a man should do in the case in question, who had a thorough insight into the lie of the law. He leaves that aside, and considers what is his duty, or not his duty, in the deficiency of his knowledge. Then he strikes upon the principle, which is the root of Probabilism, that a doubtful law has no binding power. It will be observed that this is a reflex principle. For objectively nothing is doubtful, but everything is or is not in point of fact. To a mind that had a full grasp of the objective order of things, there would be no doubtful law: such a mind would discern the law in every case as holding or not holding. But no human mind is so perfect. Every man has to take account of his own limitations of vision in judging of his duty. The question for me is, not the law absolutely, but the law as far as I can make it out. Our proposition, then, states that when an individual, using such moral diligence of enquiry as the gravity of the matter calls for, still remains in a state of honest doubt as to whether the law binds, in that mental condition it does not bind him.

3. What the law does not forbid, it leaves open. Aristotle indeed (Eth., V., xi., 1) says the contrary, that what the law does not command (he instances suicide), it forbids. All that he seems to mean is, that if there be an act which at times might appear advantageous, and yet is never commanded, there is a presumption of the legislator being averse to that act. Again, there are special occasions, in view of which the legislator undertakes to regulate the whole outward conduct of a man by positive enactment, as with a soldier on parade: what is not there commanded, is forbidden. But these instances do not derogate from our general proposition, which is proved in this way. The office of law is not to loose, but to bind. It declares, not what the subject may do, but what he must or must not. It does not bring liberty, but restriction. Therefore, if any one wishes to assert a restriction, he must go to a law to prove it. If he can find none, liberty remains. The law is laid on liberty. Liberty is not the outcome of law, but prior to it. Liberty is in possession. The burden of proof rests with those who would abridge liberty and impose an obligation. It is an axiom of law itself, a natural, not an arbitrary axiom, that better is the condition of the possessor: which amounts in this matter to another statement, also axiomatic, that a law binds not till it is promulgated. But a law of which I have serious outstanding doubts whether it exists at all, or, if existent, whether it reaches my case, is for this occasion a law not duly promulgated to me. Therefore it binds me not, and my liberty remains.

4. It remains to consider what constitutes a serious outstanding doubt. The word outstanding has been already explained. It means that we have sought for certain information, and cannot procure it. Now what is a serious doubt? It is a doubt founded on a positive opinion against the existence of the law, or its applicability to the case in point, an opinion fraught with probability, solid, comparative, practical probability. The doubt must not be mere negative doubt, or ignorance that cannot tell why it doubts; not a vague suspicion, or sentimental impression that defies all intellectual analysis; not a mere subjective inability to make up one's mind, but some counter-reason that admits of positive statement, as we say, in black and white. It is true that many minds cannot define their grounds of doubt, even when these are real. Such minds are unfit to apply the doctrine of Probabilism to themselves, but must seek its application from others. The opinion against the law, when explicitly drawn out, must be found to possess a solid probability. It may be either an intrinsic argument from reason and the nature of the case, or an extrinsic argument from the word of some authority: but the reason or the authority must be grave. The opinion is thus said to be intrinsically or extrinsically probable. The probability must also be comparative. There is many an argument, in itself a very good one, that perishes when we come to consider the crushing weight of evidence on the other side. An opinion is comparatively probable, when after hearing all the reasons and all the authorities on the other side, the said opinion still remains not unlikely, which is all that we mean to say of an opinion here, when we call it probable. In ordinary English, the word probable means more likely than otherwise, which is not the signification of the Latin opinio probabilis. Lastly, the probability must be practical: it must take account of all the circumstances of the case. Practical probability is opposed to speculative, which leaves out of count certain circumstances, which are pretty sure to be present, and to make all the difference in the issue. Thus it is speculatively probable that a Catholic might without sin remain years without confession, never having any grievous sins to confess, grievous sin alone being necessary matter for that sacrament. There is no downright cogent reason why a man might not do so. And yet, if he neglected such ordinary means of grace as confession of venial sin, having it within reach, month after month, no one, considering "the sin which surrounds us," would expect that man to go without grievous scathe. In mechanics, there are many machines that work prettily enough in speculation and on paper, where the inventors do not consider the difficulties of imperfect material, careless handling, climate, and other influences, that render the invention of no practical avail.

5. The safest use of Probabilism is in the field of property transactions and of positive law. There is greatest risk of using it amiss in remaining in a false religion. All turns upon the varying amount of trouble involved in moral diligence of enquiry, according as the matter at issue is a point of mere observance or of vital interest.

6. The point on which the probability turns must be the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action, not any other issue, as that of the physical consequences. Before rolling boulder-stones down a hill to amuse myself, it is not enough to have formed a probable opinion that there is no one coming up. That would be Probabilism misapplied. The correct enquiry is: Does any intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority make the opinion probable, that it is lawful for mere amusement to roll down rocks with any belief short of certainty that no one will be crushed thereby? The probability, thus turned on to the lawfulness of the action, breaks down altogether. This explanation, borne in mind, will save much misapprehension.

Bertha, an innocent country maiden, receives her education in a convent. After passing her examinations, she takes the veil and is employed as teacher. After a few years the Superioress is informed that Bertha shows undue attachment for some of her young girl pupils, thereby causing dissatisfaction to the others. The Superioress calls Bertha's attention to the error of her action, first in kindness, and, when this does not bring about a reform, is obliged to give her a severe reprimand. Bertha complains about this to her confessor, concluding with the words: "If this small affair, in which I have thought of nothing evil, is sinful, what a great sinner I must be! Then I am afraid I have left out many sins in my confessions, and none of them may have been valid."

The confessor takes great pains to pacify Bertha, but in vain. In fact, Bertha's trouble and anxiety increase after each confession; she becomes more and more scrupulous and answers to the admonitions and warnings of her confessor with all kinds of counter arguments. The latter at length finds himself utterly helpless, and sends Bertha to the extraordinary confessor, the pastor of the place. He also takes great trouble with her for a time, but without any good result. Not knowing what to do, he sends Bertha to his curate, a zealous man of great piety. The curate, who is besides the teacher of Catechism in Bertha's class, gains her full confidence. Whatever Bertha wishes to do or not to do, she always knows how to get her own way. If her Superioress refuses her something, she obtains permission from one of her confessors. If one refuses, she goes to the other. If one confessor orders her to do a certain thing, she gets a dispensation from another one. Before the Superioress she pleads the orders of the confessor, and before the confessor she asserts the authority of her Superioress.

In this way she gradually frees herself from observance of the rule. Meditation, prayer, spiritual reading, all these things cause her irritation. Before Confession she gets convulsions, trembles in her whole body, and becomes speechless. Notwithstanding all this her class is in excellent condition. Her looks do not betray anything unusual, except by the restlessness of her eyes and the pallor of her face. She loses her appetite and becomes more and more peculiar in her actions. By and by she takes several of the sisters into her confidence. They take her part, and the discipline of the convent is seriously impaired. When sterner measures are taken with Bertha she threatens suicide. Scenes and fits before her Superioress and the confessors become more frequent and more violent. Daily, and sometimes several times a day, she writes to the chaplain: "Permit me to call on you," or "If you do not come to see me at once, I shall jump out of the window," etc. These threats of suicide Bertha uses to keep everybody in check.

Finally these things become unbearable, and Bertha is sent to the home of her mother, a little village in the mountains. A physician of repute pronounces Bertha's health in perfect condition, but declares that her nerves are somewhat overwrought.

Dressed in the sisters' gown, Bertha goes to Confession to the village chaplain and employs here her old tactics. He listens to her repeatedly and tries in vain to pacify her with kind words. Finally he deals with her with severity, especially as Bertha begins to call several times a day at his residence, to see him about trifling matters and scruples. His change of manner suddenly ends her convulsions, and she becomes outwardly perfectly quiet. He has forfeited her confidence, and she goes no longer to him but to other priests in the neighborhood to Confession, and finding that she can not have her way she ceases going to Confession altogether. After that she writes menacing letters to her confessor at the convent, and obtains from him direction and advice. Repeatedly she visits a young physician to confide to him her scruples. After three months she returns to the convent, without having in any way improved.

Questions:

1. Has Bertha received proper treatment?

2. How should Bertha have been treated?

3. How is she to be treated in statu quo?

I. (a) Bertha's preference for some of her pupils was sinful (venially) because others felt hurt by these preferences (jealousy, envy), and because it was also detrimental for the welfare of her soul; namely, an obstacle to her duty of striving after perfection, and also dangerous because such attachments frequently lead to gross sensuality and to mortal sins, and in her case would have led there presumably, considering her character. The admonition and subsequent reprimand of the Superioress were therefore in perfect order.

(b) It seems clear from the conduct of the first confessor, at all stages of the case, that from the beginning he was wanting in the necessary prudence and energy. He made a great mistake in giving Bertha dispensations and orders different from those of the other confessors and of her Superioress. He should either have foregone entirely the guidance of Bertha's conscience, or have acted under a perfect understanding with the others. Bertha's condition was aggravated by the yielding and weakness of her first confessor. Her impassioned, proud, and wilful character got the better of him. When at last entreaties and complaints were of no avail and they proceeded against her with energy and severity it was too late; she fell into convulsions (which were undoubtedly at her command, at least partially), and threatened suicide. It must have greatly flattered her female pride to be able to hold four persons in check. Through dispensation from the rules she lost a strong support and the last hold for her suffering soul.

(c) It was perfectly proper and right to send Bertha home for recreation, and to consult a doctor. The surroundings of home and the reminiscences of her youth combined with suitable medical treatment, and proper spiritual guidance, should have acted in a quieting and healing manner. But all these remedies were without avail, and her recovery was frustrated through the interference of her first confessor. Bertha may be compared to a sick person upon whose ailment several physicians are unable to agree; they give counteracting prescriptions, and thus bring the patient to the brink of the grave.

2. The first confessor should have acquainted himself with the orders given to Bertha by her Superioress, and should have seen to it with all necessary severity that the obedience necessary in a convent was preserved. After handing her over to the spiritual care of another confessor he should have been careful not to interfere; and the pastor also should have given up the case entirely so soon as his assistant became Bertha's confessor. The three could act successfully together only with a previous understanding.

Some one should have placed before Bertha the reasons mentioned under No. 1, to justify to her mind the procedure of her Superioress. Bertha, as an intelligent person, which she was by virtue of her training as a teacher, would have been impressed with their validity. It would have been well, and even necessary, to point out to Bertha the difference between imperfection and sin, and draw the distinct line between venial and mortal sin applied to her particular case. Her attention should have been drawn to the fact, that as a religious she had made the vow of obedience, and that even in trivial affairs she was obliged to carry out the orders of her Superioress, that especially when her actions were found faulty, was she required to recognize in the decision of her Superioress the will and voice of God, and that she was moreover under obligation of obedience to her confessor when in the confessional, by virtue of which he could forbid her to harbor any thoughts of her former life. She should have been told to consider such thoughts as temptations to be resisted vigorously, that true and genuine piety shows itself in humble submission and willing obedience, etc. Bertha would most likely have been protected against getting into her deplorable condition by a sensible explanation and application of these truths.

3. As Bertha's nerves are affected by continuous brooding and subsequent excitements, it would be best to relieve her of as much teaching as possible, and let her pass most of her time with light work, in fresh air, under the guidance of a sensible and sociable sister. To keep her altogether away from her class, in which she seems interested, might cause much irritation, and prevent or retard her recovery.

An important question remains to be answered: What is to be done in regard to her threats of suicide? The best way would be to treat them with contempt, and keep her, without her knowing it, under constant surveillance. Suicide seems here to have been an empty threat. Boastful people are usually great cowards. Bertha should be told: "If you think it too long before the dear Lord comes and calls you, you can not improve your case by running with open eyes into hell. If you, however, think that your threats of suicide are making any impression upon me and that you can get me thus to let you do as you please, you are much mistaken. Either you obey promptly, as it becomes a sister, or you leave the convent at once," etc. I would mention also that for persons suffering from nervous irritation a careful application of the cold water cure has been found beneficial for restoring their shattered health. If all these remedies prove without avail, the only thing left is to send Bertha away from the convent, as a community must not be allowed to suffer seriously on account of the vagaries of an individual.

Romualdus, a not very conscientious priest, yet inclined to scrupulosity and suffering from it all the more as up to the present he has been unable to determine upon following one certain moral system, turns now to probabilism in order to rid himself of his scruples. He intends to carry it through in such way that he will invariably, in regard to himself and in the guidance of others, follow the less severe, if still probable, opinion. Especially does he believe: 1. That whenever opinions differ whether an obligation is present or not, the opinion favoring freedom from obligation may be accepted; 2. The lenient opinion is to be accepted if doubt prevails whether an obligation (sin) be grievous or slight; 3. If, finally, with regard to the necessary subjective conditions (appreciation and sufficient action of the will) for a grievous offense, there prevails an uncertainty in the penitent, according to the same principles of probabilism he may always decide on a merely slight offense.

What is to be said, I. Of Romualdus’ view in general; II. Of his particular tenets? Of course it is presumed here that probabilism and its application is lawful.

I. According to the lucid explanation of LEHMKUHL (I, n. 82 sq.) probabilism applies only to the intrinsic lawfulness of an action, or its appropriateness for a (certain) end to be attained. In regard to the matter and form of the Sacraments, in so far as their validity is concerned, the system can not be applied. Eternal salvation is the goal of every man, the means necessary for the attainment of this goal must naturally also be available. No mere probability can be of assistance in this respect; there must be, as is self-evident, as far as possible, a moral certainty attempted. Furthermore a great deal that is lawful in itself, may, either in consequence of the general frailty of human nature, or in regard to special circumstances, conceal dangers and therefore be more or less unlawful; lastly, man not only must avoid the evil, but also do the good, and, in proportion to his state and the graces granted him by God, he must strive after perfection; it is the confessor’s duty not merely to prevent, as far as possible, a penitent from sinning, but also to lead him on to the path of virtue. Much as it is to be desired that the penitent should be enlightened to such extent that he would not sin as result of a false conscience, yet it would be wrong to advise, or even command him, under all circumstances to choose the easier way.

From the above it is obvious under what suppositions alone Romualdus’ proceeding might be considered justified, and that for him, who on one hand inclines to scruples, and is not very conscientious on the other hand, as is not infrequently a fact with scrupulous people, there is the danger of entering upon a course which is opposed alike to the nature of probabilism and to the rules for its application.

II. With respect to the particular tenets of Romualdus, the following must be said:

Ad. 1. The tenets here presented—supposing of course the premises suggested under I. prevail—lie in the nature of probabilism; hence the adherer of this system may and will follow it.

2. From the maxim: A doubtful law does not bind there appears at the first glance to follow not only: An obligation is not to be imposed where it is not certainly established; but also: A grave obligation is not to be imposed where, etc.:

Upon this point also—again of course suppositis supponendis— we may agree with Romualdus. Upon closer observation, however, the matter would not seem quite so simple. Of the cases namely in which there is doubt between strict and lesser obligation (grievous and slight sin) two distinct kinds are distinguishable. Firstly, such doubt may arise from the uncertainty, whether in addition to a slight obligation there is not also, different from the first, another more serious obligation. Here, according to the principles of probabilism, one will as a matter of fact decide only on the absence of a serious obligation (in practise). Thus he who recites his breviary voluntarily without interior attention, certainly is at fault on account of lack of reverence toward God, although on this ground as a rule only at a slight fault; whether he also offends on account of transgressing an ecclesiastical precept, that is, whether the latter prescribes the inner attention and this strictly, and sub poena nullitatis recitationis, upon this point there prevail two contradictory probable opinions, Practically, an obligation on account of the ecclesiastical precept will therefore not be acknowledged. For another similar example see LEHMKUHL, I, n. 900.

Secondly, there are cases, which do not deal with two obligations (sins) of which one—the greater—is questionable, in which there is doubt, rather, whether the one present obligation (transgression) is serious or slight. For instance there are various probable opinions as to whether a promise under oath to do something venially sinful is a slight or grave offense. Again, theologians are not unanimous as to what materia of a theft is to be considered gravis, so that also here there are several probable views. If we compare these two sorts of cases, we find without difficulty that they are not quite identical, but a discussion of their difference may here be omitted as it will appear from the following argument. But how does there result from the theoretical probability of a milder opinion at once its practical certainty?

Worthy of note, and an argument against an affirmative answer, is the fact that even probabilists, like BALLERINI and LEHMKUHL, of whom the former for the first time made a thorough application of probabilism, and the latter, after a precise statement of the theoretical aspect of the case, invariably draws practical conclusions according to the system which he represents, do not, for cases of the kind now contemplated, always advance as certain the practical conclusions (Compare Gury-BALLERINI, I, n. 311; n. 313; II, nn. 208 seqq.; LEHMKUHL, I, n. 413^*; II, nn. 232 seqq.).

^* It is said there very significantly: “But this (that the sin is light) must especially be said in practice if the one swearing does not attend to the sinfulness of the action which he promises....”

Furthermore, the principle upon which probabilism is based can hardly be here the furtherance of justice or fairness. For though it may be assumed that the lawgiver does not intend to bind by a precept the existence of which is doubtful, it is not so easy to prove that he must in every case specify the degree of obligation. Furthermore, probabilism, like every other moral system, is only of value as a rule of conduct if brought to the consciousness of the mind; the conscience, however, may be easily trained to distinguish, in the heat of struggle, distinctly enough between the lawful and the unlawful; however, it is much more uncertain that in temptation the magnitude of an offense is judged, when the will has already decided for the evil. If, moreover, in a moral discussion the supernatural may be referred to, it must be remarked that in our cases grace also— already partly rejected—would hardly exert a specially effective force. Therefore the probability of the milder opinion, of which there is mention, will be frequently of no interest in practise, because consciousness of it did not prevail in the act, whence with some certainty a conclusion may be drawn as to whether from the theoretical probability the practical certainty follows. Let me quote an analogism. In order to incur a penalty imposed by a certain law it is usually necessary (at least in the case of ecclesiastical penalties) that the offender know something of the penal law, yet a precise knowledge of the nature and measure of the penalty is not in the least requisite.

From all this follows, that, in this second class of cases, from the theoretical probability of the milder view can not always be concluded with certainty its validity in practise; Romualdus did not judge rightly, as the supposition of a merely slight obligation (sin) is not justified without special reason.

The following may be adduced in elucidation and support: Supposing a grave obligation (offense) is not considered certain, then, 1. The offense can not oblige to anything incurred by a positively grave fault, for example to the reception of the Sacrament of Penance before Holy Communion. 2.. There would, however, be the obligation of awakening perfect contrition before the reception of all Sacraments for which the state of grace is necessary, as here it is a question not of a positive precept, but of something in a certain respect required necessitate medii (above 1). 3. The same may well be held in respect to the state of the soul required for the worthy administration of the Sacraments. 4. Whether this latter result follows in every degree of (still actual) probability of the more severe view, we do not venture to decide for the present. Theoretically considered it appears really to be the case, as there where something in the nature of a means must necessarily be present, any just doubt should be removed. In practise there would be frequent cause for an uneasy conscience, especially in the instance last mentioned.

III. The question of the offense of a penitent with consideration of the perception and action of the will, is a pure question of fact, and must be decided according to fixed rules for ascertaining a fact, and for this reason has no direct connection with probabilism. But if after conscientious inquiry a doubt remained about the gravity of the offense then it would be a contradictio in terminis to decide merely for a slight sin. In regard to the practical consequences (compare LEHMKUHL, I, n. 50) there would apply our remarks ad. II. (1-4).

P. AMBROSE RUNGGALDIER, O.S.F.

A young man of about thirty came to a confessor and confessed, with every sign of contrition, many grievous sins, especially many very serious ones contra VI. The confessor heard him patiently, asked the necessary questions, warned and admonished him suaviter, pointed out the consequences to body and soul, and then absolved and dismissed him. Some weeks later the penitent returned to the confessional and thenceforth came frequently, showing himself to be completely changed. The priest's exhortations had sunk deep into his "heart, and the grace of God worked a miraculous conversion. Yet at every confession he said: " Father, whenever I think of my past life, I am filled with fear; I never have a happy hour, I have no peace at all." Quid respondendum?

If the confessor is satisfied that his penitent has confessed all the formal mortal sins that he remembered, after a careful examination of conscience, — if there is moral certainty de validitate of his previous confessions, and if any that were not valid have been made good, he should begin by telling the penitent that his disturbed state is the work of the devil. Our adversary does all in his power to drag a soul that he considered his own back from the right path, and in order to discourage a poor mortal, and shatter his confidence in God, he has recourse to disturbance and anxiety of mind, and tortures him with doubts as to God's mercy. The confessor ought to urge his penitent to pray earnestly, and he should strive to strengthen his confidence in God.

None of us, not even the most pious priest, knows whether he is worthy of love or hatred (Eccles. ix, 1), and even the Apostle of the Gentiles had to acknowledge: "I am conscious of nothing against myself, yet I am not thereby justified; but He who judges me is the Lord" (1 Cor. iv, 4). It is actually a dogma of our holy religion, that no one knows with certainty that he is justified (Trid. sess., VI. cap. 9, in Denzinger, n. 684). Therefore we must be satisfied with more or less moral certainty, which varies in degree according to our power of ascertaining whether we have complied with all the requirements and conditions imposed by God. We have much reason to thank Him for this incertitudo; it preserves us from carelessness and reckless presumption, and sets a barrier to our self-confidence and boastful self-complacency.

After a penitent has done his best to obtain reconciliation with God, he should set aside all disquieting thoughts and look with confidence to the future.

To elucidate the point under discussion as far as possible, I may add that, in making the preceding statements, I have had in view a sinner who has committed unusually grievous sins during a period of many years, and now, in spite of having confessed them, enjoys no peace of mind. If he is incessantly troubled by fears ob confessiones peractas, and questions their validity, or if he is in constant dread of sinning, the regulae pro scrupulosis of course hold good for his confessor.—Prof. Gspann.

Case.—At a mission a female penitent confesses to one of the missionaries, and ad sextum she mentions that she includes everything, but that her regular confessor had forbidden her to go into details for the reason that he was convinced that her offences were only imaginary and due to scrupulousness. However, having listened to a sermon on invalid confessions, she had become troubled about the matter and feared that not everything was as it should be. Hence, she thought, she had better ask the advice of the missionary. In answer to some questions she admits that she had reason to think that she had simulated scrupulousness, partly because ashamed to state the facts, and partly “to get off easy,” as she puts it. The missionary decides that she must now tell him the full facts so that the past might be done with for good.

Question.—Is the decision correct?

Solution.—The decision is correct because it is connected with a mission, therefore with a general renovation. Also because, as a matter of fact, it happens that some penitents, especially women, simulate scrupulousness, and persist in it for a long time, to obtain leniency. While such a penitent makes confession, the confessor should be most kind, because such penitents need often a great deal of persuasion to come out with the full truth. However, when the penitent is through with the confession, the confessor may deem himself justified and in duty bound to talk very seriously and even severely to such a penitent.

95. Conscience is the human intellect applying the general principles of morals to individual acts. The term, as employed in Moral Philosophy, means not an examination into one's past deeds, but a judgment on acts about to be performed. In judging whether an individual act is morally good or evil, the intellect forms, explicitly or implicitly, a syllogism, the major of which is a known principle of morality, the minor a particular fact, and the conclusion a practical judgment, which is called a dictate of conscience. For instance, — a lie is never allowed; but to say that I have never sinned would be a lie; therefore, I am not allowed to say that I have never sinned. Conscience, then, may be defined as a practical judgment formed by reasoning from a universal principle to a particular fact, whereby I decide whether a certain individual act ought to be done or omitted, or whether it may be done or omitted, at my choice.

96. My conscience, with regard to any particular act may be correct or erroneous; its judgment may be certain or doubtful; the doubt may be concerning a law or a fact. A doubtful judgment is called an opinion; the reasons in favor of an opinion constitute its probability. In matters pertaining to conscience, we can seldom have the strictest certitude, such namely as excludes all possibility of error. However, moral certitude, which excludes a prudent doubt (Log. 79, etc.) is sufficient to safeguard moral rectitude. Hence, a certain dictate of conscience means a practical judgment free from a prudent doubt in regard to error. Moreover, it may happen that two honest men act in diametrically opposite ways about the same matter, and each may be morally certain that he is right. If I make a mistake through no fault of my own, my judgment is erroneous though it may be morally certain. In such a case I am said to be invincibly ignorant of the truth. If, however, the error is due to my own fault, my ignorance is vincible.

97. Thesis XIII. Conscience when certain must be obeyed, whether it be correct or invincibly erroneous.

Proof. We are bound to obey the law rationally — i. e., as our intellect makes known to us the application of the law. But when conscience is certain, our intellect makes known to us the application of the law with certainty, whether our judgment in the matter be correct or invincibly erroneous. Therefore, conscience when certain must be obeyed, whether it be correct or invincibly erroneous.

98. Conscience is said to be doubtful, when the motive for believing that a particular law does not exist, or that it is not applicable to the case in hand is based on an opinion more or less probable — i. e., more or less well founded. 1. An opinion is slightly or barely probable when it rests on very weak motives. 2. It is probable, or plausible, when supported by solid reasons, though stronger reasons may uphold the contradictory opinion. 3. It is equally probable with the contradictory opinion when both are supported by equally plausible reasons. 4. It is more probable, when the reasons favoring the opinion are stronger than those opposed to it. 5. It is most probable, when the arguments on which it rests are very strong, while those for the contradictory opinion are very weak.

99. Doubt, as affecting conscience is either speculative or practical. It is a practical doubt, if it regards the formal liceity of a particular act which is about to be performed. Hence, if I act with a practical doubt, I do not know whether or not I am doing wrong and displeasing God; for example: everything considered, I am in doubt whether I shall do wrong by reading a certain book which, I have reason to think, is dangerous to Faith.

Doubt is speculative when it concerns the premises of a syllogism, the conclusion of which is a dictate of conscience: that is, if I doubt either that a certain law exists, or, granting its existence, that it is applicable to this particular case. I doubt, for example, whether by a law of the Church a certain Saturday of the year is a fast day, or, knowing that such a law exists, whether to-day is that particular Saturday; or, again, whether I am excused from fasting to-day by present illness.

100. Thesis XIV. It is never right to act with a practical doubt of conscience.

Proof. To act with a practical doubt of conscience is equivalent to saying: "I may break God's law, and so displease Him by doing this act, yet I will do it any way." But this is never right, because it is a manifest proof of an evil disposition to do the act, even if it were known to be prohibited, and hence shows contempt for God's law.

101. What then must we do, in order to avoid acting with a practical doubt of conscience? We may abstain from acting, if the matter so permits; or we may choose the safer side, that, namely, by which we fulfill the obligation in question; or we may remove the practical doubt. This removal we can sometimes effect by a more careful examination into the principles or facts involved, or by inquiring from competent authorities whether such a law exists, or whether it is applicable to this particular case. This would be to solve the speculative doubt, and is the direct method of getting rid of the practical doubt. But, if we are indeed so circumstanced that it is impossible to make use of the direct method, we may, nevertheless, get rid of the practical doubt, and act in the matter with safety, by applying to the difficulty the reflex principle of moral conduct: "A doubtful law has no binding force."

102. A course of conduct is called safe, if it excludes all danger of formal wrong. Yet one course may be safer than another, for we can make assurance doubly sure by avoiding the possibility of even material wrong. The less safe course, however, must so guard me from formal wrong that I cannot be justly blamed for adopting it. Still, the fact that one opinion is safer than another, does not by itself make it the more probable of the two. Thus, if a neighbor has a less probable claim to a house in my possession, the safer course for me to follow, that I may avoid all possibility of doing him an injustice, would be to give up my claim in his favor; and yet, in point of genuineness, my neighbor's title is supposed to be less probable than mine.

103. Thesis XV. When a certain end is absolutely to be secured, we must choose the safer way of securing it.

Explanation. Since the end in this case is absolutely to be secured, I ought, if it were possible, to use means which are absolutely reliable or certain, for the means should be proportionate to the end. But it is here supposed that none of the means available is absolutely reliable, but that each is supported by probability only, one of the means having a higher degree of probability than any other. In this case, we maintain, with all moralists of standing, that the safer way, that, namely, which has the more probable opinion in its favor; must be followed in practice.

Proof. If I choose the less safe way, I freely make less certain the acquisition of an absolutely necessary end. But freely to lessen the certainty of attaining an absolutely necessary end is wrong. Therefore, I may not in this case choose the less safe way; on the contrary, I am bound to follow the safer way.

Thus, on the principle that Baptism is absolutely necessary for salvation, the Church baptizes converts, if their former baptism is doubtful. On this principle, too, physicians are not allowed, if sure remedies are at hand, to experiment with doubtful medicines upon their patients, whose health they are bound by their engagements to secure.

104. But when there is question of the mere liceity of an act, am I bound to adopt the more probable opinion? In other words, when, according to one probable opinion, the law requires a certain act of me, and, according to another probable opinion, such a requirement does not exist, am I bound to observe the law which probably has never been enacted? Or again, am I bound to observe an existing law in circumstances to which the law-giver probably never intended it to be applied?

On various theories various answers are given to this question: 1. Rigorists say: As long as any doubt remains that the law does not exist, the law must be obeyed, though, most probably, the law does not exist. 2. Tutiorists say: The law must be obeyed unless the opinion favoring an easier course be far more probable. 3. Probabiliorists say: Obey the law unless the opinion favoring an easier course be more probable. 4. Probabilists allow a free choice, provided the easier course has solid probability in its favor, even though the other course has greater probability. 5. Laxists permit liberty of choice even when the easier course is only slightly or barely probable. This last view, and that which requires for the liceity of an act certitude that it is not forbidden, have both been condemned by the Church.

105. Thesis XVI. In questions of mere liceity, we may follow the easier course if there is a solidly probable opinion in its favor.

Proof. A doubtful law has no binding force. But that law against whose existence a solidly probable opinion militates is a doubtful law. Therefore I am not bound to follow such a law. The principle, "A doubtful law has no binding force," which is received as an axiom, is apparent from the fact that such a law is wanting in an essential feature required for binding force, viz., full promulgation. If reasonable efforts have been made to remove the doubt, yet without success, we may conclude that the law, if it exists, has not been sufficiently promulgated.

106. Objections: 1. If the thesis is true, I am allowed to do wrong. Answer. We are never allowed to do formal wrong, i. e., what we know to be wrong; but we are not always forbidden to do what is materially wrong, to do that, namely, which we do not know to be wrong. 2. But the law may be certain and only the application of it uncertain; I know, for instance, that I must abstain from meat on Friday, but I do not know whether this is Friday. Answer. The same rule holds for the application of the law as for its doubtful existence. If, after trying in vain to obtain enlightenment on the subject, I have a solidly probable opinion that to-day is not Friday, I may reason that the law of abstinence as affecting this particular case is a doubtful one, and therefore, for this particular application, has no binding force.

This book deserves a welcome as an honest attempt to grapple with the difficulties of moral science. How great those difficulties are is generally recognized, and by none more fully and freely than by those who have tried to overcome them. Modern theories in history and science have directed renewed attention to the fundamental problems of ethics, and it is fitting that readers who are interested in the subject should be able to study the Catholic answer to those problems in the mother tongue. Students of theology, too, will benefit by being able to consult an English author, who goes over the ground rendered so familiar to them by our Latin text-books. There are many such works published in other modern languages, but as yet the English language is singularly deficient in them.

These, however, were not the reasons that induced Dr. McDonald to publish his essay. He tells us in his preface that while it is his main object to explain and defend the traditional system of morals which has been taught for centuries in the Catholic schools, yet he claims to have arrived at some important conclusions which are not to be found elsewhere. “If it were otherwise,” he says, “I should not have thought of writing or publishing.”

In the course of teaching moral theology, he noticed a considerable difference between the general principles formulated in the treatises on Human Acts, Laws, and Conscience, and the special conclusions arrived at afterwards when treating of the particular ’ virtues. These special conclusions he regards as the true rules of moral conduct, and as furnishing the material for that wider synthesis which forms the substance of the earlier and fundamental treatises. Hence these special conclusions should furnish a test for the validity and accuracy of the general principles laid down in the treatises on Human Acts, Law, and Conscience.

I quite agree. A general principle of morals which breaks down when applied to particular cases does not deserve to rank as a principle. It makes a pretense of being a rule of conduct, while in practice it furnishes no guide to conduct at all. If, then, the contention be true, that some of the general principles of the fundamental treatises of moral theology as found in our text-books do not harmonize with the doctrine on special virtues, all moralists will welcome the demonstration of its truth, and will be thankful for an accurate and plain statement of the general principles which should be substituted in place of the old.

No theologian would pretend that the common doctrine found in our text-books on the fundamental treatises of moral theology has reached its final, definitive, and perfect stage. Progress is still possible, and no doubt progress will be made in the method of presenting the doctrine, in the enunciation and ordering of the principles, and in other ways. And if we are to advance, some one must attempt the task, some one must act as pioneer of the way. This is another reason why this book deserves a welcome. But if the advance is to be on secure lines, it is no less necessary that the critic should be on the look out, and should perform his task honestly and fearlessly.

This is what I propose to do in this article. For the great bulk of the book, inasmuch as it presents in a good English dress the common doctrine of the Catholic schools, I have nothing but praise and a sincere welcome to offer. It is with two or three of those special conclusions at which Dr. McDonald has arrived, and which he says are not to be found elsewhere, that I propose to deal. I may say frankly at the outset that I do not agree with them; and so I find my place among those many students of morals, who, as he tells us in his Preface, the author foresaw would question and deny the success of his attempt in the direction of novelty.

In the remarks which I have to make I shall strive to be as impersonal as possible; I shall look at the doctrines criticized from the purely objective point of view, and I am sure Dr. McDonald will not resent the friendly and honest criticism of a fellow-worker in a field of knowledge, as difficult as it is interesting.

A good practical test of the morality of an action is the effect which it produces. Adultery, theft, selfishness, are seen to be morally wrong because of the evil consequences which they produce. What, however, is to be said of the moral quality of an action which produces both good and bad effects? The administration of chloroform renders the subject insensible to pain, but it also deprives him of the use of reason for the time being; craniotomy preserves the mother but it kills the child. How are we to judge of the morality of such actions as these which produce effects of opposite moral quality? Dr. McDonald discusses and rejects the test which is commonly given in our text-books of moral theology. He translates the principle as formulated by Father Lehmkuhl thus : —

It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad,—provided (1) the action, viewed in itself is good or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good (it is well to add in some cases: and provided there is no danger of subsequent evil consent or intention); (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of—the bad; (4) and there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect. (Page 149.)

He then proceeds to criticize the principle in this manner : —

There is not one of these four conditions that does not present difficulties to my mind. Let us take them in order :—

(1) ‘‘The action’’—that is, as I understand it, the external action—‘‘viewed in itself, must be good or at least indifferent.’’ But is not the whole question at issue this: how is one to know whether this action is good in itself, when its effects are good as well as evil? You tell me that it is to be considered lawful—which is the same as good— if, among other things, it is good in itself; and I do not see how this makes me a whit the wiser. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the principle which he impugns. The whole question at issue is, of course, the morality of the action which produces both good and bad effects. We wish to know whether the administration of chloroform, for instance, is a good action; whether craniotomy is lawful; whether, to take a third example given by Dr. McDonald, it is lawful to walk to the fields in summer time for the sake of exercise and relaxation, in spite of the fact that at each step we crush the life out of many lowly forms of sentient being. The principle tells us that such actions will be morally good if certain conditions are verified. The first is that the action viewed in itself, that is, apart from its effects, must not be bad. This is not the whole question at issue, as Dr. McDonald asserts that it is; the question at issue is, whether the action remains good, even though it produce an evil effect. We can examine the morality of the action apart from its evil effect, and this is what the principle tells us to do. Thus, in the last instance quoted from Dr. McDonald, it is possible to walk in the fields without destroying sentient life at all, or at least we may conceive of its being done; the question is, whether it remains a lawful action in summer time, when it cannot ordinarily be done without destroying animal or insect life. The action of walking in the fields, even in summer time, is ethically good, or at least indifferent, viewed in itself, apart from consequences, and thus it satisfies the first condition laid down in the principle. This is a distinct step towards the solution of the question concerning the morality of walking in the fields in summer time; when we have got thus far, we are something more than a whit the wiser. For, if the question were whether I may tell a lie to save another’s life, or in other words, whether a lie is lawful when it produces a good effect in spite of its also producing a bad one, the question would at once be settled in the negative by the application of our principle; the first condition would not be satisfied, because to lie is bad in itself. Dr. McDonald proceeds : —

(2) ‘‘The agent must not intend the evil effect, but only the good.’’ But, according to the doctrine laid down in the last chapter, the question of intention or subsequent consent does not arise. We want to test whether a certain external action, regarded in itself, is morally good or bad; and I think I have shown that external acts, as such, do not depend for their morality on any concomitant or subsequent act of the will. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the second condition as seriously as he misunderstood the first. We are not concerned here with the mere external action regarded in itself. We want to know whether it is lawful to walk in the fields in summer time. The action is regarded as a complete human act, therefore as a voluntary act, as one issuing from free will, therefore as necessarily informed by a certain intention, an intention which may be good or bad. To walk in the fields in order wantonly to destroy sentient life is a bad action, because informed by a vicious intention ; to walk in the fields for recreation, or to till them, is good. With a view to settling whether in a concrete case walking in the fields is a good and lawful action, the principle lays down the condition that the intention must not be bad. This has nothing to do with the disputed question whether the intention can change the nature of the external act.

The third condition is: “The good effect must be produced as immediately as — that is — not by means of the bad.”

Criticizing this condition Dr. McDonald asks: “Is this universally true?” I answer, Yes, if in the circumstances the evil effect remains evil, for we must not do evil that good may come of it. To amputate a diseased leg in order to save life is not evil, and so the example does not show that the condition laid down is false, though the Doctor seems to think that it does. And though he here implies that when chloroform is administered, the good effect is obtained through the evil, he does not prove it; and even if that were proved, he would still have to show that to produce unconsciousness by administering chloroform when there is good reason for it, is evil. Dr. McDonald refers us to another work of his for a criticism of the terminology of the fourth condition, and then briefly subjoins:

The ‘‘weighty reason’’ required is the good effect which must also be produced by the action. . .. Now it is not much addition to one’s sum of knowledge to be told that an action is wrong which does not produce any but an evil effect; nor does it help much to be informed further that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil. (Page 150.)

I shall have something to say to this further on.

After his polemic against the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald inquires whether the distinction between direct and indirect causality may not serve as a basis for the test which ought really to be applied in all cases of mixed results. He rejects this suggestion, but in his discussion on this point he falsifiés the meaning of the distinction as commonly used by theologians, and confounds it with the distinction between per se and per accidens. When theologians treat of the lawfulness of direct and indirect killing, the distinction does not merely refer to the direct or indirect causality of the external act; it has special reference to the intention.¹ Dr. McDonald, indeed, rules the question of intention out of court, but such is not the practice of moral theologians when they discuss the questions with which the Doctor is here occupied, and inasmuch as those questions are concerned with human acts, acts necessarily informed by some intention, not with the merely physical external acts of the body, as he seems to suppose, it is difficult to see the reason for abstracting from the intention.

¹

Finally, the Doctor proposes a principle of his own in substitution for the principle of a double effect. He states it thus: —

“That is said to be intended directly in any action which is intended primarily and for its own sake. Its correlative is indirectly, which is said of that which is intended only by reason of another and as it were accidentally. . . . In morals, he directly intends homicide who commands it; indirectly, he who posits some cause of it, such as drunkenness, from which it follows.”—Lexicon Scholasticorum Verborum.

An external action is to be considered morally good, even though it should produce a bad as well as a good effect, provided (1) it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated; and (2) the good effect produced is sufficient to compensate for the bad. (Page 158.)

The chief reason why Dr. McDonald wrote his book was, it will be remembered, to remedy a defect in other authors. As he says, just before the statement of his new principle: —

I am convinced that when they come to practical work our theologians retain their sound common sense and forget or neglect the general principle which they were at such pains to establish at an earlier period, when treating of what I may call the metaphysics of moral science. (Page 157.)

Unless I am very much mistaken this procedure will be necessary in the case of Dr. McDonald’s own principle. In fact, he himself virtually acknowledges as much. On two conditions, he says, an external action will be morally good, even though it produces a bad as well as a good effect; first, it must not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated. But which are those beings which by nature are not to be subordinated? Unless this is known, it will not be possible to apply the general principle. It will only be a general rule of conduct in so far as it enables us to decide the morality of particular cases. However, Dr. McDonald confesses that there is no general rule that can be given.

It is reasonable to ask [he says] how one is to decide whether and how far any being is by nature subservient to another. I know of no general rule that may be applied; one has to go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, compare them, and then decide whether and how far they are independent or subservient. (Page 163.)

To go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, and compare them, is the work of a theologian, and not an easy task even for him; so that there will be no slight difficulty in discovering whether the first condition is verified in a particular case.

The second condition is, that the good effect produced should be sufficient to compensate for the bad. Now this seems identical with one of the conditions ordinarily required by theologians in the common statement of the principle of a double effect. “ There must be a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect,’ says Father Lehmkuhl, quoted above. Dr. McDonald would seem to have forgotten his criticism of that condition in the former connection: “Nor does it help much,” he wrote, “to be informed that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil” (page 150). If it did not help much there, I cannot see how it can help much here. Furthermore, he confesses that here also no general rule can be given for deciding whether the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad (page 165). The circumstances must be balanced in particular cases, certain allowances have to be made; what those allowances are is a question which the writer on ethics has to face when he comes to treat of the separate virtues; in doing this he must draw liberally on the light supplied by other practical sciences. The work, evidently, is not child’s play; in any case the result will not help us much.

I am afraid practical moralists will not find Dr. McDonald’s principle of much use. It is as difficult to decide whether the conditions laid down are verified, as to decide the moral quality of the external action.

Moreover, unless I seriously misunderstand the Doctor’s meaning, the principle is inadequately formulated. As laid down it would allow actions to be done which are certainly wrong. For example: I am in poverty, and I have the opportunity of relieving my wants and those of my family by stealing £5 from a wealthy neighbor. This action produces a good and a bad effect; it relieves my want, though to be sure it also deprives my neighbor of a sum which he will hardly miss. The action will be lawful, according to Dr. McDonald, on condition that it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated, and if the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad. Both these conditions would seem to be verified by my action. I subordinate money to human wants, as by nature it should be subordinated; the good effect is out of all proportion to the bad. The money in my hands goes to feed my family, in the hands of its owner it would go to feed his dogs.

I must confess I do not see why this is not a legitimate application of Dr. McDonald’s principle; it is with the purpose of excluding such applications of the principle of a double effect that theologians require, as a first condition, that the action in itself should be good, or at least indifferent; but Dr. McDonald rejects that condition as involving the whole question at issue.

Besides the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald adversely criticizes the common doctrine about penal laws. However, his chief objections to that doctrine are not new; they appear to me to have been abundantly answered by such classical writers on Law as Suarez and Laymann. Besides, I should very much doubt whether the Doctor’s rather strict views on this point are at all general in the land of potheen. It will be more interesting to pass on to his criticism of the fundamental principle of Probabilism and Equiprobabilism alike, the principle that doubtful laws do not bind the conscience.

This principle is capable of being understood in several ways. All theologians hold that doubtful laws bind in some sense. Thus, in a case of practical doubt as to the existence of a law I am bound to make due inquiry, and I am not at liberty to act until I can, directly or reflexly, form a certain conscience on the question. Dr. McDonald strives to show that there is no general law which obliges one in doubt to acquire certainty as to the rightness of his action before he proceeds to act. (Page 199, sqq.) But surely the law which forbids us to act with a doubtful conscience binds us to do this. Quod non est ex fide peccatum est. If I doubt whether it be a day of abstinence or not, and eat meat without taking any pains to form a certain conscience, I commit a sin, and that whether it be a day of abstinence or not. For the very fact of my eating meat in spite of my being doubtful whether it is not forbidden by the Church shows that I am prepared to break the law of the Church about abstinence, and this is a sinful disposition, which is externated by my eating meat, which act therefore is a sin, whether there be a prohibition to eat meat on that day or not. This explains why it is always a sin to eat meat with a doubtful conscience, even when the doubtful law does not exist. How would Dr. McDonald explain this on his assumption that doubtful laws bind directly and of their own force? A law which does not exist cannot bind. Dr. McDonald’s argument, therefore, seems destitute of force. The fact that the sin committed by one who acts in doubt is of the same species as would be the sin committed against the doubtful law if it existed, does not show that a doubtful law binds the conscience; it only proves that there is a general law which prescribes that we must form a certain conscience before we act.

Moreover, a doubtful law may in a certain sense be said to bind after due inquiry has been made, and the doubt cannot be directly solved. If, after forming my conscience in this case I act against the law which really exists, I commit a material sin, but I am excused from formal guilt. All theologians, I think, also admit this. The doubtful law is said in such cases to bind imperfectly, in actu primo, not perfectly and in actu secundo. Dr. McDonald hardly seems to admit the validity of this distinction as applied to the obligation of law, and almost violently attacks the defenders of probabilism, who use it in the exposition of their system. His remarks, however, show that he has misunderstood its history and meaning.

I do not know [he writes] when or by whom this distinction between first and second act was introduced into treatises on the binding force of laws. St. Alphonsus took it, apparently, from Cardinal Gotti; and the curious in such matters may inquire whether the learned Cardinal is responsible for first transferring the terms in question from the treatises on actuality and activity, where they were found originally and where they serve some purpose, to treatises on law and its obligation, where they are almost without meaning. (Page 206.)

But surely treatises on law and its obligation are treatises on actuality and activity. This appeared so evident to Suarez that he took it for granted at the beginning of his great treatise on Laws.²

² Lib. I., c. iv., n. 3.

There can be no objection, then, to using the distinction, in actu primo and in actu secundo, of the different phases in which we may consider the obligation of laws. Such classical authors as Suarez and Sylvius used it in this sense long before Gotti wrote. The very term obligation is derived from physical activity, as St. Thomas explains in a celebrated passage: —

The command of some ruler stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can befall the will, just as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing upon which it acts; hence no one is bound by the command of any king or lord unless the command reaches the very person to whom it is given; and it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore one who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know it and does not know it, he is in no way bound by the precept. Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge.

It is difficult, then, to see what ground Dr. McDonald has for objecting to a distinction which is in accord with the nature of things, and which has been consecrated by the usage of centuries in the schools. His subsequent remarks, however, show that he has seriously misunderstood the meaning in which the distinction is used.

THE “conscientious objector” has attracted considerable attention, but I doubt whether his significance has been fully appreciated. He says that his conscience condemns war and so he refuses to join the army. When cases have come before them the tribunals have endeavoured as a rule to satisfy themselves whether the objections to war were really conscientious. If they appeared to be really conscientious the tribunals as a rule and as a matter of expediency respected them and exempted the objector from active fighting. He was still liable to be employed on ambulance or hospital work, or in digging trenches. This may be a good practical way of getting out of the difficulty, but it can hardly be called a satisfactory solution of it. As long as the " conscientious objectors " are not very numerous no great harm follows from the course pursued. But if they became very numerous it might seriously interfere with the efficiency of the army. It is worth while to try to solve the question on its merits and on the ground of principle apart from mere expediency. This is what a writer in the Times attempted to do a few weeks ago. His solution may be regarded as representative of educated, non-Catholic opinion in this country. In common with certain Anglican correspondents who had written to the Times on the subject, he admitted that conscience is a sacred thing. He accepted, in other words, the Christian notion of conscience. It is the herald, the voice of God, and as such it must be obeyed rather than any merely human authority. The battle for freedom of conscience, he wrote, was fought and won in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Liberty of conscience must now be granted to everyone. Englishmen at least have no idea of persecuting anyone for conscience’ sake. All this sounds very comforting and reassuring. But let us be sure that we understand what it means. The defenders of the conscientious objectors, the writer says, fail to see the point of the present question. “There is an essential difference,” he goes on to say, "between liberty to hold opinions as individuals and liberty to act upon them as members of a community." He grants that individuals have the right to hold what opinions they choose and that therein lies liberty of conscience. He denies that men have the right to this liberty with regard to their actions as members of a community. The writer obviously confounds liberty of conscience with so-called liberty or freedom of thought. No man can be prevented from thinking as he likes by external restraint, but for all that thought is not free. Freedom is an attribute of the will, not of the intellect. Every man has the right to think what is true — the truth shall make you free. Falsehood and error have no rights, least of all the right to freedom. The religious wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were not fought for liberty of thought. Catholics and Protestants alike fought for liberty to put their beliefs in practice. In the spacious days of good Queen Bess Catholics might hold what opinions they liked on the subject of the Mass, but it was felony to say or to assist at Mass. They might hold what opinions they chose with regard to the royal supremacy, but it was treason openly to deny it. The sacredness of conscience and the liberty of conscience cannot be defended by drawing a distinction between the rights of the individual to form opinions and his rights as a member of society to act upon them. The writer in the Times appealed to the authority of John Stuart Mill in support of the distinction. None the less it is clear that it is destructive of conscience in the Christian sense. The consciences of the early Christian martyrs forbade them to offer incense before the image of the Roman Emperor. The act was idolatrous, it was offering divine worship to a statue or at best to a man, and it was clearly against the dictates of the Christian conscience. Whether as private individuals or as members of society, the early Christians refused to be guilty of idolatry. The whole power of the Roman Empire was employed to compel them to do what the great majority of their fellow-citizens approved of and practised as a part of the national religion. The martyrs died rather than submit, and the Christian Church has honoured them ever since for their constancy. The battle for liberty of conscience was fought and won by the Christian martyrs in the first centuries of the Christian era. The blood of the martyrs put a seal on the Christian doctrine of conscience. The rights of conscience henceforth became indissolubly associated with their heroic self-sacrifice. Liberty of conscience is destroyed by explaining that it means freedom to form opinions but not to act upon them. If conscience means anything it means that the moral judgment of the individual prescribes a definite course of action. If the individual be hindered from pursuing the definite course of action which his conscience prescribes he has no liberty of conscience while the hindrance lasts. He may be hindered by the majority of the citizens of the country to which he belongs, but the hindrance is none the less an interference with liberty of conscience. To say that the consciences of the majority prescribe interference, and that the majority should prevail, is really to abandon the doctrine of the sacredness of conscience, and to appeal to brute force. There is no special sacredness in mere numbers. The majority in the early Christian centuries was on the side of idolatry. Many would say that the majority is generally on the wrong side, especially at the beginning of a controversy. So that to say that the conscience of the individual should submit to the judgment of the community or of the majority in a community is really to deny liberty of conscience. To say that an individual has freedom to form what convictions he pleases but not to act upon them, is also to deny liberty of conscience. The same conclusions obviously hold good if the majority in a community seeks to impose an obligation on individual members which their consciences refuse to accept and condemn as wrong. If the conscientious objector is to be met satisfactorily we must go deeper than the distinction between a man's right to form opinions and to act upon them. The cause of all the trouble lies in the Protestant theory of private judgment. Protestantism puts the Bible in the hands of everyone and tells him that the ultimate authority in questions of faith and morals is the Bible as interpreted by his own private judgment. The private judgment of the conscientious objector tells him that the Bible condemns war and forbids Christians to wage war. The private judgment of other people, on the contrary, tells them that the Bible does nothing of the sort. It condemns unjust wars, but not those that are waged in self-defence or for some good and sufficient cause. The contradiction is flagrant and it cannot be ascribed to God. The Bible is the Word of God and cannot teach contradictory doctrines. Conscience, according to traditional Christian teaching, is the voice of God, the herald or the messenger of God. Mistake may arise there. What purports to be the voice of God may be the voice of self-love, interest, or cowardice. The messenger may have mistaken the message. The result is not a certain conscience, not an assured conviction that a proposed action is wrong; that is the traditional notion of conscience; but a private opinion or view that a proposed action cannot be right. There we have the origin of the interpretation put upon liberty of conscience by the writer in the Times. Liberty of conscience means for him liberty to form private opinions. But then an opinion is not a certain conscience; in no sense can an opinion as to the rightness or wrongness of an action be attributed to God. Conscience in that sense cannot be called the voice or the herald of God, nor is there anything specially sacred about it. Tom Jones, the conscientious objector, is too often mistaken about other matters of importance for us to pay much attention to his views about the lawfulness of war. Especially is he likely to be mistaken when it is his interest to be so. And so his objections to join the army may be put aside without interfering with the rights of conscience. Private opinions have not the privileges of truth, and no injustice is done if lawful authority compels them to yield to the exigencies of the public good.

It was quite different with the Christian conscience in its struggle with the Roman authorities in the early centuries of the Christian era. Conscience was not regarded then as an opinion; it was a certain judgment, a conviction that a certain action was wrong. Conscience did not announce or discover a doctrine or any general principle of conduct. It was a practical judgment which applied some well-known and certain rule of conduct to a particular case. In the case in point the general principle was—Idolatry is sinful. That truth was taught in the Bible without ambiguity or possibility of its being explained away. The Christian Church taught it authoritatively as well. When, then, a Christian was told that he must perform an act of undoubted idolatry and offer divine worship to a statue, his conscience revolted against the mandate and he died a martyr's death rather than obey. He did not ask to be exempted on the ground of a private opinion of his own; there was no room for mistake; he was absolutely sure of his ground; it was guaranteed by the common teaching of the universal and infallible Church. All this leads to the conclusion that a man who refuses to join the army and to fight in a just war when ordered by the highest authority in the country to do so should not be called a conscientious objector. It is not in the sacred name of conscience that he objects, and the rights of conscience should not be invoked to shield his disloyalty.

APOLOGY
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS
SENT TO HIS LORDSHIP THE BISHOP OF ARRAS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS CENSURE OF THE BOOK OF A GERMAN CASUIST

The alleged lax moral teaching of the Jesuits is the most plausible means that the Innovators and their other enemies have employed to discredit them and to estrange upright persons from them. This means has often succeeded for them. Many persons, judging the sincerity of others by their own, cannot persuade themselves that anyone would wish to defame an entire Society by reproaches which, if supposed false, would be atrocious and horrible calumnies.

With this prepossession, they enter blindly into the sentiments of those who speak ill of the Jesuits, and even join themselves to them, believing that they earn merit before God by assisting a zeal whose sole aim, it seems, is to arrest the course of a pernicious doctrine, by discrediting everywhere those who pass for its authors. It is thus that the prejudgment forms and imperceptibly increases, until it passes into the minds of many as a constant truth against which the accused can no longer be admitted to justify themselves.

But if these persons, either a little better instructed or a little more attentive, wished, before pronouncing so decided a judgment in a matter of this importance, to consult the rules of prudence and charity more than they do, I believe that the scruple of a rash judgment might arise in their conscience. I am persuaded that they would at least suspend for some time the sentence which they pronounce without hesitation against an entire Society, which has perhaps rendered some services to them themselves, and which, constantly for more than a century, has served the Church in every part of the world with some success and with some advantage to Religion.

Would it then be possible, say these persons, whose intentions are often very upright, would it be possible that so many people of every rank, of every condition, and of the holiest professions should all be calumniators; or that, without knowledge of the cause, they should every day carry themselves away, in public and in private, into cruel invectives against a body that was innocent of the frightful excesses with which they reproach it? But let them permit me to ask them in turn whether they can easily persuade themselves that a Society such as that of the Jesuits is only a collection of villains and abominable persons. For there is no middle ground here; and if they are such as they are depicted in the libels published against them, they must be regarded as monsters within Christianity.

In vain do their most declared enemies, through an affected moderation, sometimes contrast the regularity of this Society with the detestable doctrine they attribute to it. They live well, says one of their most venomous adversaries, but they teach badly. This contrast is a chimera. To live well and to undertake to ruin the doctrine of the Gospel throughout the earth by a detestable Moral Theology are two things that cannot be reconciled. It has indeed been seen at various times that certain leaders of a heretical party constantly maintained, in order to gain followers, the appearance of a severe virtue. But a Society as extensive as that of the Jesuits, which preserved the integrity of morals for more than a century while applying itself to corrupting them among Christians throughout the earth, would be a prodigy without example and beyond probability.

It is in no way natural to reserve severity for oneself while teaching laxity to others. The contrary happens every day to several of those who appear most animated against this alleged corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. The world is witness to it. Worldly though it is, it is scandalized by it and makes sport of it. Many upright persons groan over it. But after all, judging things by the lights of good sense, it will always be less surprising to see Rigorism preached by those who live in laxity than it would be to see laxity preached by those who practice Rigorism. It is easy to do the first, and it is very much the fashion in the time in which we live. There is no attraction in the second. One gains nothing thereby either on God’s side or on the world’s. It would be to damn oneself at great cost, without being able to reimburse oneself for anything; it would be to enter hell by the narrow gate. Such a project was never in accordance with the ideas of self-love, and, to have conceived it, the Jesuits would all have to be different from the rest of mankind.

This presumption alone appears decisive to many persons in the subject at issue; but I do not wish to avail myself of it to the point of making it the sole proof of the Jesuits’ innocence in defending them against the execrable undertaking imputed to them, of undertaking to ruin everywhere the Moral Teaching of Jesus Christ. What I intend solely is thereby to put all equitable persons who might be prejudiced in a better state to judge soundly of so important a fact, to engage them to suspend for a moment their judgment between the two parties, and to dispose them to receive, with a spirit of charity and equity, the declaration I shall make in the name of the Society of Jesus on the point of Moral Theology. It is for the same end that I am going to add some reflections on the occasion and the origin of the accusations made against it in this matter, and on the means that have been used to support them and to render them plausible to an infinity of persons to whom their atrocity alone had at first rendered them incredible.

Until the time of Baius and Jansenius, the Jesuits were in possession of the reputation of persons perfectly orthodox in matters of Faith and Moral Theology. They could produce on this subject the praises which the Sovereign Pontiffs have so many times bestowed upon their Society, and in particular upon several of their principal Doctors. The heretics of France, England, and Germany could further serve them as witnesses in this regard. According to these Protestant Doctors, to attack the doctrine of the Jesuits was to attack that of the Roman Church. At that time the reproaches of laxity and semipelagianism were common to the Society of Jesus and to the congregation of the faithful. It was a very great honor to this Society to see itself, together with the Church, the object of the calumnies and persecutions of heretics; and nothing contributed more to increasing the esteem and affection that true Catholics had for the Jesuits.

But as soon as the Theologians of this Society had risen up against the innovations of Baius, had denounced them to the Sovereign Pontiffs, and had obtained their condemnation - and much more still when the errors of Jansenius had been anathematized by the Church - then the supporters of this heresy and all the partisans of Jansenius suddenly turned against the Jesuits and began, more than ever, to take them to task.

This was a stratagem to cause the public to mistake the issue. These Innovators were continually pressed hard concerning the fact of Jansenius, over which they persisted in their revolt against the Church and against the Ordinances of the King. To be ceaselessly on the defensive was for them a disadvantageous and very inconvenient course. This, therefore, is again what determined them to attack the Jesuits and to bring suit against them concerning their alleged corrupted Moral Theology.

Then appeared that fine System of the policy of the Jesuits, who have among themselves, it was said, two sorts of Directors: severe Directors and accommodating Directors; the one sort to attract persons of virtue, the other so as not to repel sinners - an infallible means of making themselves masters of every conscience, a secret of the Society which no one until then had penetrated, and whose use turned upon the doctrine of probable opinions.

Since this was a pure counteraccusation to which all the Author’s wit, whatever efforts he might make, could give no plausibility, this idea at first amused many more persons than it persuaded. It even scandalized several who believed that raillery could not be permitted in a subject of this nature. Nevertheless they continued; and, by making various extracts from the books of the Society - some faithful, some unfaithful, some capable of shocking the ordinary run of people who do not examine matters deeply, although there was nothing in them but what was orthodox - they succeeded in giving some color to what had at first appeared a pure chimera.

They did not stop there; and those whom the condemnation of the doctrine of Jansenius had consternated, profiting from the impression that these first attempts had made against the Jesuits, took courage again. They stirred up on every side, especially in Flanders and in France, in every Town and even in the countryside, persons who began, in rivalry with one another, to cry out against the corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. Nothing was seen but libels scattered everywhere, but persons who, dispersed throughout all assemblies and private companies, let themselves loose against the Jesuits. The pulpits of truth, destined to preach charity to the peoples, became in several places theaters of the most venomous calumny. Mechanisms were set in motion to bring into this plot entire bodies of Ecclesiastics from the most considerable cities of the Kingdom. The diversity and multiplicity of the Jesuits’ employments, and the blessings God bestows upon them therein, having at all times raised up many jealous rivals against them, they saw new adversaries rise against them in the Universities and in several religious orders.

One individual of their Society was perhaps the person who caused them the greatest harm in this persecution. In defiance of his Provincial, he caused a Book entitled Apology for the Casuists to appear, in which, taking his position very imprudently upon several particular cases, he drew upon himself the just censure of several Prelates. They did not fail to make all the Jesuits answerable for a work which the wisest and most learned among them were themselves the very first to detest and which was authentically disavowed. Everywhere this book and these censures were used to confirm the idea of the Jesuits’ Moral Theology which the partisans of Jansenius were spreading everywhere. The libels most filled with falsehoods and the grossest calumnies were received with applause and found credence everywhere. The Apologies of these Fathers, however solid they were, were scarcely regarded and produced hardly any other effect than to give occasion for replies even more insulting and calumnious than the first works written against them. All the censures of Rome which branded most of these libels were mocked, and no more account was made of the Decrees of the King’s Council which condemned them to the fire.

But at last the storm was calmed with time. Composure returned after this violent and impetuous fire. Wise persons for the most part soon perceived that passion and cabal had more part in this persecution than true zeal. Those who knew the Jesuits, or who until then had entrusted to them the direction of their conscience, bore witness to themselves that the Moral Theology of these Fathers was not such as it was depicted in the satires published against them. The Parish Priests of Paris and Rouen, who had made the greatest noise, came back for the most part and were sorry to have seconded, contrary to their intention, the passion of a party whose evil designs they recognized.

The greater part of the Prelates of France and Flanders have shown since that time, by the conduct they have maintained toward the Jesuits, that they did not have of their doctrine the ideas which people had endeavored to give them; and they have often borne witness that they had no persons in their Dioceses who labored for the spiritual good of the peoples with more usefulness, more edification, more disinterestedness, and more submission to their Orders.

The most distinguished persons in the Kingdom did not recognize them in the frightful portraits made of them: the intercourse they had had with them; the education that several had received from them; the conduct of those among these Fathers whom their employment obliged sometimes to appear at Court, where, whatever care one takes to dissemble, one is soon known for what one is; their constant application in their most arduous functions; their zeal for the most dangerous Missions - all these ideas, which calumny had not yet been able to efface, rendered the most violent efforts of their Adversaries almost useless.

The Lords of the Court, the Magistrates, and the Nobility of all the Provinces were seen to entrust their children, as before, to these Fathers, to raise them in Letters and in the fear of God, and to render them the honorable testimony that nowhere were the two better united. Their College of Paris, despite all contrary intrigues, did not cease to be as it were the Seminary of all the most distinguished children in the Kingdom. Several of those who were the least attached to them followed the example of the others in this regard, themselves contributing, as if in spite of themselves, to justify them by their own conduct; and everyone agreed that this was the most solid Apology that could be made in their favor against the continual and horrible satires of their enemies.

Notwithstanding all this, the agitations have recommenced for some time past more vigorously than ever; and the Jesuits were often warned that a new storm was forming against them. In fact, severe blows have been dealt them during the last few years. They have tried to parry some of them. They have done so with equal force and modesty; and they have had the consolation of seeing that equitable and well-informed persons have always rendered them justice against Adversaries who do not become discouraged, and who are as constant in the persecution they have stirred up against them as in their revolt against the Church.

Nevertheless, neither do I wish to draw advantage for the defense of this Society from this new presumption furnished me by the character of most of those who for fifty years have made so harsh a war upon it, while they secretly prepare other devices against the Church itself. The sole use I intend to make of it, as also of the first, is to prevent people from relying too readily upon witnesses who must be so suspect, and upon certain others whom they have prejudiced by their artifices and by the clamor they have deliberately raised on every side; and to obtain from those who will read this defense some attention to what I am going to say in what follows.

All Christian Moral Theology can be reduced to two articles. The first comprises what is expressly contained in Scripture, in Tradition, in the Commandments of God and of the Church, in the Councils, and in the Decisions of the Holy See. The second contains an infinity of other cases which are not evidently decided by these first Rules and concerning which, for this reason, there is division among the Doctors in the Schools. One may further include in this number the explanation sometimes given to the Commandments of God or to Scripture, on the occasion of certain particular difficulties which arise in the dealings that men have with one another and which concern the extent of their duties, whether toward God, toward their neighbor, or toward themselves.

I do not believe that the Jesuits need an Apology on the first article; and I think they will not be reproached with ever having taught that adulteries, robberies on the highways, blasphemies, and other similar sins are permitted. It is true that they have been accused of having permitted Idolatry in China; but they have always said that Idolatry was a crime, and the question was reduced to knowing whether what they permitted was actually Idolatry.

It is therefore only the second article that is at issue, that is, things which are not evidently contained in the rules of our Faith, concerning which it is claimed that they always fall into laxity. Here are some propositions whose examination will clarify the truth or falsity of this accusation.

The Jesuits, in matters of Moral Theology, have always followed, in conformity with one of their Rules, the common opinions of the Catholic Schools.

If this proposition is true, it alone suffices to place the doctrine of this Society beyond all suspicion. Now it is a fact which the Jesuits boldly advance: that what ought to be regarded as the doctrine of their Society has always been a doctrine common in the Catholic Universities.

Since this proposition is the solid foundation upon which the justification and conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine must be supported, it is appropriate to apprehend it well and explain it well, so that it may not be believed that, in a proposition too general and capable of having various senses, they are preparing evasions for themselves in order to elude the reproaches their adversaries make against them.

First, this does not mean that the Society of Jesus has a determinate opinion on each point of Theology which is also the general opinion of all the Schools and all the Catholic Universities. That could not be, because upon an infinity of questions opinions are divided there. But in this very division the opposed opinions are often equally common, and it is said of both the one and the other that they are a common doctrine in the School, because the affirmative and the negative are maintained indifferently.

When, therefore, the Jesuits say that their Society has always professed to follow the doctrine commonly received in the Schools and in the Catholic Universities, this means that in each question of Theology it has always kept to the opinions which were current in the School, and which were ordinarily followed there by the Catholic Doctors.

Second, when the Jesuits advance that the doctrine of their Society has always been the common doctrine of the Schools and Catholic Universities, they do not mean that no individual member of their body has ever departed from it, nor that none of their Theologians has ever maintained any proposition worthy of being reproved and censured. They are far from either thinking it or saying it. That would be to give themselves a praise which befits only Holy Scripture and the Church inspired by the Holy Spirit. There is within Christianity neither School nor University several of whose Doctors have not been subject to these weaknesses and these wanderings of the human mind. The Body of the holy Fathers itself, the most respectable body in the Church, is not exempt from this stain. Saint Augustine, saint though he is, has propositions of lax Moral Theology; some could be shown in Saint Jerome and in several other Fathers. And the Jesuits have no difficulty in making such an admission with regard to some of their Theologians. But what they advance without fear, and of which they are ready to furnish the proof, is that the doctrine received and authorized in their Society, that which is commonly followed there, is the same as that which they found was taught in the other Catholic Schools and Universities when they entered them, and that they can no more than the others be reproached for having departed from it.

Here, then, is a means altogether suited to the purpose and a very just rule for determining the truth or falsity of the reproach of lax Moral Theology made against the Jesuits. Has anything been commonly taught in their Society other than what has been commonly taught in the Catholic Schools and Universities? If a difference can be shown in this respect between their School and the other Catholic Schools, condemnation must be pronounced against them; if it cannot be shown, from that moment they are justified.

Some particular cases may be produced in which some of their Theologians have been mistaken; the same will be produced from the other Societies, and I dare advance that a greater number will be produced. Since these mistakes of certain individuals do not take from the other bodies the quality of being orthodox in the matter of Moral Theology, what injustice would it be if they caused the Society of Jesus alone to lose it? Here, then, once again, is the fixed point upon which everything must turn in this matter.

Let the adversaries of the Jesuits attack them on this point and press them as vigorously as they can. They must necessarily make an opening in them at this point; otherwise, it will always be the most manifest injustice to wish to distinguish them from all the other Societies by the shameful character of laxity in Moral Theology.

I add some other propositions which will serve to develop further the general proposition I have just made.

When a Jesuit Theologian has adopted some particular opinion rejected as bad in the Catholic Schools, the greater part of the Theologians of the Society have been against it; and, generally speaking, this Theologian has been neither the only nor the first of the Theologians to have departed on that point. I shall later descend into some detail which may serve as proof of this proposition. The Jesuits again boldly expose it to the criticism of their most vigorous adversaries: let them only take care to apprehend it correctly. But if this fact is true, if, when it is advanced by the Jesuits, it is left without its falsity being shown, calumny is disarmed, and the truth of the fundamental proposition I made at the outset is perfectly established: that the doctrine of the Society, that is, the doctrine authorized by the common sentiment of the Jesuits, is the same as that of the other Catholic Schools; and that, consequently, it is wrong to affect to establish a kind of opposition between the doctrine of the Jesuits and that of the other Catholic Doctors.

When some opinion has been condemned by the Church or by the Holy See, by whatever authority it had previously found itself supported, there is no Society whose superiors have taken greater care than the superiors of the Jesuits have done to ensure that it was not taught in their Schools; and it has scarcely happened that any individual has done so, and has done so with impunity.

This proposition is likewise submitted to the examination of those who will be willing to take the trouble to make it, provided that, as has sometimes happened, they do not go and make the Popes say things they have not said, and that they keep precisely to their censure, without extending it according to their caprice and following their own fixed notions.

To these three points in justification of the conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine, upon which they consent to be put to the severest test, I do not see very well what could be opposed, unless perhaps that, for them, it is not a sufficient means of justification to have followed the common doctrine received in the Catholic Schools, because this very doctrine, common though it is, is a lax doctrine.

It will no doubt not be for the Jesuits to reply to such an answer, all the more because in this very proposition they win their cause on the capital point. For the essential part of the injustice done to them, and that which must be most keenly felt by them, is that people affect to distinguish them from all the others and to regard their Theology as the sole source of corrupted Moral Theology. Now, this answer being supposed, they are merged into the crowd. Here are the School of Saint Thomas, that of Scotus, that of the Sorbonne, and all the other Catholic Universities placed in the same rank. It will no longer be said that lax Moral Theology and the Moral Theology of the Jesuits are the same thing. They will no longer be made solely answerable for the laxity of Christians. They came after the others, and it is a misfortune for them to have drawn from sources already poisoned; and they will no longer need anything but a reform which will be common to them with all the Doctors who until now have passed for Catholics. But these are among those paradoxes in which the character of the Innovating spirit appears too visibly for them to need to be refuted.

The Jesuits do not intend to stop here with these general justifications, however solid they may be. They wish to make an authentic declaration of the sentiments of their Society upon certain particular points concerning which calumny has most cruelly outraged them. They wish to make known to the whole Church that they take, as one of the rules of their doctrine, the condemnation of that great number of propositions in matters of cases of conscience pronounced by Popes Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII. Moreover, they maintain that none of these condemned propositions has ever been the doctrine of their Society; that most have never been taught by any of their authors; that those which have been taught by some, as it has happened that several other non-Jesuit Theologians maintained them, they disavow; that since the Briefs of the Popes they have always watched to ensure that they were no longer taught in their Schools; and that they are resolved to do in this regard what they have always constantly done since their Society was established, namely, to yield to no Ecclesiastical body in the submission they owe to the Orders of the Church and of him who is its visible head upon earth.