Article First. On Conscience in General.

206. Conscience. 1. The existence of moral conscience is a universal fact: for all men, cultivated as well as barbarians, perceive the voice of conscience within themselves.

The authors cited above have diligently collected testimonies of this matter, especially Cathrein. Sacred Scripture everywhere supposes conscience, since it everywhere describes its various activities. Cf. Schindler p. 195.

2. By the name of moral conscience (synteresis) is signified first of all the habit of the first moral principles, which the Greeks call synteresis. Therefore synteresis is a certain property of the intellect by which it knows with great facility and evidence the most universal moral principles or supreme principles of the natural law. Then, however, synteresis also signifies these principles themselves.

a. Principles of this kind are, e.g.: good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; the supreme deity is to be worshiped; promises are to be kept; precepts are to be fulfilled; and other supreme principles of the natural law. From these universal principles moral science deduces the truths which it itself teaches, e.g. good is to be done; but to aid the wretched is good; therefore the wretched are to be aided; evil is to be avoided; adultery is evil; therefore adultery is to be avoided.

b. There is in man an innate disposition for leading a moral life (eine sittliche Anlage), which disposition comprises two things: a disposition of the intellect for knowing the moral law, and a natural propensity of the will for following the moral laws proposed by the intellect as the norm of free activity. Since each disposition is signified by the name conscience (synteresis), it is clear that conscience in this sense designates the whole moral life insofar as it proceeds from intellect and will, as when we call a man religious or lacking religion (gewissenhaft, gewissenlos).

c. Conscience, since it is a disposition and habitual quality of the intellect and will, can and ought to be cultivated and perfected: as regards the intellect, by the fact that by learning the laws to be observed we acquire moral science for ourselves; as regards the will, by the fact that we promptly obey moral laws. The same conscience, although it can never be entirely extinguished, can nevertheless by negligence, and especially by vices and pleasures, be obscured, weakened, indeed even vitiated. Hence we speak equally of an enlightened and vigilant conscience, and of a cauterized and sleeping conscience.

¹ St. Thomas I-II q. 19. St. Alphonsus l. 1. 1. tr. 1. n. 1-89. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia mor. decalog. (Paderbornae. Typographia bonifac. 1897) I. tr. 1. n. 1-109. Reuter, Theolog. mor. pr. 1, tr. 2. n. 59 ss. Bouquillon l. c. pr. 2. n. 243 ss. Lehmkuhl I. n. 41 ss. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theolog. mor. (Prati. Giachetti. 1898) I. n. 130-235. Simar, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit (Freiburg. Herder. 1902). Cathrein, Das Gewissen und die Gewissensfreiheit (Freiburg. Herder. 1906).

207. Conscience (syneidesis). Moral conscience in the other sense is a judgment of the mind concerning the morality of an action, proximately practical, which judgment is customarily called a dictate (of conscience).

a. Conscience puts itself forth in a twofold manner: before an action it manifests that the action is good and to be done, or evil and to be omitted; after an action (or omission), if following the voice of conscience we have done good and omitted evil, it praises and approves, from which joy and tranquility of heart follow; but if we have acted against conscience, it censures us, whence anguish and pain of heart follow.

b. A judgment of the mind which has as its object the morality of a human action is one thing if remotely practical or speculative, which regards actions in the abstract and in general, as that theft is to be avoided, that one in need is to be assisted; another if proximately practical or simply practical, which is referred to moral actions in the concrete and in particular, to be placed here and now, together with all the circumstances in which they are found, and immediately directs the will of the agent, e.g. that this thing is not to be taken away by me as belonging to another, that this man in need is now to be aided by me. Not the former, but the latter, is called conscience.

c. Judgments concerning the goodness and malice of actions in general are either most universal, namely truths which constitute synteresis or the first moral principles, or less universal, which are so many conclusions deduced from the first principles: evil is to be avoided; theft is evil. These deduced truths constitute moral science. For deducing these judgments the intellect can acquire a habit, which is likewise called moral science. In forming the principles of synteresis the intellect does not err; in forming the principles of moral science it can err and sometimes does err.

d. The truths both of synteresis and of moral science are universal; conscience, on the contrary, is concerned with a singular action now to be placed, and therefore its dictates are particular, yet deduced immediately from the truths of moral science, mediately from the truths of synteresis. Therefore the dictate of conscience is always the conclusion of some syllogism, whose major contains the moral law, whose minor contains the action to be placed here and now, to which the law is applied, and whose conclusion exhibits the agreement or disagreement of the action with the law, e.g. theft is illicit; this action is theft; therefore this action is illicit.

208. The force of conscience. 1. Conscience is the proximate and internal norm of moral actions: for the will, since it is a blind power, needs suitable direction; but the will can receive direction only from conscience: for that power upon which the will naturally depends in its operations is reason; but reason which in a particular case dictates that this is to be done because it is good, that is to be omitted because it is evil, is conscience. It is called the proximate rule because it is nearer to the will than law is, and it is called the subjective and internal rule, so that it may be distinguished from law, which is the objective and external norm.

Therefore, and this must be carefully noted, human actions do not take their moral (formal) goodness or malice from the norm of morality or from law as it is in itself, but from law as proposed to the will through the dictate of conscience, or from conscience; wherefore those are distressed without reason over past actions placed in good faith who afterward hear that they were sinful.

2. The force of obliging truly belongs to conscience: for the force of obliging belongs to law truly and properly so called; therefore also to conscience, which is nothing other than law applied to individual human actions. Therefore the obligatory force of conscience is the same as that of law; and since every obligation of law must be derived from the will of God, conscience is commonly and not unsuitably called both the will of God and the voice of God.

But since God manifests His will to us through our reason, which can be deceived, the dictate of conscience can be erroneous; hence it can happen that we are bound to follow a conscience commanding evil.

209. Division. Conscience is divided in many ways:

1. By reason of the acts to which it is referred, into antecedent and consequent, according as the acts are either soon to be placed or already placed; the former judges what is good or evil, what is to be done or omitted, but the latter approves or accuses the past, or even, if this can be done, excuses it.

Antecedent conscience is given to us by God as guide and moderator of our moral life, which we are bound to follow in order that we may arrive at the end of eternal life; consequent conscience acts as judge of our actions, praising and approving if they are good, admonishing, reproving, censuring, terrifying, and chastising if they are evil. The approving judgment is called the testimony of a good conscience; the accusing and reproving judgment, remorse or the worm of conscience. The testimony of a good conscience brings consolation and reward, the gift of internal peace; the remorse of conscience brings anguish and punishment: There is no peace for the impious.¹ Hence conscience greatly helps man to attain his end.

Note. Antecedent conscience is the proximate rule of morals, concerning which alone we speak here, and to which therefore the divisions that follow pertain.

2. By reason of the obligation which it manifests, into prescribing, prohibiting, and permitting conscience.

3. By reason of assent, into certain and doubtful conscience. Certain conscience is that by which the mind firmly judges, without fear of erring, that an action is good and licit or evil and illicit; doubtful conscience is that by which the mind suspends judgment concerning the honesty of an action, or indeed forms it, but with fear of erring.

4. By reason of conformity with the object, into true and erroneous conscience.

a. True (right) conscience is that which dictates the matter as it is in itself; erroneous conscience is that which dictates otherwise than the matter is in itself.

Properly speaking, a distinction intervenes between true and right conscience. Ordinarily, indeed, right conscience will also be true. For that is called true which is consonant with the objective order of things, and therefore says good of that which in reality is good, and evil of that which in reality is evil. But the dictate of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of a syllogism, whose major proposition is a moral principle, and whose minor proposition is a human action to which that principle is applied, so that from this it can be concluded that the action is licit or illicit. Further, conscience is called right when it has been duly deduced according to logical laws from a moral principle. Now it can happen that the reasoning proceeds from a false moral principle; whence it can happen that the conclusion or conscience is indeed right, but false.

b. Erroneous conscience is either invincible and inculpable, whose error cannot morally be overcome; or vincible and culpable, whose error can be laid aside by employing moral diligence, but through carelessness is not laid aside.

Erroneous conscience can be invincible in two ways: either because not even a suspicion or doubt concerning the error comes into the mind of the agent, or because a doubt concerning the error has indeed arisen, but not even by employing moral diligence can the error be laid aside and the truth found. Thus he also errs invincibly who, doubting whether on such a day there is abstinence, after employing moral diligence is ignorant that abstinence is in reality prescribed. Nevertheless, the principle which follows is valid only concerning the former mode of invincibly erroneous conscience; concerning the other mode there will be discussion below.

5. Erroneous conscience is divided into lax and narrow conscience.

a. Lax conscience is called that which for a slighter cause either denies or diminishes the character of sin. To lax conscience is also reduced cauterized conscience (das abgestumpfte Gewissen), which, arising from a long-standing habit of sinning, makes light even of grave sins, and pharisaical conscience, which makes little of great precepts, but much of small and external observances.

b. Narrow conscience is called that which for a slighter cause affirms or increases the character of sin. To narrow conscience is reduced scrupulous conscience, which increases the character of sin too much, and perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin on both sides.

¹ Is. 57, 21. Printed as "Is. 22, 57"; corrected as a clear printer's error.