Detraction and Calumny

644. Declaration. 1. The reputation of another can be unjustly violated in a twofold mode, either by detraction or by calumny. Detraction is the unjust and hidden lesion of another's reputation which is done by revelation of a true crime, or of one which in good faith is believed to be true; but calumny is the unjust and hidden lesion of another's reputation which is done by narration of a false crime.

Some in the definition of detraction and calumny add with St. Thomas the word hidden;¹ others omit it. Those who add it call only a lesion of reputation brought forth while the one defamed is absent detraction, and they call a lesion of reputation brought forth before the one defamed mere insult; those who omit it call a lesion of reputation brought forth before the one defamed insult joined with detraction.

2. A distinction is made between direct detraction and calumny, which are done from the intention of injuring reputation; and indirect, which is done from lightness and talkativeness without the intention of defaming.

According to others, detraction and calumny are done directly when another's vices are narrated, which obtains in four modes: if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken sinisterly. The same are done indirectly when another's gifts are diminished, which again can happen in four modes: by denying the good works of one's neighbor, by lessening them, by being silent when others praise, by praising coldly.

¹ Summa II-II, q. 73, a. 1.

645. Moral malice of detraction and calumny. Detraction and calumny are sins mortal from their kind against justice: for they injure the strict right which another has to his own reputation; but a sin against commutative justice is mortal from its kind. Moreover theft is a sin grave from its kind against justice; therefore a fortiori detraction and calumny, because reputation is a greater good than riches.¹ Therefore each can be a light sin from smallness of matter. But sins of detraction will more often be light from imperfection of the act, especially because of inadvertence to the damage of one's neighbor.

a. To this is referred whispering (Ohrenblaserei), which is detraction or calumny by which discords are sown among friends. Therefore whispering differs from detraction and calumny by reason of the end, because it is committed in order secretly to dissolve friendship and to sow discord. Hence, other things being equal, it is a graver sin than simple detraction, because it moreover deprives another of the good of peace and friendship with his neighbor.

b. To commit the sin of detraction it is not necessary that the detractor have the intention of detracting from his neighbor and of harming him in reputation, but it suffices that he advert that from those things which he narrates the blackening of reputation follows.

¹ Prov. 22:1; Ecclus. 41:15.

646. Norm for judging gravity. The gravity of detraction and calumny is taken from the gravity of the damage which another suffers in reputation; but the gravity of the damage depends not only on the gravity of the crime which is manifested, but also on the circumstances both of the detractor and of the person from whom one detracts. Hence for judging the gravity of these sins one must attend:

a. To the defect which is narrated: manifestation of a grave defect ordinarily injures reputation notably, and manifestation of a light defect ordinarily injures it lightly;

b. To the condition of the detractor: a grave and prudent man harms more than a light and talkative one;

c. To the condition of the injured person, namely to the reputation which he enjoys among men and to the dignity by which he stands out among others: for he who is of intact reputation and great dignity experiences much greater detriment from detraction or calumny.

Hence it can happen that grave damage is inflicted if a light sin or even an inculpable defect is narrated about someone, as if someone says of a bishop that he is a liar or of illegitimate origin. On the contrary, to narrate a grave sin about someone can be only light detraction, as if someone says of a soldier or of a young man of lighter disposition that he is a lover of girls or has been drunk: for certain vices occur so frequently in persons of a determined condition that in them they are almost already supposed, and therefore do not gravely harm their reputation; but to narrate the same vices about a priest is mortal because of the condition of the person.

647. Applications. 1. To manifest natural defects, for example, to say that someone is ignorant, unlearned, imprudent, illegitimate, etc., ordinarily is not a grave sin, because all know that defects of this kind are not imputed and therefore do not notably diminish reputation. Moreover these things are usually publicly known. Yet if an inculpable defect is truly disgraceful, and if moreover men are gravely saddened by its revelation, and especially if they suffer damage, its revelation would be a grave sin, whether against justice or against charity.

2. To call someone in general proud, avaricious, angry, lazy, etc., ordinarily is not a grave sin, because defects of this kind signify rather a natural inclination than personal fault, or only venial defects, but not mortal sins; but to reveal inculpable defects or only venial ones ordinarily does not gravely harm.

3. To narrate a single grave sin to several will ordinarily be grave detraction, because grave damage in reputation is inflicted on one's neighbor, for example, to narrate that someone is a concubinary, unjust, or a robber.

4. To manifest a grave defect to one prudent man who is not going to divulge the matter certainly is not mortal if it is done from a reasonable cause, as if someone narrates an injury accepted to his friend in order to take consolation from it, although some defaming of the author follows from it. But if it is done without reasonable cause, there exists a twofold opinion: of those who judge that grave damage is inflicted even in this case, and of those who judge that damage to reputation in this case is not notable. Since the opinion which denies grave damage is truly probable, in practice it is permitted to follow it. Therefore a wife does not commit grave sin who communicates to her husband even gravely defaming things which she has discovered about her neighbor, provided the husband is prudent and silent. But if there is present a just reason for communicating these things, she is immune from sin.

Those who affirm that it is grave, such as Molina, Lessius, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and others, commonly argue in this way: insult gravely injures honor even if it is done by only one person; moreover rash judgment in a grave matter is a grave sin; therefore, by parity, lesion of reputation before one grave man must be judged grave. But those who with St. Thomas, Navarrus, Bonacina, and Tamburini deny that it is grave bring this reason: reputation consists in the estimation of many; therefore he who has lost reputation before one or another prudent man is not considered to have undergone grave damage of reputation. But to the arguments of the former opinion these authors deny the parity. And indeed insult is made to one present; but rash judgment must be compared more to calumny than to detraction; but to impose a grave crime on someone is mortal. But all except the case in which a crime is manifested to him to whom the delinquent would especially wish to conceal it before all others.

5. To say nothing special, but only general things about someone, of itself is not a mortal sin; yet if general things are brought forth in that mode that hearers must suspect something grave, it can be mortal; for example, if you say that you know certain things which, if they were revealed, would affect another with great disgrace, or that you know certain things about that person which charity forbids revealing.

6. To narrate a grave matter about someone as heard from others:

a. is grave against justice if the narrator foresees that the hearers are going to believe because of motives brought by him, as if he says that he accepted the matter from a trustworthy person: for in this case he is the efficacious cause of the damage;

b. is grave against charity if he foresees that the hearers are going to believe not because of motives brought by him, but because of their own lightness or malice: for although the damage of the defamed person must be attributed not to the narrator but to the lightness of the hearers, nevertheless each one is bound to impede the grave damage of his neighbor which he can conveniently impede by being silent;

c. is a light or no sin if he foresees that the hearers are not going to believe, because light or no damage is inflicted on one's neighbor.

7. He who narrates a hidden crime committed, without naming the person, for example, "it happened in this place," does not sin if the hearers cannot come to knowledge of the person; but he sins gravely if he either describes the matter in such a way that the person can easily be known, or if grave infamy redounds upon the family or monastery or religious order of that person from the narration. This can happen if someone, while keeping silent about the person, says that a member of this family or order committed such a crime.

8. About one who is already defamed in some crime, to narrate a defect commonly connected with that crime, for example, to narrate perjury about a robber, or about a drunken husband that he quarreled with his wife, is not grave, because the infamy is not notably increased from it. But to narrate about him an altogether disparate defect is ordinarily grave defamation: for he who has lost reputation in one matter, for example, in chastity, has not therefore lost reputation in another quality also, for example, in learning; but he can have good reputation in one matter and bad reputation in another.

9. To say that in such a city all or most are unjust is considered grave defamation, because the reputation of individuals is gravely injured. But to say that in such a city many are unjust is not grave, unless it can be referred to determined persons, because no determined person is injured. Hence if someone by enormous exaggeration says that in such a city all merchants are defrauders, all virgins are corrupt, and the hearers judge that many are of this sort, and yet do not refer the vice to determined persons, he does not seem to sin gravely.

10. To say about some religious order or some monastery that religious in it live badly or do not observe regular discipline is grave detraction, unless the matter is plainly notorious: for both the whole religion or house and its individual members suffer grave damage by this defamation, because suspicion is induced about individuals.

11. It is not permitted to reveal another's hidden crime while at the same time adding the penance performed for it: for there always remains in others a certain sinister opinion, since the blackening of reputation from the manifestation of the fault is not wholly taken away by knowledge of the penance.

12. To refer in general the vice of a people or of a whole nation, for example, that it is proud, generally is not a sin, or is only venial, because either the matter treated is known, or concerns a natural disposition, not personal sins, or many indeterminate persons are understood.¹

¹ Cf. Titus 1:12.

648. Specific and numerical malice. 1. Detraction and calumny are sins specifically diverse, not insofar as they injure reputation, but insofar as calumny adds to detraction the malice of lying; yet this malice, since it is against veracity, is not mortal.

Therefore of itself it is not necessary that it be declared in confession whether the reputation of one's neighbor was injured by detraction or calumny. Yet generally it is fitting that the confessor know this, both so that the gravity of the sin and so that the mode of restitution can be determined.

2. Detractions in matters diverse in species, for example, to say that someone is a robber and an adulterer, are not sins diverse in species: for reputation morally is of the same nature, whatever the prerogative may be in which it is founded; therefore also lesions of reputation are of the same species, just as all lesions in goods of fortune are of the same species.

The opposite opinion, which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus (n. 48), uses this argument: as many diverse sins are committed as there are diverse reputations and therefore diverse rights injured; but as many diverse reputations and diverse rights in reputation are injured as specifically diverse crimes of one's neighbor are revealed: for one is the reputation which someone has, for example, concerning justice, and another which he has concerning chastity, and to each there corresponds its own right. But although it must be conceded that one reputation is that which someone has concerning justice, and another that which he has concerning chastity, nevertheless each is not specifically diverse, but is of the same species. In like manner one property is that which someone has of money, and another which he has of a house and a forest; yet each is of the same species. Since St. Alphonsus also holds the former opinion as probable, the confessor would imprudently require the matter of detraction from the penitent where this is not necessary from another reason. Therefore it suffices to say: I gravely injured another's reputation.

3. He who detracts from someone before several commits only one sin, because he injures only one right to reputation: for reputation by its nature consists in the estimation of several; yet the sin is extensively so much graver as there are more who hear the detraction.¹

¹ Lugo, De poenit., disp. 16, n. 112. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 49.

649. Declarations. Another's crime which is manifested is either public or hidden.

a. A crime is called hidden which is not publicly known, even if it is known by some persons or some rumor about it has already been spread, provided there is hope that it will not come to the knowledge of the community. A crime is called public or notorious which is already known to many men of some community.

b. A twofold publicity or notoriety must be distinguished: of law and of fact. A delict is called public by law if it is established concerning it by the sentence of a judge; and it is called public by fact if it is known to many men of some community, whether because the crime was publicly committed before many, or because it was indeed committed hiddenly, but afterward became public through divulgation.

How many persons a crime must be known to in order that it can be called public by fact cannot be determined. Universally one must say: when it has become known to so many persons that, with attention given to the community, the quality of the matter, the talkativeness of men, etc., it can no longer be concealed, but will become known within a short time, it must be considered public by fact. Most theologians establish these rules: a crime is publicly known if in a college which consists of thirty persons, seven know it; in a college which consists of one hundred persons, fifteen; in a village which consists of one thousand persons, twenty dispersed through it; in a town of five thousand citizens, forty dispersed through it.

c. The community in which some crime is known is either a closed community, such as a college, monastery, seminary, etc., or an open community, such as a city, town, village, etc. Now a crime which is known in an open community is called absolutely and simply public; but a crime which is known only in a closed community is called relatively and in a qualified sense public.

Note. 1. A defect or delict which is committed to the damage of the community by him who holds a public office is also considered publicly known: for he who accepts an office of this kind submits himself to public judgment, so that his public acts can be judged by others. In like manner all matters are considered public which are carried out publicly, such as the acts of preachers and professors, which therefore are subject to the prudent estimation of others.

2. A crime whose divulgation the delinquent does not care about, indeed even shows to be pleasing to himself, is equated with a publicly known crime: for injury is not done to one consenting.

650. On the revelation of a hidden crime. 1. From a just cause it is permitted to manifest another's hidden crime, provided the due conditions are observed. A just cause of this kind is the common good or the private good either of the one revealing, of the hearers, or of the delinquent himself. For the right to false reputation ceases when either public or private good is promoted by the manifestation of the hidden defects of others.

a. Therefore not only from the precept of fraternal correction can the hidden crime of children be licitly signified to parents and of subjects to superiors, so that the guilty may be amended, but also from true charity hidden defects can be revealed to others so that either by prayers or by other means they may concur toward the amendment of the delinquent: for the spiritual good of the delinquent must be preferred to his reputation.

b. Therefore those are excused who for the sake of consolation or counsel narrate to a friend an injury done to themselves by another; likewise servants revealing injuries inflicted on themselves by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, religious by a prelate, etc., although from this some infamy may come to the author of the injury. Likewise if someone is accused of a false crime, he can licitly open the hidden crime of the accuser in order to diminish his trustworthiness and authority. Indeed even the accused may do this, provided the manifestation is necessary for invalidating the force of testimony. For no one is bound with so great an inconvenience to himself to protect the reputation of another, especially one unjustly injuring him.

c. Therefore another's reputation is licitly diminished where a false estimation concerning his learning and uprightness is harmful to others, if grave and notable damage which threatens others cannot be impeded in another way. For the good, especially the spiritual good, of the innocent must be preferred to the reputation of the guilty.

Therefore when there is question, for example, of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of entering religion, of taking on a physician, teacher, servant, etc., it is permitted to manifest another's hidden defects, incapacity, and vices, from which some detriment is deservedly feared. He who knows that someone is a thief can manifest it to those with whom he lives so that they may be on guard for themselves. Any private person can report the delict of another to the judge, so that by the punishment of that person the common good may be promoted.

2. In revelations of this kind a twofold condition must be observed: a. that the damage which is avoided through revelation be proportioned to the damage which is inflicted on another from the manifestation of the vice; but it is considered proportioned if the damage to be avoided is grave, although greater damage follows for the one defamed, because the right of the innocent is superior, yet not if it is light or far less; b. that the revelation be made with the least damage of the guilty person, that is, that it not be manifested to more persons than is necessary, nor the person revealed if this is not necessary, nor be manifested without the delinquent first being warned, if warning can be done without grave inconvenience and is hoped to profit for the intended end.

651. On the revelation of a public crime. 1. A crime which is public by law can everywhere be manifested without another excusing cause, unless it has been amended and wiped away by oblivion.

a. For the judge by judicial sentence deprives the delinquent not only of reputation, but also of the right to reputation in this matter, and this in perpetuity; and just as he himself takes care that the sentence be published, so he gives to all others the license of further divulging it, so that all can guard themselves against criminal men.¹ Wherefore it is not a sin to write or speak publicly about a crime because of which someone has been punished by prison or another penalty.

b. To reveal again a crime which was public by law, but is now amended and wiped away by oblivion, is not indeed against justice, because the force of the judicial sentence which had despoiled the delinquent of the right to reputation always endures; but it is against charity if someone without utility restores the memory of the crime in those circumstances in which he foresees that the hearers are going to hold as criminal one who has already amended himself, and that he is going to suffer grave damage.

2. A crime which is public by fact and indeed simply public can be manifested both to members of the same community and outside the community without another excusing cause, unless it has been amended and wiped away by oblivion.

a. It is expedient for the public good that each one be known as he publicly truly is, lest men suffer damage because the wicked or unskilled are held for upright or skilled. Therefore concerning publicly known matters and those things which are publicly done, anyone can speak freely before all, even those not knowing, although the estimation of others is diminished by it. Yet he must take care not to exceed the limits of truth, nor without utility inflict damage on others.

b. To reveal again a crime which was public by fact, but is now amended and wiped away by oblivion, is not only against charity, but also against justice, because through oblivion the matter returns to that state in which it was before the publicity of the crime, and therefore the right to reputation also revives.²

c. To the question whether a crime public by fact in one place can be divulged in another distant place, these things must be noted:

alpha. If the crime will justly become public in that place within a short time, it can licitly be divulged: for reputation certainly to be lost within a short time is no longer of any value; therefore its loss inflicts no damage. Something else must be said about anticipated loss of life, because any moment of life in which we can merit eternal reward is of the greatest value.

beta. If the reputation of the crime is not going to come to that place, at least within a short time, some indeed permit all crimes to be manifested, because it is expedient for the public good that each one be known by others as he publicly is, lest men be deceived in the relations which they have with him;³ but others permit this only concerning those crimes which render a man harmful to others, such as crimes of homicide, treason, scandalous impurity, etc. The first opinion is also probable, since its reason has force concerning all crimes and defects.⁴

3. A crime which is public by fact, but only relatively public, can be manifested to the members of the same community; but outside that community the same cannot be manifested without injustice.

For the delinquent has not lost reputation outside his own community, since members of a closed community are accustomed to conceal outside the community those things which are known within the community, and ordinarily there is no reason which shows further divulgation to be necessary or useful. Therefore members of a household indeed speak licitly among themselves about the crime of a religious which is known in the house or monastery; but it is not permitted to them to speak about it with outsiders, nor with religious of another monastery, whether of the same or of a diverse order.⁵

¹ Lugo, disp. 14, n. 72.

² Lugo, disp. 14, n. 85, with Molina; cf. nevertheless Lessius, l. 2, c. 11, n. 82, who thinks that one sins only against charity.

³ Lugo, l.c., n. 80 ss.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 974.

⁵ Cf. Lacroix, l.c., n. 1221.

652. On writers of newspapers. In order to determine what is permitted and what is not permitted to writers of newspapers, the conditions of the present time must be kept before one's eyes, in which public papers by their office have so great an influence on public life, both political and social. Wherefore to those who direct Catholic papers there must be conceded a broad faculty, insofar as it is permitted by moral laws, of speaking and judging: for unless this were done, the place would be wholly ceded to depraved papers.

a. They can narrate all new matters: for since readers expect that they be taught about all things recently done, whether good or evil, they licitly report even crimes, defects, etc., which are public either by law or by fact, at least in one place. But things which are hidden they are not permitted to investigate and divulge once investigated, unless the common good or a truly grave good of a third person renders the manifestation licit. Since that matter is difficult to judge, great discretion and caution are needed.

b. They can publicly judge public matters: for things which are done publicly, especially by those who hold public office, can be subjected to public censure. Therefore they can report unjust acts and defects which are committed by magistrates in fulfilling office to the damage of the community. In this way enemies of the Catholic religion can be deterred from inflicting vexations either on religion or on pious men, since officials greatly fear lest their unjust actions be divulged through newspapers and subjected to censure.

c. It is licit for writers of newspapers, which is especially valid at the time of elections, to manifest the hidden crimes or defects of those who are to be elected to the supreme magistracies of the republic or community, or to assemblies, and which render the candidate unworthy, both because the common good demands this, and because from universal custom candidates are considered to yield their right as to this as soon as they seek a public office. Yet certainly those publicists must be condemned "who, led away either by an itch for divulging everything or by partisan zeal, also touch those crimes whose knowledge contributes nothing to the public good," especially if they inveigh against the crimes and defects of men who discharge a higher office.

653. A certain greater license is customarily conceded to historians in narrating the vices and crimes of the dead: for they can, without a peculiar reason of public or private good, consign to letters even hidden crimes of those whose history they weave, so that memory of them may stand; and they can stir up again crimes already wiped away by oblivion, and this for a manifold reason. First from the general end of history: for in order that history can be that which it ought to be, the teacher of life, witness of truth, vindicator of divine justice, etc., it is altogether required that the causes and effects of deeds also be manifested, which demands the revelation even of hidden crimes. Then the prudent narration of vices and crimes contributes to public utility: for horror and abomination of crime is struck in, men are frightened away from evil, and princes are excited to punishing vices. Finally, although of itself it is not permitted to tear away the reputation not even of a dead damned person, supposing that it is known that he is damned, yet it is permitted to narrate the hidden crimes of an impious man who even after death continues to exercise harmful influence, so that his authority may be destroyed or diminished.

Yet three things must be noted about this matter: a. In writing the history of a recent age, care must be taken lest from the narration of the crimes of a deceased person surviving relatives suffer damage. b. In writing the history either of a recent or of an earlier age, care must be taken lest from the narration of crimes some state, for example, the clerical or episcopal, be so defamed that scandal arises from it which is greater than the good hoped for from the manifestation. c. Since in present times archives, even the more secret, are opened to all, and a true desire has seized learned men of divulging whatever can be found in them, it is better that a Catholic narrate according to truth those things which of themselves ought to be covered by silence, than that they be brought forth adulterated by an adversary of the Church.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 87 ss.; Lehmkuhl I, n. 1183; Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 1097.

654. How he sins. 1. He who hears one detracting and does not impede the detraction which he can easily impede sins in a twofold way against charity: first, because he does not impede the sin of the detractor by correcting him; then because he does not avert evil from the defamed person. For anyone is bound from charity to avert evil from his neighbor if he conveniently can.

A superior also who hears detraction is bound to impede it from charity; but neither the superior of the one defaming nor the superior of the one defamed is bound to impede it from justice: not the superior of the one defaming, because he must only correct his subject, but not watch over the good of others; not the superior of the one defamed, because by reason of his office he must take care only of the spiritual good, not of the temporal good, of his subjects.

Therefore anyone, even a private person, in grave matter is of himself bound under grave obligation from charity to impede detraction; yet in order that to hear and not impede one detracting be a grave sin, it is required: a. that the other certainly and unjustly detract: for it can happen that there is present a just cause of narrating the vices of another, which cause must be supposed in a grave and God-fearing person; b. that there be certain hope of impeding the detraction: for it often happens that from correction the detractor is rather excited to increasing the detractions; c. that the detraction can be impeded without grave inconvenience. An inconvenience of this kind would be insults which he fears, or great shame which the one impeding the detraction must suffer.

Hence private persons are almost always excused from mortal sin if because of negligence, shame, or fear they do not impede detraction; and they are excused from every sin if they fear lest the detractor break forth into greater things or lest they themselves gravely offend him. A fortiori they lack every fault who, noticing the detraction, depart, turn the conversation elsewhere, or by some sign show that this speech displeases them: for by this reason they indirectly try to impede the detraction.

2. He who voluntarily hears a detractor in such a way that he rejoices over the defamation of his neighbor, yet does not cooperate toward his damage, sins against justice by affection, because he consents to the detractor and therefore commits the same sin by internal affection.

a. He who against his own will must be present among those detracting and cannot impede detraction, for example, servants serving at tables or ministering to clients in workshops, does not sin at all, provided he neither directly nor indirectly provokes detractions nor narrates what he has heard to others, unless they are public.

b. He who rejoices not over the detraction, but only over the mode of narrating or over the novelty of the matter, etc., morally does not sin, because these do not pertain to hatred nor to injustice, but at most to idleness and curiosity, which are only lightly evil.

3. He who directly or indirectly induces another to detract in grave matter, whether by provoking, questioning, or approving him, sins gravely against justice, because he provokes another to a sin against justice and thus is the cause of the damage which a third person suffers in reputation.

Yet he who privately fishes out another's crime from another without intention of divulging it does not seem to sin gravely, both because he does not gravely harm the reputation of the other, and because he acts more from curiosity than from the intention of injuring another.

655. Obligation of the detractor and calumniator. 1. The unjust detractor is bound from justice: a. to repair as soon as possible the reputation unjustly taken away; b. to repair all temporal damages which he foresaw at least in confusion would follow from the defamation: for he is the efficacious and unjust cause of all these. And indeed the former obligation of restoring reputation is personal and therefore does not pass to heirs; but the latter of repairing temporal damages is real and therefore passes to heirs.

a. Therefore the calumniator is always bound to restitution of reputation; but the detractor is bound only when he harmed another in reputation without a just cause, because only then is he the unjust cause of damage.

b. It can happen that a light lesion of reputation can inflict grave damage in goods of fortune. Therefore with light detraction there can at the same time be joined a grave obligation of repairing temporal damages arisen from detraction, as if someone narrates that he is talkative whom the hearer of the narration wished to assume for the office of secretary.¹

c. He who cannot restore the injured reputation is not bound to compensate it with money, because reputation and money are not goods of the same order; yet if the defamer is condemned by the sentence of the judge to furnishing compensation in money, he must obey the just sentence of the judge, from vindicative justice.

d. He who by defaming another, from smallness of matter, sinned only lightly, must repair the reputation under light obligation; therefore he is not bound to repair it with grave inconvenience to himself. But he who sinned gravely must repair it even with grave inconvenience to himself; for a grave obligation of justice obliges with proportionately grave inconvenience. Yet if the damage which the defamer would have to suffer greatly exceeded the damage of the defamed person, he would be excused from restitution.

2. A non-unjust detractor who from inadvertence or from inculpable error injured another's reputation is bound from justice, insofar as he conveniently can, to forestall his speech from harming further: for anyone is bound to impede further damages proceeding from his action. But he is not bound to this with grave inconvenience to himself, because he harmed the other inculpably; nor is he bound if he foresees that retractation will be useless (n. 454, b).

He who culpably omits due retractation is bound to repair the damages which follow from this omission and were foreseen in some way, even with grave inconvenience to himself, because he is the culpable cause of these.

To the question whether reputation must be repaired not only before the hearers, but also before those who received the defamation mediately, one must distinguish. If the detractor foresaw that the hearers would easily divulge the defamation, as if he had narrated it without secrecy to light and talkative men, of himself he is bound, because he is the efficacious and unjust cause of the damage; yet because he is a mediate cause of the damage, he himself is bound only when other causes, namely immediate causes, fail. But if he did not foresee the future damage, because he narrated under secrecy to those whom he judged prudent, he is not bound, because he is not the theologically culpable cause of the damage. It is said of himself, because in practice detractors are generally excused from the obligation of restitution before those who had received the detraction mediately, both because it is morally impossible, and because by retractation made before those who immediately received the matter, they implicitly commit to these that they also divulge the retractation.²

¹ Cf. Genicot I, n. 449.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 15, n. 16.

656. How reputation must be restored. It must be restored in one way by a calumniator and in another by a detractor.

1. The calumniator is bound before the hearers to retract the things said in an efficacious mode, even with loss of his own reputation or another good, because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty. He is excused only when the damage which he himself would have to suffer would greatly exceed the damage of the defamed person.

Hence if this is required for efficacious retractation, the calumniator must confess that he lied. If retractation would not be efficacious unless an oath is added or witnesses are employed, these means would have to be employed, because they are not considered very difficult. He who calumniated another by a book published in print must also, so that it may be efficacious, divulge the revocation in print.

2. Strictly speaking, the detractor cannot retract, lest he lie, but he must repair the injured reputation in another way, and first indeed by employing equivocal words. And so he can say that he spoke unjustly, that he did injury to the other, that he erred, that he was deceived; but not that he said what is false or that he lied. But since from these formulas of speaking most persons infer that that is true which is not openly declared false, the detractor will very often repair the damage more efficaciously by, when occasion is given, following the defamed person with praise and honor, excusing his vices, etc.

657. Five causes excusing from restitution of reputation are usually numbered:

a. If it is prudently judged that no detriment of reputation followed, either because the hearers did not believe the detraction, or because another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the damage: for in order that there be an obligation of repairing reputation, moral certitude concerning damage caused is required.

b. If the damage has already been taken away, either because by the sentence of a judge or the testimony of others the reputation was repaired, or because by the passage of time the defamation was wiped away by oblivion.

c. If the other either expressly or tacitly condoned it, provided he could condone it; but an injury done cannot be condoned if from the condonation damage to others would follow. Sometimes even presumed condonation suffices. "And by this reason," says Sporer, "commonly men, especially the common people, are excused from restitution of reputation among themselves."

d. If restitution is morally or physically impossible. Therefore he is excused who could repair reputation only with danger to life; likewise he who would suffer a much greater damage of reputation or honor than was inflicted on the defamed person; finally, if the defamer cannot meet those who heard the detraction because of too great a distance, or if the fault has become public by another way.

e. If the injured person also violated the reputation of the defamer and refuses to restore: for one is not bound to return his right to another if the latter refuses to return the right which he himself owes him.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 44; St. Alphonsus, n. 999.

The Eighth Commandment of the Decalogue is, “ Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”¹ Primarily it forbids the giving of false evidence, especially in a court of justice, against one’s neighbour, by which his reputation is unjustly injured. But because the same effect is produced by rash judgements, calumny, tale-bearing, backbiting, contumely, lying, and the betrayal of secrets, all these sins are also forbidden by this commandment. Inasmuch as it is virtually positive, it prescribes the telling of the truth.

¹ Exod. xx. 16.

DETRACTION, slander, or backbiting is committed by unjustly depriving another of his good name in his absence. If this is done by falsely imputing to him something which injures his reputation it is called calumny. Tale-bearing is a similar sin, and consists in making mischief between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them. All these are sins against justice and charity, for they tend to deprive our neighbour of his good name, “ which is better than great riches,” and to which he has a strict right until he forfeits it by his public conduct. Even if what is said to the disadvantage of our neighbour be true, we have no right to make it known to his discredit, as long as it is not public, for he still retains his reputation, he still has a right to it, and he must not be deprived of it without just cause. Even the dead retain their right to their good name, for death does not make them non-existent, and men are prepared to do and suffer much for the sake of leaving a reputation behind them. Besides, speaking ill of the dead frequently besmirches the living. Not only individuals but corporate bodies have each their reputation, and detraction may be committed against a Religious Order, for example, or a diocese, as well as. against individuals.

Inasmuch as detraction is contrary to justice and charity, which, as we have seen, bind under a grave obligation, it will of itself be a serious sin, though frequently only venial on account of levity of matter. The measure of the gravity of the sin will be the harm which it causes to the person whose reputation suffers. The making known of the grave but secret sin of another with malicious intent or to his serious injury will certainly be a mortal sin. The disclosure of a venial sin of another, or even of some hidden defect for which he is not responsible, as, for example, illegitimacy, may cause him serious damage and constitute a grievous sin. However, the making known of even a grievous sin of another is not always mortally sinful, for sometimes no serious harm follows from it. A notorious drunkard will not be injured appreciably if a secret sin of drunkenness is made public, nor a woman of doubtful reputation if some specific fall is mentioned. On the other hand, although a man has lost his reputation in one particular matter, he may still have one to lose in other matters, and if his secret sins in these matters be made known, a more or less grievous sin of detraction will be committed. A man may be of notoriously loose morals but with a character still to lose for honesty and uprightness.

When a man has been tried and condemned in an open court of justice, there is no wrong done him by publishing the fact in the newspapers, or telling it to those who would not otherwise have heard of it. The judicial sentence penalizes him and deprives him of the right to his reputation in the matter touched by the sentence. .This holds true of distant places and countries, and even of distant times. No injustice, then, is committed against one who has been legally convicted of crime by making this known in a place to which he has come in the hope of its not being known. Uncharitable harm might be done against such a one if he was trying to lead a good life in his new surroundings.

Similarly, the sin of detraction is not committed when a sin which is matter of common report in one place is made known in another, if the knowledge of it would be sure to penetrate there before long. It is a disputed point among theologians whether or not sin is committed in such a case if otherwise the knowledge would not penetrate to the place where it is made known. At any rate, it is advisable to keep silence about such cases unless there be some good reason for making known the truth. If someone is thinking of employing an unknown servant whom we know to have committed theft from her - former mistress in another part of the country, we are justified in making the fact known to the person concerned. It does not follow that we are justified in publishing elsewhere the sin of another which was well known indeed to a particular circle or community, but which was not really public. In such a case the right to one’s reputation with the outside world has not been lost.

The right to one’s reputation is not absolute. We are, of course, never justified in calumniating another by imputing false charges to him. But for just and sufficient reasons we may make known the secret sin of another. There are cases when this is necessary for the public good or for the protection of the rights of the innocent, and in a conflict of rights the stronger should prevail. Thus, when lawfully summoned to give evidence in a court of justice we may witness to secret crime, and generally, whenever the defence of ourselves, or of the innocent, or the good of the delinquent himself, or of our hearers, require the truth to be made known.

If by listening to a detractor we encourage him to slander another, we are formal co-operators in his sin and are as guilty as the detractor himself. If our listening is not indeed the efficacious cause of the detraction, we do not sin against justice, but we sin against charity if we could prevent the detraction and do not do so. For charity obliges us, as we saw above, to correct an erring brother and to prevent harm being done to our neighbour as far as possible. It is true that private individuals will seldom be bound by a grave obligation in this matter; frequently they could not intervene without doing more harm than good; but those in authority are more frequently and more strictly bound to correct their subjects and to defend their reputation against slander.

Inasmuch as detraction, calumny, and other sins of the like nature are contrary to justice, they will always leave the obligation of making restitution as far as possible for the unjust damage which they cause, as we saw above when treating of restitution.

We shall treat first the notion, division, and morality of detraction, then restitution on account of detraction, then the causes excusing detraction, and finally the one hearing detraction.

I. Notion. Detraction is the unjust denigration of another's reputation. If it is done before the defamed person, there is added insult or injury of honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

II. Division. Detraction is distinguished into simple detraction and calumny, according as it is committed by revealing what is true, or by imputing what is false.

III. Morality. 1. Detraction, both simple detraction and calumny, is opposed to justice and is grave from its kind. It is opposed to justice because it deprives a man of a good justly possessed. It is grave from its kind, which is clear from Sacred Scripture,¹ and likewise from reason; for "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which it is said in Ecclesiasticus 41: Have care for a good name, for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures; and therefore detraction, speaking per se, is a mortal sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2). Yet they can become venial because of slightness of matter. Finally, that the aforesaid sins are opposed to justice is sufficiently elicited from what has been said (St. Alphonsus, III, 966). Besides, note:

a) The malice of calumny is graver than the malice of simple detraction; for the former injures an absolute right to reputation, the latter a limited right. For everyone has the right that what is false never be imputed to him; but with respect to revealing what is true, he has only the right that it not be revealed without a relatively grave cause.

b) The gravity of matter, if there is question of injury of reputation, depends: 1° on the gravity of the thing revealed; 2° on the judgment which the hearers make, considering their region and condition; 3° on the greater or lesser authority of the detractor; 4° on the condition of the person against whom detraction is made (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Objection. A bad man does not have the right of retaining the reputation of goodness.

Response. I deny the assertion, since on the one hand no one is certainly held to deprive himself of reputation; and on the other hand, per se it belongs to no private person to deprive another of a good which the latter has and possesses without injury to another; nor can public authority do this unless public order demands it.

2. Simple detraction and calumny, insofar as they are opposed to justice, do not differ in species, because they injure the same good or right. But to calumny there is added the species of lying. Furthermore, detractions in different matters seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to reputation, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Objection. Reputation consists of parts distinct in species; for one reputation is that which someone possesses concerning chastity, another concerning justice, and therefore injuries of reputation ought to differ in species according as they violate parts of a different species.

Response. The parts of which reputation consists are indeed diverse in species in themselves, but insofar as they constitute reputation, they differ only according to more and less.

Corollary I. Ordinarily it is venial to reveal: 1° natural defects of mind or body; 2° venial faults; 3° a defect which is indeed grave, but which is sufficiently common in men of such a condition (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Corollary II. Generally, unless the matter is known, it is mortal to say of a superior that he is a liar; of a religious or priest, that he has been drunk, or that he is a lover of girls; likewise to use words which provide occasion for suspecting something grave, as if "you should say nothing in particular, but only in general, for example, that you know something about him, which, if you should say it, would affect him with great shame" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary III. He who narrates the hidden crime of someone who has already been defamed in other matters sins gravely if the new revelation notably increases the prior infamy, or brings a new grave infamy, for example if about one infamous in one species a crime of another species is narrated, not very connected with the prior one (St. Alphonsus, III, 976).

Corollary IV. He who, in reporting someone's hidden crime, at the same time reports his repentance, is guilty of grave detraction, unless the repentance is so great that it entirely destroys the infamy.

Corollary V. Several slight detractions can coalesce into grave matter, because taken together they can contain a grave injury of reputation.

Corollary VI. What has been said about injury of reputation should also be applied to defamation of the dead, although it is less grave to detract from the dead than from the living, and the detraction is the less, the longer the person has been dead. But what is lawful for historians, see n. 1070.

3. Detraction from some person also contains a graver sin if the infamy of the defamed person redounds to the community, or to the family, to which he belongs; and the sin is graver in proportion as a greater and more common good is injured. Yet note that the defamation of a member commonly redounds into the community the more, the smaller it is in number, and therefore redounds more into a family, which of itself is smaller in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 978; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16).

¹ Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 30, 32; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Jas. III.

I. Calumny is never licit, as is clear both from what has been said about lying and from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."¹

II. The following can render simple detraction licit:

1. The consent of the delinquent, since he is master of his own reputation, and therefore per se can abdicate himself from that good.

2. The public good to be protected. Hence, if you know that a man given over to lust wishes to receive Sacred Orders, you are held to denounce him to the Superior (St. Alphonsus, III, 968); likewise, per se, you ought to manifest a dishonest physician who is to others an occasion of sinning.

3. The spiritual good of the delinquent himself; hence they rightly excuse "those who indicate to parents the hidden crime of children, or to masters that of servants, or to the prelate of religious as to a father, in order to correction; as also a wife speaking with her husband about the hidden crimes of children or servants" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

4. A temporal or spiritual good, grave with respect to defamation, whether of the revealer himself or of a third party. Hence it is lawful to manifest the guilty person if an innocent person is accused; likewise to inform a mistress about the bad morals of a maidservant whom she intends to hire; likewise, sometimes, to indicate a hidden crime to someone for the sake of taking counsel or help, etc. (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. and n. 969).

5. With respect to historians, I note:

a) It is lawful for them to write down the public things of their own time, even if these, consigned to letters, are transmitted to the knowledge of posterity, and thus injure in perpetuity the reputation of the authors of those deeds.²

b) With respect to those things which were public but have been completely obliterated, authors commonly concede more to historians on account of the integrity of history and for the instruction and terror of others. Besides, since archives, even more secret ones, in our age are easily accessible to all students of history, it can be doubted whether hidden crimes which are contained in old documents ought to be called hidden.³ And this can be urged all the more because it is better that many things, which of themselves would better remain buried in eternal oblivion, be narrated according to truth by an upright historiographer, than that they be mixed with falsehoods by the impious and propagated for wicked ends.³

Yet note that, in a historical book which is intended for the common people, many things can be passed over in silence which cannot be passed over in others.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194.

² Sweens, De virtute iustitiae, n. 473.

³ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, 1426.

I. Subject of restitution. 1. He who unjustly and with grave theological fault has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held under grave obligation to restitution "just as to restitution of any thing taken away" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who with slight fault or inculpably has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held to remove the cause of damage placed by him and morally persevering, i.e. to revoke the detraction or deprive it of force, if he conveniently can.

3. What has been said about the detractor should also be applied: 1° to him who positively influenced an unjust detraction, for example by asking, applauding, etc. (n. 1075); 2° to a Superior, in the case in which from justice he is held to provide for reputation to be restored, according to what is to be said in n. 1075.

I. He who positively influences detraction, for example by asking, laughing, or applauding, sins against justice. Yet sufficiently probably he sins only slightly who fishes out the crime of the neighbor without the intention of divulging it (n. 1069; St. Alphonsus, III, 979).

II. He who only internally rejoices over detraction sins against charity with respect to the defamed person; likewise with respect to the defamer, insofar as he omits fraternal correction in a case in which he is held to it (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

III. He who does not rejoice over detraction as such, but over the hearing of a new thing, or over curious knowledge of the crimes of others, or over the witty manner of narrating, or over the thing narrated as amusing, is excused at least from mortal sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

IV. He who does not impede detraction which he can easily impede sins against charity. But practically the obligation at least grave of positively impeding often is absent, "because in this matter of detraction it can be most difficult to establish that correction would be profitable, and from another source detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; indeed there is danger that they would rather increase or confirm the detraction. ... But according to all, those are excused even from venial sin who, noticing the detraction, either depart, or divert the conversation, or turn away the face or show it sad" (St. Alphonsus, III, 981). The contrary must be said about a Superior who does not impede detraction, namely:

1. The Superior of the defamer per se is held from charity, even more than others, to correct the subject; indeed even from justice, if he is the pastor, although he is not the Superior, or the Bishop of the defamer. But with respect to a defamer who is not a subject he is held no otherwise than others are.

2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held, even more than others, from charity to impede the evil of the subject; not, however, from justice, even if he is his pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to attend to the temporal good of the subject (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

But what if the Superior has not impeded the detraction?

Response 1. The Superior of the defamer is held from charity to compel the subject to restore reputation; indeed from justice, if he is pastor or Bishop.

Response 2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held from charity to provide for the restitution of reputation; not, however, from justice, even if he is pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to provide for the temporal good of the subject.

Response 3. If there is question of the Superior of both, and the defamed person implores the authority of the Superior, more probably he is held from justice to take care of the restitution of reputation, because in the case he seems to act as a judge, who from justice speaks the law (St. Alphonsus, III, 980).

The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a fool, lest he think himself wise.

(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without fruit.

(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.

The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame; otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage the other party the more by disregarding the attack).

(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).

Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.—(a) By reason of the intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence, there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation (e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he was a sober man).

(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen. Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.

(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation, challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his amendment).

(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not found in spoken words.

Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known Defects.—(a) It is not unjust, per se, since it does not take away fame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no sufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful per se, since grave harm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already bad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of uncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the listeners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that is caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it prepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for calumny.

Is there one sin or several when there are several objects materially and physically total, but they are referred together to one act of the will? - It is disputed. There are two opinions, and for each many and grave theologians stand. The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows, 45, teaches that diversity of objects materially and physically total constitutes in one and the same act different sins in number. The reason is that sin is the motion of the will into its term, or object. Therefore, just as by specific diversity of objects it is distinguished in species, so by their numerical distinction it is distinguished in number. Ioann. De Dicastillo, De Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 216 ff.; La-Croix 150. "Hence it is inferred that the following commit sins diverse in number: 1. He who by one blow kills several men, or detracts from several... And the same must be said if someone intends to kill or defame a whole family.... But otherwise, if someone were to injure goods which some city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to individuals in particular, but only to the whole community, whence one right is injured. 2. He who by one act desires to approach several women, or several times the same woman; much more, he who in the same night several times knows the same woman... for each fornication has its own completed term. 3. He who steals from several. 4. He who on one occasion gives scandal to several. 5. He who by one act wills through several days to omit the canonical hours or fast. 6. He who by one act desires evil to three persons." L. 46.

The second opinion holds that diversity of objects materially and physically total, in one and the same act, constitutes only one sin in number. The reason is that those objects, materially and physically several, are attained by one act after the manner of one adequate object, and therefore constitute one total formal and moral object. In one and the same act, namely one and the same interior act of the will; and if there is question of an efficacious act of the will, also one and the same exterior act. For if the exterior act is not one and the same, but there are several, since each is terminated and completed at an object total in itself, it can no longer be united with another. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 126 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 34. Hence resolves: He commits one sin who by one blow kills several men. But he would not sufficiently explain his sin by saying, "I committed homicide," which signifies the killing of one man; but it ought at least to be explained under some confused generality signifying plurality, e.g., by one blow I killed several, or many. Lugo, l. c., n. 141. The same must be said of him "who by one act of the will wills to approach, for example, ten women of the same condition, or wills to approach the same woman several times. For it is enough if he says: I willed to approach several times an unmarried woman, or unmarried women, or married women, without necessity of expressing the number of objects of such a single volition." Tambur., Meth. Conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 9, n. 59; Dicastillus, de Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 256, 257. "He who by one act of detraction has injured many at the same time, for the same reason, need not open the number of persons injured.... If someone detracts from a family or house or religion, whether it is numerous or small, it is enough if he says: I detracted from a certain family, etc." Tambur., l. c., n. 63; Lugo, l. c., n. 135. It is also one sin if someone detracts from another before many, since the right to reputation is not multiple, but one among all. Likewise it is one sin if someone by one act gives scandal to several. Lugo, l. c., n. 112, 164; L. 49. Likewise it is one sin if someone by the same act denies several articles of faith, because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely the authority of God revealing. L. 50; Lugo, l. c., n. 288 ff. He who by the same impulse of passion wishes several diverse evils to an enemy, for instance infamy, death, poverty, commits one sin in number and species, namely if all are sought under the generic aspect of evil. Lugo, l. c., n. 260; L. 50. Besides, it is one sin if someone steals a purse belonging to several, or a thing which exceeds grave matter several times. Lugo, l. c., n. 137; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 18, n. 8. "I infer that one willing not to recite the office through the whole year, and afterward executing this, commits several sins.... Similarly, he who wills to practice robberies and slaughters on the road through his whole life, does not afterward commit one sin, but several." Lugo, l. c., 546; L. l. 4, n. 149. The same must be said of sin committed with three women: it is triple, not one, etc.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What is detraction; what is calumny? - Detraction is: the hidden and unjust violation of another's reputation. Hidden, i.e., in the absence of the other from whom reputation is taken. Hidden; for if it is manifest, it is contumely. Of another's, for he who injures his own ordinarily is not unjust, since he is its owner. But reputation is the public opinion about the excellence of another.

Violation of reputation can be done in various ways: 1. Positively, if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister way. 2. Negatively, namely by denying the good works of neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others are praising, or by praising coldly. If reputation is taken from someone by opening a true crime, it is called simple detraction; if by imputing a false one, it is called calumny, which is graver and differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds to detraction a lie damaging to neighbor. Yet this diverse species, "precisely insofar as it is against truthfulness, is not mortal malice, and therefore does not bring a diverse mortal species necessarily to be explained in Confession." Lugo d. 14, n. 36. Detraction differs from whispering, which is a word sowing discord among friends. Yet whispering agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, because each says evil about neighbor; but it differs in species on the part of the end, because whispering moreover intends the dissolution of friendship. And therefore it is from its genus mortal, of a species diverse from and graver than detraction; hence it is to be expressed in Confession. Prov. 6:16, 19.; Eccli. 28:15.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 74, a. 2.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 1.; E. M.

What kind of sin is detraction? - Detraction is a sin opposed to justice and from its genus grave. This is proved, because it is opposed to the right which another has to his reputation, or good name, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; therefore it is a sin opposed to justice and, from its generic concept, mortal. 1 Cor. 6:10. Moreover detraction of itself is worse than theft, just as reputation is better than money, according to that saying of Prov. 22:1: A good name is better than many riches. And Eccli. 41:15: Have care for a good name, for this will remain for you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. - That calumny is opposed to justice is manifest. For since the crime is false, someone is in peaceful and legitimate possession of his reputation.

But as regards detraction there is difficulty; yet it is clear from this, that as long as the crime is not public, since reputation is not something consisting in the truth of the thing, but in the opinion of men, one is still in peaceful and legitimate possession of his reputation, of which he is despoiled through detraction. - But the same is always a sin in species, whatever the person may be from whom reputation is taken, because the reputation of a man is not distinguished into species; whatever the sin may be in which someone takes reputation from another; and whether in one thing or in several; because always it is one and the same thing which is injured by all these, namely estimation: hence in Confession it is not necessary to explain from whom and in what someone took reputation. L. 966, 967.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 33, a. 7 c., q. 73, a. 2.; E. M.

Whether it is grave to reveal the natural defects of another? To reveal another's natural defects, speaking of itself, is not a mortal sin. This is proved, because such defects are inculpable and ordinarily known to many; and therefore to reveal them is not usually gravely harmful to reputation. Thus it is not usually gravely harmful to reputation if someone says that another is ignorant, imprudent, etc.; nor if he says that another is one-eyed, lame, hunchbacked, etc. Speaking of itself; for if from the revelation of some natural defect another would suffer damage, or be gravely saddened, the revealer would sin gravely against justice or charity, unless he had a just cause for manifesting such a natural defect to someone. L. 967.

Note: The same must be said, generally speaking, of all those moral defects which, although without sin and without crime, can nevertheless render a person less worthy of honor; and the same must be said of merely civil defects in the same case, e.g., if someone says of an honorable girl that she suffered violence, or of an honorable and grave man that he exercised the butcher's trade.

Whether it is grave to reveal another's light sin? - To reveal another's venial sin, or to speak about sins by general words, speaking of itself, is not a mortal sin. This is proved, because in many things we all offend; and therefore to reveal another's venial sin, or sins by general words, from which it cannot be gathered that another has sinned mortally, is not usually gravely harmful to reputation. Speaking of itself; for the condition of some person can be such that in him even venial sins are judged to be of great moment; e.g., if it is said of a grave and religious man that he is mendacious, or lies frequently; or if certain sins are reported about some religious community by words even only general, e.g., I know many things about it which charity forbids me to disclose, etc.; or if so many things are said, although not individually grave, that the reputation of some person established in conspicuous dignity is notably injured, even if this is done over a long time. L. 997.

Whether it is always grave to reveal another's grave sin? - To reveal another's mortal sin is a mortal sin when on account of it he suffers grave detriment to reputation, but not when he suffers only slight detriment. The reason as regards the 1st part is clear of itself. The reason as regards the 2nd part is that certain mortal sins are so frequently committed by persons of a certain condition that they are now almost presupposed concerning them; and therefore to report a certain mortal sin about a person of like condition diminishes his reputation little; as, e.g., if it is said of a soldier that he committed a duel or seduced a girl. It would be the same if someone revealed a delict about which another is accustomed to boast, or one of the same reason, or species, concerning which he was already publicly defamed before. - L. 967.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2, 3.

Resolutions: It is inferred that he does not sin mortally who reports another's grave crime, if he is of so low a condition and authority that he can prudently persuade himself that those hearing will not believe him. The reason for this is that such a person does not cause in the hearers a firm judgment concerning another's crime, but at most some light suspicion. But if the detraction is atrocious, even to excite only suspicion is grave. He does not sin mortally who narrates to a friend an injury inflicted on himself by someone, in order that he may receive some consolation from him, and by the complaint set forth may lessen the bitterness of the pain.

The special reason for this is that it would be too difficult if someone had to digest a grave injury in silence, and under grave obligation could not report it even to a friend for the sake of consolation. There is a certain collision of rights; nor is the reputation of another properly and strictly injured. Hence servants disclosing to someone injuries inflicted by masters, wives by husbands, sons by a father, religious by a prelate, only for the sake of mitigating pain, are excused at least from mortal sin. L. 973.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 3.; 1. 2, q. 38, a. 2. Cf. 1494, 1496. It is not mortal to speak ill of someone unknown or indeterminate, if such is not the case that infamy redounds upon others known and determinate.

Thus, e.g., he sins who detracts from a religious order, or names a monastery in which someone committed a grave hidden sin. For this gravely harms such an order or monastery. They make exception if there is question of some large order, and it is not of stricter observance, since in any large place there are almost always some unruly men. L. 978. It is not a sin against justice, at least not a mortal one, to ask the cause of someone's captivity or to speak about it; for just as the captivity is public, so also the cause seems to have been made public. L. 974. To defame a dead person is less grave than a living one, since he no longer needs reputation for living and working rightly for the utility of others; nevertheless it can still be mortal and obliging to restitution, because no one wholly dies, and the estimation of the dead often pertains to the living.

And scandal can also easily be had from the publication of a thing hitherto unknown. Nor does the reason avail against this that if you do not narrate that evil deed, others will narrate it. The fact that others do an illicit thing cannot make it licit for you. L. 978. Cf. here 1493, 1494. To call back into memory crimes already given over to oblivion is grave of itself against justice, since it takes away recovered estimation. But constantly to renew the memory of crimes which have not yet been given over to oblivion is grave of itself against charity, since this, without just cause, as is supposed, affects neighbor with grave sorrow.

Whether calumny or detraction is ever licit? - It is never licit to place a false crime upon another, as is clear from propositions 44 and 45 condemned by Innocent XI. Yet for a just cause it is licit to manifest another's hidden crime, even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right. L. 972.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 69, a. 2.; E. M.

For what causes is it licit to reveal another's crime? - The causes on account of which another's crime can licitly be revealed, indeed sometimes even ought to be, are the following: 1. The notable utility of the revealer himself, e.g., for asking counsel or help in a grave matter, with any affection toward detraction nevertheless excluded. 2. The utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc. 3. Public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the republic or religion or some community. 4. Grave utility also private, whether of those hearing or of others, e.g., that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. The reason of these things is that then one manifesting the sins of another injures neither justice nor charity. He does not injure justice, because neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are obliged to cover the truth when its manifestation is necessary for avoiding grave damage, whether one's own or that of others, to which others also have a right. Hence a collision of rights occurs. The good of others altogether prevails over the good of one's own reputation, which is a false reputation. Nor does he injure charity, because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; and just as you are not held to impede the damage of your neighbor, even if great, with grave damage to yourself, so neither in the case are you held to conceal the hidden crime of neighbor.

L. 968.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2.; Lugo d. 14, n. 97, 112, 113.; Gousset 1070.

Resolutions: If someone unjustly injures your reputation, either by calumny or by simple detraction, by denouncing your altogether hidden delict, and you cannot defend it or recover it by another way than by diminishing his reputation also, this is licit, provided you do not say false things, and only insofar as is necessary for preserving your reputation, and you do not injure more than you are injured, with your person and the other person's compared. L. 972. It is licit to defame another in order to avoid grave torments, if the crime is true; because you do no injury to another, since you have the right of revealing it in necessity; but it is not licit if the crime is false, because it would be a pernicious lie. L. 982.

You also licitly diminish someone's reputation if the estimation falsely conceived of his doctrine and probity is pernicious to others, provided there is no other more suitable reason for impeding the evil, and the damage which is feared for neighbor is greater than, or at least equal to, the damage which would come to the other from the manifestation of his defect or crime. Less. 968. Indeed, according to Lugo d. 14, n. 112, neither excess nor equality of your damage or that of others is required, "provided the damage which you fear for yourself or others is not slight, but grave and notable." Thus also St. Alphonsus 968. For the correction of the delinquent himself, it is licit secretly to reveal hidden delicts to parents, prelates, teachers, masters. It is also licit by reason of avoiding damage to manifest to some master that a servant is a thief, that a maidservant admits a lover at home when the master is absent.

Whether it is mortal to reveal another's grave sin, which gravely dishonors him, to one prudent and discreet man, with special malice excluded? The first opinion, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is 1. because injury of reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave. 2. Because often men bear more painfully that they are injured before one grave person than before three or four others. Indeed it is grave to be held as good or as evil by a grave man. The second probable opinion denies it. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name only before one or another. But the parity of rash judgment does not stand, because in it there is the imposition of a false crime; and in the case at issue, the naked manifestation of a true crime. Except unless one reveals it to him from whom the guilty person most and before all others would wish to be hidden, and it gravely concerns him that it not be revealed to that person. Cf. n. 1481.; L. 973.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 11, a. 13 ad 3.

Whether another's hidden crime can be revealed by also narrating the penance performed? Resp. Negatively. For that manifestation of the delict is not equally compensated by the subsequent penance. For always a certain sinister opinion is introduced into others. - L. 974.

Whether it is grave to manifest a hidden grave sin of a certain person, who is already defamed by another known grave sin? Resp. Affirmatively of itself, if the sins are disparate among themselves. For one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation as regards other virtues. But negatively if they are connected among themselves and one implies the other, because then the infamy is not notably increased. Yet it must not be denied that it can be a grave sin to manifest even a crime committed by someone a second time, because again grave detriment is inflicted on his reputation; as if someone says of another, of whom it is known that he committed theft only once, that he stole again. L. 976.; H. A. 14.

Whether, in order to avoid grave damage of your own, you can reveal the hidden crime of another, if you received the knowledge unjustly through force or fraud, for instance by opening letters, etc.? These are St. Alphonsus's words, 969: "In this question there are several opinions. But among these so various ones, the opinion of Lugo pleases me more. This great theologian teaches that you cannot, generally speaking, use that knowledge unjustly received with the damage of another for escaping any damage whatever of your own. The reason is that the unjust action by which you received the secret obliges you to restoring all damages about to come to neighbor on account of it. Only then do Lugo etc. rightly admit that you can manifest the crime: 1. If the revelation were necessary for the common good of the republic. 2. If the other were held from justice to reveal the secret, for repairing your damage. 3. If he were unjustly vexing you."

Whether a public crime can be revealed to those ignorant of it? Resp. Affirmatively, because this seems to be neither against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law or by publicity of fact. L. 974.

Whether a crime public in one place can be revealed in another place, where it is unknown? - Resp. More probably affirmatively of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a neighboring place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public. The reason is that a reputation shortly and necessarily to be lost is of no or certainly of no great estimation, and morally speaking, it has already been cast away. Except, however, unless someone is going to suffer grave damage from it. - If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to arrive, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish.

As regards notoriety of law, or through the sentence of a judge, it is not against justice, because when the judge publicly condemns someone, he intends to despoil the guilty person of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be spread everywhere, so that the punishment may be more efficacious, and the guilty person may be known also by the inhabitants of a remote region, who could have business to transact with him. L. 974. As regards notoriety of fact, or through the mere knowledge of many, it is controverted. The first, very probable opinion says that it is not of itself illicit, because one sins neither against justice nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that infamy, from whatever source it has arisen, simply takes away good estimation; and it conduces to the public good that wicked men be known, so that all can beware of them. L. 974.; H. A. 12.; In Retr. n. 12. The second opinion, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity. Against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, to which the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive; therefore he does injury to him who defames him there. Moreover, as infamy begins by the fact of divulgation, so it ceases by the fact of silence. Against charity, because the one defaming harms neighbor in a grave thing, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury to anyone; nor at least always is there any necessity of the public good for the crimes of others to be spread more widely; indeed it concerns public tranquility and order, and the delinquent, namely that he may more easily be amended, that hidden crimes not be spread abroad without just cause, and that crimes already spread abroad not be published more and more.

Note: From St. Alphonsus, H. A. 12: "A delict published in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public; hence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order, which would have frequent communication with that one." From the same holy Doctor, l. c. 13: "A delict of someone public at one time cannot be published at another time, in which it has become hidden, without grave fault, at least against charity, unless the delict were public not only by notoriety of fact, but also by notoriety of law, i.e., through sentence of a judge, or confession of the accused in court." Yet this does not prevent public delicts from being narrated in public histories for the public good, for preserving the truth of facts, for instilling horror of vice, for commending divine mercy, etc. Cf. n. 1492.; Lugo d. 14, n. 87.

When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious? - It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community or city, town, village, etc. It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be hidden by any evasion, and it is morally impossible that it not come into the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required that a crime ought to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common opinion a crime can be called public if fifteen know it from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty of diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons. Thus St. Liguori 975. But, as Billuart better says, de Iust. diss. 15, art. 2, § 5, this is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with attention to the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - L. 11 App. n. 33.; l. 6, n. 593, 1111.; l. 7, n. 76, 78.

Whether one who merely reports another's grave sins heard from others sins gravely, e.g., if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I heard this or that about such a person? He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports it in such a way that others are more likely and deservedly going to believe it, e.g., if he asserts that he heard the things which he narrates from a trustworthy person, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing evil; otherwise, if probably no faith is given to the words, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as merely doubtful, another's enormous sin, e.g., of heresy, sodomy, etc.; because the mere suspicion of these enormous crimes greatly defames. He sins gravely against charity if he reports things heard before those who will probably believe them from levity or malice of their own; because each one is held under grave obligation from charity to remove the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage. L. 977, 978.; Billuart ib. art. 2, § 4.

How does one hearing detraction sin? - He who efficaciously induces another to detract certainly sins gravely not only against justice, but also against charity. The reason is that he is not only the unjust cause of further detriment to the reputation of him from whom reputation is taken, but also of the further sin of the detractor. Therefore, with respect to the first he sins against justice, with respect to the latter against charity on account of scandal and cooperation. - He sins gravely against charity, as regards him from whom reputation is taken, who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of neighbor.

Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself. He also sins against charity as regards the one detracting; for he furnishes to him the occasion of consummating the exterior sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4. A superior, in the spiritual order, sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because a special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject.

But more probably he does not sin against justice: 1. the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another not subject to him; 2. the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent on him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. L. 979. Yet the superior of the detractor "is not excused from grave fault against charity, and also against justice, if he is a Bishop or pastor and does not correct, because these are held from justice to correcting subjects."

L. 580.; Struggl 40. It is the office of the civil magistrate also to protect our estimation; but with the order of law observed, and therefore regularly at the instance of the party. A private person is for the most part excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame or fear or from some negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, nor does another damage besides infamy accrue.

The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction is going to profit; indeed often it is dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. Likewise someone is excused at least from grave sin if he is silent because he does not know whether the things which the detractor reports are hidden. But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they advert to detraction, depart, break off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, according to that saying of Prov. 25:24: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue. Yet he will not be without some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction. "And therefore it is turned into fault for him if he does not resist when he can resist, for the same reason by which someone is held to lift up the ass of another lying under a burden, as is prescribed in Deut. 22." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4.; L. 980, 981.

What obligation of restitution is present in the detractor? - The detractor is held from justice, as much as can be done: 1. to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2. to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority: therefore, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, on that account that injury must be repaired. The reason for the second is that all damages arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in either case the detractor has unjustly injured reputation. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - L. 613, 991, 994, 995, 996.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2, q. 73, a. 2.; C. B. 824.; C. L. 2389, 2390.

How is reputation to be restored? Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence 1. the calumniator is held to retract what was said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if reparation cannot be made otherwise; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on that account. 2. A simple detractor cannot retract what was said, because thus he would lie; but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying of Prov. 14:22: They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among intelligent and crafty persons, who rather gather from these formulas that the crime is true which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent about what was said, ought, when the occasion is given, with dexterity and truth, to praise and honor him from whom he took reputation. L. 992.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, q. 73, a. 2.

Whether someone ought to restore reputation even with inconvenience to himself? - He who, by injuring another's reputation, sinned only venially, is not held to restore the same with grave inconvenience to himself. But he who sinned mortally is held to restore the same even with grave inconvenience, yet one proportionate to the damage of the other. The 1st reason is that from only light and venial fault, in the simple damaging of neighbor, there cannot arise a grave obligation, and under mortal sin, of restitution in the forum of conscience, at least from justice. Yet if he who sinned venially in detracting from half-full advertence can conveniently restore reputation in a grave matter, he is held from charity and from justice under mortal sin to restore this; for charity obliges gravely to avert the grave evil of neighbor even if someone is in no way the cause of it; and justice obliges gravely that our action not continue gravely to influence the damage of neighbor. The 2nd reason is that such a one is held to restore reputation from justice, and on account of preceding mortal fault; but an obligation from justice and from mortal fault and in a grave matter obliges with grave inconvenience. The 3rd reason is that if the evil which the detractor would have to suffer is of a higher order, or in the same order is by far notably greater than the evil which the innocently defamed person ought to suffer, the defamer could, in the order of charity, prefer his own greater good to the lesser good of the innocent, as theologians commonly note. Yet if direct restitution of reputation by retraction of words cannot be made, or is not expedient, at least indirect restitution is to be made, by praising, honoring the injured person, etc. L. 994.

Whether one defaming is held to restore reputation also before those who received the crime revealed by him mediately? - Resp. Affirmatively, if he violated reputation before hearers whom he foresaw would easily spread the infamy. The reason is that then he himself was the first and efficacious cause of the damage. But with secondary causes failing, the first cause always remains obligated. But otherwise he is not held; rather those are held who afterward detracted before others. L. 991.

What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation? The following are commonly admitted: 1. If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., through sentence of a judge, etc. 2. If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through the course of time. 3. If restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life; because life is a good of a higher order than reputation; likewise if restitution of reputation is of far much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honored man and especially very useful to the public good or religion. 4.

If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are found especially in the reparation of simple detraction; e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preoccupied opinion. 5. If it is judged that no faith was given by the hearers to the detraction, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger. 6. If the defamed person has expressly or tacitly remitted the obligation, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal, or damage either common or of his own, etc.; e.g., if there is question of the infamy of a priest, etc. L. 997, 998, 1003.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4 ad 1.

Whether you are excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation and does not wish to restore? - Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny it; but it must more probably be affirmed with St. Alphonsus 999, because you are not held to render his right to another if he refuses to render yours to you. "Equal delicts are dissolved by mutual compensation." L. 40. de Sol. matr.

Whether you are held to compensate reputation by money if you cannot restore it? - Resp. More probably at least negatively, because justice obliges only to rendering what was taken away, or an equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction; nor is it itself equivalent to reputation, since it is of another order.

L. 1000.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2.

What is to be done if it is doubtful whether the defamation has been given over to oblivion? - These are St. Alphonsus's words, 998: "Retraction of itself brings infamy on the one retracting; hence, when there is doubt about the oblivion of the defamation, it does not seem that someone is held to suffer certain damage in order to repair the uncertain damage of neighbor. And although the injury inflicted is certain, and therefore possesses, nevertheless, because restitution is not owed on account of injury alone, but on account of damage truly inflicted, as we say with St. Thomas, there does not seem to be an obligation of repairing doubtful damage with certain damage of the one restoring, unless when only the danger of another's infamy in some case would be esteemed more than the certain infamy, or damage, of the detractor." Add that if the defamation has truly been given over to oblivion, the defamed person certainly prefers that its memory not be recalled further.

1. Anastasius, greatly desiring to think and judge well of all, experiences on the contrary in himself a continual inclination to judging badly of others. And this is altogether vehement when evil indications appear, which, although absolutely they could be taken in a good sense, nevertheless he is inclined to take them in a bad sense from a certain judgment which spontaneously arises in his mind, namely that matters are not to be considered speculatively and in the abstract, but practically and in the concrete, not according to the possibility of the same matters, but according to the depraved nature of men.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Anastasius does not seem to be accused of grave sin; since he does not form a rash judgment concerning persons, but only has some suspicion, which, with attention to the subjective disposition of Anastasius deliberately to think and judge well of all, is rather indeliberate than at least fully voluntary. Besides, the aforesaid suspicion of Anastasius in particular cases does not seem altogether rash, since it arises from those evil indications. Nor truly, speaking per se, is suspicion a mortal sin.

For “in those things which are mortal sins from their genus, imperfect movements are not mortal sins, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely when the will is complete, but not when it is incomplete; for not every movement of concupiscence is a mortal sin. But judgment is twofold, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always a mortal sin, say to say that giving alms is evil. But judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it is false, nevertheless is not always a sin, except when it is altogether rash.... But when from a slight matter a firm judgment proceeds in the heart, sometimes it is a mortal sin, because it is with contempt of neighbor; but suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment, and therefore is an imperfect movement, and therefore it is not mortal from its genus; although if it is done from hatred, it will sometimes be mortal.” S. Th. Quodl. 12. a. 34. But Anastasius is far from hatred. Therefore he is by no means to be disturbed as guilty of grave sin. — S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3; I. M. 1483.

Nevertheless that judgment of Anastasius, which spontaneously arises in his mind, is certainly not the right rule of judging, in doubt, concerning the malice of others. For from this very thing, that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and consequently affects him with injury. But no one ought to contemn another, or inflict any harm whatever, without a sufficient compelling cause. And therefore where manifest indications do not appear concerning the malice of someone, we ought to hold him as good, by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part. But it would be otherwise if there were question of applying a remedy to some evil: for then, in order that the remedy be applied more safely, it is expedient that that which is worse be supposed, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil. But to suppose is not determinately and definitively to judge evil concerning others. S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3, 4; I. M. 1485.

2. Aquilinus, in order often to excite the languishing conversation of friends, narrates the sayings and deeds of some persons, whence grave detraction against the reputation of others follows; but since he himself does not intend that, nor, as he himself says, does he narrate these things from an evil mind, he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin. But he has contracted so strong a habit of detracting from the reputation of others that sometimes he scarcely even adverts that the things which he reports can bring grave harm to others.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Aquilinus is guilty of detraction at least in cause. For it is evident that he himself sufficiently knows the depraved habit contracted, which he ought to strive efficaciously to uproot. By reason of actual inadvertence he can sometimes be excused from actual grave fault. For detraction can easily be venial not only on account of lightness of matter, or slight damage inflicted on the neighbor, but also on account of defect of sufficient advertence, on account of the sudden impulse of passion.

“Sins of speech,” says S. Th. 2.2. q. 73. a. 3, “have some lightness, insofar as they easily proceed from a slip of the tongue without great premeditation.” But Aquilinus is not to be excused from grave sin from the fact that without the intention of harming others, but from mere lightness of mind, he gravely detracts from others. For it makes no difference that detraction is not directly intended; it suffices that it is implicitly willed, namely if those things are advertently said from which detraction arises.

3. Guido constantly speaks about Iulius, and constantly reports his slight defects, which he sometimes exaggerates, at one time adverting that what he says is not true, at another almost inadvertently from his very slippery loquacity. Nevertheless Guido thinks himself immune at least from mortal sin, because in truth he says and manifests only slight things, and this seems to him to be done by himself without a malicious mind. — Does Guido sin gravely?

R. It can easily happen that Guido sins gravely. For by this very fact, that Guido reflexively considers his manner of speaking, whence he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin, that Iulius, concerning whom he speaks so easily and freely, does not seem to be any common person whatever, but a person of some note, and to whom perhaps grave damage can thereby be brought. Wherefore, for rendering a definitive judgment, it is necessary that Guido expose the personal conditions of Iulius. For if grave harm is brought to Iulius as to reputation, or even as to temporal goods from that manner of speaking, there is no doubt that Guido sins gravely both against charity and against justice. That he himself does not speak thus from a malicious mind does not of itself excuse from grave sin, objectively speaking, just as it does not impede real grave damage. Therefore Guido perhaps could then be excused from grave sin, but only on account of his subjective ignorance and some good faith. Nevertheless, without doubt, if in truth he gravely injures the reputation of Iulius and brings him some other grave damage, he himself is placed in a grave illusion. G. 427, 428; I. M. 1487, 1488.

4. Menander, a servant, was dismissed by his master Balduinus because of a hidden theft. When Lord Martinus wished to take Menander as a servant in his house, he asks Balduinus whether Menander is honest and faithful. Balduinus then opens to him the reason on account of which he dismissed him.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Balduinus could, without detraction, manifest the theft of Menander to Martinus. There was present a grave and sufficient reason for such manifestation, namely the grave damage of Martinus to be averted. In truth, the grave defects of others and grave sins can generally be manifested to some person, if this is done from a grave reason of averting grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, from some community, or family, or private person. For then those whose defects and sins are revealed no longer have a right that they not be uncovered with the damage of others. Others also have a right, and a prevailing one, to avert damage of this sort from themselves; to whose right in the Case the right to one’s own reputation yields, for this right cannot exist with the injury of others.

Hence also a maidservant, e.g., who has left a master depraved in morals and dangerous to maids, can warn another maid who, ignorant of the matter and in good faith, is arranging to devote her services to the same master. Hence also generally someone can reveal the defects and sins of another by reason of grave damage of his own or of another to be impeded, although in this way a marriage is impeded, or the obtaining of an inheritance, or the obtaining of another benefice. — I. M. 1494; G. 426, 427.

5. Alexius, whatever evil he hears concerning others, in familiar conversation with his friends and companions, is accustomed at once to report to others. Hence it happens that discords and dissensions arise among friends and companions, and since no one dares to manifest to others the cause of his own displeasure, Alexius easily enjoys the friendship and confidence of all, and dominates all despotically. Alexius, adverting his own malice, often confesses that he has detracted from the reputation of his neighbor, nevertheless adding that the matter was of little importance, and was done rather for the sake of laughter and jest than with a malicious mind. Whence, easily receiving absolution, he frequently receives the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Alexius is to be numbered among whisperers, an abominable race of men, since secretly they sow discords among brothers and friends. How many evils whisperers cause in families, in colleges, in seminaries, in religious communities, cannot easily be said. A whisperer and a double-tongued man is accursed; for he will disturb many who have peace. Eccli. 28:15. But Alexius, speaking per se, does not sufficiently confess his sin, or rather his continual sins. For the sin is not light, but grave, although perhaps the matter of detraction is light, by reason, namely, of the depraved effect gravely evil and harmful, i.e., of the grave displeasure engendered in the souls of his friends and brothers against friends and brothers, and of grave dissension and discord arisen among them. Alexius perhaps deceives himself in this so grave and delicate matter; but a prudent confessor ought not be content with so superficial a confession. Nor truly does Alexius sufficiently explain his sin by saying that he detracted from the reputation of his neighbor. For whispering is of a diverse species and graver than detraction. S. Th. 2.2. q. 74. a. 2; I. M. 1486.

1. On the vice of detraction; 2. on restoration of reputation.

377. 1. Principle: Simple detraction and calumny, which are done from the intention of injuring the reputation of the neighbor, are from their kind mortal sins against justice.

It is proved. (A) For from what has been said each one has a strict right to his own reputation; now that right is injured by defamation; this is clear when there is question of calumny, which, by imputing a false crime or defect, deprives the innocent man of the reputation owed to him; it is also clear as regards detraction, for as long as an offense remains hidden, the offender retains the right to reputation among others (unless a grave reason stands in the way, as will be explained below), and therefore he is deprived of his right when his hidden vices are manifested without reason. - Nor may it be said that truth has its rights, and demands that hidden offenses be uncovered; for it belongs to God, as supreme judge, to illuminate the hidden things of darkness and to manifest the secrets of hearts at the opportune time; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, uncovers the hidden vices of others usurps the rights of God, who is the sole judge of the living and the dead; and also harms the good of society; for if it were licit for all to bring the hidden basenesses of the neighbor into the light, contentions, quarrels, envies, and jealousies would arise on every side; the peace and tranquility of families would be gravely disturbed. Therefore defamation is unjust, and indeed of itself gravely, since it injures reputation, which of itself is more precious than gold.

378. (B) Scripture not rarely reproves detractors as hateful to God and men, and assimilates them to sinners who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven; thus it is said: "The detractor is an abomination of men";¹ - Paul, describing the pagans, depicts them as "filled with all iniquity... whisperers, detractors, hateful to God,"² as if by all these vices they had been made hateful to God; elsewhere he teaches that revilers are excluded from the kingdom of God.³

¹ Prov., XXIV, 9.

² Rom., I, 29-30.

³ I Cor., VI, 10.

379. (C) Likewise the Fathers many times condemn that vice as truly diabolical;⁴ St. Augustine, in order to keep his guests away from this vice, had written on his table:⁵

⁴ For their testimonies see in Buseus, Panarium, word Detractio.

⁵ In Possidius, Vita S. Augustini, in Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52.

"Whoever loves by words to gnaw at the life of the absent

Let him know that this table is forbidden to him."

Especially let these words of St. Bernard be noted, which set forth the threefold malice of detraction: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Very fierce indeed: namely, one which so lethally infects three with one breath"; namely, as he explains below, the detractor kills himself, - the hearer - and him against whom he detracts.¹

¹ Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

380. 2. Rules for judging the gravity of detraction. The sin of defamation, which is grave from its kind, can be venial under a twofold head: from inadvertence of mind, which attends little to the damage of the neighbor, and from lightness of matter, concerning which especially we must treat. Now the general principle is that the gravity of the sin is to be taken from the gravity of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. But the gravity of the damage ought to be considered not only in itself, but also in relation to the person injured, to the condition of the one detracting, to the number and quality of the hearers. Therefore attention must be paid:

381. (A) To the defect which is manifested; thus detraction in those things which pertain to honesty of life is much graver than that which turns upon natural defects of soul and body, both because these do not notably diminish reputation, and because they more easily become or can become public knowledge; whence generally the former defamation is grave, but the latter light. Yet if the natural defect is very disgraceful, and brings great sadness to the one injured (e.g., if it is said of a distinguished man that he is illegitimate), the sin can be mortal. - Likewise to call someone in general proud, irascible, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which these defects are actually manifested; for general propensities denote natural inclination more than personal fault. - Thus also it is not mortal to report concerning him who has already been defamed by some sin something connected with that offense, e.g., to say of a husband who is known as a drunkard that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise, if the fact is altogether dissimilar, e.g., if it is said that a priest who has already lost reputation in doctrine is depraved in morals; for he who has lost reputation in one matter has not for that reason lost the same in a matter wholly dissimilar.

382. (B) To the person injured, and to his condition and dignity; for he who enjoys an intact reputation necessary to him for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than another who neither enjoys nor needs an intact reputation.² Likewise the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much on the condition of the person; thus an accusation against chastity harms a priest more than a layman, a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an insinuation of cowardice brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl; to say that a merchant is dishonest, that a physician is ignorant, harms these especially, not only as regards reputation itself, but also as regards the profit which they can make. - To detract concerning the dead, whether by words or writings, although less damaging than concerning the living, nevertheless is unjust, because they have not lost the right to reputation, and on the other hand something of disgrace redounds from this upon the family; hence historians who, shortly after the death of some man, narrate his life, ought to take care not to injure the reputation of the deceased or of his family.¹ - It is not licit to detract concerning some family or community, because the disgrace redounds upon the whole community, e.g., if someone were to say that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such or such a vice; otherwise, if it were said in a general way that in monasteries there are not lacking those who sin gravely, although this mode of speaking is to be avoided before those who can suffer scandal from it.

² It is not licit to reveal the hidden sin of the neighbor, while adding at the same time that penance for it was performed, because, even with this correction, his reputation is injured.

¹ But if they write long after his death, they can reveal even hidden vices, by reason of the public good, so that men may be deterred from vices; hence even a little after his death they can collect documents in which these offenses are narrated, so that memory of them may exist. - Cf. Baller. P., n. 1097; Noldin, n. 642.

383. (C) To the person of the detractor; since a man who is regarded as grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one who is light, talkative, and lying; likewise if someone affirms something as certain from sight, he inflicts greater damage than if he reports the same as heard from persons of uncertain authority. Yet if someone narrates a grave matter as heard from a person worthy of faith, or if he foresees from the circumstances that the hearers will believe it, he can commit a grave sin.

He who narrates a hidden crime, without naming the person guilty of this sin, indeed does not sin against justice, if he knows that the hearers cannot know this person; otherwise, if he foresees that the same can easily be known.

384. (D) To the number and quality of the hearers; for, other things being equal, detraction brought forth before many is worse than in the ear of one, - before talkative persons who will preach the matter over the roofs than before men tenacious of secrecy.

On this occasion theologians ask whether he sins gravely who, without malice, manifests a grave defect of the neighbor to one prudent man, who is not going to divulge the matter. Now if this is done from a reasonable cause, for seeking counsel or consolation, it certainly is not a grave sin. But if it is done without cause, it is controverted: some say, with Cajetan,² that the damage is not notable, because reputation is lost before one only; others assert, with Lugo,³ that the damage is notable, precisely because reputation is lost before a grave man, concerning whose good estimation men especially care; and indeed this reason is not lacking in solidity. - In practice, those who act thus are not to be disturbed, but they are to be exhorted to abstain from manifesting the defects of the neighbor when no reason is present.¹

² Commentary on q. 73, art. 2.

³ Lugo, l. c., n. 51-52.

¹ You will find the French laws concerning calumny and defamation in the Supplement, n. 72.

385. A point to be noted for practice. Detraction and calumny are sins specifically diverse, insofar as calumny, besides detraction, contains a lie. Some say that this malice, as against truthfulness, is not mortal, and therefore does not have to be declared necessarily in confession.² - Yet this does not seem consonant with right reason; for the lie in question is pernicious, and therefore grave, if the matter itself is grave.

² Thus Noldin, n. 637, who nevertheless adds: "Yet for the most part the confessor ought to know this, both so that the gravity of the sin and so that the mode of restitution can be determined."

But detractions in diverse matters, e.g., to say that someone is a robber, a liar, or a drunkard, are more probably not sins diverse in species, since they injure reputation in the same mode, if not in the same degree; therefore the confessor is not bound to inquire concerning the very matter of detraction, except insofar as this is necessary for judging whether the defamation is grave or not.

Prior law

74. 1. The first part renews the disposition of the prior law, by which, in the General Decrees, § 2, n. 13, all writings of this sort were punished. Cf. Arndt, p. 148, n. 119.

Whether it is required that it be done of set purpose

2. Because words are to be taken properly, and the Legislator is accustomed to express the clause of set purpose wherever he requires it; indeed because in this same article, in the third part, he inserts the expression by designed effort, we cannot agree with the distinguished Pennacchi, who thinks that clause is to be understood here. With us are Génicot,¹ Card. Gennari,² Moureau.³

Yet practically we do not differ much. For, arguing from the inscription of this fifth chapter, "On Certain Books of Special Subject Matter," we think it necessary that the book be injurious to God, etc., sufficiently notably, although not yet of set purpose, so that it can be said to be of this special subject matter.⁴ Otherwise, moreover, contrary to the mind of this Constitution, this condemnation would extend itself to too many books. Finally, as Génicot, cited place, observes, scarcely will those books be apt gravely to wound or diminish the just esteem of God, etc., unless they are books in which the detraction is developed to some extent. But that grave wounding seems altogether necessary. Therefore it is necessary either that the detraction "be made in a notable manner,"⁵ or that from those detractions the work itself be morally reputed impious. Desjardins elegantly translates: "impious works, which attack God," etc.⁶

Wherefore a work in which detraction against the Blessed Virgin Mary is continued through two or three pages, even if in other parts honorable, we judge to be prohibited by this article.

What it is to disparage? Formal detraction is required

3. Furthermore, to disparage is to take away, diminish, the fame or esteem of someone by words. In French you would say: vilipender, dénigrer, discréditer. Thus detraction differs from heresy, by which a dogma is not derided but denied. But detraction is to be taken as formal, flowing from a depraved intention, not merely material or beyond intention.

Examples

4. God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the saints, the Catholic Church, and her worship or sacraments. Pennacchi, cited place, and C. Gennari⁷ report many examples of detractions of this sort, and well selected ones. Yet we do not, with Pennacchi, take the worship of the Church concerning the honor due to the Church, which would make that clause plainly useless, but concerning the divine worship which is exercised through liturgical actions. Thus the obvious sense has it, thus also the structure of the words which joins worship with sacraments: "and her worship or sacraments"; and with us say Desjardins, cited place, Son Culte; Gennari, cited place, Il sacro Culto; Hollweck, Ihr Cult; Planchard.⁸

What worship is

5. Apostolic See. This is not the person of some Pontiff as such. Yet if, from the intention of attacking the Holy See, reproachful narrations against various Supreme Pontiffs are heaped together, the present clause will obtain.

¹ Cited work, I, 452.

² On this place, p. 43.

³ Rev. des Sciences Eccl., t. 6, pp. 100, 101.

⁴ C. Gennari, cited place, sins here by excessive severity: "in whatever measure it is done (provided it is in grave matter)"; and Moureau, cited place: "it suffices that it be [injurious] in fact in some place."

⁵ Wernz, n. 111.

⁶ Études, t. 71, p. 208.

⁷ "He disparages God who blasphemes God or denies His goodness, justice, omnipotence, or any other attribute. He disparages the Blessed Virgin Mary who denies her virginity, divine maternity, sanctity, mercy, or in another way calumniates her excellence. He disparages the Saints who holds them as vicious or useless men, who are unworthy of honors, or who contemns their virtues and supernatural gifts. He disparages the Catholic Church who attacks some note or endowment of hers, or her divine origin, or equates her with other human institutes. He disparages sacred worship who exposes Catholic rites, as divine honors, to mockery, or detracts from their necessity and reasonable fittingness; he disparages the Sacraments who denies that they are necessary or useful, makes them ridiculous, or holds suspect the intentions of the Church administering them (that seems to us rather to be referred to detraction of the Church). He disparages the Apostolic See who contemns its supreme authority, divine institution, sublime and infallible magisterium." Thus nearly C. Gennari, on this place.

⁸ Desjardins, cited work, p. 34; Planchard, Rev. Th. Fr., n. 41.

The sins against the honor we owe our fellowmen are partly internal and partly external. They differ in degree according to the nature of the attack and the relation existing between the offender and the offended.

The legal axiom that every man must be considered honorable until the contrary has been proved, embodies a truly Christian principle, for the essence of Christianity is charity, which “thinketh no evil.”¹ Whoever disregards this maxim, has either lost charity, or is about to lose it. Merely to entertain unfounded suspicion internally is an injustice to others and an act of infidelity to God.²

¹ 1 Cor. XIII, 5.

² Matth. VII, 1; Luke VI, 37; John VII, 24; 1 Cor. IV, 5; Jas. IV, 13.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 4: “By the very fact that someone holds a bad opinion of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. But no one ought to despise another or inflict any harm whatever without compelling cause. And therefore, where manifest indications of someone’s malice do not appear, we ought to regard him as good by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part.”—Ibid., ad 2: “It is one thing to judge things and another to judge men. For in a judgment in which we judge things, . . . each person ought to strive to judge things according as they are. But in the judg- ment in which we judge men, . . . we ought rather to tend toward judging a man good, unless a manifest reason to the contrary appears.”—Hence the moral and legal axiom: “Nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur.”

1. The internal acts by which we violate the duty of honoring our neighbor, in so far as they influence our conduct towards him and thus cause him injury, are: groundless suspicion and rash judgment.

a) We are guilty of groundless suspicion against our fellowman if we doubt his virtue for altogether insufficient reasons (levia indicia). This sin usually begins with an unfounded doubt (dubitatio temeraria), which, if it is not promptly suppressed, engenders rash suspicion (suspicio temeraria).³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “There are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt another’s goodness from slight indications; and this is a venial and slight sin, for it belongs to human temptation, without which this life is not lived. The second degree is when someone holds another’s malice as certain from slight indications; and this, if it concerns some grave matter, is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is not without contempt of one’s neighbor. The third degree is when a judge proceeds from suspicion to condemn someone; and this pertains directly to injustice, whence it is a mortal sin.”—St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioa., 26, n. 2: “Noli velle iudicare, si non vis errare.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1607).

Unfounded suspicion of others usually comes from corruption in one’s own heart. If we were better men ourselves, says a modern writer, we should not consider others capable of so much evil. “He who is himself wicked,” says St. Ignatius of Loyola, “easily suspects others, just as he who suffers from vertigo, imagines that everything about him is moving round and round.”

b) Rash judgment (iudicium temerarium) consists in thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant. It differs from groundless suspicion only in degree: the former implies hesitation, whereas the latter does not.⁴ Holy Scripture tells us, and experience confirms it, that unfounded suspicion and rash judgment both originate as a rule either in malice, which sees nothing but wickedness in others, or in envy or hatred, which inspire ill will towards others. In some men these vices result from the bitter disappointments of a life-time. When they spring from malice, envy, or hatred, unfounded suspicion and rash judgment are invariably sinful, because they involve a lack of charity. The gravity of this sin may be gauged by the importance of its object and the degree of pleasure which the sinner takes in his uncharitable act.

⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 481: “1. A rash judgment is a true assent, conceived from slight indications, concerning some sin or defect of one’s neighbor; 2. rash suspicion is a weak assent concerning one’s neighbor’s evil, or an assent concerning another’s stain conceived with fear of the opposite; 3. doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither side.”

Merely to harbor a momentary and spontaneous (or involuntary) doubt regarding the virtue of another is, of course, no sin at all. Such judgments frequently flash through the mind—we are so quick and prone to judge ill of others without sufficient reason. All this is merely a temptation. But from the temptation we pass on to sin if, knowing the insufficiency of our reasons, we nevertheless deliberately form an unfavorable judgment regarding another’s virtue. “Suspicion,” says the Angelic Doctor, “denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this may arise from three causes. First, from a man’s being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, a wicked man is prone to think evil of others. . . . Secondly, it is owing to a man’s being ill-disposed towards another; for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it may arise from long experience, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others. The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, whilst the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently, suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.”⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “Suspicion denotes an opinion of evil when it proceeds from slight indications, and this happens in three ways: first, from the fact that someone is evil in himself and, from this very fact, as though conscious of his own malice, readily thinks evil of others. Secondly, it arises from the fact that someone is ill-disposed toward another; for when someone despises or hates another, or is angry with or envious of him, he thinks evil of him from slight signs, because everyone readily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it arises from long experience. The first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; but the third cause diminishes the nature of suspicion, inasmuch as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. And therefore suspicion denotes a certain vice, and the farther suspicion proceeds, the more vicious it is.” (Vide supra, n. 3).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Moral., I, n. 482: “A rash judgment concerning a neighbor’s fault is by its kind a mortal sin against justice; for each person has a right to his good reputation in the judgment of individuals. . . . Often, however, it is venial because of the slightness of the matter or the imperfection of the act. Rash suspicion and doubt concerning a neighbor’s stain are only venial by their kind. The reason is that, because of their weak and readily changeable adherence, they ordinarily inflict only slight harm on one’s neighbor, since they do not destroy his reputation but only diminish it and render it doubtful.”

To entertain a sort of general distrust towards strangers or to reserve one’s judgment regarding their honesty or disinterestedness, in consequence of having had one’s goodness repeatedly imposed upon, is no sin, because there is some reason for such a general distrust. Still, we must always remember that Christian charity commands us to think good rather than evil of our neighbor.⁶ The Talmud lays down a prudent rule of conduct when it says: “Judge no one unless you have been in his place.”

⁶ Cfr. Is. XI, 3; Luke VI, 37; John VIII, 15 sq.; 1 Cor. IV, 5.—St. Augustine, De Agone Christ., c. 27, n. 29: “In that passage [Mt. vii, 1], where [the Lord] forbids judging, He admonishes us not to condemn anyone whose thought is not open to us, or of whom we do not know what sort of person he may afterwards become.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 395).

“Frequently there is a greater sin involved in judging rashly of another than in the act that is so judged. The wise men of the world (sapientes mundi) warn us not to outdo the sins of others by passing rash judgment upon them; how much more carefully ought we to consider our own conduct, lest we condemn petty faults in others and at the same time incur grievous sins ourselves.”⁷

⁷ Pseudo-Ambrose, Apol. II David, c. 2, n. 5 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 889).

“To have a low opinion of oneself and always to think well and commendably of others,” says Thomas à Kempis, “is great wisdom and perfection. If thou shouldst see another openly sin, or commit heinous crimes, yet thou oughtest not to esteem thyself better, because thou knowest not how long thou mayest remain in a good state. We are all frail; but do thou think no one more frail than thyself.”⁸

⁸ De Imitatione Christi, l. I, c. 2 (ed. Pohl, II, 8).

2. The chief external sins against the honor of our fellowman are contumely, calumny, and slander.

a) Contumely (contumelia) means casting a man's faults in his face to detract from his dignity. This may be done either in his physical or in his moral presence. Moral presence is assumed when the insult is uttered before those who know the victim and to whose respect he attaches weight.⁹ This includes publication in the press.

⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 478: "A person can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or through something else in which he is represented to some extent."

Contumely implies insult. An insult is any remark or expression by which another is denied the dignity of a human being, or accused of a moral defect, or charged with a crime or an offense. It is not necessary that the utterance in question actually contain an expression of contempt or disrespect, but the intention of injuring the other (animus iniuriandi) suffices.

The seriousness of the sin of contumely is measured by the intention of the offender, the importance of the matter involved, and the dignity of the person injured. No contumely is committed by parents and superiors when they censure the sins and faults of their children or subjects, even if this is done in a humiliating way, though they should, of course, always remember that even just reproaches must be kept within proper limits and that brutality and unnecessary harshness often produce a contrary effect.

The ancients took cognizance of real contumely, but not of verbal, and the Roman law did not punish the latter, probably for the reason that in former times men were less sensitive in regard to verbal insults than they are now, but especially because the spoken word did not then enjoy the publicity now given to it through the press.¹⁰ St. John the Baptist and Jesus Christ Himself severely censured the Scribes, Pharisees, and Sadducees.¹¹ St. Polycarp, when asked by the heretic Marcion whether he knew him, answered: "Certainly I know the first-born of Satan!"¹²

¹⁰ Homer (Ilias, I, 210 sqq.) describes Athene as intervening between Achilles and Agamemnon with the words: "Do not engage in combat nor draw the sword, for you can insult him in words as much as you please."—Linsenmann, Moraltheol., p. 457; W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, London, 1892, Ch. VII, "The Ethics of Journalism," pp. 150–173.

¹¹ Matth. III, 7; XII, 34, 39; XVI, 4; XXIII, 13–33; Mark VIII, 38; Luke III, 7; XI, 42–45; cfr. Matth. XV, 26; XVI, 23; Mark VII, 27; Luke XIII, 32; Acts XIII, 10; XXIII, 3; Gal. III, 1, 3; Phil. III, 2; Tit. I, 12 sq.

¹² Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., III, 3–4; cfr. Polycarp, Epist. ad Philipp., c. 7; Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 304; Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (Loeb Classical Library), Vol. I, p. 293.

Contumely, says Fr. Slater,¹³ is of itself a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Christ shows how grievous a sin is committed by contumely when He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire."¹⁴ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be a venial sin only, if the matter involved is slight. Chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate others is, of course, harmless, so long as it keeps within due bounds.¹⁵

¹³ Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 462.

¹⁴ Matth. V, 22.

¹⁵ Slater, ibid.

We insult a neighbor not only in words, but also by sending him abusive, immoral, or frivolous cards, a custom which exists in some countries and constitutes a serious abuse of the practice, in itself unobjectionable, of sending tokens of congratulation or remembrance at certain seasons of the year. The exhibition and circulation of offensive cards seriously menaces the morals of the young and promotes the world-wide movement against sound ethics.

b) Calumny (calumnia) or slander is committed by falsely imputing to another something which injures or destroys his reputation. This usually consists in accusing him falsely or exaggerating his faults or denying his good qualities or wilfully misinterpreting his intentions,¹⁶ and may be done in speech or in writing; in the latter case is called libel or pasquil.

¹⁶ Deut. I, 27; Mark VII, 22. On Matth. XII, 36 ῥῆμα ἀργόν, verbum otiosum, cfr. E. Nestle, Philologica Sacra, Berlin, 1896, pp. 58 sq.

Calumny involves three distinct acts; namely, first, a wilful lie, which is aggravated by the fact that it is told in secret and the injured person cannot defend himself against it; secondly, a sin against charity, and thirdly, a violation of justice (iustitia commutativa), because the injured person frequently suffers damage in his social position or good name.

If calumny is committed in general terms, i. e., if we declare our neighbor to be entirely bad without a redeeming trait, it is a mortal sin. If we impute to him only one fault, or several faults, the gravity of the sin committed varies according to the seriousness of the faults imputed, the consequences of the imputation, and the malice with which the calumniator strives to effect the moral or social ruin of his victim. The lighter the unjust accusation and the less intentional the imputation of evil, the smaller will be the guilt incurred.

In its worst form calumny is little less than spiritual murder and must be reckoned among the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cfr. Ps. C, 5; Jas. IV, 11; 1 Pet. II, 1.—St. Jerome, Epist. 54 (al. 10), n. 13: "It is impossible for anyone to pass through the course of this life without being bitten by men, and it is the consolation of the wicked to carp at the good, while they think the guilt of sins is diminished by the multitude of sinners. Yet the fire of stubble soon subsides, and the overflowing flame gradually dies when nourishment fails."—Epist., 108 (al. 27), n. 19: "A slanderous tongue is accustomed to carp at saints as a consolation for the offender."—Epist., 148 (al. 14), n. 16: "Never detract from anyone at all, nor wish to appear praiseworthy by censuring others; learn rather to adorn your own life than to carp at another's. There are very few who renounce this vice, and rarely will you find those who wish to present their own life as blameless without willingly censuring another's. So great a lust for this evil has invaded men's minds that even those who have withdrawn far from other vices nevertheless fall into this one as though into the devil's final snare. But do you so flee this evil that not only do you yourself not detract, but you do not even at any time believe another who detracts. Nor by agreeing give authority to detractors, lest by nodding assent you nourish their vice. . . . Indeed, this vice is such that it should be extinguished among the first, and should be wholly excluded by those who wish to train themselves in holiness. For nothing so disturbs the mind; there is nothing that makes the mind so changeable and frivolous as readily to believe everything and to follow the words of detractors with the mind's rash assent. Hence frequent dissensions arise, hence unjust hatreds. This it is that often makes enemies even of the closest friends, when a malicious tongue separates souls that are indeed harmonious but credulous. On the other hand, it is great tranquility of mind and great steadiness of character not rashly to hear anything adverse about anyone. Blessed is he who has so armed himself against this vice that no one dares detract in his presence. But if there were in us this diligence not to believe detractors indiscriminately, everyone would now fear to detract, lest in detracting they make not others so much as themselves contemptible. But this evil is notorious for this reason, and this vice flourishes in many for this reason: because it is willingly heard by almost everyone." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 557, 896, 1211).

The varieties of this sin are described in the old memorial verse:

"Imponens, augens, manifestans, in mala vertens, Qui negat aut minuit, reticet laudatque remisse."

If one is calumniated, he should recall that it is not the worst fruit that is attacked by the wasps, as the German poet Bürger says, or, as an Arabian proverb puts it: "People do not throw stones at a tree unless it bears fruit."

Some men resemble bees, not by their diligence, but by their sting.

c) Detraction, or backbiting (diffamatio, detractio)¹⁸ is committed when one unjustly deprives another of his good name by revealing his real but secret faults in his absence. This is a sin against justice as well as charity, because every man has a strict right to his good name. The more uncharitable the disposition of the detractor or slanderer, the more unfavorable the light in which he places his neighbor, the more widely the detraction circulates, the more the victim's position or activity depends on his good name, and the worse the results of the detraction, the more serious is the sin committed. Another factor to be taken into consideration here, as in all sins of defamation, are the consequences resulting from detraction in the case of those who hear of it.

¹⁸ The older Scholastics designated both calumny and detraction with one word: detractio.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 1.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 459, says: "Detraction is a secret and unjust violation of another's reputation, or the unjust blackening of the reputation of an absent neighbor. Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone's life and morals. Detraction is called simply such if the neighbor's reputation is violated by reporting a true crime; it is called calumny if the violation follows from imputing a false crime."

Unsophisticated persons are apt to lose their good opinion of others generally (odium generis humani) and their reverence for virtue. Hence a sin of this kind, aside from the malice it involves, is more grievous when committed by persons in whose veracity and judgment one has great confidence.¹⁹

¹⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 460: "The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the harm that one's neighbor is foreseen to suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime related about him. Hence, to determine the gravity of detraction in a particular case, attention must be paid to the character: 1. of the detractor—whether he is serious and discreet, or talkative and frivolous; 2. of the injured person—whether he enjoys a good or bad reputation, etc. The reason is that greater or lesser credence will be given according as the speaker is worthy of greater or lesser trust; likewise, greater or lesser injury to reputation will follow in proportion to the greater or lesser esteem enjoyed by the injured person."

Like calumny, detraction can be committed against an entire community or class, and not only by word of mouth, but also in writing. To defame others in writing is a more grievous sin than to do so by word of mouth. Writings enjoy a certain permanency and therefore are able to exercise their influence not merely in the present, but likewise in the future.²⁰

²⁰ Cfr. St. Paul's judgment of the Cretans (Tit. I, 12), and the sayings: "Litera scripta manet" and "Literae non erubescunt"; i. e., one writes more boldly than one speaks.

Mendacity and detraction are the primary vices of the modern newspaper press. "Journalism is conducted under conditions which tend to nourish this vice. The newspaper is, by its very nature, an ephemeral production, read for an hour and then cast aside, and probably never looked at again. Its assertions have done their work before an opportunity of correcting them is presented. Besides, it rests with editors whether contradictions of false and misleading allegations, which their journals may contain, shall appear in them or not. And it is manifest to all men that the considerations by which this question is determined are, in a vast majority of instances, wholly unethical. Again, the conditions under which the newspaper publicist works are extremely unfavorable to the cultivation of the virtue of veracity. He is called upon suddenly to expound views which shall strike his readers as profound, well-considered, or original, about subjects of which, very likely, he knows nothing truly or exactly. Or he is summoned to essay the defense of 'principles' to which he is wholly indifferent. Or he is bidden to attack some institution, some interest, some work, which whatever there may be of good left to him confesses to be worthy of respect and support. A very few years' practice in a calling of this kind is apt to render him as indifferent to the goal whither his pen conducts him, as is a cab-horse to the destination whither the driver's 'fare' is conveyed. And the worst of it is that, in time, he comes to glory in his shame. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, distinguishes between two kinds of liars; there is 'the liar who loves a lie for its own sake,' and 'the liar who lies to win reputation or to make money.' But many a journalist who, at first, belongs to the latter of these classes, and is perhaps a little ashamed, for a while, at finding himself there, passes pretty swiftly into the former. Thus does he anticipate in this life, the doom which Dante ascribed to the damned; he is in the miserable estate of those 'genti dolorose' who have lost 'il ben del intelletto.' And then, by a fatal and necessary law, his chief object, next to the provision of the means of 'agreeable feeling' for himself, is to bring down as many as possible to his own level. Nor does he find any surer way of effecting this, than by the persistent denial of those moral excellences which he has ceased to strive after, or even to venerate. Is a man the object of reverence and admiration, for patriotism, philanthropy, piety? Your newspaper censors, with due protestations of hatred of hypocrisy, will strip off the veneer which imposes on the unsuspicious; will show their readers that these pretended virtues are a mere cloak for some base or sordid end; will demonstrate conclusively that 'old Cato is as great a rogue as you.' And their efforts are only too successful. I think I may truly say that the newspaper press, during the last quarter of a century, has done more than anything else to de-ethicize public life; to lay the axe to the root of duty, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, the elements of the moral greatness of a nation, which is its true greatness."²¹

²¹ W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, pp. 171 sqq.

Formal detraction differs from material in that it is intentional. Formal detraction, or, a fortiori, slander, be- ing contrary to justice and charity, which bind under a grave obligation, is of itself a grievous sin, though frequently only venial on account of the smallness of the matter involved. Material detraction usually proceeds from carelessness, lack of caution, love of gossip, or a desire to be entertaining and, therefore, as a rule, is a venial sin only, unless indeed it seriously injures the good name of others.²²

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 2: "Verbal sins are to be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Detraction by its nature is ordered to blackening someone's reputation. Hence, strictly speaking, he detracts who speaks ill of someone in his absence for the purpose of blackening his reputation. Now, to take away someone's reputation is very serious, because among temporal goods reputation seems to be more precious, through the loss of which a man is hindered from doing many good things (Eccli. 41, 15). And therefore detraction, strictly speaking, is a mortal sin. Yet it sometimes happens that someone says certain words by which another's reputation is diminished, intending not this but something else. This, however, is not detraction strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and, as it were, accidentally. And if someone utters words by which another's reputation is diminished for the sake of some necessary good, with the due circumstances observed, it is not a sin and cannot be called detraction. But if he utters them from levity of mind or for some unnecessary cause, it is not a mortal sin, unless perhaps the word spoken is so grave that it notably injures someone's reputation, especially in matters pertaining to uprightness of life, because from the very kind of words it has the character of a mortal sin."

Note that the guilt of detraction, aside from the underlying intention, is measured by the amount of injury done (gravitas damni), and that, consequently, attacks upon the good name of others are grievously sinful in proportion to the dignity or social position of the persons attacked. To attack the good name of a priest or superior, therefore, is more grievous than to attack the reputation of an ordinary citizen.

While it is never permissible falsely to impute a crime to another,²³ it may be licit, nay a strict duty, to reveal his true faults for a higher purpose. This is the case, for instance, when it becomes necessary to inform legitimate superiors, to warn inferiors, children, etc., or to protect oneself or others against serious injury, or if the faults revealed are already known in consequence of a public trial or the culprit's own admission (notorietate iuris) through the confession of confederates (notorietate facti) or through rumor (notorietate famae). Whenever the revelation of the sins or faults of another seems necessary as a means of reforming him or of averting a greater evil, it is morally licit, nay a duty, for the reason that the sinner has lost the right to his good name because he can not preserve it except to the detriment of others and to his own injury.²⁴ But even though his faults and crimes are notorious, charity commands us not to reveal them to persons to whom they would otherwise probably remain unknown. Besides rumors must never be represented as facts.

²³ Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 44: "It is probable that one who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor does not sin mortally. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194).

²⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 461: "It is never permissible to impute a false crime to another. . . . It is permissible, however, for a just cause to reveal a hidden crime even with the loss of his reputation, because sometimes the public or a private good requires this, and then the neighbor's right to the preservation of his reputation ceases. The causes for which another's crime may lawfully be revealed are the following: 1. A notable advantage to the revealer himself, e. g., to seek advice or assistance in a grave matter, provided, however, that every disposition to detraction is excluded; 2. The advantage of the offender, namely, for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3. The public advantage, as for preventing evils threatening the state, religion, or some community; 4. A grave private advantage, either of the hearers or of others, e. g., that they may guard against evils, losses, or inconveniences that otherwise will certainly or probably befall them. The reason for these cases is that one who then reveals another's sin injures neither justice nor charity. 1. He does not injure justice, because the neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are bound to conceal the truth when its disclosure is necessary to avoid grave harm, whether to oneself or to others. 2. He does not injure charity, because charity does not bind at so great a loss. For if you are not bound to prevent harm to your neighbor, even greater harm, at grave loss to yourself, neither are you bound in that case to conceal your neighbor's hidden crime." Cfr. ibid., n. 465–466.

Detraction comprises all evil speaking and criticizing of others through the spreading of tales to the disadvantage of their good name. This applies especially to suspicions cast upon the internal motives of our fellowmen.

A special kind of detraction is known as tale-bearing (susurratio), and consists in mischief-making between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them, with the object of sowing or promoting discord.²⁵ This sin is particularly detestable if it is directed to the destruction of mutual confidence between husband and wife.

²⁵ Prov. VI, 16 sqq.; XXVI, 20, 22; Ecclus. V, 16 sq.; XXVIII, 15.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 74, art. 2: "A sin against one's neighbor is graver in proportion as greater harm is inflicted on the neighbor through it. Harm, however, is greater in proportion as the good taken away is greater. Among the remaining external goods, however, a friend is preeminent (Ecclus. vi, 15). Reputation itself, which is taken away by detraction, is especially necessary for this, that a man be held fit for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than detraction and even than contumely, because a friend is better than honor and to be loved than to be honored."

By listening wilfully or with pleasure to a detractor, or encouraging him by asking questions or applauding his tales, or not hindering them if we are able, we formally coöperate in his sin.²⁶

²⁶ Prov. XXV, 23.—Cfr. St. Bernard, De Consid., l. II, c. 13: "Whether to detract or to listen to a detractor—which of these is more damnable I would not easily say." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 756).

Mockery or derision (derisio, irrisio, illusio, subsannatio) makes sport of another's honor. It sometimes runs counter to charity also by employing the faults or infirmities of others in order to make them a butt of laughter or contempt. The most grievous sin of this kind is the mockery of God and sacred things; next in order come mockery of parents, superiors, and virtuous persons.²⁷

²⁷ Is. XXXVII, 23; Prov. XXX, 17; Job XII, 4.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 75, art. 2.—Possidius, Vita Sti. Augustini, c. 22 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52): "Whoever loves to gnaw at the life of the absent with words, let him know that this table is unworthy of him."

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3–4; qu. 73 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 18 sqq., 82 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 962–977 (ed. Gaudé, II, 355 sqq.).—Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, pp. 400 sqq.—Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 77 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 110 sqq.—A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. III, pp. 156 sqq.—J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 259 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 659 sqq., 678 sq.

187. Notions. Reputation taken generally is frequent and common speech about some matter; thus we speak of the rumor of war, of the bad reputation of some evildoer. But more strictly reputation (good reputation) is the common estimation (brought forth in speech) concerning someone's excellence. In this strict sense we now speak of reputation, and thus we say, e.g.: This man has a good reputation (guten Ruf), when, namely, many proclaim his good morals or other excellences. Good reputation principally concerns a virtuous life, secondarily also other good qualities,³⁷⁹ e.g., concerning medical skill. That to every man there belongs a strict right to a good reputation has been said above, n. 7, concerning the object of dominion. This right indeed is preserved even for dead men, since their immortal soul still exists. Hence it is not lawful to take away good reputation even from them without sufficient reason. Likewise this right belongs to moral or juridical persons, e.g., a monastery, a society, etc.; and therefore it can be a grave sin to say unjustly concerning some monastery that grave disorders are committed there. - The good reputation of a man is injured by defamation.

Defamation is the unjust blackening of another's reputation.

It is explained. It is said 1. unjust blackening, because not every blackening of reputation, but only one made without sufficient cause, is defamation or detraction. It is said: blackening, because just as a man shines with a good reputation, so by defamation, through the revelation of a true or imputed crime, he is blackened or obscured, although his good reputation is not always totally taken away. It is said 2. of another's reputation, because, properly speaking, no one can commit detraction against his own reputation. St. Thomas, Bl. Albert, and many others add in the definition: by hidden words. Here is the text of St. Thomas:³⁸⁰ "Just as someone harms another by deed in two ways: manifestly indeed, as in robbery or any violence inflicted; but secretly, as in theft and a deceitful blow; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely; in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction.... Detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the manner of proposing the words, because, namely, the contumelious man speaks openly against someone, but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the intended end, or as to the harm inflicted, because, namely, the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation." Therefore only an injury to reputation, while the defamed person is absent, is defamation or detraction. But he who openly detracts from him while the defamed person is present commits contumely; because then honor is injured together with reputation. Other authors, however, teach that in this case there is both contumely and detraction.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 1, § 1.

³⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1.

³⁸¹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 1.

188. Divisions. Defamation is twofold: formal and material. Formal defamation is had when someone by his words explicitly intends to blacken the reputation of another. But material defamation is present when someone from talkativeness or levity of mind brings forth defamatory words, yet without having an intention of defaming. - Each defamation (formal and material) is again twofold, namely, either direct, when another's vices are narrated, which occurs in four ways, namely: a) by imputing a false crime, b) by exaggerating a true crime, c) by revealing a hidden crime, d) by interpreting a good work sinisterly; or indirect, when another's endowments are diminished, which also happens in four ways: a) by denying the good works of one's neighbor, b) by diminishing those good things, c) by being silent when others praise, d) by praising coldly.³⁸² - These eight modes indeed were expressed by ancient authors in these little verses:

Imputing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil, Who denies or diminishes, keeps silent, or praises faintly.

Modern theologians more briefly distinguish defamation from narration of a true but hidden defect, which they call simply detraction,³⁸³ and lying defamation, which arises from narration of a false crime or defect, which they call calumny.³⁸⁴ We also shall take detraction and calumny in this way in what follows.

Whispering also is reduced to detraction,³⁸⁵ which is detraction by which discord is sown among friends. Therefore whispering adds to detraction the end of sowing discords. E.g., Peter and Paul are friends. Andrew narrates to Peter the vices of Paul, with the intention that the friendship between Peter and Paul may be destroyed. - Whisperers in Sacred Scripture are called double-tongued, because they are accustomed to use a twofold manner of speaking, namely, otherwise before one and otherwise before the other. Whispering is a vice which renders a man not only sinful, but also contemptible and hateful; it destroys at once the reputation and the friendship of one's neighbor. Hence it is deservedly said in Sacred Scripture: The whisperer will defile his own soul, and he will be hated in all things.... The whisperer and the double-tongued man is cursed: for he will disturb many who have peace.³⁸⁶ But St. Thomas says: "And therefore whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved than to be honored."³⁸⁷ - It is self-evident that he by no means commits whispering who destroys a truly harmful or dangerous friendship by lawful means, and indeed even by manifesting the true crimes of either friend.

Rash judgment also is in some way reduced to defamation; special discussion about it will return in the following paragraph.

³⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1 ad 3.

³⁸³ Ehrabschneidung, médisance.

³⁸⁴ Verleumdung, calomnie.

³⁸⁵ Ohrenbläserei, rapport, délation.

³⁸⁶ Eccli. 21, 31 and 28, 15.

³⁸⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2.

189. The generic malice of defamation.

Principle. Unjust defamation (whether it is simple detraction, or calumny) is from its genus a mortal sin both against justice and against charity.

It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. "A good name is better than many riches."³⁸⁸ But unjustly to snatch away riches is a mortal sin. Therefore, a fortiori, the detractor commits a mortal sin who unjustly takes away from his neighbor a good name. - The evil-speaking will not possess the kingdom of God.³⁸⁹ But every defamer is a true evil-speaker.³⁹⁰

2. from the common sense of theologians and Fathers. Thus St. Augustine, that he might deter his guests from this vice, had an inscription placed above the table:

Whoever loves by sayings to gnaw the life of the absent, Let him know that this table is forbidden to him;³⁹¹

and St. Bernard inveighs vehemently and with great eloquence against detractors, saying: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Most savage indeed, surely, which so lethally infects three with one breath," namely, it kills itself, the hearer, and him from whom detraction is made.³⁹²

3. from reason. Man has a strict right to reputation, as is clear from what was said above concerning dominion. But this right is violated through defamation. Wherefore St. Thomas³⁹³ teaches: "To take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things. On account of which it is said:³⁹⁴ Have care for a good name; for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin." "Yet contumely is a graver sin than detraction, insofar as it has greater contempt of one's neighbor; just as also robbery is a graver sin than theft."³⁹⁵

That calumnious defamation is of itself a mortal sin against justice is easily understood. For it causes great injury to one's neighbor, to whom, although innocent, it falsely imputes a crime. Hence calumny is gravely punished not only by God, but also by civil law. The matter is not so clear if it is a question of simple detraction, i.e., the undue revelation of a true crime. Civil laws are accustomed rather rarely to punish revelations of this kind. But from this it does not yet follow that simple detraction is not even punished by God. For there are many things which civil law does not punish (e.g., simple fornications), which nevertheless are grave sins before God.

The reason why even simple detraction is sinful is that by it 1. the right of one's neighbor is violated, 2. the rights of God are usurped, 3. the social good is damaged. - The right of one's neighbor is violated, and therefore justice is truly injured, because a hidden sinner still possesses a good reputation, from which possession he cannot be expelled except by a just title. But the unjust detractor does not have a just title of expelling the hidden sinner from the good reputation possessed; otherwise it would no longer be detraction, but the lawful revelation of another's crime, concerning which below, n. 192. - The rights of God are usurped by the detractor, because it belongs to God alone to judge the living and the dead according to the hidden things of their hearts, all of which indeed will be made manifest in the last universal judgment. - The social good is damaged by the detractor, because from the undue revelation of a hidden fault there are accustomed to arise contentions, quarrels, and very great hatreds.

That unjust defamation also injures charity is almost self-evident, because, as St. Thomas most rightly says: "Reputation is a disposition toward friendship and ill repute toward enmity";³⁹⁶ and: "He who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning the love of one's neighbor."³⁹⁷

³⁸⁸ Prov. 22, 1.

³⁸⁹ Cf. 1 Cor. 6, 10.

³⁹⁰ St. Thomas also cites the text of St. Paul (Rom. 1, 30), where detractors and whisperers are called hateful to God, but many exegetes understand this text otherwise (cf. Cornely, Comm. in ep. ad Rom.).

³⁹¹ In Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 52.

³⁹² Sermo 17 de diversis n. 4-5 (Migne l.c. 183, 585). Cf. also De modo bene vivendi c. 33 (Migne l.c. 184, 1256).

³⁹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 2.

³⁹⁴ Eccli. 41, 15.

³⁹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 3 ad 2.

³⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2 ad 2.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. ad 3.

190. The specific and numerical malice of defamation.

1. Calumny and simple detraction do not differ in moral species (at least mortal species),³⁹⁸ since the end and effect of each is the same, namely, the defamation of one's neighbor. In calumny indeed a lie is added, but this is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless, when it is a question of grave calumny, this must commonly be declared expressly in confession, because then the confessor can more easily know both the gravity of the sin and assign the fitting mode of reparation. Yet there are authors who teach that calumny and detraction differ in species,³⁹⁹ because calumny injures the reputation of one's neighbor in a wholly other way than simple detraction does.

2. Defamation does not seem to acquire a diverse moral species according as this or that crime is unduly narrated (e.g., that someone is an adulterer or a thief). For this difference seems to be only material in the injury of reputation. Hence just as theft does not have diverse species according as someone has stolen, e.g., money or clothes, so also defamation is not specified by the diverse crimes narrated or imputed. Thus Cajetan, Serra, Noldin,⁴⁰⁰ etc. But St. Alphonsus,⁴⁰¹ with many others, judges that in this case several sins are committed; but it is not so certain whether the holy Doctor wished to say that there are several sins numerically, or even specifically distinct. In practice, at least when defamation of this kind has been made in one impulse of passion, it seems to be one sin both in species and in number. Concina also,⁴⁰² who otherwise theoretically asserts that there are several sins in this case, seems to admit this for practice. Hence the confessor would act imprudently who asked from the penitent the diverse matters of detraction, unless this were necessary for judging concerning the gravity of the detraction and concerning the modes of making reparation.⁴⁰³

3. He who detracts from someone before several people seems indeed to commit a graver but single sin. "The reason is, because to detract before several people is only an aggravating circumstance, since the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple."⁴⁰⁴ Hence it suffices to confess: I detracted before several people.

³⁹⁸ Thus also Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1418; Noldin, De praec. n. 648.

³⁹⁹ Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de iust. n. 385; Marc, Instit. mor. I, n. 1195; Mausbach, Kathol. Moraltheol. II, 2, § 57.

⁴⁰⁰ De praeceptis n. 648.

⁴⁰¹ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 48.

⁴⁰² De pecc. in commun. diss. 1, c. 6, n. 21.

⁴⁰³ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 1.

⁴⁰⁴ S. Alph., l.c. n. 49.

191. Rules for judging the gravity of defamation.

The sin of defamation, which is from its genus a mortal sin, becomes venial 1. from imperfection of the act, 2. from lightness of matter, i.e., from the slightness of the damage caused. - From the first reason, detractions are often venial sins on account of inadvertence or an erroneous conscience, since no sins seem to be more subject to lack of consideration and false judgment than those which are born from talkativeness. Moreover, how easily a talkative man finds reasons excusing him from keeping silence concerning the defects of others! Hence innumerable detractions are accustomed to be made even by persons otherwise good. Nevertheless, let the confessor fight with all his strength against this evil manner of acting, mindful of the verses of St. Augustine related above. - From the other reason likewise, many detractions are only venial sins. But in each case it must be weighed, not indeed what vice has been revealed or calumniously imputed, but whether, all the circumstances of the persons and the speech being considered, grave damage has truly been caused or not. Hence:

a) The person speaking is first to be considered; if he is serious and prudent, he harms more than if he is frivolous and talkative. Hence, if talkative women publicly known as liars detract or calumniate, often there is no mortal sin, because no one believes them. Nevertheless, let the confessor not indulge them too much, mindful of that saying: "Calumniate boldly; something always sticks." The truth of this saying, alas, appears too much in newspapers and pamphlets, which often calumniate priests and other religious persons.

b) The injured person and his condition and dignity are then to be considered. For one who is of unimpaired reputation and great dignity suffers much greater detriment from detraction and calumny than a person of low condition. Hence it can happen that grave damage is inflicted if a light sin is narrated concerning some very dignified person, e.g., if someone should say: The Pope is a liar. On the contrary, perhaps slight damage would be caused, and therefore there would be a light sin or no sin, if someone should narrate that a certain soldier known to be undisciplined had entered a brothel.

To manifest natural defects without sufficient reason, e.g., to say that someone is ignorant or illegitimate, ordinarily is not a grave sin, because defects of this kind easily come to the knowledge of others and do not injure reputation as gravely as moral defects. I say, however, that ordinarily it is not a mortal sin; for if a natural defect is very disgraceful and reputation is greatly diminished by its revelation, it is a grave sin to reveal it; e.g., to narrate that a certain pastor is an illegitimate son, which until then had been wholly unknown.⁴⁰⁵

c) The hearers of the defamation likewise are to be considered. For if they are numerous and talkative, grave damage will more easily be present than if they are few and discreet. But theologians do not agree whether it is a grave defamation to manifest to one prudent person a grave defect of another. If this manifestation is made for a reasonable cause, e.g., for seeking counsel, there is no sin; but if it is made from talkativeness, some theologians judge such a manifestation to be a grave sin, because it is truly hard to lose one's reputation with a dignified and prudent person. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion, saying: "Although even if someone speaks evil of an absent person to one alone, he corrupts his reputation not in whole but in part";⁴⁰⁶ but Billuart, who treats this question excellently,⁴⁰⁷ adds: "From the opposite opinion it follows, 1. that a prudent man, to whom you reveal the crime of another, can with equal right reveal it to another prudent man, and he to another, and thus one's neighbor will be gravely defamed among several people without mortal sin. It follows, 2. that he who alone hears a grave detraction could tolerate it as venial, accounting himself prudent, which is against the common opinion." Nevertheless, Cajetan,⁴⁰⁸ Navarrus, Bonacina, and others deny that this is a mortal sin, because grave damage is not thereby caused to the defamed person. The matter is therefore uncertain. But to calumniate in a grave matter even before one person is a mortal sin, because it is a much greater injury to impute a false crime to someone than to manifest a true hidden crime.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 967.

⁴⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1 ad 2.

⁴⁰⁷ De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Comm. in II, II, q. 73, a. 2.

192. d) Finally, the motive on account of which the defects of others are manifested is to be considered. If it is a question of calumny, an honest motive can never be present; and therefore, if a grave defect is falsely imputed to another, there is almost always a mortal sin, unless, however, it is certain among the hearers that the calumniator is lying. Wherefore Innocent XI condemned the following propositions (44): "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone, that he may defend his own justice and honor. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable"; and (43): "Why should it not be merely venial to destroy by a false crime the great authority of one detracting, which is harmful to oneself?"⁴⁰⁹

On the revelation of a hidden crime. If it is a question of simple detraction, then there is no sin at all if the manifestation of the defect is made for a proportionately grave cause. Proportionately grave causes are: the public good and a private good, whether this latter is that of the delinquent himself, of the revealer, or of another neighbor.

The public good not only permits, but altogether demands, the manifestation of a harmful defect; e.g., defects ought to be manifested to a canonical visitor; a lustful boy dwelling in some college and seducing others ought to be denounced to the legitimate superior, that harm to many may be forestalled.

The good of the delinquent himself likewise sometimes permits the manifestation of a crime, if, namely, this is necessary for his correction or for forestalling great harm to him; e.g., a girl given to dangerous love affairs, from which she is unwilling to desist, can be denounced to her father, that she may be corrected and her honor preserved.

The good of the revealer excuses the manifestation of a crime if this is necessary for the sake of defense, consolation, or seeking counsel; e.g., a penitent can sometimes confess his sin even if the confessor thereby recognizes the accomplice. In this case, however, it would at least be more perfect to approach another confessor, with whom the reputation of the accomplice would remain unimpaired.⁴¹⁰

Finally, the good of one's neighbor permits or demands the manifestation of some delinquent, as is clear in the example given above of the lustful boy seducing several persons in some college. Thus also it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to inform a betrothed woman of the hidden crimes of the bridegroom, at least those which will probably render the future marriage unhappy.

Question. Is it lawful for a grave reason to manifest a hidden crime, knowledge of which was acquired unjustly (e.g., by reading another's letters)? Lugo⁴¹¹ and St. Alphonsus⁴¹² deny it; Lessius, Concina, and others⁴¹³ affirm it, because to acquire knowledge in this way is indeed illicit, but for a grave reason to use this knowledge once acquired is contrary to no natural or positive law; just as, by an almost parallel case, to acquire money through prostitution is illicit, but to use such money is not of itself illicit. In practice, even the authors of the negative opinion sometimes permit the manifestation.

⁴⁰⁹ Denz. nn. 1194 and 1193.

⁴¹⁰ Cf. below in the tract on penance, concerning the accomplice not to be manifested, III, n. 381.

⁴¹¹ De iust. et iure disp. 14, nn. 100-108; cf. also above, n. 160, concerning excuses from giving testimony, and n. 176.

⁴¹² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 969.

⁴¹³ In S. Alph., l.c.

193. On the spreading of a notorious crime.

A public or notorious crime cannot indeed be revealed, as is self-evident, but it can be spread more and more.

a) A twofold notoriety must be distinguished: of law and of fact. Notoriety of law is had when the crime is established by a sentence of a judge or by the judicial confession of the accused. But notoriety of fact is present when the crime is already known to the greater part of the community (an altogether public or widely known crime), or so many and such talkative persons know it that the whole community will shortly know it (a simply public or notorious crime).⁴¹⁴

b) This distinction having been premised, the following principles seem to be observed:

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 2197.

194. Principle 1. Without sufficient reason and from mere talkativeness or from an itching to narrate bitter things, to speak about the crimes of others, even public ones, is always at least a certain imperfection, which produces nothing good and often much evil; indeed, sometimes it is against charity, but not against justice.

The reason is that, even if he whose crime has become notorious by notoriety either of law or of fact has indeed lost a strict right to reputation, nevertheless he is deservedly and reasonably unwilling that his reputation be destroyed more and more without sufficient advantage either to the speaker, the hearer, or the commonwealth. Hence, e.g., it seems to be a sin against charity when highly defaming condemnatory sentences passed against a delinquent who will no longer bring harm either to his neighbor or to the commonwealth are published in newspapers without sufficient reason. Certainly it is lawful to spread condemnatory sentences or crimes of this kind if certain harms are thereby forestalled. For it is expedient that the wicked not be held as upright. From these things it also follows that it is illicit, without a cause of true utility or necessity, to narrate a crime which in former times was notorious but has now been given over to oblivion and amended; likewise, to spread a crime wholly unknown in one place which is notorious in another distant place. - But a violation of commutative justice, and therefore an obligation of restitution, does not seem to be present in these cases, because he whose crime was once truly public has simply lost the strict right to conceal that crime.⁴¹⁵

Principle 2. Even the deceased retain a right to reputation; hence it is not lawful for historians to reveal and spread their vices and crimes without sufficient reason.

Nevertheless, in our times there is almost always a sufficient reason for narrating all things which are historically true. For history ought to be the teacher of life, the witness of truth, and the vindicator of divine justice; hence it is of great importance that all historical facts be set forth according to the truth of the matter. Wherefore Leo XIII ordered the Pontifical Archives to be accessible to all, so that history might be composed according to the truth of the matter. Yet in writing the history of recent times care must be taken lest survivors who are connected with the deceased person suffer any harm.

⁴¹⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 974.

195. On those cooperating in defamation.

1. He who induces another to detract, e.g., by inquiring about the defects of one's neighbor, by praising and approving the narration, sins in almost the same way as the detractor himself; indeed, if the reputation of one's neighbor is thereby injured among other persons hearing it, he sins against justice and is held to reparation. Hence, e.g., he who in some gathering unduly induces someone publicly to narrate the hidden crimes of one's neighbor is held in solidum to repair the injured reputation and the other damages thence ensuing. It is clear, because he is an unjust cooperator.

2. He who rejoices in, and willingly hears and approves, grave detraction sins gravely against charity; indeed, in affection also against justice, because he consents to the detractor, who assuredly sins against justice. Hence St. Bernard says: "To detract or to hear one detracting, which of these is more damnable, I could not easily say."⁴¹⁶ Thus, at least objectively speaking. Subjectively, however, it is often only a venial sin, because that joy is accustomed to arise more from a certain disordered curiosity than from hatred against one's neighbor. But curiosity is a venial sin.

3. A superior who does not prevent the defamation of his subject (whether active or passive) fails in his office and therefore sins,⁴¹⁷ since he is held to correct the defaming subject, but to protect the defamed subject. The superior in these cases indeed sins against charity and piety, but not against strict justice, because by reason of his office he is not held thus to watch over the temporal good of his subjects. St. Alphonsus⁴¹⁸ calls this opinion perhaps the more probable. Lugo,⁴¹⁹ however, rightly observes that if the defamed person and the defamer are subjects of the same superior, and the defamed person implores the authority of the prelate that his reputation be restored to him, then the latter is held to this from justice, provided he can do it without fear of graver harm.

4. A private person who is displeased by the sin of detraction, but who "from fear or negligence or even a certain shame omits to repel the detractor, indeed sins, but much less than the detractor, and for the most part venially." Thus St. Thomas.⁴²⁰ But he who for a reasonable cause does not correct the detractor in no way sins. Reasonable causes are, e.g., the uselessness of the correction, uncertainty whether the defamation is truly unjust, the great anger of the detractor, etc. The reason is that fraternal correction, which would have to be employed in this case of detraction, does not oblige with great inconvenience, such as would often occur if the detractor were corrected before others. Yet if it is a question of certain calumny, and not of simple detraction, even a private person is more easily bound under grave sin to resist the calumniator; because there can never be a cause excusing calumny, whereas there is often a sufficient reason for speaking about the true crimes of one's neighbor. He who hears an unnecessary narration concerning the crimes of others should at least show displeasure by his countenance; for "a sad countenance ... dissipates a detracting tongue."⁴²¹

⁴¹⁶ De consid. l. 2, c. 13 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 757).

⁴¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 4.

⁴¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 980.

⁴¹⁹ De iust. et iure disp. 14, n. 131 sqq.

⁴²⁰ L.c.

⁴²¹ Prov. 25, 23.

196. On the restitution of reputation.

1. The obligation of the defamer. An unjust defamer (whether he is a detractor or a calumniator) is held from justice to repair: a) as soon as possible, the injured reputation; b) all material damages which he foresaw, at least in a confused manner, would follow from the defamation.

For the defamer is an unjust damager. But an unjust damager is held to repair all damages culpably caused and foreseen at least in a confused manner, as is clear from what was said above, n. 93. The former obligation, namely, to repair the injured reputation, is a strictly personal obligation, and therefore does not pass to the heirs of the defamer.⁴²² But the other obligation is rather real and, when the defamer has died, falls upon his heirs, yet not beyond the goods received from the inheritance. Each of these obligations is grave if the defamation itself was gravely culpable; otherwise it is light. It must be recalled, however, that defamation does not become gravely culpable from the nature of the crime revealed or imputed, but from the evil effect ensuing and foreseen. Hence if someone, e.g., by unjustly narrating that a certain man is talkative, thereby brings it about that the office of secretary which was about to be conferred upon him is denied to him, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, provided it was foreseen at least in a confused manner.

Since the defamer is an unjust damager, the same principles concerning the obligation of reparation must be applied in defamation as in damaging. From these is resolved the controversy whether the defamer is held to repair the reputation not only among those to whom he himself narrated the hidden vices, but also among others to whom the same vices were afterward narrated by them. The answer is: If the defamer could and ought to have foreseen such spreading, and if reparation is morally possible for him, he is held; otherwise not. Yet there are authors who excuse the first defamer from this obligation, since he is not always the cause, but only the occasion, that his defamation is propagated further.⁴²³

⁴²² S. Alph., ibid. n. 996.

⁴²³ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 991.

197. 2. The manner of repairing the effects of defamation.

Reparation must be made in one way by a calumniator and in another way by a detractor.

The calumniator is held openly and effectively to retract his calumnious lies, "confessing that he spoke falsely,"⁴²⁴ unless sufficient excusing causes are present, concerning which there will immediately be discussion. - Hence he is held to say that he narrated something false; if he calumniated in public newspapers, he is held also to sing a recantation in the newspapers.

The detractor indeed cannot properly say that he lied, but he can and ought to excuse the crime revealed by all lawful means by which he can; he ought also deliberately to praise and treat honorably before others him from whom he detracted.

⁴²⁴ The Angelic Doctor briefly embraces the diverse modes of repairing defamation in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, where he seems also to teach that the defamer ought to compensate with money for the injured reputation if another restitution is impossible. St. Alphonsus holds the contrary opinion as the more probable, Theol. mor. l. 3, nn. 627 and 1000.

198. 3. Causes excusing from the reparation of reputation:

a) If no grave defamation actually followed from the unjust speech, e.g., because no one believed it.

b) If the defamation has already been given over to oblivion by the lapse of time.⁴²⁵ It is self-evident.

c) If the defamed person has legitimately remitted the reparation either expressly or tacitly. Compensation can be held as remission, i.e., if the defamed person has also defamed the defamer, and neither wishes to repair the injured reputation. A man placed in public office often cannot remit defamation, and especially calumny, which has gravely injured not only his person but also his state; e.g., a priest, magistrate, etc., cannot gratuitously remit calumnies, because otherwise their state and also the public good would be injured.

d) If reparation is morally or physically impossible, e.g., if the hearers of the detraction are unknown or cannot be approached, if the crime has become public by another way, or if reparation cannot be made without far graver damage to oneself. Certainly the defamer (and especially the calumniator) is held to repair the injured reputation even with great damage; but nevertheless, if that damage far exceeds the harm caused to the defamed person, the latter is judged to renounce his right.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1438.

⁴²⁶ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 1002.

1° On the vice of detraction; 2° on restitution of reputation.

516. • Detraction is the unjust denigration of the reputation of an absent neighbor. But reputation is the good estimation which others have concerning our excellence, whether true or apparent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by the revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if violation of reputation follows from the imposition of a false crime.

Detraction can be done in various ways: 1° directly, if either a false crime is imposed, or a true one amplified, or a hidden one manifested, or a good work explained sinisterly; 2° indirectly, namely either by denying the good works of a neighbor, or diminishing them, or also sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly. - But all these modes are, of themselves, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet per accidens they could add a new species, for example contumely, injury in goods of fortune, whispering (which intends the dissolution of friendship), a sin against piety, if the person from whom detraction is made is joined to the detractor by a most close bond, and this mortally, unless there is question of persons joined outside the second degree. Scav.²

517. Principles. - I. Every direct detraction, whether it is calumny, or detraction simply, is mortal from its own genus, because it is against justice; and indeed it is a graver sin than theft, because it unjustly deprives the neighbor of a greater good, as is clear from common sense and from Sacred Scripture: A good name is better than riches; and A detractor is an abomination of men.²

II. The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the damage which the neighbor can suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor. Hence for knowing in a particular case the gravity of detraction, one must attend to the quality 1° of the person detracting, for greater faith is given to a grave man than to a chatterer; 2° of the person harmed, because the more entire reputation and greater dignity he has, the more gravely he will take damage; 3° to the common judgment of men concerning the thing divulged, because by this very judgment, which varies according to the adjuncts of the persons to whom (n. 526. 4°) detraction is made, reputation consists.³

518. III. It is never licit to impose a false crime on another, as is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI. Yet it is licit from a just cause to manifest another's hidden crime even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of one's neighbor to conserving reputation is broken by a more powerful right.⁴

IV. But the causes on account of which, duly under conditions, another's crime can licitly be revealed are the following: 1° the notable utility of the one revealing himself, for seeking counsel or help in a grave matter, yet with any affection toward detraction excluded; 2° the utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3° public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the Republic or Religion or some Community, in which case, of itself speaking, each one is bound to reveal; 4° grave utility, even private, either of hearers, or of others, for example so that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. Thus you can make a master more certain concerning the infidelity of a servant; reveal to another, who consults you about this on account of a grave business,¹ the defects of some person; indeed sometimes you will be bound to this according to the rules of charity. Thus a murderer will have to be revealed if some innocent person were accused of this crime; for the condition of the innocent is stronger.

The reason for these things is that the right in true reputation and false, or apparent and estimated reputation, differs to this extent, that the former is absolute, or to be observed by all always and everywhere, and therefore calumny is never licit (this number III); but the latter is limited, that is, it ceases when others would take grave damage from error concerning someone's excellence: - indeed it ceases even in doubt concerning the gravity of the damage, because in such doubt the innocent must be favored. Wherefore in the cases alleged neither is justice violated, since the neighbor's right is limited, nor charity, because this does not obligate with grave inconvenience.²

I said: duly, however, under conditions, namely 1° that knowledge of this sort has not been had from Sacramental Confession, which, as is clear, it is never licit to use; 2° that the damage cannot be avoided in another way; 3° that it is sufficiently proportionate to the loss of reputation; 4° that neither more nor to more persons be manifested than is necessary for averting the damage; 5° that you have not received the knowledge unjustly by force or fraud, suppose by opening letters, etc., unless nevertheless, because of changed adjuncts, it would be licit for you to seek it even in this way; which case would be if a) revelation were necessary for the common good; b) the other were held from justice to reveal the secret for repairing your damage; c) he were vexing you unjustly.²

519. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he sin gravely who reveals one mortal sin of another?

Resp. 1° It is not always a grave sin to reveal the sin of another, even if it is manifested to several. Therefore one must attend to the adjuncts of things and persons, from which you will gather whether someone suffers grave loss of reputation from the revelation of the sin.

Resp. 2° If the sin would gravely dishonor either in itself, or relatively to the one defamed, certainly the detractor sins gravely as often as he manifests a sin of this sort, although one only, to several, because grave damage of reputation is inflicted on the neighbor.

Resp. 3° But whether it is mortal to reveal a sin of this sort to one prudent and discreet man, from whom namely there is no danger that it be manifested to others, with the spirit of harming and damage of another genus excluded, is controverted.

The first sentence, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is, 1° because injury to reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave; 2° because often men bear it with more distress to be harmed before one grave person than before three or four others.

The second sentence, sufficiently probable, denies. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name among one or another only.¹

520. • Quaer. 2° Does he commit sins diverse in number who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse contumelies, or detracts from one man before several?

Resp. See what was said in n. 227, questions 1° and 2°.

Quaer. 3° Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, who dwell in the place where it is already public?

Resp. In the affirmative, because this seems neither to be against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law, or by publicity of fact.²

521. • Quaer. 4° Can a crime public in one place be revealed in another place where it is unknown?

Resp. 1° In the affirmative, more probably of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a nearby place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public, and no grave damage follows for the one defamed from the anticipation. The reason is that reputation to be lost shortly and necessarily is of no estimation, or certainly not of great estimation, and morally speaking is already cast away.³

Resp. 2° If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to come, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish:

1° As regards notoriety of law: 1° It is not against justice, because the judge, when he publicly condemns someone, intends to despoil the guilty man of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Thus commonly. - 2° Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be divulged everywhere, so that the penalty may be more efficacious, and the guilty man may be known also by inhabitants of a remote region, who could have to conduct business with him. - Thus more commonly,¹ with Lugo, Salmant.

2° As regards notoriety of fact, it is controverted among theologians.

The first sentence, very probable, says that it is not of itself illicit, because neither is there sin against justice, nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that it conduces to the public good that criminal men be known, so that all can guard against them.² (Q) p. 480.

The second sentence, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity: 1° against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, where the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive: therefore he does injury to him who defames him there; 2° against charity, because the one defaming harms his neighbor in a grave matter, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury. - Billuart, Antoine.

522. • Quaer. 5° When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious?

Resp. 1° It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community, or city, town, village, etc.

Resp. 2° It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be concealed by any evasion, and morally it is impossible that it not come to the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required for a crime to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common sentence a crime can be called public if fifteen know from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty from at least three diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons.³

But, as Billuart rightly says,¹ in practice this matter is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances attended to, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - St. Alphonsus also warns² that a delict made public in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public, and therefore cannot be manifested elsewhere, not even in another monastery of the same Order, although it had frequent communication with it.

523. • Quaer. 6° Can a delict formerly public, but now hidden, be made public without grave fault, at least against charity?

Resp. In the negative, unless there is question of a delict formerly public by notoriety of law, or one pertaining to history.³

Quaer. 7° Does he sin gravely who only reports the grave sins of another as heard from others, for example if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I have heard such or such about that man?

Resp. 1° He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports in such a way that others are more probably and deservedly going to believe it, for example if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of faith, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing the evil; otherwise, if probably faith is not given to the things said, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as a mere doubt, the enormous sin of another, for example heresy, sodomy, etc.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity if he reports what has been heard before those who will probably believe it from levity or malice of their own; because each one is bound under grave sin from charity to take away the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage.⁴ - Billuart,⁵ and others commonly.

524. • Quaer. 8° In what way does one hearing detraction sin?

Resp. 1° He certainly sins gravely against justice who efficaciously - for example, by exciting, praising, questioning - induces another to detract. (a) p. 480.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of his neighbor. Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself.

Resp. 3° A Superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because the special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject. But the Superior does not sin against justice, either of the detractor or of the defamed; for neither is this one bound from justice concerning the temporal good of a subject, nor that one concerning the temporal good of one not a subject. But a Bishop and pastor are bound from justice to correct a subject detracting, as one sinning.¹

Resp. 4° A private person for the most part is excused either altogether, or at least from grave sin, if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame, or from fear, or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, and no other damage besides infamy accedes. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be clear that correction will be profitable; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared that detraction will rather be increased or prolonged. Yet he will not be free from some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction.²

But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they notice detraction, depart, turn the conversation to other things, or avert the face and show themselves sad according to that saying: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue.³

525. • Quaer. 9° Is it licit to defame oneself?

Resp. In the affirmative, of itself, if it is done with right intention, scandal and the damage of others being excluded. The reason is that it is not against justice, since each one is master of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not obligate one to conserve external goods except insofar as one's own salvation or that of a neighbor requires it.

But per accidens you will sin, and even gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if from this damage of life could arise for you, or of infamy for others.⁴

526. You will resolve. - 1° It is a grave sin to detract even from the dead in a grave matter; for they are not despoiled of the right to reputation, although they have departed from the living. Hence historiographers can sin gravely by branding a mark of ignominy upon the memory of the dead without sufficient cause, by manifesting hidden things, exaggerating known things, and not reporting penance done.¹

2° It can be lethal to reveal so many things, although not individually grave, concerning someone constituted in conspicuous dignity, that his reputation is notably harmed. Yet the faithful scarcely attend to the grave malice.

3° It is mortal if you say that someone is an adulterer, although you have probable indications concerning this; because you bring grave harm to his reputation. Indeed the same must be held, even if you said it was probable that he is such.

4° It is grave to say concerning a priest that he has committed a duel, that he is a lover of girls, and other things of this sort. But often it is not lethal to assert this concerning a soldier, or even concerning a young man of mediocre reputation; nor to say concerning a girl that she is talkative, proud, etc.²

5° It is not grave detraction to speak badly concerning someone indeterminate, for example, that in such a place there are many wicked, drunken, immodest persons; because grave injury is done to no one. Likewise, it is not grave to report some crime concerning someone whom the hearers do not know, nor ever will recognize, even if he is named: indeed this of itself is free from all fault, because there is no estimation of one unknown.

6° Yet it is lethal, at least commonly speaking, to detract gravely from some Monastery, although no Religious is named, for example, if it is said that in it an evil life is led, that a grave sin has been committed. The reason is that the Religious of the same Community are so joined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as though responsible in common one for another. Hence the whole Community is wont to be stained before the imprudent and simple.³

527. • 7° It is not mortal to say concerning a public drunkard that he has become drunk on this day, even if he did it secretly; indeed sometimes no sin is present, if someone has lost every reputation as regards something, for example if you say concerning a prostitute that she has fornicated. Nor is it mortal to dishonor one infamous in one crime concerning another crime closely related, for example, if you say concerning an adulterer that he has sent love letters, or concerning a drunken man that he has quarreled with his wife; because such revelation is not a new infamy, or at least not grave. Yet to defame someone concerning a disparate and unconnected crime can be mortal, because he who is dishonorable in one genus of vice has not therefore lost the right of reputation as regards the rest.¹

8° He does not sin, at least gravely, who, only for the sake of solace, with intention of detracting excluded, narrates to some friend an injury done to him by another, even if from this some infamy comes to the author. Hence servants revealing injuries inflicted on them by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, Religious by a Prelate, etc., are probably excused, at least from mortal sin; because the author of the injury cannot be reasonably unwilling, and demand so difficult a thing, that the one harmed lack solace or necessary counsel. Yet one must take care lest it be said to more persons, and lest the person be named more openly than is necessary for counsel or solace.²

9° Unless someone is to be affected by grave damage (as, for example, can happen from the revelation of illegitimate birth by which one is deprived of desired nuptials), or by great sorrow, it is slight to uncover the natural defects of the soul or body of another, for example his stupidity, or certain dispositions to more common vices, for example that someone is proud, avaricious, irascible; for the former are not moral, and neither the former nor the latter are judged gravely defaming.³

10° It is not licit in general to reveal another's hidden crime by at the same time narrating the penance done, because some sinister opinion always remains.

11° Of itself it is grave to name a person directly, but only to indicate his defects indirectly (by saying, for example, I know many things about him, but charity forbids me to disclose them), if such things are apt to cast in grave suspicion. (b) p. 480.

528. Principles. - I. The detractor is bound from justice, as much as can be done, 1° to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2° to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen.

The reason of the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority; and so, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, that injury must be repaired. - Thus all.¹

The reason of the second is that all damages proceeding from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in each case the detractor has unjustly harmed reputation. - Thus commonly.²

II. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - The obligation of restitution urges also if someone has detracted from the dead. Nor can heirs condone it, since they are not masters of another's reputation.

529. • III. Restitution of reputation is to be done in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence:

1° A calumniator is bound to retract the things said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on account of this.

2° A simple detractor cannot retract the things said, because thus he would lie, but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, for example, that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying:³ They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among the intelligent and clever, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent concerning the things said, on an occasion being given, ought with dexterity and truth to praise and honor him from whom he detracted.

Let the confessor take care that compensations of reputation of this sort, when they can conveniently be made, be made before absolution, because afterward they will be fulfilled with difficulty.⁵

530. You will resolve. - 1° He who has unjustly defamed another by manifesting a true crime is bound to repair the whole damage coming from this and foreseen, at least in common, because that unjust revelation of his is the true and sole cause of the damage.¹ Hence he who in this way impeded someone from entering into a contract with a merchant, who would have perceived honorable profit from it, must satisfy him according to the estimation of the profit. Likewise he who for this reason deprived another of an office - for example, by accusing a man who is now upright of a delict which he secretly committed some years before - is bound to satisfy for the measure of the emolument lost. But in estimating damages, the hope of gain indeed, speculatively speaking, is to be considered with St. Alphonsus;² yet practically the estimation of the hope will have to be judged from the gain itself, account being taken also both of the labor which he was compelled to spend on the office lost and which he now spends on another business, and of the uncertainty whether he would otherwise have discharged the office for a long time, which uncertainty must be attended to especially in our region. Cf. Kenrick.³

2° He who detracted through a libel is bound, so that the restitution be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings or by public revocation. Likewise the reparation ought to become known, if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown to whom it came.⁴

3° Likewise, in default of the defamer, those who cooperated in propagating the defamation are bound to reparation of reputation, and all these are equally bound concerning damages of fortune, if any have occurred.

4° A defamer is not bound to petition pardon if he cannot repair reputation; because through the petition of pardon the lost reputation is not restored; nor is he more urged by the obligation of seeking pardon than he who cannot restore goods of fortune in which he has harmed someone. - Thus commonly.

531. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Resp. The following are commonly admitted:

1° If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, for example by a sentence of a judge, etc.

2° If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through passage of time. - But in doubt, a true crime in general is not to be recalled into the memory of men, unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into memory in another way; for then restitution obtains the desired effect with more difficulty. But if the crime is false, the defamation is to be recalled. Except, however, if perhaps the greater good of the defamed man counsels otherwise, or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction, unless the doubtful damage of the defamed in some case ought to be estimated higher.¹

3° If restitution of reputation cannot be done without much greater damage of the one defaming, as if the danger of life were imminent for him, and not for the defamed, or if a prelate must undergo much graver infamy from restitution of reputation taken away from a lowly man: in which case it will suffice afterward to extol the defamed man with merited praise. L. IV. 1002.

4° If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction; for example, if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from their preconceived opinion.

5° If it is judged that faith was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger.

6° If the defamed man has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices.² But he remits it invalidly if another, suppose an accomplice, loses reputation thereby; illicitly, namely with charity or piety forbidding, if someone, for example a priest, needs reputation for the utility of others.³

Quaer. 2° Is there given an obligation of restoring reputation harmed without formal injustice, for example, if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Resp. In the affirmative, because each one is bound to repair damage arising from his action, although damaging only materially, if he conveniently can, as we shall say in the Treatise on Justice and Right.⁴

532. • Quaer. 3° Is the defamer bound to restore reputation also before those who have received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, if you violated reputation before hearers whom you foresaw would easily divulge the infamy; because then you are the true and voluntary cause of the damage; otherwise you are not bound.¹

Quaer. 4° Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the one harmed has also violated your reputation, and is unwilling to restore it?

Resp. Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny; but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus;² because you are not bound to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. (c) p. 481.

Quaer. 5° Are you bound to compensate reputation with money if you cannot restore it?

Resp. In the negative, at least more probably, because justice obligates only to rendering the thing taken away, or its equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction, nor is it the equivalent of reputation, since it is of another order.³ - Yet foreseen damages are to be repaired. See n. 528. (d) p. 481.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3; q. 73; St. Alphonsus, III, 962; ed. G., II, p. 354; Lugo, disp. 14, n. 10-134; Mazzotta, tr. 4, disp. 2, q. 2; Soto, l. 5, q. 10; Elbel, IV, n. 343; Lancicius, opusc. 19: de vitand. Judic. temer.; Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 460, Appendix.

1190. Things to be noted beforehand. REPUTATION is public opinion or estimation concerning someone's excellence. More commonly it is defined: the good estimation of many concerning the life and morals of someone.

The RIGHT TO REPUTATION can be either absolute, or conditioned or limited. The absolute belongs to him who has perpetrated no deed worthy of blame; for he possesses full ownership of his reputation. But he retains a limited right, or only possession of reputation, who indeed has committed crimes, but only occult ones. A right must be attributed to him not by reason of the person, but by reason of society, of which he is a member and ought to remain a useful member (Lugo, disp. 14, n. 97; Noldin, II, 643).

1. Both the living and the dead possess a right to reputation. As regards the living, it is plain. As regards the dead, this cannot be denied, for: a) the reputation which they had among the living endures, and they desire that its duration never cease; b) this reputation does not lack a juridical subject which holds it, because the rational soul does not lose existence. Yet reputation profits the dead less than the living.

2. The right to reputation is lost if someone's crime becomes notorious. Namely a crime can be NOTORIOUS by a threefold publicity: a) by publicity of law, if it is established concerning it either through the sentence of a judge, or through confession of the matter itself; b) by publicity of fact, if it was committed in a public place and before witnesses; c) by publicity of reputation, if it has become known to so many persons that it can no longer happen that it not be divulged among all. Now, behold the NORM which St. Alphonsus hands down concerning this matter (III, 976): "Doctors commonly judge it sufficient if in some COMMUNITY of 8 persons, four know it; or if of 100 persons, fifteen know it; or if of 1000 persons, about twenty know it, of more than two different families; but that it is public in some NEIGHBORHOOD of 40 persons if eight from different families know it; likewise, if in a TOWN of 5000 citizens forty scattered through it know it. Doctors add that a crime is called famous if the reputation of it wanders through the greater part of the town, community, neighborhood, or parish; likewise one is said to be defamed in a kingdom who has now been defamed in a court or in another illustrious place, from which reputation easily flows into the kingdom."

Further, concerning the reputation of neighbor there is given: 1. A NEGATIVE precept, namely of not injuring reputation; but it is injured interiorly, at least as it were inchoatively, through rash judgment, but exteriorly and strictly speaking, through detraction. 2. An AFFIRMATIVE precept, namely of defending the reputation of another when attacked and of restoring it when taken away.

Hence there is a fourfold article: 1. concerning rash judgment; 2. concerning detraction; 3. concerning the obligation of defending reputation; 4. concerning the obligation of restoring reputation.

1191. DEFINITION. Rash judgment is a firm assent, arising from slight indications, by which some sin or defect is attributed to neighbor.

Other internal acts approach rash judgment: 1. rash SUSPICION, which is a less firm assent and with fear concerning the opposite; 2. DOUBT, which is a suspension of the soul determining itself to neither part. Yet these grades are not rarely used promiscuously.

"Rashness in judgments, suspicions, and doubts has place when we consider that which is against, and not that which is for; and when we give to indications or reasons contrary to our neighbor more weight than they really have; whence either we judge probable what is only possible; or certain what is doubtful; or grave what is light; or continuous what perhaps was committed once; or finally malicious what perhaps was done inadvertently or even reasonably" (Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 499).

1192. PRINCIPLES. I. Rash judgment concerning a grave evil of neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that a grave injury is done to neighbor when, without cause, he is held to be wicked; since each one has a right that a false crime not be imputed to him (III, 973). Whence it is said (Matt., 7, 1): Judge not, that you may not be judged. And (1 Cor., 4): Judge not before the time (that is, of judgment). - "In confession, however, it is not necessary to explain the species of the evil judged, since all (rash judgments) are opposed to one commutative justice, in the lowest species" (III, 962).

Rash judgment is VENIAL: a) if someone has great probability for judging sinisterly about neighbor; b) if the evil which is attributed to neighbor is not gravely injurious, for example that a soldier blasphemed; c) if the judgment is made concerning someone unknown or indetermined among several, for example if he is a member of a certain group; d) if someone judges from involuntary subreption, as often happens, not perfectly adverting either to the gravity of the object or to the insufficiency of the reasons from which he judges (III, l. c.).

1193. II. Rash suspicion and doubt per se are sins only venial. Commonly all these are only a certain incitement to assent; for in some way a good estimation of neighbor remains in the mind: therefore no grave injury is done to him, since he is not totally disturbed from possession of good reputation.

Yet per accidens the sin is more probably grave, "if without indications a suspicion were made concerning the gravest sins, as it would be to suspect concerning a pious religious that he is a heretic, or that he has committed incest with his mother; or concerning a man commonly held as Catholic, that he is Jewish or atheist. The reason is that perhaps greater injury

is inflicted upon them by suspecting such things than if a certain judgment were had concerning ordinary grave crimes of theirs." Likewise, suspicions put on GRAVE guilt if they proceed from contempt or gravely sinful hatred, or if they are manifested to someone with grave damage of neighbor (III, 963, 965). Cf. the things to be said n. 1195.

1194. III. He who has rashly suspected or judged is held from justice to reform his suspicion and his judgment. This is plain from the things said: for every injury of justice must be repaired, insofar as can be done (cf. n. 726).

Note. 1. "If sinister suspicions are going to have practical consequences to the great burden of neighbor (for example if it were a question of a Superior who, without such suspicion, would be about to confer a benefice on such a priest; or of a master who on account of the suspicion would be about to cast a servant out from his own service with the servant's greatest damage); then it does not suffice to take care that those indications which are against not be increased by the imagination, and that those which present themselves spontaneously in favor not be voluntarily rejected; but it is moreover necessary that, according to the gravity and possibility of the matters, inquiries be made, so that the truth may be discerned."

2. "Suspicions and judgments against neighbor can in some way be sins, although they are not rash; and this happens when someone willingly thinks about the defects and vices of others (especially if he studiously inquires about them) without any reason and excusable motive; for thoughts of this kind are against charity (charity does not think evil: 1 Cor., 13), they beget aversions, and they have nourishment from some passion" (Berardi, l. c., n. 500, 503).

For practice St. Alphonsus warns: "In this matter let the confessor advert that many rude persons accuse themselves that they have judged rashly. It is necessary to make it so that they know: a) When sufficient moments are present for thus judging about some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore is not culpable. b) These, for the most part, are not judgments, but suspicions, which masters and fathers of families are sometimes held to have, so that they may impede some sin: for example lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by conversing with men, and other things of this kind. Only let it be adverted that they not communicate suspicions of this kind to others without necessity" (H. Ap., IX, 2).

1195. DEFINITION. Detraction is the occult and unjust blackening of another's reputation. It is said 1. Occult, namely brought upon one absent, at least from the intention of the detractor: by which part it is distinguished from CONTUMELY, which takes honor away from one present. 2. Unjust: for if it were a just blackening of another's reputation, it would not be formal detraction (Polman, 2. 2, n. 489).

DIVISION. Detraction is called: 1. simply such, or defamation, when a true vice of neighbor is manifested without a just cause; if the manifestation is made for dissolving friendship and sowing discord among friends, it is called whispering; 2. calumny, or infamation, when a false crime is imposed on neighbor.

DETRACTION can be done directly or indirectly, according as namely it either is positively intended, or is foreseen as going to follow from an action or from some locution. But it is committed in various modes, which are customarily expressed in these verses:

Imposing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil;

He who denies or is silent, diminishes, or praises tepidly.

The first four modes detract directly, the others indirectly. But all are, per se, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet not rarely other things are injured also through detraction, whether religion, piety, or chastity in words, or justice in goods of fortune.

CALUMNY differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds lying to detraction, and moreover is against the right which each one has that a false crime not be imputed to him.

Likewise a special malice is in WHISPERING. It agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, but differs on the part of the end; and therefore it is diverse in species and graver than detraction.

1196. PRINCIPLES. I. Detraction (whether it is infamation or defamation) is a mortal sin from its genus. From its nature it is graver than theft, which is mortal, since it injures the reputation of neighbor, which is a greater good than riches: according to that saying (Prov., 22, 1): A good name is better than many riches.

We have said: 1. Whether it is infamation, which is intrinsically evil, and therefore always illicit, as is established from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imposes a false crime on someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."

2. Or defamation, which is namely unjust as often as neighbor possesses his good estimation either totally or partially, and can reasonably require silence. For then he has a right that a good useful for many things and, as is supposed, by no means harmful to others, not be taken away from him (see n. 1200, Question 1).

1197. II. The gravity of detraction is taken rather from the gravity of the injury in reputation, or in goods of fortune. The reason is plain from the unshaken principle which St. Thomas expresses: "Sins which are committed against neighbor must be weighed per se according to the harms which are brought upon neighbor: because from this they have the nature of fault" (2.2, q. 73, a. 3). To the gravity of the defect revealed one must attend only afterward.

Therefore to know whether detraction is a GRAVE or LIGHT sin, it must first be distinguished whether it carries with itself PUBLIC infamy, or is restricted to a FEW PERSONS. Then the gravity of detraction is taken: 1. from the nature of the defect which is narrated; 2. from the quality of the person detracting, whether he is grave, light, talkative; 3. from the quality of the person injured, whether he is of good or bad reputation, whether he is of such a condition that the defect revealed brings peculiar infamy; 4. from the quality of the hearers, whether they are discreet or talkative, etc. (Berardi, l. c., n. 482).

The number of hearers certainly makes for the greater gravity of detraction. Yet probably it does not multiply detraction, although it multiplies the sin of scandal. See the things said in the treatise on Sins (n. 332, Question 2).

1198. III. Sometimes it is licit to manifest the true crime of another. For the right of reputation founded in ignorance of a true crime can be elided by a stronger right, when namely a just or proportionate cause requires revelation of the crime; nor can the one defamed reasonably be unwilling (III, 968).

Therefore it is licit to manifest a defect of neighbor: 1. On account of a just cause. But the just causes are the following: a) The spiritual good of the delinquent, when namely for his amendment it is necessary that the matter be manifested to a judge, prelate, master, parent, etc. b) A notable good of the one revealing, for example for taking help or counsel in a grave matter, or for averting grave damage. c) The public good, for example for impeding evils threatening the Church, or the republic, or some community. d) The private good of the hearers and of others, for example that they may be freed from threatening damages; thus, if you know a thief to dwell with another ignorant of it, you can make him more certain, so that he may beware for himself.

"Whence, when it is a question of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of receiving into Religion, of taking on a physician, preceptor, servant, associate, etc., it is licit to manifest (indeed sometimes one must manifest) the occult impediments, incapacity, crimes of another, whence notable inconvenience would deservedly be feared.

2. Under the due conditions. For it is required: a) That you not intend to defame neighbor, but to avert your own or another's damage; whence, if you can avoid the damage without diminution of the reputation of another, you are held to this. b) That the damage to be averted be sufficiently proportioned to the loss of reputation. It suffices indeed that the damage to be avoided be grave, although somewhat greater damage threatens the one defamed. Indeed, it suffices if you doubt about the gravity of your damage; because, in such doubt, favor must be given to the innocent. Yet except if you know the matter under a committed secret; because in that case a graver and more certain cause is required, as we have said (n. 1187). c) That you proceed cautiously, manifesting the matter neither more nor to more persons than is necessary, and exacting secrecy from him to whom you manifest it. d) That you did not accept knowledge of the crime through force or fraud, for example by opening letters, unless you would also have had a right to this (III, 969; 1. El. qq. ref., 40). Cf. the things said above n. 1188.

Note. The things which we establish here must be developed through those things which are said n. 494 concerning fraternal correction. In communities living under a rule, if it is a question of a matter of great moment, for the most part it is expedient that correction be made by the way of denunciation to the Superior as father. In religious Orders, this is especially valid for the time of visitation. This indeed, from its nature, is a paternal, not a judicial, inquiry. Nevertheless subjects are held to manifest those things which could yield to the damage of observance, or of the community, or of a private third party. Cf. Bouix, de Jure Reg., II, p. 478.

1199. IV. Detraction is not present when the crime of neighbor is notorious either by law, or by fact, or by reputation. The reason is that in these cases neighbor can no longer be said to be in possession of his reputation. Yet charity can persuade many things, indeed impose some things, as regards these.

a) If the crime of neighbor is notorious by publicity of LAW, it is licit to speak about it and to manifest it to others; because, in this case, the guilty person has lost the right to reputation through public authority; nor is charity injured, because the public good demands this, that bridles be thrown upon the wicked through divulgation of the sentence of the judge, and that others may be able to beware for themselves of evil-doers: provided the manifestation is not made from hatred nor from revenge. b) Likewise, it is licit to manifest if it is NOTORIOUS by publicity of FACT or REPUTATION; for such a manifestation is neither against justice, since reputation has now been lost; nor is it against charity (at least gravely), because the delinquent cannot reasonably be saddened from it. c) Similarly, it is not mortal to manifest a crime or offense which is not yet public (or is not public in such a place), but concerning which moral certainty is had that it is going to become public shortly (whether through evidence of fact, or through sentence of the judge); because it harms little, unless nevertheless from such anticipation grave damages would follow (III, 974).

We have said: it is not mortal, but it can be venial. To the matter the distinguished Berardi speaks thus (l. c., n. 481): "The poor," he says, "do not have a right to the substances of a rich man; and nevertheless the rich man from charity ought to assist the poor asking alms, as much as he can. Something similar happens in the case of a wretched man subjected to public infamy. He indeed does not have a right that we be silent; yet he asks in his heart, and perhaps earnestly begs, that we consult for his reputation as much as we can. Therefore silence and compassion are certain alms, which often we can furnish without any sacrifice, and from which therefore we are not easily excused... Further, to these we are held from charity, although ordinarily under light matter."

1200. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins GRAVELY who manifests in ANOTHER PLACE, to which divulgation has not yet come and is not shortly going to come, a crime public in one place?

Resp. If the crime is public by notoriety of law, it can be published anywhere without injustice; because the guilty person has been legitimately stripped of reputation by public authority, and indeed in punishment of his crime (H. Ap., XI, 13).

But if the crime is public only by notoriety of fact or reputation, there are three opinions. The first says that the manifestation is a grave sin against justice, because the delinquent still possesses his reputation elsewhere. The second holds that it is mortal against charity; for, although the guilty person has lost the right to reputation, nevertheless he would be greatly saddened knowing that his crime (of itself occult) is made public where it is still unknown. The third, more common opinion teaches that this is not grave, neither against justice nor against charity, because it conduces to the common good that evil-doers be known. This reason is very probable, provided it is limited to crimes which render a man pernicious and to be avoided by others, such as robbery, treacherous homicide, scandalous impurity, heresy, and similar things. And then, if the crime is public by notoriety of fact, because namely it was publicly committed, it is freely licit to speak about it; if by notoriety only of reputation it is public, great discretion is required (III, 974; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 12). "For this public reputation is easily feigned. But advert that an offense published in only one family or monastery cannot be called absolutely public; whence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order which would have frequent communication with it" (H. Ap., XI, 12; Croix, 1, 3, p. 2, n. 1221).

QUAER. 2. Whether he sins MORTALLY who manifests an offense formerly public and now occult?

Resp. Per se, he sins mortally, at least against charity. Except if the offense had formerly been public by notoriety of law, or if it belonged to history.

As Noldin rightly observes (II, n. 653): To historiographers, from the general end of history, greater liberty is accustomed to be conceded, insofar as, without a peculiar reason of good, they can commit to writings the occult crimes of private persons of a past time. Yet it is necessary that they attend to two things: a) If descendants of some very ancient family still live, the principles established as regards detraction are to be strictly observed. b) The offenses of some state in species, for example the clerical, are to be recounted in such a way that the good which is hoped from the narration, by reason of greater scandal going to arise, does not become empty.

QUAER. 3. Whether it is MORTAL only to report the occult sins of another, as heard from others?

Resp. Negatively, "if you report in such a way that it is not probable to you that any infamy will arise from it, because the others are not going to believe."

"But if you report things heard before those who probably are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you indeed do not sin against justice, because you are not the efficacious cause of the damage, but you sin against charity, because each one is held to impede grave damage of neighbor, insofar as he conveniently can."

"Finally, if you report in such a way that the hearers probably and deservedly are going to believe (say if you assert that you have heard from a person worthy of faith), then you sin also against justice, because you give a sufficient cause of believing the evil... But if you report some very enormous crime of someone, say heresy, rebellion, sodomy, then you sin gravely, even if you say it doubtfully, because this suspicion alone greatly defames a man" (III, 977; H. Ap., XI, 15).

QUAER. 4. Whether it is a MORTAL sin to reveal the OCCULT crime of neighbor to one or another prudent and taciturn man?

Resp. Distinguish. Either the revelation is made for easing the pain of an offense, or without cause. If the FIRST, Doctors most commonly hold that such a revelation made without the intention of detracting is not sinful, at least gravely; and in this way servants disclosing injuries inflicted by a master, wives by husbands, sons by a father, etc., can probably be excused. If the SECOND, some with Busenbaum judge that it is mortal, because the injury of reputation before one person is judged grave, as is plain from rash judgment. Yet others sufficiently probably deny this: provided the one revealing does not act from malice, nor on the part of the hearer is further manifestation feared. The reason is,

because, since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his reputation only before one or another.

Nor does the parity of rash judgment stand in the way; because the malice of rash judgment is not taken from the damage of infamy, but from contempt, malevolence, or injury, which is brought upon neighbor through imputation of a false crime (III, 973).

QUAER. 5. Whether it is a mortal sin to REVEAL the crime of a neighbor who is already defamed from another crime?

Resp. It is not grave if a crime very closely related to that on account of which he has already been marked with infamy is revealed; because from such revelation the infamy is not notably increased: as if you say of a public thief that he is perjured; of a notorious player, that he does not have care for his family.

Otherwise, if another diverse sin is revealed: because one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation in other virtues. Thus it is also grave, concerning a woman defamed in one adultery, to narrate another occult one (III, 976; H. Ap., XI, 14).

QUAER. 6. Whether it is licit to defame ONESELF?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. To defame oneself through the imposition of a false crime is never licit, because it is not licit to lie. If death or grave spiritual or temporal damage of another would follow from such infamation, the one defaming himself would sin mortally, because he would cooperate positively with death or damage.

But what if the guilty person were to confess a false crime for this end, that, the penalty of death being inflicted, he might avoid grave torments? Some deny that he sins gravely, because no one is held to preserve life with so great a torture, which would seem harsher than death itself; but they say that he sins lightly by reason of the lie. But others more probably affirm that he sins gravely, because the false confession would still be an illicit cooperation with his own unjust death (IV, 275).

2. "To defame oneself through revelation of a true crime regularly is not mortal; because it is not against justice, since a man is owner of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not oblige to conserving external goods, except insofar as one's own safety or that of neighbor requires this. Yet per accidens it can be mortal, as, for example, if your reputation is necessary for an office, or if damage of life to you, or of infamy to others, would follow from the same" (III, 983).

1201. From the things said you resolve: a) It is not mortal per se to reveal NATURAL DEFECTS of soul, body, or birth; because such defects are not moral; nor is it regarded as infamy among prudent persons that someone, for example, is stupid, illegitimate, one-eyed. But per accidens it can be grave, if namely great temporal damage would follow from it; or if you say concerning an honorable man that he was illegitimately born, or exercised a most vile office, etc. (III, 967; V, 72; 1. El. qq. ref., 54).

b) "It is not mortal to report mortal sins which, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON, do not notably injure his reputation: for example, if you say that a soldier thinks about revenge; that an adolescent is prodigal, given to loves, etc." (ib.).

c) It is not grave to speak ill of someone UNKNOWN or indetermined, for example that in such a place there are many wicked, drunk, impure persons; because thus grave infamy is brought upon no one in species.

d) "But they sin most gravely who detract from some Order or state of religious in common, or from a MONASTERY, by saying, for example, that life is bad in it, that regular observance is not kept, etc. (unless this is plainly notorious), because they do very grave harm; and they are held under mortal sin to restitution to the whole community, from which the remission of the Superior does not excuse" (III, 978).

e) "Similarly it is mortal, the person being kept silent, to name the monastery from which someone has committed a grave occult sin, for example adultery or fornication." The reason is that the religious of the same community are so conjoined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as it were solidary, one for the others. Hence, the whole community is accustomed to be stained before the imprudent and simple.

We are held, from the precept of charity, to defend neighbor if he, with us present, is injured in his reputation. And since we can be lacking to this office in a threefold mode, namely by bearing ourselves negatively toward detractors, by rejoicing concerning detraction, and by cooperating with detraction, the following things must be established.

1202. PRINCIPLES. I. He who hears detraction, and does not impede it when he conveniently can, sins against charity. Nevertheless, he who is not the Superior of the one detracting is excused from mortal sin by many, and grave, Doctors, if on account of shame or fear he omits correction; provided that, beyond infamy, no other grave damage comes to neighbor from the detraction, and provided it is not established that the correction will be useful (H. Ap., XI, 17). "But this can be established with difficulty; indeed there is danger that the correction may rather increase or confirm the detraction." Yet he is not without fault who, when he easily can, omits efficacious correction (cf. n. 493).

But they are excused even from VENIAL sin who, adverting to the detraction, either depart, or turn away the conversation, show a sad face, according to that saying (Prov., 25, 23): A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue. The reason is that those actions are true corrections (III, 981).

But a SUPERIOR, both of the one infaming and of the one infamed, sins gravely by hearing detraction if he does not avert it when he conveniently can; because a special obligation lies upon him of correcting the detractor and of meeting the damage of the one infamed.

Nevertheless, more probably he does not sin against justice, neither the Superior of the one detracting, since he is not held to watch over the good of another not subject to him; nor the Superior of the one defamed, since it does not lie upon him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. Except: a) if the Superior of the one detracting is a Bishop or parish priest (because these are held from justice to correcting subjects); b) if the one infaming and the one infamed are subjects of the same Superior, and the one infamed has recourse to him so that reputation may be restored to him: in which case he is held from justice, provided he can without fear of a graver evil (III, 979, 980).

1203. II. He who rejoices concerning grave detraction sins gravely against charity. The reason is that he is delighted concerning the grave damage of neighbor. But if he does not rejoice concerning the infamy of neighbor, nor concerning the detraction, but concerning the hearing of a new matter, or concerning the curious knowledge of the crimes of others, he does not sin gravely.

"Indeed, they say (the Doctors), that he does not sin gravely even if he is delighted in the detraction itself, not because of hatred or joy concerning another's damage, but from curiosity or vanity; and they deduce this from St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 73, a. 4), who teaches that it is grave only then when the detraction pleases him on account of hatred of him from whom detraction is made" (III, 979, Resp. 2).

1204. III. He who hears a detractor and cooperates efficaciously with him sins gravely both against charity and against justice. For he furnishes the one infaming an occasion of sinning, and is a true cause of the damage which is brought upon neighbor through detraction.

Nevertheless, "it is not a sin against justice, at least mortal, to ask the cause of someone's captivity, or to speak about it; for just as the captivity is public, so also the cause seems to have been made public" (III, 974, 9). Nor is it grave, if, having suspected something light about someone, you interrogate another, and beyond intention induce him to grave detraction (Sporer, tr. V, c. 4, n. 105).

1205. PRINCIPLES. I. The detractor is held both to restore reputation unjustly injured, and to repair other temporal damages following from the detraction and foreseen at least in a confused way. The reason is that he is the efficacious and formally unjust cause of all these (cf. n. 948 ff.).

We have said: 1. Reputation unjustly injured; otherwise, namely, if charity alone had been injured. Further, according to the truer opinion, he is held to restitution of reputation not only before immediate hearers, but also before mediate hearers (insofar as this is morally possible): if namely such divulgation, because it was known that the immediate hearers were talkative, was foreseen, and if the immediate hearers are judged likely to be lacking to the office of restitution.

2. Other temporal damages, say if the one defamed has been deprived of his office; if he is impeded from being able to provide for himself, etc. And it must be noted that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal; but the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore it passes to heirs (III, 991, 996).

Note. a) Manifestation of another's offense, made with only material injury, because, for example, the detractor thought the offense was public, or because he did not advert to the malice of detraction, does not induce the burden of restitution, from defect of theological fault. Yet the one manifesting is held, as much as he conveniently can, to impede that another damage follow from his inculpable manifestation (III, 994). b) The defamer is not held to compensate with money the reputation which he cannot restore; because money is not equivalent to the reputation taken away (III, 1000). Cf. the things said n. 928. c) In defect of the first defamer, all those who cooperated efficaciously with the defamation are held to the same restitution (n. 977). d) It can happen that with respect to reputation to be restored the obligation is light, but with respect to damage to be repaired, the obligation is grave.

1206. II. Restitution of reputation must be made in one way by a calumniator, in another by a detractor. For this one narrated the true; but the other affirmed the false.

Therefore the CALUMNIATOR is held to retract the things said, even with an oath, if it is necessary; indeed, with the loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; for the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the calumniator must impute to his own malice whatever he will suffer in his own reputation on account of the retraction. He who detracted from another through an infamous libel is held, so that restitution may be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings, or by public revocation. Likewise, the reparation ought to become known if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown whom it has reached (III, 991, 995; H. Ap., XI, 22).

But the simple DETRACTOR cannot indeed afterward deny the offense which he inequitably manifested, because he would lie; nevertheless, he is held to provide for the reputation of the one infamed through other means, for example by speaking of him honorably, by excusing his errors and vices, by praising his good qualities; by saying that he himself had spoken evil inconsiderately, that he had erred. For not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying (Prov., 14, 22): They err who work evil. "I," says St. Alphonsus (Praxis, n. 45), "am accustomed to give this counsel, that they say: I drew this out of my head, equivocating; because all words proceed from the mind (for which head is taken)."

1207. III. A just cause can excuse from the obligation of restoring reputation. The reason is that this obligation is affirmative and must be fulfilled through a positive act. But an affirmative obligation ceases on account of a just and proportioned cause; therefore...

But the just causes which excuse from restitution of reputation are the following:

1. Impossibility of restitution, when namely the occult evil unjustly revealed has come to public knowledge by another way; likewise, when the detractor cannot offer reparation without danger of a much graver damage threatening himself, as would be danger of life, liberty, or reputation much more necessary to himself or his own; likewise, on account of distance of places or some other impediment which renders reparation physically or morally impossible.

2. Uselessness, when, for example, it is judged that faith was not added to the detraction. Likewise, if the infamation has been destroyed by the sentence of the judge or by the common judgment of sound-minded persons; or if the detraction has so been handed over to oblivion that its reparation or re-

calling would be judged injurious; always preserved is the obligation of repairing other damages arisen from infamation, if there were any.

3. Just compensation; if namely the infamation was mutual and equivalent, when one of the detractors refuses reparation, the other more probably can, not indeed in revenge, but as a pledge of the reparation owed to himself, defer restitution until the other is at last prepared to satisfy; for the general principle is: "You are not compelled to render to another his right, if he refuses to render yours to you."

4. Presumed condonation of the one infamed, who can yield his right; as often namely as the infamation touched him alone, and reparation is not required either for avoiding scandal or for fulfilling his office. Otherwise, if the infamation redounds into others, or yields to the spiritual or temporal damage of neighbor (cf. n. 1200, Question 6). St. Alph., III, 997 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 19.

1208. IT IS ASKED. What must be done IN DOUBT whether oblivion of the offense exists or not?

Resp. 1. If it is a question of a true offense, it is not easily to be recalled into memory, since generally attention is given rather to the offense than to the detraction. Except unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into the memory of men in another way.

2. If a false saying has been imposed, the infamation must always be revoked unless oblivion is established; for since the matter is not true, the revocation can import no properly so-called infamy. Except if a greater good of the one infamed persuades otherwise; or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction (III, 998).

1209. PRACTICAL RULES. 1. Let the confessor ask the penitent: "whether he has infamed someone; and if he has done this, whether by imposing a false offense on him, or by making known a true one? And when the offense is true, whether it was occult, or public in some place, by reputation or by sentence of a judge? Likewise let him ask whether he infamed before one or several, and (by reason of scandal) before how many? Likewise, whether he divulged the fact as known by himself, or as heard from others?

2. Let the confessor take care that restitution of reputation, when it can conveniently be made, be made before absolution; because the matter will be fulfilled with difficulty afterward, although it is of lesser difficulty than restitution of money.

3. Let restitution not be exacted if the damage was doubtfully inflicted, or the retraction is doubtfully going to be useful, according to those things which we have just said (n. 1207, 2): "Namely, if restitution of reputation is probably judged going to bring greater damage than utility to the one infamed, then it is better to seize occasions of praising the one marked with infamy in some virtue of his, so that he may place him in the good opinion of others, than to recall past matters into memory by this restitution of reputation" (Praxis, n. 45).

D. Detraction, or the unjust blackening of another's reputation by hidden words, can be done in many ways, whether directly: by falsely imputing evil, or exaggerating it, or revealing what is occult, or attributing good to an evil intention; or also indirectly: by denying good, or maliciously keeping silent about it, or diminishing it, or praising coldly. Nor are the direct modes always more efficacious, but the indirect modes of speaking or keeping silent sometimes are more malicious.

But detraction is mortal sin from its genus, and not only against charity but also against justice; its gravity is to be weighed from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation.

But to manifest to another who is ignorant of it a public crime is not against justice:

a) in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a judicial sentence promulgated for this region;

b) also in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of fact alone, unless the delinquent has recovered reputation;

c) also in another place in which it is foreseen that it is soon to be legitimately manifested.

Otherwise a public crime, just like an occult one, cannot be manifested except for a grave and indeed proportionate reason.

E. Of itself there is an obligation of restoring reputation unjustly taken away, especially if the injury redounds upon others, just as also of repairing other damages which are strictly and of themselves connected with defamation.

Nevertheless, per accidens there is no obligation of restoring reputation:

1. if reputation remained uninjured, as if faith was not given to the detractor, or his detraction was not understood or not spread;

2. if the other has recovered reputation, or infamy has now been deleted by oblivion;

3. if the other inflicted a greater injury which he does not care to repair;

4. if by prudent estimation the other is judged to have condoned;

5. if reputation either cannot be compensated at all, or only with a much greater inconvenience; in which case nevertheless a certain compensation is to be made in some better manner, whether by honoring the other, or by saying good of him.

Restitution of reputation sometimes is done more opportunely through a third person of great authority.

Those cooperating in detraction, who in some way induce the detractor to defaming, are subsidiarily bound, just as he himself is, to restitution; but not those who only internally approve the defamation, or merely take delight in it, or only do not impede it.

F. Nevertheless there is an obligation of charity to impede detraction as far as one can; nevertheless in practice this will rarely be grave. It will be grave if three conditions are verified: a) another is certainly detracting unjustly; b) there is a founded hope of impeding the detraction; c) this can be done without relatively grave inconvenience; which conditions are rarely present.

Often it will be more opportune to employ indirect means of impeding rather than direct ones, unless the matter concerns superiors who can intervene authoritatively.

S. Th., II-II, q. 73 and 74.

423. Detraction or defamation (diffamation, medisance; achterklap, kwaadsprekerij) is the unjust denigration of another's reputation by hidden words. It is said:

1° unjust: for it is not detraction if reputation is injured from a just and reasonable cause;

2° denigration: for just as a man is bright with good reputation, so by defamation he is blackened and obscured, although good reputation is not always totally taken away;

3° of reputation: thus detraction is distinguished from contumely and theft, which deprive one of honor or riches;

4° another's: for no one can commit injustice against himself in his own reputation;

5° by hidden words, i.e., while the one who is defamed is absent: for if it were done while he himself is present, it would now be Contumely, because first, of itself, and formally it would deprive him of honor, but of reputation only materially and consequently.

424. Detraction is divided in various ways:

A. On the part of the matter, one detraction is simple, another calumny (laster), according as it manifests a hidden vice of one's neighbor without just cause, or imputes to him a false crime or vice; therefore calumny adds to simple detraction a lie, and indeed a pernicious one, as bringing unjust damage.

B. On the part of the mode or efficacy of the exterior act, one is direct if a vice is clearly narrated, another indirect if a vice is insinuated by silence or a good quality is denied or diminished. Detraction happens in eight diverse ways: "directly indeed in four ways," says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3: "1° in one way, when he imposes a falsehood on another; 2° when by his words he increases a sin; 3° when he reveals something hidden; 4° when he says that what is good was done from an evil intention. Indirectly, however, either 5° by denying the good of another; or 6° by maliciously keeping silence"; or, others add, 7° by diminishing; or 8° by praising remissly; yet these two are easily reduced to the fifth and sixth.

Indirect modes of speaking or keeping silence are sometimes more malicious than direct modes, as for example: I do not say all things. There are other deeds of his concerning which it is enough to keep silence! If I could say all the things I know. These are certainly splendid things; would that he had always shown himself such; but what does it help to recall the past! This person is pious, but!... I could provoke his blushing. I know certain things which no one would suspect about him, etc. Sometimes it suffices to keep silence deliberately, and a fortiori to smile or to make a gesture.

C. On the part of intention or the interior act of the will, one is formal, which is done from the explicit intention of injuring reputation; another material, which is done from another motive not necessarily evil, of lightness, lack of reflection, loquacity, utility, without the intention of defamation but with foresight of it.

425. Thesis I. Detraction, whether simple or calumnious, is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus, less grave than homicide and adultery, graver than theft.

The thesis is to be understood not only concerning formal detraction, uttered from the intention of injuring the reputation of one's neighbor, but also concerning material detraction done with full or sufficient advertence to this. It is proved:

1° It is against commutative justice: To take from an unwilling neighbor a notable good to which he has a strict right is a grave sin against justice. But by detraction there is taken from an unwilling neighbor a notable good, to which he has a strict right, namely, reputation, which is a greater good than riches. Therefore. The minor is proved: a) it is evident when calumny is in question, which deprives an innocent man of due reputation, to which he has a right by reason of virtue; b) it also holds concerning simple detraction, which deprives a hidden delinquent of reputation to which he has a right by reason of possession: he possesses a very useful good which he needs and of which therefore he ought not to be despoiled, until it becomes harmful, and meanwhile he keeps the right not to be reputed evil in society as long as he has done nothing evil openly. - Nor should you say: because of sins he deserves justly to be despoiled of reputation. For to judge concerning delicts and penalties pertains to God or to a judge constituted in the name of God; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, takes away reputation unduly usurps to himself the rights of God and of judicial authority.

2° It is against legal justice and greatly harms the good of society: for the public good demands that the evils of others not be revealed without sufficient motive; for if it were lawful for all to manifest the hidden sins of one's neighbor, contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side, and the peace and tranquility of families and of the whole society would be disturbed.

3° It is also against charity, for as St. Thomas says, q. 74, a. 2, ad 2: "reputation is a disposition to friendship and infamy to enmity," and "he who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning love of neighbor" (ibid. ad 3).

Hence a) Scripture holds detractors and evil-speakers to be hateful to God and men and assimilates them to those who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven;¹ this holds at least concerning calumniators; and b) the Fathers hold that vice as an abomination and a diabolical work. It is useful to remember that St. Bernard said of the detractor that with one breath he infects three souls lethally: he kills himself, the hearer, and him from whom he detracts.²

¹ Cf. Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 29-30; I Cor. VI, 10.

² Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

Moreover, "among the sins which are committed against one's neighbor, homicide is graver, by which the life of one's neighbor already actually existing is taken away; consequently adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, through which there is entrance to life. Consequently there are exterior goods, among which reputation excels riches, because it is nearer to spiritual goods, whence it is said, Prov. XXII, 1: A good name is better than many riches. And therefore detraction according to its genus is a greater sin than theft; nevertheless less than homicide and adultery. Yet there can be another order because of aggravating or diminishing circumstances" (a. 3).

426. How great the right to reputation is. - So that both the right to reputation, and the malice of detraction, and the reasons excusing from it may be better understood, the following are to be noted:

A. To each one there belongs a right to ordinary good estimation or good name; although no one of himself has a right to the estimation by which special virtues are attributed to him, nevertheless each one has the right of demanding that in human intercourse he be treated as someone to whom the virtues common among upright men belong: each one, from the fact that he seems to act rightly, and as long as he has done nothing evil publicly, is to be held good until he is proved evil.

Moreover there is a right to this reputation not only true, which is founded in true goodness and excellence, but also to false reputation, which rests only upon apparent and estimated goodness:

1. One can have a right in true reputation directly and of itself: for this reputation is a good positively acquired by one's own acts, in which therefore he exercises full right and dominion; whence this right also is absolute and universal, which demands that each good man be held by all to be such as he truly is.

There exists, namely, a bond between the person and true reputation, which bond can justly be violated by no one except by permission of the owner himself. Therefore this reputation is never lawfully taken away and calumny is always an injury; - nor is public calumny lawfully repeated, because it is cooperation in evil: it confirms a false opinion.

2. The right in false reputation does not arise positively and directly from the internal probity and excellence itself of the man, but negatively from acts, insofar as nothing evil appears publicly in them, and indirectly from the inconveniences which would arise against the private and common good if the hidden defects of others could everywhere be published.

Therefore it is founded positively in public and private necessity:

a) in public necessity, for from the revelation of crimes one's neighbor could not usefully perform his office, he would lose all authority, would lack the good of conversation, and those closely joined would be affected with ignominy, and thus contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side by which peace and tranquility in society would be disturbed. And this is still more established because

b) it is also founded in private necessity: for he who lacks reputation is deprived of a great protection against greater vices; on the contrary, fear of losing reputation often restrains the evil themselves, while he who has lost reputation can be restrained by no bridle; besides, as long as the crime is not public, conversion is easier, since human fear is less to be feared. Whence, says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 2: "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which Ecclus. XLI, 15 says: Have care for a good name: for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin."

That right is not absolute, but conditioned by the private and public good, and limited by it; and consequently it ceases when a notable good either of the revealer, or of the delinquent himself, or of others, or of society rather demands that hidden defects be revealed. And therefore no one can be deprived of this false reputation of his unless, from the reputation not taken away, proportionate damage would follow to a private man or to the community, whether in a right already possessed or in a right to be possessed.

B. No one of himself has a right to extraordinary reputation, which is founded in singular gifts and talents, for example, of an outstanding theologian, orator, physician, saint: he does not have a right to such reputation if he does not really possess these things. Wherefore manifestation of the error on which extraordinary reputation rests is not against justice; - nor against charity, provided there is a reasonable motive for manifesting it.

C. The preceding things hold not only concerning private persons, but also concerning moral persons because of similar reasons. Indeed also concerning the dead, in whom the subject of the right to reputation perseveres, namely, the immortal soul, which is not verified for goods of fortune, whose right rests upon the necessities of bodily life; moreover the reputation by which they live among men is a great good which they therefore esteem and desire to retain.

Nevertheless this holds concerning the dead in a lesser degree, because they need reputation less than the living, and therefore are less unwilling in the violation of the right, whence calumny is so much less a sin; and as to detraction, the common right to knowing historical truth is accustomed to prevail, provided notable damage is not at the same time brought upon persons still living or institutions still existing.

427. The gravity of detraction is taken not so much from the gravity of the crime divulged as from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. This damage must be considered not only in itself, but also as to the injured person, and as to the efficacy of the detraction.

Therefore one must attend:

1° To the imputed defect in itself: if the defect is grave, ordinarily it notably injures reputation; if light, ordinarily lightly.

Hence a) detraction regarding honesty of life is much graver than that which regards natural defects of body or soul (for example, that someone is imprudent or unlearned), because these are not accustomed notably to lessen reputation, and easily become of public right; - b) if however a natural defect is very disgraceful and brings great sadness to the injured person, it can be a grave sin, for example, if it is said of an eminent man that he is a natural son, of someone that he is the son of a priest; - c) in general to call someone proud, angry, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which those defects are actually manifested: such a general manner of speaking, rather than grave personal fault, denotes natural propensities or venial defects, which by their nature are accustomed to be public; on the contrary, to say that someone is lustful or unjust, because it indicates a habit; - d) it is not grave to report concerning one who is already defamed by sin something connected with that delict, for example, concerning a known adulterer to say that he sent love letters, concerning a husband who is known to be drunk, that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise if the fact is altogether dissimilar, for example, if it is said that he who has lost reputation in doctrine or faith is ruined in morals, or vice versa: for he who has lost reputation in one thing has not therefore lost it in a wholly diverse thing. But there is no sin of defamation if you say of a prostitute that she laid snares for a youth, because she suffers no detriment in reputation, since this is included in prostitution.

2° To the person injured and his condition and dignity. For the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much upon the condition of the person, and he who enjoys an integral reputation and needs it for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than he who neither enjoys nor needs it.

Hence a) an accusation of great ambition, hypocrisy, or lust harms a priest or pious monk more and gravely than a layman; likewise an accusation of immodesty harms a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an accusation of sloth brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl. Regularly it is not grave to say of a light and worldly youth that he is a lover of girls; on the contrary, to say that a bishop is lying, a merchant dishonest, a physician ignorant, is apt to harm gravely in reputation or also in temporal goods;³ - b) to detract from a family or community is unlawful, because the disgrace redounds to the whole community, for example, that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such a vice, or that regular discipline is not observed, or that such a crime, for example, of fornication, was committed; in such a city nearly all are infected, all the girls corrupted, all the merchants plunderers; - otherwise if in a general way it were said that in monasteries there are not lacking some who sin gravely, in a great city there are many unjust persons, many corrupted girls.

³ It can happen that the injury of reputation is slight in itself, but apt for bringing grave damage in goods of another genus, as if someone narrated that the man whom a hearer wished to take on for the office of secretary was talkative. Then to the light sin of detraction there would be added a grave injury of charity or justice in temporal goods.

3° To the efficacy of detraction, which depends both upon the quality of the detractor, and upon the number, disposition, and quality of the hearers.

a) Upon the quality of the detractor: a man who is held to be grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one light, talkative, and lying; and he who reports something as seen harms more than if he reports it as heard from persons of uncertain authority; if however he narrates a grave thing as heard from a trustworthy person, or if from the circumstances he foresees that the hearers will believe it, or if he reports a thing so enormous that the mere suspicion of it gravely defames, such as sodomy committed by a priest, he sins gravely.

Detraction is the unjust violation of reputation, or the blackening or diminution of the good estimation which others have concerning the life and morals of an absent neighbor. - It is said, of an absent neighbor, both because generally he who is detracted from is physically absent, and because if he is present, the words are not properly directed to him, and he is considered as if absent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if the violation of reputation follows from the attributing of a false crime. Each can be done in a twofold way: 1st. directly, if a false crime is imputed, if a true one is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister sense; 2nd. indirectly, namely by denying the good works of a neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly.

I say 1st. Every detraction is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to justice, which obliges under grave matter; and since the goods of reputation are better than goods of fortune, detraction of itself is a graver sin than theft. But the gravity or lightness of detraction is not to be measured precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor, but chiefly from the gravity of the harm which the neighbor can suffer from it. Wherefore, to know in a particular case the gravity of the sin, one must attend to the quality both of the person detracting and of the person injured. The reason is that greater or lesser trust will be given according to the greater or lesser authority of the one speaking, and greater or lesser detriment to reputation will follow according to the measure of the greater or lesser estimation which the injured person enjoys. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 967.

I say 2nd. Although in no case whatsoever is it ever licit to attribute a false crime to another, since a lie is something intrinsically evil, nevertheless, from a just cause, it is licit to manifest the hidden crime of another even with loss of his reputation; because circumstances can be present in which the right of the neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right, and then neither would charity urge, because it does not oblige with grave inconvenience, nor justice, because a right against a prevailing right is not given. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 968 and 972.

I say 3rd. The detractor is bound in justice, as far as can be done, both to repair the reputation unjustly taken away and to compensate all temporal harms arising from defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted by the violation of a strict right, which ought to be restored in full. But the reason for the second is that all harms arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as to their efficacious cause. Notice nevertheless that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal, but the obligation of repairing harms which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 991 and 996.

I say 4th. Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. For the calumniator is bound to retract what he said, and indeed in itself even with loss of his own reputation if reparation cannot otherwise be made; because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the latter ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is about to suffer on account of this. But the simple detractor cannot retract what he said, because thus he would lie; wherefore in another way, as far as is in him, he ought to restore the reputation, saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only do those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying, Prov. xiv, 22: "They err who work evil." But often that manner does not suffice among intelligent and astute persons, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, since it is not asserted openly to be false. Therefore then the detractor, being silent about what was said, when occasion is given, with dexterity and truth ought to praise and honor him from whom he detracted. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 992.

Question 1. Is it grave detraction to reveal to one prudent man some mortal sin of someone, which indeed greatly dishonors him, but does not have a special malice?

Response. Negatively, probably, and the reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost a good name only before one or another person. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 973.

Question 2. Do detractions differ in species in matters diverse in species?

Response. Negatively, probably, because although such detractions are distinguished materially in species, nevertheless morally they injure one reputation of a man, no otherwise than contumelies are of the same species on account of the unity of honor against which they tend. Wherefore the confessor ought not to inquire concerning what matters the penitent detracted about, not only because the obligation is not established, but also because from knowledge of the different matter of detraction he could easily come to knowledge of the very person who was detracted from, and thus the confession itself would not be immune from the vice of detraction. Indeed, because it is also probable that detractions concerning different matters, if they are not otherwise interrupted, are one sin in number, the confessor ought to abstain from inquiring not only what the matters of detraction were, but also whether they were many. - Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 265. - Baller., note (a), p. 429.

Question 3. Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, but living in the same place where the crime is already public?

Response. Affirmatively, at least without grave sin, because reputation lost in relation to the community in which one lives, through publicity of the crime, whether this is of law or of fact, can no longer have grave harm inflicted upon it. But if it is asked whether a crime already public in one place can be revealed where the crime is still unknown, the response is that there is much dispute among theologians; but according to St. Alphonsus and not a few others, probably it is not mortal, whether the crime is manifested where it will easily and shortly be made public, or whether it concerns places to which the divulgation either will never come or will not come except after a long time. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 974 and 975; and Hom. Ap., n. 12. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 14, sect. 5.

Question 4. What must be thought concerning the custom prevailing among us of divulging the whole life of those who are to be elected to the highest Magistracies or as Legislators?

Response. It is certainly licit, whether justice is considered or charity, to manifest those crimes which, even if hidden, render the candidate less fit for the office into which he is to be elected, both because the common good ought to prevail over the private, and because according to the mind of the Constitution by which we are governed and of universal custom, those candidates are judged to yield concerning their own right as soon as they consent to popular election. But in this matter there ought to be a limit, and accordingly those are to be condemned who, either from an itch of divulging everything or carried away by party zeal, touch upon even those crimes whose knowledge contributes nothing to the public good. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 10, n. 139.

Question 5. Does he sin gravely who reports grave and hidden sins of another only as heard from others, e.g., if he says: it is reported, they narrate, I have heard this or that about such a one?

Response. He certainly sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports these things in such a way that others will with reason believe them, e.g., if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of trust, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause for believing the evil; but otherwise if probably belief is not given to the words, because then no infamy will arise from them. But if he reports things heard before those who probably will believe them from levity or malice of their own, he does indeed sin against charity, because each person is bound under grave matter from charity to remove an occasion of harm to another when he easily can, but not against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the harm. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 977.

Question 6. How do those hearing detraction sin?

Response. Just as those who so listen that they add new stimuli to detractors contract the whole malice of detraction, and therefore injure justice, so those who, when they notice detraction, depart, cut off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, are altogether excused, according to that saying, Prov. xxv, 23: "A sad face dissipates a detracting tongue." - But, outside this twofold case, a distinction must be made between private persons and superiors. A private person for the most part is excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, from shame or fear or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided that he does not rejoice in it, nor that besides infamy another harm is added. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction will be of profit; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can rightly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. But a superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because there rests upon him a special obligation of correcting the detractor, or of obviating the harm of the defamed subject. But more probably he does not sin against justice, neither the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another who is not a subject; nor the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent upon him in justice to attend to the temporal good of a subject. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 979, 980 and 981.

Question 7. What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Response. The following are commonly admitted: 1st. if the offense which you revealed to one or more persons has become public by another way, or if the reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., by the sentence of a judge, etc.; 2nd. if it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been effaced by the passage of time or by oblivion; 3rd. if restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life, because life is a good of a higher order; likewise if the restitution of reputation is of much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honorable man and especially very useful to the public good or to religion; 4th. if the reparation is morally impossible on account of excessive distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction, e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preconceived opinion; 5th. if it is judged that belief was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens rather often when detraction is done in the heat of anger; 6th. if the defamed person has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal or harm either common or to his own, etc., e.g., if it concerns the infamy of a priest, magistrate, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 997 and 998.

Question 8. Is he who is only materially a calumniator, namely because he manifested a false crime which he had thought to be true, bound to restore reputation with danger of losing his own?

Response. A material calumniator, when the error has been discovered, is held to restitution, but not so strictly as he who made the calumny through formal injury: for the latter is held even with detriment to his own reputation, even equal detriment; the former not likewise, but only insofar as he can without his own notable inconvenience. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 993.

Question 9. Is there an obligation of restoring reputation from simple detraction only materially unjust, e.g., if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Response. Affirmatively, as soon as he adverts to the injustice, in the same way as one who sets fire to another's house without formal fault is held to extinguish the fire as soon as he adverts, if he conveniently can; otherwise the harm which follows from it will be imputed to him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 10. Is one who defames bound to restore reputation even before those who received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Response. Negatively, if he did not foresee, not even confusedly, the propagation of his detraction, and a fortiori if before or after the violation of reputation he demanded secrecy; for then he is not the true and unjust cause of the extension of the harm. - But otherwise it must be said if he detracted for this reason, that he might lead the hearers to repeat the infamy, because then they are to be judged as an instrumental cause which the detractor uses. - But if there was indeed foresight of the propagation, but not an express and positive intention of harming by the help of the hearers, according to St. Alphonsus, more truly he is held, because foresight alone suffices that the detractor be called the true cause of the whole harm. Nevertheless, he seems able to be excused from such a burden not only by reason of moral impossibility, which is often present, but also because after all the true cause of so great a harm is the action freely placed by the hearers. Besides, according to the testimony of Cardinal de Lugo, the practice of confessors is that such a burden is not imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 991. - Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 15, nn. 15 and 16.

Question 11. Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation, and does not wish to restore it?

Response. Many theologians deny, but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus; because you are not held to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 999.

TWO Sisters, harlots, and daughters of one Mother, are Detraction and Contumely: the one Oolla the greater, fervent and wanton; the other Ooliba the lesser, of whom Ezech. 23. Both alike in face, alike also in guilt, they run mad with the lust of calumniating, uncover the disgraces of their neighbors, and pour out upon them their malices. But detraction rages the more against the neighbor's fame, the more it lurks in secret under the lesser species of defaming, lest it betray itself by its own vice. Concerning this virulent sin, we must inquire what it is, and how manifold it is.

Colius has, in a fit of jealousy, murdered a young man, and in order to divert suspicion from himself, has left in the neighborhood of the corpse the hat and knife of his friend Florus, who had been living in enmity with the murdered man. The police discovered these articles and arrested Florus. The latter is finally found guilty and sentenced to death. Then Colius, in troubled conscience, hastens to his confessor, Father Clemens, who absolves him without hesitation, with the remark that no one is obliged to accuse himself. With little faith in this explanation Colius turned to another confessor, Father Severus. This priest refused absolution until Colius would, even with danger to his own life, free by self-accusation the innocent Florus from his unfortunate position. Colius is now perplexed. Which confessor must be obeyed, and why?

1. In the case of Colius there are present all conditions that establish the strict obligation of restitution. He is guilty of having caused the misfortune of Florus. The remarks of the first confessor that no one is obliged to accuse himself is, in this sense, and especially in application to this case, palpably incorrect. If there is merely question of one’s own punishment, then it is true that no one is obliged to accuse himself. If, on the contrary, self-accusation is the necessary and only adequate means to make good a wrong committed, such as in our case, then it may become a strict obligation.

2. With far more apparent justification it might be said that Colius, by depositing hat and knife of his friend, became merely the occasion (occasio), but not actually the cause (causa efficiens) of the latter’s conviction. Lehmkuhl says (Theol. mor. I. 997): If someone by positive fraud turns suspicion of a crime upon another, it must be considered whether that fraud could reasonably have moved them to regard and punish the other as guilty. If it did, the arousing of suspicion was the effective cause of the harm; but if others rashly condemned the other person, we have only an occasion of the harm.

Then he cites the case of a thief who throws some of the stolen coins before the door of another, who finds the same, takes them, and in the subsequent investigation is held and punished as the thief. In this case, the author explains, the real thief’s action is merely the occasio, not the causa efficiens of the resulting conviction. And rightly so, for although I may possess coins that another has stolen, there is no sufficient reason to hold me as the thief. I may have obtained possession of these coins in a perfectly innocent way. How, then, about Colius’s action? He left hat and knife of Florus beside the murdered man. Was the presence of these articles near the corpse sufficient reason for considering Florus to be the perpetrator, and to condemn him to death? One may doubt this. The possibility of the true state of facts will not be overlooked by a deliberate judge, because the trick of throwing suspicion upon others is not unusual with criminals, and Florus will certainly have stated that hat and knife had been stolen from him. If it is remembered that Florus had lived in enmity with the murdered man, the presence of these articles might well lead to a verdict of guilty against Florus, without justifying a charge of bias against jury or judge. Colius, while not responsible for the additional motive for suspicion, has nevertheless made use of it intentionally, to divert more surely suspicion from himself; he knew that because of this circumstance his act could more surely draw down upon Florus bad results. He who gives to a sick person a poison that would not kill a healthy person, is guilty of murder nevertheless, if he knew beforehand the fatal effects of the poison, and yet gave it.

Colius could and did know that by leaving hat and knife of a man who had lived at enmity with the murdered man he might easily bring about his conviction. Hence he is all the more the moral cause of it, and is obliged to avert the threatened danger from Florus, even though he must assume it himself. Colius was conscious of this heavy responsibility; for this reason he was not satisfied with the decision of the first confessor. For this reason also it will be relatively easy to induce him to the actual fulfilment of his duty. It is not necessary that Colius should give himself up and expose himself to punishment; it suffices if he declares the matter before competent, credible witnesses, and lets them take further action while he puts his own person in safety. Jacob Linden, S.J.

Case.—William, a native of New England, moved to Canada in order to live down the stigma of illegitimate birth. Here he was successful in business and finally married a lady of good family, concealing from her the condition of his birth. A few years later, James, a friend of his, traveling through Canada and hearing of William’s marriage, intending no harm, divulged the hidden facts to a distant relative of William’s wife, who, of course, immediately reported the matter to her. Hereupon the expected happened. James, conscience-stricken, hurried to Confession, only to be told that he had fallen into mortal sin.

Question.—Was James guilty of mortal sin?

Solution.—This is a case of detraction, and a grave case. Every man, by the law of God, has a right to his reputation. His good name is worth more to him than his bank account and, therefore, No one may steal this valuable asset, any more than he may steal his neighbor’s purse, without falling into serious sin. The reason for this is evident. Grave and often irremediable harm is done, and this unjustly, in depriving one of his good name. In the present case we have a forceful exemplification of this. William’s wife’s parents would never have given their daughter to him in marriage, had they been aware of the defect which stigmatized William when he came into this world. For it is a fact that spurious children are frequently looked down upon, and treated as outcasts, though the curse that comes upon them is none of their own doing.

Secondly, the knowledge of the existence of this blot often interferes with the good of the marriage, affecting at times the primary as well as the secondary end of the union. It is a widely accepted theory that children of ill-gotten parents receive as an inheritance a disposition which early shows tendencies to various evils, especially to that of lust; and though this be by no means universal, it occurs frequently enough to create a feeling of aversion to a marriage of legitimate with illegitimate offspring. This feeling of moral infection, with its partiality towards moral degeneration of the family tree, naturally causes parents to throw every impediment in the way of marriage between their children and the spurious.

From this we can see what a shock the revelation of the defect in William’s birthright brought to his wife and her relations. To realize that they had been deceived by him was cause plenty for grief; but add to this the feeling that their family escutcheon had been dishonored, and the purity of their blood tarnished, and we face a condition well calculated to destroy all harmony—all peace in that family. Here then is another and serious result of James’s garrulousness.

He has succeeded then in lowering William in the eyes of his wife and her relatives, if not in the eyes of his own children; he has put enmity between husband and wife, which frequently leads to the divorce court; he belittles William in his own estimation, and thus, in robbing him of what was most precious, he certainly has committed a very serious mortal sin. The fact that he did not intend the harm does not acquit him; he must have foreseen the effect that would necessarily follow from his revelation; hence, he must accept the responsibility entailed by that revelation.

Case.—Rusticus grievously calumniated the deceased Strigonius in a newspaper article, and this article found many believers; it can not be said that the calumny has been forgotten; with many at least this is not the case. Rusticus had had few scruples about his action, as the honor and good name of the dead had been to him a matter of indifference; on his death-bed, however, he was much disturbed about the matter and told his confessor about it. The latter insists that the defamatory article be retracted, and that this take place publicly, because the calumny was a public one, and has not yet passed into oblivion; he grants, however, that this retraction may be so made as not to put the retractor in a bad light, if this can be done. Rusticus opines that it cannot be done without hurting his honor; and since in cases where they clash, the love of self, ceteris paribus, has precedence over the love of the neighbor, it appears here that restitution is a moral impossibility. In order however to do everything morally possible, Rusticus begged forgiveness of the son and the heirs of Strigonius, asking them at the same time to release him from formal retraction. All this was agreed to by the son of Strigonius.

Question.—Is the confessor to declare that this procedure of Rusticus satisfies the law?

Solution:

1. Defamation and calumny of deceased persons are not seldom regarded as something indifferent, because for the dead honor and good name are said to have no longer any value. But this is a lax and absolutely false view, for to calumniate the dead is for many reasons a serious wrong. The chief reason is the nature of calumny which is wicked and hence allowable under no circumstances, not even in the case of the deceased. The second reason is that every one desires to leave an honored memory after his death, and by death is not to be deprived of the rights to honor and good name. “The dead are not deprived by law of their reputation, although they have departed from among the living,” say the Moralists. Further reasons which here come into consideration are: It happens not infrequently that through such calumny the profession to which the departed belonged suffers injury and great scandal is given; the friends and relatives of the calumniated have a great sorrow put upon them, and under certain conditions may suffer injury in their temporal affairs. Such a calumny may be made the reason for cancelling a marriage engagement.

2. As concerns the departed himself, not only is his memory dishonored, but the zeal to remember him in prayer will be lessened, if not altogether abandoned. The edifying example he gave in life, the good teaching and exhortations that we heard from him, will lose their power and efficacy. To all this must be added that the departed is helpless against the malice of the calumniator, cannot protect or defend himself, cannot expose the calumniator, nor prove the untruth of the calumny. This is exactly the reason why evilspeaking about the dead has always been abhorred. Hence the old saying: De mortuis nil nisi bonum.

3. Calumny of the dead is, therefore, not only opposed to charity but also to justice, and consequently involves the duty of restitution. The honor of which we have robbed the dead—his honorable memory—must be restored, and if the calumny has been the causa efficax damni for a third party, for instance for the son or daughter of the departed, then also in this respect must the injury be made good. This is according to the unanimous teaching of the Moralists.

4. Let us consider in detail the obligation of restitution.

The teaching of all Moralists is that the calumniator of a dead person is obliged to retract, and that he must do so publicly if the calumny was public. Further, the Moralists go on to say, he is only released from this obligation when, and as long as, its fulfilment is a real moral impossibility, or if his calumny was not believed, or if in the meantime the same was shown to be false and was made known as such, or, finally, if the calumny has been forgotten, especially if the one defamed was little known, held no prominent position, etc. (S. Alph., nn. 997-999). The claim that the retraction of the calumny will injure the honor of the calumniator does not make the retraction a moral impossibility. If we would admit this, no calumniator would ever have to make restitution. It is true that in the case of a clash, other things being equal, precedence is given in the ordo caritatis to the love of self over love of the neighbor; but in considering this rule we must not forget the other rule: in pari conditione potior est conditio innocentis. Therefore the honor of slandered innocence, under equal or nearly equal conditions, has precedence over the honor of the defamer, whose malice caused his neighbor to suffer injury to his honor. If the defamer finds it difficult to act according to this rule he should remember that he himself created the situation. Only if it is a case of quite unequal circumstances, and if the injury to the honor of the defamer would be a much greater evil, might a moral impossibility be assumed. But this is an exceptional happening, and not to be presumed unless positively proved from the special conditions.

5. Can a calumniator of a dead person be released by the heirs from the obligation to retract?

The defamed person may release the defamer from retraction, and then the defamer is released from this obligation mentioned unless this release contained in itself a disadvantage to the defamed which the defamer was obliged to prevent ex iustitia. This cannot be applied to a case of calumniating a dead person, for in that case such a release cannot be ascertained. The son and the heirs of a dead person can, of course, remit restitution in regard to an injury which was caused them through calumniating their dead father, but not in regard to the honor of which the father after his death was unjustly deprived, for the son is not master of the honor of his departed father. “The obligation of making restitution presses even if someone has unjustly detracted from the dead, nor can the heirs remit it, since they are not masters of another’s reputation.”

6. The fact that in our times the restitution here in question is not much thought of, must not induce the confessor to take a course which would apply the Saviour’s words: “If the blind lead the blind, they both fall into the ditch.” In order, on the other hand, to burden no one with something he is not obliged to do, he will conscientiously, and without regard to person, investigate thoroughly whether or not there is good reason present here for releasing from restitution, namely from retraction.