Obstacles to Voluntariety

Since day by day the number increases of those who not only theoretically attack the liberty of the will, but also infer practical consequences from its denial and contend that crimes committed cannot be imputed to criminals, and that for this reason they are by no means worthy of punishment, necessity demands that the existence of liberty be demonstrated and vindicated from the attacks of adversaries.

1. The Liberty Of The Will Is Asserted

19. On the different meanings. 1. Liberty in general signifies immunity from a bond; and since the bonds which can constrain us are various, the term liberty is also used in various senses.

a. Liberty from sin, which in this life is immunity from sin whereby we can not sin, and is called the liberty of grace; in the other life it is immunity from sin whereby we cannot sin, and is called the liberty of glory.

a. In this life the possibility, and through grace the facility, of performing moral good is available to us, although diverse difficulties stand in the way. In the other life there cease the difficulties and impediments which here sometimes render the choice of moral good difficult even for those who are in the state of grace.

b. This liberty of grace, which is sometimes called moral liberty, can and must be continually developed and perfected, to such a degree that man, already in this life, may gradually come to the liberty of the sons of God and may no longer be hindered by difficulties in choosing the good. For sometimes already here on earth it happens that the will, strengthened by the grace of God, yields to no temptations, but, the allurements of the senses having been rejected, without any trouble chooses the good of virtue; and to this the words of the Lord promise: "the truth shall make you free," namely from the determining influence of the passions.

b. Liberty from obligation, or from law, which is also called moral liberty, is immunity from the moral obligation of doing that which is commanded by a superior power.

It is clear that man is not endowed with this liberty: he has physical liberty of acting against the law, but he does not have moral liberty. Moral liberty is also called liberty of choosing between good and evil.

c. Liberty from coercion, or from external necessity, is immunity from force brought in from outside against the inclination of the will.

It is clear: a. that coercion can be brought to bear both upon one unwilling to act, as when someone is dragged unwillingly to prison, and upon one willing to act, as when exit is prohibited to someone shut up in prison; b. that liberty from coercion is rather liberty of acting than liberty of willing; c. that the will is immune from coercion, since a coerced act of the will is impossible.

d. Liberty from internal necessity is immunity from an internal force which would determine the will to acting or to acting in this way. This liberty is proper to the human will.

Internal necessity, therefore, would be a determination innate to the will itself toward willing or toward willing in this way. A determination of this kind is present in the human will with respect to good in general, which it must will, so that it cannot will evil as such, and with respect to happiness, which each one necessarily wills, so that he cannot will to be unhappy.

2. By reason of the object which is chosen, liberty is called liberty of contradiction, or of exercise, if the will can choose between acting and not acting; liberty of contrariety, if the will can choose a thing and its opposite, as to love and to turn away, good and evil; liberty of specification, if the will can choose between things diverse in species, this or that, to study or to walk.

a. Liberty of contrariety in the moral order, that is, liberty of choosing between good and evil, does not belong to the essence of liberty, but is a defect proper to human liberty in the state of the way.

b. Only liberty of contradiction is required and suffices for the will to be able to be called truly free, or mistress of its acts; nevertheless in man as wayfarer the other species are also found.

¹ Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis (Freiburg: Herder, 1906), I, n. 100 ff. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), I, p. 30 ff. Mach, Die Willensfreiheit des Menschen (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1887). Gutberlet, Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner^2 (Fulda: Actiendruckerei, 1907). A. Beck, Die menschliche Willensfreiheit (Munich: Volksschriftenverlag, 1906). Encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas (June 20, 1888).

20. In what it consists. 1. The liberty of the human will consists in that property and perfection of it by which, once all things required for acting have been posited, the will is not determined to acting or to acting in this way, but can and must determine itself to this. Therefore a twofold element is required for the notion of liberty, one negative and one positive: a. the absence of internal necessity; b. one's own determination to acting.

a. The liberty of the human will is called liberty of indifference, because once all things required for acting have been posited, the will remains indifferent, that is, it is not determined to one thing, namely to acting, but can act or not act, can do this or that. It is also called liberty of election, for it belongs to its nature that the will can choose between one thing and another. Indifference is opposed to determination to one thing. The indifference which belongs to the human will and essentially constitutes its liberty is active indifference, by which the will itself can determine itself to opposites or diverse things. It is distinguished from passive indifference, which consists in this, that something can be determined from without to opposites or diverse things.

b. The doctrine of those who defend liberty of the will is today called indeterminism; on the contrary, the theory of those who deny liberty is called determinism. But the doctrine concerning liberty is less aptly called indeterminism, both because the liberty of the will does not consist in a merely negative element, namely in the negation of determination or internal necessity to acting or to acting in this way, and because liberty does not exclude every determination of the will, but only necessity. That is, it is not denied that conditions preceding a free act exercise an influence upon the will, which influence can be called a determination of the will; nevertheless it does not exclude free choice.

c. Those things are called required for acting which must precede, or in fact do precede, a free act or free choice: some good proposed by the intellect together with motives for choosing or rejecting it, the consideration of these, the power of willing, the inclinations of the will, and the disposition of the soul, whether habitual or actual.

d. Today determinists of every kind chiefly deny liberty of indifference, affirming that our will is determined to one thing, or to acting and to acting in this way.¹ Most philosophers, except the Scholastics, are addicted to determinism. It is known that Luther denied human liberty and substituted the servile will for the free will of the Scholastics. Protestant theologians, having abandoned this doctrine of Luther, had until now defended liberty of the will; now, however, those Protestant theologians who adhere to monism return to Luther's servile will.

e. Liberty does not exclude an antecedent inclination of the will toward the proposed object, or diverse goods, but only internal necessity for willing or not willing the proposed good. For if some good is proposed to the will, the will naturally and necessarily is inclined toward it, but is not necessarily drawn to willing it; for the will determines itself to willing and pursuing it. The same must be said respectively of evil proposed to the will.

2. A free act is not an act elicited arbitrarily and without a cause, but an act produced by the will after the motives of acting have been considered.

a. Since determinists with one voice affirm that in our theory of liberty a free act is an effect without a cause, and therefore that indeterminism offends against the principle of causality, it is asked what the cause of a free act is. There are those who say that the cause of a free act is twofold: one objective, which is constituted by the good and the motives provoking to the act; the other subjective, which is constituted by the very power of freely willing. For, when the good and the motives for choosing it have been proposed, the will is not necessitated to choosing, but is furnished by nature with a force by which it itself can and must determine itself to choosing, so that the act may come to be. Others refer the objective element rather to the prerequisite conditions, and call the will, furnished with an innate force for producing the act, the cause of free choice. Therefore it has a cause, but one that acts not necessarily, but freely.

b. From the force and power in the will of determining itself to an act, there must be distinguished the virtue and energy of choosing the good, especially the moral good, although the choice appears arduous and impediments and difficulties stand in the way. The will is strengthened and helped both by exercise and by divine grace, so that choices may be prudent and consonant with reason, even if they are difficult for corrupt nature.

c. Pedagogy and ascetic theology treat of the means of strengthening and increasing the energy of the will. These consist especially in hardening and exercising the body, in strenuous labor whether bodily or spiritual, in good habits acquired through continual mortification of the passions, and finally in divine grace obtained by prayer and the use of the sacraments.

¹ Cf. A. Seitz, Willensfreiheit und Determinismus (Cologne: Bachem). Cathrein, loc. cit., p. 30 ff.

21. That it exists. Liberty from internal necessity, or liberty of indifference, belongs to the human will.

1. Theological arguments. a. There are many testimonies of Scripture by which the liberty of the human will is formally asserted.

"I call heaven and earth to witness today, that I have proposed to you life and death, blessing and curse; choose therefore life."¹ "He added His commandments and precepts; if thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee ... Before man are life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him."² "Blessed is the man ... who could have transgressed and did not transgress, could have done evil and did not do it."³

Likewise there are many testimonies by which the liberty of the human will is virtually asserted.

Here belong all those testimonies by which counsels are given to man, precepts are proposed, and by which man is affirmed to be worthy of praise and reward, blame and punishment, on account of his works.

b. Since liberty is the foundation of moral imputation, the Church at all times, against heretics denying it, upholds and defends the liberty of the human will.⁴ Therefore those who deny liberty are considered heretics.

2. Philosophical arguments. a. The will is the power by which man can desire every good. Therefore, if some particular good is exhibited to it, it can desire that good because it is good; but it can also not desire it, or positively reject it, because, since it is a particular good, a defect is joined with it. Therefore the will, to which a particular good is exhibited, is indifferent; hence if it embraces that good, this happens because the will determines itself to embracing it.

a. The defect which is joined with a particular good consists in this, that it either brings some inconvenience, or impedes another good, or at least is too slight to be able to fill the breadth of the power or the desire for beatitude.

b. From these things it is clear that choice must be preceded by knowledge by which either we know the diverse respects of the proposed good, good and evil, advantage and disadvantage, or we know and compare several goods at once. Without this preceding knowledge no choice could have place.

b. One's own conscience manifests to us with inescapable certitude that in very many of our actions we are not led by internal necessity, but that we ourselves determine ourselves to acting or to acting in this way, to such a degree that we can also not act or act otherwise. But this testimony of conscience is evidently true.⁵

Some determinists deny the testimony of conscience itself; others say that it is an illusion. Cathrein refutes them briefly, p. 35 ff.; Gutberlet at length, p. 31 ff.

c. Liberty is also demonstrated by penal or criminal law, which among all nations not only visits crimes with punishments, but also accurately distinguishes between purpose, negligence (Fahrlassigkeit), and fault; indeed it also contains an entire system of punishments, which are heavier or lighter according to the gravity of the fault and the evil action. But all these things would be empty if crimes were nothing but signs of disease and not of true fault.

2. The Liberty Of The Will Is Vindicated

Three diverse sciences recently cultivated attack the liberty of the will: moral statistics, criminal anthropology, and psychopathology. Each tries in its own way to show that man in all his actions is governed and determined by necessary laws and impulses just as irrational and material beings are, and therefore that committed crimes cannot be morally imputed to him.

¹ Deut. 30:19.

² Ecclus. 15:15-16, 18.

³ Ecclus. 31:10.

⁴ Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 5. Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, De fide.

⁵ For arguments from the universal consent of the human race and from the consequences which would follow if liberty were denied, consult the cited authors.

22. On moral statistics. Moral statistics collects moral facts, especially criminal facts, in great number, and investigates their causes, both internal and external. Now, when statistical lists are considered, it appears that the same phenomena, namely crimes, under the same conditions constantly return in almost the same number. Therefore, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, there must exist a stable law by which these facts are governed and determined. Hence they conclude against liberty in this way: since from the same causes, especially from the same passions, the same crimes are constantly perpetrated, these must be attributed not to free will, but to passions and other circumstances determining one to the act, and therefore cannot be morally imputed to man. For facts which, according to a stable law, constantly happen in the same way and number cannot proceed from a free will. The conclusion is then extended to all acts of the will, and its liberty is simply denied. Concerning these matters the following must be noted.

a. A free action is not a merely arbitrary action, independent of every norm and law; on the contrary, even the will in its choices observes certain norms, both physical and moral. Moreover, there are several conditions, both external and internal, especially moral character, education, the example of others, and the like, which influence human choices and determine them more or less. For ordinarily man follows in his actions his own inclinations and customs, yet not under compulsion but freely. Therefore it is no wonder that men who are found in the same conditions act in the same way.

b. In order that anything could be gathered from moral statistics against liberty of the will, it would at least have to be established that a determinate passion in the same circumstances impels a great number of men to perpetrating the same crime, and that no man troubled by such a passion has overcome the temptation. But from moral statistics this is not established, nor can it be established. Besides, not even in this way would the inescapable and necessitating influence of the passions upon the will be proved, since men placed in the same circumstances freely determine themselves to the same action; thus, when winter approaches, all freely put on thicker garments. Finally, it is useful to note that statistics considers only external phenomena, and these criminal or indifferent, and their constancy; but it does not explore internal facts and external virtues. Therefore it can pronounce nothing about their origin, whether necessary or free.

c. The stability and constancy which is discerned in the perpetration of crimes from moral statistics is explained from the existence and influence of the same motives upon the human will. For it is established that men placed in the same external circumstances and subject to the same passions and temptations generally commit the same offenses. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that many others, troubled by the same passions, overcome the temptation, which statistics cannot report. Indeed this too must be affirmed, that most of those who yield to temptation, at least aided by the supernatural powers of grace, could have overcome the temptation and were conscious of this power in themselves.

From moral statistics two things are gathered: a. that in his choices man has great dependence upon the habitual disposition of the will and upon external conditions; b. since now very many are swept away to perpetrating the same crimes, that in our time certain passions, on account of social circumstances, rage more vehemently, and that there are very many men who, as languishing in faith and in religious life, and deprived of both natural and supernatural fortitude, are easily overcome by temptations.¹

¹ Cf. Gutberlet, loc. cit., chap. 3: "Die Moralstatistik." Lehmkuhl, "Der Selbstmord und die Misshandlung der Statistik" (Stimmen aus M. L. XX, II, p. 345 ff.). Huber, loc. cit., "Moralstatistik," p. 181 ff.

23. On criminal anthropology. 1. The theory is set forth. a. This science, first cultivated by Cesare Lombroso, professor at Turin, was afterwards variously changed and developed by his disciples. The account of criminal anthropology is this. Crimes in the human race are manifest facts; therefore their causes must be investigated. Both Lombroso himself and his disciples are addicted to materialism and Darwinian evolutionism. Therefore, in investigating the cause of crimes, some explain the atavistic theory and consider the delinquent as a man who has remained behind in the progress of evolution - an infant not yet developed, a savage man. Others, setting forth the pathological theory, consider the delinquent as a man sick in soul, indeed lacking the use of reason - morally insane, epileptic. Therefore, just as according to the former, crimes are necessary phenomena of an abnormal state of the body, so according to the latter, crimes are necessary phenomena of an abnormal habit of soul. Man therefore does not become a delinquent by free will, but is born a delinquent.

b. They investigate the abnormal marks and qualities which are found in delinquents, and these bodily, biological, and psychological. Delinquents, so they say, have the greatest conformity both in qualities of body and in habits of soul with epileptics and those laboring under moral dementia; therefore they are morally insane. And from these marks they construct, as it were, a universal form of the delinquent man, a Verbrechertypus. Indeed they affirm that a peculiar form corresponds to the individual kinds of crimes; thus thieves and murderers each display their own form. The form congenital to delinquents, according to them, is transmitted to descendants by heredity, so that from a thief a thief is born, from a murderer a murderer.

2. The theory is refuted. If the things which are affirmed were true, at most it would follow that men abnormal in body and sick in mind lack liberty; but it is not demonstrated that healthy men are lacking it. In particular these things must be noted.

a. The theory itself is founded upon inadequate experiments, arbitrary hypotheses, many exaggerations, and false explanations of facts.

b. If delinquents were infants not yet developed or savage men, all infants likewise and all savage men ought to be delinquents.

c. The theory is founded upon the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution, which in relation to men is false. The delinquent is not a man not yet developed, but a man who, by his own fault, has fallen away from the moral perfection which others have attained and which he himself also could and ought to have attained.

d. It can be conceded that there are delinquents who are not of sound mind, and in like manner it can be conceded that in the concrete it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a man is of sound mind or of a somewhat disturbed mind. Nevertheless in most cases we certainly know that delinquents are sane. Therefore it is equally false that all delinquents are insane and that all insane persons are delinquents.

24. On psychopathology. a. Psychopathology, or psychiatry, is the science which considers the abnormal life of the soul, so that from this it may draw rules concerning the education of children, the imputation of crimes, and the care of those sick in soul. This science itself brings great usefulness to pedagogues, judges in criminal cases, and moralists. Nevertheless there are some who draw arguments from the same science against liberty of the will. For they consider the way of acting of men laboring under diverse diseases of the soul - insanity, dementia, paranoia, epilepsy, hysteria - who, since they lack liberty in their actions, lead them to infer this general principle, that man is not furnished with liberty.

b. But: a. from the fact that those sick in soul, or psychopathics, appear to be lacking liberty in acting, it does not follow that those sound in mind are also lacking liberty, unless someone wishes to affirm that there is no man perfectly sound in mind, but that all are more or less insane. b. It cannot be conceded that psychopathics are altogether lacking liberty: for just as disease of soul itself has diverse grades, so also liberty, from the influence of the same disease, is in some lessened more or less, and in others entirely extinguished. Besides, discussion will return to this matter below, where the impediments of the human act are treated.

3. On Those Things Which Influence Free Choice

25. Here we consider free moral activity, by which the will chooses between good and evil. The exercise of liberty is perfect if the will determines itself to an act fully from itself, without any other influence besides that which the nature of the will requires; this happens when the intellect adequately knows the object, and the will, according to the norm of reason, moves itself promptly to willing or rejecting it. Now there are many things, whether in man himself or outside man, which exercise an influence upon his free activity or upon his choice, and determine it more or less. And these indeed diminish the liberty of the will and the imputability of the action, yet they do not remove them.

26. On the relation of the knowledge of the intellect to the free act. a. The intellect must exhibit the thing to be desired in such a way that we know both its merits, namely perfection, goodness, usefulness, and its demerits, namely imperfection, detriment, inconvenience, which it has for us. This knowledge is the more perfect, the more accurately the moments of each side are apprehended. By these are supplied the reasons and motives which direct us in making a choice. Hence the more adequately the merits and demerits of a thing are exhibited, the more easily a choice can be made which is according to reason. But if more the merits than the demerits of the proposed thing are known, or conversely more the demerits than the merits, the choice will indeed be free, but less according to reason. Choice becomes impossible if only one motive is known.

b. From these things it is understood that all those things exercise a determining influence upon the free choices of man which impede the merits and demerits of desirable things, especially moral things, from being adequately known. Although they do not remove the physical liberty of choice, nevertheless they bring it about that choices are imprudent, irrational, and morally evil. Moments of this sort are especially education and the social and political circumstances of the times in which we live.¹ Since in many men a defective and inadequate knowledge of things and actions, on account of these circumstances, is more or less involuntary and inculpable, even morally evil actions which proceed from it cannot be imputed to them according to their whole malice.

¹ Cf. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit (Munster: Schoningh, 1904), p. 112 ff., 152 ff.

27. On the relation of the inclination of the will to the free act. a. When the object has been sufficiently proposed, there necessarily arises in the will an inclination, or aversion, which is sometimes slight, but sometimes more vehement. These inclinations, although inveterate and vehement, do not introduce necessity, but the will retains the power of resisting them; this the experience of all those teaches who, after a life long passed in sins, have returned to the path of virtue. Nevertheless they draw the will so that, by a free determination, it wills that to which it is already vehemently inclined; and therefore they render morally good choice difficult, and the more difficult the more intense the opposite inclination is. Vicious affections render free choice impossible only when, in a particular case, having suddenly arisen, they so cloud or impede the mind that it can no longer weigh contrary motives.

b. From these things it is understood that everything exercises an influence upon moral choices which brings it about that, on the one hand, bad inclinations and vices arise and grow strong in the appetite, and on the other hand, the energy of the will in repressing bad inclinations grows weak and is debilitated. Of this kind are heredity, age, temperament, habit, nourishment, temperature of the air, and so forth.¹

¹ Cf. Huber, p. 102 ff., 130 ff.

WE have seen that we are responsible only for those actions which are performed with knowledge or advertence and freedom of choice. Whatever tends to prevent or lessen advertence, or to restrict liberty, will tend to diminish our responsibility. Ignorance affects advertence, fear and violence influence freedom of choice, and concupiscence influences both. Something must now be said on each of these causes which affect the voluntariness and imputability of our actions.

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge which the person who is ignorant should have. It is thus distinguished from nescience, which is merely the absence of knowledge, without the implication that the knowledge should be possessed.

Ignorance must also be carefully distinguished from error or mistake, which is a false judgement concerning something. Thus, if I simply do not know the person to whom I am speaking, I am in ignorance of his identity; if I mistake him for someone else, I am in error.

(a) With reference to the subject who is ignorant, ignorance is either invincible or vincible.

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making inquiries never enters into my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so. What efforts should be made in any given case depends on the character and circumstances of the person and the matter on which he is ignorant. If the matter is of great importance, if it affects the salvation of souls or the spiritual and temporal welfare of large numbers, great efforts must be made to dissipate ignorance; the efforts which would be sufficient in the case of one poorly instructed, or very much occupied with other weighty affairs, would not be It sufficient in other cases where these suppositions are not verified. In general, where knowledge is of obligation those efforts must be made to acquire it which ordinarily prudent and good men would exert in the circumstances.

Vincible ignorance is such as can be removed by the use of the requisite diligence. Various degrees are distinguished by divines according as some, or little, or no diligence is exercised to dispel it or means are used to foster it. If means are used to foster it, the ignorance is called affected; if little or no diligence is used to dispel it, it is called crass or supine; if some diligence is used, but not what is required in the case, it is called simply vincible ignorance.

(b) With reference to the object of ignorance, we must distinguish ignorance of law, fact, and penalty. 'There is ignorance of law, if the law’s existence is not known, as when a Catholic does not know that the Church forbids marriage within the third degree of kindred. There would be ignorance of fact, if it were not known that A. B. is related to C. D. within the third degree. Ignorance of the penalty is distinguished from ignorance of law when some special sanction is not known, though the law itself is known.

(c) With reference to the action of the subject, we distinguish antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is not voluntary, it is not willed by the subject; consequent ignorance is voluntary; concomitant is not expressly willed, but the action which is done with concomitant ignorance would ex hypothesi be done, even if the ignorance did not exist.

Invincible ignorance, as defined above, excuses from fault, so that, however bad an action done in invincible ignorance may be, it cannot be a formal sin. The reason is obvious; there is no knowledge in the agent of the malice of the action, and so the bad action is involuntary, and not imputable.

Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong Prop. 2 damn. ab Alex. viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2202. action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin.¹

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulness of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

¹ Bucceroni, 1, n. 51, can. 2229.

Ignorance itself of what we are bound to know, as of the obligations of our state of life, of the truths of faith which are necessary to salvation, is sinful if consequent and vincible; antecedent and invincible ignorance is of course not sinful.

Ignorance does not render an act invalid which has all other requisites for its validity; and so baptism conferred by one who knows nothing about its effects will be valid, if the - matter and form are correctly applied with the intention of doing what the Church does. Substantial error or mistake about the person with whom marriage is contracted will invalidate the contract, while ignorance of who the person is will not, if there be the will to marry.

In theology concupiscence is used in two distinct senses. It frequently signifies the inclination to evil, which in human nature is a result of the fall of our first parents. In this sense it is called sin by the Apostle.¹ Without any moral or immoral implication the word is used here to denote any passion or any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object. It comprehends, therefore, any movement of love, desire, or hatred, sorrow, anger, or delight.

Concupiscence is antecedent or consequent. The former precedes any action of the will, and so is involuntary. The latter is voluntary, either because it is deliberately and directly excited by the will, or at any rate willed in its cause.

¹ Trent, sess. 5, de pec. orig.

Antecedent concupiscence lessens the malice of an evil action which is done under its impulse. For concupiscence troubles the intellect, so that it cannot dispassionately weigh the moral quality of the object proposed to the will and the motives for rejecting it; moreover, concupiscence paints the object in more than naturally attractive colours, so that it exerts an undue influence on the will. Concupiscence thus disturbs the indifference of the will and renders the act which follows less voluntary and free. It is accordingly less imputable to the agent.

It sometimes happens that antecedent concupiscence renders the subsequent action involuntary, and so in no wise imputable, however wrong it may be. This will be the case when some sudden onslaught of passion deprives the agent of the use of reason and blindly impels him to evil. Strong passions, such as love or anger, especially in impressionable natures, sometimes produce this result, and even when murder or suicide is committed in such circumstances juries are warranted in bringing in a merciful verdict of murder or suicide while temporarily insane. If, however, the passion was not altogether antecedent, but in the early stages of its onslaught there was room for deliberation, the consequent evil will not be altogether involuntary; it will to some extent be voluntary in its cause at least.+

It used to bea matter of dispute among theologians whether a man could be insane and not responsible for his actions in some one category, while he retained his self-control in others. In our days it will hardly be disputed that monomania exists, and if it exists, as, for example, in the matter of intoxicating drink, the monomaniac will not be directly responsible for his actions done under the influence of his madness, although he may be responsible for them in their cause.” ¹ Similarly, those who suffer from illusions may be so demented on the particular point as not to be responsible for actions which they perform under the influence of their illusion. It is a question of fact when this is the case, a fact which it is difficult even for experts to determine.

Natural propensities to evil arising from hereditary taint or from temperament lessen the voluntariness of the action just as passion does, but they are not as a rule so strong as to make what in itself is mortally sinful only venial.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7, can. 2206.

Consequent concupiscence increases the malice of a bad action if it is wilfully excited, because the tendency of the will to evil is voluntarily made more intense. If the passion is voluntary only in its cause, it is rather a sign of the great intensity of the perverse will from which it flows, but which it does not cause.

The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God’s grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 1, n. 236. ‘“‘ ' There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane.” C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174.

However, on p. 203 the same author writes: ‘‘ The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable.” Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: “‘ Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence.” committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.

Fear is defined to be a perturbation of the mind on account of some present or future danger.

It is grave or slight in proportion as the danger is serious or not serious. Absolutely grave fear is such as will seriously affect an ordinarily constant man, as the fear of death, of perpetual imprisonment, or of loss of goods; relatively grave is such as will seriously affect anyone of timid disposition.

Reverential fear is that which a subject feels lest he should offend his superior. Ordinarily, divines rank it as slight fear, but it may become grave if, for example, a very austere father threaten his daughter with loss of home or with his perpetual displeasure.

Fear from without is the result of some external danger, which may arise either from a necessary cause, as, e.g., from the danger of shipwreck; or it may be threatening from a free agent. Fear from within is from an internal cause, as the fear of death from a disease which has been contracted.

The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary,¹ for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance.² We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary.”

¹ St.Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.

² Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

Inasmuch as bad actions done through fear are simply voluntary, it would follow that they are imputable to the agent, so that fear does not excuse him from sin. And this is true of such actions as are intrinsically bad and against the natural law. The Church has always considered those to be apostates who through fear of death or persecution deny their faith, though less culpable than those who renounce it without excuse (Can. 2205).

However, with regard to positive precepts, grave fear ordinarily excuses transgressors of them from sin. The reason is, because the legislator is not presumed to desire that his laws should bind when their observance would entail such grave consequences to his subjects. Divines, relying on what we read in Holy Scripture, teach this doctrine concerning the positive law of God, and it will be all the more true of positive human legislation.¹ But if non-observance of a law or a command of a superior would cause great damage to the common good, then the law or command must be obeyed, even with loss of life; for private advantage must yield to the requirements of the common weal. And so a soldier must stick to his post in war, even at the risk of life.

¹ St Thomas, 3, q. 40, a. 4, ad 3; 1-2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 4; Suarez, De Leg. 3, c. 30, n. 6; Can. 2205, sec. 2.

Violence or coercion is the using of greater force than can be resisted to compel another to perform some action against his will. In certain connections the person who suffers violence is said in English law to be under duress.

It follows from the definition that violence is from something external to the agent; no one can offer violence to himself; and that the subject resists to the utmost of his power.

If the resistance is only partial, there is violence only under a certain respect (secundum quid).

The elicited acts of the will cannot be forced by violence, for in that case the agent would will and not will at the same time.

The other internal faculties, and much more the external faculties of man, may be subject to violence. If the violence is absolute, the resulting action is involuntary and not imputable to him who suffers violence; if the resistance is only partial, the action will be voluntary to a certain extent, and in the same degree it will be imputable to the agent (Can. 2205, 52215, Sec, 2).

Liberty taken generally is immunity from necessity. Necessity, however, is distinguished as twofold: moral necessity, which arises especially from law, and physical necessity. Hence liberty too is twofold, moral and physical. Moral liberty is immunity from the bond of law. Physical liberty is again distinguished as twofold: liberty from coercion and liberty from necessity. "Liberty from coercion (or of spontaneity) is immunity from every violence brought against the inclination of the will" (St. Alphonsus, V, XXX; n. 27). We must speak of liberty from necessity.

I. Notion of liberty. Liberty from necessity, or liberty of indifference, is an attribute of the will, by force of which, once all things required for acting have been placed, it is indifferent toward several things, or is not determined to one thing, but can determine itself (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 83, a. 4^†; St. Alphonsus, V, XXX). And since the whole account of the will and of its properties is drawn from the intellect, the root of the said indifference, as St. Alphonsus says, is the indifference of judgment, "which is nothing other than the deliberation of the good or evil which is considered in the action" (Homo Apostolicus, tract 3, n. 11). "This indifference of judgment," St. Alphonsus continues in the same place, "does not now constitute liberty, but, as has been said, is the root of liberty, so that afterward the will may freely and indifferently choose what has pleased it."

II. Division of liberty. Liberty from necessity is threefold: namely, liberty of contradiction or of exercise, which is indifference toward two contradictories, such as willing and not willing the same thing, for example loving and not loving one's neighbor; liberty of contrariety, which is indifference toward two contraries, such as loving and hating; and liberty of specification, which is indifference toward acts not opposed to one another but diverse in species, such as praying and playing (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, XXX).

Corollary I. Liberty of contradiction suffices for the essence of liberty. For it suffices for the essence of liberty that the will be mistress of its act. But by the very fact that it can place or not place the act, it is mistress of its act.

Corollary II. Indifference toward moral good and evil, or the faculty of sinning, is not required for the essence of liberty. For: 1. God is truly free. But in God there is not indifference toward evil, or the faculty of sinning. 2. "It does not pertain to the account of free choice," says St. Thomas, "that it stand indeterminately toward good or evil, because free choice of itself is ordered to the good, since the good is the object of the will, nor does it tend toward evil except because of some defect which it apprehends as good, since there is no willing or choice except of good or apparent good; and therefore where free choice is most perfect, there it cannot tend toward evil, because it cannot be imperfect" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIII).¹

¹ Leo XIII, Encyclical Libertas, 22 June 1888.

III. Existence of liberty. Man, even in the state of fallen nature, enjoys liberty of indifference or free choice. This proposition is of faith from the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the free choice of man, after the sin of Adam, was lost and extinguished, or that it is a thing only in name, indeed a name without a reality, finally a fiction introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema."¹ Moreover, the true character of this human liberty against the innovators is set in clearer light by propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs: "What is done voluntarily, even if it is done by necessity, is nevertheless done freely" (the 39th proposition of Baius, condemned by Pius V and other Pontiffs).² "Only violence is opposed to the natural liberty of man" (the 66th proposition of Baius).³ "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily" (the 67th proposition of Baius).⁴ Likewise Innocent X condemned the third proposition of Jansenius: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."⁵

The proposition is established: 1. against the Fatalists, Materialists, and Positivists; 2. against Wyclif, Luther, and Calvin, who contend that through original sin man was deprived of liberty; 3. against Baius and the Jansenists, who admit liberty from coercion, but deny liberty from necessity. They teach, namely, that man is moved insuperably to good by the greater delight of grace, and insuperably to evil by the greater delight of concupiscence.

It is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture. "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts: if you will to keep the commandments, they will preserve you, and to perform pleasing faith forever. He has set before you water and fire: stretch out your hand to whichever you will. Before man are life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him."⁶ There are added: 2. the unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers; 3. the consent of the human race; 4. the testimony of one's own conscience; 5. the absurd consequences of the contrary opinion. If liberty is denied, the distinction between virtue and vice, moral obligation, and imputability vanish (St. Thomas, I, q. 83, a. 1); 6. the intrinsic reason, which can be proposed thus: the will is free, or, once all things required for acting have been placed, it can act or not act, that is, determine itself to either one, if it is not determined by another, that is, by the object. But no object determines the will. For the will cannot be determined except by an adequate object, and as such proposed to it by the intellect. But such an object is not had; since neither particular goods, nor the indeterminate good or good in common, nor the determined infinite good or God, are of this sort. Not particular goods; for these do not satisfy the appetite for good in the universal, such as the will is, because it follows the universal cognition of the intellect. Not good in common, which is not the adequate object, because it is not a determined good, but vague or abstract, and therefore does not quiet the will. Not the determined infinite good or God, who indeed is the adequate object, but is not proposed to the will as such, because he is not yet seen in himself, but only through a mirror in an enigma (cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 2).

¹ Session 6, canon 5; cf. canons 6 and 4; Vatican Council, dogmatic constitution De Fide, chapter 3; Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1039.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1039.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1066.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1067.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1094.

⁶ Sirach 15:14-18; cf. Genesis 4:6.

IV. Extension of liberty. Man as wayfarer is free with respect to different goods as follows:

1. Concerning good in common or beatitude, he enjoys only liberty of contradiction or of exercise, but not liberty of contrariety. The reason for the former is the very intrinsic reason by which, in the preceding number, we proved liberty. The reason for the latter is that good in common or beatitude cannot be apprehended under any aspect of evil by which the will could turn away from it.

2. Concerning the determined infinite good or God, man is fully free. For "although God in himself is a greater and more eminent universal good than beatitude in common, nevertheless he is not evident and apparent to us under such an aspect, as beatitude is."¹

3. Concerning particular goods, man is likewise fully free. For "any particular goods, insofar as they fall short of some good, can be taken as non-goods, and according to this consideration can be rejected or approved by the will, which can be borne toward the same thing according to different considerations" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 2).

¹ Cf. St. Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, book V, chapter 25; Cajetan, on I, q. 82, a. 2.

I. Notion. Habit is here understood as a certain disposition acquired from multiplied similar acts, by which someone easily proceeds to similar acts. It is also called an acquired habit. It is good or bad according as it disposes toward good or bad acts.

II. Division. A bad habit, of which there is chiefly discussion here, is distinguished into voluntary and non-voluntary. It is voluntary when someone does not try, according to his powers, to uproot the habit, whether it was contracted advertently or inadvertently.¹ If someone tries to do this according to his powers, it is called non-voluntary.

¹ If someone has advertently contracted a habit and does not try to uproot it, it can be called voluntary under a twofold heading.

III. Influence on the free. Habit, or acquired habit, removes or lessens the free insofar as it removes or lessens the deliberation of the intellect. Yet it increases the voluntary as such, insofar as it causes someone to be borne into the act with greater inclination. Besides, a habit, say, of blaspheming, etc., generally leaves some advertence or deliberation, indeed for the most part such deliberation as suffices for the perfectly voluntary.

"Although," as St. Alphonsus observes, "sinners entangled in depraved habits have a less ready cognition than others, nevertheless they always have some cognition of their crimes sufficient to render their acts deliberate and mortal. For since they themselves make little of sin, there is not made in their souls that sensible and memorable impression which is made in another who has a less depraved conscience; and hence it happens that in their memory there does not remain a trace of that actual cognition which they sufficiently had before concerning the sin, or the trace is so slight that, when questioned, they easily answer that they did not advert; but a cautious confessor ought not to give credence to them" (St. Alphonsus, V, 4).

But with respect to those who have retracted the habit and fight it as they can, Reuter rightly notes: "It happens not rarely that a man who before was accustomed to sins in venereal matter, or whose imagination has been infected by venereal images from long-lasting temptations, is immediately carried off into venereal delight and thinks that he consents, but soon retracts himself and shudders, fearing lest he has consented. But let him not judge that he has consented. For although the sensitive appetite has conceived delight, and some connatural complacency of the will also has followed, this was not free. For old habits connaturally operate the first motion, and man cannot repress it before it is present.... From the same reason authors note that it often happens that a man who has begun to be seriously converted dwells for a long time on a thought and yet does not consent, because acquired habits are operating, and a man occupied with other things cannot so quickly turn his mind to resisting. The common opinion of many is also that reason, through troublesome incidents, often even comes into delight, and this for a sufficiently long delay before it becomes fully master of itself through mature deliberation; and in such a matter men ought not to fear mortal sin. If persons of this kind afterward examine themselves, and at first seem to themselves not to have consented, or only doubt or fear about consent, let them presume that they did not consent, and let them not depart from this resolution."¹

¹ Neo-Confessarius, nn. 261-268.

How greatly it matters that a man be clothed with good habits from tender age can be hidden from no one. For without habits he is wavering toward every good, inconstant, and liable to every assault of temptation; nor, in a doubt about consent, will presumption favor him. But with habits rightly rooted, by which he puts on, as it were, another nature over himself, he will stably do good; nor, in a doubt, is he easily to be believed to have yielded to sin. Therefore parents, teachers, and confessors should try with all force to uproot bad habits as they arise; and with watchful diligence, exhortation, praise, and reward, let them foster the beginnings of good habits.

Temperament, disposition, and character influence the voluntary-free more remotely. Concerning these, the following things should be noted:

I. Temperament. According to the opinion of Galen, temperament was formerly thought to arise from the prevalence of one of the four humors which were said to exist in the human body: namely blood, bile, black bile, and phlegm. According to modern psychophysiologists, it is more rightly said to have its origin from the prevalence of one of the systems from which the principal physiological functions in the human body proceed. This prevalence causes special dispositions and affections to arise in individual persons. The complex of these dispositions and affections is called temperament. But authors do not agree on how many temperaments ought to be distinguished. Since, however, three systems of functions can be prevalent, three types of temperaments are conveniently distinguished, though they admit some subdivisions. They are: 1. the sanguine temperament; 2. the nervous temperament; 3. the lymphatic temperament.

1. The sanguine temperament arises from the prevalence of the circulatory system and the suitable development of the organs of respiration. If you seek the characteristic marks of this temperament: sanguine persons usually enjoy an easy intelligence; they feel promptly and vividly, but not in an intense or constant way; they are lively, prone to amusements, even carnal ones; they are courteous, easily indulge affections, and are liberal and beneficent; their face is ruddy, cheerful, and animated.

2. The nervous temperament arises from the prevalence of the nervous system, highly sensitive, to which all operations are subjected. Nervous persons feel more intensely and more constantly than sanguine persons, although from the diversity of their emotions they display a certain instability. Excessive sensitivity renders them restless; and they are rather easily disgusted if the matter does not proceed prosperously. They are prone to sensual pleasures; their love sometimes turns into aversion. Persons who show this temperament are usually thin, slender, and stirred by continuous motions of the muscles. It can be varied in three ways.

a) By the bilious temperament, which is named from the great activity of the hepatic gland. Persons endowed with it usually show a yellowish face, lively eyes, and a grave and severe appearance. As regards psychological marks, irritability, ambition, and desire of ruling are especially enumerated. They usually enjoy a lively and reflective intelligence, and show a firmer spirit than nervous persons.

b) By the erotic temperament, when the sexual apparatus manifests great vitality and irritability. What the specific characters are is rather difficult to say; a lascivious appearance not rarely reveals it sufficiently. It can be received by heredity from parents; often it is developed more from other external causes, such as readings of depraved books, immodest scenes, and insane loves.

c) By the melancholic temperament, which usually displays a pale face, an anxious and sad appearance, and a slow gait. The nervous system is especially affected by sad affections, which take their origin from depressing thoughts. They are complacent in this sense of sadness, and therefore seek solitude, and are misanthropic and intractable. Yet they sometimes allow themselves to be swept away by vehement passions which they had previously concealed. Besides, they are usually endowed with the good qualities which the nervous temperament carries with it, such as lively intelligence and warmth of speech.

3. The lymphatic temperament, which seems opposed to the nervous temperament and in many respects also to the sanguine, is often recognized from a white or slightly red face, from blue eyes, and still more from a slow gait and difficult motion. They are agitated by no vehement passions, and when they grow angry, anger is easily restrained. Generally, lymphatic persons feel less intensely and act slowly but with unconquered constancy.

It is worthy of note that temperament is almost always constituted in an individual from the mixture of one with another, or even that different temperaments are mixed in equal proportion. From this arise, for example, the sanguine-nervous temperament and the sanguine-bilious temperament. Namely, since the nervous system and other organs continually have various relations with surrounding things, the changes of these must necessarily exercise corresponding changes upon constitution and temperament. Moreover, excessive elements, which are in unstable equilibrium among themselves, exercise influence on the development of a certain complexion and temperament; hence mixed temperaments, as they are called, arise.¹

¹ Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis, I, n. 328.

II. Disposition. Disposition seems to be constituted by native inclinations, and especially by those arising from temperament.¹

From disposition, human beings can be distinguished especially into three types, that is, into the sensitive, the temperate, and the cold. The sensitive are those in whom the passions rule more than reason, so that they are usually directed by the former rather than by the latter. The temperate are those in whom reason moderates and rules the passions, although they are intense. The cold are those who are scarcely subject to the more vehement passions.

¹ "From birth there follows in the body of the one born some disposition, both from the power of the heavenly bodies and from lower causes, which are the seed and the matter conceived, through which the soul is in some way made prone toward choosing something, according as the choice of the rational soul is inclined by the passions which are in the sensitive appetite, which is a bodily power following the dispositions of the body. But from this no necessity is induced upon it for choosing, since it is in the power of the rational soul to accept or even to reject the passions that have arisen" (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 24, a. 1, ad 19; cf. Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia, q. III, a. 9, ad 7).

III. Character.

1. Character is called disposition insofar as, strengthened or modified by frequency of acts, it has acquired a certain stability.

2. The formation of character consists in this: that a certain stable direction toward good is impressed upon the soul and is fostered more and more. Concerning the manner of forming character, certain special things are to be noted both with respect to children and with respect to others.¹

a) With respect to children. For forming the character of children, not only children themselves, but even more parents and teachers, should cooperate. To this belong: 1. care of health, by which the nervous system is strengthened; 2. development of the moral sense, by which the child is spontaneously drawn toward honorable things and turns away from dishonorable things. This development should be made both by little exhortations and by the narration of those things which were done by Christ and the saints; 3. instruction in matters of faith and morals; 4. cultivation of study and of diligence in religiously fulfilling duty, by which the will is especially strengthened; 5. removal of those things which expose faith or morals to danger; 6. use of supernatural means, especially prayer and the sacraments, by which the will is strengthened more and more.

b) With respect to others. For forming character, the following especially conduce:

a) Knowledge of oneself, that is, of good and depraved inclinations, to be obtained both by examination of conscience and by the counsel of faithful friends, especially of a spiritual director.

b) The fight against disordered motions, and the practice, even in time of peace, of those acts which oppose depraved inclinations. By this it comes about that the energy of the will, which languishes in so many persons, is exercised, sharpened, and increased; that man learns to bring force upon himself and either to block the way to disordered motions or most strongly restrain them once they have arisen. This violence the demons dread, as the Apostle says: "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you."²

c) Supports of moral vigor, which are: repeated meditation, even if briefer; prayer; frequenting of the sacraments; the choice and use of a wise spiritual director; finally, a daily order of living well arranged and, as far as can be done, fixed, by which equilibrium of soul is fostered and the vigor of the will is strengthened.

¹ Cf. Guibert, Le Caractere; Dupanloup, De l'Education; Martin, Education du caractere; Spencer, Education.

² Jas. 4:7.

Psychic abnormalities can be distinguished into those which arise from the defective and slow evolution of the psychic faculties, and abnormalities which arise from a morbid disturbance of the same faculties.

Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.—An act is human, or voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand what he is saying.

With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.

(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally while shooting at an animal.

(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before firing.

(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a man whom he mistook for a deer.

With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. (b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.

Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts.—(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may say: “Ignorance excuses.”

(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: “Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).

Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.—(a) Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be actually desired.

(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act entirely involuntary.

Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.—(a) Invincible ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice involved.

(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though he had knowledge.

Obstacles to Consent.—The obstacles to consent are all those factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus, the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.

The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.

(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant—i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears.

(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of hell.

The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows.

(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.

(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus’ surrender of his purse and Claudius’ act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as best suited to the circumstances.

(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary. Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell; hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect involuntary.

Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite towards its object through love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It tends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.). Passion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes away voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal principle with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so intense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the quality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many acts), even when it does not prevent knowledge.

Antecedent passion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the will tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes an act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power of choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays voluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately inclined that way.

Consequent passion which results naturally from an intense act of the will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is not its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense, for it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the will and affects the emotions.

Imputability.—Just as an act may be an act done by man (i.e., higher than the operations of brutes) and yet not be human (i.e., not performed in the manner that is proper to man as man; e.g., an act of reasoning or of decision during a dream, see 23 sqq.), so an act may be moral (i.e., in conformity or disagreement with the standards of right) and yet not imputable as good or bad to the agent (e.g., a prayer or imprecation said by an infant, or the drunkenness of one who did not realize the power of a liquor).

Imputability is that property of an act by which it belongs to its agent, not only in its physical nature as something of himself or as an effect produced by him or in its human quality of subjection to his will, but in its moral character of goodness or badness. From contact with the moral object, the agent takes as his own something of the brightness or defilement of that object, and so becomes chargeable himself with goodness or badness.

The conditions for the imputability of an act are:

(a) the act must be human—i.e., it must be performed knowingly and willingly (see 23 sqq.). One is not chargeable with the quality of the act, if not responsible for its very substance. Example: Titus suffers such intense pain that he does not know what he is saying, and he blasphemes. The morality of blasphemy is not unknown to him, but his present act is not voluntary, and hence is not imputable;

(b) the morality of the act must be known, or be something that should be known, at least in a general way, to the agent; for no one is responsible for what he is wholly ignorant of through no fault of his own. Example: Titus, Caius, Balbus and Sempronius rob the orchard of their neighbor. Titus in good faith thinks he is doing an act of virtue, because the owner owes money to his companions. Caius thinks that some kind of sin is being committed, but he does not know whether it is theft, or gluttony, or what. Balbus thinks that only a venial sin of stealing is being perpetrated. Sempronius, the youngest of the crowd, looks on the whole affair as a part of the day’s sport. All committed theft, and the act is wrong; but Titus and Sempronius were not guilty of sin, since they were in good faith. Caius and Balbus committed sin, the species and degree depending on the knowledge they had or should have had (see 588 sqq.);

(c) the morality of the act must be willed. If the act is good, the goodness must be intended, since a person should not get credit for what he does not wish. Example: Titus does not believe in virtue, and Caius is opposed to helping the poor; but both give an alms to a beggar, the former in order to get rid of the beggar, the latter in order to get rid of some old clothes. Hence, neither wishes or receives credit for the charity done. If the act is bad, the badness is sufficiently intended by the performance of what one knows is forbidden and wrong. The will chooses contact with the evil object, and thus implicitly with the evil of the object. Example: Balbus protests that he does not wish to harm anyone, and then proceeds to calumniate his neighbors. His disavowal of sinful intent does not make him any the less responsible for his calumny.

Imputability may be conceived as making one responsible for the moral quality of an act in three ways: (a) generically, if one should get the credit or diseredit of goodness or badness only; (b) specifically as to kind, if one gets the credit or discredit of a particular category of goodness or badness; (c) specifically as to degree, if one gets the credit or discredit of higher or lower grades of the same virtue or vice, or if one is made guilty of mortal or venial sin. These points will be discussed in the articles on the virtues and vices (see 186 sqq.).

Goodness is imputable as follows:

(a) As regards internal acts, a person is credited with all the goodness of the object, end, and circumstances, in so far as it is known and willed by him. Example: Titus purposes to pray in a penitential posture, in order to obtain the virtue of humility. Hence, he has the credit of worship, mortification and humility through his holy desire. If he thought of the penitential posture, not as a moral circumstance, or if he regretted it, he would have the act, but not the credit of mortification;

(b) As regards external acts, a person is credited with the greater readiness or intensity or duration which, through it, his will gives to what is good. Example: If Titus prays in the manner above described, his good will is intensified, and he has the credit of this increase in the accidental goodness of his act;

(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is not credited with their goodness, if this is merely permitted. Example: Sempronius, who is sorry that thoughts of a better life will go through his mind as a consequence of going to church, has not the credit of those good thoughts;

(d) As regards consequences that were foreseen, or that naturally result from an act, one is not credited with their goodness, unless it was wished. Example: Balbus teaches religion to children because he is paid to do so; Caius does so because it is a good act. The consequence that these children afterwards live virtuously is not morally creditable to Balbus, since he thought nothing about it; but it is a circumstance that increases the goodness of Caius’ act, since he intended his teaching precisely as it is a good work;

(e) As regards consequences that are not natural results of an act, if they were not foreseen or intended, they are not credited to the agent. Example: Titus speaks a simple and ordinary word of good advice to Sempronius, but the impression is so great that Sempronius undertakes and accomplishes extraordinary things, which Titus would not have deemed possible or advisable.

Evil is imputable as follows:

(a) As regards the internal act, a person is guilty of all the evil of the object, end and circumstances, as far as it is known and willed by him. Example: Balbus wishes he could steal all the possessions of Caius, and thereby drive the latter to suicide. Balbus has committed theft and murder in his heart;

(b) As regards the external act, one is guilty of all the circumstances of greater willingness, etc., which it adds to the internal act. Example: If Balbus actually steals from Caius and causes his death, his malice is shown to be very strong and to extend to the evil consequences of his external acts;

(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is guilty of the evil they entail, if one could and should have prevented it. Example: Balbus is guilty of the blasphemies he foresees will take place when he has taken too much drink, for he could and should have kept sober.

(d) As regards the evil consequences of acts, foreseen or natural, one is responsible for the evil, if one could and should have prevented it. Examples: Titus knows that a beggar will use profane language if denied an alms, but Titus cannot spare the money and is not responsible for what happens. Sempronius blasphemes in the company of many, and is therefore guilty of the sin of scandal, since he has no right to blaspheme;

(e) As regards the evil consequences of acts that could not have been foreseen, they are not imputable. Example: Balbus steals fifty cents from Caius, and the latter is so heartbroken that he commits suicide. Balbus is not responsible for the suicide, since such a thing was far from his thoughts when he stole.

It was just said (102, d) that when two results, one good and one evil, follow an act, the evil is imputable if it could and should have been prevented. It is not always easy, however, to determine at once when the evil result should be prevented, and, as cases of double effect are many, it will be useful to give rules that are more particularized, and that enable one to decide when it is lawful to do that from which will follow an act indirectly willed, or a consequence that is evil.

It is lawful to perform an action from which an evil effect is foreseen when the following conditions are present:

(a) the action willed itself must be good or at least indifferent; for clearly, if the action is bad, it is also unlawful;

(b) a good effect must also follow from the act, and it must not be caused by the evil effect; for the end does not justify the means. Thus, it is not lawful to take what belongs to others in order to give alms, for the evil effect (stealing) results from the act (taking) immediately; whereas the good effect (almsgiving) results only mediately through the theft;

(c) the agent must intend only the good effect, since it is unlawful to wish evil. Thus, if one foresees that one’s virtuous life will cause the sin of envy in a neighbor, this evil result of one’s virtue must not be entertained by one as something pleasing;

(d) the agent must have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil result that follows his act. Evil should not even be permitted, unless there is adequate compensation in the good that is intended.

To judge whether a reason for permitting an evil effect is proportionately grave, the following rules should be kept in mind:

(a) the greater the evil that results, the greater must be the good that is intended. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a robber in order to save a small amount of money: but it is lawful to kill an aggressor, if this is necessary in order to save one’s life;

(b) the greater the dependence of the evil effect on one’s act, the greater must be the reason for performing the act. Example: Titus gives permission to his class to play a game against another class, foreseeing quarrels and disputes between the teams. Less reason is required for granting the permission, if Titus knows that higher authority will grant it, should he refuse it;

(c) the more nearly the evil effect follows upon the act, the greater must be the reason for the act, Thus, less reason is required to direct a person who looks like a heavy drinker to the city than to direct him to a bottle of strong drink;

(d) the more certain it is that the evil effect will follow, the greater is the reason required for placing its cause. For example, one who speeds in an automobile on an unfrequented road, does not require the same excusing cause as one who speeds on a thoroughfare where many other cars are passing;

(e) the more obligation one has to prevent the evil effect, the graver is the reason required for placing its cause. Thus, since parish-priests, lawgivers, superiors and policemen are bound by their office to prevent moral disorders, a far greater cause is required in them, than in persons who have no such charge, for doing what will have an evil consequence.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 22-48.)

Having discussed the acts proper to man, we shall now speak of the passions, which are common to both man and beast.

Definition.—The passions—also called the emotions, affections, or sentiments—are acts of desire; but, unlike the acts of the will, they are directed, not to good apprehended by the higher knowing power of the intellect, but to good apprehended by the lower knowing power of sense and imagination. They are defined as: acts or movements of the sensitive appetite which arise from the representation of some good in the sense faculties, and which produce some transformation in the body, such as palpitation of the heart, increased circulation of the blood, paleness, blushing, etc.

Division.—There are two classes of passions; (a) the concupiscible, which have as their object sensible good considered as delightful, or sensible evil considered as unpleasant, and which are love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; (b) the irascible, which have as their object sensible good or sensible evil considered as difficult to attain or to avoid, and which are hope and despair, boldness and fear, anger.

The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; (b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul on account of the presence of an evil.

The irascible passions are explained as follows: (a) hope reaches out towards a future good whose attainment is difficult, but not impossible; despair turns away from a good that seems impossible of attainment; (b) bravery goes out to attack an evil that seems difficult and imminent, but not unconquerable; fear falls back before a future difficulty that seems irresistible; (e) anger is the desire of vengeance for an injury received.

Moral Value of the Passions.—The Stoics held that all the passions are diseases of the soul, and that one is perfect when one arrives at the condition of being passionless or apathetic. Lucretius, on the contrary, taught that all the impulses of passion are good. The truth is that the passions are good or evil according to the way they are considered. (a) Physically, the passions are good, since they are the acts of natural powers, or the perfection and complement of something good in itself. (b) Morally, they are indifferent, if they are viewed in themselves, as the product of the sensitive appetite. For this appetite is an irrational power of the soul, similar to that of the beasts, and acts are not moral unless rational—i.e., an act is good or evil only from its relation to reason. (c) Morally, the passions are good or bad, if commanded by reason and will, for thus they partake of the good or evil that is in the acts from which they proceed, just as the acts of the external members of the body are moral in so far as they execute the commands of the will. The passions are voluntary if commanded by the will, or not forbidden by it. Examples: Our Lord looked about Him with anger, being grieved at the blindness of His enemies who watched Him in the synagogue (Mark, iii. 5); He wept over the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke, xix. 41); He was sad at the approach of His passion (Mark, xiv. 34).

The passions are morally good: (a) if they are directed by the will to a morally good object; for example, shame is a praiseworthy passion, because it is fear of what is dishonorable, and pity is also good, because it is according to right reason, being sorrow for the misfortune of another; (b) if they are chosen by the reason for a good purpose; for example, it is good to excite the emotion of joy that one may pray with greater fervor, or to arouse the feelings of pity, fear, or hope, in order that one may be more earnestly moved to acts of mercy, repentance, courage; (c) if the circumstances are moderated according to right reason; for example, to grieve over the death of a friend excessively, so that one is unfitted for duty and suffers in health, is unreasonable; but to grieve even unto tears, as Christ did at the tomb of Lazarus, is an act of piety. Similarly, the slight anger of Heli was blamable and the great anger of Moses was laudable, because the evils in both instances called for severity (I Kings, ii, iii; Exod., iii).

The passions can either diminish or increase the goodness of an act. (a) They diminish its goodness, if they are antecedent—i.e., prior to the judgment of the reason—for they thus obscure the mind and make the act that follows less voluntary. For example, there is less goodness in an alms given under an impulse of sentimentality than in one given after serious consideration of the matter and from a motive of charity. (b) They increase its goodness if they are consequent—i.e., subsequent to the judgment and the result of the vehemence of the will, or of deliberate encouragement by the will (see 47 sqq.)—for, just as the external act increases the goodness of the internal act, so is it better that man should tend towards good, not only with the will, but also with the emotions. Examples: The spiritual gladness of the Psalmist is seen to have been more than ordinarily great from the fact that it acted upon his feelings, and both heart and flesh rejoiced (Ps, lxxxii. 3); to sing a hymn in order to encourage oneself to greater fervor or devotion adds to the goodness of what is done, through the greater promptness or ease it causes in the act that follows.

The passions are morally evil: (a) when they are commanded by the will and directed to an object, a purpose, or circumstances that are evil, Thus, envy is an ignoble passion, since it is unreasonable, being sorrow at another’s success. Examples; Titus drinks to excess for the delight of intoxication (bad object); Balbus purposely excites his imagination, that he may hate more bitterly and act more cruelly (bad end); Sempronius loves his children so immoderately that he grows morose and jealous (bad circumstance). (b) The passions are also morally evil when they should be forbidden and are not forbidden by the will. Example; Caius is surprised by a sudden burst of anger, which, though he judges to be unreasonable, he does nothing to check.

The passions can remove, diminish or increase the evil of an act. (a) Thus, antecedent passions take away all evil, if (a thing that is rare) they prevent entirely the use of reason; they diminish malice if they obscure the judgment. Examples: Balbus, fearing that he is about to drown, becomes panic-stricken, seizes Titus and almost drowns him. Caius, threatened with a black eye if he refuses, calumniates: his calumny would be worse if he acted coldbloodedly. (b) Consequent passions increase the evil, for then they manifest a strong intention, or are the result of direct purpose. Examples: Sempronius attacks the conduct of an opponent, not with dispassionate argument and from a love of truth, but with bitter personal feeling and from a desire of revenge. Titia works herself into a rage that she may be the more ready for an encounter with a person of whom she is unjustly jealous.

Though the passions are physically good and in their nature morally indifferent, they may have physical reactions or moral consequences that are harmful or evil. These dangers may be physical, mental or moral.

(a) Physical Dangers of the Passions.—It is a well-known fact that there is a close connection between the passions and the nerves, heart, and bodily organism in general, and that strong or persistent emotion can work great detriment to the health, producing disease, unconsciousness, or even death.

(b) Mental Dangers of the Passions.—It is admitted by all that the passions disturb the judgment, and can even take away the use of reason. For they act upon the body or the senses, and these in turn affect the mind in a way similar to what happens in sleep or intoxication. Thus, love makes one blind to the defects of the object of one’s love; fear makes one magnify the evil of what is dreaded; melancholy unbalances the mind, etc.

(c) Moral Dangers of the Passions.—It is likewise a matter of common experience that the passions are a source of many temptations and sins. Often they are antecedent (i.e., not premeditated or willed), as when they arise from bodily states over which one has no control or from imaginations strongly fixed in the mind, and at the same time tend to that which is not according to right reason, rebelling against the law of the mind. Thus, a person whose health is bad is easily dispirited, and this feeling occasions temptations to despair; one whose memory is haunted with the image of a lost parent becomes a prey to sadness, which makes it difficult to perform duties with zest and diligence.

A passion may become morally bad on account of the physical or mental evils connected with it. (a) Thus, a person has duties to his own well-being, and he indirectly wills (see 35 sqq., 94 sqq.) to neglect these duties, if he indulges harmful passions. Example: Sempronia grieves immoderately over the death of her mother, with the result that her health and mental vigor are impaired. (b) A person also has duties with respect to the life, health, and happiness of his neighbor, and he chooses to neglect these duties if he unjustly provokes emotions in others, foreseeing injurious consequences (see 96 sqq.). Examples: Titus so vexes Balbus by petty annoyances that the latter loses appetite and sleep, and becomes an invalid. Sempronia so exasperates her father by long-continued unfilial conduct that the latter becomes insane. Caius appeals to prejudices in order to have injustice done to a rival.

As to passions that incite to evil or deter from good, we must observe the following: (a) if the passion is consequent, one is placing oneself or others in danger of sin, and one’s conduct must be judged according to the principles given in 258 sqq. (Examples: Titus likes to brood over his troubles, although this causes temptations to neglect duty; Sempronia makes remarks to a hot-headed acquaintance which are a provocation to great uncharitableness); (b) if the passion is antecedent, it constitutes a temptation which one is bound to resist (see 252 sqq.). Example: Balbus has a natural dislike for Caius, and often feels impelled to judge him rashly or treat him unjustly.

Antecedent or involuntary passions, as well as other involuntary acts of imagination, thought and will, tending to evil, are sometimes called “first motions of the soul,” as distinguished from consequent or voluntary passions and acts, which are known as “second motions of the soul.” The first motions are of two kinds: (a) those that precede all deliberation and consent, actual or virtual (motus primo-primi), and these are free from all sin; (b) those that precede full deliberation and consent, but follow on partial deliberation (motus secundo-primi). These latter are venial sins.

Most theologians since the Council of Trent maintain that the inordinate movements of passion which precede the advertence of reason, such as lust, envy, sloth, etc., are not sins. The Council of Trent defined that the fomes peccati has never been understood by the Church to be truly a sin in the baptized, but has been called sin by St. Paul in the sense that it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council of Trent, fifth session). On the basis of this text some authors argue that it is of faith that the inordinate motions called primo-primi are not sins for the baptized. The condemnation of both the fiftieth proposition of Baius: The evil desires to which reason does not consent, and which man endures unwillingly (invitus), are prohibited by precept; and his fifty-first: Lust, or the law of the members, and evil desires of it, which men suffer unwillingly, are true disobedience of the law; is interpreted as establishing as certain the non-sinfulness of such movements in infidels. (See Merklebach, O.P., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 448).

St. Thomas taught otherwise that such inordinate movements of passion are venial sins (Summa. Theol. I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2um; de Malo q. 7, a. 6. ad 4m; de Veritate, q. 25, a. 5). Although they precede the deliberation of reason, they attain to the order of moral acts, however imperfectly, insofar as sensuality in man by its nature is made to be subject to reason. Reason can and ought to control these motions, but fails to do so owing to the great number of them possible to occur. Hence they are not involuntary, but indirectly voluntary as sins of omission (II Dist. 24, q. 3, a. 2; de Veritate, q. 25, a. 5; Quodlib. IV, q. 11, a. 1). Since these movements are indirectly voluntary, St. Thomas’ teaching does not conflict with the Council of Trent which speaks of the fomes as habitual dispositions and not of its acts which St. Thomas considers. Clearly, too, his teaching does not fall under the condemnation of the propositions of Baius; with Baius the motions are involuntary, but for St. Thomas indirectly voluntary.

St. Thomas distinguishes the motions of sensuality differently from modern manualists. For him the motions-primo-primi arise from corporal dispositions which are not under the control of reason and hence can not be sins. Motions-secundo-primi arise from some apprehension of the internal senses proper to the passions and can, at least if taken singly, and ought to be ruled by reason. Thus, they are moral acts (de Malo, q. VII, a. 6, ad 8um; II Dist. 24, q. 3, a. 2).

Bodily suffering or sickness is sometimes called a passion of the body, but, unlike the passions of the soul, it is a physical evil. Morally considered, it is indifferent in itself, but it has contacts with morality in various ways. (a) Thus, it may receive morality from the will. Examples: Sufferings endured with resignation are acts of virtue; sickness or pain inflicted upon others is imputable to the unjust cause. (b) It may affect the morality of the act of the will. Examples: Severe toothache or other exquisite pain is an extenuating circumstance in sins of grumbling, for the suffering draws so much attention to itself that deliberation on other things is much diminished; weakness of stomach may be a moral advantage in freeing one from temptations to over-eating.

Though the passions are good in themselves, they are often morally dangerous. The regulation of the passions through the virtues of fortitude and temperance will be treated later on, but we shall indicate here some natural means by which, God helping, their first motions may be controlled. (a) Thus, if a passion is not strong, it may be repressed directly by command of the will. Example: The impulse to anger may sometimes be checked by the command of silence. (b) If a passion is strong, it may be combated through other activities which are its opposites or which, through the amount of energy they call for, will diminish proportionately the force of the passion. Examples: In time of fear one can fall back on thoughts of confidence; in time of mourning one can seek joy or alleviation in the society of friends or in the repose of sleep. Study or other strenuous occupation is an excellent means to overcome impetuous passion.

(c) If a passion is persistent, it may be diverted to some lawful object vividly represented and held in the imagination and thoughts. Examples. Those who are inclined to love immoderately the world or the things that are in the world should direct their love to divine goodness. Those who are inclined to be too fearful of men should think how much more God is to be feared.

Habits and Morality.—The importance of habits in man’s moral life is very great. (a) Habits are an index to a man’s past career, for the ease and facility he now possesses through them is the result of many struggles and efforts and difficulties overcome, or of defeats and surrenders and neglected opportunities. (b) Habits constitute a man’s moral character. Morally, a person is the sum of his moral habits and dispositions grouped around the central interest or idea of his life. He who would know himself, therefore, cannot do better than to examine what are his habits, and which is the predominant one among them. (e) Habits are a prophecy of the future. Habits are not irresistible and do not destroy freedom, but they produce such ease and readiness for acting in one particular way that the probabilities are, when habits are strong, that a person will continue to follow them in the future as he has done in the past, thus progressing or deteriorating, as the case may be.

Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

1. Blasius, wishing to harm Caius his enemy, intended to pierce his ass with lead. But alas! a double misfortune befell him. For the ass is not struck by the bullet, but leaps and springs away unharmed, while the cow of Titius his friend, which after a dense hedge was lying quietly, and could not be seen by him, is unhappily killed.

Q. 1. What is the not-voluntary and the involuntary? 2. Is Blasius held to restitution for the ass not harmed, or for the cow killed?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 8, 18. To the second, negatively to both. He is certainly not held to restitution for the ass, since it escaped unharmed. For to sin the mere will of causing damage suffices; but for restitution from damage caused, the mere damaging will does not suffice. There is also required a truly damaging action, and damage truly inflicted.

Nor is he held to restitution for the cow, since he neither intended that damage nor could foresee it, and so it was not voluntary; indeed it was altogether involuntary to him. For, for restitution from damage caused, an action actually damaging and damage actually inflicted do not suffice; it is required also that damage of this sort proceed from the will and be voluntary, so that it may be imputed to him and an obligation of reparation arise for him. Therefore in the forum of conscience, or before the sentence of a judge, he cannot be urged to any reparation of the damage. But what if the ass and the cow had belonged to the same Caius? In the rigor of principles, not even then would Blasius be held for the damage. For although it would not then have been involuntary, nevertheless it would still have been not-voluntary, because that damage would always have been unforeseen. For he had not seen the cow. - G. 3; I. M. 1358, 1370.

2. Faustinus, wishing to affect Nicolinus his enemy with injury, resolved to kill a pair of horses, which Nicolinus held very dear to himself. But amid the darkness of night, not discerning well, he kills another pair, namely asses of the same Nicolinus, which Nicolinus also held very dear to himself.

Q. Is Faustinus held to restitution; and, if affirmatively, what ought he to restore?

R. Faustinus is held to restitution from unjust damaging. For in the case there was a culpable, efficacious, and unjust cause of damage. Therefore no necessary condition for restitution is lacking. And indeed, knowingly and willingly, Faustinus killed the pair of asses, although he thought it was a pair of horses. Whence it cannot here be said that that killing was not-voluntary to him. The difficulty can only be in the estimation of the damage, because this cannot be taken from the horses, which he did not kill, nor from the asses, which he did not wish to kill. But certainly it cannot be taken from the horses, because their damage does not exist; and, on the contrary, it must be taken from the asses, because their damage does exist. In the present matter, error of person excuses from restitution, because then there is no injury of the person; but error of thing, since it does not remove injury of the person, does not excuse from restitution; for this always remains, whether by damage of horses or of asses; for in that damaging, the injury of the person, not of the horses nor of the asses, is considered. Therefore the damage unjustly inflicted must be repaired: the damage inflicted, by no means that which was not inflicted. If Caius, in order to inflict injury on Sempronius, were to snatch from him a golden necklace, judging it silver, and throw it into the sea, would he not certainly be held for the estimated value of a silver necklace? And if the necklace were silver, and he judged it golden, would he not again be held for the real value of the silver necklace? - Cf. 5. 1.

What are the impediments of the human act? - As is clear from what has been said, to have a human act there is required: 1. the exercise of the adverting intellect; 2. the free exercise of the will; 3. the exercise of the other faculties proceeding from free will. Now then, if we look at the fact itself, often we act without knowing what we are really doing, for we think we are doing something else. Likewise, often we act impelled by some vehement passion of concupiscence, or oppressed by some vehement passion of fear, and with violence done to us. In the first case there seems to be lacking the condition required on the part of the intellect; but in the second case there seems to be lacking the condition required on the part of the will. Here without doubt an impediment of the human act is had; and the question is raised concerning ignorance, concerning concupiscence and passion, concerning fear and force, whether they cause the involuntary. For ignorance and error obstruct advertence; force and fear obstruct deliberation; concupiscence and passion obstruct both.

Does ignorance cause the involuntary? - Ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly "when ignorance concerns that which is done; nevertheless, even if it were known, it would still be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to willing that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is done and unknown; as... when someone would indeed wish to kill an enemy, but, ignorant, kills him, thinking he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary" (namely contrariwise), "because it does not cause something that is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary" (or the involuntary merely privatively), "because what is unknown cannot be actually willed." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8.

But it makes the non-voluntary, whether that merely concomitant ignorance is involuntary, or whether it is not merely concomitant, but voluntary. Nevertheless there is a distinction between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case; because involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes something simply non-voluntary. But voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, makes that which is done with that ignorance non-voluntary indeed in itself, but voluntary in some way in the cause. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Voluntary in the cause, namely insofar as the ignorance concerns a thing which ought to have been known, and perhaps someone knowing would not do what he does ignorantly. And if certainly he would do it even knowing, the voluntary is still had indirectly in the cause, by reason of that evil disposition which the willed ignorance leaves intact, and by reason of that action, for example hunting, which was the cause of the consequent act, for example homicide. To the point Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2, n. 19: "That ignorance does not excuse from fault; therefore neither does it take away the voluntary. He is bound to expel that ignorance in order to avoid the act, and voluntarily omits to do this; therefore he also acts voluntarily, at least indirectly. Therefore it matters nothing that this ignorance is not the cause of the act, and that if knowledge were present, the act would nevertheless take place; both because, although we grant that that act is not voluntary in ignorance as in a cause, nevertheless that ignorance will be a sufficient condition for that act to be voluntary indirectly, insofar as man is bound and can avoid it and does not do so; for what he would have done if knowledge existed does not excuse him, but rather in a certain way accuses him more, because that is an evil disposition and contrary to the obligation by which he is bound to avoid the act; and also because that effect is voluntary in another act directly willed, as, for example, the killing of a man in hunting. But voluntary ignorance, although it is concomitant, is the reason or condition that that prior act of hunting be done imprudently or incautiously, and consequently that in it the effect thence following is judged to have been willed."

Indeed, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he was still then bound, indeed much more, to know; and knowing, perhaps, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he would not have committed the monstrous crime with open eyes. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; Billuart, de Act. hum., diss. 1, art. 6, I say 3.

If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is causing, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is afterward done from that ignorance. "But consequently," says S. Th. ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary."

Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, "since it is itself voluntary... it cannot cause the involuntary simply" (that is, contrariwise; since that which is done is voluntary in the cause from which it proceeds, i.e. in that willed ignorance). "Nevertheless it causes the involuntary according to a certain respect, insofar as it precedes the movement of the will to doing something, which would not be if knowledge were present," ibid.; that is, although that movement of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is altogether involuntary, for it would not be if knowledge were present. L. 1. 5. n. 4.

But if the causing ignorance, or that which is the cause of doing what is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not be if knowledge were present, and accordingly is against the will. Nor indeed is that willed in itself; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. "But antecedently," says the Holy Doctor ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for example, when someone, diligence having been used, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passerby. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply."

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. As regards the insane, it is certainly not always established that they are not sufficiently in possession of themselves in an act of sin. Nor likewise is it established whether those who are hypnotized, and in hypnotic sleep execute the evil commands of the one hypnotizing, are not also sufficiently in possession of themselves. But in these cases the voluntary can easily be in the cause.

Whether ignorance renders the act objectively null? - R. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot change the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who baptizes, thinking that a man is not really justified by baptism, nevertheless, if he has the intention of doing what the Church does, baptizes validly. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the water is truly natural, baptizes validly. A pastor who assists at a marriage, falsely thinking that he still needs some special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Consequently it must be said that by ignorance an act objectively null is not validated. Therefore, if a confessor ignorant of reserved cases absolves from them, he by no means truly absolves from them. Bonacina, de Sacram., d. 1, q. 2, p. 1, n. 28; Sporer, de Matr., n. 48.

Is ignorance always sin? - One ignorance is invincible, another vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects nothing at all concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or although he has fallen into suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after using moral diligence, he could not know the thing. After moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be used be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportionate to the person and to the matter about which there is question.

Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt about the thing and about the obligation of inquiring, but also has occasion of coming into knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by. L. 1. 1. n. 3. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible; but not every invincible ignorance is antecedent. Even merely concomitant ignorance is invincible. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary.

Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary accidentally. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether because of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse, or so that he simply may not be drawn back from sin. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study to knowing, or neglects to learn because of mere laziness or sloth, because of the labor of learning, or because of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine, and into purely vincible. Crass or supine ignorance is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless uses no diligence or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible ignorance is when someone uses some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, considering the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter.

Finally, accidentally voluntary ignorance is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had "when someone directly or indirectly wills something to which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as appears in the drunk man, who wills to drink wine excessively, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; but indirectly, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, growing, bind the use of reason in the particular thing to be chosen." S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Oblivion, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Therefore the same moral judgment must be made concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 3; L. 1. 1. n. 169; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9; q. 76. a. 3.

Finally, one ignorance is of law, by which a law or precept is unknown, as if someone does not know that marriage is contracted invalidly with one related by affinity; another is of fact, by which a fact is unknown, as if someone contracting marriage with one related by affinity does not know that she is related by affinity; another is of penalty, by which someone is ignorant of the penalty added to the law, as if someone striking a cleric does not know that excommunication is attached to that striking.

Invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it concerns those things which one is not bound to know. The reason for the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason for the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or to do sins by a sin of omission. Hence because of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which one cannot rightly exercise a due act. Hence all are bound commonly to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is naturally able to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and contingent particulars, unless perhaps in some particular case that occurs.

St. Augustine, l. 3 de lib. arb., c. 19; Suarez, on 3. p., t. 5, d. 4, s. 8, n. 18; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 6; q. 76. a. 2, 3; Quodl. 1. a. 19; Quodl. 8. a. 15; L. 1. 5. n. 4, 26 ff.; Wurzburg, c. 1, a. 3; E. M.

Whether ignorance diminishes sin? - Antecedent, invincible, efficacious ignorance, or ignorance that is the cause of sin, "which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but altogether removes it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. "Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it." S. Th. l. c., since it in no way influences the act of sin; nor consequently does it take away sin, insofar as it does not render it involuntary, but it takes it away only insofar as it renders it non-voluntary. S. Th. l. c. a. 3. But cf. 48.

Consequent ignorance that is purely vincible, or even crass or supine, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "diminishes the voluntary and consequently sin." S. Th. l. c. For the voluntary is had only indirectly or in the cause. Consequent affected ignorance, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "seems to increase the voluntary and sin; for from the intention of the will to sin it comes that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the liberty of sinning." Thus S. Th. l. c. a. 3 and others. But others deny this, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. tr. 19, n. 8, truly cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat. But one must distinguish; for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives.

If someone affects ignorance because of weariness of learning, or not precisely so that he may not be drawn back from sin, but so that he may not be drawn back from such an action to which he strongly adheres, or even so that he may not be drawn back from sin, the sin is not thereby increased. For ignorance of itself diminishes the notion of a human act and formal contempt of the law. Moreover, if for this reason he wills to be ignorant, so that he may not be drawn back from sin, therefore if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows a will not so confirmed in such a sin.

But if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, then the sin is increased, because that ignorance is a sign both of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt; since with such affection he pursues sin that he is willing also to suffer the loss of ignorance, and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not a sin. Therefore although that ignorance also excuses, because it always conceals the condition of the work, nevertheless it accuses and increases the sin by reason of its cause. Luke 23:34; Acts 3:17; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, s. 4, n. 183; Struggl, l. c. n. 36.

Since sins which proceed from ignorance are voluntary only in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in the positing of the cause itself, the gravity or lightness of the sin which follows from it must be taken from that cause, not from the gravity or lightness of the thing which is derived from it. For this latter is voluntary and culpable only insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary and culpable. And thus from lightly culpable ignorance of a physician or confessor, grave effects can follow, which consequently do not bring grave fault.

Is vincible ignorance of law a special sin of itself? - R. Negatively. For every law commanding its own observance implicitly commands knowledge of the same law. But it commands this only in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression of the law itself, for which it provides the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of them, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and through itself, and therefore, standing in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is culpable of itself, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the same virtue of faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence dissents from those things which are said by God. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 182 ff.; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 10; Viva, de Act. hum., q. 3, final article.

Are actions which someone does from a contracted habit to be held as human, and accordingly imputable? - A habit is a certain disposition of the soul by which something is done when there is need; and, if it is acquired by acts, it is called acquired. Hence habit contains a certain special propensity to an act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 49.

Now speculatively: They are human and imputable if he adverts to them, in themselves; otherwise only in the cause, as long nevertheless as he foresaw, at least confusedly, that they would follow from the habit when he was contracting the habit, and has not retracted the habit, nor tries to extirpate it. Practically: "Sinners of this kind badly habituated, although they have less ready knowledge than others, nevertheless always have some actual knowledge of their crimes sufficient to render the acts deliberate and mortal." L. 5. n. 4, par. Third; l. 3. n. 127; tr. de Act. hum. XIV. "It is manifest that he who sins from habit sins from certain malice." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. "He is said to sin from certain malice or industry, as if knowingly choosing evil," S. Th. l. c. a. 1, with full affection of the will.

For he who neglects to amend a custom of sin is convicted of loving and fostering sin, freely conserving a habit freely acquired; from this the will is borne into the act with greater readiness and propensity. Hence the voluntary is increased, although the free is diminished. And this applies whether the habit is bad or good. But sin of this kind "from certain malice, according as it comes from the inclination of habit, is not a special sin, but a certain general condition of sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 1 ad 3; 1. 2. q. 73. a. 4.

Does concupiscence cause the involuntary? - The sensitive appetite is distinguished into the concupiscible and the irascible. The concupiscible is that by which it reaches after or flees from those things which are represented through imagination as good or evil. The irascible is that by which it strives to remove those things which stand in its way as it reaches after the former things or flees from the latter. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23.

By the name concupiscence is understood here any movement whatever of the sensitive appetite which is borne toward the good or flees from the evil proper to itself. But those things which are said concerning the affection of the sensitive appetite can easily be applied to the affection of the will; for just as the movement of the will can be caused from sensitive concupiscence, so one affection of the will can be caused from another affection of the will itself. And thus from love of children, of God, of honor, someone voluntarily undertakes dangers, and that will will be the more fervent, the greater that affection was.

One concupiscence is antecedent, another consequent. The former precedes the free act of the will, and consequently is excited merely naturally. The latter follows upon the free act of the will. The former draws and inclines reason and the will. The latter redounds from the will. The former is not voluntary; the latter is voluntary, either in itself, if the will deliberately wills and excites it, or in the cause, if it naturally results from a free act of the will. "The sensitive appetite," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6, "can have itself to free choice both antecedently and consequently. Antecedently indeed, according as the passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines reason or the will. But consequently, according as the movement of the higher powers, if they are vehement, redounds into the lower powers. For the will cannot be moved intensely into something without some passion being excited in the sensitive appetite."

Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the voluntary both under the notion of voluntary and under the notion of free. Therefore an act proceeding from it is the less voluntary under both notions, the more intense it is. The reason for the first part is that an act is voluntary insofar as it is from an intrinsic principle. But concupiscence is extrinsic to the will. Therefore an act proceeding from its impulse is less voluntary under the notion of voluntary. Hence S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6 ad 3 says: "It must be said that, although the movement of the will is more intense when incited by passion, nevertheless it is not so proper to the will as if it were moved by reason alone to sin." And ibid. in the body: "An act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to be in us through reason and will. Hence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us."

The reason for the second part is that an act is the less voluntary under the notion of free, the less dependence it has on the part of free will and advertence on the part of reason. But when a preceding passion is more vehement, so much less is the dependence of this consequent act upon the will freely determining itself and upon reason considering. For the more the free will finds the soul already inclined by passion, the less it itself influences the determination of the consequent act. Then, although passion cannot directly influence judgment, nevertheless it can indirectly influence it in three ways: 1. Through a certain distraction, for the sense is less attentive to individual things when it is intent upon many. 2. Through a certain contrariety, insofar as it inclines to the contrary of what ought to be judged, and the soul becomes weak and feeble. 3. Through bodily alteration; for it perverts the phantasy, which does not present itself to the right operations of the intellect, as is seen in the insane and in those raging from the vehemence of passions.

But although from antecedent concupiscence the act of the will is less voluntary, nevertheless it becomes more intense and easier, because it inclines the will to willing. And according as the passion is greater, it renders the effort of the will easier. And thus soldiers from hope of glory, parents and friends from love of children and friends, gladly endure all kinds of burdensome things. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7 ad 3; q. 10. a. 3; q. 33. a. 3; q. 48. a. 3; q. 73. a. 6 ad 2; q. 77. a. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7; 2. 2. q. 154. a. 3 ad 1; q. 158. a. 3 ad 2; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 3, 4.

Consequent concupiscence presupposes an act the more voluntary the more intense it is. The reason is that consequent concupiscence is excited in us consequently upon an act of the will freely determining itself. Therefore whether it is excited naturally, through a certain redundancy into the lower part from the higher; or whether it is excited voluntarily, either indirectly through voluntary negligence and omission of repressing rising motions, or directly, deliberately and studiously, by exciting motions in the lower part; concupiscence, as consequent and not preceding the free act of the will from which it proceeds, cannot exercise any causal influence upon that act, but presupposes the same act of the will, which rather exercises influence upon it. And, if the discussion again is of concupiscence which is excited from the very act of the will, whether voluntarily or naturally, since an effect must be proportioned to its cause and cannot surpass it, consequent concupiscence does not diminish the voluntary, but rather increases it, insofar as it signifies and demonstrates a greater propensity and inclination of the will to the act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3 ad 1; q. 73. a. 6 ad 2; q. 77. a. 6.

Consequent concupiscence which arises from a merely natural resulting and redundancy of the superior part into the inferior, renders that which proceeds from it voluntary and more voluntary in the cause, the more interior it is, by the very fact that it proceeds from the will. But it renders that less voluntary in itself, since it always somehow clouds reason and somehow impedes the free exercise of the will.

But consequent concupiscence directly excited for acting, for example if someone deliberately excites hatred in himself against an enemy by turning over received injuries in his mind, so that he may seek vengeance more obstinately and execute it with greater daring, renders that which proceeds from it more voluntary simply, because that passion directly and voluntarily excited is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 10, 11; 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3 ad 1, 3; E. M.

Does passion diminish sin? - Passion is here called a movement of the sensitive appetite, as if by a certain force and impetus carrying off the soul, so that the soul seems as if to suffer under its influence. "It must be said that sin essentially consists in an act of free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Therefore if passion is taken according as it precedes the act of sin, then it is necessary that it diminish sin. For an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary.... And according to this passion lessens sin insofar as it lessens the voluntary. But consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or rather is a sign of its magnitude, insofar namely as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin. And thus it is true that the more someone sins with greater lust or concupiscence, the more he sins." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 79. a. 6; q. 24. a. 3. Cf. preceding n.; L. 1. 5. n. 23.

You will resolve: Hence it follows that sin is diminished the more vehement the antecedent passion is. "It must be said that it belongs to the notion of sin that it be voluntary, but that is called voluntary whose principle is in the agent himself. And therefore the more its principle is increased, the graver the sin also becomes; but the more an exterior principle is increased, the lighter the sin becomes. But passion is a principle extrinsic to the will, while the movement of the will is an intrinsic principle. And therefore the stronger the movement of the will has been toward sinning, the less" [the sin becomes]. S. Th. de Malo, q. 1. a. 11 ad 3.

But an act proceeding from consequent concupiscence is the more voluntary and the greater sin, the greater that concupiscence is. "If under concupiscence is included also the very movement of the will, then where there is greater concupiscence there is greater sin." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 73. a. 6 ad 2.

Does passion totally excuse from sin? - "It must be said that an act which of its genus is evil is totally excused from sin according to this alone, that it is rendered totally involuntary. Hence, if there is such a passion which renders the following act totally involuntary, it totally excuses from sin; otherwise not totally.... Passion sometimes indeed is so great that it totally takes away the use of reason, as is clear in those who become insane because of love or anger. And then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin, because it is voluntary in its cause.... But if the cause was not voluntary, but natural, for example when someone from sickness or some cause of this kind falls into such a passion that totally takes away the use of reason, the act is rendered altogether involuntary, and consequently totally excused from sin. But sometimes passion is not so great that it totally interrupts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude the passion by turning to other thoughts, or impede it from attaining its effect, because the members are not applied to the work except through the consent of reason. Hence such a passion does not totally excuse from sin." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 7; q. 6. a. 7 ad 3; q. 10. a. 3.

Are the first motions of evil concupiscence always sins, and of what kind? - There can be no doubt that the first motions of evil concupiscence are sins, and mortal sins, for there is question of a grave matter, if, when they arise, the will consents in the following time, and by consenting morosely delights in them, whether with a long, or short, and very brief delay. For the act is concerning a gravely base matter and is fully deliberate; and that first motion of concupiscence, although it was excited entirely independently of the will, once the consent of the will accedes, now begins to be a commanded act in its delay and permanence.

Likewise there is no doubt that the first motions of evil concupiscence naturally excited and independently of the will, which afterward dissents from and resists them according to its powers, are in no way sins. For the acts are altogether involuntary, and without the voluntary there is no sin. Indeed, merit is thence had for the will resisting. "The first motion," says S. Th. 2. d. 40. q. 1. a. 4 ad 3, "does not have the notion of fault except according as it is in some way in the power of the will. Hence, when the will does not resist, it has the notion of sin. But when the will already begins to resist, then man merits."

If finally, when the first motion of concupiscence arises, the will neither consents nor dissents, but permits it, not prohibiting it, such a motion already has the notion of sin, because in some way it is in the power of the will. For that motion is now not against and outside the will, which certainly does not intend it, but at least permits it. But the sin is not mortal, but light. For mortal sin is in aversion from God, which cannot be had without reason turning itself away from God through deliberation, which aversion is not had here. Therefore that sin is not mortal, but venial. For it is sin, since it is a certain disorder against natural honesty. S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2; Quodl. 4. a. 21; E. M.

Does fear cause the involuntary? - Fear is the trepidation of the mind because of present or future danger. L. 1. Quod metus, etc., Dig.

It is divided first into light and grave. The first is had either when the present or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is only little probable. The second is had when the evil is grave, very probable or certain. But an evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Absolutely grave is that which strikes fear of itself even into a constant man, and it has place when the evil which is feared is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such, as death, mutilation, etc. Relatively grave is had when the evil which is feared is not grave according to itself, but is such with respect to this or that person.

Fear is furthermore divided into intrinsic and extrinsic by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject himself, namely from each one's own weakness of body or soul. Fear of death excited by a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises, as from a cause, from an infirmity which is in the very subject of the fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is excited by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the road. Extrinsic fear inflicted by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have the right of inducing fear; as fear induced by a judge or by a highway robber. And whether fear has been inflicted justly or unjustly, such fear can be inflicted simply to obtain something, or to bring in some evil, as in robbers threatening death unless someone gives what he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in vengeance; and it can be inflicted in order to extort consent to some certain thing, for example, to betrothals, to marriage, to a contract, etc.

Fear by a special name is called reverential when there is fear lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subject, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator; and likewise an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering the fear dwells with them and receives support from them. "Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear of itself is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily includes fear of some grave damage imminent from obedience not rendered, for example, long-lasting indignation, etc." L. 1. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc., is an evil; and if it is long-lasting, it is a grave evil. Therefore, even with other evils excluded, for example beatings, threats, etc., reverential fear of itself is grave. L. 1. 5. n. 20; l. 6. n. 1056; C. H. 1267; C. G. 111, 11112; C. I. 1111 ff.; C. L. 666. "It is one thing to do something with fear, another truly from fear; for the first states concomitance. Hence what is done in that way, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers the fear itself, which is a sign of a great will: as when Christ the Lord was advancing toward death, fearing it, He embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that the fear itself induces one to willing or doing something; and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposed evil. For in this way in the present case, when someone fears death, he determines and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example, to throw goods into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause exciting and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, n. 6.

Now those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary according to a certain respect. For each thing is simply such according as it is in act. But here the act, insofar as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed, because, although such an action considered in itself is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a suitable means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that notion it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be made with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not by abstraction or precision of the intellect. "But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, insofar as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason, and therefore it is involuntary according to a certain respect, i.e., insofar as it is considered as existing outside this case." "Therefore that which is done through fear is voluntary without qualification, i.e., according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, i.e., if such fear were not imminent." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. "And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is voluntary simply, involuntary according to a certain respect." S. Th. Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; Quodl. 5. a. 10; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, 2.

Note: Light fear is not regularly judged a cause of acting, because it can easily be repelled and contemned. Nevertheless sometimes it can well be a cause of acting. And thus a subject, not daring out of reverence to contradict a superior, is determined by him, unwillingly, to acting.

Those things which are done from fear are involuntary according to a certain respect when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example given of throwing goods overboard for the merchant, which is evil for him in itself, and good for him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne into that thing with a perfect inclination of the will, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary according to a certain respect. And thus one who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an involuntary mixed in, because the observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even abstracting from that circumstance of fear of divine judgments.

Moreover, "he who wills to keep the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no punishment; for by this very affection he would sin and incur the guilt of punishment, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection be present with that motive." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 2, n. 6; L. 1. 6. n. 442, objection II.

Do importunate prayers constitute grave fear? - "Pontius, etc., affirms. But more truly it must be denied, unless the prayers are added to fear of reverence toward a superior; thus Sanchez, etc. And Sanchez well notes that not all assiduous prayers are called importunate, but only those which are most urgent and very often inculcated." L. 1. 2. n. 717.

Does grave fear excuse from fault? - Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and of themselves evil, or of those things which are from their nature intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with a grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. Ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law, which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from fault of transgression. For in the first, the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second and third, there would already be question of a thing intrinsically evil from its own nature. Nevertheless in this second and third case, if the one suffering, when he violates the law, publicly protests that he does not act thus in contempt of the law or of religion, but only to decline the violence, in the presence of which he declares that law and religion no longer oblige, then, if public scandal ceases, and the aforesaid contempt ceases - which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult - he would be excused from fault.

If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault. For those things, since they include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. But, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done that it suffices for mortal sin. L. 1. 1. n. 175; l. 5. n. 21; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 125. a. 4; Elbel 43-52; Del Vecchio, vol. 1, n. 144.

You will resolve: Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, whether divine or human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept. And thus someone is not bound with danger to life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, or to aid a neighbor in extreme necessity of life. On the contrary, to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Viva, Opusc. de Act. hum., q. 4, a. 4; Lessius, q. 6, a. 6; L. 1. 1. n. 175.

Can the will suffer violence besides fear? - Force or violence is the impulse of a greater thing which cannot be repelled. Here it is commonly defined as that which is from an extrinsic principle, while the one who suffers force resists. While resisting, and accordingly it is against the inclination of the will, so that the one who suffers force cannot do the contrary, and entirely resists. Therefore two things are required for violence. The first, that it be from an extrinsic principle, because no one can properly be said to inflict violence on himself. Hence the distinction between violence and fear is clear, which can come both from an intrinsic principle, such as, for example, fear of death coming from illness, and from an extrinsic principle, such as, for example, fear of shipwreck, of hell, and of punishments. The second thing required is that the one suffering entirely resist, that is, according to his powers and positively; for if someone were only passive, then indeed he would not contribute to violence by acting, but he would contribute by willing to suffer. Nevertheless resistance altogether absolute and continual against the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other on the other hand the matter concerns something less dangerous. Thus the martyrs, when led to pagan temples, did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting the danger of scandal or injury to religion. L. 1. 5. n. 15 seq. "As regards the proper act itself of the will (namely, the elicited act), violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior principle which knows.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Therefore no one can will unwillingly, because he cannot will while not willing to will. By the hypothesis he would will, and at the same time he would not will, because he would be opposing himself as willing. S. Anselm, De libero arbitrio, l. 1, c. 6; L. 1. 5. n. 19. "As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence, insofar as the exterior members can be hindered by violence from carrying out the command of the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. The will can likewise suffer violence in the exterior members, even though the command of the will is not properly present, as, for example, if someone is seized against his will, bound hands and feet, cast into prison, etc. And this holds not only as regards the exterior members, but also as regards the interior faculties. For it is clear that the will can command not only the hand, for example, not to sign one's name on the promissory note of a fictitious creditor, and yet that hand, seized by force by him, must sign; but it can also command the intellect to think about and consider some matter, and yet the intellect, distracted, is carried off to thinking about other things; it can command the sensitive appetite to obey reason, and yet that appetite is moved contrary to reason. Likewise an extrinsic cause, for example the devil, can excite phantasms in the imagination against the will, etc. Suarez tr. 2. d. 2; Lessius on q. 6. a. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 80, S. q. 47. a. 2; L. 1. 3. n. 430. 433; E. M.

64 bis. Note: The command of the will is not exercised in the same way over the senses as over the exterior members. When these are found in their normal state, the will exercises perfect command over them, according to their natural power. But as regards the senses and the sensitive appetite, it is not the same. "It must be said," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3 ad 3, "that, as the Philosopher says, reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible powers; not indeed by despotic rule, as a servant is moved by his master; but by royal or political rule, as free men are governed by one ruling, who nevertheless can move in a contrary direction. Hence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in a contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them."

Does violence cause the involuntary? - Violence causes the involuntary as such contrarily. For "violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that both are from an intrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature, so in things that know it makes something be against the will. But what is against nature is said to be unnatural; and similarly what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Hence violence causes the involuntary," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6; violence simply causes the involuntary simply, violence in a qualified sense causes the involuntary in a qualified sense; not indeed as regards elicited acts, but as regards commanded acts. For only as regards commanded acts, and not also as regards elicited acts, can the will suffer violence. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5 ad 1, S. q. 47. a. 1. - E. M.

You will resolve: Therefore when some passion is simply violent, namely because someone resists and opposes it by the will in every way he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a qualified sense, namely because it is not sufficiently resisted when it can be repelled or weakened, or because it is not wholly opposed when in no way can it be repelled or diminished, then the notion of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither is the notion of a human and imputable act; but it is only diminished, according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, and according to the greater or lesser resistance and opposition. Rom. 7:20; S. Aug. De Civitate Dei c. 16; L. 1. 3. n. 430. 433, 1. 5. n. 16.

66 bis. Note: "The involuntary is said in two ways, namely through ignorance and through violence. And therefore robbery has one notion of sin, and theft another. Therefore on this account they differ in species.... In other genera of sins the notion of sin is not taken from something involuntary, as it is taken in sins opposed to justice; and therefore where a diverse notion of the involuntary occurs, there is a diverse species of sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 4. 9.

Four things are opposed, namely ignorance, concupiscence, fear, and force or violence.

20. • DEFINITION. Force or violence is coercion which is inflicted on someone by an extrinsic and free cause, his will resisting.

DIVISION. A twofold violence is distinguished, namely absolute or in a certain respect, according as coercion is inflicted on someone resisting in every way, or resisting only to some extent ¹.

¹ It happens in two ways that someone resists only to some extent, namely 1. when the force is not of such a kind that it cannot be broken or weakened by stubborn resistance; 2. or when someone does not suffer the force inflicted, whatever it may be, unwillingly.

Principles. - I. Elicited acts of the will can in no way be coerced, because force cannot be brought upon the will. Hence St. Anselm: No one unwilling (he says) can will, because no one can will not willing (On Free Choice, ch. 6). And St. Thomas: It is contrary to the notion of the act itself of the will that it be coerced or violent (I-II, q. 6, art. 4).

II. External acts ² posited from absolute violence are in no way voluntary or free, and therefore neither sinful nor demeritorious; but external acts which are posited from violence only in a certain respect are more or less free according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection with which someone suffers force. - St. Lig., nos. 17-18.

² Understand acts extrinsic to the will, which are elicited by other powers, whether external or internal. For not only the exterior members of the body, but even the interior faculties, such as imagination, the sensitive appetite, etc., can be moved by some extrinsic force, for example of an Angel, both good and evil, to some acts, while the will resists in vain.

21. You Will Resolve. - 1. A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her in no way sins, even if she suffers rape; for no one sins wholly unwilling.

2. Women suffering force sin gravely if through pusillanimity or vain fear, for example of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even apart from danger of consent; because even if they do not consent to sensual pleasure, nevertheless while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves and cooperate in the crime of another. - But whether a woman oppressed by force sins if, because of fear of death, she omits to cry out, is controverted. - It seems probably to be denied, apart from danger of consent. Indeed very probably, apart from the aforesaid danger, a woman is not held to cry out when there stands a danger of any notable harm, whether of infamy or of excessive shame; for if otherwise she already resists as much as she can, she is not held with so great an inconvenience to repel force. Thus expressly St. Lig., book 3, no. 430. Yet in practice the opposite manner of acting is to be advised, on account of some danger of consent ³. - St. Lig., book 3, no. 368.

³ But indeed if the danger of consent is present, the opposite manner of acting is not merely to be advised, but altogether to be enjoined. But if this kind of danger can prudently be judged absent, it does not appear that a penitent is easily to be induced to undergo grave danger of harm or infamy without an equal cause. Compare La Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 916.

3. Sometimes absolute and continuous resistance to coercion inflicted is not required, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other hand the matter at issue is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of the pagans did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required to avert the danger of scandal, or injury to Religion.

1. We have spoken of the voluntary of human acts in the first Commentary; now, in this second Commentary, we must speak of the free. That the free is found in human acts is a truth of faith, which is established with all evidence and certitude from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Cf. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 2. The reason is that “if some good is proposed to the will which has the complete notion of good, and the ultimate end, on account of which all things are desired, it cannot not will to be happy, or will to be miserable. But in those things which are ordered to the ultimate end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in, nor anything so good that it suffices in all things; whence, however much it is shown to be good or evil, it can always adhere and flee into the contrary by reason of the other which is in it, from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good, and, if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and thence it is that in all things which fall under choice, the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it desires natural happiness, and not determinately in this or that.” St. Thomas, 2. Dist. 25. q. 1. a. 2., 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 3., D. 8. S. 4.; Lessius on q. 10. St. Thomas; Würzburg Theology, n. 144 ff.

2. The free adds, above the act of the will, only a relation to the power eliciting the act of the will and having the power to suspend that act, or to elicit another act diverse only in species or even opposed. In the first case it is called liberty of exercise or of contradiction; in the other case, liberty of specification; in the third case, liberty of contrariety. Cf. Becanus, tr. 1. c. 2. q. 1., c. 3. q. 3. The exercise of the act is from the application of the will to willing; specification is from the various nature of the object. Therefore the free certainly requires in the will an active power of act and non-act, of this or that act; but it by no means requires immunity also from infirmity, namely from concupiscence and other passions and miseries of human life; since these are extrinsic, they cannot change the intrinsic manner of acting of the human will. Hence St. Thomas says: “it must be said that that infirmity which is in voluntary evils is subject to the power of man; and therefore it neither removes nor diminishes the notion of fault.” 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. ad 3. This liberty, concerning which we are treating, is physical liberty. But moral liberty involves in its concept only the lack of obligation in conscience, or under fault, by force of a law commanding or prohibiting; which obligation presupposes physical liberty. Wherefore moral liberty connotes physical liberty. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. 3., q. 15. a. 2., q. 24. a. 3.

3. The aforesaid active power of the will essentially requires immunity from intrinsic necessity. The reason is that otherwise there would now be no further distinction between natural or necessary acts, and voluntary or free acts; now all acts of the will would be necessary, as being from intrinsic necessity, or all would be free if intrinsic necessity does not take away the liberty of the act. And thus the very acts of the will concerning the ultimate end or happiness, or concerning good in common, would be free. “Will,” says St. Thomas, “is divided against nature, as one cause against another, for some things happen naturally, and some things happen voluntarily.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. ad 1. Namely, acts are divided into necessary acts and free acts. The former happen naturally, but the latter voluntarily. For an act to happen naturally is for it to happen from the instinct of nature, from intrinsic necessity. But for an act to happen voluntarily is for it to happen neither from the instinct of nature nor from intrinsic necessity. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. 4.; Würzburg Theology, n. 94 ff.

4. Besides immunity from intrinsic necessity, that active power of the will which is contained in the liberty of the same will further requires intrinsic active indifference to acting, namely a power intrinsically indifferent to acting or not acting, to acting this or that, once all conditions prerequired for acting have been posited. - Proof of the first part: the free excludes intrinsic necessity of acting. Therefore it necessarily implies intrinsic power of acting or not acting, of acting this or that. But this power is a power intrinsically and actively indifferent. Therefore. Proof of the second part: if that active indifference were to be understood only antecedently to the necessary prerequisites for acting, a free cause would differ in nothing from a necessary cause. Würzburg Theology, n. 100 ff. - The voluntary, according to the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1, imports the motion or act of those things which, from their own inclination and not inclined by another, perfectly move themselves. How therefore, if the aforesaid active intrinsic indifference of the will were lacking, would the voluntary still be had from one's own inclination and from perfect motion by oneself to act?

5. The doctrine concerning the free, proposed in the preceding number, both as to the matter and even as to the words themselves, is truly the doctrine of St. Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor explains the free through dominion of the act. “Those actions alone are called properly human of which man is master. But he is master of his acts through reason and will; whence also free choice is said to be the faculty of will and reason.” 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. - He explains it through moving oneself to the end. “Therefore those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion of their acts through free choice.” 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. “Perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, insofar, namely, as, the end having been apprehended, someone can, deliberating about the end and about those things which are to the end, be moved into the end or not be moved.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. - He explains it through power for opposite acts. “From this, that deliberating reason is disposed toward opposites, the will is able toward either.” Ibid. ad 2. - He explains it through the determination of the faculty itself to act. “Man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparently good,” 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3; and he excludes God's determination to one from without; for he opposes this determination to particular good, proceeding from the will itself, to the motion of God toward good in common. Likewise he excludes intrinsic determination to one, saying: “But there is another mode of causing proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the mode which belongs to nature, which is determined to one.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. ad 1. ad 3. “But the will is indeed, according to the order of nature, determined to one common thing, which is good, but it is indeterminately disposed with respect to particular goods.” 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2. And here it must be noted that St. Thomas so truly excludes from a freely acting cause determination to one, that he explains a necessary cause in acting through this determination to one, taking necessity in acting and determination to one in acting for one and the same thing. And thus in 1. 2 q. 13. a. 2 he says: “But there is a difference between the sensitive appetite and the will, because, as is clear from what has been said above q. 1. a. 2. ad 3, the sensitive appetite is determined to one particular thing according to the order of nature; but the will is indeed, according to the order of nature, determined to one common thing, which is good, but it is indeterminately disposed with respect to particular goods.” And ad 2.um: “The brute animal takes one thing before another, because its appetite is naturally determined to it; whence immediately, when through sense or through imagination something is represented to it, to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to it without choice, just as also without choice fire is moved upward and not downward.” These things specifically concerning the distinction between the will and the sensitive appetite. But speaking altogether generally about causes, St. Thomas divides them into natural and voluntary, or into necessary and free, q. 10. a. 1. ad 1, q. 21. a. 1. 2, etc.; and he explains the mode of causing of a natural, or necessary, cause by determination to one, without power toward either. Wherefore, according to the Angelic Doctor, a necessary cause is a cause determined to one; a free cause is a cause actively indifferent toward either. The Angelic Doctor furthermore explains the free expressly through the active indifference of the will. “Therefore because the will is an active principle not determined to one, but holding itself indifferently toward many things, God so moves it that he does not determine it of necessity to one, but its motion remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 4.

6. And in this last place the Angelic Doctor explicitly, in the very words, excludes determination by God to one; wherefore he also excludes predetermination to one. But if by the name of premotion is understood that motion of God concerning which the Angelic Doctor says, God moves the will, divine premotion can very well be admitted, indeed must be admitted, since God's motion is prior by nature to the motion itself of the will. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, namely q. 9. a. 6. ad 3, “that God moves the will of man as universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is good; and without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man through reason determines himself to willing this or that... good.” Moreover it is evident that that universal motion is prior by nature to this determination; whence, without that preceding universal motion of God, the particular determination of the human will cannot be had.

7. But if by the name of premotion is understood premotion to one certain act, to one determined act, just as St. Thomas excludes determination, or predetermination, by God to one, so also he excludes motion or premotion by God to one. Whence the Angelic Doctor immediately adds that God so moves the will that its motion remains contingent and not necessary: it certainly remains contingent and not necessary, as flowing from the human will, in the composite sense of the divine motion itself. He so moves that it remains contingent. Wherefore the explanation of the Angelic Doctor differs in nothing from the explanation of liberty given above in the preceding number.

8. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor explains liberty through choice, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2. 6, which altogether excludes determination to one, and is indeterminately disposed toward many things, or is actively indifferent toward choosing them. Nor indeed can choice be understood without this intrinsic active indifference. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, “that since choice is the pre-acceptance of one thing with respect to another, it is necessary that choice be with respect to many things which can be chosen; therefore in those things which are determined to one, choice has no place. But there is a difference between appetite and the will, because, as is clear from what has been said above, q. 1. a. 2. ad 3, the sensitive appetite is determined to one particular thing according to the order of nature; but the will is indeed, according to the order of nature, determined to one common thing; but it is indeterminately disposed with respect to particular goods. And therefore properly it belongs to the will to choose, but not to the sensitive appetite, which alone is in brute animals; and on account of this it does not belong to brute animals.” Cf. Contra Gentiles, l. 2. c. 48, l. 3. c. 88. 89.

9. Finally, the Angelic Doctor explains the free through the active application of appetitive motion to something, which also excludes any intrinsic and extrinsic determination to one. “Consent,” he says, “properly speaking, is not in brute animals. The reason for this is that consent imports application of appetitive motion to the doing of something. But it belongs to him in whose power the appetitive motion is to apply appetitive motion to the doing of something: just as touching a stone indeed belongs to a staff, but applying the staff to the touch of the stone belongs to him who has it in his power to move the staff. But brute animals do not have appetitive motion in their own power; rather such a motion in them is from the instinct of nature, whence a brute animal indeed desires, but does not apply appetitive motion to something. And on account of this it is not properly said to consent, but only a rational nature is, which has appetitive motion in its own power, and can apply it or not apply it to this or to that.” 1. 2. q. 15. a. 2.

10. Wherefore it must be concluded that, as the free excludes any intrinsic necessity, and consequently any extrinsic coercion, so also it excludes any intrinsic and extrinsic determination to acting. Nor indeed does it avail to object those things which the Angelic Doctor has in the same cited place, q. 10. a. 4. ad 3, where he says: “it must be said that, if God moves the will to something, it is incompossible with this position that the will not be moved to that thing; nevertheless it is not impossible simply. Whence it does not follow that the will is moved by God of necessity.” From these words indeed the Holy Doctor can seem to teach that the will is not determined to one before the divine motion, but, once the divine motion has been posited, is now determined to one. And this would be to teach, in almost the same number of words, the noted distinction of the composite and divided sense. Namely, in the composite sense of the divine motion it is impossible or incompossible that the act not be posited; but that this is possible simply, possible namely in the divided sense of the divine motion. - But the Holy Doctor in that response ad 3 certainly says this, which is quite different: once the divine motion has been posited, it is impossible that the act not be posited. But since the divine motion is of such efficacy that through it not only is something done, “but also that it be done in that mode which agrees with the nature of the thing itself; and therefore it would be more repugnant to the divine motion if the will were moved from necessity, which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved freely, as belongs to its nature,” ibid. ad 1; consequently it cannot be said to be impossible simply that the act not follow; for what is impossible simply cannot be that which is, but contingently is toward either, for the acting will can act or not act. What is impossible simply is not contingent, but is altogether determined. And it must be noted that the act remains contingent and free in the composite sense of the divine motion itself, and in the same composite sense that act consequently proceeds from a will actively indifferent and able toward either. For the Holy Doctor says, both in the said response ad 1.um and in the body, that that motion accommodates itself to the nature of things and of the will, and consequently does not move this will by necessity and with determination to one. If that motion agrees with the nature of the will, if it does not move by necessity by determining to one, it certainly moves in such a way that, with the divine motion itself standing, the will remains what it is, and, as the Holy Doctor says in the body of the article, this is the will, namely an active principle not determined to one, but holding itself indifferently toward many things. Therefore the will remains, in the composite sense of the motion, wholly what it is, and therefore actively indifferent and able toward either, not determined to one; and likewise, with that motion standing, the motion of the will remains contingent and free, and therefore proceeded from the will, under that motion, as not determined to one. God so moves it that he does not determine it of necessity to one, but its motion remains contingent, in the evidently composite sense of the divine motion itself. Nevertheless, once this divine motion to something has been posited, it is incompossible with this position that the will not be moved to that thing, since that divine motion already implies with itself the concomitant motion of the will itself, though contingent and free, because most certainly the motion of the will remains contingent and free. Cf. 1. p. q. 19. a. 8.

11. According to the Angelic Doctor, the free is founded in the objective indifference of the preceding judgment of reason, proposing the thing not as absolutely to be chosen, but only as choosable on account of the various reasons of fittingness and unfittingness which can be present in it. For he says that the free is had “insofar as, the end having been apprehended, someone can, deliberating about the end and about those things which are to the end, be moved into the end or not be moved.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3. “From this it happens that man is master of his act, that he has deliberation concerning his acts. For from this, that deliberating reason is disposed toward opposites, the will is able toward either.” Now deliberation cannot be had unless reason proposes to the will the various fittingnesses and unfittingnesses which are in the object. Moreover in 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2 the Angelic Doctor has these words: “In the motion of any power by its object, the account must be considered through which the object moves the power.... Whence, if some object is proposed to the will which is universally good, and according to every consideration, of necessity the will tends into it , if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed to it which is not good according to every consideration, the will is not borne into it of necessity.” Therefore the free is founded in this proposing of the object on the part of reason under diverse considerations, according to which the same object can be rejected or approved by the will. And in 1. 2. q. 13. a. 6: “In all particular goods, (reason) can consider the notion of some good and the defect of some good, which has the notion of evil. And according to this it can apprehend each of goods of this kind as choosable or fleeable. But perfect good alone, which is beatitude, reason cannot apprehend under the notion of evil, or of some defect. And therefore man wills beatitude of necessity, nor can he will not to be blessed, or to be miserable. But choice, since it is not about the end, but about those things which are to the end, is not of perfect good, which is beatitude, but of other particular goods. And therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.” And 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. ad 2: “It must be said that the root of liberty is the will, as subject; but reason is so as cause. For from this the will can freely be borne to diverse things, because reason can have diverse conceptions of good. And therefore the Philosophers define free choice as a free judgment concerning reason, as though reason were the cause of liberty.”

12. “It is inferred that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, whether concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, that then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. First, those which precede the use of reason and are elicited by the tempted person in that instant or time in which the intellect has not yet proposed to the will motives deterring it, but only those enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. Secondly, those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the tempted person in that instant in which the intellect proposes deterring motives only obscurely, but motives enticing toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved by the deterring motives only weakly and imperfectly. And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. Thirdly, finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unfittingness and moral malice, by which the will could be freely deterred, if it seriously willed. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. Acts of the 1.i kind are not free, and consequently neither are they formally sinful. Acts of the 2.i kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the 3.ii kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful.” Struggl, Moral Theology, tr. 1. q. 1. a. 1. n. 10. Cf. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.

13. A question arises from the established doctrine of the preceding number 11: whether for the exercise of liberty there is prerequired a practical judgment, or command of reason, by which it is defined that the object here and now, all things considered, is to be chosen or rejected? - R. Bellarmine (On Grace and Free Choice, l. 3. c. 8. 9.) indeed concedes that a judgment of this kind is required, and he further concedes that the will is determined to one from this judgment, but he denies that liberty is weakened thereby. For he says that that very practical judgment by which the will is determined is in the power of the will, insofar as, various objects or reasons of fittingness or utility having been proposed to the will, the will permits itself to be moved rather by one than by another object, rather by one than by another reason of fittingness or utility, from which permission of the will one practical judgment rather than another flows. Wherefore, although the will is determined by practical judgment, nevertheless this practical judgment follows upon the exercise of liberty. And thus liberty remains whole. But although the authority of Cardinal Bellarmine is great, still we cannot follow his opinion in this matter. For that practical judgment by which the will is determined to one: is it absolutely necessary, or is it absolutely free? If the 1.um, therefore all liberty is ended. If the 2.um, either it is free intrinsically, or extrinsically from the command of the will. The first cannot be said, because the formally free faculty is not the intellect but the will. But if the second is said, then either that command of the will is determined from another judgment of the intellect, and thus one must proceed to infinity, or it is not determined from a previous practical judgment, and then it is false that the will in all its free acts is determined by the last practical judgment of the intellect. Wherefore, with Suarez in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 2, D. 6. S. 5. 6, D. 8. S. 4, Lessius in q. 6 of St. Thomas, and others, it is rather to be said that, for having the free determination of the will, such a practical judgment altogether determining it is not necessary. For to have the exercise of the will it is enough that the intellect propose the object to it as choosable; for by thus proposing the object, it proposes that object under some notion of good. Cfr. Becanus, tr. 1. c. 2. q. 5. 6. 7.

14. As has already been said, “the will is moved in two ways. In one way as to the exercise of the act; in another way as to the specification of the act, which is from the object. - Therefore in the first way the will is moved by no object of necessity. For someone can fail to think about any object whatever, and consequently neither actually will it.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. And De Malo q. 6. a. un.: “The appetite for beatitude itself also is from necessity as to the determination of the act, because one cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can then not will to think about beatitude, because even the acts themselves of intellect and will are particular.” “But as to the second mode of motion, the will is moved by some object of necessity, but by some not.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. The reason is that there are some objects, namely good in common, the ultimate end in common, and the means necessary to it, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. 2, which are not proposed to the will by reason except under the consideration of good. “But any other particular goods, insofar as they fall short of some good, can be taken as not good. And according to this consideration they can be rejected or approved by the will,” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2, rejected as not good, approved as good; for thus indeed there is had, on the part of the object, a moving reason of the faculty toward act, but a sufficient moving reason is not had. “The sufficient motive of any power is only an object which totally has the notion of motive. But if it is deficient in something, it will not move of necessity.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. ad 1.

1. In the preceding Commentaries we have spoken about the nature of the human act; now we must speak about the impediments of the same human act. For having a human act there is required the exercise of an adverting intellect, the exercise of the free choice of the will, and the exercise of the other faculties proceeding from the free will. If we consider the fact itself, often we act without knowing what we are truly doing, thinking that we are doing something else. Often also we act, impelled by some vehement passion of concupiscence, or oppressed by some vehement passion of fear. Not rarely also we are forced to suffer, wholly unwilling, by an extrinsic force inflicted on the members of our body. Hence it is asked whether acts of this kind are truly human acts and imputable to the agent, since ignorance, concupiscence, fear, force, or violence seem to take away or diminish the aforesaid conditions and endowments of the human act. For ignorance takes away the prerequired cognition; concupiscence clouds and diminishes it; likewise concupiscence, fear, and violence hinder the inclination of the will. In the present Commentary there will be discussion only of ignorance. Concerning concupiscence, concerning fear, concerning force, there will be discourse in the following Commentaries.

2. Ignorance is distinguished into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Ignorance can be compared either to the will of the one ignorant, or to the action done ignorantly. With respect to the will, every ignorance is either antecedent, because it precedes the consent of the will, or consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. The former is involuntary, the latter voluntary. With respect to the action, it is either antecedent, because it is the cause of the act, or concomitant, because it is not the cause of the act. Hence the same ignorance can be antecedent and consequent in a diverse respect: antecedent, because it is the cause of the act; consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. Becanus, Tr. 1, C. 2, q. 10, n. 36.

3. The first question which is raised concerning ignorance, and which the Angelic Doctor in fact raises, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8, is: “whether ignorance causes the involuntary.” The question is not whether ignorance causes the non-voluntary, or the involuntary merely privatively. For it is evident and not disputable that an act from ignorance, or done with ignorance, destitute of the condition essentially required for the voluntary, is a non-voluntary act. Therefore the question is only whether an act of this kind is, besides, involuntary, namely involuntary contrarily. Understand involuntary with respect to the condition ignored, not with respect to the object known and willed. For he who, for example, eats meat on a forbidden day can be understood to will and operate two things. The first is to eat meat, which is not unknown by him; the other, that he transgresses the precept, is unknown by him.

4. Therefore ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly “when ignorance is about that which is done; nevertheless even if it were known, it would nonetheless be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to will that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is both done and ignored; as in the example posited, namely when someone indeed wished to kill an enemy, but, being ignorant, kills him, thinking that he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary (namely contrarily), because it does not cause something which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary (or the involuntary merely privatively), because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. And this holds whether that concomitant ignorance is voluntary or is involuntary. Hence it is that the Angelic Doctor speaks generally and does not distinguish. Nevertheless a difference is present between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case, because, although neither causes the involuntary, concerning which the Holy Doctor properly treats, l. c., nevertheless involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes the simply non-voluntary; but voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, indeed makes the non-voluntary in itself, but voluntary in the cause. “Therefore because that which is caused from the will is regarded as voluntary in morals, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary, to that extent it falls short from this, that it causes the non-voluntary.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.

5. If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is a cause, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or is antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is then done from the ignorance itself. “Consequently,” says St. Thomas in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary.” Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, “since it itself is voluntary..... it cannot cause the simply involuntary (namely contrarily, since that which is done is voluntary in the cause whence it proceeds, namely in that willed ignorance); nevertheless it causes the involuntary secundum quid, insofar as it precedes the motion of the will toward doing something, which would not exist if knowledge were present”; ib.; namely, although that motion of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is wholly involuntary; for it would not be if knowledge were present. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4.

6. But if the ignorance causing, or which is the cause of doing that which is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not exist if knowledge were present, and thus is against the will. Nor indeed is it, in itself, willed; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. “Antecedently,” says the Holy Doctor in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act, which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for instance when someone, diligence having been applied, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passer-by. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply.”

7. Whether ignorance renders an act objectively null? — Resp. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot alter the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who, in baptizing, thinks that a man is not in reality justified by baptism, if nevertheless he has the intention of doing what the Church does, validly baptizes. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the true water is natural, validly baptizes. A parish priest who assists at matrimony, falsely thinking that he still needs a certain special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Cf. Bonac., De Sacram., D. 1, Q. 2, P. 1, n. 28.; Sporer, De Matr., n. 48.

8. Whether ignorance is always a sin? — Ignorance differs from nescience and from error. Nescience is the simple negation of knowledge; whence anyone who lacks knowledge of certain things can be said not to know them. Nescience, as is clear, is not a sin. But ignorance is the privation of knowledge, namely when someone lacks knowledge of those things which he is apt by nature to know. Error is to approve false things as true. “Whence it adds a certain act over and above ignorance: for there can be ignorance without the fact that someone makes a judgment concerning things unknown, and then the one ignorant is not erring; but when he now makes a false judgment about the things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err. And because sin consists in act, error manifestly has the account of sin (namely of itself or objectively); for it is not without presumption that someone make a judgment concerning things ignored, and especially in those things in which danger exists.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 7. It is not without presumption, namely again of itself or objectively; for subjectively and as to formal sin, or fault, presumption yields to truth, if in good faith, if invincibly, someone has erred, as must presently also be said concerning ignorance.

9. Although ignorance is joined with error, nevertheless it is distinguished from error. Likewise, although ignorance is joined with sin, nevertheless it is not always sin itself. “Since the will is of the good or of the apparent good, the will is never moved into evil unless that which is not good appears in some way to reason as good; and on account of this the will would never tend into evil except with some ignorance or error of reason.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 2. Ignorance indeed takes away cognition of the thing ignored, but it does not take away the use of reason. If the use of reason itself is lacking, as in infants, the insane, those sleeping, the drunk, the voluntary and the human act cannot be had from defect of the use of reason, unless perhaps in the cause. Yet practically it is not always easy to determine whether sometimes in these there is had a use of reason sufficient for grave sin.

10. Further, as concerns ignorance, a twofold ignorance must be distinguished by reason of the voluntary: one invincible, the other vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects absolutely nothing concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or, although he has fallen into a suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after moral diligence has been applied, he could not know the thing. It is said, after moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be applied be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportioned to the person and to the matter in question. Cf.

St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 3. Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, but besides has the occasion of coming to knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by.

11. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary. Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary per accidens. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether on account of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse for sin, or so that he may simply not be drawn back from sin, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9., q. 76. a. 3., De Malo q. 3. a. 8. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study for knowing, or neglects to learn on account of mere laziness or sloth, on account of the labor of learning, on account of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine and into purely vincible. Crass or supine is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless applies no or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible is when someone applies some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, with consideration of the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter. Finally, ignorance voluntary per accidens is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had “when someone directly or indirectly wills something upon which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as is clear in the drunk man who wills to drink wine superfluously, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; indirectly, however, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, increasing, bind the use of reason in a particular eligible thing.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.; 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

12. Moreover forgetfulness, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Wherefore the same moral judgment must be passed concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Cf. Suarez, D. 4, S. 3.; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 169.

13. Further, invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin, if it is of those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it is of those things which someone is not bound to know. The reason of the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to a man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason of the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or do, sins by a sin of omission. Whence, on account of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. But the sin is graver in proportion as the ignorance is more voluntary. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 2., q. 19. a. 6., Quodl. 8. a. 15.

14. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which someone cannot rightly exercise a due act. Whence all are commonly bound to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is born apt to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and particular contingencies, unless perhaps in a particular case occurring. S. Th. l. c.

15. Having posited that ignorance can be sin, it is asked further: whether ignorance can also be a cause of sin? — Sin can be taken in two ways: formally, for subjective fault itself; materially, for the objective act itself of sin. — If the discussion is about the objective act itself of sin, how ignorance can be a cause of sin is shown thus. Toward that which is unknown as to all things, the will cannot be borne. But if something is known according to something and unknown according to something, the will can will it. And in this way ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this one whom he kills is a man, but does not know that he is his father; or when someone knows that some act is pleasurable, yet does not know that it is sin. Further, the moving cause is twofold, one per se and another per accidens. Per se indeed is that which moves by its proper power; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, or as the very removal of what prohibits. And in this way ignorance can be the cause of an act of sin. For it is the privation of knowledge perfecting reason, which prohibits the act of sin insofar as it directs human acts. Whence it is clear that not every ignorance of one sinning is a cause of sin, but only that which takes away the knowledge prohibiting the act of sin, not that which simply takes away the knowledge of the act of sin. If the will of someone, for example, is so disposed that, recognizing his father, he certainly would not kill him, and this man kills a man not knowing that he is his father, ignorance is the cause of the act of parricide; if on the contrary the will of someone is so disposed that he would not be prohibited from the act of parricide even if he recognized his father, ignorance of the father is not the cause of sin for this man, but has itself concomitantly to the sin; and therefore such a one does not sin because of ignorance, but sins while ignorant. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. — If the discussion is about the subjective fault itself of sin, vincible ignorance can be a cause of sin or fault. The reason is that “ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting.” But someone can deliberately will not to know certain things, lest he be drawn back from sin; someone can, on account of other occupations, neglect to learn those things by which he would be drawn back from sin. But invincible ignorance cannot be the formal cause of sin. For invincible ignorance can be the cause of effecting an act which would be sin if it were done voluntarily; yet simply it is never a cause of sin, because when it is present, not only is the act not sin, but it can even be virtue. Cf. n. 6. — S. Th. l. c. a. 3.; Suarez, Tr. 5, D. 4, S. 1, n. 5.

16. “But it must be considered that reason is directive of human acts according to a twofold knowledge, namely according to universal and particular knowledge. For one conferring about things to be done uses a certain syllogism, whose conclusion is judgment, or election or operation. But actions are in singulars. Whence the conclusion of the operative syllogism is singular; but a singular proposition is not concluded from a universal except by means of some singular proposition. Thus a man is prohibited from the act of parricide by this, that he knows that a father is not to be killed, and by this, that he knows this one to be his father. Therefore ignorance of either can cause the act of parricide, namely both of the universal principle, which is a certain rule of reason, and of the singular circumstance.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. The former, by reason of the object, is ignorance of law; the latter is ignorance of fact. The first is had when either the general law itself is ignored, or the comprehension of some particular case under the aforesaid law. But the other is had when either the thing itself morally taken, concerning which the matter is, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing a wolf and you kill a man; or when some circumstance of the thing, likewise morally inspected, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing an enemy and you kill your brother. Ignorance of law happens both in the uneducated and in learned men themselves, who often go off into contrary opinions; ignorance of fact likewise can happen in all, from inconsideration, from forgetfulness, from inadvertence. Ignorance of law is one thing simply of law, commanding or prohibiting something; another is of the penalty constituted by law against transgressors of the law. This ignorance can happen more easily when the penalty is extraordinary.

17. Since ignorance can be a cause of sin, another question arises: whether ignorance can excuse entirely from sin? — Ignorance which is the cause of an act has of itself that it excuses from sin. The reason is that the voluntary belongs to the account of sin. But that ignorance causes the involuntary; since, as has already been said, ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting; and thus such an act, if knowledge were present, would be contrary to the will, which the name involuntary imports.

18. But sometimes it does not excuse totally from sin, sometimes it excuses totally from sin. And this the Angelic Doctor declares thus, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 3: “That it sometimes does not excuse totally from sin can happen from two things. In one way from the part of the thing itself ignored. For ignorance excuses from sin insofar as something is ignored to be sin. But it can happen that someone indeed ignores some circumstance of sin, which if he knew, he would be drawn back from sinning, whether that circumstance makes for the account of sin or not; and nevertheless there still remains in his knowledge something through which he knows that it is an act of sin; for instance, if someone striking someone knows indeed that he is a man, which suffices for the account of sin, but nevertheless does not know him to be his father, which is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin; or perhaps he does not know that the one defending himself strikes him back, which, if he knew it, he would not strike him, which does not pertain to the account of sin. Whence although such a one sins on account of ignorance, nevertheless he is not totally excused from sin, because there still remains to him cognition of sin. In another way this can happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, namely, that ignorance itself is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know certain things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and a sin, provided that it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know. And therefore such ignorance does not totally excuse from sin. But if the ignorance is such as to be wholly involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it is of that which someone is not bound to know, such ignorance wholly excuses from sin,” if namely ignorance of this kind, invincible, is total by reason of the bad object unknown, and not only partial; for example, if someone in the example already adduced not only invincibly were ignorant of the circumstance of father, but also of the circumstance of man, and believed that he was striking and killing a beast.

19. Ignorance which is not the cause of sin does not excuse from sin. The reason is that ignorance of this kind does not cause the involuntary, but only makes the man not willing; but of the account of sin, as has been said, is the voluntary; and the voluntary is taken away by the involuntary, not by the non-voluntary; for the non-voluntary is simple lack and negation, just as white is taken away by black, but is not taken away by non-white, because non-white is a mere negation. — Wherefore when it is said that ignorance which is not the cause of the act does not excuse from sin, the sense is that of itself it does not excuse from sin, or does not have the force of taking sin away from the act, because it permits or leaves the act to be perfectly voluntary; but the sense is not that in the act in fact there perseveres the account of formal sin, for while ignorance stands, if it is invincible, the act lacks the condition required for sin, namely cognition of the malice of that act. But the Angelic Doctor, in the cited place, says simply that ignorance of this kind does not excuse from sin, because this ignorance in relation to the act has itself merely per accidens and not per se, as is clear from what has been said, since it influences nothing in the act, and knowledge considers those things which are per se, not those which are per accidens. — Wherefore, since that ignorance merely happens accidentally to sin, it neither accuses nor excuses the sin. It does not excuse, since it does not cause the involuntary; it does not accuse, because nevertheless it makes the act non-voluntary. But that by these things the Holy Doctor does not wish to affirm that in an act posited with such ignorance the account of sin is had, is confirmed from q. 6. a. 8., where, speaking of concomitant ignorance, which namely is not the cause of that which is done, and of what would be done still even if it were known, he says: “and such ignorance does not make the involuntary, because it does not cause anything which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” Moreover formal sin cannot exist in the non-voluntary. Cf. also q. 19. a. 2. ad 3.

20. The question now follows: whether ignorance diminishes sin? — “Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. The reason is that that ignorance influences nothing in the act of sin; whence, just as it does not excuse from sin, cf. n. 19, so also it neither increases nor diminishes sin, but leaves it wholly in that state in which it is. If a confessor, for example, is so disposed in soul that he absolves all penitents, whether prepared or indisposed for sacramental absolution, the fact that he is ignorant, whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily, of the principles of Moral Theology, this ignorance, as it is not the cause of the sin and does not excuse from that sin, so neither does it increase or lessen it. The same should be said of an ignorant physician of the healing art who is so disposed in soul that he wills to procure, as much as is in him, not the health, but the death of the sick.

21. But ignorance which is the cause of sin, and “which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but wholly takes it away.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

22. Ignorance alone which is the cause of sin, and yet does not totally excuse from sin, can diminish sin, because it diminishes the voluntary. Cf. n. 4. 5. Wherefore consequent ignorance indirectly voluntary, namely crass or supine ignorance, or purely vincible ignorance, and ignorance voluntary per accidens, since they diminish the voluntary, consequently diminish sin.

23. “Sometimes,” says the Angelic Doctor in the cited place, “ignorance which is the cause of sin is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or per accidens; as when someone does not will to labor in study, from which it follows that he is ignorant; or when someone wills to drink wine immoderately, from which it follows that he is made drunk and lacks discretion. And such ignorance diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin. For when something is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens. Whence there is less contempt there, and consequently less sin.”

24. Consequent ignorance directly voluntary, that is, affected ignorance, seems on the contrary to increase the voluntary, and consequently sin. “But it happens sometimes,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, “that such ignorance is directly and per se voluntary, as when someone of his own accord does not know something, so that he may sin more freely. And such ignorance seems to increase the voluntary and sin. For from the intention of the will toward sinning it comes about that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the freedom of sinning.” Thus indeed St. Thomas and others. But others deny it, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. Tr. 19. n. 8., in reality cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat.

25. But it seems that one must distinguish, for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives. If someone affects ignorance merely on account of weariness or labor in learning, or not precisely lest he be drawn back from sin, but lest he be drawn back from such an action, to which he strongly clings, the sin certainly is not increased: for example, if someone were unwilling to know what the Church has defined concerning some matter, because he does not wish to depart from the Church’s definition, and otherwise wishes to think freely, as long as the Church’s definition is not certain to him. For then, if it happens in the matter that he dissents from the definition of the Church, without doubt this is with a lesser will, and without pertinacity, and with less contempt. But if someone affects ignorance for this end, lest he be drawn back from sin, the sin is increased precisely in the account of intrinsic inclination, and of the inclined will, and, in this sense, of the voluntary, since the man so loves that thing that on account of it he wills even to undergo the loss of ignorance; but it is diminished simply in the account of a human act, for ignorance, from whatever cause it may arise, per se lessens the account of a human act and the formal contempt of law. Moreover, in such a case that man wills to be ignorant for this reason, lest he be drawn back from sin. Therefore, if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows that the will is not so firmly established in such a sin. Finally, if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, wholly contemning the law, the sin certainly is increased, because that ignorance is a sign of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt, since he pursues sin with such affection that he wills even to suffer the loss of ignorance and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not sin; as if someone, in the example adduced, should be unwilling to know the definition of the Church, because he has decreed to think thus, whatever the Church may think. And in this sense indeed St. Thomas in the cited place seems to be understood. Cf. Suarez D. 4. S. 2.; Lugo, On Penance, D. 4. S. 4. n. 183.; Struggl, cited place, n. 36.

"2. Although invincible ignorance of the natural law be granted, in the state of fallen nature this ignorance does not excuse one who acts from it from formal sin." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"10. That they did not sin who, not knowing Christ, crucified Him, and that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to guilt." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II in the year 1140.

"But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or the fomes, remains in the baptized; and since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent, but who resist manfully through the grace of Christ Jesus; indeed, he who shall have contended lawfully shall be crowned. This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it is from sin and inclines toward sin. But if anyone shall think the contrary, let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 5, Decree on Original Sin, penultimate paragraph.

"74. Concupiscence in the regenerate who have relapsed into mortal sin, in whom it now dominates, is sin, just as are other vicious habits. - 75. The evil movements of concupiscence are, for the state of corrupted man, prohibited by the precept: Thou shalt not covet; whence a man who feels them and does not consent transgresses the precept Thou shalt not covet, although the transgression is not imputed as sin. - 76. As long as anything of carnal concupiscence is in one who loves, he does not fulfill the precept: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"19. That neither the work, nor the will, nor concupiscence, nor pleasure, when it moves the soul, is sin, nor ought we to will to extinguish it." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II.

"17. Free will having been handed over to God, and the care and thought of our soul having been left to Him, no further account is to be taken of temptations; nor must any resistance be made to them other than a negative one, with no industry employed; and if nature is moved, it is necessary to allow it to be moved, because it is nature. - 37. On occasions of even furious temptations, the soul must not elicit explicit acts of the opposite virtues, but must remain in the aforesaid love and resignation." Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI.

"8. To eat and drink unto satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided that it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts. - 9. The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone is wholly free from all fault and venial defect." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, Decree of 2 March 1679.

87. After those things which we have set forth concerning the principles which produce a free act, it remains to inquire concerning the causes which influence the same, for increasing its liberty, or diminishing it, or wholly taking it away. Generally theologians treat only concerning the impediments of a free act, four of which are enumerated by St. Thomas: ignorance, concupiscence, violence, and fear. Yet elsewhere others are listed, concerning which it is useful to say a few things here, so that the confessor may be more equitable in judging the works of penitents. But we consider it more opportune here to treat not only concerning the impediments of liberty, but concerning the principal causes which influence it for diminishing or increasing it. Now certain causes influence the voluntary more proximately: 1. indeed directly in the intellect, and indirectly in the will, such as error and ignorance; 2. directly and principally in the will, such as the passions; 3. directly in the execution of volition, and indirectly in the intellect and will, such as violence. - But other causes influence the intellect and will more remotely, such as heredity and temperament, education, habit, and also certain morbid states affecting body or soul. Concerning these we must speak separately.

The subject of morality is man as a rational creature, able to know the moral law and conscious of being responsible for his acts and omissions.

Man's chief ethical faculty is free-will, i. e., the power to determine his own actions or to choose for himself between right and wrong (liberum arbitrium, vis electiva). By virtue of this faculty man is truly and properly the master of his own actions (dominus actuum suorum).

Only those acts are properly called human (actus humani, in opposition to actus hominis) of which man is master, i. e., which he performs with consciousness and free-will (actus morales). ¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 83, art. 3: "Choice is proper to free judgment. We are said to possess free judgment because we can accept one thing while refusing another, which is to choose; and therefore the nature of free judgment must be considered from choice." —Ibid., 1a 2ae, qu. 1, art. 1: "Man differs from other irrational creatures in this: that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are called properly human of which he is master. Man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be a faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are called properly human which proceed from a deliberate will. If any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of a man, but not properly human actions, since they do not belong to man insofar as he is man."

The liberty of the human will, which we take as an axiom from philosophy and Dogmatic Theology, ² is not merely a Catholic dogma,³ but a fundamental truth of revealed religion,⁴ and the pivot of all morality.⁵ Without free-will man could perform no ethical acts, either good or bad; there would be no moral responsibility, no imputability, no virtues or vices, neither guilt nor merit, and no redemption.⁶ To deny the freedom of the will, therefore, is to deny Christianity itself.

² See Readings at the end of this chapter.

³ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 5: "If anyone says that man's free will was lost and extinguished after Adam's sin, or that it is a thing only in name—indeed, a name without a reality—and finally a fiction introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema."

⁴ Cfr. Gen. IV, 7; Deut. XXX, 19-20; Ecclus. XV, 14-18; Matth. XXIII, 37.—St. Augustine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, II, n. 2, says: "He has revealed to us through His Holy Scriptures that there is free choice of the will in man. ... The divine precepts themselves would not profit man unless he had free choice of the will, by which, in doing them, he might attain the promised rewards."—Ibid., n. 4: "What of the fact that in so many places God commands all His commandments to be kept and done? How does He command this if there is no free will?" (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 882 sq.)—Cfr. E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. II, Paris 1904, pp. 51 sqq.

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 24, qu. 3, art. 2: "The will is the principle of moral things, and therefore the moral order begins where dominion of the will is first found."

⁶ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, c. 1, n. 3: "Both punishment and reward would be unjust if man did not have a free will."—IDEM, De Vera Religione, c. 14, n. 27: "If we do evil not by the will, no one at all should be rebuked or admonished; and if these are removed, the Christian law and every discipline of religion must be taken away. Therefore sin is committed by the will. And since there is no doubt that sin is committed, I see that there should likewise be no doubt that souls possess free choice of the will." —IDEM, Enarrat. in Ps., CI, serm. 1, n. 11: "If You had not given me free choice and by this reason made me better than beasts, just condemnation would not follow me when I sinned." —IDEM, Retract., I, c. 9, n. 4. (See Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1241; XXXIV, 133; XXXVII, 1302; XXXII, 596).—Cfr. St. Jerome, Adv. Iovin., II, c. 3: "God created us with free choice, and we are drawn by necessity neither to virtues nor to vices. Otherwise, where there is necessity, there is no crown." (Cfr. ibid., XXIII, 286). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 83, art. 1: "Man possesses free choice; otherwise counsels, exhortations, precepts, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain."

Free-will is capable of development and cultivation, and hence is not the beginning but the end of moral endeavor. Man, by "going from virtue to virtue," and by ''growing unto salvation," ⁷ is called to attain "moral liberty," to develop into "a perfect man unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ," and thereby to reach that blessed freedom which is "the glory of the children of God." 8 Moreover, free-will is not absolute but relative and limited in various ways:—metaphysically, by man's dependence upon the will of His Creator, and ethically, by certain natural, individual, personal, and social factors which constitute as many intrinsic determinants of liberty.

⁷ Ps. LXXXIII, 8; Phil. III, 13; 1 Pet. II, 2.—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 11.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. ⁸ sqq., 13, 83. —C. Gutberlet, Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner, Fulda 1893, pp. 26 sqq. —M. Maher, S.J., Psychology; Empirical and Rational, 4th ed., London 1900, pp. 394 sqq. —IDEM, in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 259 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, New York 1902, pp. 249 sqq. —IDEM, Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill), London 1906. —W. von Rohland, Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner, Leipsic 1905. —A. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. I, Paris 1904. —H. Gründer, S.J., Free Will, the Greatest of the Seven World-Riddles, St. Louis 1911. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 329 sqq. —W. McDonald, Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1910, Ch. VIII. —J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 21 sqq.

⁸ 2 Cor. III, 17; Eph. IV, 13; Rom. VIII, 21.

I. Man was created for both time and eternity. Here on earth, where he is to prepare himself for the life beyond, he is subject to the same laws as other terrestrial creatures. However, since he holds first rank among, and was made to rule over these creatures,¹ he is empowered to use them as means to achieve his own particular ends.²

¹ Gen. I, 26 sqq.; II, 19 sq.; IX, 2.—Cfr. St. Augustine, Tract, in loa., 33, c. 6; Vergil, Aeneis, VI, 727; Sophocles, Antigone, 332 sqq.; A. Jakob, Der Mensch, die Krone der irdischen Schöpfung, Freiburg 1890.

² 1 Cor. III, 22.

But man is not created for this world alone. He has an immortal soul,³ and is bound so to employ his earthly sojourn that he may attain eternal beatitude. This is the express will of God, which man cannot change, and to that extent his freedom is limited by his supernatural end. However, this limitation by no means abrogates free-will, but rather elevates it to a higher plane of perfection.⁴

³ Rom. XIV, 7 sq.; Acts XVII, 28; Job XIV, 5 sqq.

⁴ Job I, 21; Prov. XXVII, 1; Luke XII, 20; 1 Tim. VI, 7; Jas. IV, 13 sqq.—St. Polycarp, Ep. ad Phil, IV, 1 (ed. Funk, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 301). —Tertullian, Ad Uxorem, I, c. 7: "Beyond these things, I advise you to reflect that no one is taken from this world except by God's will, if not even a leaf falls from a tree without God's will. The same One who brings us into the world must also lead us out." (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 68).—Horace, Carm., I, 4, 13; 28, 15.

II. Though he is the lord of the physical universe, man is in several respects subject to nature.

1. His moral life is influenced by natural causes. Certain physical disturbances are regularly followed by definite phenomena in the ethical domain. Statistics show how greatly men are dependent on climate, the weather, seasonal changes, and other physical agencies. They are compelled to battle with nature for their existence and well-being, and this struggle involves a constant expenditure of physical as well as intellectual energy.

2. Man's control of his own actions is limited by the life of the body.⁵ His intellectual knowledge depends upon the senses. Through the organs of the body man receives impressions by the aid of which he forms mental images, concepts or ideas. Moreover, the intellectual and moral life of man is influenced by various bodily conditions, e. g., the need of food and sleep, the sexual instinct, disease. Man has to devote considerable thought and attention to the care of his body and is frequently compelled to combat its impulses. The body has been compared to a dead weight or a prison impeding the intellect in its movements. But this comparison is one-sided. The body is an essential constituent of the compound, man. It is the organ of the soul, subject to its elevating influence. Animated and, as it were, spiritualized by the soul, the body becomes the source of sentiments conducive to moral improvement. ⁶ The life of the body, moreover, furnishes the soul with many occasions for practicing virtue and acts as a strong counterpoise to pride and self-conceit.

⁵ Wisd. IX, 15.—Cfr. J. B. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 174 sqq.

⁶ St. John Chrysostom, Orat. de Angusta Porta, i, says that the body is the harp of the soul; the spirit moves the strings, and if this is done in the right way, the instrument gives forth the beautiful melody of virtue. (Migne, P. G., LI, 41).

Whereas the Old Testament emphasizes man's mastery over the earth, the New insists that the body be kept holy because it is a temple of the Holy Ghost.⁷

⁷ 1 Cor. I, 19; III, 16; Rom. VIII, 11; VI, 16-22.

READINGS. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit. 2nd ed., Münster 1908.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 169 sqq. —Ellsworth Huntington, World Power and Evolution, Yale University Press, 1919. —J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 30 sqq.

Man as an individual is constituted by a material body and a spiritual soul,¹ and endowed with impulses and inclinations which give rise to definite temptations, virtues, and vices. The individual determinants of free-will are chiefly three: 1. AGE. —Age exercises a notable influence on the human organism and offers to the will a special field in which to exert itself. Though the individual continues the same, and his personality is essentially unaffected by age, the differences wrought by the latter are so far-reaching that moral science must take account of them.

¹ See Scholastic Psychology and Pohle-Preuss, The Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 124 sqq.

Each age has its peculiar ethical tasks and problems. ² In infancy man is almost completely ruled by egoism, but the egoism of the child has a redeeming feature in his ready submission to God (faith) and parents (filial love, pietas).³ In early childhood the operation of the will, so far as it acts independently, is negative rather than positive, characterized by a tendency to obstinacy, destructiveness, and cruelty.

² 1 Cor. XIII, 11; Tit. II, 1-6; John II, 12-14.

³ Cfr. Matth. XVIII, 1-6; XIX, 13-15; Mark X, 13-16; Matth. XI, 25. —St. Jerome, Ep., 52 (al. 2), n.

³ (Migne, P. L., XXII, 528); W. Preyer and K. L. Schafer, Die Seele des Kindes, 8th ed., Leipsic 1908; R. Gaupp, Die Psychologie des Kindes, Leipsic 1908.

The period of adolescence is marked by a struggle between liberty and control. Though very receptive at first, the boy soon begins to assert himself against his elders. He is inclined to follow the bent of his sensual nature, to enjoy himself, to substitute knowledge for faith, to criticize and doubt, to engage in airy speculations, to waver to and fro between optimism and pessimism, hope and despair. Over against these tendencies are the faculty and inclination to labor, to cultivate tender sentiments, and to seek noble ideals. Unless these faculties are properly trained, the young man is liable to become an egoist, a dreamer, and a sentimentalist.⁴

⁴ Cfr. Sophocles, Antigone, 705 sqq.; Horace, Ep., II, 3, 156 sqq. (De Arts Poetica)', I, 2, 67 sq.; Homer, Ilias, III, 108; IV, 320.

Manhood, the age of maturity, is marked by full control of the vital energies, by a certain fixity of both the bodily and the intellectual type, and by a preponderance of the active over the receptive faculties. The peculiar dangers that beset middle life are pride, vainglory, isolation, heartlessness and obtuseness of mind resulting from untoward experiences. These perils can be avoided by cultivating a strong sense of duty and devoting oneself to the service of God and one's fellowmen and to the contemplation of nature. ⁵ Thus each succeeding period of life has its peculiar ethical stamp; each its special dangers and pitfalls; each its own capacity for virtue. This truth is exemplified in the lives of the saints, who belong to every age, clime, and condition.

⁵ Cfr. Job XII, 12-13; Prov. XVI, 31; Ecclus. XXV, 6-8; Wisd. IV, 8-9.—J. Ehring, Des Priesters Greisenalter, Münster 1896, pp. 3 sqq., 59 sqq.

2. TEMPERAMENT. —By temperament we understand the peculiar physical and mental character of an individual. The ancients enumerated four types —the sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric (or bilious), and melancholic. None of these temperaments is found unmixed in any one individual. Nevertheless, as the temperaments contain the germs of definite inclinations and tendencies, a study of them is of great importance for the formation of character. The temperaments undoubtedly influence the will, though by no means irresistibly. Besides, every man is more or less responsible for the faults peculiar to his temperament. Hence arises the duty of acquiring control over one's temperament and its idiosyncrasies. In this matter the Apostles furnish splendid models.⁶

⁶ Cfr. A. Fouillee, Temperament et Caractere selon les Individus, les Sexes et les Races, Paris 1895; P. Michel, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Vol. I, pp. 445 sqq.

3. NATURAL TALENT. —Talent is a special aptitude or faculty for effective action along certain lines. Talents differ and are differently distributed. Some men are more talented than others. Some are highly gifted in more than one respect, while others scarcely show any trace of talent at all. The presence or absence of special aptitudes necessarily influences man's intellectual and moral development, and hence is an ethical factor of considerable importance. A man's choice of vocation and his social standing are largely conditioned by his talents, and experience teaches that, as a general rule at least, the moral sense develops in proportion to the growth of intelligence.

However, while talent has a place among the individual determinants of free-will, its influence is by no means compelling. Whether endowed with many talents or few, great or small, man remains master of his actions. There is no hard and fast relation between morality and intellectual culture. Intellectually inferior men sometimes attain to great moral perfection. Moreover, man's ethical development depends upon other factors besides natural aptitudes. Even infidel savants admit that the low mental and moral state of many primitive races is the result, not of natural inferiority, but of a process of depravation.⁷ For some reason or other their natural faculties and aptitudes were not properly developed. The Catholic Church teaches that every normal human being is able to distinguish good from evil and to observe the more general or absolutely necessary precepts of the Gospel. It is this conviction that inspires Catholic missionary activity among the heathen. History testifies that nations which have attained to some degree of culture are more easily converted than those completely immersed in savagery.

⁷ Cfr. W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker, Vol. I, Paderborn 1885, pp. 3 sqq.; C. Gutberlet, Der Mensch, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1903, pp. 474 sqq.

READINGS. —J. B. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 251 sqq.; Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 268 sqq., 418 sqq. —C. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, Freiburg 1904, pp. 99 sqq., 131 sqq. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, 2nd ed., Münster 1908, pp. 132 sqq. —M. Maher, S.J., Psychology, 4th ed., London 1900, p. 393. —T. Pesch, S.J., Instit. Psychologicae, § 1078 sq. —O. Brüssau, Die Temperamente und das christliche Leben, Hamburg 1906. —M. Maher, S.J., in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. II, p. 585.—A. C. O'Neil, ibid., XIV, 8. —A. Waldron, O.P., ibid., XV, 474. —F. Muszinski, Die Temperamente, Paderborn 1907. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 65 sqq. —Fr. a Barbens, O. M. Cap., Introductio Pathologica ad Studium Theologiae Moralis, Tarracona 1917.

Man is not merely an individual, he is also a social being, and as such his liberty of choice is influenced by several other factors in addition to those already enumerated. They are: 1. SEX. —Sex is the sum-total of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish the male from the female organism. Its influence is not limited to the body, but extends to the intellect and the will, and consequently affects the moral character.¹

¹ See Readings at the end of this Section.

The male sex, generally speaking, possesses greater spontaneity, energy, and strength than the female. These advantages are counterbalanced by certain defects, e. g., lack of delicacy and sentiment. The female sex, on the other hand, enjoys greater receptivity, a more delicate sense of modesty, a more intense religious sentiment² and greater patience, but is less strong in resisting evil,³ and more prone to fall.⁴

² The liturgical phrase, "devotus femineus sexus," be it remarked in passing, is merely a synonym for "virgines Deo devotae," i. e. the members of female religious orders.

³ Cfr. 1 Pet. III, 7, and the hymn for Matins in the Commune Virginum of the Roman Breviary.

⁴ Cfr. R. Stade, Aus der Gefängnisseelsorge, Leipsic 1901, pp. 56 sqq., 105 sqq.; IDEM, Frauentypen aus dem Gefängnisleben (1903), pp. 40 sqq., 57 sqq., 67 sqq.; H. F. Beneke, Gefängnisstudien, Hamburg 1903, pp. 13 sq., 76 sqq.

But though sex is a determinant of morality, it does not neutralize free-will. For in the first place the human soul or spirit is non-sexual ⁵ and the same law binds both male and female. "There is one law for men and women." as the Schoolmen put it. The assumption of a so-called double standard of morals is unchristian.⁶ Secondly, all virtues are attainable by both sexes, and neither enjoys any intellectual or moral privilege that is denied the other.⁷ Third, the sexual relations of men and women, unlike those of irrational brutes, are not governed by physical necessity, but controlled by the will,⁸ which can ennoble and spiritualize them.⁹

⁵ Cfr. St. Ambrose, Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., II, n. 28: "The soul, which has no sex." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1562); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 93, art. 6, ad 2: "The image of God is common to both sexes, since it is according to the mind, in which there is no distinction of sexes."

⁶ Cfr. 1 Cor. VII, 3-4: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife." —Cfr. the Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. IV, 8: "This is the course of action for wife and husband." Ibid., 10: "For this reason it was enjoined on you to live by yourselves, whether husband or wife." (Ed. Funk, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 476, 8 and 13; Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers, Vol. II, London 1913, p. 81). —The Corpus Iuris Canonici quotes the following from St. Ambrose (C. 4, C. XXXII, qu. 4): "A man is not permitted what a woman is not permitted. The same chastity is required of the husband as of the wife." And this from Innocent I (c. 23, C. XXXII, qu. 5): "The Christian religion condemns adultery on equal grounds in both sexes." St. Jerome in speaking on the same subject centuries before the days of Gratian insists on the striking contrast between the pagan double code of morality for men and women, and the single or equal code of Christian teaching. (Ad Oceanum, Ep. LXXVII). "The laws of the Caesars are one thing," he writes, "those of Christ another: Papinian commands one thing, our Paul another." And after describing the larger licence the Roman laws allowed to men and husbands, he sets against this the Christian code of equality: "Among us, what is not permitted to women is equally not permitted to men; and the same servitude is assessed on equal terms." Such is the contrast presented, in the judgment of St. Jerome, at the close of the fourth century, between the Christian and Pagan ideas on this question. And yet, after the lapse of fifteen hundred years, a candid historian of morals is fain to confess that the pagan idea still predominates in modern Europe.

⁷ Cfr. Gal. III, 28; Matth. XXVIII, 10; Acts XVII, 12, 34; XVIII, 2. —St. Ambrose, Expos. Evang. sec. Lucam, IV, n. 57: "The Lord came to heal both sexes, and he who 'was created first' had to be healed first; nor was she who had sinned more through fickleness of mind than through depravity to be passed over." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1629).—St. Augustine, Serm., 12 (al. 16 de Diversis), n. 12: "Wishing to bring both sexes to the hope of renewal and restoration, He chose the male sex, in which He would be born, and the female, through which He would be born." —IDEM, Serm., 190 (al. 61 de Diversis), n. 2: "Since He Himself assuredly created both sexes, that is, male and female, He therefore also wished by being born to honor both sexes, which He had come to liberate. ... The Lord, coming to seek what had been lost, wished to commend both by honoring them, because both had been lost. Therefore in neither sex ought we to do injury to Christ: the Lord's Nativity commended both to the hope of salvation. The honor of the male sex is in the flesh of Christ; the honor of the female is in the mother of Christ. The grace of Jesus Christ conquered the serpent's cunning." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 106, 1008).—St. Leo the Great, Serm., 74 (al. 72), c. 3: "For this faith throughout the whole world not only men but also women, and not only immature boys but also tender virgins, contended even to the shedding of their blood." (Migne, P. L., LIV, 398).—In the benediction of the baptismal font in the Roman Missal we read: "And may mother grace bring forth into one infancy all those whom either sex distinguishes in body or age distinguishes in time."

⁸ Cfr. Matth. XIX, 11-12: "All men take not this word, but they to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs, who were born so from their mother's womb: and there are eunuchs, who were made so by men: and there are eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take, let him take it." —Rom. VIII, 12-14: "Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh. For if you live according to the flesh, you shall die: but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." —Cfr. 1 Cor. VII, 25 sqq.

⁹ Matth. XXII, 30: "For in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married; but shall be as the angels of God in heaven." — Cfr. Tertullian, Ad Uxorem, I, c. 1 (ed. P. Leopold, II, 62 sq.) —St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XXII, c. 17 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 778 sq.); IDEM, Serm., 243 (al. 6 de Divers.), n. 6 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 1146). —St. Jerome, Adv. Iovin., I, c. 36 (P. L., XXIII, 261).

2. EDUCATION. —Education signifies the process of imparting and drawing out (e-ducere) knowledge, skill or discipline of character. As society is at present constituted, education is imparted partly in the home and partly at school. The early training a child receives at home is of supreme importance for his future welfare because it leaves upon the mind deep traces of good or evil.¹⁰ Whether a man will be virtuous or vicious, whether his life will redound to the advantage or detriment of his fellowmen, depends largely upon the character of the domestic circle in which he spends his youth. No other factor, agency, or institution can fully supplant a good Christian home.

¹⁰ Cfr. Plato, Politia, II, 17: For it is then especially that a character is molded and takes on the impression which anyone may wish to stamp upon each one. —Cfr. Horace, Carm., IV, 4, 29, 32 sqq.: "The brave are born of the brave and good; ... but instruction advances the inborn power, and right cultivation strengthens the heart: whenever either is lacking, faults disgrace what was well-born."

In spite of all this, however, home-life does not give a necessary predetermination for either good or evil. The will remains free, and even the most excellent training sometimes fails to bend it in the right direction. It happens that good parents have bad children,¹¹ whereas, on the other hand, a naturally good child will often preserve its innocence in spite of a bad example.

¹¹ " Filii heroum nequam."

The school supplements and completes the training received at home, and its influence on the formation of character is second only to that of the family.¹² Its chief defect is that it cannot give to each child the individual care required, and hence the influence of the school upon the moral character is less pronounced than that of the home.

¹² Cfr. the Greek proverb: Πολλοὶ μαθηταὶ κρείσσονες τῶν διδασκάλων. —Many pupils are better than their masters.

3. SOCIETY. —Human society is the sum-total of living men, considered as an aggregate, of which each individual is a member. Every man is more or less a child of his time, nation, and country, —not merely in a physical sense, i. e., by the external characteristics due to soil, climate and national type; but also intellectually and ethically, in regard to his views of right and wrong, his likes and dislikes, etc.¹³

¹³ Cfr. Ps. XVII, 26-27: "Withthe holy, thou wilt be holy; and with the innocent man thou wilt be innocent; and with the elect thou wilt be elect: and with the perverse thou wilt be perverted." —Pope Hadrian VI composed this epitaph for his tombstone: "Alas, how much it matters into what times the virtue of even the best man may fall!"

The relation existing between man's free acts and the social environment in which he lives (milieu) has been carefully investigated in recent times. It was found that certain crimes and misdemeanors recur more or less regularly under certain conditions. This observation led Lombroso and others to conclude that the law of physical causation applies to ethics and that human conduct is governed by necessity.¹⁴ With this conclusion we cannot agree, for three reasons:

¹⁴ Cesare Lombroso's writings in particular, some of which have been translated into English, have exercised a malign influence on contemporary thought. Cfr. Krauss, Der Kampf gegen die Verbrechensursachen, pp. 17 sqq.; R. Frank, Die Lehre Lombrosos, Tübingen 1908. — Enrico Ferri, another popular author, contends that crime is "a biologico-social abnormality," which has "its origin in an anti-social biological constitution, cosmic or physical," and is "the resultant of anthropological, cosmic, and social factors." (Cfr. Criminal Sociology by Enrico Ferri, tr. by J. I. Kelly, Boston 1917)- Ferri too often makes words serve in place of ideas. Put to the logical test, his system fails completely. Cfr. Charles Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study, London 1920.

a) That men think, feel, calculate, and act alike under similar conditions is no proof that they lack liberty of choice. b) At all times there have been many who, under identically the same circumstances, have attained a degree of moral perfection that raised them far above their fellows. c) Statistics are limited to external acts, whereas the individual inclinations and dispositions as well as the intentions and motives from which individual actions spring, and which therefore constitute the true essence of morality, elude observation and inquiry. All that science can demonstrate is to what extent men observe the law or, rather, in what degree they are given to immoral practices. Even those acts which are common to a large number of men and can therefore be statistically tabulated, remain rational and ethically free—actus humani—regardless of social and economic environment. ¹⁵ The science of what is called moral (or, more correctly, criminal) statistics devotes its attention entirely to vice and crime. Virtue, as a rule, makes no noise. An ancient Chinese proverb says: "If you do a good deed, your neighbor will never find it out; but if you commit a crime, everybody for a hundred miles around will talk about it." To regard only the evil that men do will never lead to an adequate knowledge of human nature.

¹⁵ Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Willensfreiheit, pp. 40 sqq.

READINGS. —Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 163; XV, 687. —A. Rosier, C.SS.R., Die Frauenfrage vom Standpunkt der Natur, der Geschichte und der Offenbarung, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1907, pp. 18 sqq., 26 sqq. —H. Marion, Psychologie de la Femme, Paris 1900.—Ch. Turgeon, Le Féminisme Français, Vol. II, Paris 1902, pp. 152 sqq. —C. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, pp. 138 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 69 sqq.

L. Desers, L'Education Morale et ses Conditions, Paris 1909. —W. Toischer, Die Macht der Schule, Prague 1897.—F. W. Foerster, Schule und Charakter, 7th ed., Zurich 1909.

1. INSTINCT. —Instinct, which is the first and lowest stage of the appetitive faculty, may be defined as "an impulse of the sensitive appetite towards certain acts and objects, the suitableness of which transcends the range of knowledge of the agent that performs them."¹ All instinctive actions are performed under internal compulsion. The primary form to which all instincts may be reduced, is an impulse towards happiness. This impulse is irresistible, i. e., the will cannot decide against it because no man has it in his power not to will to be happy. The case is different with the secondary forms that proceed from this primary form of instinct —the impulse to self-preservation, the sexual instinct, and others. These are subject to the will. Intimately connected with the instinct of self-preservation are modesty, anger, and fear. (a) Modesty is directed to the preservation of personal integrity. This instinct reacts with particular vigor to attacks against chastity and truth. Modesty furnishes an invaluable protection against sin, and for this reason it should be assiduously cultivated, especially since it is weak and tender and can easily be destroyed. Under conscientious cultivation modesty ceases to be a mere instinct and becomes a virtue.² (b) Anger is defined as a violent desire to wreak vengeance on persons or objects that oppose or thwart the Ego in the prosecution of its ends. This instinct tends to destroy that which opposes it. Anger is a dangerous instinct because it makes deliberation difficult. For the same reason, of course, it diminishes accountability and inspires foolish and injurious actions.

¹ Cfr. E. Wasmann, S.J., Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), London 1910; IDEM, Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom, St. Louis 1903.

² Cfr. St. Ambrose, De Offic., I, c. 18, n. 69: "Modesty is the companion of chastity, in whose company chastity itself is safer. For shame is a good companion in governing chastity; if it places itself before the first dangers, it does not allow chastity to be violated." (Migne, P. L., XVI, 44). —Cfr. W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker, Vol. II, pp. 426 sqq.

Anger is essentially a craving for vengeance on account of wrong done. Though there is a just and holy anger, the stirrings of this passion in the weakened state in which humanity exists since the Fall, mostly spring from sinful egotism. Anger, in the words of Father Rickaby, "is then only a safe course to enter on, when it proceeds not upon personal but upon public grounds; a nd even by this maxim many deceive themselves." ³ (c) Fear (metus) will be treated later.⁴

³ Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, p. 64. —Cfr. Mark III, 5; Matth. XXI, 12; John II, 15-17.

⁴ Infra, p. 116.

2. AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS. —When the intellect proposes some good to the will, or when sensual perception presents something as desirable to the lower appetites, there ensues a tendency towards that object. This tendency is either spiritual or sensual, according to the nature of the object. The stirrings of the rational appetite are called affections; those of the sensual appetite, passions (passiones).

The passions, in so far as they are excited by external objects, are involuntary in their origin because independent of free-will. Consequently man is not accountable for them, unless he has willed them in the cause (voluntarium in causa).

The affections, on the other hand, whether pure or mixed, are either wholly or partially subject to the will, according as they proceed from it either entirely or in part.⁵

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 6: "It matters what sort of will a man has; for if it is perverse, it will have these movements in a perverse form; but if it is right, they will be not only blameless but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all [that is, the movements]; indeed, they are all nothing other than wills. For what are desire and joy but a will consenting to the things we will? And what are fear and sorrow but a will dissenting from the things we do not will?" (Migne, P. L., XLI, 409).

There is a difference between the affections and passions on the one hand, and instinct on the other. The former may proceed mediately from the will and presuppose a clear knowledge of their object, whereas the latter springs from sentiment and cannot be elicited by an act of the will. However this difference is not always easy to discern.

An affection is distinguished from a free act of the will in that, when a man is under the influence of an affection, willing immediately follows knowledge, and no choice takes place. For this reason the affections, though they may be voluntary in the highest degree, are not free, unless indeed the knowledge from which they spring was caused by the will, or if they are made the object of reflection. But the will is never accountable for an affection unless it has cooperated in its production, or consented to it after due deliberation, i. e., from the moment when it began to participate in what was originally no more than a physical impulse. (a) A motus primo primus is an impulse which, resulting immediately from an involuntary act of knowledge, precedes all rational deliberation and therefore is neither free nor imputable. (b) A motus secundo primus is an impulse which causes the desired object to enter more or less into the consciousness of the subject, thus affording a possibility of deliberation and free choice. Such acts are not entirely compulsory; nor, on the other hand, are they entirely free. It follows that while they may be to some extent imputable, they never constitute more than a venial sin. (c) If the knowledge that gives birth to an impulse is caused by the will, or if the will positively and deliberately acquiesces in the impulse and makes its own the object towards which it tends, we have a motus secundus. This happens, e. g., when the will, instead of rejecting sinful thoughts, deliberately entertains and nourishes them. Hence the Scholastic maxim, "Motus sentire est naturale, motibus consentire est criminale." ⁶ The motus secundus, being a voluntary and deliberate act of the will, is fully imputable and, when the matter at stake is sinful and important, involves a mortal offence.

⁶ Cfr. St. Augustine, In Ep. ad Rom., prop. 13-18: "We sin not in the evil desire itself, but in our consent." (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 2066). —IDEM, Enarrat. in Ps., CXVIII, s. 3, n. 1: "What does sin accomplish when we are unwilling except illicit desires alone? If the assent of the will is not given to them, some affection is indeed stirred, but no effect is permitted to it." (P. L., XXXVII, 1507).

It needs no argument to show how strongly man's actions are influenced by the affections and the passions. As affectus antecedentes they precede, incite, and elicit the decision of the will, and are frequently the very requisites of freewill actions, capable of becoming concurrent causes in their production, thus entering as important factors into man's accountability for his deeds. Not every good impulse or emotion —enthusiasm, love, hatred, anger —is supernaturally meritorious. Neither is every evil impulse sinful. Many of these stirrings are purely natural and involve no deliberate choice.

Usefulness. It is of no small moment, and often of no small difficulty, that a moral theologian, for example in the sacrament of penance, be able prudently to discern guilt, and to judge concerning the value of promises and of obligations undertaken. To this end the present title has been written.

Account and division of impediments. 1. Although we speak of impediments of the intellect and will, nevertheless the spiritual faculties cannot properly either fall sick or be affected by an intrinsic impediment. Therefore all impediments cohere with our present necessity of using the body and material powers even for the noblest acts. And so by the same bonds by which the senses, whether interior or exterior, are bound, the intellect itself is externally bound. Now we distinguish the impediments and limits of free choice in a healthy man, and the impediments which must be ascribed to a morbid state. The former are either common to all, insofar as all men per se experience those states in which the higher faculty, impeded in its act, can make no free act, at least not perfectly; and accidental impediments, such as ignorance, which bring it about that, not indeed per se but per accidens, a faculty, even when unimpeded for its own acts, nevertheless does certain things involuntarily.

Distribution of the argument. Both by age, sleep, and the state of drunkenness, even the free choice of a healthy man is commonly impeded. Moreover various movements of appetite anticipate deliberation, beyond which psychological liberty cannot extend itself.

Hence:

I. Common impediments. 1. A child is not free. For, the development of the brain being deficient, he lacks conscious possession of universal notions.

2. One sleeping is not free. For, according to the varied perfection of sleep, the senses are impeded more fully or less fully. Nor is liberty restored by any dream. For in a dream phantasms are joined in the fatal order in which either they were already previously connected, or by some accidental fact, as for instance by hearing a sound or by contact with a heavy or cold thing; one thing succeeds another ¹; and, the normal communication between the higher centers and external perceptions being broken, consciousness cannot judge concerning the objective state; finally every conscious direction is taken away from the will. If sometimes we seem to ourselves to deliberate and to act freely, we rather dream the use of free choice than truly have it. If we resist an evil suggestion, it is an indication of virtue which, confirmed by long exercise, has phantasms of its own acts sufficiently strong that they are presented together with the phantasms of the passions and of lower propensions. Yet men are accustomed to be led through dreams more by instinct than by acquired virtue. Nor are the commands of dreams completed by execution.

3. One perfectly drunk is not free in act, although the drunkenness could have been voluntary.

4. One imperfectly awake does not yet enjoy an unimpeded use of the exterior senses and of the interior sense. And by those impediments of the senses the higher powers are prohibited from procuring for themselves the supplements of strength which would be necessary for overcoming the temptation or suggestion ². Therefore the efficacy of command is deficient, and a perfect consciousness of things and of self is not yet present. Wherefore, if the respect of moral goodness or malice was not present before the mind, then there will be no liberty; but if thought about a good action or about moral obligation has entered the mind, the will which with diminished strength overcomes the temptation can greatly merit; but if it has yielded to the temptation, it cannot be gravely blamed. For as long as man is prohibited by his subjective state from estimating and intending the ultimate end according to its dignity and with fitting efficacy, he cannot by his own proper act determine concerning that end, so that his disorder is only venial.

¹ Often two recent memories are mingled. A friend occurs; then, with another, a question was raised about a meal: we dream that we dine with the friend.

² Helps are sought by diverting the mind to other things, by renewing purposes or vows.

On non-deliberated movements. 1. In the sense itself, various concupiscences ¹ spontaneously follow sensible apprehension. These are not from the will. Wherefore only the act by which those concupiscences thereafter either are admitted or fostered, or are repelled, can be free. With what obligation of repelling: this will be said in the proper place.

2. The will itself, as it is the appetite of man, experiences in itself spontaneous affections toward all things which also by lower reason are proposed in some way as goods of man. (We call lower reason that which proposes motives drawn from the present goods of this life and of the world; which goods, moreover, with the aid of sense, are represented more vividly.) Those movements of the will, since they precede comparison with the motives of higher reason, or considerations of the honorable good, are not from the will as it is rational appetite. Wherefore those movements, which are called first-first, are outside the limits of liberty and are not governed by moral law.

3. Moreover the will has, even in the state of wakefulness, on account of distraction of mind or the force of involuntary concupiscence, imperfectly deliberated acts, concerning which one must pronounce as concerning the acts of a half-sleeping man. Wherefore those movements, second-first, if good, will be very praiseworthy; if they tend toward evil, they cannot induce grave guilt.

¹ We are not treating here of concupiscence insofar as, according to its force, it makes the use of free choice more impeded, but of spontaneous concupiscences which can even aid honorable appetite: for example, the movement of love toward offspring.

I. Notion. Deceit is not any lie whatsoever, but denotes lying arts employed for deceiving another. Deceit per se begets error; hence its efficacy upon the voluntary is to be estimated. It happens, however, that beyond the connatural force of error an act is made weaker by positive law.

In penal law deceit is the deliberate will of violating the law (c. 2200); and also in the civil forum harms inflicted by the will of harming are judged to have proceeded from deceit; this deceit is thus distinguished from simply blameworthy negligence.

The Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 2, establishes concerning deceit the same thing as concerning grave fear unjustly inflicted: acts done from deceit are valid unless something else is provided by law, but they give place to an action for rescission. Yet they are invalidly admitted to the novitiate who, induced by deceit, enter religion, or whom the Superior, induced in the same manner, receives (c. 542, 1°); for the validity of any religious profession it is required that it be emitted without deceit (c. 572, § 1); the renunciation of an office or benefice, made by deceit, is void by the law itself (c. 185).

¹ For instance, blasphemy (v. 2323).

² If, in order to mock the faith, someone is commanded to dine, drink wine, and then celebrate Mass.

³ If a priest is commanded to violate an interdict in order to empty out the authority of the bishop.

⁴ In certain circumstances it will not be licit to flee persecution, if the flock would thereby lose courage.

I. Man's free choice is finite; and even within its own limits it is suppressed or diminished by impediments.

For healthy men, of whom we speak first, there are common impediments and accidental impediments.

II. On account of common impediments, the following lack liberty: a child, one sleeping, one perfectly drunk. A semi-wakeful person uses diminished liberty, which makes glorious the victory of one then overcoming temptation, but is not sufficient for sinning mortally.

III. As to the ends within which free choice is enclosed: the motions of lower concupiscence, and also motions of the will itself which are called first-first motions, anticipate deliberation. Second-first motions give place only to imperfect deliberation.

IV. Accidental impediments. 1. Ignorance,. or the privation of knowledge, differs from simple nescience and from actual forgetfulness or inadvertence.

a) In the subject, ignorance is distinguished as invincible and vincible, according as it could not or could be driven away by at least moral diligence. Vincible ignorance is attributed either to negligence, which can be crass, supine, or simple, according as an easy occasion of knowing, or merely sufficient diligence, has been omitted; or to the direct will: then it is called affected. The existence or sense of a law can be unknown: ignorance of law; or the condition of application: ignorance of fact.

It can antecede or follow an act of the will; be a cause, removing what prohibits, or have no causality. Antecedent ignorance is called that which is at once involuntary and a cause of willing; concomitant, that which is not a cause of willing; consequent, that which is at once vincible and a cause of willing.

b) Positive laws can be invincibly unknown, and also conclusions not so remote from the natural law, if you except a few too near to the first principle: good is to be done, evil is to be avoided.

The habit itself can produce inadvertence; nevertheless it is not presumed to do this.

c) The gravity of vincible ignorance is estimated from the conscious degree of negligence or of evil will. He who carries culpable habitual ignorance sins as often as he wills to be ignorant and as often as he exposes himself to the danger of harmful error. But the sin is opposed either to a special precept of knowing, or takes its species from the transgressions which are foreseen to follow.

d) Antecedent ignorance makes involuntary; concomitant ignorance makes non-voluntary; consequent ignorance makes voluntary in the cause, but not in itself. Affected ignorance is a sign of a great propensity to the thing for the sake of which someone wills to be ignorant; yet it diminishes or increases the voluntary according to the motive by which the will of being ignorant is determined. Note that affected ignorance can also be praiseworthy, like the reason of every ignorance. In general, ignorance at least diminishes the voluntary.

e) What it effects in the voluntary it effects also in merit or demerit.

f) Canonical penalties, though for the most part not likewise civil penalties, are diminished or even taken away on account of ignorance of law. Affected ignorance excuses from no penalty; all non-affected ignorance excuses if the law has the words "shall have presumed," etc., or similar words; simple ignorance, but not crass ignorance, excuses from medicinal penalties latae sententiae.

g) Insofar as voluntariness is required for validity, for the same reason ignorance will be able to obstruct the validity of an act.

h) What has been said about habitual ignorance holds also concerning inadvertence.

2. Concupiscence,. or the motion of the sensible appetite, is at once and per se a help to us; but per accidens it is an impediment.

a) It is antecedent or consequent, according as it precedes or follows an act of the will. Consequent concupiscence can be so by mere resultance or by direct excitation. An affection thus excited is by no means fictitious.

b) Concupiscence can take away deliberation. Per se, however, it allows liberty to be intact; but an act conformable to it is less voluntary and free if the concupiscence was antecedent. Consequent concupiscence by resultance is a sign of an intense will; by direct will, however, it increases the voluntary. By the same reason it diminishes or increases merit or sin. Yet by consenting to resultant concupiscence, then we increase merit or sin.

A good act contrary to concupiscence will be of itself more voluntary and meritorious; but it is not an effect of concupiscence itself.

c) By custom there are produced forgetfulnesses and also propensities which can create a moral impossibility to be healed gradually.

d) On account of present infirmity, we need medicinal grace for overcoming grave temptations.

e) Passive tolerance of a sensible motion, but not likewise of an indeliberate motion of the will, cannot in itself be a grave sin. Nevertheless there remains the obligation of avoiding the proximate occasion which the tolerated concupiscence itself can bring on. Resistance to temptations is sometimes to be counseled as positive, sometimes as negative. Let it always be commended as quiet, not anxious.

3. Coercion. is a motion whose principle is outside, while he who suffers resists to the contrary.

a) The will cannot be coerced; the sensible faculties and exterior acts can be coerced.

b) Absolute force is distinguished, which effects the involuntary; and force according to something, which by greater resistance can in some measure be overcome.

c) The omission of resistance can be blameworthy or praiseworthy. Absolutely to be denied is every participation in an intrinsically evil action, unless, when the question is of exterior goods, the malice itself of the participation could cease because of the primary destination of goods. One can abstain from useless resistance, provided scandal and danger of consent be avoided.

4. a) Fear, or a trepidation of mind arising from the apprehension of danger, can take away every voluntary element by disturbing reason. But if reason is not disturbed, it is distinguished as grave or light, and this absolutely, or relatively to the person who fears. Reverential fear is per se light, but easily, on account of circumstances, is converted into grave fear.

b) Fear per se leaves sufficient place for deliberation, so that the act is voluntary and juridically valid. Yet fear which has been absolutely or relatively grave, if it has been inflicted by a free cause - which fear is called fear from without - provides the law with a reason why several acts are rendered null or rescindable. Cf. cc. 185, 642, 572, § 1; 1087, § 1; 1307, § 3.

Considered in itself, however, an act done from fear is simply voluntary and for the most part, but not always, involuntary according to something. Fear also can, as an impulsive cause, operate beyond its own power, if powers for a nobler act are at hand, as when an act of charity is commanded by fear.

c) An evil act placed from fear diminishes sin, yet not so that from mortal it becomes venial. It also diminishes canonical imputation; indeed, when there is question of merely ecclesiastical laws, for the most part it takes away the delict.

d) Phobias are to be healed diligently; but better are they to be prevented by wise education.

5. a) Deceit, or lying arts employed for deceiving another, impede the voluntary, insofar as they beget error. By positive canonical law deceit is assimilated to fear and invalidates, by the law itself, religious profession and renunciation of office or benefice.

b) In penal law, deceit is the deliberate will of violating the law; in the civil forum, when there is question of repairing harms, deceit is called the will of harming, and is distinguished, as a cause of harms, from negligence.

422. - 1. In the higher or rational psychic life, right philosophy, departing from Cartesian tenets, recognizes only a twofold faculty: intellect and will, or rational cognition and appetite; but the third, which was called the affective faculty or affection (le sentiment), some judge to pertain to the intellect and others to the will.

Moreover, in the lower psychic life, three things occur which are observed distinctly: sensations or sensitive apprehensions; affections, agreeable or disagreeable, resulting therefrom; and appetite, or tendencies of pursuit or aversion. Modern authors also reduce these three to two. But, inquiring more into what appears simple or irreducible and what composite, they are accustomed to exhibit both of the former things as simple: sensations and affections, while they contend that appetite can be resolved into each of the two preceding elements. Classical philosophy, however, looking more to active faculties, instead refers all things to apprehension and appetite. In pleasure or the contrary affection there intervene: a) conjunction with good or evil, as the proximate cause of an agreeable or disagreeable affection; b) perception of this conjunction; c) the consequent complacency or displeasure. But whether pleasure or the contrary affection is formally in apprehen- sion or in appetite: concerning this matter the Scholastics dispute, and St. Thomas himself seems to have varied. Cf. De veritate, question 26, article 4, reply to objection 4; In tertium Sententiarum, distinction 15, question 2, article 3, solution 2; Summa theologica, I-II, question 35, article 1. Concerning this matter cf. Froebes, Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie, vol. 1, pp. 24, 197, 198; vol. 2, p. 425, no. 2.

2. In order that we may say a few things concerning the individual elements: sensations are distinguished into three genera, according to physiologists: external sensations, so called from their object or cause by which they are determined, for example by contact; kinesthetic sensations, that is, those by which we are chiefly informed concerning the position and movement either of the body itself or of the members in their mutual relation (cf. Froebes, in the cited work, vol. 1, p. 145); organic sensations, which are excited by a change in the internal organs and teach us the state of the organism, but especially warn us concerning disturbed functions of vegetative life, as concerning poorly digested foods, visceral obstruction, hunger, thirst, and fatigue.

3. Affection or affective state designates the state and condition of the subject within himself, or the manner in which he experiences himself to be, whence we say: I am - or, I feel - well or ill.

Affection is accustomed to be joined with sensations, whether it accompanies them or results from them: thus a healthy man experiences the sense of agreeable satiety if, within the limits of temperance, he consumes good and pleasant foods. Nevertheless, it can sometimes subsist independently of sensations. Thus, with the will commanding, or with a cause of great joy dominating, someone in the midst of sensible pain can judge himself to be well or well affected, just as, on the contrary, moral sorrows can impede the efficacy of agreeable sensations. Therefore, between affection and sensations there prevail laws of association and mutual influence.

Most authors today, at least when there is discussion of lower psychology, distinguish only two specifically diverse affections: that of pleasantness or that of discomfort (jouissance, bien-être, ou malaise, indisposition). Nevertheless, not a few, with Wundt, recognize several pairs of affections: of excitation and quiet; of tension and relaxation.

The more vehement affections produce physiological changes of the internal organs, which changes in turn produce sensations and partial affections connected with them. Thus sadness of soul removes hunger and brings indigestion of the stomach, which itself also changes our affection.

Several partial affections - according to not a few physiologists, even if they are contrary - are accustomed to flow together into a resultant sum which is called the total affection. But the total affection arising from the cooperation of all organic sensations, or the affection of our body taken as a whole, is called the general or common affection.

4. Appetite is the act by which the subject is borne toward an apprehended good, whether present or absent. In the lower appetite the tendency is spontaneous; upon it, from instinct, there follows, likewise spontaneously, an exterior pursuit or flight: instinctive directions are less defined in man.

428. - 1. Sexual instinct is also present in man, but is less defined. For a twofold instinct can be distinguished: one, strictly so called, which is borne immediately toward carnal pleasure to be obtained through copulation: it moves body toward body in order to obtain venereal pleasure. The other moves person toward person, or seeks a person of the other sex because of secondary sexual characters, that is, because of the psychic and somatic qualities of the other sex, whose company is thereby rendered agreeable. But this interest in the person remotely disposes one toward venereal pleasure. Together with the person, the body is near; familiar association soon excites the carnal appetite itself. All these things have been wisely ordered so that matrimony among men would truly be not a mere conjunction of bodies, but would dispose and lead toward bodily enjoyment through a more universal union.

429. - On sexual instinct strictly so called. The stimuli of sexual instinct strictly so called are distinguished into normal or customary stimuli common to men, and abnormal stimuli which are proper to certain persons. They are further specific if they have almost no other use than to actualize sexual instinct; while those are called common which also possess some other utility.

Normal and specific stimuli are psychic or nonpsychic, that is, merely material. The latter affect the nerve centers by a chemical influence and operate independently of every consciousness of the subject: thus aphrodisiac drugs, and especially the "hormones" secreted internally, to whose influence nocturnal pollution seems chiefly to be ascribed. Some add the very pressure (la pression) of a gland which abounds in elements to be excreted.

A psychic stimulus does not move unless it is known. In order that it exert its power, besides an object suitable for exciting the appetite, or savory, and that object known, there is required in the subject an aptitude for undergoing that incitation, and then for acting upon the object, or for being acted upon, which we can call sensibility: it is called "receptivity and reactivity."

These subjective aptitudes vary considerably. There are some who are affected in no way by a whole particular class of stimuli, while for others the stimulus must be furnished with certain peculiar notes: some are excited by nudity, others by colors; some, besides nudity, require definite forms of the body from which others shrink. Stimuli, therefore, are relative, yet not to such a degree that there are none to which a common excitatory power can be assigned, which, before experience, is to be presumed capable of being effective. Such are, when perceived by external sensation or represented internally, the sexual functions, the sexual parts, a certain nudity of the body, and the acts preliminary to copulation.

2. Once the stimuli have been received, there follows a certain affective state, sufficiently complex, composed of the agreeable elements of sexual sensations and of the disagreeable elements of the excited and distended organ and of the unsatisfied venereal appetite: the excited and distended organ physiologically, and the unsatisfied appetite psychologically, induce an affective state in which discomfort and unpleasantness prevail.

3. Hence there arises an appetite for full satiety, which will be obtained when the agreeable affections are completed and the others removed. To this end, through instinct they appear to the phantasy, and through experience to reason, as manipulations to be performed about the sexual organs, especially those of the other sex; the subject is vehemently impelled to perform them (the appetite of manipulation). Excitation then increases with the addition of new stimuli, and the akme, or apex of excitation, is reached. Then the greatest pleasure of the lower order is obtained, and at the same time, with the outpouring of semen or quasi-semen, the orgasm is resolved, by which name is meant the whole process of the greatest carnal commotion, consisting of sensations, affections, and physiological changes. But the natural impulse to remove the tension of the organs is called the appetite of detumescence: it is satisfied in the orgasm itself.

430. - 4. You should therefore observe that, as such, venereal instinct is borne not toward procreating offspring but toward experiencing one's own pleasure.

But the nexus between stimuli, sensations, affections, appetite, and the impulse toward execution or exterior acts is not from human choice but from a natural connection and the instinct's innate associations.

5. Venereal instinct in man is variously subject to the command of the rational faculties. Led by intellect and will, which, because of the unity of the human composite, are also inclined toward seeking these things, man can deliberately seek sexual stimuli, retain them, increase them even artificially, preserve them longer, and excite himself in unusual ways for which there is no desire in brute animals. For man, unlike a brute animal, at the same time senses how unequal even complete carnal satisfaction is to procuring happiness. Therefore, the stimulus to perceive the sensation is received in him with the desire of increasing satiety itself. And he can also deny assent to the stimuli and to the affections themselves, call the mind away to higher things, diminish the efficacy of the stimuli by antecedent thought, and deliberately flee occasions of excitation.

431. - On sexual instinct broadly so called. Persons of different sex can also be bound together by a noble friendship: thus the strictly sexual consideration is ordinarily very far removed from the affection of children toward both parents and of parents toward offspring. But when the other sex is formally sought, then love founded upon sexual characters is necessarily, at least in part, sensual. (And even into a noble affection toward a person of the other sex who is not closely related by blood, something sensual easily enters.)

Sexual instinct broadly so called also becomes active with the aid of stimuli which are chiefly psychic (which do not act unless known).

These stimuli induce an affective state similar to that which exists in venereal instinct. There is agreeableness if the person toward whom the subject is borne is present and place is given to the desired association. If either one is missed, an affection of tension and discomfort will prevail, with an inclination toward seeking full satisfaction. A more vehement affection brings about physiological changes, sensations with connected affections; not, however, in the genital organs, at least of itself. But if it begins to pass into carnal appetite, changes will at once be present in these organs. Yet you should observe that this carnal propensity can be involuntary and repudiated.

The appetite tends, as we have said, toward obtaining a common and total affection of agreeableness; toward retaining and completing it, if it is present. It therefore impels toward interior and exterior acts by which union with the beloved person is perceived. But the more the proximity of persons becomes a proximity of bodies, the more attention is directed toward typical bodily qualities (the secondary criteria of sex), and the more the union between persons manifests itself by bodily signs such as kisses, prolonged embraces, caresses, etc. Conversely, the more one withdraws from carnal instinct, the more attention is given to psychic qualities, and bodily signs of familiarity are more or less neglected.

These things prepare the way for not a few prudent counsels.

Nothing special need be added concerning the action of the higher faculties. When the matter advises it, these can prudently prevent the propensity from becoming carnal; prevent carnal movements which may happen to arise from being accepted; lead persons to renounce every satisfaction of the senses; and prudently break off the association itself when it is not very useful.

Preliminary note. As appears from what was said above, n. 49, the voluntary is not the same as the free. For the sake of brevity we here treat together those things which attack the voluntary and the free. But since for a perfect voluntary act two principles are required, namely, cognition of the intellect and consent of the will, therefore whatever either takes away or diminishes either one also takes away or diminishes the voluntary, and is customarily called an enemy of the voluntary. Enemies of the voluntary of this kind are enumerated as six: 1. ignorance, 2. violence, 3. fear, 4. passion, 5. habit, 6. certain morbid states of the body. Each must be treated singly; nevertheless ignorance is omitted, of which sufficient discussion has already been had above. - Passion and habit are not always enemies of the voluntary, as will be said below in their places.

The subject of the present lecture, gentlemen, is “Insanity.”

I. This subject belongs to a course of Medical Jurisprudence, because a physician who treats patients for insanity is liable, from time to time, to be cited before a court of law either as a witness or as an expert. His conduct in such cases is to be guided by the principles of natural and legal justice.

Various important cases at law turn upon the question of a person’s soundness of mind; and frequently the medical expert has it in his power to furnish the court with more reliable information in this matter than any one else. At one time, the validity of a last will may be contested, and the possession of a fortune by one party or another may hinge on the question whether the testator at the time of making his will was in sufficient possession of his mental powers to perform an act of so much consequence.

At another time, interested parties may plead for or against the validity of a sale or other bargain made by a person of doubtful competency of mind; or a life-insurance company may be interested in ascertaining the mental condition of an applicant for membership; or it may be questioned whether the payment of an insurance policy is due to the family of a suicide, the doubt depending for solution on the sound or unsound condition of his mind at the moment of the fatal act. Again, there may be a real or pretended doubt whether a certain property-owner is so far demented as to be unfit to manage his estate; or whether he needs a guardian to take care of his person; or it may even seem necessary to confine him in a lunatic asylum. There may be objections raised to the mental soundness of a witness in a civil or a criminal suit; or, finally, a criminal prosecution will depend mainly on the sanity or insanity of the culprit at the moment when the crime was committed; as was the case with a Prendergast and a Guiteau.

You see, then, gentlemen, that important interests are dependent on the thorough and correct understanding of this matter; and therefore much responsibility rests upon the experts consulted in such cases: property, honor, liberty, nay, even life itself may be at stake.

That cases involving an insane condition of mind must be of frequent occurrence, both in the medical and in the legal professions, is apparent from the large and rapidly increasing amount of lunacy in our modern civilization. Wharton and Stillé’s “Medical Jurisprudence” states (sec. 770, note) that in 1850 there was in Great Britain one lunatic to about one thousand persons; only thirty years later the Lunacy Commission of Great Britain reported one lunatic to 357 persons in England and Wales, that is, nearly three times as many. In New York there is one to 384 persons. It appears certain that its increase of late is out of all proportion to the increase of population; and even though I see reasons to distrust somewhat the figures quoted for England, enough is known to create serious alarm regarding the fruits of modern manners and customs on the minds of thousands. This fact makes the matter of insanity very important for the medical and the legal student.

II. Still it must be noted that the responsibility of deciding cases of lunacy does not rest chiefly with the medical expert. In cases of doubtful insanity the decision is to be given not by the Doctor but by the court of justice. Except on very special occasions, as when a physician is appointed on a committee or commission of inquiry, he appears before a court either as an ordinary witness, stating what facts have fallen under his personal observation; or as an expert, explaining the received opinion of medical men with regard to cases of a certain class. Even though he feels convinced that the culprit or the patient is as mad as a March hare, the physician cannot expect that his statement to that effect will be received as decisive. It is for the judge to instruct the jury what kind or degree of insanity will excuse a culprit from legal punishment, or will disqualify a person from testifying as a witness, or from being a party to a civil contract in certain cases; and it is for the jury to decide whether, in the case in hand, the fact of such insanity exists or not. In criminal cases, the jury pronounces on the double question, whether the accused did the act charged to him, and whether he has been juridically proved to have been accountable for the act under the laws as expounded by the judge.

1. To come to a decision on this double question, the jury might need to hear the facts stated which the physician has personally observed, and of which he is summoned to be a sworn witness. In such a situation all that is required of the Doctor is that he shall give a most faithful and intelligent account of the facts.

It would disgrace his standing in society if any fault could be found with his testimony; and, as a sworn witness, he is bound in conscience, like any other witness, to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This is always the case when the purpose of the inquiry is the discovery of the sane or insane condition of a person’s mind. But if the inquiry concerns the performance of the guilty act, the commission of the crime, many States of the Union, as explained before, consider the Doctor’s professional secrets as privileged, just like those of the lawyer and the clergyman; i.e., the Doctor must not use against his patient any knowledge he has become possessed of while acting as his medical adviser.

2. When the physician appears before a court or commission as an expert, he is expected to give the views of the medical profession upon hypothetical cases resembling the one under examination, and the scientific reasons and authorities on which those views are advanced.

3. But here a considerable difficulty presents itself; it is so serious that, owing to it, the weight of the medical expert’s testimony with judge and jury is often much less than could reasonably be desired. The difficulty is to ascertain what really are the views of the medical profession on any given subject. Of course no individual Doctors can put themselves up as representing the convictions of the medical profession, nor can they always appeal to the unanimous agreement of their leading men. Leading physicians, unfortunately, are far from entertaining concordant views on many most vital questions. It is this want of agreement that has made the testimony of experts so powerless to sway the minds of judge and jury.

The medical profession has no organization through which it can pronounce judgment. In fact, many of its most conspicuous members have adopted principles at variance with the deepest convictions of mankind generally; such, for instance, are the followers of Darwin, Huxley, Maudsley, and similar agnostic and materialistic leaders of modern thought.

4. What still further diminishes the credit of medical experts is the fact that, both in civil and criminal trials, they are summoned either by the defence or by the prosecution, and are thus naturally selected, not on account of their thorough knowledge, but on account of their peculiar views known beforehand to the parties citing them. Thus their testimony is likely to be partial to either side, and is distrusted; at least it fails to command perfect confidence. The only way in which the prejudices thus created against the physician can be overcome is by his acquiring thorough knowledge of his specialty, and showing himself on all occasions to be as honorable and faithful as he is evidently experienced and intelligent.

5. The medical profession could be brought to be much more useful to society for the discovery of insanity if we could have here something like what exists in some parts of Germany. “The practice obtains there of requiring the medical faculty of each judicial district to appoint a special committee, to which questions of this kind are referred. This committee is examined directly by the court, and gives testimony somewhat in the same way, and with the same effect, as would a common-law court when reporting its judgment in a feigned issue from chancery, or as would assessors called upon under the canon law to state, in proceedings under the law, what is the secular law of the land on the pending question” (Wharton and Stillé, sec. 274).

The matter of introducing some such practice into this country has been agitated of late, and may by and by lead to beneficial results. Dr. Shrady has taken steps to promote this object by striving to have a law enacted by the New York legislature providing for the regulation of expert medical testimony in jury trials. According to his plan, once such a commission has been established, the court is to send the medical issue to these experts, just as it sends other issues to special juries to be decided. The regular petit jury will then decide only upon the facts constituting the crime.

This would do away with special pleas of insanity before a jury that knows little or nothing about the nature of the disease, and whose sympathies may readily be worked upon by shrewd lawyers to render a verdict of acquittal.

As things are now, the medical expert, summoned to testify in a case of contested sanity or insanity of mind, ought to rise above minor considerations, and promote the cause of justice, by giving all the valuable information that his profession enables him to acquire on the very difficult subject of mental unsoundness.

6. For this purpose, he must be skilled in three departments of science.

(a) In law—sufficiently to understand what are considered by the courts as characteristic marks of an insane mind, and what amount of sanity the courts require to hold a culprit responsible for his crime or a contract valid in its effects.

(b) In psychology—to such an extent that the expert witness can speak analytically and correctly as to the properties and actions of the human mind.

(c) In medicine—so far as concerns the treatment of the insane, and the understanding of their peculiarities, so as to reason from them by induction to the real condition of the client’s or patient’s mind.

But the main requisite for an expert witness is to understand clearly in what insanity properly consists, and how far it ought to excuse an insane man from bearing the consequences of his acts.

III. This two-fold knowledge is obtained by the psychological study of insanity, on which study we are now to enter, and it is the principal point in this whole matter.

Insanity means a want of soundness; he is insane whose mind is not sound, but is deranged, and therefore, like a machine out of order, it cannot properly perform its specific task, namely, to know the truth of things. An insane man cannot judge rightly.

1. Insanity takes various forms, which may be reduced to two kinds, with the doubtful addition of a third kind, namely, moral insanity, of which we shall speak in our next lecture.

The first kind consists in the total want or gross torpor of mental activity. When there is a total, or nearly total, eclipse of the intellect, the disease is called idiocy, the state of an idiot. When there is an abnormally low grade of the reasoning power, it is styled imbecility. The failure or decay of reason in old age is called dotage.

The second kind of insanity is called illusional or delusional. In it the intellect is not impotent; on the contrary, it is often unusually active; but its action is abnormal, its conclusions are false. Not that it reasons illogically or draws conclusions which are not contained in the premises. Very keen logicians may be demented. Their unsoundness arises from the fact that they reason from false premises; and they get their false premises from their diseased imaginations, whose vagaries they take for realities.

2. Here a difficulty presents itself, which we must explain at once, namely, how can there be unsoundness of mind at all? Is not the intellect of man a simple power, and his soul a simple being? How can a simple being become deranged? Can that which has no parts become disarranged, disorganized? I answer, the soul is a simple being, its intellect is a spiritual faculty; and therefore we never say that the soul is insane, nor should we say that the intellect is insane or diseased; but we say that the mind is deranged or insane; the mind comprises more than the intellect; it designates the intellect together with those lower powers that supply the materials for our thought, the chief of which is the imagination. Now the imagination is an organic faculty: it works in and by a bodily organism, which is the brain. Therefore, when the brain is not in a normal condition, the action of the imagination may be disordered. And the intellect or understanding of the spiritual soul is so closely united in its action and its very being with the organic body that the two ever act conjointly, like the two wheels of a vehicle. If one wheel breaks down, the other is thrown out of gear. Thus it is readily understood that mental unsoundness is an affection of the brain, a bodily disease, which may often be relieved and even cured by bodily remedies, by the use of drugs or wholesome food, healthy exercise, fresh air, and all that benefits the nervous system.

Pathologically considered, the nerves may be too excited or too sluggish and torpid; and we have as the result two subdivisions of mental insanity—mania and melancholia. The differences between these two are very striking; as they proceed from opposite causes they produce opposite effects, and, therefore, they betray themselves by very different manifestations; but in one point the two agree, and with this point precisely we are concerned, because in it lies the essence of mental insanity, namely, that both produce a disordered action of the imagination.

3. The manner in which the imagination co-operates in mental action is this. It presents to the intellect the materials from which that power forms its ideas. When we see, feel, hear, taste, or smell anything by our bodily senses, our imagination takes note of the object perceived by forming a brain-picture of it which is called a phantasm. I do not mean to say that it forms a photographic picture of the object; for there can be no photographing taste or smell or feeling; but it forms an image of some kind which it presents to the intellect. This power at once proceeds to form, not a brain-picture, but an intellectual or abstract image of the object presented. For instance, you see this book, and at once you, in some mysterious way which has never yet been explained, impress some image of it on your brain. That you do so is clear from the fact that the image remains when the book is withdrawn. That material image or brain-picture is the phantasm. It is not an idea, though it is often improperly so called. But your intellect forms to itself an idea of a book; that is, you know what is meant by a book. You distinguish between the mere form of a book and the book itself. Your idea of a book is a universal idea, which stands for any book, no matter of what shape or size. Every phantasm, or brain-picture, is a representation which presents its object as having a definite shape or size, while your idea of a book ignores any shape or size. And yet, when your intellect conceives a book, your imagination will picture some particular form of book. If your brain became so affected by disease as to be unfit for the formation and retention of the proper phantasms, then your intellect either would not work at all or it would work abnormally; your mind would then be insane.

4. Now, in an infant the brain is still too soft and imperfect to form the proper phantasms from which the intellect is to elaborate its ideas. A false school of psychology would say that the infant’s brain cannot yet ideate; but that is incorrect language. No brain can ideate or form ideas; an idea is an intellectual or mind image, not a brain image; it is an abstract and universal image, and matter cannot represent but what is concrete and individual. Only a simple and spiritual being, the rational soul, can form ideas. Nevertheless our soul, in its present state of substantial union with our body, is extrinsically dependent on the body; to form ideas it needs to have the sensible object presented to it by a phantasm or brain-picture. Now, a child born blind and deaf, and thus having its mind, as it were, cut off from communication with the outer world, could scarcely form the necessary phantasms, because the clogged senses could not supply proper materials for them; such a child would, therefore, be apt to remain idiotic. And even in children whose outer senses are sound the brain or the nervous system may be too imperfect to allow of its forming proper phantasms. In this torpor of the mind then consists the first kind of mental unsoundness, that of idiocy, or its milder form imbecility. In old age, and in peculiar diseases, the worn-out system may return to a second childhood, then called dementia or dotage. The existence of such species of insanity is not difficult to discover.

5. The second and more common form of insanity, and that which it is often difficult to discover and pronounce upon with certainty, is that which I have called delusional or illusional. Its characteristic trait, its very essence, lies in this, that the insane man mistakes what he imagines for what is real; and he cannot be made to distinguish between imagination and reality, though the difference is obvious to an intellect in its normal state.

In this connection, it is well to point out a distinction, not always observed, but useful to explain the workings of an insane mind, between illusions, hallucinations, and delusions.

(a) An illusion is properly a deception arising from a mistake in sense-perception; as when a half-drunken man sees two posts where there is only one. He has a picture of the post in each eye, and his brain is too much disturbed to refer the two pictures to the same object. In this case the cause of the mistake is subjective. A mirage offers another instance of a sense-illusion; but in it the cause is objective.

(b) A hallucination is a creation of the fancy mistaken for a reality. The deception may be but momentary, as when Macbeth is stealing on tiptoe to the chamber of his guest to murder him. His mind is disturbed by the imagination of the horrid deed he is about to perpetrate. He thinks he sees a dagger in the air, and he says: “Is this a dagger that I see before me, its handle towards my hand? Come, let me clutch thee. I hold thee not, and yet I see thee still; and on thy dudgeon gouts of blood, which was not so before.” But Macbeth, upon a moment’s reflection, sees it is all imagination. “There’s no such thing,” he exclaims. He is not insane, though deceived for a while.

(c) A delusion, on the contrary, is a permanent deception, whether it results from an illusion or a hallucination, it matters not; as a fact, it almost always originates in hallucinations. The deluded man clings to his imaginings; you cannot talk them out of his head. Such is the case of an inebriate who suffers from mania a potu, or “the horrors;” he sees snakes and demons, he thinks, and persists in his error. Such also is a fixed idea not arrived at by faulty reasoning, but come unbidden and proof against all reasoning and evidence. Thus an insane man may be convinced, solely by his imagination, that he is poisoned or pursued or conspired against.

6. This delusion constitutes the essence of mental insanity, which therefore is often called delusional insanity. It may be chronic, i.e., of long continuance, or it may be temporary, acute. For the time being, the effects are the same. Perhaps any man may, at times, be for a moment thrown off his guard, and mistake a fancy for a reality; this does not constitute lunacy. But when the error is so firmly held in the mind’s grasp that nothing can dislodge it thence, then the mind is deranged in its special sphere of action, which consists in knowing the real from the unreal; the mind is then insane.

You notice, gentlemen, that I speak of the mind as grasping the error, and I suppose it to do so independently of the free will’s command. But when the error is voluntary; when a man clings to it simply because he loves it; when he hugs a delusion to his heart, this shows not mental but moral obliquity; it is not insanity but self-deception, and it is by no means of rare occurrence. In a well-reasoned article on “The Metaphysics of Insanity,” written by Mr. James M. Wilcox and printed in the “American Catholic Quarterly Review” for January, 1878, some very severe and no less true strictures are made upon the readiness of a vast multitude of people to practise this wilful self-deception. “Self,” he writes (p. 54), “is the prolific origin of such errors; and so indulgent are we to its faults that we try secretly to hide them even from our own eyes, mostly with success; and where success is not perfect, we make a second effort to hide the imperfection. Repeated efforts of this kind, from which we but half turn away, are crowned in the end, and we soon forget what successful hypocrites we have been. Our numerous passions, the complexities of our desires, the tenacity of their grasp, and the pleasant gentleness of its touch explain an infinity of temptations followed by wilful successes in blindness, all of which are nothing less than guilty acts of self-deception.”

7. It oftens[**] happens in real insanity that mental derangement manifests itself upon one error or one group of errors only, while for all the rest the patient appears to be quite rational. Such a man is called a monomaniac. But he is truly an insane man; for the essence of insanity is in him. It is usually found that a monomaniac will, sooner or later, exhibit signs of mental unsoundness on other matters as well; and even while he has given no such signs, it still remains true that a mind cannot be trusted, but has something radically unsound about it, if it is really unhinged at any point at all.

But then you must be very careful not to confound monomania with eccentricity. The distinction is as important as it is real. Eccentricity is a conscious aberration from the common course of life; it consists in peculiarities in reasoning, words, and actions, which are wilfully indulged, in defiance of popular sentiment. The eccentric man knows that he is eccentric; he is willing to be so, and to take the consequences; but he is not insane.

Everything impedes the imputability of human acts which is opposed to the principles of imputability itself, that is, to the voluntary and the free. But there is no reason why we should treat separately of the impediments of THE FREE; and the reason is, because, if we except internal necessity, which is opposed only to the free, the impediments of the voluntary and of the free are altogether the same. But the treatment of internal necessity is rightly and deservedly omitted, for the reason that man as wayfarer never experiences it in his peculiar acts. Therefore the discourse will be concerning only the impediments of THE VOLUNTARY, of which four are counted, opposed to the two constitutives of the voluntary, namely: violence and fear, which are opposed to the intrinsic principle, or the will; ignorance and concupiscence, which are opposed to knowledge (cf. n. 271).

These impediments proximately influence the internal act. But there are given also others which exercise a remote influence upon liberty and are: heredity, temperament, and certain pathological states.

Yet let it be noted that these impediments, which are called remote, obtain efficacy only through the mediation of the proximate ones, as Bessmer, S.J. rightly notes (Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1908, II, p. 258), and therefore can, indeed ought, rightly to be reduced to the four heads noted above, already introduced by Aristotle.

I. On the impediments which proximately influence the voluntary.

Cf. St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 4-5; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XV; ed. G., II, p. 692; Salmant., de Vol., disp. V; Frins, de act. hum., n. 247-280.

281. DEFINITION. Violence is a motion proceeding from an extrinsic principle, while he who suffers the force resists (V, n. XV).

Violence cannot be inflicted on the will with respect to elicited acts; but it is inflicted with respect to commanded acts. God indeed, and He alone, can change the will; but He cannot coerce it. But extrinsic force can be inflicted not only on the body, but also on the inferior faculties of the soul. Cf. n. 559.

In order that force, coercion, be present, it is not necessarily required that the influence be caused by one compelling from without. The notion of violence first of all demands that something be done in us while the will resists; and therefore first-first acts, by analogy, are reduced to the impediment of violence. Any cause whatever, whether it is in man or is found from outside, can violently influence the acts of man.

DIVISION. Violence is either absolute, when he to whom it is inflicted resists in every way in which he can; or in a certain respect, when he does not resist according to his powers.

282. PRINCIPLES. I. Absolute violence takes away the voluntary. The reason is, because when the will of the one suffering resists the extrinsic agent according to its powers, the action of the agent is in no way willed by the one suffering; for it is against

every inclination of the will, and therefore simply involuntary; whence, those things which are done by force merit nothing of good or evil. Hence it is deduced that a woman who in every way resists the violence which is inflicted upon her against chastity does not sin, even if she suffers rape unwillingly (V, n. XVII; compare St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 5, ad 2).

283. II. Violence in a certain respect does not take away, but lessens the voluntary.¹ The reason is, because where the will does not resist as much as it can, there remains in part the notion of the voluntary; hence, according to the greater or lesser resistance of the will, the action will be more or less imputable. Whence girls are by no means excused from sin who, when lustful youths act more freely with them, do not oppose resistance in every way (V, n. XVIII).

284. IT IS ASKED. What resistance must be applied so that an act proceeding from violence not be imputable?

Resp. Since resistance is the reluctance of the will so that an act may not be imputable, it is clear, as regards commanded acts, that all that resistance must be applied which seems useful for impeding the act or its effects. "But to the impossible, or to the useless, no one is held." Thus martyrs, conducted by force to the temples of idols, did not sin, although they themselves walked. Nevertheless sometimes, or per accidens, even ineffective resistance must be applied for the sake of protestation; namely where tacit protestation, or protestation expressed by words alone, would not suffice for averting injury to religion, or for removing the danger of scandal. Similarly, a peculiar obligation of resisting urges in more dangerous matter, for example, when it is opposed to chastity; because defect of resistance induces danger of consent (cf. n. 374, 778). But if resistance is not only useless, but also consent will certainly not be present, then of yourself you are not held to resist, unless further attempts are feared.

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XX; ed. G., II, p. 693; VI, n. 1047 ff.; ed. G., IV, p. 193; Bain, Les emotions et la volonte, p. 147.

285. DEFINITION. Fear is trepidation of mind, on account of an evil present or future: namely an evil present either to the very person who fears, or to another who is closely joined to him by blood-relationship, affinity, marriage, or singular friendship (V, n. XX).

Fear can be present on account of an evil apprehended in the mind alone as present and imminent.

DIVISION. Fear is divided in many ways:

1. By reason of influence upon the act, it is antecedent or concomitant. Antecedent is that which moves one to acting, so that the action is said to proceed FROM fear. Concomitant is that which only accompanies the action, without influencing it in any way, so that the action is said to be done WITH fear.

Thus a traveler who gives a purse to a robber acts from antecedent fear; but the robber acts with concomitant fear, lest he be discovered.

2. By reason of object, fear is light or grave. Light fear, which is also called vain, is that by which a light evil is feared, or even a grave one, but from a light and improbable cause. Grave fear is said to be present if a grave evil is feared from a very probable cause.

But fear: a) is grave absolutely if an evil grave in itself is feared from a grave and truly probable cause, and cannot be escaped: this fear is said to fall upon a constant man, as being that by which even a firm man is deservedly struck. Commonly grave evils are judged to be death, mutilation, a foul wound, loss of liberty, status, reputation, chastity. b) It is grave respectively if the evil which is feared is indeed in itself and commonly light, yet grave with respect to the one fearing, because he is fearful, such as children, women, old men are (V, n. XX; VI, 1047; H. Ap., III, 16).

Reverential fear must be added, by which a son fears the offense of parents, a ward of a guardian, a wife of a husband, a subject of a Superior. But it can be grave if the fear is lest he who strikes fear be held offended for a long time or gravely (III, 717; VI, 1056; H. Ap., l. c.).

3. By reason of cause, fear is from within or from without. That is said to be from within which comes from an internal cause, such as disease, weakness of mind, etc.; or also, in a broader sense, that which comes from any natural cause whatever, for example, from shipwreck, fire, an attack of wild beasts, etc.; but that is said to be from without which comes from an external and free cause, or from man (VI, 1049).

4. By reason of the mode by which it is struck, fear is just or unjust, according as it is struck from a just cause, for example, of merited penalties, or from an unjust one, that is, through injury.

286. PRINCIPLES. I. Grave fear regularly does not take away, but lessens the voluntary. The reason for the first is, because through fear neither knowledge on the part of the intellect nor choice on the part of the will is taken away, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those who denied the faith from fear of torments have always been held as apostates. The reason for the second is, because since fear has joined to it repugnance of the will, the action becomes involuntary in a certain respect: whence the voluntary is lessened, as is clear (V, n. XXI).

We have said regularly; for sometimes fear altogether takes away the voluntary, namely if it is so great that it takes away the use of reason; but this is per accidens, and fear, in such a case, takes on rather the nature of passion, concerning which it will be said n. 290.

II. Light fear neither takes away nor lessens the voluntary. Hence that saying of right: "Vain fear is not a just excuse."

Note. Fear sometimes excuses from law, or at least from penalty, as we saw in the treatise on Laws (n. 223); sometimes it stands against the value of an act, as we shall see below when we dispute concerning vows, oaths, contracts, and matrimony. For from the fact that fear does not take away the voluntary, it does not follow that all things are firm and valid which are done under the influence of fear (V, n. XXII).

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 76; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXVI; ed. G., II, p. 695; Ami du Clerge, 1898, p. 1153; Huber, Hemnisse der Willensfreiheit; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1909, p. 253.

287. DEFINITION. Ignorance, in general, is lack of knowledge in a capable subject. One ignorance, which is called negative or nescience, is lack of knowledge otherwise not owed, for example, in a rustic who does not know canon law. Another, which is called privative, is lack of owed knowledge, for example, in a confessor who does not know the things which pertain to the administration of the sacrament of penance. Another, which is called positive, or of depraved disposition, or also of contrariety, or error, is assent given to the false as to the true, or dissent from the true as from the false, for example, in a heretic (H. Ap., III, 13).

To ignorance are referred both FORGETFULNESS, which is privation of remembrance of a thing formerly known; and INADVERTENCE, which is lack of actual knowledge and defect of consideration in acting. This, if it comes from a depraved habit or from passion, is called ignorance of evil choice.

Here we consider ignorance insofar as it is lack of owed knowledge, whether it has error annexed to it or not; whether it is habitual or merely actual, as inadvertence.

DIVISION. Multiple ignorance is distinguished (V, l. c.):

1. By reason of object, it is of right or of fact. Ignorance of right is had if someone does not know the law, or is ignorant that something has been prescribed or prohibited: for example, if he is ignorant that fasting must be observed on Ember Wednesdays. Ignorance of fact is had if someone is ignorant of the existence of a fact, or of its circumstances: for example, if he is ignorant that today is an Ember Wednesday (cf. n. 40, 4.).

2. By reason of the action which is done ignorantly, ignorance is causing the act or merely accompanying. It is called causing the act when in some way it influences the work, and is the reason why the act is placed, either simply, or clothed with such a circumstance. It is had in him who can say: if I had known, I would not have done it, or I would not have acted in such a mode: for example, a hunter killing a friend whom he believes to be a wild beast would by no means have killed him if he had known that he was a friend. Moreover, ignorance causes the act not of itself, because, since it is privation and not a being, it cannot of itself influence; but per accidens, namely insofar as it removes knowledge, which, if it were present, would impede the work.

Ignorance merely accompanying is said of that which in no way influences the act; because, if knowledge were present, the work would be placed equally, indeed perhaps more easily and promptly, for example, if someone, thinking he is killing a stag, kills his enemy, whom nevertheless he would have killed even if he had known him (H. Ap., XIX, n. 8).

3. By reason of subject, ignorance CAUSING THE ACT is invincible or vincible. Invincible is that which cannot be overcome, either because doubt concerning the opposite does not occur, in which case it is physically invincible; or because, when moral diligence has been done, it cannot be put aside, and in this case it is called morally invincible. This ignorance is also called antecedent, because it altogether precedes the consent of the will. But vincible is that which a man does not overcome when he can and ought. It is also called consequent, because it follows the determination of the will, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary and proceeds from free will. As is clear, there is not given vincible ignorance unless the obligation of inquiring further is known, at least confusedly; for the first thought of things is not in man's power (cf. n. 20 and n. 218).

VINCIBLE or consequent ignorance is subdivided into affected and non-affected. Affected, or directly voluntary, is that by which someone industriously labors, or in which he desires to remain, willing namely to be ignorant of the precepts of the law: either so that he may have an excuse for sin already committed; or so that he may not be drawn back from sin to be committed, according to that (Ps. 35:4): He would not understand that he might do well. This ignorance is found in those who, deliberately, neither attend sacred sermons or instructions, nor seek counsel in doubts, lest they be deterred from an evil purpose. Non-affected ignorance, or indirectly voluntary, is either crass, or simply vincible. Crass ignorance is had in him who, although he does not affect to be ignorant, nevertheless neglects to learn those things which he can and ought to know. This is also called supine, because the thick and fat, and those who lie supine, are accustomed to be idle. But if the negligence is common or light, so that some diligence is applied, yet not sufficient, the ignorance is called simply vincible. This is more or less culpable according to the various measure of negligence and the gravity of the thing concerning which the matter is treated. See St. Alph., III, 269; ed. G., I, p. 549; VII, 48; ed. G., IV, p. 291.

288. PRINCIPLES. I. Concomitant ignorance makes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary positively; but it makes the non-voluntary or involuntary privatively. The reason for the first is, because such ignorance has itself per accidens to the work which is done, and influences nothing into it. The reason for the second is, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed (V, n. XXVIII).

II. Antecedent or invincible ignorance altogether takes away the voluntary. For whatever proceeds from it is by no means voluntary, neither in itself as being unknown, nor in its cause, namely in ignorance, which is plainly involuntary. But the work is done against the inclination of the agent, if not actual, at least habitual and interpretative. Thus the Doctors commonly (V, n. XXVII). Cf. however n. 125.

III. Consequent or vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary, but lessens it, yet sometimes increases it. IT DOES NOT TAKE AWAY; because it is voluntary, and therefore its effect is voluntary. But IT LESSENS: for that which is willed only indirectly and per accidens is less voluntary than that which is intended in itself and directly. Whence Doctors commonly say that ignorance excuses, if not from the whole, at least from so much. But IT INCREASES the voluntary, if it is affected, not indeed by reason of itself, since ignorance, as such, is always opposed to the voluntary; but by reason of its cause, which is greater aversion from the right and greater affection into the depraved. For, as St. Thomas (1.2, q. 76, a. 4) observes: "from intention toward sin it comes about that someone wills to undergo the damage of ignorance, on account of the liberty of sinning" (V, n. XXIX).

289. From these things you resolve: 1. Those who do not observe feasts and fasts from ignorance, because they are accustomed to be little solicitous concerning knowing them, are not excused from sin, because their negligence is vincible. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 78, 3. But if, suspecting nothing concerning an occurring feast or fast, they omit the ordinary means of knowing for one or another week, they are excused from sin, because by such omission they did not fail in the required diligence, and therefore the ignorance is not vincible.

2. He who, noticing that the knowledge necessary for exercising an office is lacking to him, voluntarily performs the office, is held concerning the errors which he foresaw at least confusedly. But if the errors are grave, he remains in a habitual state of sin as long as he has not revoked his evil will, by not seizing the occasion of putting away ignorance. Cf. the things which will be said below n. 317.

3. If negligence in putting away ignorance is only venially culpable, the deed following from it, although grave in itself, will be imputable only unto venial fault. For acts of this kind are voluntary by reason of the cause.

Note. See many other things concerning ignorance in the treatises on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, on Contracts...

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 22-48; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXIII; ed. G., II, p. 694; Frins, I, n. 295; Surbled, La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine, III, p. 16; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions.

290. DEFINITION. Concupiscence, in the stricter sense, sounds the same as the tinder of sin, and is defined: A motion of the sensitive appetite rebelling against the spirit and tending toward the delectable good. But in the broader signification, insofar as it is considered here, it sounds the same as passion, and is defined: A motion of the sensitive appetite toward the delectable good, arisen from the imagination of good or evil, with some bodily transmutation (H. Ap., III, 15).

Passion of itself is indifferent: and it becomes good or evil according to the nature of the object which is sought according to or beyond the order of reason. But since passions conduce much to increasing the powers of the will, it will be worthwhile to use them rightly, to coerce their disordered impulses, and to order them to a good end.

DIVISION. Antecedent and consequent passion are distinguished.

1. Antecedent passion is said to be that which anticipates the consent of the will, and rises up from the apprehension alone of the object; as if someone, from the fortuitous sight of a base thing, is enticed to carnal delight; or on account of an injury received is moved to revenge. Of the motions of the passions, some are first-first: these arise in us without us, that is, without any consent of the will; others are called second-first, namely those which are produced with half-full advertence and half-full consent; lastly, others are second motions, or fully deliberate; these are excited with full advertence and with perfect consent.

2. Consequent passion is said to be that which arises from a previous act of the will; either by redundancy, because a vehement motion of the will overflows into the inferior appetite and moves passion, as is accustomed to happen in those who have the habit of some sin, for example, lust; or by direct excitation, because the will industriously moves the inferior appetite, by stopping, for example, the object before the eyes or the imagination, as if someone turns over in mind an injury received in order to provoke anger (V, n. XXIII, XXV).

Passions are generally numbered as eleven, of which six are in the concupiscible appetite: love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; but five in the irascible: hope and desperation, fear and daring, anger. Concerning these the Scholastics treat at length, and indeed usefully, because such treatment serves much both to the acquisition of virtues and to the governance of souls. See Schram, Inst. Theol. Myst., § 90.

291. PRINCIPLES. I. Concupiscence or antecedent passion, although it increases the inclination of the will, nevertheless lessens the free voluntary; indeed, if it is most vehement, it can entirely take it away. Thus commonly with St. Thomas (1.2, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3, and q. 10, a. 3).¹

It is said: 1. It increases the inclination of the will; for the more passion burns, the more vehemently the will breaks out into act.

2. It lessens the free voluntary, and therefore imputability. For it weakens the notion of the voluntary insofar as it obscures the mind and turns it away from consideration of the end, by impeding the intellect, enticed by the sensible object, from weighing the baseness of the act and the offense of God.

3. It can entirely take it away; which happens when passion is so vehement that it anticipates every judgment of reason and consent of the will; as is clear by the example of those who, on account of love or anger, become insane. Yet this happens comparatively rarely, especially as regards external acts; for regularly, as St. Thomas observes (1.2, q. 17, a. 9), members are not applied to work except through the consent of reason (V, n. XXIV, XXV). St. Alph., V, 3, says: "The intellect can be so seized by the delectability of the object offered that it adverts nothing of moral malice in it." Concerning this Berardi (I, n. 408) writes: Let Confessors note these things well, lest they cast some miserable souls into desperation.

Hence it is gathered: 1. First-first motions of concupiscence are not sins, but an occasion either of sins or of virtues. Second-first motions, in every illicit matter, are venial sins. Finally, second or deliberate motions, in a gravely illicit matter, are mortal sins, although their gravity, on account of the vehemence of passion, is somewhat lessened (cf. n. 322). See St. Alph., Op. dogm. (ed. Walter, II, p. 413).

2. Good passion, if it precedes the judgment of reason, so that man is moved more by passion than by reason to acting well, diminishes the goodness and praise of the act. You have an example in a father of a family who chastises his children more from anger than from the judgment of reason; in a merciful man who relieves the poor rather from compassion than from the impulse of reason and faith (St. Thom., de Malo, q. 3, a. 11).

II. Concupiscence or consequent passion sometimes increases the voluntary, sometimes is a sign of its magnitude. 1. It increases the voluntary if it proceeds from direct excitation; for then the motion of the will is more vehement, and the obscuration of reason, as being voluntary, does not take away in the effect the notion of the voluntary. 2. It is a sign of its magnitude if it arises from the redundancy of the aroused will into the inferior part: then it is compared to the will as effect to cause; but an effect demonstrates the cause. St. Thomas aptly to the matter (de Malo, as above): "and thus consequent passion adds to merit or demerit, because passion is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more." Cf. 1.2, q. 77, a. 6.

Note. As regards the question: Whether we are held to resist the motions of passion, see what will be said below, n. 322.

292. It is helpful here to add a few things concerning habit, which influences the voluntary in almost the same way as concupiscence.

DEFINITION. Habit is a firm disposition for acting, caused for the most part from repeated acts. It is said for the most part; for sometimes it happens that habit is generated even from one act, namely if the active thing, as St. Thomas speaks (1.2, q. 51, a. 3), was of great power, as when strong medicine immediately induces health. Cf. St. Thom., 1.2, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disp. metaph., disp. XLIV; Ami du Clerge, 1899, p. 529-593.

DIVISION. Since habit always supposes an act of the will, it cannot be divided into antecedent and consequent.

Habit is therefore either admitted by the will, or attacked by the will. It is admitted by the will if it is caused with advertence, that is, with foresight of its generation from the repetition of acts, or also if, although caused without advertence, it afterwards is no longer efficaciously extirpated. But it is attacked by the will if apt means are applied for putting away the habit.

PRINCIPLES. I. A habit admitted by the will sometimes increases, sometimes lessens, but never takes away the voluntary.

1. It increases the voluntary insofar as it gives greater alacrity to the will, without the attention of the mind being lessened in the agent. 2. It lessens the voluntary insofar as man, the slave of custom, is so drawn by it that tranquil consideration of mind is prevented or impeded. 3. It never takes away the voluntary, since man, from the fact that he does not will to cast off the habit, by that very fact has willed in the cause the effects flowing from the cause. See St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 49 ff.

II. A habit attacked by the will always lessens the voluntary, sometimes also takes it away.

1. It lessens the voluntary insofar as the powers of the will and the deliberation of reason are more or less impeded by the habit. 2. It takes away the voluntary in the case in which the habit so vehemently dominates the executive powers that it anticipates the judgment of reason, as is clear among those who are agitated by bile.

Therefore let the human will be constant in repressing habits; for custom is conquered by custom. Yet let it not neglect to apply the physical means prescribed by physicians, by which the powers of nature can increase.

II. On the impediments which remotely influence the voluntary.

293. Among men there are numbered some who not only have obtained a good soul (Wis. 8:19), but also, with God so ordering, obtain a bodily constitution more apt for the exercise of virtue (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 51, a. 1). But others are given who from the cradle are inclined to evil, are infected with the poison of depraved propensities, and direct heart and will upward with the greatest difficulty.

Among all these we can consider three things which most greatly influence the will: heredity, temperament, certain pathological states.

I. On heredity. No one can deny that certain qualities of body and propensities of soul are transmitted, as are: kleptomania, impulse to suicide, etc.; which nevertheless do not pass from parents to children in the same mode, nor according to a constant rule. Although the laws of transmission are explained most difficultly, as being since the whole matter furnishes almost nothing for investigation, nevertheless there is no doubt concerning the fact of transmission.

Heredity without doubt has influence upon liberty, because in reality, as is clear among the children of drunkards, a body more or less apt for operating is transmitted. Sometimes also natural propensities can overturn the judgment of the intellect, so that liberty ceases. But in no way is it lawful to affirm with Determinists that free choice is taken away by the law of heredity, because, with the case excluded in which the will is suddenly drawn under the influence of natural propensity, the mind can remain conscious of its imputability. Considered historically, our affirmation obtains great weight from the fact that it is discovered that children shining with great virtue have had origin from parents given to vice, while, conversely, God-fearing parents have begotten children given to every nefarious crime. And thus it is clear how empty is the argument taken from moral statistics (cf. Lehmk., I, 63), and at the same time how grave a wound they inflict upon society, whoever before judges excuse any guilty persons whatever, as if from the law of heredity they were not conscious of their crimes.²

II. On temperament. The complex of diverse propensities of body and soul, by which a special disposition is conferred on such a man, is called temperament. If those propensities become firm by efforts of the will, character is had.

Whatever may be the case concerning the diversity of opinions between the ancients and moderns, whether namely four or only two foundations of distinction among temperaments are present, it is certain that in all something dominates, which impresses a special mark on operation.

Temperament in no way takes away, but only lessens THE VOLUNTARY. The reason is, because from constitution there indeed arises an influence upon the will (St. Thom., Contra Gent., l. II, c. 63), but not such that the rational part as if necessarily follows the inferior propensities. Indeed, the rational part, through repeated acts, can so change natural inclinations that someone becomes as it were a new man, as is clear by the example of certain Saints who, choleric by nature, with grace favoring and the will striving, shone forth as a form of meekness.³

III. On pathological states. Especially in our times there are given various diseases by which either the will or the center of the nerves is affected; the will indeed, insofar as because of dullness of mind it appears as if impotent to will anything efficaciously; but the center of the nerves, insofar as the nerves are so exhausted or weakened that the agent, although remaining master of himself, labors under great inconstancy or is shaken and depressed by great passions.

1. WEAKNESS OF WILL is called aboulia. This so affects men otherwise robust that liberty is always lessened, sometimes also, but most rarely, taken away. It is necessary that friends furnish help to the miserable, so that they may again learn efficaciously to will or not to will.⁴

2. WEAKNESS OF THE NERVES brings with itself neurasthenia, if the disorder is sufficiently grave, or hysteria, if the disorder is graver. Sometimes also not constantly, but with some delay interposed, this disorder breaks into a man, and epileptic disease is had. But who can measure, who would dare to measure, the influence of the disease upon the free exercise of the will among those who are situated in this miserable condition? The voluntary is always indeed lessened, and sometimes altogether taken away. Let the sick flee to God, let them hope against hope, let them commit themselves plainly to be ruled by a prudent physician and by a long-suffering and patient confessor. But let the Confessor himself, although it is his part to judge all things rightly, know that in many things he ought to suspend judgment and commit the whole matter to the judgment of God.⁵

Note. A very useful question pertaining to this matter regards the hypnotic state, into which many cast themselves either for the sake of experiment or of recovering health. It is evident that liberty of the will is much affected through suggestions to be fulfilled afterwards, but from this do not conclude that the agent lacks all responsibility. Cf. what Tanquerey teaches, II, p. 76. Read what will be said below, n. 570, concerning hypnotism.

65. The involuntary is that which does not proceed from knowledge of the end, or, if knowledge of the end is present, nevertheless not from an intrinsic principle, or: that which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle or at least not with knowledge of the end. If only knowledge of the end is lacking, in one who is capable of knowledge and of the voluntary, the involuntary is negative, or non-voluntary, and is that which the agent does not know and therefore neither pursues nor turns away from: thus a dishonorable movement before the advertence of reason is properly non-voluntary. But if inclination from an intrinsic principle is lacking, the involuntary can be positive, or contrary in the proper sense, and is that which the agent turns away from by a positive act and which is against his inclination: thus a base thought had unwillingly is properly involuntary.

66. The involuntary is distinguished as involuntary simply, which the agent in no way causes nor desires but rather turns away from and tries to impede absolutely and efficaciously; and the involuntary in a certain respect, which the agent would not will but which would displease him when certain circumstances are considered, yet, all things weighed, he wills and it pleases him. In other words: that which he turns away from by a conditioned will, yet embraces by an absolute and efficacious will, so that the involuntary in a certain respect is voluntary simply. This voluntary is not pure, but mixed with the involuntary. Thus the throwing of merchandise into the sea is voluntary by reason of the storm, but in a certain respect is involuntary, for if the danger were lacking, the throwing would not be done.

1. Others also divide the voluntary thus: they call voluntary simply that which someone wills absolutely; voluntary in a certain respect, that which he wills or would will conditionally, although now he absolutely wills the contrary. But that which he conditionally wills is only the object of velleity or the willed thing, not voluntary, because it does not proceed from the will. Whence there is no voluntary in a certain respect; but every voluntary is voluntary simply. Therefore when St. Thomas, II-II, q. 142, a. 3, writes that those things which are done from fear are not simply voluntary but mixed, he takes simply for that which is the same as purely, altogether, from every part, and as it is opposed to mixed, as is clear from the terms. But here he takes simply for that which is actual in reality, says Billuart, diss. 1, art. 7. Whence St. Thomas understands voluntary simply in diverse ways: either in the sense explained by us above (I-II, q. 6, a. 6), or as pure voluntary (II-II, q. 142, a. 3).

67. Impediments of the Voluntary. - The following impede the voluntary and thus the human act: 1) all those things by which man is not master of himself, such as defect of reason, alienation of mind, sleep, drunkenness, the state of perfect somnambulism or hypnotism, diabolical obsession, etc.; certain of these, however, can be voluntary in cause; 2) in a man master of himself there are four proximate principal causes (to which the others are reduced) which impede the voluntary, that is, remove or diminish it: violence and fear, which impede the inclination of the will; concupiscence and ignorance, which impede intellectual knowledge, that is, remove or diminish it. Hence they are called enemies of the voluntary.

89. The causes which more greatly impede freedom, and in this way the human act, are of different kinds. Some proximately diminish or remove it, and these are only two: 1) one actual principle alone, namely the passions or movements of the sensitive appetite, for the movements or acts of reason and of the will concur in constituting the human act; 2) another habitual principle, namely habits (and habitual dispositions) with the attached custom, and these can also be found in reason and will. Besides these, 3) there are other causes which more remotely influence freedom, insofar as from them passions or habits or habitual dispositions can arise, such as bodily constitution, heredity, education, drunkenness and imperfect hypnosis, and several pathological or nervous states.

Four things are opposed, namely ignorance, concupiscence, fear, and force or violence.

10. Definition. - Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge.

Division. - Ignorance is distinguished:

1° On the part of the subject, into positive (or privative) and negative (or nescience), according as it is the lack of knowledge owed, or of knowledge not owed, for example ignorance of canon law in a countryman. Each differs from error; for the latter denotes a discrepancy between that which the mind judges and the thing concerning which it judges. Thus, with respect to a usurious contract, he labors under ignorance who does not know it to be usurious (lack of cognition); but he labors under error who, although he knows it to be usurious, nevertheless judges it lawful. Therefore every error is ignorance, but not conversely. How error differs from fraud, see n. 882. 3°.

2° On the part of the object, into ignorance of law and of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or of a particular fact.

3° On the part of the cause, or of the will from which it proceeds, into vincible and invincible, according as, with diligence applied, it can be overcome or not. - But invincible ignorance is physically such, if in no way it can be overcome; morally such, if, after moral diligence has been applied, it cannot be removed.¹

But that diligence is judged moral which prudent persons, according to the gravity of the matter and according to their own capacity, in such circumstances, are wont to employ.¹

4° On the part of the action which is done from ignorance, one kind is antecedent, which is in no way willed and is the cause of the work, so that, if the ignorance itself were not present, the work would not be done; as if someone pierces a man whom he invincibly thinks to be a wild beast, and would not have killed him unless he had been ignorant that he was a man. Another kind is concomitant, which neither is voluntary, nor is the cause of the work, so that, although it were absent, the work would equally be done; as if someone, invincibly thinking that he is killing a wild beast, kills a man long sought for death, whom he would also have killed if he had known him. Another kind is consequent, which in some way follows an act of the will unwilling or negligent to inquire, and is directly or indirectly willed; and therefore it is otherwise called vincible ignorance. Haine, ib. p. 11. q. 27.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished in three ways, namely: 1° simply such, when some diligence, yet not sufficient diligence, is applied to dispel it; 2° crass or supine, when no, or scarcely any, zeal is put into investigating the truth; 3° affected, when someone voluntarily shuns the means of laying aside ignorance, lest he be drawn back from his own purpose.

To invincible ignorance perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence must be referred. But these, if they are not perfect, or if they proceed from culpable negligence, belong to vincible ignorance.

11. Principles. - I. Invincible ignorance entirely takes away the voluntary, both because it itself is not voluntary, and because nothing can be voluntary where there is no cognition. Therefore no act proceeding from invincible ignorance can be imputed to the agent. Thus likewise one must determine concerning perfect forgetfulness and inadvertence, since the same reason obtains. - Antecedent ignorance precisely causes the involuntary, and indeed positively, because, if knowledge were present, the act would not be placed.

II. Vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary. For ignorance of this sort, whether directly or indirectly, is truly voluntary. Nevertheless it diminishes the voluntary, because it is the cause of willing that which, if it were absent, one is supposed never to have willed. The same also, by parity of reason, say concerning imperfect forgetfulness and inadvertence, and also concerning consequent ignorance.

III. Crass ignorance and affected ignorance diminish the voluntary much less, and consequently sin. The reason is that the former arises from grave negligence, while the latter is retained deliberately for sinning more freely, and therefore is an indication of a very intense voluntary, under which respect it also increases the sin. S. Th., De malo, q. 3. a. 7.

IV. Concomitant ignorance causes the involuntary, but only negatively, or the non-voluntary, not positively, because it is not against the inclination of the will; for the agent rejoices when he notices it. Hence it does not wholly excuse from sin, because it does not take away every habitual or actual conditioned will of sinning; nor again does it wholly cause sin, because it is involuntary and invincible. Hence he who from such ignorance kills, as if it were a wild beast, a cleric who is his enemy, remains guilty of internal homicide because of the evil will of killing his enemy, if he had known him; nevertheless he is excused from external homicide, nor does he incur excommunication, irregularity, or restitutions; because an external act not voluntarily placed does not induce these penalties, and an internal act does not induce them. Haine, ib. p. 13. q. 29.

Resolutions. - 1° Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any pang of conscience or suspicion of malice did not formally sin in reality, even if they had already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterwards they are not bound to confess them, when they understand those things to be illicit, since material sins are not matter for confession.

2° If a confessor or judge notices that he lacks sufficient knowledge to discharge his office as is fitting, and neglects to acquire knowledge, or before he has acquired it continues to exercise his office, he will be held for the errors which he foresaw at least in some way, because they are voluntary to him, at least in their cause.

3° Those who through their own fault are not accustomed to hear Mass on Sundays and are little solicitous about the feasts and fasts to be observed, as such persons have become accustomed, are not excused from sin if they do not observe the feasts and fasts, on the ground that they are ignorant of them; for the ignorance is vincible, since they voluntarily neglect to apply the means by which they could know them. But if only once or twice they have omitted Mass, whether with or without their own fault, and have not even suspected that a feast day or day of fasting was occurring during the week, they are excused from sin, since their ignorance is invincible; for he cannot be called voluntarily negligent in applying the means of dispelling ignorance who does not even think about applying them. - Likewise they sin who, dwelling in the country, far from a church, have neglected to inquire from books, or, if they do not know how to read, from others, for example Catholic neighbors, concerning feasts and fasts. But those are excused who, unskilled in reading and living among non-Catholics, have no one to admonish them concerning these things. The reason for both is the same as that which was brought forward just now.

4° If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable only to venial fault. The reason is that acts of this sort are voluntary and therefore culpable only in their cause; therefore, since the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect cannot exceed light fault.

5° Vincible ignorance of a thing knowledge of which is prescribed by reason of itself (for example, of the mysteries of Faith, n. 257 sqq.) is a sin specifically distinct from that which is done from ignorance of this sort; because one sinning in this way acts against two diverse precepts issued for a diverse motive (n. 213). But if cognition is prescribed only by accident, by reason of the work to be done, it is not a special sin, but only one sin against that virtue

to which belongs the observance of the precept that is vincibly ignored. For by the same precept by which I am bound, for example, to fast, I am also bound to inquire. Hence, if through negligence in inquiring I do not fast, it is enough if I confess: I violated the fast. Haine, ib. p. 14. q. 31.

See many other things concerning ignorance elsewhere passim, especially in the treatise on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, and on Contracts in general, where error is treated.

12. Definition. - Concupiscence is commonly defined: a motion of the sensitive appetite, or a motion which operates not only in the soul, but also in some sensible part of the body, at least in the heart, namely moving it more intensely toward a real or apparent good, or drawing it back more intensely from that which is represented as evil. In order that this may be understood more fully, it must be known that often we suffer in our body certain commotions, which vehemently impel and excite us toward something; these, moreover, are called passions, which are far from being evil in themselves. For they are from the author of nature, and can be incentives of virtues: thus, for example, a soldier inflamed with desire of true glory fights more bravely. Yet because in the present state of corrupted nature the passions snatch man beyond the limits within which virtue stands, therefore in ordinary usage the passions themselves, just as also concupiscence, are regarded as evil movements; and therefore concupiscence, insofar as it is opposed to the voluntary and to the free, is defined: an inordinate motion of the sensitive appetite, by which the will is borne toward sensible good.

13. Division. - A twofold concupiscence is distinguished: one antecedent, another consequent. The former is that which, in the order of causality, precedes any deliberation or consent of the will, yet allures and draws it to consent; thus, for example, when an enemy has been seen, at once the appetite of vengeance is aroused. But the latter is that which, in the order of causality, follows an act of the will: either because a vehement motion of the will overflows into the inferior appetite, as is wont to happen in those who have a habit of some sin, for example of lust; or because the will directly and deliberately excites this very thing, as, for example, when someone reads obscene books in order to excite lust, - or deliberately thinks about an enemy or about injuries received, in order to kindle hatred in himself or increase the desire for vengeance, - or, when about to rebuke those whom he loves with tender affection, he in some way excites himself to applying himself seriously to the rebuke.

14. Principles. - I. Antecedent concupiscence, and therefore non-voluntary concupiscence, the greater and more vehement it is, the more it diminishes sin; indeed it can excuse entirely from sin. The reason is that the motion of the sensitive appetite disturbs, diminishes, or even impedes the judgment of reason; but causes which diminish the judgment of reason also diminish the voluntary. Since therefore an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary, by that very fact concupiscence, while it diminishes the voluntary, diminishes also the sin; and therefore where concupiscence is more intense and stronger, there the sin is less. Indeed the notion of sin will entirely cease if the motion of concupiscence totally impedes the use of reason (first-first acts).¹

II. Consequent concupiscence, and therefore voluntary concupiscence, does not diminish sin, but rather increases it; or rather it is a sign of its greatness, insofar as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin.²

The former part is proved, because although physically, nevertheless not morally, it diminishes the voluntary, since the very diminution of the judgment of reason proceeds from the will of the agent himself; for he who wills the cause, by that very fact also wills the effect. Haine, ib. p. 15. q. 33.

The latter part is proved, because, as St. Thomas has it:³ "When from a strong movement of the will the lower appetite is stirred to passion, ... passion adds to merit or demerit, because the passion is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who does alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger."

15. Definition. - Fear is a trepidation of mind on account of some danger present or future to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself.

Division. - Fear is commonly divided as follows, namely:

1° By reason of itself, into grave and light, according as a grave evil is feared (hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, great loss of goods), certain or probable, inevitable; - or an evil either light, or improbable, or avoidable. Thus, if you take fear objectively. - Subjectively it is most grave, grave, or light according as it disturbs reason entirely, notably, or lightly.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when, although light in itself, nevertheless it is grave with respect to certain persons. Thus boys, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2° Fear, by reason of the cause, is from within or from without, according as the thing itself produces fear, as disease, shipwreck, etc., or an extrinsic cause, namely a man bringing fear upon someone.

3° Fear, by reason of the manner in which it is struck in, is struck in justly or unjustly, according as it is inflicted from a cause either just, for example deserved penalties, or unjust; and this fear is unjust as to substance. It is called unjust as to manner when it is inflicted indeed from a just cause, but without the order of law being observed. See n. 1599. II.

4° By reason of the end, fear from without can be struck in either for extorting some act, or for another end.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other Superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave if there is prudent fear lest those who strike in the fear be held offended for a long time and gravely.

16. Principles. - I. An act placed from fear, however grave, is simply and absolutely voluntary and free. The reason is that through fear neither is cognition taken away on the part of the intellect, unless the mind is entirely disturbed, - nor election on the part of the will, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those have always been regarded as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the Faith.

II. Those things which are done from fear, although simply voluntary, nevertheless regularly are also involuntary in a qualified respect; whence also the gravity of fault is diminished. The reason is that, by hypothesis, when someone is impelled to acting by fear alone, he acts in such a way that, with fear absent, he would recoil from acting; and therefore a work done from fear alone has joined with it a certain sadness and repugnance of the will, although inefficacious. It is said regularly, because sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance excludes every true notion of the involuntary, or every deliberate affection toward sin. Understand this of fear or attrition that is simply servile, not of servilely servile fear; for the latter does not exclude the will of sinning absolutely, as the former does. Namely, just as in a merchant who casts his wares into the sea from fear of shipwreck there remains an affection simply voluntary toward the wares, so in a sinner detesting his sins from servilely servile fear there remains an affection simply voluntary toward sins; and neither this detestation nor that casting overboard is involuntary except in a qualified respect.

III. If fear takes away the use of reason, the act, as is clear, can in no way be voluntary. But if it does not indeed take away the use of reason, but notably impedes it, the act will be imperfectly voluntary because of imperfect cognition of the thing.

17. Note. - 1° What has been said holds concerning those things which are done from fear, not concerning those things which are done only with fear; for the latter can in no way be called involuntary, and are wont to belong to a man acting manfully or overcoming fear, for instance to a soldier fighting bravely. Bouq. n. 59.

2° It happens that together with fear other causes impel one to acting, and then the action can be pleasing rather than troublesome. For example, someone eats meat on a forbidden day from fear indeed of the mockery of companions, but at the same time from affection for meat. In this case it is not always evident what the act has from fear and what from elsewhere, nor therefore in what degree it is involuntary in a qualified respect. Ib. n. 61.

3° Theologians treat of fear under a threefold respect: 1. as an impediment of the voluntary; 2. as a cause excusing from law; 3. as a cause of invalidity of acts. Here we have spoken of it under the first respect.

18. Definition. - Force or violence is coercion which is brought upon someone by an extrinsic and free cause, while his will is resisting.

Division. - A twofold violence is distinguished, namely absolute and in a qualified respect, according as coercion is brought upon someone resisting in every way, or only in some measure. Moreover it happens in two ways that someone resists only in some measure, namely: 1° when the force is not of such a kind that it cannot be broken or weakened by stubborn resistance; or 2° when someone does not unwillingly suffer the force brought upon him, whatever finally it may be.

Observe that, in a moral matter, absolute violence is that to which, on the part of the one who suffers it, that resistance is opposed which can be opposed to it according to one's power. I say: according to one's power; this intimates two things: one, that the resistance to be applied must be not only internal, but also external; for internal resistance cannot be sincere and efficacious unless there is also external resistance which can be applied. The other, that that external resistance must be as great as, according to the circumstances, can and ought to be applied. See the examples in n. 20 under 2° and 3°.

19. Principles. - I. Elicited acts of the will can in no way be coerced, because force cannot be brought upon the will. Therefore St. Anselm:¹ "No one can will unwillingly," he says, "because no one can will while not willing."

II. Other acts, placed from absolute violence, are in no way voluntary or free, and therefore are not sinful or demeritorious; but external acts which are placed from violence only in a qualified respect are more or less free according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection by which someone suffers the force.² Moreover, not only the exterior members of the body, but also the interior faculties, such as phantasy, the sensitive appetite, etc., can be moved to some acts by some extrinsic force, for example of an angel, whether good or bad, or of another natural cause, while the will resists in vain; for instance, to distractions, to obscene imaginations, etc.

20. Resolutions. - 1° A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her sins in no way, even if she suffers violation; for no one sins wholly unwillingly.

2° Women suffering force sin gravely if, through pusillanimity or vain fear, for example of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even with the danger of consent set aside; because although they do not consent to sensual delight, nevertheless, while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves and cooperate in the crime of another. - Whether a woman oppressed by force sins if, on account of fear of death, she omits to cry out, is disputed. - It seems probably to be denied, with danger of consent set aside. Indeed, very probably, with the aforesaid danger set aside, the woman is not bound to cry out when there stands a danger of any notable harm, whether of infamy or of excessive shame; for if otherwise she already resists as much as she can, she is not bound to repel force with so great an inconvenience. Thus expressly St. Alphonsus.¹ In practice, however, the opposite manner of acting is to be advised, because of the danger of consent.²

3° Sometimes resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion brought upon one is not required, namely when, on the one hand, it would be useless, and, on the other hand, the matter at issue is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of the pagans were not sinning, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting danger of scandal or injury to Religion.

Note. - From what has been said it is clear that force and fear, although in Law they are sometimes used promiscuously, differ very much from each other. "For 1° force is an impulse brought upon one from without, and does not act upon the mind; but fear is an affection of the mind arising from the apprehension of an evil, whether to be brought on by force, or to happen in any other way; 2° force does not act except insofar as it is brought upon one as actually present; fear arises from the apprehension of an evil either present or to happen afterwards; 3° the things which are done under one compelling are altogether involuntary; the things which are done from fear are more often voluntary." Walsh, n. 348.

I. Various pathological states. - Causes of nervous agitation, not rarely occurring in present times, which more or less impede human liberty and moral life, are pathological states or diseases of the mind, which are so called not because the soul or spiritual faculties can be sick in themselves, but because, on account of badly affected organs of the body, specifically centers of the brain and sensitive faculties, they are impeded in action, either transitorily or permanently. Now those who labor under such a morbid state are commonly called abnormal. These are distinguished according to diverse genera, according to their diverse illnesses, the principal of which are numbered here:¹

¹ Theologians are accustomed to treat of these in the doctrine concerning human acts. We have taken the principal things from Vermeersch, Prummer, and Tanquerey; Salsmans also has excellent things in the work Geneeskundige plichtenleer and in the article Abnormalen in den biechtstoel, in Pastor Bonus, Aug. 1927. Besides, the following can be compared: P. Janet, Les Obsessions et la Psychasthenie, Les Nevroses, Nevroses et idees fixes; Dr. Raymond, Nevroses et Psychasthenie; Rauh and Revault, Psychologie appliquee a la morale; Ribot, Les maladies de la volonte; Grasset, Demifous et demiresponsables, Psychisme inferieur, La responsabilite des criminels; Axenfeld and Huchard, Traite des Nevroses; Pitres and Regis, Les Obsessions et les Impulsions; Van Velsen, Hypnotisme, suggestion, psychotherapie; Francotte, La raison et la folie (Rev. des Q. scient., d. 27); Vigouroux, Traite de medecine, t. III; Dubois, Les psychonevroses et leur traitement moral; Pere Raymond, Le guide des nerveux et des scrupuleux; Eymieu, Le gouvernement de soi-meme (vol. 2); Surbled, La morale dans ses rapports avec la medecine et l'hygiene, t. III; Boule, Questions de responsabilite (N. R. Theol. 1910); D'Agnel and d'Espiney, Direction de conscience et Psychotherapie des troubles nerveux; Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoralmedezin (Latin and French versions); Familler, Pastoral-Psychiatrie; Bessmer, Storungen im Seelenleben, Die Grundlagen der Seelenstorungen, Seelische Hilfe bei Nervenleiden, Die Krankhaften Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit (in Stimmen); Schloss, Propadeutik der Psychiatrie (French version); Huber, Die Hemmnisse des Willensfreiheit; Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der speziellen Seelensorge; Romer, Psychiatrie und Seelesorge (an excellent work although the author is Protestant); Weber, Zwangsgedanken und Zwangszustande in pastoral-psychiatrischer Beurteilung; Tummers, De nieuwere richting in de strafwetenschap; Van der Hoeven, Psychiatrie (where sometimes there are positivist conceptions); Roels, De Psychologie van den wil; Schimm Van der Loeff and Barnhoorn, Zielsziekten en hunne verpleging; Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis; Gemelli, De scrupulis, psycho-pathologiae specimen, etc., etc.

1. Phrenesis, in which the sick put forth false judgments that are radically incurable, because they are deceived by perpetual or temporary hallucinations, or have disturbed associations of imagination, so that their psychic life can be equated with the life of those dreaming. Hence in delirium (even if it is monomania, or hallucination circumscribed to one topic) they are not free; during intervals of delirium nothing of itself impedes liberty.

2. Obsession so occupies the mind that the obsessed person is bound to think or do certain things. It disturbs practical judgment sufficiently, so that more often room is left only for light fault, and mortal sin can scarcely be given in them. But, besides perpetual obsessions, there are others which are generated only in certain circumstances; whence outside the state of obsession, the sick are held by the precept of fleeing occasions of morbid excitation toward committing dishonorable things, and if they freely violate this, they are guilty.

To obsession are reduced phobias, fixed ideas, and more intense scruples.²

² Concerning remedies and education against obsession and phobias, cf. Prummer, Th. M., I, n. 95; and Vermeersch, Th. M., I, n. 85.

3. Blind impulses or invincible propensities can exist in a morbid state, whether they immediately obtain an act that is not deliberate, or overcome fruitless resistance, so that the act is nevertheless elicited. Hence some are merely mechanical or motor, which often are without affection, as, for example, in an idiot; others are psycho-mechanical or even merely psychic, which occur with more distinct perception and stronger affection, and often leave partial liberty.

All suppose a suggestible person, for his passive docility depends on the intensity of a certain phantasm which rather easily generates an insuperable motion. Thus some are known to be prone to lies, others to internal blasphemies, others to suicide or homicide, others to thefts, drunkennesses, or fires, according as they labor under kleptomania, dipsomania, pyromania. Yet with these must not be confused those who from habit are thieves, drunkards, liars, etc.; for these certainly are not abnormal, but sinners from malice.

It is not easily discerned whether the impulses are truly irresistible, but it must be judged from all circumstances whether liberty is only diminished or taken away. The latter can easily be supposed a) if the action cannot be explained by natural concupiscence, b) if after the evil action the soul has remained quiet and content, c) if something is done which one otherwise altogether abhors; yet liberty is not always taken away. Hence those things can be applied which are handed down in the Treatise on Human Acts concerning violence, fear, and concupiscence.

4. Abulia renders the will powerless to will efficaciously that which is desired, whether it remains idle, or, as if unwillingly, is compelled to seek or flee certain things against its practical judgments. In the first case, the sick person is often excused from certain positive duties, because liberty is at least sufficiently diminished; in the second case, what has been said concerning impulses holds.

Abulia, however, is sometimes not universal, but limited to certain acts or certain times. Besides, it can be voluntary and free in the cause, when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state, e.g., by constantly abdicating the will without sufficient reason.

5. Neurasthenia is a pathological state consisting in habitual fatigue of the nervous system from an organic or psychic cause, in which the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although master of himself, labors under the greatest inconstancy and is greatly depressed physically and morally. Wherefore liberty is diminished, though not taken away. Hence the sick can rather easily be excused when, yielding to weariness, they neglect certain positive precepts, especially merely ecclesiastical ones, as an excessive burden. Nevertheless, of themselves they are to be judged to sin if, because of sadness, they seek shameful delights to which the illness itself does not impel.

6. Hysteria, although its cause is disputed, also carries with itself disorder and disturbance of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia. It consists in an immense morbid suggestibility, from which sensibility is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia); there also arise motions of the body more or less disordered, and also vivid hallucinations or vehement passions which are very unstable and greatly impede the free exercise of the will, as also right judgment and moral sense. Hence in practice, only from all circumstances, and from the declaration of hysterical persons themselves, can it be known how much liberty remains in them. Yet hysterical agitation (crise, acces de grande hysterie) cannot be combined with grave guilt.

7. Still graver is larvate or hidden epilepsy, which impels one to perpetrate various strange, shameful, atrocious things: to inflict injury, blasphemies, shameful conversations, striking, homicide, etc.; not indeed constantly, but with longer intervals interposed, without the sick person retaining memory of all these things. Epileptic agitation or crisis certainly cannot be combined with grave guilt. But outside times of frenzy the mind is sane and perfectly free; unless sometimes a transitory psychic disturbance comes upon it.³

³ Speech is not instituted concerning hypnotism, because it is not an illness, but a phenomenon induced by an extrinsic cause.

All the aforesaid disturbances, even if they affect affection or the will, seem to draw their origin from an obscuring or diminution of intellectual cognition.

II. Conjectural signs of invincible inclination, by which it can more or less be discerned whether someone has yielded to an ineluctable inclination, are taken from various circumstances, especially taken together:

1. if on several occasions, and as if instinctively and swiftly after the manner of a mere instrument, he has placed some action, without any proper advantage, sensible delight, or satiation of a base instinct;

2. if he acted from a certain nervous anxiety or unrest which, when the action has been performed, immediately falls and becomes quiet; while on the contrary in a tranquil and quiet state he never acts thus;

3. if sincerely, and without any dissimulation, he wonders at his own operation, and spontaneously affirms himself conscious that he acted under the impulse of a certain violence;

4. finally, if he seems infected by hereditary blemish, by which, namely, his parents or blood-relatives also seem to labor under the same pathology.

Especially, in the matter of chastity and lust, there is sometimes given an abnormal propensity, as if invincible, toward sexual delight, namely sexual hyperesthesia or erotism, which according to the different sex is called satyriasis or nymphomania. Different species of this are numbered:⁴

⁴ Concerning these, our Questions concerning Chastity and Lust, pp. 99-102, can be compared.

a) a most vehement propensity to procuring self-abuse, especially among certain young persons of either sex;

b) exhibitionism, or an inclination to display in public the sexual parts or operations, every shame having been left behind;

c) homosexuality or uranism, that is, a perverse inclination toward the same sex, and as it were insensibility toward the other sex;

d) sexual perversion, by which venereal delight is procured from those things which are not by nature fitted to procure it. This is manifested in sadism, by which they inflict violence and torments on others to procure sexual delight for themselves; in masochism, by which, on the contrary, with a view to the same delight, they wish to undergo violence and torments; in fetishism, by which lust is excited by the sight or imagination of indifferent things (hair, shoes, cloths, etc.) which the mind conceives as associated with sexual things. In healing this, it is necessary to break apart that association and, as far as possible, erase it from memory.

III. As regards imputability and responsibility, the Determinists and Criminalists are not to be heard, who hold almost all malefactors as irresponsible sick persons, nor many physicians or cultivators of Psychiatry, who too easily deny the liberty and imputability of actions. But on the contrary, the better among them affirm not only that liberty generally is not extinguished, but also that the greatest influence is exercised by the soul upon the body, notwithstanding the latter's native propensity; and therefore in curing mental illnesses they are accustomed to use suggestion or moral persuasion, and indeed acknowledge the beneficial influence of the priest. Besides, for the greater part men are healthy, not abnormal; the latter constitute an exception.

Hence for practice let it be noted:

1. abnormal persons remain perfectly free in relation to other matters in which they are not abnormal;

2. in those matters about which they labor under abnormal affection, liberty and imputability are often attenuated and diminished, yet not in such a way that what is mortal always becomes venial;

3. generally, however, liberty is not extinguished; wherefore this is not to be supposed, but on the contrary sufficient liberty is presumed to be present;

4. even if liberty is greatly diminished or extinguished, this can be, and rather often is, voluntary in the cause: for the more conscious they are of invincible propensity, the more they are bound to flee occasions and circumstances of morbid excitation by which they are carried to dishonorable things;

5. in the case in which responsibility is greatly diminished or almost extinguished, this is not to be said to penitents, because it would increase their concupiscence and induce them to more rash acts, so that now, without any rein or restraint, they would rush into vice: namely, despairing of resisting, they would think that all things are now permitted to them.

Wherefore confessors judge imprudently who immediately from a few indications conclude to grave abnormality, and much more who therefore conclude to inculpability and excuse; they act still more imprudently if, for the sake of consolation, they reveal this to such penitents.

And thus especially in the matter of chastity, in relation to those who have an extraordinary erotic constitution (whether native, or adventitious from readings, spectacles, disordered loves), by which they are assiduously pressed by the lust of untamed flesh, so that the smallest spark produces a great fire which is accustomed to be extinguished only when passion has been fulfilled; they are filled with thoughts and phantasms and are agitated by vehement temptations of the flesh, and finally break forth into the deed. Such persons:

a) generally and of themselves cannot be excused, especially if they have come to the deed; nor even, if their responsibility is doubtful, can the aforesaid commotions and actions be permitted to them under the pretext that probably they are not formal sins: for it is not licit to expose oneself to the proximate danger of consent, even doubtful consent, but formal sin must certainly be avoided. This is, namely, a case in which systems of probability cannot be applied, but the safer way is to be chosen;

b) hence, as often as they at least have broken forth into the deed, they are rather to be presumed guilty, and then regularly they should not be permitted to approach holy communion without previous confession;

c) besides, unless they diligently use all natural and supernatural means, they are not capable of living chastely;

d) whence let the confessor pity them and help them with fatherly solicitude and great patience; therefore let him give courage to them for fighting, urge them to flee diligently all dangers of chastity, to pray frequently and renew a good purpose of resistance, to frequent the sacraments, to mortification in food, drink, and sleep, and also to use other physical means or certain medicines.

e) generally let him be kind toward them in conceding absolution, even if they are recidivists, because of their intrinsic fragility; yet if they were also in occasions, they would have to be treated more rigorously because of their proclivity to pleasures.

IV. As regards care and medical treatment, it must be noted: those who are abnormal in an acute degree are simply to be committed to a trustworthy and Catholic psychiatrist physician; for others the confessor can contribute to healing by rational persuasion and suggestion, so that, namely, obsessions, fixed ideas, and harmful impressions may gradually be diminished and erased from the mind. For this, divine help having often been invoked,

1. let him excite the confidence of the penitent: for it is necessary that the latter wish to be healed and understand that this must be procured by his docile submission and education of the will;

2. let him proceed with great kindness and at the same time inflexible firmness;

Four causes of the involuntary are commonly assigned: violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance. But note, once for all, that when it is said that violence, or fear, or concupiscence, or ignorance cause the involuntary, the sense is not that violence, fear, concupiscence, or ignorance physically influence the act of will, upon its very involuntariness so to speak, but that they move physically or morally toward an act which simply or relatively is contrary to the inclination of the will; whence that involuntariness is caused by love of some opposite good. Thus, e.g., while one is moved by fear of shipwreck to cast goods overboard, that casting is involuntary in a certain respect [secundum quid], because it repugns to the affection which the one casting has for preserving his goods; whence the involuntary found in that casting is not caused by fear, but by love of his goods.

The proper sense, therefore, of these questions is, that acts from violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance are involuntary simply or in a certain respect, inasmuch as they suppose in the agent an inclination simply or in a certain respect contrary to the present act toward which they move. I suppose that violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as to elicited acts, well indeed as to commanded acts.

The first part stands, because the violent, which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting, is against the inclination of the patient. But an act elicited by the will is not from an extrinsic principle but intrinsic, namely from the will, nor against the inclination of the patient, since it is nothing else than the very inclination of the will toward its object. Whence St. Anselm rightly said, de Lib. arbit., cap. 6: « No one unwilling can will anything, because he cannot will, unwilling to will. »

Plain also is the second part, because the members, or exterior powers, can be moved by force from without or impeded against the command of the will ¹, as if, e.g., the will wished to see, one could forcibly close the eyes, and if it wished not to see, one could force open the eyes: and so of the rest. Therefore. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 4, c.

Of these commanded acts the question is whether violence causes the involuntary in them. Wherefore

I say: Violence causes the involuntary simply, or the act done under violence is involuntary simply.

Understand the conclusion of absolute violence, which one cannot overcome with all legitimate effort employed, not of violence in a certain respect, which one could conquer if he resisted as much as he morally can.

It is proved of the conclusion. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle and consequently according to inclination; the violent is from an extrinsic principle and against the inclination of the patient; for we defined it « that which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting ». Therefore what is violent is not voluntary.

From these authors commonly gather that a woman oppressed by violence from a man, resisting him both within and without as much as she morally can, sins nowise; because this violence destroys altogether the voluntary, without which there is no sin.

But if you ask what and how much the woman ought to do, that she be held to resist as much as she morally can, and thus suffer absolute violence simply so called,

I answer. First that she cannot kill the oppressor; because, as we say de Jure et Just., dissert. X, a. 6, § 2, chastity is a good of lower order than the life of man. She can however resist with cries, blows, slaps, wounding of the oppressor, yet not lethally, and the like; and to these she is bound, short nevertheless of danger to her own life and reputation; because, if such danger be present, and elsewhere there be absent danger of interior consent to lust, she is not bound to resist externally at so great loss of higher goods; because external resistance is an affirmative precept which does not bind always, and at so great cost. I said, « provided danger of consent to interior lust be absent »; which since it rarely is absent, rarely also is she bound to employ these at peril of life or reputation.

[Too absolutely does our Author deny that, in the case proposed, it is licit for the woman even to kill the oppressor.

Theologians commonly hold it licit to kill an unjust invader of goods of fortune, « if they be of great moment, and cannot otherwise be defended or recovered than by the death of the despoiler, » as Sylvius says, in IIam IIae, q. 64, a. 7.

And the same many cited by St. Alphonsus hold, lib. IV, n. 383; and this card. Gousset holds at least as more probable, n. 617, and Gury, n. 397. But chastity, and especially virginity, considered in itself, far surpasses goods of fortune. Therefore much more is it licit to kill the aggressor, if no other way be at hand for preserving chastity. So say the authors just named.

Moreover everyone is bound to turn away proximate danger of mortal sin. But in the case the woman is placed in proximate danger of consenting to another's lust, which consent would be mortal sin. Therefore she not only can but is bound to turn away that danger, even by killing of the aggressor.

If you say that everyone is bound to prefer the eternal salvation of his neighbor to his own temporal good, I answer:

1° The aggressor freely and knowingly casts himself into danger of salvation, and cannot require that the woman renounce a good, even temporal, which far surpasses other goods of the same order, to turn away from a criminal such danger as is willed at least in its cause.

2° The woman, if she repel not the force by every possible means, is herself constituted in danger of the same kind, namely of consenting to lust and losing through mortal sin the supernatural life of the soul. But not only is she not bound, she cannot even licitly prefer the salvation of another to her own salvation. Therefore. Whence St. Antoninus says in Summa, part. III, tit. 4, c. 3, § 2: « The woman uses her natural right, whereby she may repel force with force, and she is bound rather to provide for her own salvation than for another's; for she exposes herself to danger of consenting to an act of sin by suffering herself to be oppressed, on account of the difficulty of the pleasure. »

It must therefore be concluded, against our Author, that this violence does not destroy the voluntary altogether; for that cannot be judged altogether involuntary which is not removed by all possible and licit means.]

Fear is defined in law: « Trembling of mind from the cause of future and imminent danger, » that is, disquietude and disturbance. One fear is grave, another light. Grave fear is one kind absolutely grave, namely whereby a grave and imminent evil is feared, as death, exile, hard imprisonment, etc.; this is called such as befalls a man of constancy, that is, whereby men otherwise of constancy are commonly moved, although at times they ought not to be moved; for no one ought to be moved by any fear whatever, e. g., to perjury. Another fear is respectively grave, whereby although a man of constancy would not be moved, yet a timid person would be moved, as a child, a woman, an old man.

Fear is light when a light evil is feared, or indeed a grave one, but not imminent; as if, under a serene sky, or with frost pinching, you should fear lightning. To absolutely grave fear is reduced reverential fear, whereby one fears superiors gravely incensed and threatening. But if threats and grave indignation are absent, it can be called light, unless perhaps respectively as regards daughters of the family, who have a timid disposition.

I say 1°: Things done out of fear are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary¹. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 4, c.

It is proved of the conclusion. Things done out of fear, considered in themselves, are not voluntary; nay, thus they are involuntary; but they are made voluntary and willed out of fear, namely in order to avoid the evil that is feared. This whole matter is clear in the common example. The merchant, considering his goods in themselves, setting aside the peril of shipwreck, would not wish to cast them overboard; but a tempest having arisen and the peril of death being imminent, he wills to cast them overboard. Therefore.

I say 2°: Things done out of fear are voluntary simply, and involuntary secundum quid². ² Ibid.

It is proved. That which is voluntary here and now, all circumstances weighed, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from here and now, or from the individuating circumstances, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. But what is done out of fear is voluntary here and now, all circumstances attended to, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from the circumstances. Therefore. — The min. is clear in the casting of goods into the sea out of fear of shipwreck.

It is confirmed. What is done out of fear is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only: so the merchant, the tempest pressing in, wills absolutely and efficaciously to cast overboard his goods, which he would not will to cast overboard were the tempest absent. But what is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. Therefore.

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that contracts entered into out of grave fear are valid by natural law. Some, however, are invalidated by positive law: concerning which when we treat of contracts.

You will gather 2° that grave fear does not excuse from the whole sin in those things which are intrinsically and immutably evil, or, as is said, forbidden because evil, because they remain voluntary simply. Hence he who out of fear of death denies the faith, commits perjury, fornicates, etc., sins mortally. It does excuse, however, from so much of the sin, and the more so the graver the fear, because it diminishes the voluntary.

But in those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because forbidden, grave fear regularly excuses from the whole, not because they are not voluntary simply, but because positive laws, whether divine or human, by the intention of their legislators do not oblige regularly with so great a loss. Whence works of this kind, which are evil only by reason of the law, the obligation of the law ceasing, cease to be evil. Hence he who out of fear of death or of grave infamy, or of another grave evil, did not fast in Lent, or did not hear Mass on a feast day, etc., would not sin.

I said, « regularly, » because sometimes positive laws, whether divine or human, oblige even with loss of life: 1° when that which the law commands is of such moment that in the judgment of prudent men it outweighs the life of a particular individual. It is clear in the soldier commanded not to abandon his post, or to break upon the enemy with evident peril of death. 2° When transgression of the law would redound to contempt of religion or of ecclesiastical authority, as happened to the Machabees, whom tyrants threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law; since it is better that the law, the faith, or religion be not despised than that the life of one private person be preserved. But of these specially when we treat of Laws.

I say 1°: Antecedent concupiscence rather causes a thing to be voluntary than involuntary¹. For a thing is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what concupiscence desires. Therefore concupiscence contributes more to making a thing voluntary than involuntary. ¹ Here q. 7, a. 4, c.

I say 2°: Antecedent concupiscence increases absolute voluntariness, and diminishes perfect and free voluntariness.

The first part is proved. Absolute voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end materially, such as belongs to brutes. But antecedent concupiscence causes the will, with prior knowledge of the end materially, to be borne toward the object with greater force and inclination than if there were no concupiscence. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° By reason; for, concupiscence impelling, the intellect proposes to the will the object as more desirable, and therefore to be pursued with greater efficacy. 2° By experience; for we see that those who pursue an object with love are carried toward it with greater force than if they were not affected by this passion. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Perfect voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end formally as end, that is, with knowledge of the dignity of the end and of the proportion of the means to it. But concupiscence diminishes, nay sometimes takes away this knowledge. Therefore. — The minor is proved. For it diminishes the judgment of reason, nay sometimes destroys it and causes madness, as experience shows. But knowledge of the end formally as end pertains to the judgment of reason. Therefore.

The third part is proved. Free voluntariness is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end under indifference concerning the thing proposed. But antecedent concupiscence diminishes this indifference. Therefore. — The minor is proved: 1° Because it diminishes the judgment of reason, as I was just saying. 2° Because concupiscence causes the intellect to propose to the will, in pursuing the object, all the aspects of the desirable and deficient good, and to attend less to the aspects of the honest good by which the will would be withdrawn from that object. Therefore it diminishes indifference.

Hence you will infer that antecedent concupiscence diminishes sin, insofar as it disturbs the judgment and diminishes liberty, nay sometimes exempts from all sin, when it is so violent that it altogether takes away the judgment of reason and indifference, and renders one mad.

Ignorance on the part of the will is divided into ignorance antecedent, concomitant and consequent¹ : and of ignorance taken in this sense the question is here. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that it is not at all willed or voluntary; it is nevertheless the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present: as in one who, with sufficient diligence used, kills a friend, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would not have killed had he known him to be a friend. It is also called invincible. Yet antecedent and invincible ignorance do not coincide, for antecedent, as here taken, adds over and above simply invincible ignorance that it be the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent; which does not belong to every invincible ignorance, as is clear in concomitant ignorance, which, as I shall say presently, is invincible, and yet not antecedent. Whence every antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely. ¹ Here q. 8, a. 4, c.

Concomitant ignorance is that which also precedes every act of the will, nor is it at all willed, and therefore invincible, like the antecedent, but it is not the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present. It is clear in one who killed an enemy, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him to be an enemy.

Consequent ignorance is that which follows an act of the will, so that it is willed either directly or indirectly, and it is the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent. That which is directly willed is called affected, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, whether that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse in sins, or on account of something else; of this is understood that Job, XXI, 14 : The wicked said to God: Depart from us, and we will not the knowledge of thy ways. And that Psal., XXXV, 4 : He would not understand that he might do well. Indirectly willed it is, when someone, although he does not will directly and positively to be ignorant, yet neglects to learn; whence this ignorance is called voluntary or willed indirectly and in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Which negligence, if it be grave, such that either none or only very slight diligence was used according to the quality of the matter, the ignorance is called crass and supine; but if the negligence be slight, such that notable diligence was used in learning, yet not wholly sufficient, the ignorance is called light or lightest, according to the quantity of diligence used in learning, respectively to the quality of the thing to be learned. These things noted,

I say 1° : Antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary simply¹; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, and is, as to the circumstance ignored, against the inclination, whether actual, or habitual and interpretative, of the agent; for he would not will to do it if the ignorance were absent. It is clear in him who, sufficient diligence being used, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, killed a friend. For although this killing, as to the substance of the act, and as it is a killing as such, be voluntary, yet not inasmuch as it is the killing of a friend; under that reason indeed it repugns the inclination of the slayer, and is done without cognition. ¹ Ibid.

Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge; but it is divided in many ways, and is:

1st. Positive or negative, according as it is the lack of knowledge due, for example, of moral theology in a confessor; or not due, for example, ignorance of canon law in a rustic.

2nd. Of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or of a particular fact.

3rd. Vincible or invincible, according as, diligence being employed, it can be overcome, or not. But invincible ignorance is physically such if it can in no way be overcome; but morally such, if, moral diligence being employed, namely that which prudent men are wont to employ according to the gravity of the matter, it cannot be removed.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished as threefold, namely: 1st, simply such, when some diligence, yet not sufficient, is employed to drive it away; 2nd, crass or supine, when no, or scarcely any, zeal is applied in investigating the truth; 3rd, affected, which is directly willed, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, either that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse from sins, or for some other reason.

To invincible ignorance are to be referred perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence. But these, if they are not perfect, and proceed from negligence, pertain to vincible ignorance.

4th. Antecedent or consequent, according as it precedes an act of the will or follows it; whence the former is also called involuntary, invincible, and therefore inculpable; but the latter voluntary, either directly or indirectly, vincible, and more or less culpable. But each is a cause of willing or doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present. This last thing only, namely that it is the cause why the will wills what otherwise it would not will, antecedent or consequent ignorance adds beyond simply invincible ignorance, to which this does not necessarily belong. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 13.

Here also mention is to be made of concomitant ignorance, which is had when someone is ignorant of what he is doing, but would still do it even if he were not ignorant; for example, if someone killed an enemy thinking him to be a wild beast, yet would still have killed him if he had not been ignorant. It in no way flows into the act, but only accompanies it by accident. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 26 and seq.

Invincible ignorance wholly removes the voluntary, because no voluntary can be present where no knowledge is had; but vincible ignorance does not remove it. For such ignorance is truly voluntary, either directly or indirectly, and in morals what is caused from the voluntary is reputed voluntary. Yet if this ignorance is indirectly voluntary, namely either simply vincible, or crass or supine, then it diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin, because it diminishes, although in a diverse degree, the knowledge of the malice of the act. But if it is directly voluntary, that is, affected, then, according to St. Thomas, "such ignorance does not excuse sin either wholly or in part, but rather increases it." Yet this greater malice seems to have to be understood of the depravity of the will, while it positively neglects to learn the law in order to sin more freely, but not of the very infraction of the law, which indeed is sinful because known in some way, but nevertheless less so than if it were perfectly known. Cf. St. Thomas, QQ. DD., q. 3, De Malo, art. 8.

The voluntary properly so called, although diminished, can suffice for grave sin. And this must be adverted to. But the gravity of the sin is taken first from the gravity of the arising obligation, for instance, from a positive precept or from the matter considered in itself; as in children the necessity of learning the catechism, and in a confessor the necessity of knowing those things which are required for rightly fulfilling his office. Secondly, to this must be added the gravity of negligence, which is measured according to the mode of diligence which the matter demands. Cf. Ballerini, Op. Mor., v. 1, tr. I, n. 904.

You Will Resolve. 1st. A spouse sinning with a woman whom he invincibly does not know to be the sister of his wife is guilty of adultery, but not of incest.

2nd. Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any anxiety of conscience or suspicion of malice have in reality not sinned formally, even if they had already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterward they are not bound to confess those things, when they understand them to be illicit, since material sins are not matter for confession.

3rd. If a confessor adverts that sufficient knowledge is lacking to him for discharging, as is fitting, his office, and neglects to acquire knowledge, or before he acquires it goes on exercising his office, he is guilty of the errors which he foresaw at least in some way, because they themselves, at least in cause, are voluntary.

4th. If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable unto only venial fault; because acts of this kind are voluntary, and therefore culpable, only in cause; since therefore the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect also cannot exceed slight fault.

5th. Ignorance can be concerned either with those things which ought to be known at any time whatever, or with those things which here and now only ought to be known; for example, upon any faithful person there lies the burden of knowing the truths of faith and the obligations of his state, and a similar burden is imposed upon a physician of investigating the disease of this sick person. In the first case the ignorance is habitual; in the other, actual. The one culpably ignorant of things necessary to be known is in some manner in the state of habitual sin; namely, he sins as often as there is present a recognized occasion of acquiring knowledge, which nevertheless he voluntarily neglects. In the second case the physician sins when the necessity of investigating shines forth to his mind, but he does not investigate.

6th. Error renders an act null if it is concerned with that which constitutes the substance of the act or falls back upon a condition sine qua non; otherwise the act is valid, unless something else is provided by law; but in contracts error can give place to a rescissory action according to the norm of law (Can. 104).

By the name of concupiscence here there comes, not indeed that inborn tinder of depraved desires concerning which the Apostle complains, Rom. vii, 23, but a movement of the sensitive appetite, by which we tend toward a sensible good; or, as St. Thomas says after Damascene, 3, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1: "a movement of the sensitive appetitive power which is from the imagination of good or evil."

But concupiscence so understood is distinguished as twofold, for one is antecedent, and another consequent. The former is that which, in the order of causality, precedes any deliberation or consent of the will, and allures and draws it to consenting. But the latter is that which, in the order of causality, follows an act of the will, either because a vehement movement of the will overflows into the lower appetite, or because the will directly and by design excites this appetite itself. That which is produced from mere overflowing is voluntary only in cause; that which is directly and by design excited is voluntary in itself. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 14.

Antecedent concupiscence does not remove, but rather increases, the voluntary, insofar as by this name the inclination of the will is signified; but it diminishes, and even wholly removes it, insofar as the judgment of reason and the indifference of the will are signified. The reason for the first is that through concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires, and from another side the mind is not impeded from knowing at least the sensible qualities of the thing; indeed it is more occupied in considering them. Therefore the act proceeding from it is done through itself from a fuller and more intrinsic propensity of the will. But the reason for the second is that concupiscence turns the mind away from considering the inconveniences and defects of the object, and diminishes the indifference of the will. But when the passion is so great that it wholly removes the use of reason, as happens in those who are driven mad on account of love or anger, the act is indeliberate, and for that reason is rendered wholly involuntary. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 7; q. 73, art. 6; and q. 77, arts. 2, 6, and 7.

Consequent concupiscence neither increases nor diminishes the voluntary, but rather, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 77, art. 6, "is a sign of its magnitude, insofar as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act." The reason for the first is that the act of the rational will in that hypothesis precedes the movement of concupiscence, as a cause precedes an effect. Therefore the later disturbance of reason, which concupiscence induces, cannot affect the act which has already preceded, and therefore neither diminish nor increase the account of the voluntary. But the reason for the second is that, as St. Thomas has it, De Malo, q. 3, art. 11: "when from a strong movement of the will the sensitive appetite is moved to passion, passion adds merit or demerit, because it is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who sins with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger."

You Will Resolve. 1st. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the merit or demerit of an act; for it diminishes the free element, from which an act has that it is worthy of praise or blame, capable of merit or demerit.

2nd. Consequent concupiscence contributes nothing through itself and formally to the moral goodness or malice, merit or demerit, of an act, but rather takes on the morality, merit, or demerit of this act; although, as has been said, it is a sign and indication of greater or lesser merit or demerit.

3rd. Concupiscence which so follows an act of the will that it has been excited and willed is good and praiseworthy in itself, if it is not inordinate or immoderate, and is referred to an honest end. Cf. Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 1.

Note. - Concerning concupiscence, insofar as it is the tinder of depraved desires and inclines the will to sin, we shall treat below, where we treat of sins.

Fear is a trembling of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself; but it is commonly divided thus:

1st. Grave or slight fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, a great loss of goods, etc.; or slight or mediocre inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation; or even something grave, but from a slight cause, or which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when evils, though slight in themselves, are nevertheless grave respectively to certain persons. Thus children, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2nd. Fear from within or from without, according as it proceeds from an intrinsic cause, for example, from sickness, from infirmity of mind, etc.; or from an extrinsic cause, either free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3rd. Fear justly or unjustly impressed, according as it is brought in either from a just cause, for example, from deserved punishments, or from an unjust cause, that is, is impressed through injury. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who impress the fear be offended for a long time or gravely.

An act posited from fear, however grave, is voluntary simply, although regularly it is also involuntary in a certain respect. The reason for the first is that what, being known as the lesser evil here and now, is efficaciously assumed as a means for avoiding another evil, is called voluntary simply. Hence they have always been held as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the faith. The reason for the second is that what is done from fear alone is repugnant to the will, and apart from this case would not be done. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 21.

I said, 1st, from fear or from fear alone, because acts posited with fear, or from fear but not as from a total or moving cause, are voluntary without any admixture of the involuntary.

I said, 2nd, however grave, but always excepted is the case in which the fear is so great that the use of reason is wholly removed. But if the fear should be slight under every respect, and at the same time the total cause of the action, in the external forum indeed it is not reckoned, because it is presumed not to have had influence; but in the internal forum that action will be less sinful according to the quantity of influence, or of the involuntary, which it causes.

I said, 3rd, regularly, because then an action is involuntary in a certain respect from fear when in itself it is hateful to the will, although relatively, and appears here and now desirable as a means for avoiding the evil which is feared. But this happens regularly, yet not necessarily and always. For he who, for example, flees sin in order to avoid hell, or from fear of hell, does not for that reason have flight from sin as hateful in itself; otherwise by the force of such a disposition he would always sin and become worse, which it is wicked to assert. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 8.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Fear proceeding from within or from natural causes does not prevent an act elicited under its influence from being able to be valid: thus a vow emitted from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck, or in grave sickness, is valid. But if a vow from fear impressed by an extrinsic and free cause is not valid, the reason is not taken from the absence of the voluntary, but from the presence of injury.

2nd. Fear, even grave fear, does not of itself excuse from mortal sin whenever the violation falls into contempt of religion; but it excuses when there is question of a prohibiting human law, or even a positive divine law, not because the voluntary ceases, but because the legislator is judged not to will to press the obligation with so great an inconvenience. But natural laws which prohibit acts intrinsically bad continue to oblige, and so do laws which regard the common good of the whole republic; nor in these does fear excuse.

3rd. § 2. Acts posited from grave and unjustly impressed fear, or from deceit, are valid unless something else is provided by law; but they can be rescinded, according to the norm of can. 1684-1689, by the sentence of a judge, either at the petition of the injured party or ex officio (Can. 103).

Force or violence is coercion which is brought upon someone by an extrinsic and free cause, his will resisting. But the will is said to resist when, both exteriorly, that is, by the aid of means extrinsic to itself, for example, by prayers dissuading, by threats deterring, by repelling force with force, etc., and interiorly, that is, in itself and by an interior affection, it resists as much as it can.

Acts elicited by the will can in no way be forced, because, as St. Thomas says: "it is against the account of the act of the will itself that it be forced or violent." But the other acts extrinsic to the will, whether they are completed by the external powers, or by the internal powers as by phantasy and the sensitive appetite, if they are posited from absolute violence, are not voluntary, and therefore not sinful; but if from violence in a certain respect, they are more or less voluntary according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection with which one suffers force. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 4. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 17 and 18.

In canon law.

§ 1. Acts which a person, whether physical or moral, posits from extrinsic force, which cannot be resisted, are held as not done (Can. 103).

You Will Resolve. 1st. A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her sins in no way, even if intercourse occurs; because no one sins wholly unwillingly.

2nd. Women suffering force sin gravely if, through faintheartedness or vain fear, for example, of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even with the danger of consent excluded, because while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves, and cooperate in the crime of another.

But if you ask whether this resistance ought to be so great that it reaches even to crying out, a distinction is needed: if there is present proximate danger of consent, the woman is bound to cry out, despising whatever damage the aggressor threatens to her, because formal sin must absolutely be avoided. But with this danger excluded, again a distinction must be made: if the aggressor does not seek intercourse, being content only with touches and other things of this sort, then, according to St. Alphonsus, it is very probable that there is not such an obligation, even if fear of a damage less than death is cast upon her. The reason is that such an obligation cannot arise either by reason of preserving virginity, which by hypothesis remains intact, or by reason of charity, which does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But if intercourse is sought, then, according to the same holy Doctor, the opinion which holds that a violated woman is not bound to cry out, while fear of death stands, is not lacking in probability, but only speaking speculatively; for practically it scarcely seems possible that this woman would not consent to venereal delight. Cf. St. Alphonsus, on the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 368; on the sixth precept of the Decalogue, n. 430.

3rd. Sometimes resistance wholly absolute and continuous against inflicted coercion is not required, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other hand there is question of a less dangerous matter. Thus martyrs led to pagan temples did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting the danger of scandal, or injury to religion.

The things established in these two chapters concerning the human act receive splendid confirmation from those things which the new Code decrees concerning delicts, or external violations of law to which a canonical sanction has been added.

Question 1. On what things does the imputability of a delict depend?

Response. The imputability of a delict depends on the malice of the delinquent, or on his fault in ignorance of the violated law or in omission of due diligence; wherefore all causes which increase, diminish, or remove malice or fault, by that very fact increase, diminish, or remove the imputability of the delict (Can. 2199).

§ 1. Malice here is the deliberate will of violating the law, and to it there is opposed, on the part of the intellect, defect of knowledge, and on the part of the will, defect of liberty.

§ 2. Once an external violation of law has been posited, malice in the external forum is presumed until the contrary is proved (Can. 2200).

Namely, such is the fault to be imputed as is the deliberate will of violating the law; defect of knowledge diminishes the account of the voluntary according to the measure of ignorance, just as defect of liberty also diminishes actual imputation; in equal manner omission of diligence flows into fault. These things notwithstanding, once an external violation of law has been posited, the deliberate will of violating the law, or malice, is supposed, unless the contrary is proved. Therefore the subjective elements of a delict are discretion of mind and liberty of will; when these are lacking, there cannot be given an intention of committing a delict, or the foundation of imputability.

Question 2. Who are, and who are presumed to be, incapable of delict? In what manner does voluntary and involuntary drunkenness stand toward the imputability of a delict? In what manner weakness of mind?

Response. § 1. Those are incapable of delict who actually lack the use of reason.

§ 2. Those habitually insane, although sometimes they may have lucid intervals, or in certain reasonings or acts may seem sane, are nevertheless presumed incapable of delict.

§ 3. A delict committed in voluntary drunkenness is not devoid of some imputability, but this is less than when the same delict is committed by one who is fully master of himself, unless, however, drunkenness was sought expressly for perpetrating or excusing the delict. But when the law is violated in involuntary drunkenness, imputability is wholly absent if the drunkenness takes away the use of reason entirely; it is diminished if only in part. The same is to be said of other similar disturbances of mind.

§ 4. Weakness of mind diminishes the imputability of a delict, but does not wholly remove it (Can. 2201).

This canon is an application of the preceding one to various cases, and first indeed to those lacking the use of reason, who cannot intend a delict and therefore are simply incapable of it. For how shall he be constituted guilty who does not know what he is doing? By equal reason the habitually insane are presumed incapable of delict; they should rather be cared for and pitied than punished, c. 14, C III. 9. Drunkenness stands in diverse ways toward the imputability of a delict, which certainly will not be lacking when the drunkenness was voluntary, although it is less than when a man is fully master of himself, unless the drunkenness was directly sought for perpetrating the delict. Involuntary drunkenness indeed removes fault; weakness of mind does not remove the use of reason, but plainly diminishes it and liberty, and thus imputability.

Question 3. Does ignorance affect the imputability of a delict?

Response. § 1. The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself.

§ 2. Ignorance only of the penalty does not remove the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat.

§ 3. Those things which are established concerning ignorance are also valid concerning inadvertence and error (Can. 2202).

This canon is an application of canon 2199 to defect of knowledge, which is opposed to imputability. For if ignorance of the violated law is inculpable, the very fact of violation is inculpable. But if, however, ignorance of the law is culpable, the violation will be culpable; and indeed the culpability of the latter follows the culpability of the former. Ignorance only of the penalty leaves the violation of the law intact; and therefore in no way removes imputability. But since such a violation does not carry with it contumacy against the punishing authority, imputability is diminished. Nevertheless a sinner of this sort has posited the cause of some punishment.

Question 4. Is imputability diminished from the omission of due diligence?

Response. § 1. If someone violates a law from omission of due diligence, imputability is diminished according to a mode to be determined by a prudent judge from the circumstances; but if he foresaw the matter and nevertheless omitted the cautions for avoiding it which any diligent man would have employed, the fault is proximate to malice.

§ 2. A fortuitous case which cannot be foreseen, or which when foreseen cannot be met, exempts from any imputability (Can. 2203).

If, therefore, some unjust damage occurs which could and ought to have been foreseen by the one omitting diligence, the infliction of damage is imputable according to the measure of the diligence omitted. The law directly obliges me to avoid voluntary violation; indirectly it also obliges lest from my action there follow the same damage which would follow from voluntary violation. And hence omission of diligence is imputable, as, for example, in homicide arising from omitted diligence of taking care lest it be done by the action. It belongs to the judge to determine the mode by which imputability is diminished.

But if the agent foresaw the matter and neglected it, his fault is proximate to malice. Thus the Most Holy Eucharist is to be guarded under faithful custody with keys employed, lest a sacrilegious hand extend itself to it for carrying out wicked things; the fault of a priest foreseeing such a sacrilege, yet omitting diligence by employing cautions lest the crime occur, is proximate to the fault of deliberate violation of the law, or malice.

Of the unknown there is no desire, nor imputability; wherefore it is not imputable to anyone that which followed by chance from his action, and which was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen.

Question 5. What is the influence of passion upon the imputability of a delict?

Response. Passion, if it has been voluntarily and deliberately excited or nourished, rather increases imputability; otherwise it diminishes it more or less according to the diverse heat of passion; and it wholly removes it if it precedes and impedes every deliberation of mind and consent of the will (Can. 2206).

In these circumstances the influence of passion upon imputability is varied. If passion has been deliberately excited and nourished, it increases affection and hence the voluntary; if it has not been such, it is not in the full power of man; wherefore according to the greater or lesser heat it is less or more voluntary; indeed it can be that it not only precedes every consent of the will and deliberation of the mind, but also simply impedes it, in which case it removes imputability.

You will resolve. - 1st. Lesser age, unless something else is established, diminishes the imputability of a delict, and by so much the more the nearer it approaches to infancy (Can. 2204).

The reason is that in minors there is not that perfect reason, by defect of which full malice seems to be absent from their crimes. Cf. Clement XIII, Quemadmodum, n. 5. And the nearer age approaches to infancy, by so much the less must the delict be held imputable. Hence, in children, much is usually left which in others of more advanced age human laws say must be more severely corrected, as c. 2, X, V. 23. On account of the defect of the age in which the excess was committed, rigor is to be tempered by mildness.

2nd. § 1. Physical force which takes away every faculty of acting wholly excludes a delict.

§ 2. Grave fear also, even only relatively grave, necessity, indeed even grave inconvenience, for the most part wholly remove a delict, if there is question of merely ecclesiastical laws.

§ 3. But if the act is intrinsically bad, or tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward damage of souls, the causes spoken of in § 2 indeed diminish the imputability of the delict, but do not take it away.

§ 4. The cause of legitimate defense against an unjust aggressor, if due moderation is preserved, wholly removes a delict; otherwise it only diminishes imputability, just as also the cause of provocation does (Can. 2205).

Concerning force the matter is clear: it removes the foundation of imputability.

The reason for the second paragraph lies in this, that ecclesiastical laws and other human laws do not oblige with great inconvenience, unless the act is intrinsically bad, or tends toward contempt of the faith, etc. Certainly the excuse of necessity does not extend itself to freeing someone from the obligation of not blaspheming, of not perjuring; wherefore also the reason for the third paragraph is clear. But the fourth paragraph is evident from this, that he who so defends himself in no way sins, provided that he does not exceed the limits of just defense.

Question 2. Does invincible ignorance impede the effect of invalidation?

Response. Negatively, because ignorance does not supply the defect of a thing essentially required, nor does it remove the grave inconveniences which would follow if the law did not invalidate in every case. As is clear from the Code:

§ 1. No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws excuses from the same, unless something else is expressly said (Can. 16). And also: Ignorance of irregularities, whether from delict or from defect, and of impediments does not excuse from the same (Can. 988). Cf. Sanchez, de Matrim., lib. 9, disp. 32, n. 17.

Question 5. Does ignorance excuse from penalties?

Resp. § 1. Affected ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty alone, excuses from no penalties latae sententiae, even if the law contains the words of which in § 2.

§ 2. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, has acted deliberately, or other similar words which demand full cognition and deliberation, any diminishment of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

§ 3. If the law does not have those words:

1°. Ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, if it was crass or supine, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae; if it was not crass or supine, it excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties latae sententiae;

2°. Drunkenness, omission of due diligence, weakness of mind, impetus of passion, if, notwithstanding the diminishment of imputability, the action is still gravely culpable, do not excuse from penalties latae sententiae;

3°. Grave fear, if the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

§ 4. Although the guilty person is not held by censures latae sententiae according to the norm of § 3, n. 1, this nevertheless does not impede him, if the matter bears it, from being affected by another suitable penalty or penance (Can. 2229).

Affected ignorance is ignorance directly willed and studiously acquired or not rejected; the end is that which someone regards, so conducting himself that he remains in ignorance. Such a one strives that knowledge of the law not be acquired.

Not likewise one who labors under crass ignorance, which does not arise, as such, from the fact that someone directly wishes not to acquire knowledge or to retain ignorance, but because for another cause, on account of love of leisure, weariness of study, he is excessively negligent in fulfilling the obligation of learning the law and driving away ignorance. Therefore this ignorance, excessive negligence of study, is crass, and thence the man himself is crassly ignorant, because, supine, he lies as if content in the mire of ignorance. This is indirectly voluntary ignorance.

Surely he is not worthy of immunity and liberty from a penalty conjoined with violation of the law who acts precisely so that he may not know the law. Such a one esteems the law itself little, indeed least of all. Wherefore one acting from affected ignorance is equated with a man acting knowingly when it is a question of penalties latae sententiae; from which, therefore, this ignorance does not excuse, not even when there are in the law the words knowingly, etc., as in § 2.

But when the words of the law demand a perfect voluntary, namely full cognition and deliberation, any diminishment of imputability arising from the part of the intellect or from the part of the will exempts from a penalty latae sententiae. In other words, the very extreme things required by the law must be verified.

When the law does not have the words has presumed, etc., ignorance whether of the law or of the penalty alone does not excuse, if it was crass and supine, from any penalty latae sententiae; such ignorance, so gravely and altogether culpable, is not worthy to be granted immunity; it is surely a certain great contumacy, and no cause is present for exempting a man who applied either no diligence or very slight diligence so that he might know what he is bound to know.

But it is otherwise if it was not crass, and it is a question of medicinal penalties; for to what end is a penalty or medicine for one who is ignorant? and therefore, since a penalty which he does not know does not amend him, in those ignorant persons who are not crassly, although gravely, ignorant, an excuse is present: "that dangers of souls may be met, we do not will those ignorant to be bound by sentences brought by the statutes of any Ordinaries whatever, provided nevertheless their ignorance was not crass or supine" c. 2, I, 2, in VI°. But the same gravely culpable ignorance does not excuse from vindicative penalties; for such a delict is voluntary in the cause and therefore imputable, and the man by transgressing the law placed the cause of the penalty, which can by law be brought upon the unwilling. But in general, although the guilty person is not entangled in censures latae sententiae, let him be affected by another suitable penalty or penance.

By equal reason fear does not excuse from penalties latae sententiae when the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of the Church or toward public harm of souls.

Question 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Affected ignorance excuses from none. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, any diminishment of imputability excuses. If the law does not have those words, crass or supine ignorance does not excuse; but that which is not crass or supine excuses. - Cf. Can. 2229.

This QUESTION is exceedingly weighty, and presupposes much, and hands down things necessary also for other Tracts, even that on marriage.

I ASSUME first, from the first part 2. Tract. 1. disp. 3. quaest. 5., that the Will, as regards elicited acts, cannot be coerced.

I ASSUME secondly, from the same disput. quaest. 8., that things done through fear are not involuntary. So holds also the Jurisconsult l. si mulier 21. §. si metu coactus, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. and l. cum proponas C. de hered. instit. and C. si privatus, ff. qui et a quibus. The reason is clear, because he can elicit, and not elicit, the act.

Fear IS a trepidation of mind from danger present or to come. So defines Ulpian the Jurisconsult, l. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. It is defined likewise by D. Bonav. 3. p. Centil. sect. 55. and in 4. at the place cited.

Fear is DIVIDED into Concussive, such as that which is inflicted by threats, and Impressive, which is called fear of Fact, as when deeds intervene, say blows, etc. So D. Bonav. loc. cit., on which Zasius Instit. de actione, §. quadrupli, num. 10. Bursatt. consil. 72. num. 11. vol. 1., where he reports others; Sanchez l. 3. de matrim. disput. 12 num. 8. Another fear they add, Compulsive from a powerful man, which is also called Violent; because the force that strikes fear is a man of great power: another fear, they say, is tacit, or of reverence, such as a daughter's toward her Father. The last they call fear of treachery, such as that of a sick man fearing to be treated treacherously by his physician.

Fear, then, is said of someone coerced conditionally, because setting fear aside the will would not will it; yet not absolutely, because he can still be unwilling, and therefore it is called conditional force.

BUT violent force, or absolute force, is that which is from without, not conferring force upon the sufferer ex 3. Eth. cap. 2., as if a Christian were dragged to a Mosque, and compelled by blows to offer incense to an Idol; which force D. Bonav. defines thus, loc. cit. Centil. and in 4. at the place cited, following the Jurisconsult, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa: Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, which assuredly lacks the voluntary altogether:

A CELEBRATED division of fear is that of D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. in corpore, and loc. cit. Centil., and found in c. Considerationi, c. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. cap. cum dilectus de his quae vi, et from the Jurisconsult, l. metu, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Decio cap. final. de appell. c. causam matrimonii, num. 4. de off. deleg. Menochio de arbitrariis l. 2. Centur. 2. casu 135. n. 1. Flaminio de resignatione benef. l. 13. q. 1. n. 54. Abb. c. cum dilectus n. 3. D. Thoma in 4. dist. 29. quaest. un. art. 2. and elsewhere everywhere with the other Theologians and Summists.

Another is called fear falling upon a constant man, which is also called just fear, c. Finali de appell.; it is called probable by D. Bonav. loc. cit. and Goffredo de his, quae vi, num. 2. Angelo, at the word metus. Sylvest. quaest. 1. Sanchez loco cit. num. 19. It is called also grave fear by D. Bonav. and others, with the Jurisconsult, lege metum, l. 2 ff. de eo quod metus causa, where he says, it is not of a man of no account, since even the strong are shaken by it.

Another is called the fear of an inconstant man, and it is called light fear, in contrast to the preceding, because it marks out as inconstant, light, and vain the one who is shaken by it and led to act against his appetite.

Five conditions, however, S. Bonav., in the places adduced, whom the rest follow, assigns to fear, that it be of the first kind. The first is that the evil feared be grave, l. Metum, l. 1. de eo quod metus causa, there, Labeo says fear is to be taken, not any fear whatever, but of a greater evil.

From the last words they take occasion to say that this fear need not be great absolutely, but comparatively, so that it be greater than another, though light in itself. So Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Veracruz p. 1. speculi, art. 8. concl. 3. Carbon. de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 3.

But D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit. in corpore, and loc. cit. Censil. wills it to be grave in itself, say of death, infamy, or mutilation; whom follow Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez num. 12. The reason is, D. Bonav. loc. cit., because contracts are rescinded by such fear, seeing it impedes consent, cap. Cum locum de sponsal.; but when the evil is light, though preferred before a graver evil, the liberty of consent in a strong man is not held to be impeded.

To those words I say that the comparative is there abusive, and signifies only what is positively great, as the Gloss explains there.

The second condition of fear falling upon a constant man is that the estimation of the grave evil be of one probably imminent, and not a light suspicion. So D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit., and found l. Metum la 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. For a constant man is not so lightly terrified; so also D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore. Scotus there quaest. unica, §. de primo contradictio. Durandus there quaest. 2. Richard. art. 1. quaest. 1. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios there, disp 1. Ledesm. dub. 23. de matrimonio. And from the Jurisperiti, Torcremata 31. quaest. 2. in summa, num. 6. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Tabiena v. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. Burlat. consil. 72. num. 30. vol. 1. Alphaeus in his collectaries, collect. 877. Sanchez num. 15. Hence Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 9., says, the brave man is fearless, because he does not fear lightly, but where right reason dictates that he must fear.

Hence I infer with D. Bonav. loc. cit. in resol. that there is not required a true and real infliction of the punishments, for then it would be called not fear but harm; but it is enough that there be a probable fear of a future or imminent infliction, Leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa and l. 15. tit. 2. p. 4., and the Gloss teaches, c. el. primo vero metuebant de electione. Bartolomaeus l. metum autem, at the beginning, num. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Lopez on that l. 15. Cucus l. 5. instit. Maiorum, tit. 12. num. 157.

Some add that the fear ought to be present, not awaited, though the evil be only future. They gather this from l. metum autem 9. ff. de eo, quod metus causa. So expound many, as Sanchez num. 16. reports.

Others, however, think that a probable suspicion of fear suffices, and that this is enough for rescinding the act, Leg. novissime, ff. de falso tutore, there, that he was thus compelled by fear, or fearing, lest he be compelled. So Bartol. l. 2. lectura 2. C. quod metus causa. Baldus leg. interpositas at the end C. de Transact. Alex. cons. 99. n. 6. vol. 3. Parisius consil. 60. num. 15. vol. 3. Romanus l. 5. ob turpem, num. 10. C. de condonatione ob turpem causam. Hostiens. c. Cum dilectus de his, quae vi, on the words nec metum mortis, and there Anchar. num. 7. Rebuff. Tom. 2. consil. Gallicarum, tit. de rescissione contractuum, art. unico Glossa 2. 2. num. 6. Alex. Tartagnus among the matrimonial consilia of Tileti cons. 21. num. 5. Sylvest. v. metus Villalobos in communi opinione, litt. N. at the word metus, num. 70. Anton. Gabr. tom. 2. commun. l. 11. v. metus, fol. 107. Burgos de Paz cons. 25. num. 73. Padella l. cum proponas, la 1. num. 3. C. de transact. Decisio Pedemontana 170. num. 3. Ioan. Garzia de nobilitate, gloss. 17. num. 14. Mascard. de probat. concl. 1055. num. 26.

Yet that Law sounds differently to me: that the contract be rescinded of one who, compelled by fear, or fearing, would not be compelled, that is, by force against the thing, say if he were compelled to subscribe, l. nam timor violentiae inferendae vitiat electionem. So the Gloss C. bone, CL. 1., at the word metuebant de electione, which all follow there, Alex. cons. 98. vol. 3. Rebuff. Mascad. loc. cit.

Therefore I note that the Law does not say, or thinking probably, lest fear be struck into him, but fearing (it says) lest he be compelled, that is, by force.

The third condition required for grave fear is assigned by D. Bonav. loc. cit. in corpore; and it is that the one striking fear be able to command his threats to execution; for it is not for a brave general to be terrified by the threats of little rustics, as D. Bonav. notes, l. Famosi, ff. ad legem Iul. maiest., there, for the person also is to be considered: whether he could do it, Gloss. l. metum, v. iactationibus, C. de his, quae vi. Anchar. c. ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his, quae vi. Baldus l. metum q. C. de his quae vi, and there Alex. Salicetus num. 2. Sebastianus de medicis, de casibus fortuitis, quaest. 1. num. 67. Flaminius de resign. benef. l. 13. quaest. 1. n. 116. Cucus l. 1. Instit. Mai. tit. 12. num. 165. Rolandus consil. 83. num. 28. vol. 2. Angelus v. metus, Sotus l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. §. Pro explicatione, fol. 988. Carbo de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 4., and all whom Sanchez num. 19. follows.

Note, however, that it is not to be taken as though he could in very fact fulfill the threats, but that the one fearing reasonably judge that he can fulfill them, even though in fact he truly cannot, for some reason unknown to the one fearing. Which D. Bonav. signified excellently, loc. cit., whom Richardus follows, there art. 1. quaest. 1., as Sanchez num. 19. reports. Wherefore the quality and power of the one striking fear and of the sufferer must be weighed, as if the former were a powerful man and the latter weaker, as Beroius cap. 1. n. 30. de off. deleg. Sotus, Arag. Carbo, and Sanchez loc. cit., and Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., teach well.

The fourth condition is D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., which he indicates in 4., that it be likely that the threatener will execute his threats; because he is wont to do so, and is not of those Worthies who fling out threats but do not execute them. It is established ex l. unica, C. Si quis Imperatori, there, let us weigh the sayings from the characters of men. And leg. Famosi, ff. ad Leg. Iul. maiest. and Leg. metum, C. de his, quae vi, there: Fear ought to be proved not by boasts or contentions alone, but by the atrocity of the deed. And so teaches Bartolus, Paulus, Alex. Baldus, Salicet. and Aretinus: Abbas indeed cap. 1. num. 3. de offic. deleg., and cap. causam matrimon. numer. 5. on the same title, and cap. Cum dilectus, numer. 8. Anchard. in the chapter ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his quae vi. Navo cap. consultatione, num. 12. de sponsal., and cap. finali, num. 17. de appel. Felinus cap. 1. de offic. deleg., there Decius, and cap. causam matrim. on the same title num. 21. Crottus leg. stipulatio hoc modo concepta, num. 67. ff. de verb. oblig. Vitalis de Cambaris tract. de clausulis; clausula non vi, tit. de metu uxoris, found in Tom. 18. tract. noviorum, Iacobinus leg. interpositas, num. 10. Cod. de transact. Couar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 6. Tiberius Decianus consil. 18. num. 128. vol. 1. Bursatus consil. 72. num. 35. and 42. vol. 3. Flaminius lib. de resignatione, benef. lib. 15. quaest. 1. num. 174. Mascardus de probat. consil. 1055. num. 18. Antonius Gabriel. Tom. 2. com. lib. 11. v. metus, fol. 106.

From the Theologians, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 40. fo. 1071., and Sanchez num. 20., who num. 21. adds that it is required that such a one be wont to execute the threatened evil in the same kind of evil as that threatened, on the doctrine of Baldus leg. finali at the end, ff. de haered. instit., where he says that conjecture is not drawn from unlike things; so Cynus, whom Alexander cites and follows, leg. metum, num. 2. Cod. de his, quae vi.

The last condition is that the one fearing be unable to meet the threatened evils otherwise than by vowing; for if he could meet them otherwise, it would not be the fear of a brave man, but of a little fellow, whose it is to dread evils he could easily escape. This condition, however, seems to me implicit in the second, whereby the evil is imminent, for then it is well-nigh irreparable.

Straightway Sanchez disputes whether one choosing a greater evil, say to deny Christ, in order to avoid a lesser, say death, can be called a constant man, and whether that fear of a lesser evil, though grave in itself, suffices to render external acts invalid, as involuntary, because it is fear falling upon a constant man, since it is grave according to the first condition of fear.

Very many assert that an evil, even if grave, does not suffice to strike fear into a constant man if it be chosen to avoid another greater evil, to say, he is not held to be a constant man if he chooses the greater evil, say fault, to avoid a lesser penalty, say death; the reason is, because such a one is moved not by rational but by irrational fear; but the constant man acts rationally.

And indeed D. Bonavent. holds this, at the place cited, toward the end, D. Thom. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore, Scotus quaest. unic. §. de prima contradictio, and §. hic dicitur, Durandus quaest. 1. Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1. ad Paludanum quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 2. num. 13. Gabriel. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. and art. 3. concl. 8. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 168. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios in 4. dist. 29. dub. 1. fol. 655. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. and others, whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 2. num. 2., where he asserts that these Doctors, speaking of fear in reference to marriage and other contracts to be rescinded — namely that it be fear falling upon a constant man, sufficient to annul marriage — require that the lesser evil be chosen by the man, otherwise he was not constant but inconstant.

Others, however, explain that these Doctors will this condition of choosing the lesser evil to be required in order that fear excuse from fault, but not that it suffice for rescinding contracts; and in this sense D. Bonavent. spoke, in 3. dist. 29. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he grants fear falling upon a constant man with regard to human contracts; yet with regard to things of universal justice he denies it, according to that of Matth. 10.: Fear not them that kill the body. Therefore such fear, on grounds urged before God, is not reckoned a sufficient cause to excuse man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath, though it exempt him from human contracts, according to the Axiom of the Jurisperiti reported above.

In the place indeed adduced by Sanchez, in the fourth sent., at the end of the question cited, he says that fear falling upon a constant man is of those things only that are not contrary to our salvation, and thus no fear of penalty, with respect to committing sin, can fall upon a constant man; therefore he ought rationally to suffer death rather than sin; but marriage is not of things contrary to salvation, whence he infers that, with respect to it, the fear of a constant man can fall, which fear renders the act involuntary; whence it comes about that this condition, of one choosing the lesser evil in order to be a constant man, in our case does not come into play in a vow or oath, but only in things that carry fault in themselves, which, even though they carry only venial fault, are yet a greater evil than any penalty whatsoever, even of death, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 3. dist. 38, whom others imitate after D. Augustine, reported in cap. ne quis 22. quaest. 2.

Which things being so, Sanchez does not rightly institute the second disputation lib. 4. de matrimonio: Whether the fear of a constant man necessarily requires that the lesser evil be chosen, that is, the penalty rather than the fault. He says that B. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others assert that such an evil ought to be preferred in reference to marriage; for since marriage is not compared, as an evil, with the fear, and consequently cannot be called a lesser evil than the evil certainly threatened by the threatener unless one enter marriage, I do not see on what ground Sanchez says that D. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others spoke in this sense, that by choosing marriage rather than death, or death rather than marriage, one is said to choose the greater or the lesser evil, and thence one is argued to be a constant or inconstant man. As D. Bonavent. subtly argues, at the place cited, and Sanchez himself, disp. 5. num. 16., where he says that the fear of just excommunication does not strike grave fear with regard to some contract, because one thing is not chosen as an evil before another, since both are goods.

This fear, then, is not only required for the rescission of marriage and other just contracts, as Soto asserts, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 4., Nauar. summa lat. cap. 22. num. 51., and others whom Sanchez follows, num. 3.; neither can it even intervene.

Sanchez defines this well indeed, disp. 3.: this grave fear, which is called falling upon a constant man, is not equally to be assessed, but proportionally, so that what is light to a man may be grave to a woman or a child, cap. indignanti, 13. quaest. 6., as Tiraquel notes, lib. 1. connub. num. 71., the Gloss cap. cum locum de sponsal. v. metu, where Anton. num. 12. Abbas num. 6. Alexand. de Nevo, num. 23. and others.

Moreover, note that it is not required for grave fear, which deters a constant man, that the evil be feared for one's own person, but it is enough that it be feared in the persons of one's children, leg. isti quidem §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

The same of other kindred, in cap. sciam cuncti de electione, in 6., which text Jason says is notable, leg. de pupillo, ff. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de operis novi nuntiat. Felinus cap. Ecclesiae sanctae Mariae, n. 99., where fear inflicted upon the kindred of an elector in order to strike fear into the elector is held to have been struck into the elector himself.

The same of a bond of friendship closely joined, Sanchez teaches, num. 9.; because a friend is another self. Attend also to other things concerning grave evil, sufficient to strike fear into a constant man.

AND indeed, as to those evils that are not declared grave by law, that is to be defined by the judgment of a Judge, leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis. The greater reason is, because all cases cannot be expressed; but this judgment is not required for those evils that are clearly grave by law. So Baldus, cap. 2. de his, quae ad finem; his reason is, because arbitria are given with respect to those things that cannot be comprehended under a rule, on account of human variety, as is noted on leg. non possunt, ff. de legibus. Sylvester notes the same, V. metus, quaest. 4.; it will be so judged, whether the estimation of the impending evil be in accordance with right reason.

AS TO evils certainly grave, D. Bonavent., at the place cited, in corpore, enumerates death, found in cap. cum dilectus, de his quae vi, and leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa. The reason is, because of all terrible things the greatest is death, by the testimony of Aristotle, 4. Eth. So also Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 4.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of mutilation; for it is a kind of partial death, cap. si quis absciderit disp. 55., and it is found expressly in dicta leg 7. The same, of grave bodily torment, is found expressly in the said cap. cum dilectus, and the said leg. 7., to which grave blows are reduced. The same must be said of the fear of arms, leg. 3. at the beginning, in the verse qui armati, ff. de vi, et vi armata.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of servitude. It is found in leg. ego puto, and leg. isti quidem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. Say the same of the fear of captivity and of grave exile. Of the fear of prison, it is found in leg. nec timorem, and leg. qui in carcerem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

I. We shall have much to say concerning oaths that are deceitful, and extorted by fear, which can be consulted, lest we act twice over. We shall therefore only touch briefly on a few points here, all the more since, when treating of contracts and marriage, we shall bring similar controversies under examination.

II. Question I. Does an error concerning the substance of a vow render the vow invalid? Response: Authors commonly affirm this — since error removes the voluntary: for nothing is willed unless first known. Therefore, if you are ignorant of the nature, or substance, of the vow, then the thing promised by the vow is not voluntary, but involuntary. There is, then, no vow — since it is not voluntary. Hence, if you were to profess religious life, ignorant that profession is perpetual, your profession would be null — since perpetuity pertains to the substance of profession. Say the same of ignorance of those things which are reduced to the substance of the thing promised: say, you vowed to journey to Jerusalem, thinking your vow could be fulfilled by an overland journey, being ignorant of the sea voyage; you vowed to enter the Carthusian, or Dominican, order, thinking that eating meat there was permitted — these vows are null, as is taught by Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 21), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 12), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 1, n. 21), Prado (ch. 31, q. 4, §1, n. 2), Palao (disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, punct. 6, §4, n. 116), who add that the one vowing is not bound to other religious orders, since he determinately vowed these two.

Two things present a difficulty to me. The first is that abstinence from meat should enter into the very substance of profession, or pertain to it — for it seems that this abstinence is a certain grave circumstance, but it is not the one thing that distinguishes one Order from another; indeed, all monastic orders that have this law observe the same abstinence from meat. Of the four mendicant orders, two observe this same abstinence. Moreover, this abstinence, compared with the three solemn perpetual vows, does not seem so grave a circumstance as to enter into the very substance of the profession, and to be able to invalidate it. The other difficulty is likewise this: namely, that such a one vowing ought not to be bound to enter any other religious order. Since one who vows entrance into religious life seems to vow, first, the religious state, and then, secondarily, this particular religious order — when there is no express, determinate, contrary intention. All these considerations together render the aforesaid resolution quite doubtful to me. Wherefore it seems to me safer, and more probable, that the one vowing is bound either to enter the promised religious order, or to choose another in which meat is eaten — since, as I said, the circumstance of abstaining from meat does not seem to enter into the substance of a perpetual profession.

III. All theologians, moreover, admit that ignorance of circumstances which do not pertain to the substance of the matter does not invalidate vows, or oaths, but leaves their obligation intact as to substance — even if the person, had he foreseen these circumstances when he made the vow, would not have made it — since such ignorance, as they say, is concomitant with respect to the vow, not principal, or as giving cause to the vow. For you embrace absolutely the principal object of your vow, even though, had you foreseen that object clothed in such a circumstance, you would have abstained from it. For very many vows, promises, and contracts would not be made, if all the circumstances that supervene in the course of time were foreseen; yet, when they actually occur, they invalidate neither vows nor contracts. In this all agree: Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, near the end), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 3, ad 3), Molina (Vol. II, disp. 272), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 20, dub. 2, n. 10), Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 6), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 6), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 4), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 6, §1, n. 156). The difficulty is which of the circumstances redound into the substance of the promise, or vow. The cited authors maintain that, in the aforesaid vow of religious life, abstinence from meat is a circumstance invalidating the profession, since it pertains to the substance of the profession. It seems to me, however, that such a circumstance does not pertain to the substance of monastic profession, for the reasons assigned; and this opinion seems to me more probable.

IV. Likewise, if error concerns the end of the vow, if the ignorance is of the essential end of the vow, such ignorance will also impede the value of the vow — since the end of the vow is its object. Wherefore, if ignorance of the essential end of the vow occurs, it will produce the same effect regarding the end as it does regarding the substance of the vow. Several ends are distinguished in a vow. The first is the divine worship, which is common to all vows, and can be called universal, and extrinsic; without which no matter is fit for a vow. The second end is the special, and, in a certain way, intrinsic end, upon whose cessation, too, the vow ceases — as, for example, the proximate end of alms is the relief of another's need. For example: you vowed to give Peter alms, thinking him poor; you afterward discover him to be rich, and in no way needy, and in no way in need of alms; the vow ceases, since it altogether recoils into the nature of the object, which is a peculiar and total relief of poverty — and, that failing, the vow ceases entirely. The third is the extrinsic end which the one vowing freely set before himself: as if you vowed to give health to your sick son... , whom you believe infirm; and, that son being restored to health, or having died, the vow ceases, and so too is that end reduced to the nature of the object; and thus, once that ceases, the vow ceases. If, however, the error is about the occasion, or occasional cause, of the vow, then the vow is not impeded — although, if, before the vow was made, the cause had been known, it would have impeded the making of the vow.

V. You will object, from St. Thomas (Bk. IV, Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 3), where he says that "that which, if present, would impede the vow being made, also removes the obligation once the vow has been made." But the circumstances and difficulties that supervene were unknown to the one vowing. Therefore, once the vow is made, they remove the obligation. Response: St. Thomas, in the place cited, speaks in express words of a difficulty, or circumstance, that renders the execution of the vow impossible. Now what renders the execution of the vow impossible, whether it follows, or precedes, the making of the vow, renders the vow null. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor which immediately follow the passage cited: "Whence, since there cannot be a vow concerning the impossible, as has been said, if something which was formerly possible becomes impossible after the vow is made, the obligation of the vow is removed as to that." And to the proposed difficulty the Angelic Doctor answers, in the first argument, that no one is obligated to a vow whose execution is impossible.

VI. Question II. From what is it to be gathered that circumstances are only an impelling, not a principal, cause of the vow — that is, that they do, or do not, redound to the substance of the object promised by the vow? Response: It is clear from what has been said that all authors agree in this: that error concerning the substance invalidates the vow; not so, error concerning adventitious matters, or concerning impelling causes. The whole difficulty turns on this: from what is it to be gathered whether the circumstances redound into the substance of the object, or not? Authors commonly answer that all those things are the end of the vow which the one vowing intends to obtain through the vow; but that those things are merely the occasion of vowing which only excite the one vowing to make the vow — as if you vow alms to be conferred on a respectable poor person: the relief of poverty is the end of the vow; but the respectability of the poor person is the occasion which excites, and impels, you to make the vow. For relief of poverty is not obtained through the vow in the same way that relief of poverty is really obtained; and therefore this is the end of the vow. Respectability, however, is the occasion of the poor person, which excites you, but is not the end of the vow. All this is clear, and quite easy to grasp. But sometimes circumstances occur so grave that they seem to some to redound into the substance of the vow, on which several others judge otherwise; and concerning these no certain rule can be established, but this business must be left to the judgment of prudent men.

VII. In doubt, however, whether some circumstance has the character of a final, or an occasional, cause, one must consider whether, these being absent, all the other circumstances retain merely the character of occasion. For if, in their absence, the end of the vow still stands, the rest have merely the character of occasion. If, however, in their absence, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end, as Sylvester teaches (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 8), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, near the end, n. 52), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 7). If, all things considered, probable and grave reasons press on both sides, Sánchez teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 5) that it is lawful to adhere to either side, even the less probable, as Bonacina says more explicitly (loc. cit.). If, however, all things considered, the matter remains doubtful and undecided, both these authors determine that it must then be judged in favor of the vow — since when the words of the vow are established, whether spoken aloud or held in the mind, possession stands for the vow, not for the external forum's liberty; and also because the presumption favors the validity of the act. From this you see, then, that these authors do form a peculiar notion of doubt. For if, they say, probable reasons induce the opinion, it is lawful to adhere to either side; but if the reasons are such as to leave the intellect undecided, then judgment must be made in favor of the vow. We too decide that judgment must be made in favor of the vow, in doubt — but on this principle: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen; and, furthermore, when equal reasons press on both sides, we say the intellect remains in doubt, however probable both sides may be. When, however, the reasons are more probable in favor of the vow, and less probable in favor of liberty, we hold that judgment must be made, by the stronger right, in favor of the vow — as we shall prove at length in its proper place.

VIII. Question III. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Response. The distinction of fear has already often been explained. For one fear is grave, falling upon a steadfast man; another is light. Grave fear can arise from within: say, from illness, from a storm, from death feared from a wild beast, from an imminent shipwreck. This fear is called intrinsic, because, although the danger that excites the fear is external, it in no way compels the making of the vow; the one vowing is moved by himself to make the vow. Another fear is called extrinsic, which arises from an external cause that compels; and this again is twofold, one justly, the other unjustly instilled in order to extort the vow. Wherefore the one vowing, struck by such fear, chooses the vow as the only means of turning aside the danger that threatens him. These things being laid down, authors by common consent assert that the vow is valid, both by the law of nature and by positive law, when it arises from a grave fear that is intrinsic: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself, and of his own accord and freely chooses the vow as a fit means of escaping the danger. All vows, therefore, made to avoid shipwreck, illness, or death threatening either from a wild beast or from an enemy, are valid. Indeed, even vows elicited on account of a fear instilled from without, but not in order to extort the vow, are valid. For example: you have offended your neighbour; he threatens you with death in revenge; you make a vow to escape death. The vow is valid, because you made the vow with no one compelling you to it. Likewise valid is the vow you elicit in order to avoid the death, or the danger of harm, with which the brother of the girl whom you deflowered threatens you. For although such fear is unjustly instilled from without, it does not tend to extort a vow, but to take revenge; and you, to withdraw yourself from the danger, make the vow of your own accord and freely. The same must be said when the fear comes from without, but is justly brought to bear in order to extort the vow. Because, when the fear is just, the one vowing is unwilling unreasonably; and consequently the consent is justly extorted, and the one vowing is justly compelled to the vow: the whole of the coercion and necessity comes from the one vowing himself, who unjustly refuses to make the vow. Finally, neither does light fear make a vow void, as all commonly admit, because it impairs free consent but little and lightly. And this is certain among all authors.

IX. The whole difficulty, therefore, turns on this: whether a vow is valid that proceeds from grave fear brought to bear from without in order to extort the vow itself. It is agreed almost among all that by the law of nature even such a vow is valid, supposing that the man, though unjustly coerced, truly and sincerely wills the vow and actually makes it: for without the will and deliberation of the one vowing a vow is null, as we said in its place. But if he truly and deliberately wills it, although coerced by unjust fear, the vow is valid by the law of nature: because such external coercion, although it diminishes the voluntary, nevertheless does not take it away, but leaves it absolutely, so far as it suffices for merit and demerit; as is plain in the martyr, who, if under examination he denied the faith out of fear unjustly instilled by a tyrant, would sin mortally. External coercion, therefore, does not take away liberty, though it diminishes it. Much less does an injury inflicted by an unjust aggressor impair that same liberty. For this injury leaves to the one who promised only the right not to be bound to render what he pledged to the invader; but not the right to be freed from the obligation of keeping and fulfilling the faith given to God. The Angelic Doctor explains all this clearly, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3, speaking thus: In an oath which someone makes under coercion, there is a twofold obligation. One by which he is bound to the man to whom he promises something; and such an obligation is taken away by the coercion. . . . The other is the obligation by which he is bound to God, to fulfil what he has promised in His name; and such an obligation is not taken away in the forum of conscience: because he ought rather to suffer temporal loss than violate his oath. The theologians, both of the household and from without, commonly subscribe to the doctrine of St. Thomas: Sánchez, Lessius, Azor, Palaus, Trullench, and others.

X. The dissent of the theologians comes down to ecclesiastical law. Although, even with this in view, if the discourse is of the solemn vow made in the profession of religion, all affirm that such a vow is null: because the laws speak openly of this vow, and declare that it is made void: chapter Perlatum, Bk. I, tit. 40, on what is done by force or for fear; chapter Sicut qui monasterium, causa 20, q. 1; and chapter Praesens, causa 20, q. 3; and expressly the Synod of Trent, sess. 25, ch. 17, on reform: Let a girl who wishes to take the regular habit . . . not take it beforehand, nor afterwards . . . make profession before the Bishop has diligently examined . . . the will of the virgin, whether she has been coerced, whether seduced, whether she knows what she is doing.

XI. Concerning other vows there are two opinions. The first maintains that other vows are valid: because the laws do not speak of the other vows; and on the other side the making void of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the natural law, in respect of which the vow is valid. When, therefore, no plain text occurs in the law declaring the aforesaid vows null, we ought to defend them as valid. But no such text is in fact found. Therefore these vows are valid, even with ecclesiastical law in view. And this opinion is defended by Sylvester, s.v. Metus, 8, at the end, and s.v. Votum, 2, q. 12; Pontius, On Marriage, Bk. III, ch. 19, n. 9; Suárez, Bk. II, ch. 8, n. 5. The contrary opinion, namely that such vows are null and void, is defended by many authors, who contend that this was declared in the chapter Cum locum, on betrothals, where it is said: Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes; and in the chapter Ad audientiam, and the chapter Perlatum. These texts, they say, though they do not speak expressly of these vows, are nevertheless extended to the vows recounted, by the common interpretation of the jurists and the custom of the Church. Soto, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, in the solution to the 1st and 2nd; Trullench, Bk. II, ch. 2; Bartholomew of St. Faustus, Bk. I of the Thesaurus, q. 111; Prado, ch. 31, q. 5, n. 4; Sánchez, Bk. IV, ch. 3, n. 11; Lessius, Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 3, n. 18.

XII. It is difficult to pass judgment for either of these opinions. The authors themselves who disagree judge both to be probable. The former, if reason alone is regarded, seems to rest on the firmer foundation. For all the laws alleged speak expressly either of the solemn vows of monastic profession, or of betrothals and matrimony. Why is it that they do not speak universally? Why is it that they restrict their declarations to the two aforesaid kinds of promises? Certainly it seems to be very clearly drawn from the written law that only solemn vows and matrimony are excepted, while the rest are left under the common law. Since, then, the universal law of nature declares these vows valid, on this side this opinion appears the more probable. Moreover, the very reason which the authors of the contrary opinion put forward tells against them. They rely on the examples of matrimony and of monastic profession: because, they say, the reason of all vows is the same. Granted: and in fact by the law of nature all are valid. But if the Church expressly excepts two only from the burden of the obligation, it is legitimately inferred that the rest are not excepted from the law of nature. This reason, which asserts that the condition of all vows is the same, was known to the makers of ecclesiastical law; and nonetheless they excepted only monastic vows and matrimony. Why, then, did they make no mention of the other vows as well? To what they add afterwards, that by the custom of the Church these vows have been declared null, we reply that if such a custom exists, we readily admit that the aforesaid vows are null. But no document of this custom is brought forward. Therefore in such cases, when they occur, it is safer, and to us more probable, that a dispensation should be obtained.

X. Question VIII. From what indications can it be gathered that an erring conscience is vincible, or invincible? Answer. You can prudently presume the ignorance to be invincible: 1. If the thing ignored be of human, or of positive, law. 2. If the matter be most difficult even among the Learned themselves. 3. If no scruple, doubt, or any confused notion whatever has preceded. 4. If the man, on perceiving that he was deceived and violated the Law from ignorance, grieves and is saddened. 5. If the man be upright, and of an entire and well-ordered conscience. 6. If he has not been prejudiced by a false system and a depraved manner of opining. From these and similar circumstances and signs the Confessor can gather that the ignorance or inadvertence was invincible. The contrary holds if the matter be of the natural law; if some doubt has preceded; if the man be accustomed to offend, and be of a conscience entangled in crimes; if he be facile in adopting opinions which favor liberty and the appetites. For the rest, this ascertainment is difficult: therefore God must be prayed to with the Prophet David: Remember not my ignorances.

III. Ignorance is the privation of knowledge. Error is the approbation of falsity. One ignorance is of law, which is ignorant of a law or precept; another of fact, which admits knowledge of the law, but is ignorant of the fact. One is vincible, or voluntary, consequent, and culpable — this can be conquered by diligence and study, and through negligence is not conquered. Another is invincible, which can be overcome by no study — this is without all fault. Of vincible ignorance, one kind is affected, which repels knowledge: He would not understand, that he might do well. Another is crass and supine, which applies no diligence at all to know those things which one can and ought to know.

XIII. The Probabilists rather commonly teach that sin is never committed without actual consideration, clear or obscure, of the malice of the action. This opinion, as it seems to my weakness, is the same as the error of the Pelagians denying the sins of ignorance, as Jerome and Augustine and the other Fathers testify. No crime, said the Pelagians, without liberty; no liberty without knowledge; therefore no sin without knowledge. The Probabilists deny that sin can be committed without some actual knowledge of the malice of the action: therefore the doctrine of the Pelagians and of the Probabilists is the same, so far as appears from the force of the reasoning. Which I prove thus.

XIV. It is a Catholic truth that men commit sins of ignorance. Actual advertence being admitted, the darkness of ignorance vanishes. The Probabilists teach that actual knowledge, or advertence, is necessary that the ignorance be vincible and criminal. Therefore the doctrine of both parties is the same. Tell me: what is opposed to ignorance? Knowledge. Therefore it cannot be that he sins ignorantly who knows, and considers — and that actually — that he is sinning.

XXI. Invincible ignorance is that — as the very word bears on its face — which cannot be conquered and overcome. The mere doubting of the thing which is unknown makes the ignorance vincible and criminal. When you doubt whether such an action be depraved, by the confession of all you sin, because you expose yourself to the danger of sinning. And when you judge it more probable that the action is befouled with malice, and you repudiate this more probable opinion, and select the opposite, less probable one — if this be false, will your ignorance be invincible? You flee from the more splendid light, you close your eyes to it, that you may select the less probable opinion, which favors your liberty and is opposed to the Law: and in this case your error will be insuperable? Who, I pray you, endowed with common sense, can defend so great a paradox? Yet this is the paradox which all the Probabilists champion. But it is repugnant to common sense. For that is called invincible which cannot be conquered and overcome. With what face, then, do the Probabilists assert that this error cannot be overcome and conquered, at that very time at which they turn their eyes away from the greater light shining forth — at which they will not understand, that they may do well, and may at least approach nearer to the truth?

VIII. Question II. Are sins committed from ignorance to be corrected by force of the precept? Answer. All affirm it, if the ignorance be vincible. Of invincible ignorance there is disagreement among the Theologians. But the more common opinion, and the true one to me, is that the precept presses above all when the neighbor labors under a double misery — both that he has committed a sin, material though it be, and that, wrapped in the gloom of darkness, he is ignorant of the sin. The precept of enlightening the neighbor, then, presses greatly at that time. If the invincible ignorance be only of ecclesiastical law, the precept presses even then — especially if that law regard the universal Church, as does the law which commands Lent, the Ember days, abstinence from flesh on Friday, and things of that kind. For ignorance of these is a grave evil, from which the neighbor must be rescued by the benefit of fraternal correction.

VI. Likewise in the same place, article 5, reply 1, he subjoins: It must be said that in him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will to that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. And therefore that which is done through fear is in a certain manner involuntary. … The timid man acts against that which even now in itself he wills.

VIII. Ignorance, as has been said elsewhere, is of one kind of right, of another of fact, of another of penalty. One is invincible, another vincible; another gross, affected, or supine. He labours under ignorance of right who is ignorant of a law forbidding or commanding. He labours under ignorance of fact who is ignorant that he whom he beats is a cleric. Ignorance of penalty is when someone is ignorant that a penalty has been appended to such a crime. You know that the beating of a cleric is forbidden; you know that he whom you beat is a cleric; but you know not that a penalty has been appended to this unlawful beating of a cleric. That is invincible which cannot be overcome by human industry; and vincible which can be overcome.

X. Ignorance truly invincible, whether of right or of fact, just as it excuses from fault, so it exempts from censure. Ignorance venially vincible excuses from a censure for the incurring of which a mortal fault is required. Ignorance nevertheless is not presumed in the exterior forum unless it be proved, as is said in chapter Ignorantia on the rules of law in the Sixth. Ignorance of fact excuses, but not of law. He who knows that homicide is forbidden by divine right, but is invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law forbidding it under a censure, does not according to very many incur the censure, although he sin against natural and divine right: because, they say, for the contracting of a censure contumacy is necessary, which an admonition ought to precede. For the penalty of censure differs from those penalties passed either by the civil forum or by the ecclesiastical forum, which are contracted even if they be ignored, when the law is known. Wherefore a homicide, from whom the law forbidding it is not hidden, is obnoxious to capital punishment even if he be ignorant of this penalty. Similarly he who knows the ecclesiastical law forbidding such an act would incur irregularity from a delict, although he were ignorant of such a penalty. On the contrary, if he were invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law, just as he would be immune from fault, so he would be free from irregularity from a delict.

Albert, a young Catholic who applies himself to the study of medicine with this intention, that after his studies have been completed he may practise the medical art, does not hesitate also to give a great span of time to pleasures. His parents and teachers warn him to prepare himself more diligently for undertaking that rather burdensome state; nevertheless, matters proceed almost as before. At fixed times he undergoes examinations with by no means unhappy success, since he always gives evidence of sufficient learning, although because of laziness he is ignorant of some things in each examination. Finally, at some point, he is admitted to practise the art, and he goes to a certain city in order to seek a livelihood there by his art. He undertakes the care of the sick, and immediately finds himself to be ignorant of many things altogether necessary for him to know, since very often the remedies prescribed by him seem to be of no benefit, and indeed not rarely to increase the disease. After some months he is so distressed by scruples of conscience that he lays open his whole condition to his confessor and asks what is to be done. Hence it is asked:

1. When is ignorance culpable?

2. When a bad act has been performed from invincible ignorance, at what time and in what way is sin committed?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. When is ignorance culpable?

Ignorance is culpable if it concerns what we are bound to know and if it is voluntary. There is no guilt attaching to ignorance about what we are under no obligation to know. Neither can we be blamed for ignorance which we can not help. The degree of culpability for voluntary ignorance about what we are bound to know will depend upon the seriousness of the matter and the degree of voluntariness in the ignorance. If the matter is serious and if there was great negligence in not procuring the requisite knowledge, grave sin will be committed. On the other hand, if either the matter be trivial or the negligence slight, no more than a venial sin will be committed.

2. When a bad action is done out of voluntary ignorance, is the sin committed when the agent culpably neglected to procure knowledge or when the act is done; and of what species is the sin?

Per se, inasmuch as formal sin consists in doing wrong or neglecting duty with advertence, formal sin is committed when the doer of a bad action, which is the result of voluntary ignorance, culpably neglects to procure the requisite knowledge. At the time when the bad action is done through ignorance the doer of it does not advert to the wrong that he is doing, and so the act can not be a formal sin at the time when it is done. Of course if the bad act is not merely the result of ignorance, but at the time when it is done there is some suspicion of its not being right, or some advertence to its malice, then the harm done will not only be voluntary in its cause, but also voluntary in itself. But then it will not be done out of voluntary ignorance, but out of malice here and now.

A sin of ignorance is of the same species as the act done out of ignorance would be if it were committed with knowledge. For the law which is violated by the sin is violated also by voluntary ignorance concerning it, inasmuch as every law imposes on those who are subject to it the obligation of obtaining knowledge of it, and voluntary ignorance is a violation of this obligation.

3. Albert neglected his work when he was a medical student. In spite of warnings from professors and parents he gave a great deal of time to enjoyment. In each examination he managed to show sufficient knowledge to pass, though there were some subjects of which he was ignorant. When he began to practise, he soon found out his deficiencies. His prescriptions often seemed to do harm to his patients instead of good. After some months he became so uneasy that he spoke on the subject to his confessor and asked him what he was to do. After satisfying himself that there are good grounds for Albert’s scruples the confessor should tell him that he must give some time to study now, so as to make up for his idleness in his student days. He knows what subjects he neglected, and he should apply himself to those in the first place. Until he can make up for lost time he should not undertake cases where his ignorance is likely to be an obstacle to his treating them properly. On one pretext or another he may call in some other medical man, and forego his own fees in such cases. If he does what he can in this way, he need not give up his practice, as all serious danger of doing harm will be removed, and he will soon gain the knowledge without which he should not have begun to practise at all. He committed sin in neglecting his studies, and as the matter was serious, nothing less than the lives and health of his patients, and the negligence was apparently grave, the sin was a grave one. He must be sorry for this and resolve to make up for it as far as he can in the future and then he may be absolved.

Philip, a seventeen-year-old student in a certain Catholic college, confesses before his confessor that he has suffered depraved motions. The confessor asks whether he consented to them, which Philip denies. Then, when the confessor asks whether perhaps he has posited a cause of them and what cause, he replies that sometimes they arise as if spontaneously, sometimes from the reading of books, sometimes from association with other boys toward whom perhaps he cherishes a carnal affection, and sometimes from the fact that he has kissed them. Hence it is asked:

1. What is concupiscence?

2. Can any order of the acts by which sin is usually committed be distinguished?

3. Is there sin in the motions which are called first-first and second-first?

4. What is to be said concerning the case, and what counsel is to be given to Philip concerning each point?

1. What is concupiscence?

Concupiscence is commonly used in different senses by dogmatic and by moral theologians. Dogmatic theologians use it to signify the inclination to evil and the inordinate motions which we all experience within us, and which, as the Council of Trent teaches, are the effects of original sin.¹ In moral theology concupiscence is used in a wider sense to signify any movement of passion, or any movement of the sensible appetite toward its own proper good. Thus it is a general term used to signify emotions of love, hatred, joy or gladness, desire, sorrow, and anger. Such emotions are not in themselves either good or evil; their moral quality depends on their object, on whether they are voluntary or not, and on whether they are duly moderated. Thus, regulated love of what is good is praiseworthy, love of what is evil is wrong and blameworthy.

1 Sess. 5, Decree on Original Sin.

2. Can any order be traced in the acts by which sin is usually committed?

Yes, the first promptings of sin usually come through the senses. I see a beautiful piece of jewelry; by its beauty and luster it naturally attracts me. I can not help feeling this impulse; it is the necessary movement of the appetite toward an object which promises satisfaction. It is the motus primo-primus of the moralists. When such an emotion is excited, it attracts the notice of the intellect. The intellect begins to consider whether the incipient desire for the jewelry is right or wrong. If I have money to buy it and am willing to pay the price, the intellect sees nothing in the series of acts which conscience can condemn. But if I have not the money or I have no intention of parting with it, then it behooves me to put a curb on my desire. No harm is done if it stops at a mere velleity — “I should like to have that pretty thing if I could afford it.” But such an imperfect desire if not kept under control is apt to issue in a definite purpose — “I like that and I will have it, by theft if need be.” In this deliberate act of the will sin is first committed; the seeking for means and opportunity and the actual execution of the purpose only belonging to the accidental perfection of the sinful act.

3. Is there any sin in the movements of the sensible appetite called by theologians primo-primi and secundo-primi?

Those movements which are called primo-primi are antecedent to the exercise of the deliberative reason and therefore are not free, and so can not be sinful. Those called secundo-primi follow upon imperfect advertence to the morality of the movement in question, and so if the object or circumstances are bad, the movement will be bad also, and inasmuch as to some extent it is voluntary and free, to that extent it will be imputable to the agent. However, as the act is imperfect, and for mortal sin a perfect and consummated act is required, a secundo-primus movement can not be mortally sinful.

4. Philip, a boy of seventeen, confesses that he has had movements of impurity. His confessor asks him whether he consented to them, and he answers “No.” Then the confessor asks him whether he caused them, and the boy answers that sometimes they arose spontaneously, sometimes from reading novels, sometimes from talking with other boys for whom he entertains a feeling of softness, and occasionally he has kissed these. The confessor should tell Philip to pay no attention to the impure movements which arise spontaneously, and to turn his mind away from them by thinking of something else. If the novels are lascivious and obscene, Philip commits a grave sin by reading them, inasmuch as he voluntarily and without justification puts the cause of strong temptations to impurity which will frequently be the cause of sin. If Philip has any such books, he should destroy them. If they are not lascivious, there will not be grave sin in reading them, and they may be permitted even to young people like Philip in moderation, for the sake of cultivating the imagination and style, and gaining a knowledge of literature. The confessor, however, should warn his penitent against wasting too much time in such reading and against the dangers which frequently arise from it.

Philip should be told not to touch, fondle, much less to kiss the boys for whom he feels a sensual attraction. If such acts on his part have not hitherto led to grave disorder and sin, they will certainly do so before long. By such conduct he is developing passions which are very difficult to keep in order. He should be told to act in a manly and Christian manner towards his companions, and to treat them with respect — Great reverence is owed to a boy.

1. See c. i., nn. 2, 3, 4.

2. An act is more or less voluntary, as it is done with more or less knowledge, and proceeds more or less fully and purely from the will properly so called. Whatever diminishes knowledge, or partially supplants the will, takes off from the voluntariness of the act. An act is rendered less voluntary by ignorance, by passionate desire, and by fear.

3. If a man has done something in ignorance either of the law or of the facts of the case, and would be sorry for it, were he to find out what he has done, that act is involuntary, so far as it is traceable to ignorance alone. Even if he would not be sorry, still the act must be pronounced not voluntary, under the same reservation. Ignorance, sheer ignorance, takes whatever is done under it out of the region of volition. Nothing is willed but what is known. An ignorant man is as excusable as a drunken one, as such,—no more and no less. The difference is, that drunkenness generally is voluntary; ignorance often is not. But ignorance may be voluntary, quite as voluntary as drunkenness. It is a capital folly of our age to deny the possibility of voluntary intellectual error. Error is often voluntary, and (where the matter is one that the person officially or otherwise is required to know) immoral too. A strange thing it is to say that "it is as unmeaning to speak of the immorality of an intellectual mistake as it would be to talk of the colour of a sound." (Lecky, European Morals, ii., 202.)

4. There is an ignorance that is sought on purpose, called affected ignorance (in the Shakspearian sense of the word affect), as when a man will not read begging-letters, that he may not give anything away. Such ignorance does not hinder voluntariness. It indicates a strong will of doing or omitting, come what may. There is yet another ignorance called crass, which is when a man, without absolutely declining knowledge, yet takes no pains to acquire it in a matter where he is aware that truth is important to him. Whatever election is made in consequence of such ignorance, is less voluntary, indeed, than if it were made in the full light, still it is to some extent voluntary. It is voluntary in its cause, that is, in the voluntary ignorance that led to it. Suppose a man sets up as a surgeon, having made a very imperfect study of his art. He is aware, that for want of knowledge and skill, he shall endanger many lives: still he neglects opportunities of making himself competent, and goes audaciously to work. If any harm comes of his bungling, he can plead intellectual error, an error of judgment for the time being; he did his best as well as he knew it. Doubtless he did, and in that he is unlike the malicious maker of mischief: still he has chosen lightly and recklessly to hazard a great evil. To that extent his will is bound to the evil: he has chosen it, as it were, at one remove.

5. Another instance. A man is a long way on to seeing, though he does not quite see, the claims of the Church of Rome on his allegiance and submission. He suspects that a little more prayer and search, and he shall be a Roman Catholic. To escape this, he resolves to go travelling and give up prayer. This is affected ignorance. Another has no such perception of the claims of Catholicism. He has no religion that satisfies him. He is aware speculatively of the importance of the religious question; but his heart is not in religion at all. With Demas, he loves the things of this world. Very attractive and interesting does he find this life; and for the life to come he is content to chance it. This is crass ignorance of religious truth. Such a man is not a formal heretic, for he is not altogether wilful and contumacious in his error. Still neither is it wholly involuntary, nor he wholly guiltless.

6. Passionate desire is not an affection of the will, but of the sensitive appetite. The will may cooperate, but the passion is not in the will. The will may neglect to check the passion, when it might: it may abet and inflame it: in these ways an act done in passion is a voluntary act. Still it becomes voluntary only by the influx of the will, positively permitting or stimulating: it is not voluntary precisely as it proceeds from passion: for voluntary is that which is of the will. It belongs to passion to bring on a momentary darkness in the understanding: where such darkness is, there is so much the less of a human act. But passion in an adult of sane mind is hardly strong enough, of itself and wholly without the will, to execute any considerable outward action, involving the voluntary muscles. Things are often said and done, and put down to passion: but that is not the whole account of the matter. The will has been for a long time either feeding the passions, or letting them range unchecked: that is the reason of their present outburst, which is voluntary at least in its cause. Once this evil preponderance has been brought about, it is to be examined whether the will, in calm moods, is making any efforts to redress the evil. Such efforts, if made, go towards making the effects of passion, when they come, involuntary, and gradually preventing them altogether.

7. What a man does from fear, he is said to do under compulsion, especially if the fear be applied to him by some other person in order to gain a purpose. Such compulsory action is distinguished in ordinary parlance from voluntary action. And it is certainly less voluntary, inasmuch as the will is hedged in to make its choice between two evils, and chooses one or other only as being the less evil of the two, not for any liking to the thing in itself. Still, all things considered, the thing is chosen, and the action is so far voluntary. We may call it voluntary in the concrete, and involuntary in the abstract. The thing is willed as matters stand, but in itself and apart from existing need it is not liked at all. But as acts must be judged as they stand, by what the man wills now, not by what he would will, an act done under fear is on the whole voluntary. At the same time, fear sometimes excuses from the observance of a law, or of a contract, which from the way in which it was made was never meant to bind in so hard a case. Not all contracts, however, are of this accommodating nature; and still less, all laws. But even where the law binds, the penalty of the law is sometimes not incurred, when the law was broken through fear.

Readings.—Ar., Eth., III, i.; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 6, art. 3; ib., q. 6, art. 6, 8; ib., q. 77, art. 6.

Case.—Confessor A has a penitent who rather frequently has to accuse himself of certain solitary and grave sins. This penitent has tried for many years to overcome the temptation but without success. The habit in question was formed in early boyhood days and has grown upon him to such a degree that it is now, he claims, beyond his control. The temptation comes upon him with such suddenness and fury that, at least to his mind, he seems compelled to yield, and he is of the opinion that he would do so even though he knew with certainty that at the moment of gratification his soul would be lost.

Question.—Now, what is the confessor to do with such a case?

Solution.—To decide whether this penitent is guilty of grave sin each time he falls, one must consider whether his habit of sin is voluntary or involuntary.

(1). If the penitent desires to retain the evil habit it is clear that the resulting acts are of his own choice and that he sins gravely each time he yields to the temptation.

(2). If he does not positively will to continue the habit, but yet has not efficaciously rejected it, his guiltiness will depend on whether the habit was begun voluntarily or involuntarily.

(a). In the former hypothesis, the acts consequent on the habit are voluntary in their cause, since the penitent foresaw and willed them, at least in a confused way, at the time he consciously contracted the vicious habit. He cannot decline responsibility on the ground that his will-power has been weakened, any more than a person who deliberately throws himself into a deep pit can excuse himself for not continuing a journey. (b). In the latter hypothesis, the voluntariness of the acts are much diminished. The sinful habit was contracted in boyhood days before its sinfulness or gravity was understood and it grew so powerful that the will seemed utterly enslaved. One must beware, however, of taking a lax view. Only when the force of habit is so strong as to unbalance the reason and to extort consent before a clear judgment is possible, may it be said that the act is not free and not imputable. Such cases are comparatively rare. The confessor will have to judge from the circumstances the extent to which the sinful habit has weakened the free-will and diminished the guilt of the penitent. He should remember, too, that even though the habit was involuntary in its origin, it may have become voluntary subsequently, if the duty of using proper means to combat the vice was knowingly neglected.

(3). If the penitent has formally retracted the habit and has employed means to conquer it, this circumstance greatly extenuates his guilt. But here again it is only when the habit produces a gravis perturbatio mentis that it takes away grave culpability.

The confessor should be slow to conclude that such a condition of mind exists, even though the penitent should protest ever so much his powerlessness to resist. This is the very explanation that self-deceived consuetudinarii often allege in their own favor. However, the confessor should use great gentleness along with prudence and firmness. The penitent should be so directed that on the one hand he will not feel that he is free from imputability, nor on the other hand that God is a tyrant and that there is no hope for himself. He should be absolved as often as he presents himself with dispositions which the priest judges to be genuine and sufficient. Moreover he should be persistently exhorted not to become the slave of discouragement but to keep up his efforts despite his frequent relapses, and to use all means, natural and supernatural, which tend to lessen the severity of his temptations, and to strengthen the force of will-power. Especially should he be urged to commend himself to the Mercy of God.

61. Since our accountability for an act is based on our power to control the act, whatever hinders or lessens this power must, to the same extent, hinder or lessen our accountability. There are mainly four such hindrances: ignorance, concupiscence, fear and violence.

62. I. Ignorance is the absence of knowledge. In Ethics it regards two classes of objects — viz., laws and facts. If a man does not know that marriage between third cousins is forbidden, he is ignorant of the law. If he is not aware that his betrothed is his third cousin, he is ignorant of the fact. Ignorance, whether of the law or of the facts, is either vincible or invincible. When it cannot be overcome by the due amount of diligence, it is invincible; otherwise, it is vincible. The latter is said to be gross or supine when scarcely an effort has been made to remove it; and if a person deliberately avoids enlightenment in order to sin more freely, his ignorance is affected.

63. Thesis IX. We are free from responsibility for acts performed through invincible ignorance, but not for acts done in ignorance that is vincible.

Part I. In cases of invincible ignorance, we are not responsible. Proof. We are responsible for our acts only inasmuch as they are human acts. Now an act, inasmuch as it is done through invincible ignorance, is not a human act; for, in that respect, an essential element of a human act is wanting, namely, knowledge. Therefore we are not responsible for acts performed through invincible ignorance.

Part II. Vincible ignorance does not free us from responsibility. Proof. This ignorance could have been removed if we had so willed; hence, it is voluntary. As any deordination in the act performed is caused by our voluntary ignorance, it becomes voluntary in its cause. But what is voluntary in its cause affects the morality of the act, as was explained above (Nos. 50, 51), and we are responsible for the morality of our acts. Therefore, vincible ignorance does not free us from responsibility.

64. Objections. 1. Invincible ignorance is rejected when offered as an excuse before civil tribunals. Answer. Human judges, unlike the Divine Judge, cannot see our thoughts. They are thus forced to consider presumptions of guilt, and it is presumed that a law duly promulgated is known to all.

2. In cases of invincible ignorance, our acts are free. Therefore we are accountable for them. Answer. Though free in other respects, they are not free violations of the law. For if I cannot know the law, I cannot will to violate it.

65. II. Concupiscence is a strong impulse of the sensible appetite inclining the will to seek sensible good and to fly from sensible evil. When it arises unbidden by the will, it is termed antecedent; but when it arises at the command, or continues with the consent, of the will, it is called consequent. As soon as sensible good or evil is perceived, the appetite generally acts instinctively. This first impulse is not free, and consequently not imputable to us. In as far as concupiscence impels the will, it restrains our liberty, and thus lessens our accountability. Yet, unless the impulse be so violent as to deprive us for the time being of the use of reason, it does not dispossess our will of the power to refuse consent; hence, when the will yields, though its consent may be reluctant, it does so freely and we are responsible. Consequent concupiscence is a willful intensification of consent, which therefore increases our responsibility.

66. III. Fear arises from the apprehension of threatening evil, and prompts us to seek safety in flight. Our will is thus dragged along, as it were, and so its freedom is restricted and our responsibility is diminished to the same extent. Great fear sometimes exempts a person from acts enjoined by positive law.

67. IV. Violence is an impulse from without tending to force the agent to act against his choice. It cannot affect the will directly — i. e., the elicited acts of the will — for we cannot will that which at the same time we do not will. But violence can sometimes affect our external acts. In so far as the violence is irresistible, we are not responsible for the external act. If, however, the will yields a reluctant yet real consent, we are blamable, though in a lower degree than if there had been no reluctance.

The question of Education is, of all others, the most important. It has for some time back received a good deal of attention in public meetings, in newspapers, and in the pulpit. In fact it has become a question of the day. On this question, however, there is unfortunately such an amount of ignorance, prejudice, and confusion of ideas, that it is almost impossible to make the public understand it. The reason of this is, because so many follow the vague views expressed on this subject in newspapers. Many a paper is undoubtedly political, and so far partisan; and as such its editor will defend and advance what he believes to be the principles of his party. But the question of education rises above party politics; yet when you read many a paper you will find that the editor appeals to the prejudice and passions of party in a way quite unworthy of an independent journalist, and of the grave subject under consideration. He advances principles which, at first sight, seem to be quite true; for instance: "Public School Education is necessary for our republican form of government, for the very life of the Republic." "It is an admitted axiom, that our form of government, more than all others, depends on the intelligence of the people." "The framers of our Constitution firmly believed that a republic form of government could not endure without intelligence and education generally diffused among the people. The State must, therefore, take all means within its power to promote and encourage popular education, and furnish this intelligence of the people through her public schools."

At first sight such principles seem to be true, and the people in general will accept them. Experience teaches that the public will accept, without question, almost any maxim or problem, provided it be formulated in such a manner as to convey some specific meaning that does not demand reflection or complex examination. For the same reason no small portion of the public will reject anything that at first sight seems to exceed the measure of their understanding. Knaves and charlatans, knowing this, impose on the public by flattering their intelligence, that they may accomplish their own ambitious and selfish ends. In this way a multitude of pernicious religious, social, and political maxims have come into vogue, especially in reference to the question of public instruction. Yet on the sound principles concerning this question of education, and on the right understanding of them, depend not only the temporal and eternal happiness of the people, but also the future maintenance and freedom, nay, even the material prosperity, of the Republic.

In the discussion of the system of education it will no longer do to use vague, unmeaning expressions, or to advance some general puzzling principles to keep the public in the dark on this important point. It is high time that the public should be thoroughly enlightened on the subject of education. Everybody is talking about education,—the advantages of education, the necessity of education; and yet almost all have come to use the word in its narrowest and most imperfect meaning, as implying mere cultivation of the intellectual faculties, and even this is done in the most superficial manner, by cramming the mind with facts, instead of making it reflect and reason. The great majority even of those who write upon the subject take no higher view.

The term education comprehends something more than mere instruction. One may be instructed without being educated; but he cannot be educated without being instructed. The one has a partial or limited, the other a complete or general, meaning. What, then, is the meaning of Education? Education comes from the Latin "educo," and means, according to Plato, "to give to the body and soul all the perfection of which they are susceptible"; in other words, the object of education is to render the youth of both sexes beautiful, healthful, strong, intelligent and virtuous. It is doubtless the will of the Creator that man—the masterpiece of the visible world—should be raised to that perfection of which he is capable, and for the acquisition of which he is offered the proper means. It is the soul of man which constitutes the dignity of his being, and makes him the king of the universe. Now the body is the dwelling of the soul—the palace of this noble king; the nobility of the soul must induce us to attend to its palace—to the health and strength and beauty of the body;—health, strength and beauty are the noble qualities of the body.

The noble qualities of the soul are virtue and learning. Virtue and learning are the two trees planted by God in Paradise; they are the two great luminaries created by God to give light to the world; they are the two Testaments, the Old and the New; they are the two sisters, Martha and Mary, living under one roof in great union and harmony, and mutually supporting each other.

Learning is, next to virtue, the most noble ornament and the highest improvement of the human mind. It is by learning that all the natural faculties of the mind obtain an eminent degree of perfection. The memory is exceedingly improved by appropriate exercise, and becomes, as it were, a storehouse of names, facts, entire discourses, etc., according to every one's exigency or purposes. The understanding—the light of the soul—is exceedingly improved by exercise, and by the acquisition of solid science and useful knowledge. Judgment, the most valuable of all the properties of the mind, and by which the other faculties are poised, governed and directed, is formed and perfected by experience, and regular well-digested studies and reflection; and by them it attains to true justness and taste. The mind, by the same means, acquires a steadiness, and conquers the aversion which sloth raises against the serious employments of its talents.

How much the perfection of the mind depends upon culture, appears in the difference of understanding between the savages (who, except in treachery, cunning and shape, scarce seem to differ from the apes which inhabit their forests) and the most elegant and civilized nations. A piece of ground left wild produces nothing but weeds and briers, which by culture would be covered with corn, flowers and fruit. The difference is not less between a rough mind and one that is well cultivated.

The same natural culture, indeed, suits not all persons. Geniuses must be explored, and the manner of instructing proportioned to them. But there is one thing which suits all persons, and without which knowledge is nothing but "a sounding brass and tinkling cymbal": this is the supernatural culture of the soul, or the habitual endeavor of man of rendering himself more pleasing in the sight of God by the acquisition of solid Christian virtues, in order thus to reach his last end—his eternal happiness. It is for this reason that our Saviour tells us: "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? For what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"—(Matt. xvi. 26.) It is, then, the supernatural culture, or the perfection of the soul, that is to be principally attended to in education.

Now what is the perfection of soul? The perfection of each being in general, is that which renders the being better and more perfect. It is clear that inferior beings cannot make superior ones better and more perfect. Now the soul, being immortal, is superior to all earthly or perishable things. These, then, cannot make the soul better and more perfect, but rather worse than she is; for he who seeks what is worse than himself, makes himself worse than he was before. Therefore the good of the soul can be only that which is better and more excellent than the soul herself is. Now God alone is this Good—He being Goodness Itself. He who possesses God may be said to possess the goodness of all other things; for whatever goodness they possess, they have from God. In the sun, for instance, you admire the light; in a flower, beauty; in bread, the savor; in the earth, its fertility; all these have their being from God. No doubt God has reserved to Himself far more than He has bestowed upon creatures; this truth admitted, it necessarily follows that he who enjoys God possesses in him all other things; and consequently the very same delight which he would have taken in other things, had he enjoyed them separately, he enjoys in God, in a far greater measure, and in a more elevated manner. For this reason, St. Francis of Assisium often used to exclaim: "My God and my All"—a saying to which he was so accustomed that he could scarcely think of anything else, and often spent whole nights in meditating on this truth.

Certainly true contentment is only that which is taken in the Creator, and not that which is taken in the creature; a contentment which no man can take from the soul, and in comparison with which all other joy is sadness, all pleasure sorrow, all sweetness bitter, all beauty ugliness, all delight affliction. It is most certain that "when face to face we shall see God as He is," we shall have most perfect joy and happiness. It follows, then, most clearly, that the nearer we approach to God in this life, the more contentment of mind and the greater happiness of soul we shall enjoy; and this contentment and joy is of the self-same nature as that which we shall have in heaven; the only difference is, that here our joy and happiness is in an incipient state, whilst there it will be brought to perfection. He, then, is a truly wise and learned, a truly well-educated, man, who here below has learned how to seek God, and to be united as much as possible with the Supreme Good of his soul. He therefore imparts a good education to the soul, who teaches her how to seek and to find her own Good.

Now what is it to teach the soul to find her own Supreme Good? It is to train, to teach, to lead the child in the way he should go, leading him in the paths of duty, first to God, and secondly to his neighbor. All not professed infidels, it appears to me, must admit this definition. But as very many believe in "Webster," or "Worcester," I give the former's definition of education: "Educate"—To instill into the mind principles of art, science, morals, religion, and behavior. According to this definition of education, morals and religion constitute essential parts of education. Indeed, the first and most important of all duties which the child must learn are his moral and religious duties; for it will, I hope, be universally admitted that man is not born into this world merely to "propagate his species, make money, enjoy the pleasures of this world, and die." If he is not born for that end, then it is most important that he be taught for what end he was born, and the way appointed by his Creator to attain that end.

Every child born into this world is given a body and soul. This soul, for which the body was created, and which will rise with it at the last day, be judged with it for the acts done in life, and be happy or unhappy with it for all eternity, is, in consequence of the "fall," turned away from God, and the body, no longer acting in obedience to right reason, seeks its own gratification, like any irrational animal. Religion (from religio) is the means provided by a merciful God to reunite the chain broken by the sin of our first parents, and bridge over the chasm opened between man and his divine destiny. To give this knowledge of religion is the principal purpose of education. Without this it is mere natural instruction, but no education at all. It would be worse than giving, as we say, "the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out."

Religion, then, forms the spirit and essence of all true education. As leaven must be diffused throughout the entire mass in order to produce its effects, so religion must be thoroughly diffused throughout the child's entire education, in order to be solid and effective. Not a moment of the hours of school should be left without religious influence. It is the constant breathing of the air that preserves our bodily life, and it is the constant dwelling in a religious atmosphere that preserves the life of the youthful soul. Here are laid the primitive principles of future character and conduct. These religious principles may be forgotten, or partially effaced, in the journey of life, but they will nevertheless endure, because they are engraved by the finger of God Himself. The poor wanderer, when the world has turned its back upon him, after having trusted to its promises only to be deceived, after having yielded to its temptations and blandishments only to be cruelly injured and mocked, may, at last, in the bitterness of his heart, "remember the days of his youth," and "return to his father's house." So long as faith remains, however great the vice or the crime, there is something to build on, and room to hope for repentance, for reformation, and final salvation. Faith or religion once gone, all is gone. Religion is the crystal vase in which education is contained, or rather the spirit which infuses and vitalizes it. Religion is the very life of society, the very soul of a Christian State.

All nations and governments know and understand that to exclude Christian education from the schools is to exclude it from their law, legislature, courts, and public and private manners. It should, then, ever be borne in mind that religion, though distinguishable, is never separable from true civil and political science and philosophy. Enlightened statesmanship will always accept and recognize religious education as a most valuable and powerful ally in the government of the State, or political society. The great Washington clearly asserts this in his farewell address to the American people: "Of the dispositions," he says, "which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. Where is the security for property or for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are administered in our courts of justice? And let it not be supposed that morality can be maintained without religion." Accordingly our legislatures are opened with prayer, the Bible is on the benches of our courts; it is put into the hands of jurymen, voters, and even tax-payers; indeed, from its late use and abuse, one might think that we were living under the Pentateuch, and that the whole moral law and Ten Commandments were bound to the brows of the public or State phylacteries.

Indeed, the politics of every tribe, nation, or people, will reflect in an exact degree their moral and religious convictions and education. If these are false, the political society will be violent, disorderly, and abnormal; if true, the State is calm, prosperous, strong and happy. If these propositions be true, and I claim they are as axiomatic and undeniable as any proposition in Euclid—yea more so, for they are the maxims of inspired wisdom—how immeasurably important is a true Christian education!

And if its influence is so great in determining even the political conduct of men, it is still more necessary and powerful in forming the character of true woman—the Christian wife, mother, and daughter. The influence of Christian woman on society is incalculable. Admitting it possible, for a moment, that irreligious men might construct or direct an atheistical State, yet it would be utterly vain to build up the family, the groundwork of all organized communities, without the aid of the Christian woman. She it is who, in the deep and silent recesses of the household, puts together those primitive and enduring materials, each in its place and order, on which will rest and grow, to full beauty and development, the fair proportion of every well-ordained State. This foundation is laid in the care and rearing of good and dutiful children. The task of the Christian mother may indeed be slow, and unobserved; but God makes use of the weak to confound the strong, and this is beautifully illustrated in the Christian woman, who is strong because she is weak, most influential when she is most retired, and most happy, honored, cherished and respected when she is doing the work assigned her by Divine Providence, in the bosom of her household.

It will be admitted, then, that the education of girls demands a special culture. Generally upon mothers the domestic instruction of the children, in their infancy, mainly depends. They ought, therefore, to be well instructed in the motives of religion, articles of faith, and all the practical duties and maxims of piety. Then history, geography, and some tincture of works of genius and spirit, may be joined with suitable arts and other accomplishments of their sex and condition, provided they be guided by and referred to religion, and provided books of piety and exercises of devotion always have the first place, both in their hearts and in their time.

They should, then, from their earliest years, if possible, be separated in their studies, their plays, and their going and returning from school, from children of the opposite sex. They should be placed under the surveillance and instruction of mature and pious women. Every possible occasion and influence should be used to instil into their young and plastic minds, by lesson and example, principles of religion and morality. Their studies should be grave and practical. Their nervous organization is naturally acute, and should be strengthened, but not stimulated, as it too often is, thereby laying the foundation for that terrible and tormenting train of neuralgic affections of after-life, debilitating mind and body.

A thorough Christian education, then, is the basis of all happiness and peace, for the family as well as for the State itself; for every State is but the union of several families. It is for this reason that we find good parents so willing to make every sacrifice for the Christian education of their children, and that all true statesmen, and all true lovers of their country, have always encouraged and advocated that kind of education which is based upon Christian principles.

Good, dutiful children are the greatest blessing for parents and for the State, whilst children without religion are the greatest misfortune, the greatest curse that can come upon parents and upon the State.

History informs us that Dion the philosopher gave a sharp reproof to Dionysius the tyrant, on account of his cruelty. Dionysius felt highly offended, and resolved to avenge himself on Dion; so he took the son of Dion prisoner, not, indeed, for the purpose of killing him, but of giving him up into the hands of a godless teacher. After the young man had been long enough under this teacher to learn from him everything that was bad and impious, Dionysius sent him back to his father. Now what object had the tyrant in acting thus? He foresaw that this corrupted son, by his impious conduct during his whole lifetime, would cause his father constant grief and sorrow, so much so that he would be for him a lifelong affliction and curse. This, the tyrant thought, was the longest and greatest revenge he could take on Dion for having censured his conduct.

Plato, a heathen philosopher, relates that when the sons of the Persian kings had reached the age of fourteen, they were given to four teachers. The first of these teachers had to instruct them in their duties towards God; the second, to be truthful under all circumstances; the third, to overcome their passions; and the fourth teacher taught them how to be valiant and intrepid men.

This truth, that good children are the greatest blessing and that bad children are the greatest affliction that can befall parents and the State, needs no further illustration. There is no father, there is no mother, there is no statesman, who is not thoroughly convinced of this truth. Can we, then, wonder that the Catholic Church has always encouraged a truly Christian education?

There is nothing in history better established than the fact that the Catholic Church has been at all times, and under the most trying circumstances, the generous fostering-mother of education. She has labored especially, with untiring care, to educate the poor, who are her favorite children. It was the Catholic Church that founded, and endowed liberally, almost all the great universities of Europe. Protestants and infidels are very apt to overlook the incalculable benefits which the Church has conferred on mankind, and yet without her agency civilization would have been simply impossible.

The Catholic Church was, moreover, the first to establish common schools for the free education of the people. As early as a.d. 529, we find the Council of Vaison recommending the establishment of public schools. In 800, a synod at Mentz ordered that the parochial priests should have schools in the towns and villages, that "the little children of all the faithful should learn letters from them. Let them receive and teach these with the utmost charity, that they themselves may shine as the stars forever. Let them receive no remuneration from their scholars, unless what the parents, through charity, may voluntarily offer." A Council at Rome, in 836, ordained that there should be three kinds of schools throughout Christendom: episcopal, parochial in towns and villages, and others wherever there could be found place and opportunity. The Council of Lateran, in 1179, ordained the establishment of a grammar school in every cathedral for the gratuitous instruction of the poor. This ordinance was enlarged and enforced by the Council of Lyons, in 1245. In a word, from the days of Charlemagne, in the ninth century, down to those of Leo X., in the sixteenth century, free schools sprang up in rapid succession over the greater part of Europe; and, mark well, it was almost always under the shadow of her churches and her monasteries! Throughout the entire period, called, by ignorant bigotry, the "dark ages," Roman Pontiffs and Catholic Bishops assembled in council and enacted laws requiring the establishment of free schools in connection with all the cathedral and parochial churches. This is a fact so clearly proven by Catholic and Protestant historians, that to deny it would be to betray a gross ignorance of history. Even at the present day, the Papal States, with a population of only about 2,000,000, contain seven universities, with an average attendance of 660 students, whilst Prussia, with a population of 14,000,000, and so renowned for her education, has only seven! Again, in every street in Rome there are, at short distances, public primary schools for the education of the children of the middle and lower classes. Rome, with a population of only about 158,000 souls, has 372 public primary schools, with 482 teachers, and over 14,000 children attending them, whilst Berlin, with a population more than double that of Rome, has only 264 schools. Thus originated the popular or common schools, or the free education of the people, as an outgrowth of the Catholic Church.

Every one knows that to the Catholic Church is due the preservation of literature after the downfall of the Roman Empire; and all those who are versed in history must admit that the Popes, the rulers of the Church, have been the greatest promoters and protectors of literature and learned men in every age. They collected and preserved the writings of the great historians, poets, and philosophers of Greece and Rome, and they encouraged and rewarded the learned men who, by their labors, made those fountains of classical literature easily accessible to all students. What shall I say of the patronage which they accorded to painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and the other arts which raise up and refine the human soul? Even the present glorious Pontiff, Pius IX., in the midst of troubles and persecutions, has done more for education than the richest and most powerful sovereigns of the world. You will unite with me, I am sure, in praying that he may soon recover the sovereignty of Rome and the Papal States, and that he may live many years to defend, as he has done in the past, the cause of religion, truth, Christian education, and civilization in the world. But it would take a whole day to refer even briefly to all that the Catholic Church and her Supreme Pontiffs have done to dissipate ignorance, and to improve and enlighten the mind of man. I shall merely add that a Protestant writer, and an open enemy of our religion, does not hesitate to state that, acting under the guidance and protection of the Holy See, some of our religious orders, which are so often assailed and calumniated, have done more for the promotion of philosophy, theology, history, archæology, and learning in general, than all the great universities of the world, with all their wealth and patronage.

Moreover, it is a well-known fact that the Catholic Church has always fought for the liberty to educate her children not only in the necessary branches of science, but also, and above all, to teach them, at the same time, their religious duties towards God and their fellow-men. And who but an infidel can blame her for that?

Every one must know that by the united efforts of the Catholic clergy and laity, schools, colleges, seminaries, boarding-schools for ladies and boys, and other educational establishments, have been erected in almost every part of the world, and erected without a cent of public money, which was so plentifully lavished on Protestant institutions. But, without leaving this country, do we not find in the various States of the Union magnificent proofs of generous Catholic zeal in promoting everything connected with education? And have not the parochial and religious clergy in so many places made the noblest exertions to erect institutions for the instruction of their flocks? and have not the laity assisted them in a most munificent manner? All this shows their great desire to promote the growth of knowledge.

Man is born a believing creature, and cannot, if he would, destroy altogether this noble attribute of his nature. If he is not taught, or will not accept, a belief in the living and uncreated God, he will create and worship some other god in His stead. He cannot rest on pure negation. There never has been a real, absolute unbeliever. All the so-called unbelievers are either knaves or idiots. All the Gentile nations of the past have been religious people; all the Pagan powers of the present are also believers. There never has been a nation without faith, without an altar, without a sacrifice. Man can never, even for a single instant, escape the All-seeing Eye of God, or avoid the obligations of duty imposed on him by his Creator. The Pantheists of ancient as well as of modern times recognize this fact, although they do not discharge their religious obligations conformably to the Divine will, but make to themselves other gods instead.

As there has been a religion and a ritual among all nations, tribes and peoples, so has there been also a "hierarchy" to teach this religion, and make known its obligations. These religious obligations constituted then, and constitute even now, the basis of all popular education throughout the world—Christian, Gentile, or Pagan—there is no exception to this fact save in these United States of America.

We live in a time of great activity and change, and intense worldliness. "Men run to and fro and knowledge is increased." Would that we could feel that there is an increase also in integrity and virtue, and respect for Religion. We all know that it is not so. So far as we can form accurate ideas of the social and religious condition of men at any particular period in the world's history, we may doubt whether the words of the Apostle St. Paul, describing what shall come to pass in what he calls "the last days," ever touched any people so closely as they do those of our times and country. "Men," he says, "shall be lovers of themselves, covetous, haughty, proud, blasphemous, disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked, without affection, without peace, slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful, without kindness, traitors, stubborn, puffed up, and lovers of pleasure, more than lovers of God." Well may the Apostle speak of such times as "dangerous times." When the moral atmosphere we breathe is so full of what the Scriptures call "the spirit of this world," we can only hope to escape its corrupting influences by doing all in our power to diffuse Christian principles among the rising generation, by means of truly Christian schools.

The arrangements can be made without disturbing the general system. It is this: "Let the State aid, but not direct, a system of plain English education, confined to all those whose circumstances are limited, or who are left destitute, or orphans. Let all religious denominations, when they desire it, have the privilege of conducting their own schools, subject only to general uniform inspection and examination on the part of the State, and have their proportion of the school-moneys." The wealthy classes will know how to take care of the education of their own children, as they do of their family affairs in other matters.

The advocates of this "Denominational System" yield to none in their endeavors to secure to all the children within the State a good, solid, and practical education, according to the religious convictions and circumstances of all. This, they claim, is not, and cannot be furnished on the present plan. They do not, as falsely charged, desire to distract or divide, or introduce sectarianism into the Public Schools; on the contrary, they wish to satisfy conscience by yielding to all others what they claim for themselves, and cannot help denouncing the present system as practically resulting in a form of sectarianism worse than any yet professed: to wit, "Indifferentism."

If the "Denominational System" was adopted, it would satisfy and do justice to all, and, at the same time, excite such rivalry and competition among teachers as to advance education, whilst it diminishes its cost in the same ratio. We have seen that it costs about four times as much to give the miserable infidel instruction in the Public Schools, as it does to give a good Christian education in the denominational schools. What possible objection, then, can there be to adopt the denominational, or separate system, when it costs four times less, and imparts, to say the least, as good an education to the greatest number of children? It is no argument to urge that schools would be sectarian. We have sectarian churches, and various shades and differences of belief, already. This would not alter one or the other a particle. The State cannot impose uniformity on churches; why force it on schools? Indeed it is worse, inasmuch as this scholastic conformity or uniformity is against all religions, and in favor of infidelity, or the no-religious sect, if there be such a one. It discriminates against the believers, and is in favor of the unbelievers.

But it is easy to see what the matter is. It is not religion these men fear so much as competition. One session's trial of the separate system would so clearly demonstrate to the public the economy and advantages of this plan, that the troop of paid teachers, officers, musicians, and others, who are fattening at the expense of a credulous people, would be exposed, and have to take their "carpet-bags" and tramp. However, I have no cause of quarrel with the employés, male or female, of the Public Schools. They do not elect themselves, nor make their salaries, and they are not to be blamed for taking them. If the clever gentleman who draws (in one State, at least) $2,750 for ten months, four hours' a day work, or the accomplished lady who gets $2,000 for the same time and labor, or the three musicians at $2,000 each, or the humble, but perhaps not less useful, corps of "school-sweepers" (janitors), who are rewarded with $16,886.50, or the officers (three), who pocket $14,457.90 salary, and $20,771.96 office-expenses!! are so handsomely rewarded, it is their good fortune, and not their fault. There is, doubtless, a great deal of human nature in their composition, as well as others.

There is no earthly way of giving satisfaction to all, except by granting the denominational system, thereby leaving to all sects and denominations, as well as to those who do not range themselves under any specific form at all, to apply a fair proportion of the school-money. All those who prefer the present plan would have no change to make, and all those who desire the separate plan would have the right to select their own class-books and teachers; in other words, would have the interior management of their own schools. This is the way church matters are managed to the satisfaction of all. Peoples' views and convictions on education are just as conscientious and distinct as on religion, and they have just as good a right to them. If any man denies this truth, I would like him to give his reasons.

There is one other thing to be taken into consideration here: if, as is claimed, all, from the highest to the lowest, have a right to an education at the hands of the State, and if, as is admitted, all should be instructed in their moral and religious duties, if not by the State, at least by their parents and pastors, who will instruct the poor little orphans, the very class for whose benefit the public provide an education—who, I say, will instruct them in the way they should go? who will answer for these little "waifs of society"? They ask for bread, and the State gives them a stone; it has, with the best intentions in the world, no better to give them. These considerations have compelled most of the European States, as well as our neighbors—the Canadians—to abandon the godless system, and establish separate schools, when asked to do so by the members of any denomination.^G

G By "An Act to restore to Roman Catholics in Upper Canada certain rights in respect to Separate Schools," passed May 5, 1863, they provided that "the Roman Catholic separate schools shall be entitled to a share in the fund annually granted by the legislature of the province for the support of common schools, and shall be entitled also to a share in all other public grants, investments, and allotments for common school purposes now made or hereafter to be made by the municipal authorities, according to the average number of pupils attending such school, as compared with the whole average number of pupils attending schools in the same city, town, village or township."—Cap. 5, sec. 20.

There is no exception to this rule, except here! With all our boasted progress, we are behind all civilized nations in this important particular.

Now by adopting this fair method, the poor orphans and ragged children, who have the first and best claim of all, would be educated. As it is, it is a notorious fact, that as far as Public Schools are concerned, they are left out in the cold. This fact is capable of being demonstrated to any lady or gentleman who will visit the Catholic orphanages and poor schools of any city. If any one doubts this, and does me the honor of putting himself at my disposal, I will show him or her thousands of such poor ragged little ones in one evening. Now is it not drawing largely upon public credulity, as well as on the public purse, to ask for thousands for high schools, and normal schools, etc., to educate the children, in great part, of the rich, or, at best, comparatively well to do, and turn their backs on the poor fatherless orphans and the ragged children of the poor widow or laboring man? Will anybody who has his eyesight doubt or deny this? If so, he can be convinced, any day of the week, by looking at the class and style of boys and girls who go to the upper Public Schools, and observing the boys and girls (several hundreds in number) who go to the poor schools of the Sisters of Mercy, or, in fact, to any other charity convent school.

The Bible, or religious education in schools, will ever come up to vex and torment the public, especially the Catholic portion of the community, until the right of separate schools is granted. It is especially the Catholics that do and must insist upon having separate schools, for it is the Catholics that have always done all in their power to establish and maintain the republican form of government, and it is through the influence of Catholicity alone that our Republic can be maintained, and increased in power and glory.

Many people speak of the error of philosophical sin without knowing very distinctly in what it consists. The distinction between philosophical sin and theological sin is neither new nor chimerical, as some imagine. It is from Saint Thomas, who says that sin is considered in one way by the Theologian and in another by the Philosopher. [Ia. 2, q. 71, a. 6, ad 5.] The former, he says, examines the nature of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and the latter insofar only as it is contrary to reason. It is the same sin viewed under different aspects. According to the one it is called theological, and according to the other it is called philosophical. According to the one it offends God; according to the other it offends reason.

Since Theology is ordinarily taught in Latin, the terms employed in it must be understood according to the force they have in that language. The word offendere, which in French signifies to offend, has various significations in Latin according as it is taken in the proper or in the figurative sense. In the proper sense it signifies what happens to a body which is in motion and which strikes another upon encountering it. In the figurative sense it is said of a rational being who acts against the will, against the inclinations of another, against the respect and against the obedience which he owes him. This signification is the one most used in our language.

The Theologians, following this usage of the Latin Language, say that sin, taking the force of the terms, is an offense against God, offensa Dei, only insofar as it strikes against the obedience which is owed to him; that when neither God nor his commands are known by the one who commits the sin, this sin, speaking rigorously, ought not to be called an offense against God, because then it does not directly strike against this obedience nor against his commands, which the sinner does not know. But this sin always offends reason, because it is against the lights of conscience and against that law written in our hearts, which are not things different from reason. This is what must first be well conceived in order to understand the question of philosophical sin. This perhaps appears a vain subtlety when speaking Theology in our language; but it is not so in the customary language of Theologians, that is to say, in the Latin language. After all, in matters of this kind one must always agree upon the signification which usage attaches to words.

It is then necessary to make a very important observation. It is that the Theologians who have made all these precise distinctions, and principally the Jesuits, when saying that the sin of a man who does not know God is not properly called an offense against God, do not thereby deny that it is a sin, and a sin punishable by damnation. On the contrary, most of the Theologians say that, even in this supposition, the sinner is justly punished with Hell, because although he does not act against the commands of a known God, he nevertheless acts against the law which that God has placed in his heart; that this law marks out his duty for him and makes him understand that he violates it by not following it; which, according to them, suffices to render him guilty of the penalties with which this God, altogether unknown though he is to him, punishes him in this life and in the other. Thus almost all the Theologians agree that the sins of the Barbarians which gave rise to this question, as soon as they are against the natural law, are punished by God in hell; but they do not all reason from the same principles, and they posit different ones from which they equally conclude the just punishment of these sorts of sinners.

Some lay down as a principle that an invincible ignorance of God is never found, at least for a long time, among the Barbarians who have the use of reason, whether their natural light, stirred by the sight of creatures, suffices to give them this knowledge, or whether God acts interiorly in them by ways which are unknown to us and of which they alone could give an account. What Saint Paul says of the Pagans in the Epistle to the Romans gives great authority to this System. However that may be, this principle being laid down, it follows that the sins of these Pagans offend not only reason but also the obedience which they owe to God, and that they are offenses against God in the most exact signification that this term can have in scholastic language.

The other Theologians have reasoned from an altogether opposite principle, which they believed to be more conformable to experience. They have said that there could be among some Barbarians an invincible ignorance of God; but to this principle they add that other one of which I have already spoken: that in order for the sin of a Barbarian to merit damnation, it is not necessary that it be directly against the obedience owed to God, nor that the sinner know distinctly that the law which he violates comes from that God; but that it suffices that he commit this sin against the lights of his conscience, which marks out his duty for him and makes him understand at the same time the obligation he has to conform himself to this law, which is written in his heart. That, by not doing so, he justly incurs the disfavor of God and the punishment attached thereto for all eternity. In this manner, neither in the one opinion nor in the other is there among the Barbarians any purely philosophical sin, that is to say, one which purely offends reason without offending God, either directly or indirectly, and which does not merit Hell, when it has the other conditions required for the essence of mortal sin.

All this having been set forth, it will be easy to understand in what the error of philosophical sin consists. It consists first in saying that certain Barbarians perform actions against the natural law, such as homicides, adulteries, etc., which are not mortal sins worthy of damnation, because in all those who are ignorant of God sins are purely Philosophical, that is to say, only against reason, and in no way Theological, that is to say, they are not against God, whom the sinner does not know and by them, consequently, God himself does not hold himself offended. [In Decreto Alexandri VIII, 24 Aug. 1690.]

A second Proposition may be made which will contain the same error, or an altogether similar error founded upon the same principle. It is this: that not only those who are ignorant of God and who have never known him, but also those who are not ignorant of him, if, when acting against the Law, they do not actually think that they offend God, do not in fact offend him; that their sins are purely philosophical, because they see clearly that they are against reason, but that they are not Theological, because they do not think that they are against God, and thus they are not worthy of being eternally punished. This concerns the sins of an infinity of libertines who, they say, commit the most horrible actions and abandon themselves to the most extreme debaucheries without ever thinking that God forbids them. It is precisely in these two Propositions that the error of Philosophical sin consists, and it seems in fact expressed in the famous Theology Thesis of Dijon about which so much clamor was made some years ago.

It was denounced to the Bishops and to the Pope as a new heresy of the Jesuits. It was condemned by Alexander VIII on the twenty-fourth of August in the year 1690. The Jesuits, who were as much scandalized by it as the others, anticipated the condemnation of the Pope by being the first to condemn it in public writings. They subsequently produced, among others, one entitled The Error of Philosophical Sin Combated by the Jesuits, in which they demonstrated that this had never been the doctrine of their Society. They showed, moreover, that this very Thesis was in no way conformable to the writings of the Professor of Dijon, which they caused to be authenticated and brought to Paris. They printed extracts from them which contained only the common doctrine in Theology on this subject. And in fact, in reading the writings of the Professor, one does not comprehend how he could have made a Thesis of this nature.

This is not the place to enter into the detail of the defense of the Jesuits, nor of the calumnies which were published against them on this subject. Nothing was omitted in order to tear them apart and to render them odious everywhere. For this purpose people dared to falsify the writings of the Professor; to cite the objections which he made to himself as though they had been his assertions; and to make him advance not only the most detestable but also the most extravagant maxims, so that, in order to say what people made him say, not only would he have had to be a libertine by profession, but also mad in the sovereign degree. And what is surprising, and what will never be believed unless one is willing to take the trouble to compare the writing of the Jesuits with those of their Adversary, is that after these Fathers had published the true extracts from the writings of the Professor in order to show the falsification that had been made in them, no other answer was given than that it was by a figure of Rhetoric that he had been made to speak in that manner. [The true extracts are in the Second Letter to a Man of the Court. The false extracts are in the Denunciation of the New Heresy, art. 3, third denunciation, pp. 81-82.]

However that may be, in order to execute the design proposed here, the Jesuits declare, first, that they condemn this doctrine as scandalous, as rash, as offensive to pious ears, and as erroneous, which are the qualifications with which the Holy See censured it.

Second, they declare, and they have always declared with truth, that this was never the doctrine of their Society, and that none of their Authors ever taught it.

Third, not only is this doctrine not that of their Society, but none of the principles of their Theology leads to it. Some of their Theologians have held, after several others, that invincible ignorance of God can exist for some time among some Barbarians; but they have added at the same time that these Barbarians, acting against the lights of their conscience, committed not only philosophical sins but mortal sins worthy of hell, as I explained previously. Others have held that, in order to offend God in this manner, it is necessary to know him; but they have at the same time laid down as a principle that invincible ignorance of God was impossible, as several other Theologians think. In a word, in reasoning in this manner they have reasoned as people reason in all the Catholic Schools. From neither the one nor the other of these two principles taken separately does the error of philosophical sin with respect to the Barbarians follow. And there has never been, so far as is known, any other Jesuit who joined them both together, except a Spaniard, namely Arriaga, who did so after the example of some other non-Jesuit Theologians, but who was neither followed nor preceded in such a doctrine by the Theologians of his Society, not even by the Professor of Dijon, who in fact admits neither ignorance nor forgetfulness of God that renders sin purely philosophical, and who expressed himself as he did only in a purely metaphysical and morally impossible hypothesis, as he expressly says himself.

In the fourth place, the Jesuits declare that the constant and universal doctrine of their Society is that the sins of libertines, of habitual sinners, and of the hardened are imputed to them in themselves or in their cause; that their Theologians follow in this only the common doctrine in the Catholic Schools; that every ignorance or inadvertence which has its source in the free will of the sinner cannot excuse his sin. And, on the occasion of the Thesis of philosophical sin, they did not fear to challenge their Adversaries to show anyone among the great number of Jesuit authors of every kind - Interpreters of Scripture, Scholastic Theologians, Controversialists, Casuists or Canonists, Preachers or those who composed Treatises of devotion, and even Philosophers themselves - they challenge their Adversaries, I say, to produce any one of them who, when treating of ignorance or inadvertence with respect to our duties, did not distinguish that which is culpable from that which is not; or who did not always suppose this distinction; and who did not say, when treating the matter, that voluntary ignorance or inadvertence never excuses the evil which one has thus ignored through a criminal negligence. So constantly has this doctrine, which is directly opposed to the error of philosophical sin, always been that of their Society.

After this, what is the charity, what is the equity, what is the sincerity of those who wish to persuade the world that the error of philosophical sin is the doctrine of the Jesuits? Where is the good faith of those who every day, in Books and in Theses, affect maliciously to inveigh against the error of Philosophical sin more vehemently than against those of Nestorius and Arius, in order to cause its infamy to fall back upon the Jesuits, who detest it more than they do, and whose Society, of all the Societies that are in the Church of God, has always openly professed to be the most submissive and the most universally submissive to the decisions of the Holy See which concern faith and morals? I pass to the article of probable opinions.