Chapter I. On Liberty Considered in Itself

Liberty taken generally is immunity from necessity. Necessity, however, is distinguished as twofold: moral necessity, which arises especially from law, and physical necessity. Hence liberty too is twofold, moral and physical. Moral liberty is immunity from the bond of law. Physical liberty is again distinguished as twofold: liberty from coercion and liberty from necessity. "Liberty from coercion (or of spontaneity) is immunity from every violence brought against the inclination of the will" (St. Alphonsus, V, XXX; n. 27). We must speak of liberty from necessity.

I. Notion of liberty. Liberty from necessity, or liberty of indifference, is an attribute of the will, by force of which, once all things required for acting have been placed, it is indifferent toward several things, or is not determined to one thing, but can determine itself (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 83, a. 4^†; St. Alphonsus, V, XXX). And since the whole account of the will and of its properties is drawn from the intellect, the root of the said indifference, as St. Alphonsus says, is the indifference of judgment, "which is nothing other than the deliberation of the good or evil which is considered in the action" (Homo Apostolicus, tract 3, n. 11). "This indifference of judgment," St. Alphonsus continues in the same place, "does not now constitute liberty, but, as has been said, is the root of liberty, so that afterward the will may freely and indifferently choose what has pleased it."

II. Division of liberty. Liberty from necessity is threefold: namely, liberty of contradiction or of exercise, which is indifference toward two contradictories, such as willing and not willing the same thing, for example loving and not loving one's neighbor; liberty of contrariety, which is indifference toward two contraries, such as loving and hating; and liberty of specification, which is indifference toward acts not opposed to one another but diverse in species, such as praying and playing (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, XXX).

Corollary I. Liberty of contradiction suffices for the essence of liberty. For it suffices for the essence of liberty that the will be mistress of its act. But by the very fact that it can place or not place the act, it is mistress of its act.

Corollary II. Indifference toward moral good and evil, or the faculty of sinning, is not required for the essence of liberty. For: 1. God is truly free. But in God there is not indifference toward evil, or the faculty of sinning. 2. "It does not pertain to the account of free choice," says St. Thomas, "that it stand indeterminately toward good or evil, because free choice of itself is ordered to the good, since the good is the object of the will, nor does it tend toward evil except because of some defect which it apprehends as good, since there is no willing or choice except of good or apparent good; and therefore where free choice is most perfect, there it cannot tend toward evil, because it cannot be imperfect" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIII).¹

¹ Leo XIII, Encyclical Libertas, 22 June 1888.

III. Existence of liberty. Man, even in the state of fallen nature, enjoys liberty of indifference or free choice. This proposition is of faith from the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the free choice of man, after the sin of Adam, was lost and extinguished, or that it is a thing only in name, indeed a name without a reality, finally a fiction introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema."¹ Moreover, the true character of this human liberty against the innovators is set in clearer light by propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs: "What is done voluntarily, even if it is done by necessity, is nevertheless done freely" (the 39th proposition of Baius, condemned by Pius V and other Pontiffs).² "Only violence is opposed to the natural liberty of man" (the 66th proposition of Baius).³ "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily" (the 67th proposition of Baius).⁴ Likewise Innocent X condemned the third proposition of Jansenius: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."⁵

The proposition is established: 1. against the Fatalists, Materialists, and Positivists; 2. against Wyclif, Luther, and Calvin, who contend that through original sin man was deprived of liberty; 3. against Baius and the Jansenists, who admit liberty from coercion, but deny liberty from necessity. They teach, namely, that man is moved insuperably to good by the greater delight of grace, and insuperably to evil by the greater delight of concupiscence.

It is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture. "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts: if you will to keep the commandments, they will preserve you, and to perform pleasing faith forever. He has set before you water and fire: stretch out your hand to whichever you will. Before man are life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him."⁶ There are added: 2. the unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers; 3. the consent of the human race; 4. the testimony of one's own conscience; 5. the absurd consequences of the contrary opinion. If liberty is denied, the distinction between virtue and vice, moral obligation, and imputability vanish (St. Thomas, I, q. 83, a. 1); 6. the intrinsic reason, which can be proposed thus: the will is free, or, once all things required for acting have been placed, it can act or not act, that is, determine itself to either one, if it is not determined by another, that is, by the object. But no object determines the will. For the will cannot be determined except by an adequate object, and as such proposed to it by the intellect. But such an object is not had; since neither particular goods, nor the indeterminate good or good in common, nor the determined infinite good or God, are of this sort. Not particular goods; for these do not satisfy the appetite for good in the universal, such as the will is, because it follows the universal cognition of the intellect. Not good in common, which is not the adequate object, because it is not a determined good, but vague or abstract, and therefore does not quiet the will. Not the determined infinite good or God, who indeed is the adequate object, but is not proposed to the will as such, because he is not yet seen in himself, but only through a mirror in an enigma (cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 2).

¹ Session 6, canon 5; cf. canons 6 and 4; Vatican Council, dogmatic constitution De Fide, chapter 3; Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1039.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1039.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1066.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1067.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1094.

⁶ Sirach 15:14-18; cf. Genesis 4:6.

IV. Extension of liberty. Man as wayfarer is free with respect to different goods as follows:

1. Concerning good in common or beatitude, he enjoys only liberty of contradiction or of exercise, but not liberty of contrariety. The reason for the former is the very intrinsic reason by which, in the preceding number, we proved liberty. The reason for the latter is that good in common or beatitude cannot be apprehended under any aspect of evil by which the will could turn away from it.

2. Concerning the determined infinite good or God, man is fully free. For "although God in himself is a greater and more eminent universal good than beatitude in common, nevertheless he is not evident and apparent to us under such an aspect, as beatitude is."¹

3. Concerning particular goods, man is likewise fully free. For "any particular goods, insofar as they fall short of some good, can be taken as non-goods, and according to this consideration can be rejected or approved by the will, which can be borne toward the same thing according to different considerations" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 2).

¹ Cf. St. Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, book V, chapter 25; Cajetan, on I, q. 82, a. 2.