The Sources of Morality

69. On the sources themselves. 1. The sources, or also the principles, of morality are called those elements of human acts which constitute a moral action in the concrete as fitting to the moral order or discrepant from it: these elements are object, circumstances, and end. Therefore three sources of morality are numbered: object, circumstances, and end.

a. Namely, the morality of actions in general is taken from their fittingness or discrepancy with the moral order; but moral acts, both good and evil, are diverse. Now it is asked what constitutes actions as fitting to the moral order or discrepant from it; and since there are three things which constitute actions in the concrete as conformable or difform to the moral order - object, end, and circumstances - and no other element is found in the action, rightly and deservedly it is said that morality is derived into an action from a threefold source.

b. That the morality of actions is derived from this threefold source does not signify that morality in any given action is taken from these three things simultaneously, but that it is derived from one of these three: therefore in the concrete, according to the diversity of acts, it is taken now from one or another, now from all simultaneously.

2. In order that an act be good, all the principles on which morality depends must be conformable to rational nature; if even one is difform, the action becomes evil. Hence the axiom has prevailed: good from the whole cause, evil from any defect. Therefore, if an act from object, from end, and from circumstances is fitting to rational nature, it is good simply; but if either from object or from circumstances or from end it is unfitting to rational nature, it is evil simply.

Whether and when this principle, good from the whole cause, evil from any defect, must be restricted, will be said in its proper place; for it is asked whether an act good from its object always loses its whole goodness through an evil end or through an evil circumstance.

1. On The Object

70. Notion and principle. 1. The object of a moral act is called that about which the tendency of the will is proximately and primarily concerned.

a. That about which the tendency of the will is concerned is diverse according as the act of the will is merely elicited or elicited and at the same time commanded: a. some thing; thus God is the object of love of God, money the object of avarice for money; b. some external action, as in these acts: to will to bestow alms, to will to steal, to will to walk; c. some internal act, as in these acts: to will to love God, to will to believe.

b. It is said proximately and primarily because also the end and circumstances are that toward which the will tends, but not proximately and primarily.

c. To the object of an act pertain all those things which constitute its substance, considered not physically but morally; moreover, all those things constitute the substance of an act which are so essential and necessary to it that, if something is lacking or another thing is added, the act becomes diverse. Thus the object of theft is a thing of another taken while the owner is reasonably unwilling: for if the thing is not another's, or if it is not taken while the owner is unwilling, or not while he is reasonably unwilling, there is no theft.

d. The proximate object is the commanded act of the will itself (to steal, to believe), or the object of the elicited act (God, money); the remote object is that about which the commanded act is concerned (the thing of another in theft, revealed truth in an act of faith).

2. Human acts receive their first and essential morality from the object: for the object, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, gives species to acts per se and primarily, because powers are moved to act by the object per se and primarily.

Therefore it happens that the morality which belongs to an act from the object is conceived before every other which belongs to it from the end or from the circumstances. One who from love of God gives alms to relieve the misery of the poor exercises an act of mercy, and one who steals in order to become drunk places an act of theft, because the object, not the end, primarily constitutes the moral species of the act. Therefore the morality which acts receive from the object is called objective, essential, and substantial.

71. Division. 1. The object is called good if it is consonant with rational nature, as to adore God, to will to give alms; it is called evil if it is dissonant from it, as to blaspheme, to will to steal; it is called indifferent if neither obtains, as to eat, to walk, to write, which of itself is neither fitting nor unfitting to rational nature.

2. One object is internally and per se good or evil, another is per accidens and by reason of a precept good or evil. The former is from itself and by its nature conformable or difform to rational nature, as to love or to hate one's neighbor; the latter is not from itself and by its nature, but only by reason of a supervening law, good or evil, as to eat meats or to abstain from them.

Objects of the former kind are commanded because they are good, and prohibited because they are evil; but objects of the latter kind are good because they are commanded, and evil because they are prohibited.

3. Objects evil in themselves are of two kinds: some are evil absolutely and independently of any condition whatever, because of themselves they are so repugnant to rational nature that not even God Himself can change them, for example hatred of God, perjury; others are evil conditionally, that is, by reason of some condition which lies under the power of God because of the dominion which He exercises over created things; if God removes this condition, they cease to be evil and become licit, as to take another's thing, to kill a man, etc.

4. The material object is called that about which the act of the will is concerned, for example another's money which is desired, the taking of another's thing; the formal object is called the same material object insofar as it is attained freely by the agent with knowledge of its morality, for example the desire or taking of another's thing done with knowledge of moral malice.

2. On Circumstances

72. Notion and number. 1. Circumstances are conditions which are added to the substance of a moral act and affect it morally, as in theft the circumstance of a sacred place or of a sacred thing. Because circumstances are added to the moral act already constituted in its substance, they are called accidents of moral acts.

a. Only those conditions are customarily called circumstances of moral acts which are added to the moral substance of the act, or to the act already constituted in its moral species. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing, not the being another's, but only the being sacred, is called a circumstance of the act.

b. Those circumstances affect the object morally which contain some relation to rational nature or to the moral order.

2. Seven circumstances are customarily numbered, which are presented in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.

Who indicates the special quality of the person who acts, for example that he is a cleric, bound by vow or by marriage.

What denotes the quality or quantity of the object itself: whether a striking is grave or light, of a father or of a stranger; whether a thing taken by theft is great or small, sacred or profane.

Where signifies the aspect of place: whether it was sacred or profane, hidden or public, so that scandal could arise.

By what aids signifies the special character of the means which the agent employed, as to become drunk with money taken by theft, to wound with prohibited weapons.

Why indicates the end of the one operating, as to steal in order to become drunk. Although the end pertains to the circumstances, nevertheless because of its peculiar influence on morality it deserves a peculiar consideration.

How signifies the mode of the action, both interior, as to act intensely or remissly, advertently or inadvertently, in good or evil faith; and exterior, as to kill by poison or by the sword, to cut up limb by limb with cruelty.

When denotes the quantity and quality of time: whether something was done for a long time or briefly, in sacred time or non-sacred.

3. Not only objects are indifferent, but also many circumstances must be called indifferent, which do not influence the morality of an act nor confer any morality upon it, because they are neither fitting nor unfitting to rational nature, as to give alms with the right hand or the left, to steal on the second feria or the third.

73. Principles. 1. A human act receives morality also from circumstances, which determine the object in the concrete: for circumstances can bring it about both that an act is or is not fitting to rational nature, and that it is more or less fitting. Thus to refresh oneself temperately is fitting to rational nature, but to refresh oneself intemperately is unfitting to rational nature; to worship God fervently is more conformable to rational nature than to worship Him remissly; to kill a brother is more difform to rational nature than to kill a man.

2. Circumstances confer morality upon human acts in a fourfold way, in that:

a. an act indifferent from its object becomes good or evil from circumstances; thus to eat meats on a day of abstinence is evil, to refresh oneself temperately is good;

b. an act good from its object becomes evil from a circumstance; thus it is evil to pray against the precept of a superior;

c. an act good or evil from its object receives a new goodness or malice from circumstances; thus one who abstains from meats by vow places an act of temperance and religion, and one who steals a sacred thing places an act of injustice and irreligion;

d. an act good or evil from its object becomes more or less good or evil from circumstances; thus if a poor man gives alms, the act of mercy is greater, and if a priest sins, the malice of the sin, other things being equal, is greater.

It must be noted that those circumstances which confer the first moral species upon an action indifferent from its object are commonly referred to the object itself and are not distinguished from the object, so that an act is said to be objectively good or evil when, indifferent from its object, it is constituted good or evil from some circumstance; thus to eat meats on a fast day is customarily called an act evil from its object.

3. A gravely evil circumstance removes the whole goodness of the act, but a lightly evil circumstance accompanying an act (to attend remissly, to act precipitately, to pray tepidly, to give alms with distaste) does not remove the whole goodness of the act. The reason for the first is that an act which fully turns away from the ultimate end cannot conduce to the end. The reason for the second is that an act of this kind does not turn away from the ultimate end, and therefore the tendency of the will toward evil does not destroy the whole goodness of the act; and indeed, unless this were so, very few good acts would be found even in holy men.

With the circumstances of actions, which affect the actions themselves, there must not be confused actions, whether internal or external, which occur during an action but are in no way referred to the action itself, as a pious sigh or idle word while studying, an act of impatience or of prayer while working. Acts of this kind, whether they are good or evil, neither increase nor diminish the merit or demerit of the action, but have their own morality in themselves.

74. Division of circumstances. Circumstances are divided:

1. Into those changing species and those not changing species, according as they modify an action only within the same moral species, or make the moral species of the action diverse, or rather add another moral species to the action.

2. Circumstances not changing species are either aggravating or diminishing, according as they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice, as if someone performs acts which endure for a longer or shorter time, or if one committing a grave theft takes a greater or lesser sum. These circumstances increase or diminish the morality of the act either lightly or gravely, or notably.

We are indeed accustomed to speak of diminishing circumstances, but when the matter is considered more accurately, there are properly no diminishing circumstances. Thus if, with regard to an act of prayer, the circumstance of longer duration is lacking, nothing is taken away from the act, or the act is not diminished, but rather a greater perfection is not added to it. Likewise, if with regard to the evil act of theft the circumstance of a greater quantity is lacking, properly the objective malice of the act is not diminished, but a greater malice is not added.

3. Circumstances changing species change the theological species of the action if they bring it about that an action which from its object is a light sin becomes grave, and one which is a grave sin becomes light, for example because of smallness or greatness of matter; but other circumstances change the moral species if they confer upon the action a new species of goodness or malice besides that which it has from the object, as if someone steals a sacred thing.

3. On The End

75. Notion. 1. The end of a human act is that on account of which the agent operates. There is distinguished the end of the work and the end of the one operating, or the internal and external end.

a. The internal end, or end of the work, is called that into which the act per se and by its nature is ordered, as alms to relieving the misery of the poor. The end of the work, or internal end, is not distinguished from the work itself or from the object; therefore it does not confer upon the act a morality distinct from that which it has from the object. The external end, or end of the one operating, is that to which the act is ordered by the one operating, as alms to making satisfaction for sins. Now it can happen that only the internal end is intended by the one operating, or the internal end and at the same time some external end, or, with the internal end neglected, only some external end; as if someone bestows alms only to relieve another's misery, or also to draw another back from sin, or only to draw another back from sin.

b. The discussion here is only of the end of the one operating, because only that end can introduce into a human act a morality distinct from the object.

2. Ends indifferent in themselves must be admitted, which confer no morality upon acts, because they are neither conformable nor difform to rational nature, as to sing in order to make profit, to go into a field for the sake of relaxing the mind.

76. Division. The end of the one operating is divided in multiple ways:

a. Into proximate end and remote end: the proximate is that which is intended with no other intervening; the remote is that which is intended by means of another end. Thus if someone sings so that, after receiving a stipend, he may procure support for himself, the stipend is the proximate end, support the remote.

b. Into ultimate end and intermediate end: the ultimate is that which is intended for its own sake, in which therefore the agent rests without referring the act to a further end; the intermediate is that which is intended for a further end. Thus if someone composes books in order to acquire for himself money to be spent on the salvation of neighbor and on the glory of God, the glory of God is the ultimate end, while money and the salvation of neighbor are intermediate ends.

c. The ultimate end can be simply or absolutely ultimate, besides which there is no other to which the work is referred; and ultimate in a qualified sense, which is ultimate only in some order of things or in some series of actions. Thus knowledge is the ultimate end in a qualified sense in the order of studies; the glory of God is the simply ultimate end.

d. The ultimate end (in a qualified sense) is either positively or negatively ultimate, according as a further end is excluded, or indeed is not excluded, but neither is intended.

a. For one who studies only in order to acquire knowledge for himself, knowledge is the positively ultimate end, because he excludes a further end, for example the glory of God. For one who studies in order to acquire knowledge for himself and does not think about a further end, knowledge is the negatively ultimate end, because he neither intends nor excludes a further end, for example the glory of God.

b. The ultimate end can be excluded not only explicitly and formally, but also implicitly and virtually, namely by the fact that an action, as disordered and sinful, cannot be referred to the ultimate end. Thus one who eats intemperately for the sake of pleasure excludes (virtually) the ultimate end of the glory of God, even if he does not think about the ultimate end.

e. Into total end, which alone moves to the action, so that, if it were not present, the action would not be done; and partial end, which moves to the action together with another. A partial end can be so constituted that it is equal with another, or equally principal, if each is sufficient to move to the act; or so that one is primary, which is first intended, and the other secondary, which is intended only with subordination to the primary and moves to the act. The former is called moving and alone would suffice for the action; the latter is called impelling and indeed influences the action, but alone would not suffice for the action.

For a priest who celebrates Mass only to worship God, the worship of God is the total end of the Mass. If he celebrates Mass both to worship God and to gain a stipend, the worship of God and the stipend are partial ends of the Mass. But if the priest is so disposed that he would celebrate even if he did not have the stipend, the worship of God is the primary end; if, with the stipend lacking, he would not celebrate, the stipend is the primary end of celebrating.

77. Principles. 1. A human act receives morality also from the end on account of which it is done: for the end to which an action is ordered by the one operating can bring it about that, by reason of this ordering, the action is conformable or difform to rational nature. Thus not only to give alms, but also to give in order to redeem sins, is conformable to rational nature; and not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk, is difform to rational nature.

The end which confers the first moral species upon an act indifferent from its object is said to enter the object itself and to pertain to the object; thus to bestow money in order to relieve misery, to sing in order to praise God, are called actions good from their object; and to sing in order to create annoyance for another is called an action evil from its object.

2. It can happen in diverse ways that the end confers morality upon an action: for an act good, evil, or indifferent from its object can be referred by the agent to a good, evil, or indifferent end.

a. An act good from its object receives from a good end a new goodness, indeed as many species of goodness as there are diverse good ends which the agent intends. If someone, for example, bestows alms for the honor of God and to redeem sins, the action has a threefold goodness: of mercy from the object, and of religion and penance from the end.

b. If an act good from its object is ordered to an evil end, one must distinguish:

a. If the evil end is the total end, or the sole and adequate cause of the action, whether it is gravely or lightly evil, it corrupts the goodness of the act and renders the whole work either gravely or lightly evil; for example, to give alms to a poor man in order to turn him away from the faith, or to pray only for vainglory, is evil, because the will does not intend the good except under the aspect of evil, or as a means to an evil end, and therefore wills only evil.¹

b. If the evil end is a partial end, or if the action is done on account of a good end and an evil end which is only lightly evil, whether it is primary or secondary, it does not vitiate the whole act, but the act is partly good and partly evil. For the will can will both at the same time, good and evil; but the tendency toward good is not destroyed by a lightly evil tendency, because the will is not turned away from the ultimate end by it, as if someone gives alms to relieve the poor and at the same time to catch the praise of men.

This partial end can relate itself to a good action in three ways: antecedently, so that it does not influence the action afterward to be placed, but rather is its occasion, as if someone from human respect approaches the sacred rite, at which he then assists with due intention; this occasional end does not vitiate the action. Concomitantly, so that together with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if someone plays the organ to praise God and for vainglory; this vitiates the action in part. Consequently, if, when an action has already been begun from a good end, an evil end is added, as if someone began to sing in order to worship God and then something of ostentation also creeps in; this end likewise vitiates the action in part.²

Authors explain in diverse ways how the will can will both at the same time. For some teach that the same act can be at once good and evil; others say that in the will there can be at the same time, concerning the same object, two acts, one good and the other evil.³ Commonly, however, we are accustomed to consider acts of this kind as one act, even if composed of several.

c. If the evil end is a partial end and gravely evil, it vitiates the whole work and constitutes it evil, for example to extinguish a fire in order to help one's neighbor and at the same time to commit a grave theft; for it is impossible that an action be pleasing to God by which man is totally turned away from God.

c. An act good from its object does not become evil from an indifferent end to which it is ordered by the agent, whether the indifferent end is the partial reason of willing the good object or the total reason, as if someone sings in church either solely or also in order to earn money.

d. An act evil from its object cannot receive goodness from a good end, but is and remains evil: for if the object is evil, the good end does not prevent the will from really willing evil; but good is from the whole cause, evil from any defect. Hence that saying of the Apostle: let us not do evils that goods may come.⁴ Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the action, as if someone steals in order to do good, because the affection toward evil is less, since the will does not seek it except from love of some good.

From these things it is clear that he offends against the first principles of ethics who teaches that the end sanctifies the means, that is, that a good end constitutes an action good when it is evil from its object or from its circumstances. For although a good end can bring it about that an action indifferent from its object or circumstances is good, nevertheless it cannot bring it about that an action evil from its object or circumstances is good.⁵

e. An act evil from its object receives from an evil end a new malice, indeed as many malices as there are evil ends into which the action is ordered by the agent. If someone, for example, steals in order to become drunk, the action has a twofold malice, of injustice and of intemperance.

f. An act evil from its object is not changed by an indifferent end to which it is referred by the agent, but retains its malice.

g. An act indifferent from its object receives moral goodness from a good end to which it is ordered by the agent; for example, to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion.

h. An act indifferent from its object receives moral malice from an evil end to which it is ordered by the agent; for example, to sing in order to create annoyance for another is a sin against charity.

i. An act indifferent from its object, which is ordered by the agent to an indifferent end, for example to sing in order to earn money, remains indifferent in the abstract; whether also in the concrete will be said presently.

In the manner of a proverb it is said that the value and merit of our works do not depend on what is done, but on how it is done. In order that this may be rightly understood, it must be noted: a. If there is question of two works, of which one from its object is nobler and more perfect than the other, other things being equal, that is, if they are performed with equally perfect intention (from obedience, from charity), the work more perfect from its object is of greater merit, provided that the objective goodness is also intended by the agent. b. Of two works equal from the object, that is of greater merit which is performed with a more perfect intention (end of the one operating), whether as to substance or as to intensity. c. It can happen that a work less perfect from its object (indifferent) has greater merit than a work more perfect in itself, if the end of the one operating is more perfect in one than in the other, whether as to essence or as to intensity.

¹ Cf. Matt. 6:1, 5, 22, 23.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 98.

³ Cf. Billuart, De actibus humanis, art. 4, n. 2.

⁴ Rom. 3:8.

⁵ Cf. Reichmann, Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel (Freiburg: Herder, 1903). Supplement to Stimmen aus Maria-Laach 68.

We saw in the preceding section that there are various rules by which we know whether a human action is good or bad. It will be a good action if it be conformable to right order, otherwise it will be a bad action. It remains for us to cor- sider what elements in an action make it conformable or not with right order. What have we to attend to in order to know whether an action is according to right reason or not ?

There are three such elements, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, sometimes all together, contribute to make the actions in right order or, on the contrary, inordinate. They are the-object, the end, and the circumstances of the action.

By the object is here meant that to which the will primarily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.

It is obvious that some objects, in the sense above defined, have an objective morality of their own, and this causes the will which tends towards them to be either good or bad as the object is good or bad. To blaspheme God is an action which no creature of his can will without the greatest inordinateness. The will to commit murder, or to steal another’s property, is essentially an evil will, because it tends to an evil object. On the contrary, to love God, to relieve human misery, to show love, honour, and reverence to one’s parents, are good actions, because these objects are good, and the will that tends to them is good.

Human actions, then, derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indifferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is performed.

By the end is here understood the reason or motive which induces the agent to act.

The end of all human life is called the last end; other motives for action are intermediate ends. An end is primary if it holds the first place among several, and would be sufficient by itself to induce action; otherwise it is secondary.

It is obvious that the end or motive which induces the agent to act holds a very prominent place among the sources of the morality of an action.

For it is the object to which the will tends, the prospect of gaining which moves the agent to act; but, as we saw in the last point, the motion of the will takes its moral quality from the object; a will, then, which tends to a good end will so far be good; a will which tends to a bad end will be bad. But the morality of an action resides chiefly in the will, so that a good or bad will, derived from the motive of an action, must necessarily contribute to the goodness or badness of that action. It is the end or motive which sets the will in motion and gives its own moral quality to the action which follows. One, then, who steals money in order to be able to commit adultery commits a sin against justice, induced thereto by a desire to sin against chastity, and as St Thomas, following Aristotle, says, he is more of an adulterer than a thief.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 6.

The end which the agent has in view may coincide with the natural scope of the action, as when a man eats to support life. The extrinsic end is then said to correspond with the intrinsic end of the object. Or it may be different, as when a man eats merely for the sake of pleasure; and a man may be moved to action by a variety of subordinate ends, as when he eats to keep up his strength, to be able to work, to obtain the money wherewith to be able to support his family, and so fulfil his duty.

If the object of the action be good, and the extrinsic end of the agent be good also, the action will have a twofold merit. And so there is a twofold merit in giving an alms to relieve distress for the love of God. On the other hand, a grievously sinful motive corrupts and makes an otherwise good action grievously wrong. It turns the agent altogether away from God, his last end. And so it would be a mortal sin to give an alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her.

Even a venially sinful motive, if it be the whole or the primary motive for the action, corrupts the whole act and makes it venially sinful; for then a bad object is sought by good means indeed, but the means are infected with the purpose to which they are prostituted. And so one who preaches merely out of vanity commits a venial sin.

If, however, an end be only venially sinful, and be not the whole or primary motive of the agent, the resulting action will be partly good and partly evil. We suppose that the object is good, a partial motive or motives are also good; in this case a partial and secondary bad motive, which is only venially sinful, cannot corrupt the whole action. One who preaches principally out of obedience, but more willingly because his vanity is flattered, performs an action which is substantially good, but which is infected with a slight defect.

A good motive gives its own moral quality to an indifferent action and makes it good. And so I do an act of charity by depriving a man of a knife with which he was threatening to commit suicide, while the same action done with a view to making the knife my own would be theft.

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the purpose or intention with which an action is performed can make an action unjust, which, apart from that intention, is not so.

Would a man, for example, be guilty of an act of injustice towards his enemy, and bound to make restitution to him, if he committed a crime, foreseeing and intending that it should be imputed to his enemy, who would be punished for it? Of course he is guilty of a grave sin by giving way to such an act of hatred, and if by any means he procures the false accusation of his enemy he is also guilty of injustice by causing his undeserved punishment. But supposing the false accusation, though foreseen, was in no way procured by him, but was brought about by other causes, would his intention make him guilty of injustice towards his enemy and bound to make restitution to him ? Many theologians affirm that it would,¹ but seeing that the false accusation is indeed occasioned by the crime, but not caused by it, it would seem that the bad intention of the man who committed the crime was incapable of supplying the . causal connection between the crime and the false accusation. The intention alone cannot change the nature of the external action. But if this be so, he is not the effective cause of the injury done to his enemy, and he is not bound to make restitution to him, A good intention certainly cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to tell a lie even to save another’s life, according to the teaching of Innocent III. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. This is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in open court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means, Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne in the spring of 1905.² Here we must touch upon a question which has raised a good deal of controversy among divines, and which still divides them. Some, following the great St Augustine, hold that it is a venial sin to eat and to perform other operations of our animal nature for the sake of the pleasure which they give us. Others, on the contrary, hold that the sensible pleasure which accompanies the satisfaction of our animal appetites is good, inasmuch as it is natural and intended by the Author of nature, and so to perform actions which are not wrong in themselves from the motive of pleasure cannot be sinful. If it were not for the sake of the pleasure afforded by eating and by other animal functions many men would abstain from them altogether through disgust. The imperious Stimulus of our fleshly appetites and their satisfaction is required for the preservation and increase of the human race. These satisfactions of our animal nature must indeed be ruled and moderated by right reason, the norm of human conduct. If they are thus moderated, they are conformable to man’s nature, they are in right order and morally good. This seems to be the teaching of St Thomas;³ it is the commoner opinion among modern theologians, nor is it involved in the condemnation of the eighth and ninth propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679.⁴

¹ Lugo, De Justitia, disp. 8, n. 75.

² Civilta Cattolica, Oct. 7, 1905, p. 3.

³ Cont. Gent. 3, c. 9, n. 1; Summa, 2-2, q. 141, a. I, ad I.

⁴ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 505.

By the circumstances of an action we understand certain accidental conditions, which, as it were, surround (circumstant) and complete the substance of the action. enumerated in the doggerel line— There are seven Who, what, where, when, by what means, why, and how.

The circumstance indicated by who does not signify the agent merely as the author of the action; the action must necessarily be done by someone; but it signifies some special quality in him or condition which affects the morality of the action. Thus if a son strike his father, the circumstance of the parental relation changes the morality of the act, and makes it a sin not only against justice, but also against the fourth commandment or the virtue of piety. If a thief steals a consecrated chalice, the sacredness of the object makes the sin a sacrilegious theft, a circumstance indicated by what. And so of the rest.

It is obvious that circumstances of this kind are sources of morality, for they make the action conformable or not to the norm of morality. It is against right reason to strike anyone unjustly, but it is still more inordinate to strike a parent. At the proper time it is a good action to play in the proper place and with good playmates; if any of these circumstances be wanting, the action becomes so far bad.

Some circumstances affecting the intensity, or quantity, or duration of an action add to or lessen its malice, but they do not change its moral species; such circumstances are called aggravating circumstances. Although they do not change the moral species of the act, they sometimes make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, as the quantity in theft; they are then said to change the theological species of the action. If the circumstances add to the action a special and distinct malice of their own, they change its moral species, as the sacred object or place in a sacrilegious theft. Such a theft is not only against justice, but also against the virtue of religion.

In order that an action may be altogether and simply good, the object, the end, and the circumstances must all be good; for good indicates completeness and perfection; there is evil in any defect. If all the sources of morality are evil, the action may have a triple malice; as when a thief steals Church plate in order to be able to indulge his vicious propensities. If only one source or circumstance of an action be mortally sinful, the perpetration of it turns the evil-doer away from God and makes the action wholly bad. An accidental and secondary circumstance, when only venially sinful, does not corrupt the whole action; it only lessens its merit. Thus it is a grievous sacrilege to receive Holy Communion in a state of mortal sin; a state of venial sin only makes the Communion less fruitful.

I. Notion of end. An end is said to be: that for the sake of which something is done, or that for the sake of which an agent operates, or that which, by exciting the appetite of the one about to operate, draws him to acting. Now the appetite is drawn only by an apprehended good. Hence good and end, although they differ in formal concept, materially fall into the same thing. That is, one and the same thing is called a good insofar as it is fitting to the appetite; it is called an end insofar as, through that fittingness, it draws to acting.

Good, by reason of appetibility, is distinguished as threefold: honorable, delectable, and useful. The honorable is that which is conformable to the rules of morals; the delectable, that which is apt to satisfy the appetite; the useful, that which is apt for attaining some other good. Now since an end is that which by its goodness moves one to acting, a useful good as such does not have the character of an end but only of a means (St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, ad 2); for that which is chosen by reason of another is called a means. Thus, for example, victory is the end of those fighting, while the fight is the means.

II. Division of end. End is distinguished:

1. Into the end of the work and the end of the worker. The end of the work, or the intrinsic end, is the end to which the work by its nature is ordered. The end of the worker is the end which the worker intends in acting, whether it is the end of the work itself or some other end. Thus in almsgiving the end of the work is the relief of the poor person; the end of the worker can be the relief of the poor person, or vainglory, or something else (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 1).

2. Into the end which, the end for whom, and the end by which. The end which is the very good that is intended; the end for whom is the person for whom the good is desired; the end by which is the very possession or acquisition of the intended good. Thus health is the end which, the sick person is the end for whom, and the acquisition of health is the end by which intended by the physician.¹

3. Into the primary end and the secondary end. The primary or principal end is the one intended by the worker in such a way that, if it were lacking, he would not act, and for its sake he would act even if other ends were lacking. The secondary end is the one intended in such a way that without it the action would nevertheless be placed.

4. Into the final end and the intermediate end. The final end is the one intended only by reason of itself, and therefore not referred to another end. An intermediate end is said to be one which is indeed intended by reason of itself, but with a relation or subordination to a further end.

5. Into a natural end and a supernatural end, according as it can be attained by natural means or - as with the beatific vision - only by a supernatural means.

¹ The end which and the end by which, for example health and its acquisition, likewise the end which and the end for whom, for example health and the sick person for whom health is desired, should not be taken as simply several ends, but rather as two quasi-parts of one total end (Billuart, same place, article 1).

I. The final end for whom of man - as also of every creature - is God, or the divine goodness. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "For whom are all things, and through whom are all things"; "The Lord has made all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day."¹

It is proved 2. by reason. He who is the first cause and therefore the absolute Lord of all things is necessarily the end to which all things are subordinated. But God is the first cause and therefore the absolute Lord of all things.

¹ Heb. 2:10; Prov. 16:4.

III. Besides the absolutely final end, which man has in common with every creature and which consists in the external glory of God, there is also another final end proper to man. "In the parts of the universe," says St. Thomas, "each creature is for the sake of its own proper act and perfection" (I, q. 65, a. 2). Now the final end proper to man is beatitude. For that is rightly called the proper end of man toward which he himself tends by a natural appetite, and therefore by one implanted by the author of nature. But man tends by a natural appetite toward beatitude.

Corollary. Beatitude, although rightly called the final end proper to man, is nevertheless subordinated to the glory of God, which is the absolutely final end. For from the fact that God is the final end for whom of man, it follows that all things which pertain to man or regard him, and therefore also the beatitude itself of man, are ordered to the good of God, that is, to his external glory. Besides, the beatitude of man and the external glory of God are so connected with each other that they are constituted by the same acts. Lessius explains this in these words: "The highest glory of God is our highest good, and our highest good cannot be anything except his highest glory. The reason is that his highest external glory is that he be perfectly known, loved, and tasted by us. Hence it consists in three vital acts; and in the same acts our highest good formally consists.... For our highest good and formal beatitude is to see, love, taste God, or, what can be said in one word as the same thing, to enjoy God. And so in the highest glory of God our highest good is formally and intrinsically included, so that it cannot be conceived without it; and by this very fact, that God intends and seeks that glory, he intends and seeks our highest good and advantage."¹

¹ Lessius, De perfectionibus divinis, book 14, chapter 3.

I. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some end. For always, when he acts deliberately, he intends some effect or some good. But that effect is truly an end: for an end is that for the sake of which something is done (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1).

II. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some final end. For man, whose rational appetite regards the good as its object and is satisfied only by a good apprehended as perfect, man, I say, whatever he deliberately desires, desires either as a perfect good or as tending toward a perfect good. But in either case he acts for the sake of the final end: in the former case, because the perfect good has the character of the final end; in the latter case, because one desiring something as tending toward the perfect good desires it in order to the perfect good or to the final end (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 6).

III. The final ends for which man can in fact act are distinguished as three, namely God, the creature, and beatitude in common. Of these, God and the creature are final ends in the concrete, as regarding a concrete object, and are called material ends. Beatitude is the final end in the abstract, as regarding the indeterminate perfect good, or whatever that may be; and it is usually called the formal end. Now that God and the creature can be intended as the final end is plain and admitted by all. The same seems to be said of beatitude in common. For by the consent of all, there are acts that are venially evil. But acts of this kind are neither referred to God as to the final end, nor to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be mortal sins. It remains, therefore, that they are referred to beatitude in common. Moreover, there are good acts placed without charity. But acts of this kind do not seem to be referred to God as to the final end (n. 243); nor are they referred to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be gravely evil. Hence it seems necessary to admit that they are referred to beatitude in common. Others, however, teach otherwise, and judge that acts that are venially evil and good acts placed without charity are referred to God positively, to the creature negatively, or - as others say - to God efficaciously, to the creature inefficaciously.¹

¹ Cf. Billuart, De ultimo fine, dissertation I, articles 4 and 5.

IV. Man cannot act at the same time for several final ends. For someone desires as the final end that which he desires as the perfect good. Hence the final end so fills the appetite of man that nothing outside it remains to be desired by man. Given this, neither can he desire anything outside it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 5). Hence a deliberate act is referred either to God alone, or to the creature alone, or to beatitude in common alone, as to the final end. If to God, the act is good; if to the creature, it is gravely evil; if to beatitude in common, it is good or venially evil, according as it is or is not referable to God (n. 243). Others, however, think otherwise according to what was said under III.

I. Notion. Object is here understood as that toward which, insofar as it is subject to the rules of morals, a human act is borne per se. Thus another's property is the object of theft; God is the object of the act of love (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVI; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 2).

II. Morality from the object. A human act takes specific morality, goodness or malice, from its known object, good or evil. The reason is that an act takes specific morality from that toward which it is borne per se; such is the object (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVII). I have said "from its known object, good or evil," namely so that morality can be contracted or become formal; for nothing is willed unless known.

Nevertheless, circumstance and end, as we shall note later, sometimes destroy the goodness of the object. Moreover, if the object and the circumstances are indifferent, for example the act of walking, specific morality is taken from the end¹ (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII; XLI).

¹ In this case circumstance or end is said to put on the account of the object. But when the matter is taken in this way, it can be said that even in this hypothesis specific morality is derived from the object.

I. Notion. Circumstance is an accident which stands around a human act already constituted in some moral species, and is subject to the rules of morals (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX). Therefore two things are required: 1. that the act already have morality independently of the circumstance; 2. that the circumstance be subject to the rules of morals, or that it morally affect the act.

II. Enumeration of circumstances. "A circumstance is so called as existing, as it were, outside the substance of the act, yet so that in some way it touches the act itself. Now this can happen in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself; in another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act; in a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself either by way of measure, as time and place; or by way of quality of the act, as the mode of acting. From the part of the effect, it is when what someone has done is considered. From the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, there is taken on account of what; from the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what; from the part of the principal agent cause, there is taken who has acted; and from the part of the instrumental agent cause, there is taken by what aids" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX).

III. Morality from circumstance. That an act takes some morality from circumstance is clear from the fact that circumstance, as we posited, is subject to the rules of morals. Take these things especially:

1. Some circumstances increase or diminish morality within the same species. They are called aggravating or diminishing when they simply increase or diminish morality, for example the circumstance that someone steals a greater, but not yet grave, matter. When circumstances so increase or diminish morality that they make a mortal sin out of a venial one, or a venial sin out of a mortal one, they are called changing the theological species, for example the circumstance that someone steals grave matter, or consents semi-fully to a temptation.

2. Others cause the act to receive a new moral species, a new specific goodness or malice. Thus, for example, theft of a sacred thing involves a twofold diverse malice (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10; St. Alphonsus, l.c.).¹

3. An evil circumstance influences an act good from its object in this way:

a) A lightly evil circumstance causes the act to be partly good, partly evil; good insofar as the honesty of the object is intended. For nothing prevents the one who does not repudiate a lightly evil circumstance of the object from sincerely seeking the honesty which inheres in the object. Added to this is that, if this opinion is rejected, even devout persons would perform a good work with greater difficulty, because a lightly evil circumstance or end is so easily mixed into the act. Hence, if someone, by praying, were to neglect only a light obligation of helping a sick person, he would contract the goodness which the act of praying has from its object (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX).

b) A gravely evil circumstance certainly prevents the act from being meritorious. But it does not seem to prevent the act from being partly good, partly evil; partly good, I say, because the agent, as it seems, can also in that case sincerely will the honesty which inheres in the object. Yet most authors hold an act of this sort as simply evil. According to the former opinion, one who, while neglecting a grave obligation of helping a sick person, assists at Mass contracts the goodness which inheres in the object of the act.

¹ According to some, other circumstances cause the act, rather than receiving a twofold malice, to receive a malice distinct from that which inheres in the act and the circumstance considered in themselves, and which, as it were, coalesces from a twofold malice. Thus, for example, the circumstance that a married person has intercourse with a third party, according to those authors, causes the act to have one specific malice, distinct from fornication and injustice, from which it, as it were, coalesces.

The principal one among the circumstances of an act is the end, concerning which we must deal especially.

I. Notion. What the end is, and how manyfold it is distinguished, was explained in nn. 1 and 2.

II. Morality from the end. That an act takes some morality from the end follows from what has been said about morality taken from circumstances, since the end, as we have noted, is the principal circumstance of an act. Take these things especially:

1. An act good from its object:

a) Referred to a good end, distinct from the intended end of the work, receives a new species of goodness; indeed, it obtains as many species of goodness as the good ends appointed for it. Thus, for example, fasting in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary and in satisfaction for sins has a threefold goodness: of temperance from the object, of religion and penance from the ends (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, aa. 4, 6, and 7; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII).

b) Referred to an evil end:

a) It becomes simply evil if the evil end, whether gravely or lightly evil, is the only end, as if someone gives alms to a poor woman solely in order to seduce her, or solely to seek vain glory. The reason is that in this hypothesis the object is not intended insofar as it is honorable, but only insofar as it is useful for obtaining the evil end. "The will," says St. Thomas, "cannot be called good if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For one who wills to give alms for the sake of obtaining vain glory wills that which of itself is good under the account of evil; and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil; hence his will is evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII).

b) It is partly evil, partly good, if the end is venially evil, as if someone prays also from vain glory. The reason is that a venially evil end does not prevent the object, insofar as it is honorable, from being intended, and thus the honesty of the object from being contracted. Added to this is that, as we noted in n. 68, if this doctrine is rejected, even among devout persons a good act would be found with greater difficulty, since a lightly evil end is easily mixed into the work (St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3).

c) It is disputed if the evil end is not indeed the only end, but nevertheless is gravely evil. But even such an end does not seem to prevent the act from being able to be partly good, partly evil; partly good, I say, because the agent can, as it seems, even in this hypothesis intend the object insofar as it is honorable, and thus contract its honesty (n. 68). Yet most authors hold acts of this sort as simply evil. Therefore, according to our opinion, one who gives alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her, though not solely for that reason, can contract the goodness which inheres in the object.

We spoke above of an act partly good and partly evil. But it should be noted that, in the cases adduced, strictly speaking a multiple elicited act of the will should rather be admitted, of which one is good, the other evil; or that by appearance rather than in the reality itself there is had one elicited act of the will which is partly good and partly evil (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 6). Apply these things also to what has been said about circumstance (n. 68).

2. An act evil from its object:

a) Referred to an evil end, receives a new species of malice; indeed, it obtains as many species of malice as the evil ends appointed for it. Thus, for example, theft committed in order to make oneself drunk has a twofold malice: of injustice from the object, of intemperance from the end.

b) Referred to a good end, remains evil and contracts no goodness: not from the object, since this is not changed by intention and therefore retains its malice; nor from the end, because the end, as it is intended in the concrete, that is, as to be obtained through an evil means, is evil. Hence, for example, a lie committed in order to save the life of a neighbor is good under no heading. Nevertheless, ignorance or good faith rather often excuses from grave fault, or even from every fault.

3. An act indifferent from its object:

a) Referred to a good end, is good.

b) Referred to an evil end, is evil.

c) Concerning an act referred to an indifferent end, or placed on account of a pleasurable good, something will be said later.

II. In order that an act be morally good, these things are required:

1. The object must be good or at least indifferent (n. 66). If it is indifferent, the act becomes good if it is referred to a good end; in which case the end assumes the character of object.¹

2. The act must be referred to a good end; for "since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 9).²

3. Goodness must be intended in itself; otherwise it is not contracted subjectively. "In order that the will be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good; that is, that it will the good, and on account of the good" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3). But goodness is intended in itself when someone wills the good affected by its goodness, even if he does not reflexively think that he wills the good because it is good.

¹ On circumstances, see n. 69.

² Note, however, that an act good from its object is at least not deprived of goodness by just any bad end (n. 71).

III. Of the conditions assigned, the second must be developed more fully; in other words, it must be explained what kind of end is good, or to what end in the concrete an act must be referred. Now:

1. Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually. I said:

a) Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. The proposition is established against the Scotists, who teach that those acts which of themselves are ordered only to some comfort or relief of nature, such as walking, smelling flowers, stroking the beard, those acts, I say, can without sin be directly referred to the lower end alone, namely to comfort or pleasure, provided the ultimate end is not positively excluded.¹ According to the stated authors, one who directly rests in such an end neither sins, because to act for the end of the work alone is not evil, nor acts morally well, because he does not refer the act to an honorable end. Therefore he places an indifferent act. But the contrary opinion is deduced from the fact that every human or deliberated act must be done for that end alone which befits rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

Objection. He who acts for the end of the work alone cannot sin. But the works about which there is controversy are, by their nature, ordered to pleasure alone.

Response. The argument proposed by us proves precisely that he sins who acts for the end of the work alone, if there is question of a work which by its nature is ordered to pleasure alone.

Corollary I. It is illicit to act for pleasure alone, so that an act placed for that end alone not only is destitute of goodness, but is also evil. It is, however, only venially evil, if there is question of a thing licit in itself or venially evil, because the disordered relation of an act licit in itself or slightly evil does not import grave disorder. Except the case in which pleasure would be intended as the ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to act, even, for pleasure, by resting, even, in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem licit, insofar as the honorable act and its delectability constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is licit to act for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it attracts to an act ordered in itself, for instance to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure, considered as such, has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 9, n. 1).

b) Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, whether the end of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived in species or in a vague way. The very end of the work, at least to this extent, does not fall under precept, insofar as there is no obligation of intending it, although there can be an obligation of not impeding it. This being posited, the agent is free to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 927; cf. 882 and 883). Nevertheless several think, as we shall soon note, that the end of the work itself, by the very fact that it is not positively excluded, is at least implicitly intended.

c) It is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually, or that the act be virtually referred to an honorable end, or that the act be placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. For it suffices that the act truly be referred to an honorable end; but it is truly referred to an honorable end if it is placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. There is added that the obligation of an actual relation "would be an unbearable weight and a matter entangled with six hundred scruples" (St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

d) It is disputed whether one who places an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, by that very fact intends the honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this; but it seems it must be denied. For that on account of which an act is distinguished is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the act is performed. But the end of the act is distinguished from the act itself, for example the procreation of offspring from intercourse, as effect from cause; hence in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places, in the due mode and order, an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude this end, commonly positively includes that end, although only confusedly and weakly.

2. It is disputed whether every human act must, in order to be good, be referred to God, or whether it suffices that it be referable to God.

Some teach that every act must be referred to God, because the dignity of the true ultimate end requires that all acts be referred to him. They add, however, that an implicit relation suffices, and that this is had by the very fact that the act is placed for an honorable end; because every honorable act by its nature is referred to God, the first and fontal honorableness of every particular honorableness.

Others deny that every act must be referred to God, and teach that, for a good act, it suffices that it be referable to God. They think this because acts cannot in any way be referred to God except through charity. But charity is certainly not required in order that a good act be placed; and this is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."² According to the latter opinion, a good act not referred to God is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end (nn. 12 and 13).

3. A human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nor from another supernaturally known motive; this again is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition just cited.

4. Although a human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nevertheless to this extent there is an obligation of referring one's acts through an act of charity to God as to the ultimate end, insofar as it is prescribed to elicit an act of charity at certain times. Another precept besides that which is identified with the precept of charity cannot be proved. Hence St. Thomas says: "If it is asked when one must refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when the habit of charity must go out into act, because whenever the habit of charity goes out into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him" (In II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6).

Nor does St. Alphonsus contradict these things when he teaches that acts should be offered to God several times in the day, at least in the morning (V, XLIV). For, as is clear from the context, he does not speak about the relation of acts to God as to the ultimate end, but about the care of referring all one's acts, even those which from the object are indifferent, to a good or honorable end. In order that this be done certainly, a good intention should be repeated more often.

5. Those who think that, for the goodness of an act, it is not required that it be referred to God as to the ultimate end, since according to their opinion this cannot be done without charity, ask what kind of influence must proceed from charity in order that an act be referred to God.³ Now:

Some require only habitual charity, without its influencing the act, since honorable acts are referred to God as if by their own weight.

Others likewise require only habitual charity; but according to them honorable acts which are placed in that state are always placed under the influence of the intention of God as ultimate end. For every agent, they say, acts from the intention of the ultimate end; but this, in one who is ordered to God, that is, in a just person, is God himself.

Others, besides habitual charity, require an act of perfect charity, by force of which good acts are referred to God. Of these, some say that in itself one act suffices for referring all future good acts to God, with the things that must be posited of course having been posited, namely that one not lose charity in the meantime. I said "in itself," because from another source there is the precept of eliciting an act of charity at certain times. Others think that the act of charity must be repeated at least from time to time. Here, however, it is further disputed whether the act of charity, in order to refer human acts to God, must be their causing principle, or whether it suffices that it be an ordering principle.⁴

Van Roey, who embraces the latter opinion, describes the stated ordering thus: "But if you ask how that virtual ordering of works is conceived, which is not virtual causality, we respond that it is a certain determination left behind from the first intention, some dictate arising from the first dictate, by force of which works are exercised in loving service of God and are determined and specified as friendly offerings made to God. This determination, this dictate, must be perceived as something truly persevering in the will, although here and now it does not occur to thought; the sign, indication, and argument of its real persistence is if someone, self-possessed and acting morally, is in such a disposition of mind that, seriously reflecting upon himself or asked why he does this or that work, finally and ultimately, after perhaps giving other particular motives, he answers that he acts on account of God, to please God, or something similar including explicitly or implicitly the motive of charity.

"If the matter is understood thus, it cannot be denied that the ordering of works is virtual; that is, the preceding intention, when it vanishes from the mind as an explicit intention, leaves behind some power, some determination, some disposition, which suffices so that the works, if they are done, are directed to God."

¹ Therefore they do not apply the doctrine to those acts to which the Author of nature has appointed the certain end of some honorable necessity or utility; such are, for example, eating, conjugal intercourse, etc. Besides, Innocent XI condemned proposition 8: "To eat and drink to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts"; and proposition 9: "The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect" (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1158 and 1159).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

³ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 26 sq.; Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., VIII, n. 639.

⁴ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 232 sq.

I. Notion. Intention is here understood as the deliberate will of confecting a sacrament.

II. Division. Intention is distinguished:

1. By reason of itself into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. Actual intention is had when the minister, at the time at which he confects the sacrament, actually wills to confect it. It is reflex, or rather in actu signato, if there is had an express and formal volition of confecting the sacrament; it is in actu exercito if someone actually wills indeed, but nevertheless less expressly and formally, to confect the sacrament, as if someone, recognizing a rite as a sacrament, administers it under this recognition. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament, and that will, though not actually, nevertheless perseveres virtually, so that he operates by force of the will once had, as if someone, from the intention of celebrating Mass, puts on the vestments and performs the other things, even if perhaps at the time of the ministry he is wholly distracted. Habitual intention exists if someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament and that will has not indeed been retracted, but nevertheless does not persevere virtually. Interpretative intention is had when someone neither actually and explicitly wills nor actually and explicitly has willed to confect a sacrament, but is presumed to be going to will it if thought about it should occur.¹ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 15.)

2. By reason of the object into merely external and internal. Merely external intention is had when someone wills and outwardly seriously performs only the external rite, but lacks the mind of confecting a sacrament, or even intends the contrary. It is called merely external because, although in itself it is internal, nevertheless its whole object is external, namely only the placing of the external rite. Internal intention is had when someone wills the external rite insofar as it is sacred, or at least insofar as it is held as such by the Church.

By reason of the object, intention is further distinguished into determinate and indeterminate, according as the thing intended is certain and defined; or is uncertain, as if someone intends to consecrate only ten hosts out of a multitude of hosts.

3. By reason of mode into explicit and implicit, according as someone expressly wills such a sacrament known and thought of, or by a more general will wills such a sacrament, whether not known, or known but not thought of.

By reason of mode it is also distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone intends to confect a sacrament independently of, or dependently upon, some circumstance or event; as if someone absolves another under the condition: if you are attrite; or: if you make restitution.

¹ Some call interpretative the intention which others call implicit habitual intention.

III. The intention required. It is of faith that intention is required, and indeed intention "at least of doing what the Church does."¹ In order that these things may be unfolded and completed, observe the following:

1. In itself, actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices; habitual intention does not suffice, much less interpretative intention; fear, however, does not hinder intention. I said:

a) Actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices. For it must be judged that the intention suffices which truly flows into the act or sacramental rite, and therefore can be called its cause. Such is not only actual intention, but also virtual intention. There is added the fact that actual intention is not always within man's power, and its necessity would give occasion for anxieties about the validity of the sacraments (St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 3;² St. Alphonsus, VI, 17, 18).

Corollary. A priest validly acts who, in the customary way, betakes himself to the baptistery, confessional, or altar and there baptizes, absolves, or consecrates; for there is had at least virtual intention; indeed practically everywhere actual intention is present, even if remiss. Likewise, a priest validly consecrates who has placed on the corporal the hosts to be consecrated, even if at the time of consecration he does not think of them. Indeed, in general it must be said that one imprudently doubts the value of the act who has placed the required rite, unless he has expressly excluded the due intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 18).

b) Habitual intention does not suffice; since it cannot be admitted that an intention suffices which in no way flows into the action of the minister; such is habitual intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16). Much less, as is clear, does interpretative intention suffice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16).

c) Fear does not hinder, because, as we posit, it does not take away the voluntary (St. Alphonsus, VI, 19). Except, however, Matrimony, as will be said in its place.

2. As regards the object, there is required the intention or will of confecting a sacrament. This is established against those who judge that external intention suffices; in other words, that it suffices for someone outwardly and seriously to place the external rite, even if inwardly he does not will to confect the sacrament. This doctrine, first defended by Roland Bandinelli, and afterwards revived by Ambrosius Catharinus (1553), is today almost commonly abandoned and rightly seems to be rejected. For: 1. as we have said, it is of faith that intention is required in the minister, "at least of doing what the Church does." But these words seem to have to be understood according to the sense which they had in the schools, in other words, of the intention of doing what the Church intends to effect through the rite. 2. Proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, even though inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does."³ Here it seems entirely that there is discussion of one who outwardly and seriously places the external rite. Therefore this does not suffice. 3. The Roman Missal has these words: "If someone has before him eleven hosts and intends to consecrate only ten, not determining which ten he intends, ... he does not consecrate, because intention is required,"⁴ namely, as the Missal, according to the obvious sense, supposes, the intention of consecrating, and that a determinate one (St. Alphonsus, VI, 23).

It suffices, however, that the minister implicitly will to confect the sacrament, for example, that he will the rite as sacred, that he will to do what Christ instituted, what the Church does, what is asked by a Christian, etc.

Corollary I. A sacrament is not valid: 1. if someone places the external rite without any intention; this, for example, will have place if someone does not place a human act, as if he baptizes someone in sleep or drunkenness; 2. if someone performs the external rite for the sake of jest, mockery, or mere exercise.

Corollary II. A sacrament can be valid, even if someone does not regard the rite placed by himself as sacramental, provided he truly wills, for example, what Christ instituted, what he who admits the sacrament asks, etc. Hence heresy or infidelity of itself is not a reason for doubting the required intention;⁵ otherwise if there is added hatred of the Christian name, which, for example, we can easily suspect in a Jew.

3. As regards the term, intention must be borne toward a determinate person or matter; yet it suffices that the intention be directed to the person or to the whole matter present, without being directed to the parts individually. But he consecrates invalidly who would will to consecrate ten hosts out of eleven and would not determine those ten.

4. As regards the mode, especially as regards a sacrament to be confected under a condition, several things must be noted:

a) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the present or the past generally is valid or not valid at once, according as the condition is verified or not verified. I said "generally," because it is disputed whether a sacrament conferred under a condition naturally unknowable is valid; as if someone were to absolve another if he were predestined. Further, it seems this must be denied, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human knowledge" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 26).

b) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the future, for example: I absolve you, if you will make restitution, that is, as soon as you shall have made restitution, generally is not valid, neither before nor after the condition has been fulfilled. Not before the condition is fulfilled, because there is not had the intention of confecting the sacrament before the fulfilled condition; not after the condition is fulfilled, because then the matter and form no longer exist (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I said generally, because Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract. But a contract entered into under a condition is perfected when the condition has been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, Session 7, On the Sacraments, canon 11.

² St. Thomas in the cited place indeed says: "Although he who is thinking of something else does not have actual intention, nevertheless he has ... habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament." But St. Alphonsus responds: "By habitual intention here the holy Doctor without doubt understands virtual intention; for immediately after he adds thus: Suppose that when a priest approaches to baptize, he intends to do with respect to the one to be baptized what the Church does; hence if afterwards in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried off to other things, the sacrament is perfected from the force, note well, of the first intention" (VI, 18).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1318.

⁴ De Defectibus, title 7, n. 1.

⁵ Holy Office, 18 December 1872 (Collectanea, n. 1392).

For validly receiving a sacrament neither faith nor uprightness is required, as is clear from the sense and practice of the Church, which has always held as valid a sacrament received according to the rite of the Church in heresy. Penance is excepted, for which the good acts of the penitent are required, as will be explained in its own place.

Baptism, however, is required for the other sacraments. This is established, namely, from tradition, that the other sacraments were instituted only for those who through Baptism have been made members of the Church (St. Alphonsus, VI, 79).

Finally, for the valid reception of all the sacraments there is required, at least in adults, intention, that is, the will of receiving the sacrament; concerning which intention we must speak more fully (St. Alphonsus, VI, 80, 139).

I. Requisites for daily Communion. "Frequent and daily Communion, as being most desired by Christ the Lord and by the Catholic Church, should be open to all Christ's faithful of whatever order or condition; so that no one who is in the state of grace and approaches the sacred table with a right and pious mind can be prohibited from it" (cited Decree, n. 1). "But a right mind consists in this, that one who approaches the sacred table does not indulge custom, vanity, or human reasons, but wills to satisfy God's good pleasure, to be united to Him more closely by charity, and by that divine medicine to meet his infirmities and defects" (n. 2). Now:

1. An intention which is predominantly supernatural suffices to this extent, that one who approaches with such an intention cannot be kept away from Communion.

2. It suffices that the good ends assigned be intended implicitly.

3. Custom, whether one's own or that of others, will in practice rather often be more the occasion than the principal reason. Vanity will be the principal reason if someone becomes conceited because of frequency of Communion and willingly speaks about it to others in the manner of little devotees.¹

¹ Instruction to the Bishops of Prussia, 8 December 1906.

II. Sins to be confessed must be declared according to: 1. the lowest moral species, at least known confusedly; 2. number; 3. certain circumstances; 4. the external act; 5. the effect, as will be explained.

1. The lowest moral species, at least known confusedly. This follows from the Council of Trent,¹ which declares that sins must be declared "in species," which words in their obvious sense signify the lowest moral species. The reason is clear from what has been said about the necessity of integrity (n. 317). It is said:

a) Moral species; since it is not necessary to declare the physical species, so that one who has stolen, for example, 100 florins and a cow satisfies by confessing that he committed two grave thefts.

b) Lowest species, so that it does not suffice to confess, for example, the proximate genus of the sin, for instance by declaring: "I committed a sin of lust" or "of lust against nature."

c) At least known confusedly; for a species wholly unknown is not contracted.

Question. What must one confess who knows that he has sinned gravely but does not remember the lowest species?

Response. He is bound to confess the sin according to its generic aspect; for one who cannot integrally satisfy the precept is bound to satisfy it insofar as he can do that, unless the reason of the precept is not found in the defective fulfillment (St. Alphonsus, VI, 480).

2. Number. For the Council of Trent² declares that sins must be confessed "individually." For the rest, this is elicited also from the fact that all mortal sins must be confessed (n. 319; canon 901), which does not take place if the number is not assigned. Moreover:

a) If the true number is established, this must be declared.

b) If the true number is not established, but some number is established, for example, if someone certainly sinned eight times but doubts whether he sinned more often, say twelve times, let him either confess only the certain number or declare a truly approximate number, adding "about" or "more or less," saying, for example, in the case alleged, "about ten times I committed this or that sin." Now by an approximate number a moderate excess is comprehended, but not a notable one. And the greater the number expressed, the greater the excess comprehended. Thus, for example, by saying "three times more or less," up to 4 can be understood; by saying "ten times more or less," up to 12; by saying "thirty times more or less," up to 33; by saying "a hundred times more or less," up to 105 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466).

c) If not even an approximate number can be assigned, let the habit of sinning be declared, the time through which it persevered, and, as far as possible, the frequency of falls in a day, week, or month (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). But if not even that can be done at all, or not without great danger of erring, it suffices, after the time of the habit has been declared, to add that he sinned "as often as the occasion was given" or "as often as that desire occurred" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). Hence a prostitute commonly satisfies by declaring that she was given over to prostitution for such a time, and that as often as there was occasion she afforded the use of her body both to married and unmarried men. Nevertheless, she should determine more exactly the number of less usual species, if they occurred, for instance sins committed with clerics. Indeed, if she can, she must manifest the number more accurately. One who is accustomed to desire any women he meets satisfies by declaring that habit and the time through which he persists in it; let him add whether often married women, whether sometimes relatives, or sacred persons. One who is accustomed on any occasion to speak about shameful matters likewise satisfies by manifesting the time of a habit of this kind.

Corollary. One who has confessed an approximate number, adding "more or less" or "about," is not bound to supplement if afterward he certainly learns of a moderate excess above the number expressed. The reason is that the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment to be exercised in a human way. But, considering the human manner of proceeding, in the case posited the case to be judged seems to have been so declared and judged that, if the penitent proceeded in good faith, the obligation of supplementing seems to be denied (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). For the same reason the same seems to be said of one who, having confessed more generally and confusedly, afterward remembers the number more distinctly, unless afterward so great a multitude of sins comes to mind that they were not comprehended in the general and confused confession. Finally, it is clear that one who in good faith manifested too great a number is not bound to confess again, since the true number was included in the greater.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins numerically, for instance by killing three men by one act, can confess thus: "I killed three men."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, because he truly confesses the number of sins.

Objection. In the case posited the confessor is led into error as regards the number of acts; which is opposed to integrity.

Response. The confessor is led into error as regards the number of physical acts, let that pass; as regards the number of sins or malices, I deny it; namely, that act, physically one, is morally threefold. But an error induced as regards the number of physical acts is not opposed to integrity.

3. Circumstances of sin. The following must be declared:

a) A circumstance changing the theological species, as it is called, that is, one which makes a venial sin mortal or conversely; at least insofar as this is required lest the confessor take as light what was grave, or as grave what was light. Hence, for example, the circumstance of grave matter in theft must be declared, and the circumstance of half-full consent in an act gravely evil, if the penitent - to which in the case he is not bound - wishes to confess the consent.

b) A circumstance adding a new species of grave sin, or, to use the terminology of the Council of Trent³ and of the Code (canon 901), changing the species of sin, as if someone were to kill a sacred person. Thus the Council of Trent at the cited place and the cited canon of the Code; and it follows from what has been said about the obligation of confessing sins according to the lowest species.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins in species, for instance if one bound by a vow of chastity pollutes himself, can confess thus: "I gravely transgressed a vow and perpetrated pollution."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, provided he truly declares the lowest species, as in the example alleged; for nothing seems lacking to integrity. But if it is objected that the circumstance of the sin must be declared which changes its species or which adds a new species to it, whereas in the case the sin against the vow is not declared as a circumstance of the sin of lust, I respond that by objecting in this way one insists too much, as it seems, on the letter of the law.

c) Circumstances about which the confessor asks, so that he may judge better concerning the disposition and obligations of the penitent, and which especially regard habit, relapse, and proximate occasions. Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 58: "We are not bound, when the confessor asks, to confess the habit of some sin."⁴

d) Accidentally, the circumstances must be declared on which a censure or reservation of sin depends.

Question. Whether a circumstance which notably aggravates a grave sin in the same species must be declared. I said notably, because no one teaches that a lightly aggravating circumstance must be manifested.

Response. Some affirm simply; others affirm as regards the circumstance "what," or of the object, or which regards the quantity of the thing, as in excessive theft, in incest in a very near degree. Others deny absolutely; with St. Alphonsus (VI, 468) we hold this opinion as sufficiently probable. For: 1. the Council of Trent,⁵ as also canon 901, speaks only of circumstances changing the species, so that a further obligation seems at least practically to be excluded; 2. a further obligation would impose a nearly intolerable burden and would be a source of scruples and difficulties. St. Antoninus,⁶ St. Bonaventure,⁷ St. Thomas, as it seems (4, distinction 16, question 3, article 2, solution 5; opusculum 12 to the reader of Besancon), and all more recent authors also adhere to the more benign opinion.

Corollary. Let the confessor generally not inquire into aggravating circumstances, but let him permit the faithful, for the tranquility of conscience, to manifest them. I said generally; for: 1. as regards sins against chastity, not only should he not inquire into circumstances not to be exposed, but generally he should also advise penitents not to expose anything besides that which must be exposed; 2. as regards sins of injustice, he should for the most part inquire into the gravity of the thing taken or of the damage inflicted, both because the faithful often do not know what matter is grave, and so that he can judge about the obligation of restoring and can teach the faithful about it.

4. External act, whether committed, as fornication, or omitted, as omission of Mass. Moreover, an external act which completes the internal act in the character of sin must be declared; for it comes under the name of sin and in reality is contrary to the law. But of itself an external act which is merely the manifestation of a sin that is properly internal, for example of heresy, need not be declared. Except if it introduces a new species, for example of scandal, or if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

5. Effect. The discussion concerns grave effects which were foreseen in the cause and either intended or permitted without sufficient reason. Effects of this kind can be, for example, blasphemies uttered in drunkenness, pollution, the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison, etc. Now:

a) The effect must be declared: 1. if the confessor asks about it so that he may judge better concerning the obligation of the penitent; 2. accidentally, if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it. Otherwise:

b) The effect need not be declared if the evil will was sincerely retracted before the event; for when that has been retracted, there is no source from which true morality can accrue to the effect, so that it cannot come under the name of sin (tom. I, n. 10). If the evil will has not been retracted, it is disputed. Moreover, it seems it must be said thus: the effect must be declared which is the complement or consummation of the internal sin, or the external execution, as foreseen blasphemies uttered in drunkenness. The reason is that an effect of this kind, as an act infected by the malice of the will (t. I, n. 60), comes under the name of sin (St. Alphonsus, IV, 149; V, 10). Otherwise it must be said of an effect which cannot be called the consummation or external execution of the internal sin, as the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison.

Question 1. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a sin not yet confessed as confessed.

Response. It seems this must be wholly denied, because by declaring necessary matter as free, he does not subject it to the judgment of the confessor, but only to repeated absolution, or at least deceives the confessor as regards the obligation of judging the sin; and that deception is grave. Namely, necessary matter must be subjected to the judgment of the confessor and judged by him, because judgment concerning it has not yet taken place; free matter is only subjected again to absolution, although it is licit to subject it to judgment again.

Question 2. Whether one satisfies integrity who, with the confessor aware, for example in a general confession, omits to distinguish between sins confessed and not confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to subject sins already confessed together with those not yet confessed again to the judgment of the confessor, and not only to absolution, as happens if the whole confession is made concerning free matter. In the case, however, the confessor must judge concerning each sin, and therefore also investigate the species and number of old sins, namely lest some sin which has not yet been judged be left unjudged.

Question 3. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a confessed sin as not yet confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to submit free matter again to the judgment of the confessor. Nevertheless he would commit a lie and a light sacrilege, and so would sin venially (n. 324).

Question 4. Whether one satisfies integrity who falsely declares the time of the committed sin, for instance by declaring a sin recently committed as committed long ago.

Response. Some deny this, because an act recently posited is not an act posited long ago, so that in the case the act posited is not declared. But it seems this must be affirmed, provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed. The reason is that the act is declared primarily as posited, so that it is undeservedly said that the act posited is not declared. I said "provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed"; this he would do if he accused himself of a sin not yet confessed in this way: "Besides, I accuse myself of this or that sin of my past life." Besides, a penitent rightly questioned about the time is bound to open the truth.

Corollary. The penitent has satisfied the precept of integrity only when he has exposed his sins in such a way that he can prudently judge that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things to be exposed. Hence: 1. one who notices that certain grave matters were either not heard by the confessor or were wrongly understood is bound to supplement; 2. a fortiori he is bound to this, indeed he confesses sacrilegiously, who deliberately chooses a somewhat deaf confessor lest the things to be exposed be duly perceived. On the other hand, however, the penitent can presume that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things exposed, until the contrary is established.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² Session 14, chapter 5.

³ Session 14, chapter 5.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1208.

⁵ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

⁶ Summa Theologica, part 3, title 14, chapter 19, § 7.

⁷ 4, distinction 17, part 3, article, question 3.

XI. Right intention; concerning this it suffices to have observed these things:

1. A merely natural intention, that is, one resting on a natural motive alone, does not suffice, so that someone can be excluded for that cause.

2. An intention at least predominantly or equally supernatural suffices to this extent, that one approaching with an intention of this kind cannot be kept away.

The Sources of Morality.—The sources from which the morality of an act is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have a relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals. These sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its essence (e.g., God is the object of charity); (b) the circumstances of the act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a circumstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the agent, which is the chief circumstance (e.g., to please God, as the purpose of a work of charity).

The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally tends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms is directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor (end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given it by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the agent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent).

The circumstances are all those conditions, different from the object, that affect the morality of the act. The chief moral circumstances are: (a) the time (i.e., the duration, the character of the day, as a holyday, fast-day, etc.); (b) the place (i.e., in public or in private, in church or elsewhere, etc.); (c) the manner (i.e., the advertence or inadvertence, the cruelty, etc.); (d) the quantity or quality of the thing done (e.g., that an alms is large or small, that the person who is helped is more or less deserving, etc.); (e) the purpose of the agent (e.g., that an alms is given to honor God); (f) the quality or condition of the agent (e.g., that the giver of an alms is poor himself); (g) the means used (e.g., that a benefactor’s own money is used against himself).

With reference to their influence on the moral character of acts, circumstances are divided as follows: (a) circumstances that change the kind of morality, by making what was good to be bad, what was indifferent to be good or bad, what was venial to be mortal, what belonged to one class of mortal sins to take on another character, etc.; (b) circumstances that change the degree of morality, by making a good act more or less good, or by making a bad act more or less bad.

The purpose or end of an action is the reason which induces the agent to act. It is the chief circumstance of an act, and hence is treated as a separate source of morality.

The end or purpose is twofold. (a) It is the total end when it alone is intended, so that the action is done with no other aim in mind. Thus, if one helps the poor only to practise charity, the total motive is charity. (b) The end is partial when it is intended along with another motive of equal or unequal force. Thus, if a person helps the poor in order to relieve them and also to benefit temporarily by his charity, the assistance of others is only a partial motive of his act; and if he would not give alms except in view of the personal advantage he expects, charity becomes the secondary motive.

Bad Acts.-An act is called entirely evil when all its elements—its object, circumstances and purpose-are contrary to the moral norms. Thus, to steal, on a large scale, in order to drive the victim to desperation is an act that is entirely wrong. The wickedness of the circumstance and of the motive increases the wickedness of the object of the act.

An act is likewise called entirely bad, when one or more of its elements are of themselves good or indifferent, but when there is an element which is evil and which neutralizes or transforms the good. This happens in various ways:

(a) when the object is evil, and the purpose is good, as when one steals in order to pay one’s debts. The good end is wished only as obtainable through a wicked means, and thus ceases to be good;

(b) when the object is good or indifferent, and the total purpose is evil, as when one talks or prays with no other motive than to annoy another person. The good is willed, not as good, but only as a means to evil;

(c) when the object is good or indifferent, and a partial but ulterior purpose is evil. For example, if a person extinguishes a fire in order to save a neighbor’s house and thus be enabled to rob him; if a person takes physical exercises to develop his strength so as to be enabled to bully a neighbor. The good act and the immediate end in these cases are intended not for the sake of their goodness, but as instruments to the accomplishment of the evil ulterior end;

(d) when the object is good or indifferent, and an evil circumstance is intended, not as a circumstance, but as forming a unit with the object and as affecting the substance of the act—for example, when a person intends prayer precisely as distracted, thus converting prayer into a sin. The good object is willed in such cases, not as good, but as vitiated by an evil circumstance.

Although an act is totally evil when the good in it is absorbed by the evil, the presence of what is good in itself can diminish, though it cannot take away, the evil. Thus, to lie in order to help a neighbor is totally evil; yet, it is not as great an evil as to lie to hurt that neighbor.

What are the sources of morality? - As has already been said, the morality of human acts, and their moral goodness or malice, is from a bearing toward the ultimate end of human life and law, from suitability or unsuitability with that same end and law. Now this bearing, this suitability or unsuitability, in a human act which is completed by an exterior act, is derived from the exterior act and from the end of the will, as was indicated in n. 71. But a human act is not always perfected by an exterior act, but is often contained in a merely internal act.

Hence generally the aforesaid bearing toward the end can arise from a threefold head, namely from the end of the same act, from its object, and from the circumstances, which are also brought back to the object. For this reason it is commonly said that the human act takes its moral goodness or malice from this threefold head; namely particular, specific, and individual goodness or malice. For not all good acts are in the same species, nor likewise are all evil acts in the same species. Moreover, the object, the circumstances, and the end can have an order and a diverse order to man's ultimate end and to law. But in this order of human acts to the ultimate end and law, morality consists. Here the question concerns only the morality of human acts, and not their supernaturality and merit before God. Hence for their goodness, besides a good object, end, and circumstances, neither the motive of faith nor charity and grace is required. E. M. 6.

What is an end, and how manyfold is it? - By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such or such an act, as the reason on account of which he acts. This is that end which is called the end of the one acting, and it is an end extrinsic to the act. "It must be said," says S. Th. 2. D. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, "that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends." But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the intrinsic end itself of the action which he does, then the end of the one acting coincides with the end of the work, as appears in one who wishes to steal in order to steal, that is, in order to become rich from another's goods. The intrinsic end of the work cannot be wholly excluded by the one acting if he knows the nature of the work, for that end is intrinsic to the work. And thus if someone blasphemes the divine Name, he cannot exclude the injury inflicted on God. Hence what the uneducated say is of no force, namely that they blasphemed God not to inflict injury on God and to sin, but for mere relief; that they fornicated not in order to sin, but to experience natural pleasure. Yet sometimes the one acting can by his intention exclude the very moral exterior action, when it depends on this, for example, if someone goes to church not to hear Mass, but so that he can commit theft.

The end of the one acting can be considered in two ways: 1. with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2. with respect to the act itself which is commanded as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed the chief object, since the end is that which moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus it is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, in order to commit adultery, chiefly wills adultery; this he intends and efficaciously procures. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for that reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has the substantial malice proper to itself from its proper object, that is, from taking another's property against the owner's will; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one acting to such or such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the choice of the one acting.

Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end of the work itself, which gives species to the act, but some joined end; just as that the brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3, q. 18. a. 6 ad 2. The intrinsic end is always the proximate end, as is clear; but the extrinsic end can be proximate and remote and ultimate. The proximate is what is immediately intended, the remote what is intended mediately, the ultimate that in which one rests.

Is there one sole end of a human action? - "The same act numerically, according as it proceeds once from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 3. According as it proceeds once from the agent: for there can be several ends of the act according as it is continued and repeated; for example, to take another's property so that someone may grow rich from another's; to retain another's property, or to take it again, so that it may be preserved for the owner. To one proximate end, that is, of the act or work itself. Cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 4 ad 2. From which it has species: for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work, of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work, from which there is, as it were, the substantial species of the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage in order to celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the celebration of Mass itself intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of the celebration itself, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance, not giving species to the act, namely the first species, or substantial species of the act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, a. 7 ad 1.

Therefore it is possible "that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Just as this very thing, to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger (either by the same person in diverse acts, or by diverse persons). And from this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice. But moral ends are accidental to a natural thing; and conversely the notion of a natural end is accidental to the moral; and therefore nothing prevents acts which are the same according to the species of nature from being diverse according to the species of morals, and conversely." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 3.

The end, whether proximate or remote, of the one acting, to which the act of the will is ordered, can itself give a moral species to the act. And if it is the ultimate end in some series, it is that which most especially gives species to the act, because it is prior in intention, and all other ends depend upon it, since all those others are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery in order to steal, and steals in order to commit homicide, is rather a homicide than an adulterer and a thief: because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. "When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. The end, whether proximate or remote, of the one acting can be multiple, and indeed primary; for example, if someone goes to the house of an enemy in order to kill him and at the same time steal his goods, and is determined to go even though he can accomplish only one or the other in act. Primary is that which moves and determines to the act. It is therefore distinguished from the secondary, which only impels to the act and by itself alone does not suffice to move efficaciously to acting.

Does a human action take goodness and species from the end; and does this differ from the goodness and species which is taken from the object? - R. To the 1st: "The end is the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; hence also the moral act has species especially from the end." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, q. 1. a. 2. 3; Matt. 6:1. 2. 22.

To the 2nd: "The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, as regards the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as it does in acts of the other powers; unless perhaps accidentally according as the end depends on the end and the will on the will"; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1, namely when several ends per se subordinated and willed are present together, as when someone wills curative medicine for the sake of entering military service, for the sake of victory: the formal goodness of the object, say, to be healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, say, of military service; and when the will of one end, say adultery, depends on the will of another end, say theft, as when someone wills to commit adultery in order to steal, the malice also of the object, say adultery, differs from the malice of the end, say theft. But both are accidental; for it is accidental to the end that it be subordinated to another, and it is also accidental to the will that it depend on another, otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan on this place.

Moreover, a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. And each of these has its own proper object. "But the end is properly the object of the will. That about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will is related as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments; nor do exterior acts have the notion of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Hence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking per se, more an adulterer than a thief." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. For adultery is first intended and more voluntary than theft, which is chosen only as a means to it. Yet the primary species of the work is theft rather than adultery, for that is taken from the object. And thus also he who gives alms in order to satisfy God for his sins is rather penitent and just than merciful; but that action of distributing alms is rather a work of mercy than of penance and justice. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; E. M.

Can the intention of an extrinsic end intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Negatively. The reason is: 1. Because the intrinsic nature of things cannot be changed. 2. Because the intention of the one acting adds nothing to the work; indeed it does not even touch it, since it is wholly extrinsic to it. - Therefore our good intention cannot render an evil work good, nor can our evil intention render evil what is good, nor intrinsically transfer what is evil into another species of malice.

But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one acting can confer moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference, insofar as it is a human work; and in morals this determination is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the accused cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust damaging, nevertheless the intention of taking another's property determines the very taking, according as someone takes another's property in order to preserve it for its owner, or in order to take it for himself and steal. - L. 1. 3. n. 584. 636.

Is an act good if it has a twofold end, one good, the other evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the evil end relates itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or accedes to an act already preexisting, or even if it relates itself merely concomitantly, that is, contributes nothing to the being of the act itself, but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which the act itself is done, but is only the reason of another act, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its own influence even without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example, if almsgiving were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency in the esteem to be had thereby among men. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7.

R. Negatively, if the evil end relates itself truly causatively, and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the notion of evil, which is to will evil. "For the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the notion of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good." S. Th. l. c. ad 3. Except unless the end is only lightly evil, and is not the primary end, and not even inadequately the end moving and determining. The reason is that then the only lightly evil and secondary end, merely impelling, does not influence the substantial being itself of the act, but the extrinsic accidental being of the act; and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a light ostentation has extrinsically crept into that act and truly influenced it, so that someone gave it more promptly and easily, in such a way that there is a multiple act in the genus of morals, although one in the genus of nature. This, as is clear, falls back into the preceding case. Nevertheless there are not lacking those who hold that one and the same act can be at once substantially good and lightly evil. Yet this appears difficult; for then there could be an act not only morally good as to its substance, but even supernatural, which nevertheless would be lightly evil and displeasing to God. Cf. 73. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; Suarez d. 8. s. 1. n. 14 seq.

Does he sin who acts for the sake of delight? - R. Affirmatively, if he acts for the sake of delight alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking per se, does not exceed venial sin. Negatively, if he simply acts for the sake of delight. The reason of the first is that delight is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful to human life. Therefore delight is not the end of action, "but a means for exercising the action more constantly, more easily, better." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. Confirmed from prop. 8, condemned by Innoc. IX. The reason of the second is that since delight is not evil of itself, but good, unless someone constitutes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is no grave disorder in human action. The reason of the third is that delight is not evil of itself, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by delight to operating. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 26. n. 6. 7. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing about a further honorable end, is moved by delight to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example, to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all.

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1; E. M. Although he expressly thinks nothing about a further honorable end, for example, about the preservation of his own life by eating and drinking. For to act honorably it suffices that someone apprehend the act as licit, or, what is the same, that he not apprehend it as illicit. For by willing an act consonant with reason he implicitly wills all those things on account of which that act is suitable to reason, although he does not expressly think about them, indeed even if he is ignorant of them.

What is understood by object? - By the object of a human act is not understood here whatever is proposed to the will; for in this way both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, it is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and per se wills. The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. About the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. And thus, for example, concerning the same wife there can be an honorable conjugal act and a shameful act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it stands under the rule of morals, or under law commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another's property precisely insofar as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner's will. Hence A. D. says 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: "it must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will." S. Th. q. 18. a. 5, S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.

Do human acts take moral goodness or malice from the object? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. For the object is said to be that which we will. That which we will; not, to whom we will. Therefore as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. "The good and evil of an action," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, "as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing that seems to pertain to fullness of being is that which gives species to a thing. But just as a natural thing has species from its form, so an action has species from its object, as also motion from its term.

And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a suitable object. Hence it is also called by some good from the genus, for example, to use one's own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if the thing generated does not attain the specific form, for example, if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another's property. And it is called evil from the genus, the genus being taken for the species, in that way of speaking by which we call the whole human species the human genus." Hos. 9:10; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

Is an act good if the object is good, but the end evil? - R. Negatively. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the notion of evil, and therefore according as it is willed by him it is evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Hence S. Alph. 1. 5. n. 38 says: "if the object is good, but the end of the one acting is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness." Except unless the end is lightly evil, not chief and moving to acting, but secondary and impelling, for example, if someone preaches the word of God and is also impelled by vainglory. For there is a certain light disorder, which does not corrupt the substance of the action from its object and end, but is joined extrinsically by another act. Cf. 81. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6, 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4; Suarez tr. 3. d. 6. s. 1. 2, d. 8. s. 1. n. 13.

Is an act good if the object is evil, but the end good? - R. Negatively. The Apostle condemns those saying: let us do evil things, that good things may come. Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the very willed object, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from really willing evil. Since the substance of the act is from the object, if this is evil, it is impossible for it to be made honorable from a good end, or even from good circumstances. - S. Aug. l. Contra mendac. n. 18; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 8. s. 1. n. 20 seq.

What is understood by circumstances? - By the circumstances of a human act are understood all those aspects which are accessory to the willed object, and, as it were, accidental to the substance of the act, and which are willed only concomitantly or consequently. "The name of circumstance," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 1, "is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local matters something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, yet pertains to the thing itself, is called its accident. Hence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents."

As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of the human act, morally affecting it in moral being, already constituted from the object. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. Indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of an act that someone, for example, struck another with the right hand or the left, or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter insofar as they offend God more gravely. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2; Suarez tr. 2. d. 5.

Do human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances? - R. Affirmatively. For since they tend not toward an abstract object, but toward a concrete one, or one determined by its individuating circumstances, just as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and they put on various accidental qualities from them, just as man has the notion of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And certainly, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3. 9, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

You will resolve: 1. A human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, whether within the same species, or even of diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing in order to give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft; from the circumstance of the sacred thing, sacrilege; from the end, fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species.

2. The intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is moved first and per se, or directly, to the act. Hence, although for a human act to be good simply it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances, from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as love of God. Objective circumstances are mentioned, or those on the part of the object, for circumstances on the part of the act itself are always at least in some way found, which confer upon it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in an act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice, which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it.

3. In order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice upon an act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act; because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice upon a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this kind affect the object itself and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as though naked, but as though clothed with its circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance who, for the one acting can regard himself as the object of his own will, and will the dignity or condition of his person to be applied to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting, etc., act itself is voluntary. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 138, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6. 7; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 5, d. 6. s. 3.

Can a circumstance intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself, regarded in the concrete, and by no means extrinsic, as the end of the one acting is with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can change the external work itself. It can change it. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at the time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Hence it is also enough to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic change to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from the proper intrinsic nature belonging to it, or in such a species by reason of its proper object, becomes by its nature determined as to malice or goodness, evil, good, or in another species. For a circumstance, since it is something accessory to the object, if the object by reason of itself is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, remains indifferent and good and evil and in such a species under that respect, although it can also intrinsically become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species by reason of a circumstance. Thus, for example, eating is of itself an indifferent action, but eating on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this evil circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action, but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice, but to steal a sacred thing is an evil action also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.

How are the various circumstances distinguished? - Certain circumstances are those which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, increasing or diminishing moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing, and these can be either simply such, or notably, or greatly aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this kind are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act, which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Hence they increase or diminish the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of the act, the long or short delay of the act, does not according to itself have moral goodness or malice, but only through order to the good or evil act, of which consequently it constitutes only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not according to itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example, this, that it belongs to another, which according to itself is opposed to reason. Hence to take another's property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 11.

But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called species-changing. Circumstances of this kind are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another's property has its species from the notion of what belongs to another, for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if on top of this place or time is considered, these will have the nature of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or concerning time and other things of this sort, it happens that a condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, because reason orders that injury is not to be done in a sacred place. Hence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance to the order of reason. And therefore place, which was previously considered as a simple circumstance, is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason. Hence S. Th. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2: "a circumstance," he says, "remaining in the notion of a circumstance, since it has the notion of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species."

Circumstances which change a sin only from venial into mortal, under one respect, are only aggravating; and they are called aggravating infinitely: namely if mere opposition to such a virtue is considered, as may be seen in light and grave theft; for both are opposed to the same virtue of justice. Under another respect, they are species-changing, namely if opposition and repugnance with the general rule of morals is considered, namely with the law and the end to be attained. Circumstances which confer a new species upon an act already constituted in some moral species are properly species-adding. Thus, if someone bound by a vow sins against chastity, to the malice of the sin against chastity is added another malice against religion. But if the malice of the new species is not grave but light, then that circumstance is either held as simply aggravating, or as indeed adding a species, but with the addition, lightly: for then the whole specific substance of the act still remains intact, nor, morally speaking, does any substantial change of the act accede. Thus as regards a merely internal sin against chastity committed in a church, if the malice of sacrilege is present in it, it is only light, and therefore it is not a circumstance strictly and properly adding a species, but aggravating. But circumstances which first render an act simply good or evil are properly species-conferring or species-changing, for example, if someone undertakes a journey from the end of exercising a work of charity, that journey, indifferent of itself, first passes into an act of virtue; if someone gives alms only from vainglory, that act, although good in itself, then becomes evil. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4.

Is an act good if the circumstance is evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals. The reason is that then a bad circumstance of this kind is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, sinning gravely by adhering to a shameful thought, and taking a sacrilegious communion, he places an evil act. - R. Negatively, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will, which embraces all these things together, namely the object and the circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good from every side, it will be evil.

Hence, if there is a circumstance which is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, which the will embraces concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether extrinsic and accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. And thus an affection toward venial sin in Communion does not corrupt Communion in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful. But if the lightly evil circumstance is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil. Therefore the action of a religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior, or from another's property, is evil, although the unlawfulness by reason of the vow or precept is only light. Suarez tr. 3. d. 8. s. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. art. 1.

How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? - Seven, and they are: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. "The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as something existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. But this can happen in three ways. In one way insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place; or after the manner of quality of the act, as the manner of acting. On the part of the effect it is when what someone has done is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; on the part of the material cause or object, about what is taken (which is comprehended under what); on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental agent cause, by what aids is taken." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.

How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? - They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they accidentally affect it. Otherwise they would no longer have the notion of circumstances. - Therefore:

1. Who does not signify the substance of the one acting, but his quality or condition, for example, that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. To this circumstance Lugo, De Poenit. d. 16. n. 200, brings back the habit of sin; for through it is explained how someone is disposed to sin more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a union, office bringing a special obligation, vow, or state; as if a priest fornicates, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty only of blasphemy, just as another blaspheming. Malach. 2:1. 8; C. Trid. sess. 22. C. 1 de R.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 45. a. 4, q. 110. a. 4 ad 5; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. s. 4.

2. What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity, for example in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing belongs to another, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with damage thereby to a poor person, to wards, to girls to be married, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be species-changing. But what, that is, the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species. To this circumstance can be brought back how often, or the multiplication of acts. Nevertheless S. Th. did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are around the same act. But the number of operations does not stand around one and the same operation. For a second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely; nor the third of the second, and so on. From this it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole many times, but he must explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he must express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. Lugo l. c. s. 4. § 7. s. 5. 6. 9.

3. Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that every act of man happens somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example, that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of a sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only those into the species of grave sacrilege which are directly opposed to the sanctity of the place, or to the immunity annexed to it, such as effusions of blood or of human seed, which impede the divine worship to be exhibited there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals, which are contrary to immunity. Lugo l. c. s. 10.

4. By what aids signifies accidental instruments, or means, which the one acting used, for example, if someone used sacred vessels for poisoning, employed the aid of the devil, induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to relate to sin merely materially, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. Lugo l. c. n. 475. 476.

5. Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end, and that of the one acting, as if someone steals in order to get himself drunk. Why can manifestly give another species to an act. Lugo l. c. n. 477 seq.

6. How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example, intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, for example, that you killed by poison, by the sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although ordinarily aggravating or diminishing sin, can sometimes also give species. - Lugo l. c. n. 497 seq.; Laym. l. 3. de Iust. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 4. n. 1; Tambur. Meth. Confess. l. 2. c. 6. n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 3 ad 1, a. 4.

7. When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example, on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time aggravates sin, but does not add the grave species of sacrilege, unless it is done in contempt of the sacred time. Lugo l. c. n. 515 seq.; Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; L. 1. 6. n. 923; S. Th. 4. D. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4. Sol. 2.

The sources of morality are named those principles which give to human acts species, or a modification of species, in the genus of morals.

Three sources of morality are numbered, namely 1. the object of the act; 2. its circumstances; 3. the end of the agent. These three are altogether required for a good act; if even one is evil, the act will become evil. Hence the well-known axiom: Good from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever.

26. • The object is that about which the moral act is concerned, and in which the will of the agent is proximately and per se terminated.

The object is good, or evil, or indifferent, according as it agrees or does not agree with reason, law, or right order, or holds itself apart from law or right order. Likewise it can be intrinsically good or evil, that is, by reason of itself from the requirement of right order; or not intrinsically, but only by reason of a positive precept.

I say: From the object morally considered is taken the first and essential morality of a human act; for the morality which the object gives to an action is conceived before every other which may come either from the end or from the circumstances.

The morality which is taken from the object is called morality, or objective goodness or malice. - If the object is in itself indifferent, it will receive its morality from the end or from the circumstances.

Intrinsically evil objects, however, are of a threefold class, namely 1. Some are such absolutely, and independently of every circumstance, because of themselves they involve repugnance with right order absolutely necessary, as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. - 2. Others are intrinsically evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of an adjunct or of some condition which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: such are the taking away of another's thing, injury to body or reputation, and similar things which sometimes become lawful. - 3. Finally, others are evil only by reason of danger which they ordinarily have joined to them, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, a reasonable cause being given and the danger being removed, can become lawful.

27. • Circumstances are accidental determinations of an act, without which it could exist as to substance, and which nevertheless in some way touch upon its morality. Hence circumstances are not the object of the act, because they are touched upon by the will only secondarily.

Seven classes of circumstances are numbered, expressed in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when?

Namely: Who, or what sort is the agent, married, cleric, etc.? - what, or what is the accidental quality or quantity of the object? - where, or in what place, whether sacred or profane? etc. - by what aids, that is, what means, instruments, etc., did the agent use? - why, or from what end, namely extrinsic? - how, namely whether maliciously, or in good faith, whether in an intense or remiss manner, whether advertently or not? - when, that is, at what or how much time?

I say: A human act takes true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances determine the act as moral, namely as having a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order; indeed sometimes circumstances alone introduce agreement or disagreement of this kind into an act, as happens in acts indifferent from the object.

Hence 1. some circumstances are those which pertain to the morality of the act; - 2. others are those which contribute nothing to it, and therefore must be held wholly indifferent; - 3. others are those which leave the object in the same moral species, and others which change the species itself, or add a new species. Of the former, some aggravate the malice, but others lessen it, and do this gravely or lightly ¹.

¹ If circumstances so lessen or aggravate sin that from mortal it becomes venial, or vice versa, then they are said to transfer the act into another theological species.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether a lightly evil circumstance always corrupts the whole good act?

I answer. No. For the substance of the good act can remain unharmed notwithstanding a circumstance of this kind; whence that act is infected only in part. Thus, for example, the agent does not lose the whole merit of a good work, nor its principal part, although he may have given consent to some incident temptation of vainglory. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - See what is to be said below concerning the end, no. 30.

28. • An end in general is that for the sake of which something is done.

It is twofold, namely the end of the work, that is, the end intrinsic to the work itself and toward which the work tends per se; and the end of the worker, that is, extrinsic to the work, and toward which the agent directs his intention at will, or which the agent has set before himself ¹. We must speak only about this latter end, since it alone is properly called the end.

¹ These two ends sometimes fall into the same thing, sometimes one is added to the other, sometimes, with the intrinsic end of the work set aside, one alone directs the act extrinsically.

Now that end is 1. intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it; - 2. positively ultimate, or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended or not intended with the exclusion of another end; - 3. primary or secondary, according as it is the totally motive cause of the act, or only partially impulsive. Again the ultimate end can be explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved expressly or only virtually by an end of this kind.

I say 1. A human act takes true morality from the end. The reason is that the end can express an order of conformity and deformity to right reason. Thus it is conformable to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give it unto the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say 2. He sins who acts for the sake of delight alone ². The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight is on account of operation, and not vice versa: namely, delight is like salt and a certain condiment, which serves to entice to actions of life necessary or useful. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, appended delights for the sake of operations. I-II, q. 4, art. 2.

² It is one thing to act for the sake of delight, another to act for the sake of delight alone. This latter positively excludes a further end of the work; but this exclusion of an end is inordinate, and indeed not only in desiring delight, but also in an act of any virtue whatever; because even an act of virtue, if it is exercised in such a way, or so stopped in itself, that the higher or ultimate end is positively excluded, by that very fact will already become vicious.

But that first thing involves no inordination of this kind. For first, delight, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, ch. 26, no. 6), is good and to be desired if it follows a good operation; and it is proper to the virtue of temperance to moderate the use of delightful things, and indeed to draw back from those things which are against reason, but not from those which are convenient according to reason (see St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, art. 1, ad 1). But then the further end is not excluded, except perhaps negatively only. But a negative exclusion of the end does not vitiate the act; for it is not necessary for the honesty of an action to think about the further end, or even about the intrinsic end of the work. Therefore, that someone may honestly take delight from play, or food, or rest, it is in no way necessary that he think about the end, whether intrinsic or further, of play, or food, or rest; but it is sufficient that he apprehend the action as consonant with right reason, or also that he find nothing in it contrary to the order of reason; since, as St. Thomas has it (Supplement, q. 49, art. 4), from the same thing some act has that it is not evil in the genus of morals, and that it is good, because no act is indifferent.

From this the reason plainly comes forth why propositions VIII and IX concerning the work of marriage or the act of eating on account of pleasure alone were deservedly proscribed by Innocent XI. For they labor under an intrinsic vice on account of the predicate alone, which positively excludes any other ends, unto which actions of this kind are ordered. For otherwise, that someone is enticed and moved to the work by an appetite for delight, just as also to labor by hope of reward or wages, is consonant with the order of nature, as St. Thomas has it in the cited place. Compare the Salmanticenses (On Marriage, ch. 3, no. 33), Viva (On Proposition VIII of Innocent XI, no. 6), Duarte (Exposition of Condemned Propositions, no. 162), Roncaglia (On Marriage, q. II, ch. 1, q. 2, resp. 2), Pontius (On Marriage, book X, ch. 8, no. 6), Azor (part I, book 2, ch. 5, q. 4), etc.

It is confirmed from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: To eat and drink unto satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts. - Nevertheless this disorder is not grave per se, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end ³ is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless there is question of those of whom the Apostle says, Phil. 3. 19: Whose God is their belly.

³ The Author understands the ultimate end of human life, not the intrinsic end of those works about which the discussion is held. Moreover, that ultimate end is excluded through any grave sin, which the Author deservedly supposes in those whose God, as the Apostle says, is the belly.

29. You Will Resolve. - 1. Every election of an evil means is evil, but not conversely is every election of a good means good. Thus no one is praised because he abstains from drink out of avarice; but he must be held guilty who steals money in order to give alms.

2. He who chooses an honest means for an honest end posits an act of twofold honesty ⁴, if each honesty is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

⁴ ** St. Alphonsus (On Human Acts, no. XXXVIII), after Collet (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 2, sect. 2, conclusion 3), writes that this doctrine is common among theologians, with Vasquez alone excepted. But this exception of Vasquez is a mere hallucination of Collet, who here did not have accurately before his eyes the distinctions and conclusions of the schools. Namely, so that in the case there be a twofold goodness of the act, it is necessary that the means be loved not only because it is useful for the end, but also because it is good in itself. To this pertain those words of Becanus (On Human Acts, ch. 4, q. 3, no. 6): When the object of election, which is good per se, is not loved in any way on account of itself, but only on account of the end, then the goodness of the object does nothing to the matter. But when it is loved both on account of itself, insofar as it is good per se, and on account of the end, insofar as it is useful for obtaining that end, then the goodness of the object remains with the goodness of the end. For this reason the Author adds that phrase: If each honesty is intended. And to this Vasquez pertains (On I-II, disp. 51, ch. 3, no. 13; which place Collet alleges), where he says: When someone choosing a work of one virtue from the intention of the end of another virtue is then not allured by the goodness of the virtue of which that matter is, and chooses that work only as useful for the end, it is effected that that election has only the goodness of the end.

But to avoid Collet's hallucinations, even where a twofold honesty or goodness in reality comes to the act, the doctrine of the school must be inspected, which Suarez expresses thus (On I-II, treatise 3, disp. 6, sect. 2, no. 2): It can happen that an honest object is not indeed willed on account of its own honesty, yet its honesty is willed in itself and per se on account of another end.....; for one good can be useful for another not only by reason of its matter, but also by reason of its honesty; and then indeed the honesty of one object or act can be loved in itself, although it is not loved precisely on account of itself, but on account of another end. And soon the same Suarez says (ibid., no. 3): Concerning an act of this kind almost all also agree that it has essential and first goodness from the end, but not from the material object nor from its honesty. Thus St. Thomas can be taken (3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 138), where he signifies that abstinence done from vow has, besides the goodness of temperance, also the goodness of religion: indeed that it is more praiseworthy from the vow than from abstinence.

From these things someone could conclude with Collet that according to Suarez a twofold goodness is denied in an act of temperance. But theologians do not so speak, although they call one goodness essential, the other accidental. Thus also Vasquez (cited disp. 51, ch. 2): If however the means has from itself proper goodness... even if the election had proper goodness from the means, nevertheless it would take also the species of another goodness from the end, so that that goodness would be primary and substantial, insofar as it is election, but that which it would have from the means according to itself would be secondary to it and as it were accidental.

3. He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example, if someone lies to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise conversely, he who employs an honest means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4. He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you undertake a journey in order to show the way to a pilgrim, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you have only the guilt of the end. But in confession it is not necessary to declare the circumstance of means of this kind, as is clear.

30. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act?

I answer 1. A gravely evil end always entirely infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For that act can be good in no part, since the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God.

I answer 2. A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act, if it is the total end, or at least the primary end, of the agent. For if it is total, it encompasses the whole object, and therefore infects the whole, because the agent, by an evil end, wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, as it is willed by him, it is evil. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 7. - This is also clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 6. 23: If thy eye is wicked, thy whole body will be dark. Hence the gifts of Cain, although good in themselves, displeased God as proceeding from an evil end.

But if a twofold end is had, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because that act is still chosen so that it may be an instrument for evil, and therefore it is vitiated substantially.

I answer 3. But if a lightly evil end is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which will be partly good, partly evil. The reason is that that act retains its goodness from the object; but the evil end holds itself only concomitantly, and does not influence the very substance of the action. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - Gerdil, On Human Acts, and others commonly.

31. • YOU WILL ASK 2. Whether all actions, that they may be morally good, ought to be informed by the motive of charity?

I answer. No. For acts elicited from the motive of other virtues are good per se, as are acts of Faith, Hope, etc. This is also clear from the Council of Trent, session 14, ch. 4, where it is declared that attrition is a gift of God and disposes the penitent to justification. Likewise session 6, canon 31, where it is said: If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he works well with a view to eternal recompense, let him be anathema.

YOU WILL ASK 3. Whether all our actions, that they may be honest, ought to be referred to God from a supernatural motive, or one apprehended through Faith?

I answer. No. For otherwise all the works of unbelievers would be sins, which doctrine has been condemned by the Church.

YOU WILL ASK 4. Whether all our actions ought to be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. 31: Do all things unto the glory of God?

I answer. Concerning the obligation, which is drawn from the cited text, of referring actions to God, the obscure and often entangled opinions of certain more recent authors being set aside, the common doctrine of the ancients is altogether to be preferred, which is contained in these headings.

And first indeed, the words of Paul, from the common opinion of the Doctors, pertain to the virtue of charity, and, no otherwise than the precept of charity, can be taken both in a negative and in an affirmative sense.

If they are taken in a negative sense, they signify: Do nothing against God ⁵; and thus, according to the opinion of all, indeed from the very nature of the matter, they contain a precept, namely of not sinning. Nevertheless this precept does not give species to sin, because sins take their species not from a general virtue or law, but from special precepts, for example, not killing, not blaspheming.

⁵ See St. Thomas, 2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7, and St. Bonaventure, 2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

But if the words of Paul are understood in an affirmative sense, the Doctors dissent somewhat among themselves, and they neither explain them in the same way nor attribute the same force to them.

For some, with St. Bonaventure, judged that through those words Paul insinuates that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions subordinated among themselves, be referred to God actually, or by an actual relation. Nevertheless at the same time they contended that Paul there had handed down no precept, but a mere counsel. - See St. Bonaventure, 2, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and ad 6.

But others, more commonly with St. Thomas, teach that a precept is in reality contained in the words of the Apostle. But lest someone be carried from this into absurdities ⁶, it is plainly necessary to retain the integral doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter.

⁶ Notable was the fraud of the Jansenists, that they contended the words of Paul to be preceptive, alleging these things from St. Thomas (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true; but they did not explain the Pauline sentence with St. Thomas, but with St. Bonaventure, where he says (2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1): The Apostle admonishes... that we refer any work of ours to God: and concerning any work dividedly we can do this. From this, however, they concluded that sin is committed as often as any work is not actually referred to God. And since to refer works to God pertains to charity, among other things they inferred this also, that unbelievers and sinners, as being those who do not have charity, sin in every work.

Moreover not a few among the more recent, although they abhor this condemned error, nevertheless while they themselves also mingle the disparate interpretations of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure of the Pauline text into one thing, fall into another inconvenience. For on the one hand they call back the words of Paul with St. Thomas to a precept; but on the other hand they place the reason of this precept in that which St. Bonaventure required merely for the account of merit, namely that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions, be actually referred to God; and thus, while they establish that this actual relation of all works is obligatory, they bring the matter to this, that scarcely anyone can be found who, on account of this omitted relation of works to God, does not daily and everywhere stain himself with manifold guilt, as Gazzaniga in reality concluded (and indeed coherently) (On Human Acts, diss. 2, ch. 4, no. 87); and Collet adds (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 1, sect. 2) that there is not given invincible ignorance which perhaps excuses from this sin. Nor indeed do they sufficiently remedy this inconvenience by so restricting that obligation that it suffices daily, or several times in the day, as Collet says (in the cited place), or at least in the morning, to have referred works to God. For 1. this does not effect that individual actions or individual series of actions subordinated among themselves are actually referred to God according to the mind of St. Bonaventure, and thus that manifold guilt of omissions is absent; 2. since this actual relation is not distinguished from an act of perfect charity, they now infer an obligation hitherto unheard of in the schools, namely of eliciting an act of charity several times in the day or at least once in the morning daily. And from these things it is sufficiently clear that no reason for avoiding these inconveniences is at hand, unless either we deny with St. Bonaventure that a positive precept is contained in the words of Paul, or, if indeed we contend better with St. Thomas that a precept is uttered in them, we take also the explanation of the precept, as it is expounded in the text of the Author, from the same holy Doctor.

**And indeed it were to be wished that St. Alphonsus, who excellently wrote (Treatise on Human Acts, at the beginning): I think one must not depart from the sound doctrine of the Angelic Doctor where it can be had; for with him as guide in theological matters one walks with unoffending foot; it were to be wished, I say, that the holy Doctor in this question also had followed the Angelic Doctor rather than Collet, the continuator of Tournely. For, insisting on his footsteps, he writes (ibid., no. XLIV): Hence for practice we gather: It is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer to God all one's acts, so that thus the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled, at least with the virtual intention of doing all things unto the glory of God. The most manifest sense of these words is, namely, that to fulfill the precept of the Apostle it is necessary that several times in the day, at least in the morning, all actions be actually offered to God, so that thus all daily actions and words may thereafter be referred to the glory of God at least by virtual intention. Whence he adds: For the actual relation of all words or works into an honest good is not required, which would be an unbearable burden, and a thing entangled with six hundred scruples, but the virtual suffices, as we have said.

In the preceding edition of this Compendium, care was taken to soften this opinion of the holy Doctor in some way. But VV., both in St. A. (pages 114, 115) and in V. (pages 127-134), took this as an insult cast upon the holy Doctor. They object against it 1. that the Doctors who stand for the obligation of a daily relation of acts are in no way to be counted among those who demand an actual relation of all actions, and 2. that they in no way affirm that an act of charity must be elicited daily: all of which are beside the matter, because the question here is not what other Doctors have said; and besides they rest on a false supposition, as though the alleged Doctors (if you except Collet) defend the obligation of a daily relation. That would be to the point which VV. then added, namely that St. Alphonsus wished to signify not that to which we are held, but merely what is expedient and congruous, to have wished to signify. But this is very difficult, and too alien from likelihood. For 1. when he says: Hence for practice it is concluded, etc., he surely wishes to draw a consequence from those things which he had set forth, namely that the words of the Apostle contain a precept, not however a mere counsel. Therefore the consequence necessarily regards the thing commanded, not the thing of counsel; otherwise he would have said nothing at all about that which it most interests us to know and which the connection of the discourse demanded, namely to what we are held by force of that precept. 2. Granted, the word it is necessary is sometimes taken for that which is merely useful and congruous. Thus, for example, we say that for leading life in a Christian manner it is necessary that a suitable time be granted to pious meditation, examination of conscience, etc. But not so in the present matter. For here the discussion is expressly about fulfilling a precept, that is, about the obligation which the precept necessarily imposes, and which it is necessary to furnish in order that satisfaction be made to the precept. Therefore the word it is necessary here necessarily signifies the necessity which obligation imposes. Nor is it strange that this word, according to the diverse matter of the question, has a diverse sense. Thus if you say that it is necessary that Mass be heard daily, and the Holy Eucharist be received every eight days or at least every month, this will have been said very well if the discussion is about fostering piety, etc.; but badly if this is about fulfilling the precepts of the Church, which command both that Mass be heard on feast days and that the Holy Eucharist be received at paschal time.

Therefore we shall certainly say that the industrious zeal of VV. for protecting the doctrine of the holy Doctor is commendable. But perhaps zeal of this kind will not be most acceptable to the holy Doctor whenever it departs from the boundaries of truth.

1. Caius, an ingenuous youth, indeed confesses rather often, because he knows that this is very pleasing to his directors. Likewise he is accustomed to hear Mass daily, moved by the example of his companions, lest he seem less devout than they. Moreover, he not rarely distributes among the poor money received from his father, but almost always experiences in himself a desire for vain glory. Hence, after spiritual exercises have been completed, he greatly fears lest his confessions were invalid and sacrilegious, and lest he acquired no merit from his pious works, but, on the contrary, incurred demerit and sin.

Q. 1. Do human actions take their species from the end? 2. Has Caius received the sacrament of penance invalidly, and has he lost all merit of pious works?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 79. To the second: the confessions of Caius were neither sacrilegious nor invalid. For for the validity of confession there is required, and there suffices, sincere sorrow and purpose. But Caius could well have sincere sorrow and purpose, even if he approached confession because he knew that this was pleasing to his directors. Nor indeed, since Caius is an ingenuous youth, can it be supposed that he principally intended this end, or that he confessed without due sorrow and purpose. Therefore the confessions of Caius were neither invalid nor sacrilegious, but substantially good and meritorious, although perhaps he was moved in some way by the impulse of vain glory; because such an impulse does not intrinsically affect the very substance of confession, but is related to it merely concomitantly and extrinsically. Therefore granted that such an impulse was venially evil, confession nevertheless, as having been made from a good intrinsic end, namely of reconciling himself to God and obtaining grace remissive of sins, could well remain morally good and sufficient for validity and for merit. And thus also it remains substantially good and sufficient for validity, although in confession perhaps you lie lightly, or without cause lightly defame your neighbor. For although such a lie and such defamation are morally evil, nevertheless, because they are related accidentally in order to confession, and since venial sins from elsewhere do not obstruct divine grace and reconciliation, they leave confession good in itself, and sufficient for validity and for merit. Hence the same must be said of Masses heard and of alms bestowed. - Elbel 78, 79; G. 33, 34; I. M. 77, 78, 81.

2. Sebastianus, being scrupulous, in order to abstract himself from every creature, resolved to deprive himself of every pleasure not necessary for the sustaining of life. He thought that pleasure not necessary to life could be sought only from the satisfaction of natural inclination, since pleasure is not referred to the glory of God. But in order that he might live wholly for God and seek the glory of God in all things, he resolved actually to offer all his actions to God before he did anything. Hence in a short time it happened that, gravely ill in the head, he died in an asylum of the insane.

Q. 1. Is it licit to act for the sake of pleasure? 2. Must all actions be referred to God? 3. What as to the case?

R. To the first and to the second, cf. I. M. 75, 82. To the third: Sebastianus is deceived, with grave detriment to his body and soul. In order that one may live wholly for God and seek the glory of God in all things, he does not therefore necessarily have to be deprived of every honest pleasure, not altogether necessary for the sustaining of life. Pleasure also, even only useful for restoring the bodily powers by moderate delight and recreation, is honest, and by its own nature is implicitly and mediately ordered also to the ultimate end, or to God. Hence it is altogether licit to act for the sake of pleasure and delight, and to intend it, provided that another honest end, to which by its very nature it is referred, is not excluded, namely that man may act better and may be able to persevere longer in honest operation; by which intermediate end as mediator, it is referred to God himself. Therefore, whenever one does not exclude that honest end, the pleasure or delight sought is virtually referred to God, nor is it necessary that one actually offer it to God, since a virtual offering suffices.

Indeed, honest recreations and amusements have been created by God himself for the use of men. Therefore they are naturally good in themselves and honest. Therefore, as one who intends another honest thing acts honestly, and the action is virtually referred to God without his explicitly and actually offering that action to God, so also someone acts honestly by accepting an honest recreation of mind and an honest amusement, without actually and formally offering it to God. Hence the same must consequently be said of pain and inconvenience, to be avoided and repelled by honest means. Whence it is also clear that, in order that an action be honest and be referred to the glory of God, it is not necessary actually and explicitly to offer it to God. It suffices that one intend an honest action and act honestly. It suffices that each day in the morning one offer to God all his actions to be done during the course of the day. "In this way every act, even one indifferent in species, becomes good and virtuous in the individual." L. tr. De Act. hum. XLIV. - G. 29, 30, 35, 36.

1. Marianna is accustomed to tell slight lies to prevent quarrels, oaths, and blasphemies of her husband, which have the best success in constantly preserving the peace of the family.

2. Monica confesses that she has sometimes spoken badly about her neighbors, because, she says, they are truly evil and do evil to all.

3. Aurelius confesses that he, pressed by grave necessity, stole a grave sum of money. But when the confessor declares to him the obligation of restoring, Aurelius replies: it is impossible, because I have nothing. Indeed, since that necessity perseveres, I still ought to continue in the same theft, and afterwards I shall restore everything.

Q. 1. Do human acts derive morality from the object? 2. What must be thought concerning the various cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 84. To the second: Marianna, speaking in itself, sinned; but only venially, and this as many times as she lied. The reason is that a lie, as intrinsically evil, cannot be rendered honorable by any extrinsic end, however good, unless perhaps it is done from an invincibly erroneous conscience. For evils are not to be done that goods may come, Rom. 3:8. Therefore Marianna must be advised to abstain altogether from lies; and, when grave necessity urges, rather to use some tergiversation and equivocation, since she is not held always to manifest the truth openly. Elbel 74; G. 27. Cf. I. M. 86, 1523 seqq.

Monica, speaking in itself, must furthermore declare whether she spoke badly about her neighbors in a light matter or in a grave matter; and if in a grave matter, how many times this happened, and whether any other damage happened besides damage to reputation. Speaking in itself; for it is otherwise if from the confession itself it is understood that it is a matter of a thing known and public, whence no damaging of reputation has come; just as already seems sufficiently to be drawn from her words, because they are truly evil and do evil to all. - Elbel 11, 102; G. 31.

Aurelius indeed sinned gravely; for grave necessity does not excuse from theft. Therefore neither can he continue in theft. And if in the present he cannot restore, how will he be able to restore an always greater quantity in the future? Whence neither does his excuse avail. But he sufficiently explained his sin; for the various degrees of grave theft do not change the species. L. 1, 6, n. 47; G. 31; I. M. 1313.

1. Henricus confesses thus: 1. I committed carnal sins. 2. I performed gravely immodest acts. 3. I had evil thoughts. 4. I injured the reputation of my neighbor. 5. Besides homicide, I committed all other sins.

2. Paschalis, a priest, confesses thus: I am a priest and once sinned with a woman; omitting that he has care of souls, and that he had previously solicited his own parishioner in confession.

Q. 1. Is the morality of human acts derived from circumstances? 2. Do Henricus and Paschalis confess rightly?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 88. To the second: Henricus by no means confesses rightly. For first, besides the number, he ought to declare the various species of carnal sins, for example whether he sinned by himself alone, or with another person; and if with this person, whether unmarried, or bound in marriage, etc. But, speaking in itself, it is not necessary that he say whether he committed fornication twice, three times, etc., with the same person or with different persons. - Elbel 103; La-Croix l. c. p. 2, n. 1040; I. M. V. 2, n. 708.

In the second case, acts even gravely immodest, unless they are acts consummated, must be declared by their proper number and proper species. For acts of this sort also differ in species, as for example if someone mixes in filthy conversations, or looks upon himself; or touches a woman or himself shamefully, etc. I. M. 307, 310, 783.

In the third case it is also necessary to declare, besides the number of internal acts, the objects of desires or of delights, varying in species. For desires and morose delights take their species from their objects, Elbel 80, 102; and those evil thoughts, voluntary and deliberate, appear from the context of the case. For Henricus does not seem to be a man who is accustomed to resist temptations of this sort.

In the fourth case he ought to explain whether he gravely injured the reputation of his neighbor; and, if gravely, how many times he injured the reputation of his neighbor, and whether any other damage followed thence for the neighbor. But, speaking in itself, he is not held to declare whether he injured the reputation of his neighbor by simple detraction or by calumny. I. M. 1486.

Finally, in the fifth case it is clear that the confession of Henricus is very imperfect; and so he must be directly questioned by the confessor concerning other special sins against the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and against the obligations of his proper state, which Henricus could probably have committed. Cf. Elbel 96.

Nor has Paschalis confessed rightly. For he ought to have explained the circumstance of solicitation in confession, which adds the malice of real sacrilege, and the circumstance of the care of souls, which made the sin specially repugnant to the virtue of justice. Elbel 97, 98. - G. 31, 32.

15. Moreover the end which intention regards is not necessarily the ultimate end, as in fruition, as will be said in its own place. “Intention,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, “regards the end according as it is the term of the motion of the will. But in motion the term can be taken in two ways. In one way, the ultimate term itself, in which one rests, which is the term of the whole motion. In another way, some means which is the principle of one part of the motion, and the end or term of another. As in a motion by which one goes from A into C through B, C is the ultimate term, but B is a term, though not the ultimate. And there can be intention of each. Whence, although it is always of an end, nevertheless it is not necessary that it always be of the ultimate end.... Fruition indeed imports rest, which is in the end, which pertains only to the ultimate end; but intention imports motion into the end, not into rest.”

27. Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? — In an exterior act, a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished. For first, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and from the circumstances by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this sort, which the exterior act has according to itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will. Secondly, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act is subject to the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the character of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found prior in the act of the will, and from it is derived to the exterior act. Likewise, in so far as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will then is compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; whence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act as existing in the acting cause. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore “the goodness of the end from the will redounds into the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

28. Therefore the moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered in the order of intention, as merely willed, as an object, and in the order of execution, insofar as the aforesaid act is commanded by the will, as execution or effect. In the first way, the goodness or malice of the exterior act gives moral goodness or malice to the interior act of the will, as the object specifying it. Therefore the goodness and malice which is in that act objectively is transferred into the act formally, so that the object has nothing objectively which is not in the act formally. Therefore the exterior act as object does not have any goodness or malice distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, since it is the same in both, with this difference, that it is objectively in the exterior act as in the object and motive of the will, and formally in the interior act as in the subject. In the second way, the exterior act has its moral goodness or malice from the act of the will, from which it has that it is voluntary and human. The exterior act, precisely as the execution or effect of the interior act, has no intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but is good or evil extrinsically, only denominatively from the goodness or malice of the interior act. “As from the healthy which is in the animal, healthy is derived to medicine and urine....; in this way from the goodness of the will is derived the goodness of the exterior act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3 ad 3. The reason is manifest, because formal morality is placed in a foreknown and freely willed conformity with the end and law, or with the rule of morals; and this free volition of the will is only in the interior act of the will itself.

29. Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, St. Thomas, q. 20. a. 3. If the human act is thus considered adequately, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in exterior acts only by a merely extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, considered formally, is not found except in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end. “But since the end is the proper object of the will, it is manifest that this character of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and from it is derived into the exterior act.” St. Thomas, q. 20. a. 1. Whence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this sort, which is according to order to the end, depends entirely on the will. St. Thomas, ibid. a. 2. But that “goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; yet it is not other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause.” St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 4 ad 2. It is confirmed: “For however much the exterior act may seem good of itself and conformable to reason, if nevertheless it is commanded by an evil internal act, or by a depraved intention and choice, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore it is a sign that in the account of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. The argument is similar because the exterior act, taken precisely and in itself, does not add formal moral goodness to man, nor does it make him more virtuous; for if we understand someone, thinking that he can perform an exterior act of virtue, to have an efficacious will of exercising such an act, he is right and virtuous, whether he can truly perform it or cannot, because virtue does not depend on a faculty, which can be lacking to us against our will, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite.” Suarez, D. 10, S. 1; Becanus, Tr. 1, c. 6.

30. Hence another question arises: whether the external act in some way adds morality to the internal act. — “First it must be said that the exterior act of itself does not bring an increase of goodness or malice, other things being equal, in the interior act: thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4..... because the exterior act does not have goodness distinct from the interior act, and necessarily follows from it, if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not lessen the goodness of the will.... Secondly, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness; this also is what St. Thomas intends in that a. 4. For when it is in man’s power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he execute the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior act, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that works when it can.... Thirdly, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply. Thus St. Thomas in the place cited above, and it is easily clear. For 1. on account of the exterior act a man often lasts and perseveres more in the interior act, indeed often also multiplies interior acts; and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection and thus contributes to the interior act, in which way vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the affection of satisfaction for the temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is not taken only from goodness, but chiefly from the penality of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its proper punishment and pain. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato or from special privilege, such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar; because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection but also in effect. And in the same way, conversely, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures which are not incurred through the interior act alone.” Suarez, D. 10, S. 2; Becanus, in the cited place. Hence the exterior act does not add goodness or malice to the interior act, but, as it were, extends and consummates it, or rather shows the perfection of the interior act. The matter concerns, as is clear, an interior act efficacious of itself. For if the interior act is inefficacious of itself, as, for example, to will to perform all possible good or all possible evil, one does not contract the same goodness or malice as if he were to carry out every possible good or evil. Cf. Commentary 4, nn. 7, 8.

1. As has already been said, the morality of human acts, and their moral goodness or malice, is from relation to the ultimate end and law of human life, from fittingness or unfittingness with the same end and law. Moreover this relation, this fittingness or unfittingness, can arise intrinsically in a human act from a threefold head, namely from the object of the same act, from the end, and from the circumstances. Hence it is commonly accustomed to be said that the object, the end, and the circumstances are the three sources of morality in a human act, and that a human act takes its moral goodness or malice from this threefold head, namely its particular, specific, and individual goodness or malice; for not all good acts are in the same species, nor likewise all evil acts in the same species. But the object, the circumstances, and the end can have order, and a diverse order, to the ultimate end and law of man. And morality consists in this order of human acts to the ultimate end and law.

2. By the object of a human act is not here understood whatever is presented to the will; for thus both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, the object is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and of itself wills. — The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. Concerning the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. Concerning the same wife, for example, there can be an honorable conjugal act and a base act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it falls under the rule of morals, or law, commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another’s thing precisely as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner’s will. Hence the Angelic Doctor says, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8: “A human act, which is called moral, has its species from the object in relation to the principle of human acts, which is reason.” And ibid. a. 2 ad 1, he says, “it must be said that although exterior things are good in themselves, nevertheless they do not always have due proportion to this or that action.” And ibid. a. 5 ad 3: “The conjugal act and adultery, according as they are compared to reason, differ in species and have effects differing in species, because one of them merits praise and reward, the other blame and punishment. But according as they are compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species. And thus they have one effect according to species.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: “It must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will.” Cf. q. 18. a. 5; S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.

3. Human acts take their first and essential moral goodness or malice from the object. — The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. Therefore, as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. “The good and evil of an action,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, “just as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing which seems to pertain to the fullness of being is that which gives species to the thing. But just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has species from its object, just as motion also from its term. And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a fitting object. Whence it is also called by some good from its genus, for example to use one’s own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if a generated thing does not obtain its specific form, for example if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another’s things. And it is called evil from its genus, genus being taken for species, in that manner of speaking by which we call the human genus the whole human species.” And q. 18. a. 5: “Every act has species from its object.” And q. 19. a. 1: “But the difference of species in acts is according to objects.” Likewise ibid. a. 2: “The goodness of the will depends on that one thing alone which of itself makes goodness in an act, namely on the object, and not on the circumstances, which are certain accidents of the act.” For the first source of morality in a human act is its object. From the object, as from a formal principle, the human act has its being, and the first thing that occurs in each thing is its being.

4. Nor indeed is it valid to object that the first and essential moral goodness is to be taken from the end, which is the first foundation of all morality, and because every willed object is willed for the sake of the end, and consequently the end is willed before the object. For the human act indeed regards first the end, but the end of the work, which is the intrinsic end and coincides with the object itself, which consequently is ordered by that intrinsic end to the ultimate end, and orders the human act first and essentially to that same ultimate end.

5. In order that an act be morally evil, it suffices that the malice be indirectly, virtually, or implicitly willed in another thing to which it is annexed. The reason is that malice cannot be intended otherwise. No one operates intending evil; but someone does not seek evil except by reason of some good which he apprehends in it. Therefore it suffices that someone seek in a thing the pleasurableness to which he knows malice to be annexed.

6. But in order that an act be morally good, it is required that goodness be formally and directly willed in itself, at least in the act exercised. The reason is that honorableness is appetible in itself. Therefore right reason dictates that it is to be sought in itself. But it is not necessary that someone intend honorableness in a signate act, but it suffices that someone intend that which he sees to be honorable. And thus it is not necessary that one giving alms intend its honorableness, but it suffices that he wish to relieve the misery of his neighbor. “Evil occurs,” says St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3, “from singular defects, but good from a whole and complete cause. Whence whether the will is of that which is evil according to itself and under the aspect of good, or is of good under the aspect of evil, it is always evil. But in order that the will be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good.”

7. Whether an act is good if the object is good, but the end evil? — R. In the negative. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the aspect of evil, and therefore as it is willed by him it is evil. The honorableness of the means is then in no way truly sought, but only the means of attaining a depraved end is sought. “When someone wills to give alms on account of vain glory, this is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from everything that is in it.” St. Thomas, 2 D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. And St. Alphonsus says: “If the object is good, but the end of the one operating is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness.” Tr. de Act. hum. n. XXXVIII; Suarez, D. 6, S. 1, 2; D. 8, S. 1, n. XIII.

8. Whether an act is good if the object is evil, but the end good? — R. In the negative. And indeed the Apostle condemns those saying: “Let us do evils that good things may come.” Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the willed object itself, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from in reality willing evil. Suarez, D. 4; D. 8, S. 1, n. XX ff.

1. By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such and such an act, as the reason on account of which he operates. This is that end which is called the end of the one operating. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, “that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends.” But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the very intrinsic end of the action which he does, then the end of the one operating coincides with the end of the work, as appears in him who wishes to steal so that he may steal, i.e. so that he may become rich from another’s property. The end of the work cannot in any way be excluded by the one operating, if he himself knows the nature of the work; for that end is intrinsic to the work. Now the end of the one operating can be considered in two ways: 1.º with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2.º with respect to the act itself which is commanded, as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed its principal object, since the end is what moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, so that he may commit adultery, principally wills adultery; he intends this and efficaciously procures it. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for this reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has its own substantial malice from its proper object, that is, from the taking of another’s thing against the will of the owner; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one operating to such and such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the judgment of the one operating. Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end itself of the work, which gives species to the act, but some adjoined end: just as the fact that a brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but it is a circumstance if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3; q. 18. a. 6 ad 2.

2. The end of the one operating can be one thing as primary, another as secondary. The primary end is that which someone first proposes to himself, and is the cause simply of the action. The secondary end is that which is added to the primary, and is not the cause simply of the action, but only, with the primary end, impels that it be done better, that is, more eagerly, more easily, more pleasantly, etc.

3. Human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end. For the end can be considered as a circumstance and as the object of a human act. If the end is considered as a circumstance, it can, not otherwise than the other circumstances, state an order of conformity or deformity to reason. Thus it is conformable to reason not only to give alms, but also to give them in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk. Therefore, as circumstances give goodness or moral malice to a human act, so also does the end. And as circumstances of themselves give only accidental goodness and malice, so also does the end. But if the end is considered as object, then human acts take species from the end as from an object, and therefore from it they take not only moral goodness or malice, but also from it they take essential moral goodness or malice.

4. “The same act numerically, according as it once goes forth from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has species, but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another.” It is said according as it once goes forth from the agent, for there can be several ends of his act according as this is continued and repeated; for example, to take another’s property, so that one may become rich from another’s property; to retain another’s property, or again to take it, so that it may be preserved for the owner. It is said from which it has species, for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work from which comes the species, as it were, substantial to the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage so that he may celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the very celebration of Mass intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of that celebration, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance not giving species to the act. But the remote end of the one operating, to which the act is ordered, can itself also give species to the act; indeed, if it is the ultimate end in that series, it itself is what gives species to the act most of all, because it is what is prior in intention and on which all the other ends depend, since all those are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery so that he may steal, and steals so that he may commit homicide, is rather a murderer than an adulterer and thief, because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. “When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. “Nevertheless it is possible that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Thus this very thing which is to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger. From this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2.

5. “The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Whence as to the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as in the acts of the other powers, except perhaps accidentally, according as an end depends on an end and a will on a will;” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1; namely when several ends subordinated of themselves and willed are together, as when someone wills healing medicine on account of going into military service, on account of victory, the formal goodness of the object, for example being healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, for example military service; and when the will of one end, for example adultery, depends on the will of another end, for example theft, as when someone wishes to commit adultery so that he may steal, the malice also of the object, for example adultery, differs from the malice of the end, for example theft. But each is accidental; for it happens to an end that it is subordinated to another, and it also happens to the will that it depends on another; otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan, in the cited place. Moreover a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. Each of these has its proper object. “But the end is properly the object of the will. But that about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will stands as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments, nor do exterior acts have the character of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Whence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking of himself, more adulterer than thief.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6.

6. Now a commanded act can be considered according to itself and taken specificatively, and it can be considered formally and reduplicatively as commanded. If it is considered in the first way, it takes its essential and specific goodness or malice from the object, and accidental goodness or malice from the end. The extrinsic end of the one operating comes to the act already constituted in its species from its proper object. And it is altogether accidental to such an act, considered according to itself, that it be ordered to such an end. Thus the volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards the honorableness of almsgiving or mercy, but only secondarily and mediately the honorableness of penance. If the commanded act is taken in the other way, i.e. formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has its essential species from the end, because the commanding act and the commanded act are considered one act, whose principal object is then the end which each regards.

7. Therefore human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end because, insofar as they are acts, they receive species from the end as from an object. And this can also be shown otherwise. For human acts can be considered after the manner of actions and after the manner of passions, because through them man moves himself and is moved by himself. But action obtains species from the principle of acting, while passion obtains species from the term of motion. And thus heating as action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat; heating as passion is nothing other than motion toward heat; and a definition manifests the account of species. For indeed each thing obtains species according to act, and not according to potency; and therefore motion, which is distinguished through action and passion, insofar as it is action, takes species from the act which is the principle of acting; but insofar as it is passion, it takes species from the act which is the term of motion. Moreover “acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will, but the object of the will is good and end. And therefore it is manifest that the principle of human acts, insofar as they are human, is the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. For the end is not only an end, but also the object of the will, and through this is in the place of form, which is the principle of acting. But the end is the object of the will, and is the reason of acting for it, precisely insofar as it is end; for it is that which is sought of itself; and thus the end is good, and “good has the character of end.” St. Thomas, ibid. a. 4 ad 1. “The motive and object of the will is the end... the end, although it is not of the substance of the act (namely of the commanded act), is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act (aforesaid), insofar as it moves the agent to act. Whence also the moral act most of all has species from the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, body and ad 2. “The end is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 7 ad 2. “The end, according as it is prior in intention, according to this pertains to the will. And in this way it gives species to the human or moral act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2. “And similarly (the end) is the term of the same (acts). For that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end.” Namely, the human act is from the end, and is to the end: from the end as action; to the end as passion; from the end as object, the intrinsic form of the act, the principle of the act by which the will acts; to the end as the term of the act, for the sake of which it acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3.

8. Therefore human acts, besides the absolute and intrinsic goodness or malice which they have from their proper object, have goodness or malice from the end on which they depend. “For the disposition of things in goodness and in being is the same. For there are certain things whose being does not depend on another. And in these it suffices to consider their being itself absolutely. But there are certain things whose being depends on another, whence it is necessary that they be considered by consideration toward the cause on which they depend. But just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4; q. 72. a. 3.

And hence this is understood: good and end are convertible, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 2 ad 2. For whatever the will wills and does, it wills and does as good and for the sake of good.

9. Whether the intention of an extrinsic end can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? — R. Some affirm it; others deny it. The opinion of the latter seems to us alone true. The reason is: 1.º because nature cannot be changed; 2.º because the intention of the one operating adds nothing to the work, indeed it does not even touch it, since it is entirely extrinsic to it. Therefore our good intention cannot make an evil work good, nor can our evil intention make what is good evil, nor transfer what is evil intrinsically into another species of malice. But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one operating can give moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference insofar as it is a human work; and this determination in morals is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the guilty person cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust causing of damage, nevertheless the intention of taking another’s property determines the taking itself, according as someone takes another’s thing so that he may preserve it for the owner, or so that he may take it for himself and steal it. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584, 636. — Therefore if someone without force and fraud, but from hatred, or even so that he may harm another, impedes him from the attainment of a good to which he has no right, for example if someone impedes a testator from leaving an inheritance to someone who has no right to it, he is by no means bound to restitution. For he sins either only against charity, or even against justice, but affectively only, not effectively. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584.

10. Whether an act is good if it has a twofold end, one good and the other evil? — R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the evil end has itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or is added to the act already preexisting, or even if it has itself merely concomitantly, that is, influences nothing in the being of the act itself but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which of the act itself, but is only the reason, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its influence without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example if alms were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency over the esteem to be had thence among men. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Sometimes, in carrying out a good work, a certain sense and imperfect affection touches someone’s soul, although in no way is it the end which he proposes to himself. Whatever of fault is found in this, the goodness of the work which someone does does not perish on that account. — 2.º In the negative, if the evil end has itself truly causatively and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the aspect of evil, which is to will evil. “In order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of good, i.e. that it will the good and on account of the good.” St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3. — Except unless the end is only lightly evil. The reason is that then the only lightly evil end influences not the substantial being itself of the act, but only the accidental being of the act, and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a slight ostentation has crept into that act and has truly influenced it. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; De Malo, q. 2. a. 4 ad 2; Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. XIV ff. The question concerns, as is clear, an exterior act which is one in the genus of nature and multiple in the genus of morals. “If one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; yet if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

11. Whether he sins who acts for the sake of pleasure? — R. In the affirmative, if he acts for the sake of pleasure alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking of itself, does not exceed venial. In the negative, if he acts simply for the sake of pleasure. The reason for the first is that pleasure is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful for human life. Therefore pleasure is not the end of action, “but the means to exercising the action more constantly, more easily, and better.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. It is confirmed from proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI: “To eat and drink even to satiety for the sake of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its acts.” The reason for the second is that since pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, unless someone establishes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is not had a grave disorder in the human action. The reason for the third is that pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by pleasure to operating. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 26, nn. 6, 7; 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2. Otherwise, it would have to be said that he also sins who would be moved to acting honorably from heavenly pleasure. Moreover nature indeed more principally intends the operation itself, to which pleasure is joined. But secondarily the same nature intends that man, from the appetite of pleasure, seek the operation. Therefore pleasure can be intended as an end, provided it is not intended as the ultimate or principal end. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing of a further honorable end, is moved by pleasure to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1.

1. By circumstances of a human act are understood all those accounts which are accessory to the willed object, and are as accidents of the substance of the act, and are willed only concomitantly or consequently. “The name of circumstance,” says St. Thomas, q. 7. a. 1, “is derived to human acts from those things which are in place to human acts. But in local things something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it itself or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and nevertheless touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, while pertaining to the thing itself, is called its accident. Whence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents.” As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of a human act, morally affecting it in its moral being, already constituted from the object. In its moral being, already constituted from the object, because if it gave the first and essential moral species, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would pass over into the condition of object and essential difference. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. For indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of the act that someone, for example, gave a slap to another or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter, insofar as they offend God more gravely. Cf. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 5.

2. Human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances. For since they tend not to an abstract but to a concrete object, or to an object determined by its individuating circumstances, as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and from them they put on various accidental qualities: just as man has the account of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And indeed, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. Therefore, just as “in natural things there is not found the whole fullness of perfection which is due to them from substantial form, which gives species, but much is superadded from supervening accidents, as in man from figure, from color, and so concerning others, and if any of these is lacking for a decent relation, evil follows; so also it is in action. For the fullness of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but something is added from those things which come upon it as certain accidents. And things of this sort are due circumstances. Whence, if something is lacking which is required for due circumstances, the action will be evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3, 9.

3. For indeed a human act takes goodness or malice from the object for this reason, that the object states a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason. But circumstances also can import a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason; thus, for example, it is not only unfitting to reason to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.

4. “Thus, therefore, in a human action goodness can be considered in four ways. One indeed according to genus, namely insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of action and entity, so much it has of goodness. Another according to species, which is taken according to a fitting object. The third according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents. But the fourth according to the end, as according to relation to the cause of goodness.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. “Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another, and according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species, or according to circumstances, is ordered to an evil end, or conversely. Nevertheless an action is not good simply unless all the goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4, body and ad 3.

5. Therefore a human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, either within the same species or even of a diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing so that he might give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft, from the circumstance of the sacred thing sacrilege, from the end fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species. But the intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is first and of itself, or directly, moved to the act. Hence although, in order that a human act be good simply, it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as the love of God. Objective circumstances are meant, or circumstances on the part of the object, for at least some circumstances on the part of the act itself are always found which confer on it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in the act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it. But in order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice on the act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act, because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice on a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this sort affect the object itself, and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as if naked, but as if clothed with its own circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance who; for the one operating can regard himself as the object of his will and will to apply the dignity or condition of his person to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting act itself is voluntary, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 138; 1. 2, cited places; Suarez, D. 4, D. 5, D. 6, S. 3.

6. Whether a circumstance can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work and of the interior act? — R. In the affirmative. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself or to the act itself, but by no means extrinsic, as is the end of the one operating with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can modify the external work itself and the internal act. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at a time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Whence it is enough also to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic modification to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from its own intrinsic nature and in such a species by reason namely of the object properly, becomes from indifferent, by its nature, good or evil, from evil good, from good evil, or in another species. For since a circumstance is something accessory to the object, if the object, by reason of itself, is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, it remains indifferent, good, evil, and in such a species under that respect, although intrinsically it can also become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species of evil by reason of the circumstance. Thus, for example, the action of eating of itself is indifferent; but to eat on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action; but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice; but to steal a sacred thing is an action evil also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.

7. Now there are certain circumstances which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this sort are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Whence they increase or lessen the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of an act, the long or short delay of an act, do not have moral goodness or malice according to themselves, but only through order to a good or evil act, of which consequently they constitute only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not of itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example this, that it is another’s, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. Whence to take another’s property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. Circumstances which, by aggravating a sin, render it mortal from venial are called aggravating infinitely.

8. Of aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. A circumstance is judged to aggravate notably in quantitative matter, or matter which consists in number, weight, and measure, when, taken separately and separated from the act, it would suffice for mortal sin; as one who, beyond five or six lire constituting in the case a mortal sin, should steal another five or six, namely ten or twelve. But in other matters it would be judged to aggravate notably when it notably exceeds the ordinary manner of sinning in matters of this sort, as if someone should spend the whole night in impurities with a woman, if someone should persevere for months and years in fraternal hatred, if someone should kill an enemy by cutting him limb by limb, etc. If neither of these occurs, it is judged to aggravate lightly, as that a thief steals seven or eight lire in the same case of grave matter of five or six lire, or that after a quarrel someone, being angry, remains for a little while in hatred. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.

9. But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called those changing the species. Circumstances of this sort are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another’s property has species from the character of what is another’s; for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if beyond this the character of place or time is considered, it will have itself in the character of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or time and other things of this sort, it happens that the condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, that reason orders that injury is not to be done to a sacred place. Whence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance as regards the order of reason. And therefore the place which previously was considered as a simple circumstance is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason.

10. Nor indeed is it repugnant that a moral act be found constituted in multiple species. For a natural being cannot be except in only one species, because its being is physically determined; nor can there be physically a process of nature into infinity, whence it is necessary to stop at some ultimate form from which the specific difference is taken, after which there cannot be another specific difference. And hence it is that in natural things that which is an accident of some thing cannot be taken as a difference constituting species, since it comes upon a thing already constituted in its species. But a moral being can be constituted in multiple species, for the species of moral acts are constituted from forms according as they are apprehended by reason. But the process of reason is not determined to one thing; rather, when anything whatever has been given, it can proceed further. And therefore what in one act is taken as a circumstance superadded to the object which determines the species of the act can again be taken by ordering reason as a principal condition of the object determining the species of the act. And thus in theft, if the mere account of place is considered, it has itself as a circumstance; but if that account of a sacred place, for example, is considered as contrary to ordering reason, because reason orders the reverence due to a sacred place and that no injury be done to it, then that account is no longer considered as a mere circumstance, but as a certain principal condition of the object; whence, as from the object, so also from it the act receives species, as though from a certain specific difference of it.

11. Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2, says: “a circumstance, remaining in the character of circumstance, since it has the character of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species.” For indeed since an act, as the whole that it is, tends to the object, it is indeed specified by the object. But since it tends to a concrete object, it also attains its circumstances, and from them itself puts on various accidental qualities. But when those circumstances import some consonance or dissonance with reason, and are changed into a certain principal condition of the object, then the act, which attains the object as it is, namely according to that condition which it really has, and is specified by the object, also takes species from that condition of the object. Namely that circumstance, constituting the principal condition of the object, itself also becomes the object of the act, so that there is, as it were, a twofold act, or one act virtually twofold: one concerning the object of the act, the other concerning the object of the circumstance, as appears in theft in a sacred place; namely the taking of another’s thing, the object of the act of theft, and the injury inflicted on the sacred place, the object of the circumstance of theft. And thus the principle still stands: that an act is specified by the object; for in truth there is a twofold object which is attained by the act: since the object here is not simply this or that thing, but according as it bears relation to the order of reason; moreover both the object of the act properly such, and the circumstance of that object, will be able to be consonant with or discordant from the order of reason.

12. Cajetan aptly says on q. 18. a. 10 and 11: “Notice and consider diligently that just as in natural things certain accidents are forms according to themselves, such as whiteness and sweetness, but certain others are only conditions of presupposed forms, as more, less, greater, strongly, quickly, and other things of this sort; so in morals circumstances are twofold: some are goodnesses or malices according to themselves, as are all acts of virtues and vices; some are only conditions of supposed virtues or malices, as greater and less, more and less, and the like. The difference between these circumstances is manifest, because the latter never make an act good or evil, although they increase or diminish goodness or malice. But the former make an act good or evil; and the reason is ready at hand, because the former of themselves add goodness or malice, the latter do not. Again, the difference between them is that the former according to themselves are certain species of morals having their own objects, fitting or unfitting to reason, as is clear concerning theft done in a sacred place. For to the act of theft is joined injury of a sacred place, which has its proper species from the sacred place, as an object for reason, as suffering injury: for this object is according to itself discordant from reason. But the latter are not according to themselves species of morals, nor do they have their own objects; and from this it follows that the former give species to the act which they circumstantiate, since the act is concerned with that object of the circumstance.”

13. The matter can still be explained otherwise. “It must be said that according to its substance something cannot be in two species, of which one is not ordered under the other. But according to those things which come to a thing, something can be contained under diverse species. As this apple according to color is contained under this species, namely of white, and according to odor under the species of sweet-smelling. And similarly an act which according to its substance is in one species of nature can, according to supervening moral conditions, be referred to two species.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8 ad 1.

14. What, generally, are circumstances changing the species? — “A circumstance is sometimes taken as an essential difference of the object, according as it is compared to reason; and then it can give species to a moral act. — And this must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from goodness into malice; for a circumstance would not make an act evil except through this, that it is repugnant to reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6 ad 4. This same thing must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from indifferent into good or evil, by giving namely the first and essential species of goodness or malice. — Thus, for example, if someone after a vow of chastity should use marriage, from that circumstance of the vow the act is changed from goodness into malice; if someone for the sake of recreation wished to ride in a church, or to hold a wedding banquet in a church, or to eat a small quantity on a fast day after several other small meals; from the circumstance of place and fast the act becomes evil from indifferent, and is constituted in a determinate species of malice. — For indeed, from the fact that a circumstance according to itself is repugnant to or fits reason, it imports malice or goodness according to itself, and bears before itself an object repugnant to or fitting to reason; and through this it places in its proper species the act which it changes into evil from good, or changes into good or into evil from indifferent. For the constitution of an act in the being of evil or good is from the object. But it is clear that the changing of an act from good into evil, from indifferent into evil or good, is a constitution in the being of evil or good.

15. From what has been said it is clear, 1.º that circumstances changing the species can be threefold: because they give to the act a new species of goodness or malice beyond the preceding species from the object; because they change the act from good into evil; because they give to the act its first moral goodness or malice. 2.º There are two general rules concerning circumstances giving species to moral acts. The first is that whenever a circumstance makes an act evil from good, or good or evil from indifferent, it gives species to the act. The second is that whenever a circumstance regards a special, of itself proper order of reason, it again gives species to the act. But it regards a special proper order of reason when it of itself exhibits something congruent with or discordant from reason. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 72. a. 8, 9; q. 73. a. 7; q. 88. a. 5; De Malo, q. 2. a. 6 ad 2, a. 8.

"15. God does not command an external act. - 16. An external act is not properly good, nor does God properly perform it. - 17. Let us bring forth the fruit, not of external acts, which do not make us good, but of interior acts, which the Father dwelling in us makes and performs. - 18. God loves souls, not the external work." Condemned propositions of Eckhart, condemned by John XXII in the year 1329.

"9. He truly sins who hates sin merely because of its turpitude and incongruity with nature, without any regard for God offended. - 10. The intention by which someone detests evil and pursues good merely in order to obtain heavenly glory is not right or pleasing to God. - 11. Everything that is not from supernatural Christian faith, which works through love, is sin. - 13. Whoever also serves God with a view to eternal reward, if he should lack charity, is not free from fault whenever he acts, even with a view to beatitude. - 14. Fear of hell is not supernatural. - 15. Attrition, which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of benevolence for God on account of Himself, is not a good and supernatural movement." Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"60. If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more violent this penance is, the more it leads to despair. - 61. Fear restrains only the hand; but the heart is devoted to sin as long as it is not led by the love of justice. - 62. He who abstains from evil only through fear of punishment commits it in his heart and is also guilty before God." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI.

147. Notion. (A) The end concerning which we are treating is not the end of the work, which is not distinguished from the object formally taken, but the end of the one operating, or the intention, the motive on account of which the agent operates (above n. 4). Thus, if someone gives alms, the end of the work is the relief of the poor man, but the end of the one operating can be love of neighbor for his own sake, love of God or of Christ, the intention of redeeming sins, or vainglory, etc. Indeed one and the same act by the same agent, and at the same instant, can be performed on account of a manifold intention; thus someone can bestow alms in order to relieve the poor man, because he is loved on account of Christ and God, and at the same time in order to obtain remission of sins, etc. - Hence the end of the work is sometimes the same as the end of the one operating, namely when the agent intends the very goodness intrinsically inhering in the act, for example the relief of the poor man in the case of alms. - The intention itself is necessarily good or evil: for since it is deliberate, if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason and is good; otherwise, it is evil.¹

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9: "For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, from this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to the due end." Cf. Didiot, op. cit., n. 440-454.

(B) With the end is connected the means, or that through which the agent wills to attain the end. A means, insofar as it is a means,² is not desirable or good of itself, because the will does not rest in it; but it is perceived as something useful for attaining the end, and therefore it is intended not on account of itself, but on account of the end. From this arose the axiom: he who wills the end, by that very fact wills the means; and he who wills the means, as it is a means, by that very fact wills the end. For the end cannot be obtained without the means, and consequently no one sincerely wills the end without by that very fact willing the means necessary for attaining the end. Likewise the means, as it is a means, is not intended except insofar as it conduces to the end; therefore no one sincerely wills the means as such unless at the same time he wills to attain the end. Thus he who wills to kill Peter, by that very fact wills the means necessary for perpetrating this homicide; likewise he who knowingly wills to apply, or in reality applies, means of themselves apt for killing Peter, by that very fact wills to kill Peter.

² It is said insofar as it is a means; for if it is considered not in order to the end, but in itself, insofar as it is an independent act, it has its own morality from the object, its proper end, and the circumstances.

Therefore the end and the means, by reason of morality, are indivisibly connected and are subjected to the same rules.

148. 1. Principle: A human act receives some principal morality from the end, or intention on account of which it is done. For from this intention it can happen that an action is conformable or difform to right reason: for by force of the intention, an act indifferent of itself can become good or evil, a good act can become better or evil, an evil act can become worse. Thus a walk, indifferent of itself, is good if it is done so that afterward one may be more free for work or prayer, but evil if it is done in order to seek occasions of sinning; alms, good in itself, is rendered better if it is done from love of Christ, but evil if it is done in order to turn the poor man away from the true faith; theft, evil in itself, becomes worse if it is committed for the sake of drunkenness or lust.

But St. Thomas¹ declares thus that this morality, derived from the end, although not primary or fundamental nor essential, is principal: "To the second it must be said that the end, although it is not of the substance of the act, is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; whence also a moral act most especially has species from the end."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 4, ad 2.

149. 2. Corollaries. (A) An act good from the object, and referred to a good end, besides the objective goodness which it retains or can retain, acquires a new goodness, and sometimes a manifold one, from the intention or end.

Thus alms given to a poor man, for relieving him, on account of the love of God, and at the same time in satisfaction for sins, has a threefold goodness: that of mercy from the object, that of charity from the intention of loving God, and also that of penance, on account of the motive of making satisfaction for sins; for the agent truly seeks this threefold goodness, and his action is virtually and morally threefold.

We said: an act can retain its objective goodness. Indeed it in fact retains it if this is at least implicitly intended; but if it is in no way intended, and only the final goodness is sought, the act derives its morality solely from the end; thus if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the moral goodness of abstinence, about which he cares nothing, but in order more easily to preserve the health of the body.

From this it follows that those who wish to progress in the spiritual life and to acquire greater merits ought especially to take care concerning the purity and perfection of their intention, and to embrace several good ends; for the purer, more perfect, and more manifold the intention is (provided excessive anxiety about this matter is avoided), the more perfect is the manner of acting.

150. (B) An act good from the object, but referred to an evil end, (a) becomes totally evil if the depraved intention is the total and adequate cause for positing it; for example if someone bestows alms solely in order to turn the poor away from the true religion. For then the agent wills the good, not as it is good, but as a means to an evil end, and therefore as something evil.

(b) But if an act good of itself is posited partly on account of a good end and partly on account of an end lightly culpable, it is more probable that the whole is not vitiated, but that it is partly good and partly evil; for example if someone gives alms both in order to relieve the poor man and in order to catch praise. For then the will is truly borne toward the good object, and that tendency is not destroyed by the intention lightly culpable, which by no means turns us away from God.¹

¹ Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 4, § 2; Collet, De act. hum., cap. IV, art. 2, sect. 1, conclus. 1; Gury, n. 30; Ball. P., I, n. 98; Noldin, n. 65. - But Suarez, op. cit., disp. 8, sect. I; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 70, cap. 2; Walsh, n. 546-561, defend the contrary opinion.

But if the evil intention, although not the adequate cause of the act, is nevertheless gravely culpable - as is alms given partly in order to relieve the poor, but partly and especially in order to turn them away from the faith - the act is totally evil, at least much more probably; for that intention turns us away from God, and consequently prevents the act itself from pleasing God.

151. (C) An act evil from the object, and known as such, even referred to a good end, remains evil, though less so than if it were elicited on account of an evil end.

(a) It remains evil; for if the object is evil and is known as such, the good end does not prevent the will from seeking evil; for example, if someone steals in order to relieve a friend who is by no means placed in extreme necessity, by that very fact he wills the malice of theft, although the relief of the poor man is good. In this sense the Apostle says:¹ "And not (as we are slandered, and as some claim that we say) let us do evil that good may come." - Therefore it is not lawful to apply a means evil of itself in order to attain a good end.²

¹ Rom. III, 8.

² Therefore they slander Catholics who ascribe to them this saying: The end justifies the means. For theologians reprove it; while certain non-Catholics approve the same, among whom Matthew Prior, who wrote that from a good end even evil means become legitimate, and that only he sins who has a depraved intention:

"The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends."

Cf. The works of the english poets, London, 1810, t. X, p. 155; Etudes des PP. Jésuites, 5 August 1904, p. 357.

(b) Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the act, because it shows that the affection toward evil is lesser, since the evil is not sought except from love of some good, or as a means for attaining an honorable end; thus, in the case brought forward, the malice of theft committed for doing good is less than that committed for harming one's neighbor. - Conversely, however, an evil end adds new malice to an act objectively evil, because it is difform from the rule of morals in a twofold way, as if someone steals in order to become drunk.

152. (D) An act indifferent from the object, but referred to a good end, receives from the end a certain goodness; but if it is ordered to an evil end, it receives moral malice from it. Thus to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion, while to sing in order to excite lust is a sin of scandal: for in the former case the will truly intends something good, in the latter something evil.

From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to set before oneself an honorable end in all actions, even indifferent ones, so that all may become morally good.

168. State of the question. The things which we have said concerning morality regard the act in itself, or directly willed; but, since there are effects which are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, it remains to be inquired whether these also are moral and imputable to the agent. For understanding this, a few things must be noted beforehand.

(A) That is voluntary in itself, or directly, which the will immediately and expressly intends either as the end or as the means; thus certainly the death of an enemy which the murderer intends as the end is voluntary in itself, or the killing of a traveler which a thief intends as a means for taking money. - But that is voluntary in the cause, or indirectly, which is intended neither as the end nor as the means, but is foreseen as going to follow from the act directly willed, and consequently is imputed to it in some way; thus he who from curiosity reads a depraved book, foreseeing that doubts concerning the faith are going to arise from reading of this kind, by that very fact indirectly, or in the cause, wills to experience these doubts. - Again an effect can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: positively, if an action is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow; and negatively, if an action is omitted while foreseeing the effect as going to follow from this omission; thus he who sees a house blazing in fire, and does nothing to extinguish the fire, when he could do something, indirectly and negatively wills the conflagration.

169. (B) These things posited, it is asked whether an effect voluntary in the cause is truly voluntary and ought to be imputed to the agent. Namely, an act is imputable when its goodness or malice can and ought to be attributed to the agent as to its proper author; moreover one can be held as the proper author of this action when he freely posited it, with prior knowledge of its morality.

Nevertheless in this matter one must carefully distinguish between a good effect and an evil effect. A good effect, willed only in the cause, is not imputed to the agent; thus he who writes a book for the sake of making profit, foreseeing at the same time good effects going to follow from its reading, but not intending them in themselves, even confusedly, does not perform a morally good act, because he intends his own utility, not honorableness; this is clear from what was said above, n. 145. - But an evil effect, willed only in the cause, can be imputed to the agent; for from what was said in n. 146, an act contracts the malice of the object as often as this is known and interpretatively willed; but when it truly ought to be imputed will be clear from what is to be said below.

(C) The indirect voluntary can occur in two ways: (a) sometimes an evil effect, willed in the cause, follows from an act directly willed without the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called the indirect voluntary simply. (b) Sometimes, however, an evil effect is produced with the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called a case of cooperation, because namely two (or more) concur toward the production of this effect. - Concerning each one, we must speak separately.

170. Preliminary notes. In order that one may judge concerning the morality of an effect, it must first be inquired how it is connected with the cause.

¹ St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7; Suarez, De volunt., disp. I, sect. 5; Billuart, diss. I, a. 4; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, n. 23; Walsh, n. 88-192; Laloux, De Act. humanis, diss. 8; Ball. P., I, n. 26-32; Bouquillon, nn. 328, 371-374; Noldin, n. 33-38.

(a) Sometimes a cause is so determined to producing one effect that this effect follows necessarily: then the effect is directly intended and is deservedly imputed to the agent; thus he who knowingly applies fire to wood directly wills to burn it, because fire of itself is determined to burning.

(b) Sometimes, however, the cause produces a double effect, yet in such a way that one is subordinated to the other and follows necessarily from it; thus if someone knowingly and willingly discharges a gun at the father of a family, certainly foreseeing that from his death his children will be deprived of support, the double effect (the death of the father and the miserable condition of the children) is deservedly imputed to the agent, because the former is directly intended as a means to the end, namely vengeance, but the latter indirectly as an effect which necessarily follows from the means directly willed.

(c) Effects produced by a cause can be so coordinated that they proceed equally immediately, because the cause of itself is determined to producing each; thus if a physician gives to a pregnant woman a medicine which can heal her and at the same time cause abortion; in which case each effect is said to follow per se. But if one effect does not proceed equally immediately from the cause, because this is not of itself determined to producing such an effect, this follows per accidens: thus if someone writes a good or indifferent book for the sake of making profit, by whose reading, however, another, on account of his own fragility, is scandalized. - Now the question is whether and when effects of this kind, which proceed either per se or per accidens from the cause, and were willed in the cause, are imputable to the agent.

There will be a double principle: the former declares when an evil effect is imputable; the latter when it can be permitted.

171. First principle: An evil effect, willed only in the cause, is morally imputable when these three things concur at the same time, namely: 1. the agent foresaw the effect at least in the confused; 2. he was able not to posit the cause; 3. he ought to have impeded the effect. It is explained and proved by parts.

1. It is required that the agent have foreseen the effect at least in the confused; for if he did not foresee it in any way, the effect is not voluntary, and therefore not imputable: nothing is willed unless foreknown. - But he foresees the effect in the confused who knows, even obscurely or indistinctly, or at least suspected that the effect was going to follow; thus he who undertakes the office of physician, judge, confessor, etc., adverting that he is wholly lacking the knowledge required for such an office, truly, although indistinctly, foresees the evil effects going to follow from this; likewise the hunter who suspects that what he sees is a man, and nevertheless fires upon it, confusedly foresees the homicide going to follow from this.

Conversely, he who becomes drunk from a small draught of liquor whose force he did not suspect does not incur the malice of drunkenness.

From this it is given to understand when sins committed in drunkenness ought to be imputed: if someone has known by experience that, in the state of drunkenness, he is liable to anger, fights, blasphemies, etc., and nevertheless freely becomes drunk, he is guilty of sins of this kind, because he foresaw them; but if he is not accustomed to commit these things, the same cannot be imputed to him, if perhaps they occur, because they were not foreseen.¹

¹ Certain theologians assert that for imputability it suffices that the agent could and ought to have foreseen the effect; which falls back into the same thing, for he neither could nor ought to have foreseen it if he in no way actually foresaw it.

172. 2. It is required that the agent could not have posited the cause: for if he is morally bound to posit the cause, he cannot abstain from that act, and therefore the effect is not morally imputable to him; since no one is bound to the impossible. - Thus the priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound faithfully to keep the sacramental seal.

173. 3. It is required that the agent be bound to impede the evil effect; for if he is by no means bound to this, he permits rather than effects the effect; and besides, if he has a just and proportionate reason for permitting it, such an effect is not to be imputed to him.

Now he is bound to impede the effect if this flows of itself from the cause: for then he who wills the antecedent wills also the consequent. But if the effect follows per accidens, namely from other causes independent of the will of the agent, so that the act posited is rather the occasion than the cause of the evil effect, the agent is not bound to impede this effect by abstaining from an act otherwise good, which is only the occasion of the evil effect. Thus a physician who, in the exercise of his art, is liable to not a few movements of concupiscence, is not guilty of these, even if he foresaw them, because the exercise of medicine produces those movements not of itself, but per accidens.

174. But when the three aforesaid conditions concur, the evil effect, although indirectly willed, is truly free and consequently imputable. Then, however, sin is committed not at that instant in which the evil effect follows, but at that instant in which it was foreseen and intended; and therefore, even if the effect does not follow, the sin has already been committed, because it has been willed.

Thus he who gives poison to another, foreseeing that death will follow from it, at this very instant commits homicide in his heart, even if, on account of the intervention of a physician or some other cause, death does not in fact follow. Thus he who adverts that he will be made drunk by further drink, and by experience knows that in drunkenness he commits many sins, implicitly intends all these sins at that instant in which he intends to drink the further drink.

Whence, in order to judge concerning the gravity of an indirectly willed sin, attention must be paid to the very malice of the internal act: the more distinct and certain the foresight of the evil effect was, the graver is the fault; the less distinct and certain, the lighter is the fault. Whence many are excused from grave sin because, on account of lightness of soul, they apprehend only confusedly the depraved effects of their actions.¹

¹ Vieux Moraliste rightly explains this, apud Ami du Clergé, XX, 1898, p. 1121-1129.

175. Second principle: It is lawful to posit an act good in itself or indifferent, from which a double effect follows, one good and the other evil, provided the good effect is not produced except not by means of the evil, a proportionately grave reason is present, and the end of the agent is honorable.

Therefore four conditions are required:

1. That the act be in itself good or indifferent; for if it is evil in itself, it can never become lawful, even if a good effect follows from it, and a fortiori if an evil effect follows. - But in order to judge whether the act is evil in itself or not, attention must be paid to whether the malice arises from the circumstances, or is found in the act itself according to the common estimation of the prudent: if the former, the act is judged good or indifferent in itself; if the latter, it must be judged evil in itself. - Thus, since hypnotic sleep is evil not in itself, but from circumstances, sometimes, though rarely, it can be permitted on account of a grave reason, provided due precautions are applied for warding off depraved effects.

176. 2. That the good effect not be produced except by means of the evil effect; for if the evil effect immediately follows from the cause, and the good arises only through the mediation of that evil effect, it is not lawful to posit the cause: for then the evil effect is assumed as a means to good, and therefore is directly intended.² Thus he acts illicitly who gives an intoxicating drink to a servant so that thereby he may cast horror of drunkenness into others.

² Certain persons, however, deny the necessity of this second condition; for, they say, it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor in order to protect one's own life; now in this case the good effect, namely the preservation of one's own life, is not obtained except through the mediation of the evil effect, that is, the death of the aggressor. Thus Walsh, n. 143-144. - The matter is not without difficulty; nevertheless it can be said that in this case the death of the unjust aggressor is not an effect morally evil in itself: by natural and divine right, the killing of the innocent is indeed prohibited, but not that of the guilty. - Besides, he who, in order to protect himself, kills the aggressor, does not intend his death as a means to the preservation of life, but strikes or fires for the end of rendering him unarmed and incapable of harming, foreseeing nevertheless that perhaps the death of the aggressor will follow from this.

177. 3. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause and permitting the evil effect, so that the good effect compensates for the evil. For right reason dictates that it is better to lack a lesser good than to obtain it through an act from which a greater evil follows; but conversely, if the good effect surpasses or at least compensates for the evil, the law which prohibited the evil effect now seems to cease.

The whole difficulty is in defining what reason is proportionately grave. But this, in individual cases, can be discerned only from the judgment of the prudent, all the circumstances being attended to. The principal adjuncts to be carefully weighed are reduced to these:

(A) One must inspect not only the advantage or disadvantage going to arise in the particular case, but also that which would threaten the whole society, if such an action were generally permitted or prohibited. For there are actions for which there does not seem to be a sufficient reason, if attention is paid to the particular case; but it will be recognized as present if regard is had to the universality of cases, with attention to the public good, or the good of the whole society.¹ Thus the social good requires that an unjust aggressor can be killed when other means of preserving one's own life are lacking, even if the aggressor perhaps loses not only temporal life, but eternal life; for otherwise assassins, robbers, and impious men, knowing that good men, for guarding life, would never kill, would become more audacious and would disturb families and society itself with homicides and robberies, as is explained in De Justitia, n. 325.

¹ Cf. Laloux, diss. 8, p. 217; Walsh, n. 136-137.

178. (B) Attention must be paid to the gravity of the evil effect: the graver the evil foreseen is, the greater the excusing reason must be. Thus if someone repels an unjust aggressor by bringing death upon him, a greater reason is required than if he inflicts a non-lethal wound: in the former case, it is required that the goods to be defended be of the greatest importance, while in the latter they can be of lesser importance (De Justitia, n. 329-331).

179. (C) The influence of the action upon the effect, whether good or evil, must also be inspected. For the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences that effect; therefore it must be compensated in that proportion in which it influences the effect. - But the measure of the influence depends on several things, namely on proximity, probability, and the positive or negative mode of acting. Generally, the more proximately, the more probably, the more positively the action influences the evil effect, the greater reason is required for lawfully positing it.

(a) A cause is called the more proximate the fewer intermediates there are between it and the effect; for example, if someone learns to read, foreseeing that perhaps he will incur the danger of reading depraved books, and from this of experiencing temptations, this last effect follows quite remotely from the act; but if someone in reality reads a depraved book, movements of concupiscence follow more proximately from this reading; therefore a greater reason is required.

(b) A cause influences the effect the more probably the more likely this effect is foreseen as going to follow from the cause; for example, if someone throws a stone from a window in a city and on a street where many pass by, the wounding of one's neighbor is going to follow much more probably than if he does this in a village where very few make the journey; therefore a much greater reason is required.

(c) The agent influences the effect the more positively the more actively he behaves; thus a greater reason is required for doing something than for omitting something from which an evil effect is going to follow.

180. (D) Attention must also be paid to the connection, more or less necessary, between the cause and the effect; thus, for leasing to heretics some building in which they will spread their errors, a greater reason is required if they cannot find any other building in the place than if they can easily lease others.

(E) Likewise one must keep before the mind the right or office which belongs to the agent of positing the act: certainly a lesser reason is desired if there is question of those who have a special right, or a fortiori an office, of doing the act; for example, if a physician or priest foresees that he will experience some temptation by reading books which he has the right and office of reading, in order rightly to fulfill his duty, a much lesser reason suffices than if there is question of another who wants to read the same books only from curiosity.

181. 4. It is required that the end of the agent be honorable, that is, that the agent not intend the evil effect which he foresees, nor afterward approve it, but behave permissively only with regard to it; wherefore he cannot take complacency in the depraved effect, but ought to be so disposed that he would wish it not to be produced, if he could otherwise obtain the good effect which he intends. This is clear from what was said where we treated concerning the end, n. 150; for he who intends a depraved end, or takes complacency in it, by that very fact wills some evil.

182. When the four aforesaid conditions concur at the same time, the evil effect only indirectly willed is not imputed to the agent; for that effect, insofar as it is evil, must be judged morally involuntary, since the will neither intends it nor takes complacency in it.¹ The agent indeed foresees and permits, or tolerates, the evil effect, but on account of a just and proportionate cause, just as God Himself tolerates evil on account of grave reasons. Now the public good demands that an act, otherwise good or indifferent, not be prohibited on account of an evil effect, if there is present a grave reason for positing it, as is clear from the examples already brought forward and from others to be brought forward in the whole course of the work.

¹ "Nothing prevents there being two effects of one act, one of which alone is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention. But moral acts receive species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention." (St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7).

By the circumstances of an action are understood certain accidental conditions which determine and distinguish it from others of the same kind.¹⁵

¹⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 7, art. 1: "In matters of place something is said to stand around a thing which is indeed extrinsic to it, but nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act and yet touch a human act in some manner are called circumstances. That which is outside the substance of a thing but pertains to the thing itself is called its accident. Hence circumstances must be called accidents of human acts." Cfr. ibid., qu. 18, art. 3, 10, 11. —Sweens, Theol. Mor. Fundament., pp. 106 sqq.

There are seven such conditions, enumerated in the old-time versus memorialis:

"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando?" (Who, what, where, when, by what means, why, and how?)

Some circumstances (circumstantiae gradum moralitatis mutantes) merely augment or diminish the malice of an act, whereas others completely transform its moral species (circumstantiae speciem moralitatis mutantes). This distinction is of great practical importance, for the circumstances which alter the species of a sin must be mentioned in confession.¹⁶

¹⁶ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, de Poenit., c. 5 and canon 7; Catechismus Romanus, P. II, c. 5, qu. 47.

However, it is not so much the external circumstances as the interior disposition or intention of the agent manifesting itself in and through the circumstances, that furnishes the criterion for determining the moral character of an act.

A modern writer on ethics somewhat paradoxically says: "It depends on time, place, and circumstances whether a virtue is a vice, or a vice, a virtue." This dictum is not true except in the limited sense explained above.¹⁷

¹⁷ Matth. VI, 1 sqq.; Luke X, 30 sqq.; XVIII, 9 sqq. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 7, art. 3.

The circumstances that augment or lessen the malice of an evil action (circumstantiae aggravantes vel minuentes peccatum) are enumerated in the following hexameters by a medieval writer: 15 "Aggravat ordo, locus, peccata, scientia, tempus, Aetas, conditio, numerus, mora, copia, causa, Et modus in culpa, status altus, lucta pusilla." ¹⁸ The circumstances that alter the moral species of an act may be variously classified.

¹⁸ Frater Conrad of Saxony, d. 1279. Cfr. A. Franz, Drei deutsche Minoritenprediger, Freiburg 1907, p. 30.

There are (1) Circumstances which render an act a transgression of more than one commandment or duty, e. g., when a man kills his parents or commits fornication with a married woman; (2) Circumstances by which a sinful act becomes a source of injury to others, as, e. g., when scandal is given; (3) Circumstances in which the matter of the sin committed (where such matter is divisible) ceases to be materia parva and becomes materia magna, as when one eats several ounces of meat on a day of abstinence, or steals, say, thirty-five dollars.¹⁹

¹⁹ This is the amount put down in the latest editions of Sabetti as materia absolute gravis. (Compendium Theol. Mor., ed. 23, New York 1915, p. 340.

(4) Another specific difference arises from the circumstance that an act which might have been externalized remains immanent, and therefore incomplete.

(5) Finally, the circumstance that an evil action was committed more than once furnishes a criterion (though not an infallible one) for classifying it as a sin of malice. It is for this psychological as much as for juridical considerations that the Church requires penitents to mention the number of their grievous sins in confession.

For determining the number or the numerical (in contradistinction to specific) distinction of moral acts, theologians give the following rules: a) The determining factor of an individual act is the last stage which it reaches in the process of realization. The natural preliminaries (introduction, preparation, etc.), the intermediary stages, and the ordinary means or instruments used in attaining the final end, are always presumed. Thus if one has burglarized a house he need not mention the circumstance that he employed a ladder to climb through the window. In this and similar cases a whole series of distinct acts is regarded as morally one (actus numero unus), provided, of course, the introductory and preparatory acts stand in their natural relation to the main act. When this is not the case, and if such acts have a malice of their own, the circumstances must be separately enumerated, as when a man drinks to excess in order to commit fornication. b) Acts belonging to the same moral species are reckoned as separate and distinct if they were far enough apart in time to render it possible and necessary for the agent to make a new decision of the will. A series of actions may be interrupted either voluntarily, e. g., by express or silent retraction, contrition; or involuntarily, e. g., by a considerable interval of time, inadvertence, sleep, etc. c) Sins are multiplied according to the numerical distinction of those affected by them. Thus, if you have told a lie in a grave matter, it is necessary to state how many persons were deceived or injured by it; if you gave scandal, to how many, and so forth.

READINGS.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 41 sqq. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 18 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 31 sqq. —J. Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung, pp. 244 sqq. —J. F. Delany in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 69 sq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 84 sqq.

Principle. Since by willing good or evil, and not otherwise, the will itself becomes good or evil, this also holds in the moral order: Acts are specified by the object. Therefore one source of morality can be spoken of, or that whence the moral quality of an act is discerned. But then object is taken in its full signification: it is whatever is proposed by the intellect to the will, or is set before it to be embraced or fled. In this signification it includes the end, the object taken more strictly, and the circumstances with which the object or act is clothed. And three sources of morality are customarily distinguished, about which we must now speak individually.

Nothing terminates the will more than the end, or the good on account of which the will acts. Wherefore the end is the principal source of morality. Yet because the object, even if it is chosen as a means, confers an immediate morality from which one cannot prescind - so that, if it is evil, it impedes the very morality which the action would borrow from a good end - and because in the object there is per se the notion of an intrinsic end, therefore, with St. Thomas, we shall speak first of the object, then of the end, then of the circumstances.

110. After in the preceding article there has been discussion of the nature of morality in common, or of the formal cause of morality, now one must treat of morality in particular or in concrete. In other words: now it is asked what the elements are which in any human act efficiently cause a determinate morality. And these elements are called the principles or sources of morality. For by principles or sources of morality are understood all those things from which morality is derived in concrete into human acts, that is, they are those things which really make a human act either good or evil or indifferent. St. Thomas³⁷ assigns three principles or sources of morality, namely, 1. the object, 2. the circumstances, 3. the end. For although that end of which there is question here, namely, the subjective end, is also a circumstance of the act,³⁸ nevertheless, because it especially influences the morality of the act, and because special difficulties exist concerning it, therefore the Angelic Doctor, and with him commonly all theologians, treat specially of the end. For the sake of clarity we divide this article into three paragraphs, treating separately of the object, the circumstances, and the end.

³⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4.

³⁸ Ibid. q. 7, a. 4.

296. Theologians call the principles or sources of morality all those things from which it comes about that some action is good, or evil, or indifferent. For just as the natural goodness of a thing rises from the fullness of its being, or from the collection of all those things which are required for its integrity, so moral goodness rises from the collection of all those things which befit a human act according to right reason; but moral malice rises from the defect of that integrity (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 18, a. 1).

But the integrity of a human act coalesces from object and from circumstances. Hence, so that a right judgment may be made concerning some act, it must be compared with the rule, both as to object and as to circumstances. But one circumstance, namely the end, which on account of its peculiar influence on morality demands for itself a peculiar consideration. Wherefore three principles of morality are counted, namely object, circumstances, and end. Now more about each.

297. DEFINITION. Object, in the broader sense, designates everything which is set before the will. In this sense, it can include both end and circumstances. In the stricter sense, as it is taken here, object is that thing, or person, morally considered, concerning which a human act is occupied, and toward which by its nature and of itself it tends. Thus another's thing is the object of theft; God the object of an act of love (V, n. XXXVI).

DIVISION. Object is good, or evil, or indifferent, according as it has a relation of agreement, or disagreement, or no relation to the rule of morals.

298. PRINCIPLE. A human act takes morality from the object, and indeed essential, or specific, morality.

The first part is clear: 1. From Scripture: They became abominable, as those things which they loved (Hos. 9:10). The contrary, on account of the same reason, must be said concerning good acts. 2. From St. Augustine (tr. 2, in 1 Ep. St. John, n. 14): "Each one is such as is his love. Do you love earth? you are earth; do you love God? what shall I say? as it were, you are God." 3. By reason: an act takes its morality from that from which it has relation to the rule of morals; but it has this from the object; therefore. Recall the things said n. 294.

The second part is proved: Essential or specific morality of an act is that which is conceived to be in it before every other, without which it cannot be conceived, and which, when other things are changed, remains invariable. Now indeed, such is the morality taken from the object; for to this, by hypothesis, the act by its nature tends, and to this it has itself as to its formal principle. Thus, for example, theft which someone commits in a sacred place in order to intoxicate himself, although it can be conceived without the malice of sacrilege and intemperance, nevertheless cannot be conceived without the malice of injustice.

"Hence, in human actions, before all things one must attend to the object, concerning which they are as concerning their proper term. If the object is agreeable to right reason, the action will be specifically good. If the object disagrees from right reason, the action will be essentially or specifically evil." Zigliara, Ethica, l. 2, c. 1, a. 6.

299. DEFINITION. Circumstance, as if standing around the act, is an accidental quality morally affecting a human act already constituted in its moral being (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 7, a. 1).

Therefore two things are required for a circumstance: 1. that it does not attribute first being to the act; 2. that it affect the act morally, that is, modify it in order to the rules of morals. For here the discourse is not concerning circumstances affecting the act only physically or juridically, for example, with which hand someone committed theft (Billuart, de act. hum. Diss. 4, a. 3, § 2).

DIVISION. Seven classes of circumstances are numbered, expressed by this little verse of Tully:

Who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, when.

For qualities affecting an act can adhere: 1. to the person of the agent, for example, whether he is a priest, religious, married; 2. to the object of the act, for example, whether the thing taken by theft is in great or small quantity, sacred or profane; whether the person struck is a cleric or layman, etc.; 3. to the place where the action is committed, whether it is public or secret, sacred or profane; 4. to the means of acting, whether they are just or unjust; 5. to the extrinsic end of the one operating, concerning which below (n. 304); 6. to the mode of acting, for example, whether the one operating acted maliciously or in good faith, intensely or remissly, from contempt or levity, from ignorance or fear, etc.; 7. to the time, for example, whether on a feast day, whether by long or brief delay.

300. PRINCIPLES. I. A human act takes true morality from circumstances. This is proved from Sacred Scripture (Mark 12:43), where the woman is praised who cast only two coins into the treasury, before the Pharisees casting many. The reason is, because circumstances have a relation of agreement or disagreement with right reason: thus in sacrilegious theft the circumstance of the sacred thing violated has a peculiar disagreement with right reason, besides that which it has from the object, or from the fact that it is another's thing. Thus also, other things being equal, greater quantity of alms renders the act more praiseworthy (V, n. XXXIX).

301. II. Circumstances are given which add a new morality to the act. This is clear from the fact that there are circumstances which according to themselves, separately and independently from the first morality sought from the object, import a special and distinct relation of conformity or deformity to right reason or the rule of morals, as in sacrilegious theft.

Circumstances of this kind are said to pass into the object, because with relation to the superadded species they become the object: thus in sacrilegious theft, the thing insofar as it is another's is the object of theft; insofar as sacred, it is the object of sacrilege. Those circumstances are commonly called species-changing.

302. III. Circumstances are given which increase or lessen morality in the same species; wherefore they are called AGGRAVATING or lessening. For there are circumstances which do not have of themselves a distinct morality, but modify that which comes from the object; such as more and less, intense and remiss, etc. Thus the quantity of money says no morality of itself; but it says good morality if the matter concerns alms; evil, if the matter concerns theft. Whence the saying: More or less does not change the species.

But if circumstances transfer sin from venial into mortal, or vice versa, they are said to change not the objective species, which they only increase or lessen, but the theological or demeritorious species. Thus theft of one as does not differ, as to the virtue to which it is opposed, from theft of ten gold pieces; nevertheless it differs as to fault, namely theologically: for the one is a venial sin, the other a mortal sin. Whence a circumstance which makes mortal from venial is called by some increasing unto infinity, because it brings with itself privation of grace and glory (cf. n. 334 and 342, q. 2 and 3).

Note. "A lightly evil circumstance, for example, precipitation in acting, tepidity in prayers, light indignation, concomitant vainglory, etc., coming to an act, does not take away its whole goodness, nor destroy every merit" (V, n. XXXIX). Thus commonly. "If it were otherwise," says Billuart (l. c.), "scarcely any good act would be found, even in the Saints themselves, since it happens so easily that any work whatever is infected by some lightly evil circumstance."

303. DEFINITION. End, in general, is that for the sake of which something is done, namely whose goodness, true or judged, entices the will and determines it to operating.

DIVISION. End is distinguished by reason of origin, or source, into the end of the work or intrinsic end, and the end of the one operating or extrinsic end. The end of the work is called that to which the work is ordered from its nature, as a house to dwelling, alms to relieving the want of a poor person. This end is one and the same as the object, concerning which n. 297. The end of the one operating is called that to which the one operating himself, from his own choice, orders his work: as if someone deceitfully builds a house on another's soil so that he may acquire it for himself; likewise, if someone bestows alms on account of empty glory.

If the one operating intends only the end of the work, the act therefrom contracts a morality not diverse from the morality which it has from the object; whence discourse concerning that does not return.

304. The end OF THE ONE OPERATING, concerning which here the matter is properly treated, is subdivided:

1. By reason of the motion of the will, it is primary or secondary.

Primary is said of that which is esteemed before the others, and which the agent, if perhaps a collision among various ends should arise, would retain first of all. Secondary is that which is subordinated to the primary end, and, with this presupposed, is intended as annexed to the primary. Let there be as an example the twofold end of an adolescent entering Religion: his primary end is that he provide for his eternal salvation; the secondary, that he be exempted from secular cares.

The secondary end sometimes is the cause why the agent applies himself to the work, yet with subordination to the primary end: for example, if a priest not intending to celebrate determines himself to this, that he may show himself pleasing to a friend. Ordinarily then it obtains the name of impulsive cause.

2. By reason of coordination among themselves, it is ultimate or intermediate. The ultimate end is that on account of which we will the rest, but it for its own sake only. The intermediate end is that on account of which we will something, but which again we refer to another: as if someone afflicts the body on account of virtue, which he seeks so that he may please God: God is the ultimate end of this affliction, but virtue the intermediate end.

3. By reason of formal morality, it is good or evil; but there is not given an indifferent end. This is clear from the fact that the end, as such, necessarily involves the notion of some good which the agent pursues. But the pursuit of this good either is according to right reason, or not: in the first case, the end is called good, in the other evil, and thus it is clear that an indifferent end is not given.

The act by which the will bears itself toward the end is called INTENTION: which is distinguished into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative; explicit or implicit, according as was said above concerning the voluntary (n. 272, 6.).

305. PRINCIPLES. I. The end of the one operating attributes true morality to a human act. This is clear from the things said; for the end, not otherwise than other circumstances, can say a relation of conformity or deformity to reason. Whence Christ the Lord (Matt. 6:22, 23): If thy eye shall be single, thy whole body will be lightsome. But if thy eye shall be evil, thy whole body will be dark. By the eye, however, the intention of the end is commonly understood; by the body, the action.

Hence St. Alphonsus (H. Ap., III, 5): "Every human act," he says, "whether it is elicited or commanded by the will, is specified by the end for the sake of which it is exercised. Wherefore those acts which have the same end, although materially they are diverse, nevertheless assume the same species; for example, if someone fasts, prays, preaches on account of the glory of God: all these acts are acts of charity. On the contrary, if one and the same material act is elicited by the will on account of diverse ends, it assumes diverse species": for example, if someone serves the sick from charity, from penance, from humility, etc.

The morality which is had from the extrinsic end is accidental with respect to the act to which it comes; for this act has its essential morality from the object, or from the intrinsic end: nevertheless it is called principal with respect to the agent, who primarily intends the extrinsic end, and is borne toward it with greater affection than toward the object itself. For we are denominated not from the act, but from the affection. Thus, for example, he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking per se, more an adulterer than a thief (Aristotle apud St. Thom., 1.2, q. 18, a. 6).

306. II. The end of the one operating sometimes attributes multiple morality to an action; but from the end of the one operating and from the end of the work, sometimes only one moral quality results. For distinguishing well this diverse morality, St. Alphonsus gives the following RULES (l. V, n. XXXVIII; ed. G., II, p. 701):

1. If the object is good, but the end of the one operating is evil, the human act is either simply evil, or partly good and partly evil.

a) It is simply evil, if the end is gravely evil. For the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God; for example, if someone gives alms to a needy girl in order to allure her to sin. b) Likewise, it is simply evil, if the lightly evil end is the total cause; for example, if someone gives alms solely for empty glory; for right reason disapproves that good be chosen on account of a depraved end (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 18, a. 4 and 6). c) It is partly good and partly evil, if the lightly evil end is a partial cause: for example, if someone, from a sincere affection of mercy, wishes to give alms to a poor person; but because the poor person asks publicly, there also enters in a stimulus of empty glory, which is not repelled.

This diverse morality in the same work can easily be understood from this, that about the same object there can be a multiple act of the will.

2. If the object is good and the end also good, the human act has a double species of moral goodness, as is giving alms in satisfaction for sins. Indeed, as many as are the good ends in the one operating, so many are the goodnesses in the act (as was said n. 305).

3. If the object is indifferent, a good end makes the act morally good, as is walking from obedience.

4. If the object is indifferent, an evil end makes the act morally evil, as is walking for a display of luxury.

5. If the object is evil, an evil end makes the act worse from evil, as to steal in order to support a concubine: in which act a double malice is involved, one against justice, the other against chastity.

6. If the object is evil, but the end of the one operating is good, the act does not lose its malice; nevertheless its deformity is less. The reason for the first is because a good end also ought to be intended well, namely through honest means. And Paul the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) condemns those who do evils that goods may come. The reason for the second is because the agent, from a good end, is borne into sin with a lesser affection: for example, if someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger.

The sources or principles of morality are those things from which it comes about that a human act is good or evil, better or worse.

Three sources of morality are numbered, namely: 1° the object; 2° its circumstances; 3° the end of the agent. These three are altogether required for a good act; if even one is evil, the act will become evil. Hence the commonly known axiom: Good is from an integral cause; evil, from any defect whatsoever.

I say: are required. Yet, in order that goodness be imputed, it is required besides that it be directly willed; for "for the will to be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good."¹ Wherefore it is imputed to no one for praise that, for example, he visited the sick only for the sake of conversation. Yet it is not required that it be intended explicitly and reflexively, or in a signate act, for example that you say or think: I will to fast because it is honorable; but it suffices that it be sought implicitly and equivalently, or in an exercised act, that is, that the act be apprehended as becoming, praiseworthy, worthy of reward, commended by pious men, or especially as a work, for example, of mercy, etc., and thus be done with a good intention. Cf. n. 31. Corol. 2. - On the contrary, in order that the malice of an act be imputed, it suffices that it be indirectly willed. Hence it is not necessary that the agent tend into the act as evil, because in that way scarcely anyone would sin; but it suffices that he intend an act to which malice is known to be annexed, although this malice in itself does not please him, or that he not avoid the act or the effect of the act which here and now he can and is bound to avoid; because by this very fact he virtually contemns the law and indirectly wills the malice. The reason for the difference is that good must be sought; but evil not only cannot be sought, but must be avoided; and it is not avoided by him who freely places an action to which evil is annexed. Hence he who voluntarily makes himself drunk, although he does not directly will the malice itself of drunkenness, but intends only the delight from drinking, nevertheless acts shamefully and sins. Haine, ib. p. 17. q. 42.

26. - The object is everything (thing or person) about which some action is morally¹ concerned. Hence in theft the object is another's thing which has been unjustly taken away; in an act of justice, another's thing which has been restored; in detestation of sin, an evil action which has been perpetrated. - Now this object can be something either good, as to venerate parents; or evil, as to steal another's goods; or indifferent, as to walk, to speak, to sleep. Again something can be either evil from its own nature, as drunkenness; or evil only because it is prohibited, as to eat meat on Friday without permission. But things evil from their own nature, or intrinsically evil, are of a threefold class, namely:

1° Certain things are such absolutely, or independently of every circumstance, because of themselves they involve repugnance with an absolutely necessary right order, as is hatred of God, blasphemy, etc.

2° Other things are intrinsically evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of some adjunct or condition which depends on the dominative power of God or man; such are the taking away of another's thing, the injuring of body or reputation, and similar things, which sometimes become lawful.

3° Finally, other things are evil only by reason of the danger which is ordinarily joined to them, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a wicked book, etc. ... These, when a just cause has been given and the proximate danger of sinning removed, can become lawful.²

That a human act derives its distinct morality from the object is clear from this, that from the object it has that it is such a moral action and not another, that is, good or evil; justice or religion; lust or blasphemy. And indeed from the object the act derives its first and essential morality. First, because it belongs to the act before any other morality (arising from circumstances or end); essential, because it cannot be absent from the act, although others (arising from circumstances

or end) were absent. Thus theft of a sacred thing in order to make oneself drunk is primarily conceived as evil by reason of the object, insofar as it is the unjust taking away of another's thing; and this injustice cannot be absent from theft, even when the end, which is drunkenness, and the circumstance of the sacred thing, are absent. Haine, ib. p. 19. q. 44.

27. - Circumstances, so called as if standing around the act, can be defined: "Accidental determinations, or certain accidents of an act, without which this act could indeed exist as to substance, but which nevertheless add to it a morality in some way different from that which that act already participates from the object and the end." Therefore, in order that a circumstance confer some morality upon an act, it is required that, for example, the circumstance of the sacred place in which it is perpetrated confer the malice of sacrilege upon an act of lust; but that the fact that a theft was committed with the right or left hand confers nothing of morality upon the theft.

Circumstances, as also the end, as such, attribute to the act a secondary and accidental morality. Cf. the things said at the end of n. 26. I said: as such; because sometimes they attribute to the act a first and essential morality, as if either a work objectively indifferent becomes evil from the end for which it is placed (to sing for vain glory) or good (to sing so that the profit coming from it may fall to pious causes), or if an evil circumstance is the whole reason why a good work is chosen (to sing divine praises in church merely so that you may be praised by men). But then circumstances, as being intended in themselves, induce the notion of object in the genus of morals. Haine, ib. p. 19. q. 46.

I say: A human act derives true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances determine the act as moral, namely as having a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order; indeed, as I have said, sometimes circumstances alone induce agreement or disagreement into an act, as happens in the acts about which we spoke above. Hence some circumstances leave the object in the same moral species, as the quantity of money stolen by theft or given in alms; for the species of malice in theft, or of goodness in alms, is not changed by the quantity of money stolen or given. But others change the species itself, or add a new one over it; thus the circumstance that the thing taken away is sacred adds over the malice of theft a new species, namely sacrilege.

From the former circumstances, some aggravate malice, but others diminish it, and that gravely or lightly. Thus the greater or lesser quantity of money taken away by theft, or given in alms, renders either the malice of theft or the goodness of alms greater or lesser, and that gravely or lightly lesser, according as the quantity of money is notably or not notably greater or lesser.

But if circumstances transfer a sin from venial into mortal, or conversely, then they are said to change not the objective species, which they only increase or diminish, but the theological or demeritorious species. Thus the theft of one cent does not differ as to the virtue to which it is opposed from the theft of a gold coin; nevertheless it differs as to fault, namely theologically, because the theft of one cent, as being a light sin, does not deserve the privation of grace and glory, as does the theft of a sum that is grave, as being mortal.

Number of circumstances. - Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly enumerated, and they are comprehended in that common little verse:

"Who, What, Where, By what helps, Why, How, When."

See the reason for precisely this number, if you wish, in St. Thomas.¹ Bouquillon² and Haine³ explain them clearly in the following practical way.

Who, or the one acting, is considered not by reason of himself, for thus he belongs to the substance of the human act, but by reason of his accidental quality or condition, which morally attributes to the act in moral estimation either a diverse value (changing the species), or a greater or lesser value (aggravating or diminishing in the same species). It changes the species, for example, in a sin of lust, if it is committed by a religious; it aggravates in theft, if it is perpetrated by a priest, insofar as, other things being equal, any sin whatever is graver in a priest than in a layman. I say: other things being equal, that is, supposing that in each the act is voluntary in the same degree, and thus in a holy man the same venial sin, committed from frailty or subreption, is wont to be lighter than in one not holy, because the holy commonly neglect less to guard against sins of this sort.¹ Similarly it also increases goodness, if, for example, an eminent man humbles himself, or a poor man gives alms.

What, that is, not the object itself into which the will is borne first and of itself, for a circumstance comes to the object; but the quantity or accidental quality joined to the object. In theft, for example, it is aggravating insofar as it signifies quantity, and thus the theft of 1000 coins is worse than of 100; but it can change the species insofar as it signifies quality, as if the thing stolen is sacred.

Where, or the circumstance of place, namely sacred, profane; public, private. If it operates anything morally, it ordinarily changes the species. Thus the holiness of the place adds the species of sacrilege to a homicide perpetrated in a church; publicity adds the species of scandal to a sin which is committed in a public place. But if you cling to base thoughts in church, it is only aggravating. But if an act, lawful in itself, is prohibited in reverence for a place, for example the extraction of a thief from an immune place, the quality of the place passes into the substance and gives the first species.

By what helps, or by what means which is not necessarily joined to the act; for, as I again admonish, circumstances are accidents of a human act. It changes the species if, for example, by the help of a demon or magician you have brought evil upon your neighbor, or have put on sacred vestments in order to deceive another; it aggravates if, for example, someone steals the ladder of one person in order that he may take away the money of another.

Why, or the end of the one acting, about which presently.

How, or by what accidental manner an act of virtue or of sin is placed; intensely or remissly; from malice or from vincible ignorance; with force brought upon someone or without it, etc. It changes the species, for example, in violation and in robbery; it aggravates, for example, if you sin from malice; it diminishes if you sin from vincible ignorance, from grave fear, from strong temptation, etc.; it changes the theological species if with semi-full advertence.

When, or the accidental quantity (for a long or short time) or quality of time, namely sacred or not sacred. The quality of time ordinarily does not notably aggravate the malice of an act; but, according to Lugo,¹ to a sin which is perpetrated on a feast day it can add a malice diverse in species (namely sacrilege), and that grave, if from the circumstance of sacred time notable irreverence were inflicted upon divine worship; as if someone should exhibit public games, etc., on the Parasceve of the Lord.² I would add: in places where that day is publicly or at least commonly distinguished from other days. - If an act not evil in itself is prohibited at that time, for example the eating of meat, the time passes into the object.

28. - The end is that for the sake of which something either is of itself, namely independently of the will of the one acting (the end of the work; proper; intrinsic), or is made at pleasure by the agent (the end of the one acting; extrinsic). Thus the relief of the poor person is the end of the work in almsgiving; but in the one giving it, either that very relief or vain glory will be able to be the end of the one acting. Concerning this alone, as being the only thing properly called end (motive), we must speak.

But this is: 1° either primary, which flows into the act as an efficient cause, so that without it the act would not be done; or secondary, which only allures to acting, without nevertheless being the efficient cause of the action. Thus a priest in celebrating Mass primarily intends the worship of God, secondarily the stipend.

For others, the primary end is that on account of which the act is chiefly placed; the secondary is that which moves the agent less than the primary, yet so that nothing prevents the agent, if that (secondary end) were lacking, from not acting. Primary in the former sense (which is ours) is equivalently the only or total end, and thus it is understood by St. Alphonsus (H. A. XVI. 136), when he explains who are to be judged to pass otherwise into fraud of reservation. Secondary, in the latter signification, is employed by the same holy Doctor, L. IV. n. 206, § Nota igitur, and is called by him the secondarily motive, without which the act (he is treating of a vow) would not be done. The Vindiciae give an example (Ed. 2. T. I. p. 307 (1); Ed. 1. p. 919. 1) in one who resolves to enter Religion in order to work out his eternal salvation; but since he is borne inordinately toward the eating of fish, he wishes to enter none but that of the Carthusians.

2° The end is intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it. Again the ultimate end is either a) positively or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended, or is not intended, with the exclusion of another end; or b) explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved by an end of this sort expressly or only virtually. Thus the dealings by which a miser strives to increase riches, in which he places his beatitude or ultimate end, can be called so many intermediate ends. But if in riches the will rests in such a way that it excludes God, these will constitute an end positively ultimate; otherwise negatively ultimate. Again, if it expressly excludes God, those dealings will be an ultimate end explicitly intended; if not expressly, but he acts in such a way that he must be said by his deed to exclude Him, as if for increasing riches he commits mortal thefts, those dealings will be an ultimate end implicitly intended; for through mortal sin he renounces God. - A means is that which is intended insofar as it is useful for the end, without the will taking pleasure in it, as, for example, the lack of food which the miser unwillingly tolerates in order to increase his riches. Hence the intermediate end participates in the nature of a means insofar as it is referred to a further end; but in the nature of an end insofar as the will takes pleasure in it.

I say: 1° A human act derives true morality from the end, as being consonant with or dissenting from reason. Thus it is conformed to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give them for the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say: 2° He sins who acts for delight alone. The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight exists on account of operation, and not conversely; namely delight, for example in eating or drinking, is as a certain salt and seasoning, which serves for enticing one to actions necessary or useful for life. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out those actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but is not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas says: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, has appointed delights on account of operation.¹ Confirmation from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV). - Yet this disorder of itself is not grave, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless the matter is of those "whose," as the Apostle says, "God is the belly."

29. Resolutions. - 1° Every choice of an evil means is evil, but, conversely, not every choice of a good means is good. Thus no one is praised from the fact that he abstains from drink from avarice; but he is to be held guilty who steals money for making alms.

2° He who chooses an honorable means for an honorable end places an act of twofold honorableness, if each honorableness is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

3° He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example if someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise, conversely, he who employs an honorable means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4° He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you take up a journey in order to show a traveler the way, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you contract only the guilt of the end.

30. Questions. - It is asked 1° whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act.

Resp. 1° A gravely evil end always wholly infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For an act by which someone, by sinning mortally, totally withdraws from God, can in no part be approved by God. Thus if someone gives alms to a needy girl in order to entice her to sin, although also in order to relieve her poverty, the act is wholly infected by the evil end.

Resp. 2° A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act if it is the total end, or at least the primary end of the agent. For the total end (i.e. the end intended solely), since it embraces the whole object, infects the whole, because the agent wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil.²

This is also clear from the words of Christ:¹ "If ... thy eye be evil, thy whole body will be dark." But if there is a twofold end, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because in such a case there is not indeed physically, but morally, one act of the will, since the secondary end is subordinated to the primary end² (in the sense declared above in n. 28 in the former place); as if someone gives alms from mercy and from vain glory, and would not give unless he expected the praises of men.

Resp. 3° But if the end, lightly evil, is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which is partly good and partly evil. The reason is that in this case two acts of the will are present, even morally, of which one is not subordinated to the other, and of which one is good, the other evil. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - You have an example in one who from a sincere affection of mercy wishes to give alms to a poor person, but because the poor person asks publicly, there also enters the stimulus of vain glory, which is not repelled. - Let the same be the judgment concerning a lightly evil circumstance sometimes accompanying an act good from the object, as when someone, rebuking another from charity, incidentally consents to a movement of anger. For a movement of this sort is an act standing of itself. Wherefore properly it does not deprave the act which it accompanies, but mixes evil with it.²

31. - It is asked 2° whether all our actions must be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle:³ Whether therefore you eat, ... do all things unto the glory of God?

Resp. More commonly, with St. Thomas, Doctors teach⁴ that in the words of the Apostle a precept is truly contained.

It is asked 3° what is required so that one not sin against this precept.

Resp. "This relation" of all works "unto the glory of God is understood either in act, or in aptitude of being referred, which is not only in good things, but also in indifferent things."⁵ With these things set down, I say:

1° On the part of the work, it is required that it be referable to God; such is also a work indifferent from the object. Therefore it suffices that it be neither mortally nor venially evil.

2° On the part of the agent, some positive relation of works to God is certainly required. But what kind?

Resp. a) An actual relation is required as often as the precept of eliciting an act of charity urges; for "under the precept of charity it is contained that God be loved from the whole heart; and therefore a man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also are referred to God."¹

b) When the precept of eliciting an act of charity is not urging, a virtual relation is required and suffices. It is required, "so that an actual relation to God be joined to every action of ours, not indeed in act but in virtue, according as the virtue of the first ordering," i.e. of the actual ordering previously had, "remains in all following actions, just as the virtue of the ultimate end also remains in all ends ordered to it."²

c) In neither case is an explicit relation required, but an implicit one suffices. It suffices in the former case, namely when the precept of eliciting an act of charity urges, "because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all the things which are ordered to him."³ It likewise suffices in the latter case; for "it is not necessary," nor possible, "that someone always think of the ultimate end whenever he desires or does something."⁴

d) It is not required that we refer our works to God from the motive of charity; for the mode of charity does not fall under the precept of the divine law, except when from precept an act of charity is to be elicited.⁵ St. Alphonsus agrees,⁶ requiring nothing other and nothing more, except that works be referred "to any honorable good."

e) Nor is it required that all things be done from a supernatural motive. "And therefore when some unbeliever, from the dictate of reason, does some good thing, not referring it to evil, he does not sin."⁷ This is confirmed from proposition 8 among those condemned by Alexander VIII (p. XXII).

Corollaries. - 1. Those are to be said to observe this precept, insofar as it demands an actual relation, who elicit an act of charity when the precept of eliciting it urges.

2. Likewise those who, when this precept does not urge, deliberately place a work honorable in itself, "not referring it to evil";¹ - who study to preserve the mean of virtue in jokes, games, recreations, adornment, etc.;² - who collectively order all their works to God. For those who deliberately place a work honorable in itself, by this very fact that they do not refer it to evil, are to be judged to intend, at least implicitly, the honorableness of the work. But those who study to preserve the mean of virtue in jokes, etc., by this very zeal of theirs show themselves to seek the good of virtue. Finally, the collective relation of all works to God implicitly contains the relation of each one.

3. "Although someone approaching the table does not think of the conservation of life, but only of the delight of food, ... he does not on that account sin, because he wills such delight," at least virtually (as is supposed), "on account of the conservation of life, and thus he does not inordinately seek it."³

4. "That the intention may remain more in virtue in our daily actions,"⁴ and that the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled in a more perfect and more salutary manner, "one ought more often in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer all one's acts to God."⁵

It is asked 4° in what way the human will, that it may be good, ought to be conformed to the divine will.

Resp. 1° In all things it ought to be conformed at least negatively, i.e. it is never permitted to disapprove that which God wills, or to murmur against it; for He disposes all things wisely.

Resp. 2° Positively our will can be conformed to the divine will in two ways, namely in the thing willed materially and in the thing willed formally. The thing willed materially is the thing itself or object which we will; the thing willed formally is the reason or end on account of which we will that thing. Again, the thing willed formally is of two kinds: one proximate or particular, i.e. the particular reason on account of which we will that thing; the other universal or ultimate, and it is the glory of God. Thus, while I will my father to live, whom God wills to die, the thing willed materially is the life of the father; the thing willed formally and proximately is the reason of piety toward one's father, the good of the family, etc. But if I should will this ultimately on account of the glory of God, my will is conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately; because just as the ultimate reason on account of which God wills my father to die is the glory of God, so the ultimate reason on account of which I will my father to live is also the glory of God. With these things set down:

I say: a) Our will ought positively to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately, but not always in the thing willed formally and proximately. - I say: "it ought positively to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately"; for the motive of the divine will is ultimately referred to the glory of God, to which the human will, that it may be right, ought to refer all its actions, at least virtually, as was said above.

I added: "but not always in the thing willed formally and proximately"; because, although it is unlawful to will something opposed to the divine will under the same reason under which God wills it, nevertheless it is not always unlawful to will it under a diverse reason, namely one which is not dishonorable. Thus it can happen that a son, on account of reasons of particular good, lawfully wills his father to live; but God wills him to die on account of other reasons, for example on account of sins, or because the course of nature demands it.

I say: b) Our will ought to be positively conformed to the divine will also in the thing willed materially, where the matter concerns a sufficiently known precept or prohibition; for the will of God commanding or prohibiting, when sufficiently known, always has annexed the will of obliging man to willing and doing what He commands, or to not willing and not doing what He forbids. I said: "where the matter concerns a precept or prohibition." - Wherefore 1. of itself I am not bound to will to follow the evangelical counsels. Yet I am bound, as is clear from the things said under Resp. 1°, to be conformed negatively to the divine will with respect to them, insofar as it is not permitted to disapprove them, since they are good and salutary. - Nor 2.

am I bound to will all things harmful to me which, God willing, happen to me, hunger, sickness, the death of parents, etc., in such a way that it is lawful for me, as much as I can, to flee them or strive against them. But after and insofar as these things have already happened, it is not permitted with an absolute and consequent will to oppose them, because again this would be the same as not being conformed to the divine will even negatively. But with an antecedent or conditioned will I am not bound in these things to be conformed to the divine will; and in this way it is lawful for a son to will his father, who is already dead, to live, namely while he wills this under another reason than that under which God willed the opposite. For the antecedent or conditioned will considers the life of the father under the reason of a particular good, abstractly from the circumstance of the divine will. - Haine,¹ Dens.² Cf. S. Th.³ and St. Alphonsus.⁴

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4, 10.

138. Notions. - After we have spoken of the ultimate foundation and the first objective principle of morality, the immediate principles now come to be considered, which are called the sources of morality; namely, the elements of the human act from which it immediately comes about that it is conformed to the rule and good, or difform from it and evil, and indeed more or less. They are the object (the primary source), and the circumstances (the secondary source), of which the chief is the end, because it most greatly influences the act.

A. The object in the present matter is considered 1) not as the whole objective element or complex of all the circumstances, but in the proper sense as distinguished from circumstances: it is that which is first and per se attained by the act, or the matter (thing or person) about which it is concerned, that into which, primarily and per se from its own nature, it tends; hence it is the same as the intrinsic end;

2. not according to physical being, but according to moral being, that is, insofar as it is conformed or difform to the rule of reason.

Hence the words object, matter, end are used indiscriminately. For, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 75, a. 3, ad 1: "the object, although it is the matter about which the act is terminated, nevertheless has the notion of end, according as the intention of the agent is borne into it." Cf. q. 72, a. 3, ad 2.

B. Circumstances are secondarily attained by the act as accidents which affect and determine the human act in its constituted being. Some affect the human act according to physical being, and these are indifferent (for example, that someone steals in the morning or in the evening); others according to moral being, which they increase or diminish (for example, that he steals much or little): these are called moral, to which alone we attend here.

C. End is here understood not as the end of the work or intrinsic end, which is the same as the object, but as the extrinsic and adjoined end of the one acting, "by which the agent is moved to the work."

But since reason is not determined to one thing, but can tend first and per se to all things, hence the same thing can be the object with respect to one act and only a circumstance with respect to another, and indeed: a) moral being can be a circumstance of an act considered according to physical being, for example, that the thing is another's or deposited in a sacred place is a circumstance as to the act of taking, but it is the substance of theft or sacrilege; b) indeed, the circumstance of one act can be the object and substance of another act: thus with respect to theft it is not a circumstance that the thing is another's, but that it is sacred, although this is not a circumstance as to sacrilege.

139. Observation.

The object, and similarly the end and circumstance, can be considered in two ways: physically and materially in the being of a being, insofar as it is something in the nature of things, and thus it is always good, with the goodness of nature or of being; or morally and in the being of conduct, insofar as it is the object of such an act and insofar as it is attained by the one acting, and thus it can be morally good or evil. It is said:

1. As to the objective element: insofar as it is the object of such a human act, or has or does not have due proportion to such an act; that is, insofar as it is subject to the rule of reason and is conformable to it and morally good, or difform and evil, that such a thing or person be attained by such an act. Thus the object of theft is not another's thing considered in itself and physically, but insofar as the rule forbids that it be taken from its owner; the object of temperance is not food considered in itself, but insofar as it is conformable to reason that it be taken as much as is necessary. Hence:

a) An object physically good can be morally evil, and conversely. Thus, although God and sin according to themselves are a good or evil object, nevertheless God as to be hated is an evil object, and sin as to be destroyed is a good object conformable to reason.

b) One and the same physically single object can be morally good or evil, as to seize or to restore another's thing, to love and to hate a man.

c) The same act according to physical being can be of diverse species according to moral being: thus to give money is a donation if it is done as a favor, alms if to relieve misery, payment if to extinguish a debt, restitution if to compensate an injury, recompense if on account of merit.

d) An act physically the same can be morally good or evil according as it is done by diverse subjects, or by the same subject but at diverse times, for example, the act of fornication and the conjugal act, the eating of flesh on Thursday and Friday, the killing of a man by a robber or by a soldier.

e) Acts of the same physical species can be of diverse moral species, for example, to know one's own wife or another's, love of God and of wine, of virtue and of vice; on the contrary, acts of the same moral species can be of physically diverse species, for example, love and desire of the same object.

2. As to the subjective element: insofar as it is attained by the one acting, that is, is known as conformable or difform with the rules, or insofar as the object and its morality is known by the conscience of the one acting as conformable or difform to reason. For it can happen that an object in itself evil is nevertheless from invincible ignorance thought good: thus if someone takes another's thing which he thinks is his own, the act will be formally good; and conversely, as if someone thinks that today one must fast and does not fast, the act will be formally evil.

All the aforesaid things also hold concerning circumstances and the end.

140. Principle I. The object considered morally gives morality to the act, that is, goodness or malice, and indeed fundamental, principal, and primary morality.

It is said: 1) fundamental, because it is intrinsic and essential to the action, just as the object without which the act cannot be;

2. principal, because it gives to the act the moral species by which it is distinguished from others;

3. primary, because it is conceived before every other morality which comes from circumstances, and perseveres even when these are changed. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing on account of vainglory, the malice from the object, or injustice, is first and fundamental; the malice from the circumstances of sacredness and of the end is called secondary and accidental.

It is proved 1) by reason: that is good which has the fullness of being due to it, evil if it does not have the whole being which it ought to have. But something has being and therefore goodness first from that which gives it species, namely, from its form, for example a man generated from this, that he is a rational animal; on the contrary, it has principal and fundamental malice if it does not have the being of the species which it ought to have, for example if instead of a man a monster is generated. But a human act has its species from the object considered morally, as from form. Therefore from a fitting object it has goodness, and indeed primary and fundamental goodness; likewise malice if it does not have the fitting object which it ought to have.

The minor is proved: a human act is a movement or tendency toward the object considered morally, as toward a term. But every movement has species from the term as from its form, because it is to the term as potency to act. Therefore a human act has species from the object considered morally, as from its form.

This can be contracted briefly thus: every thing has fundamental being and goodness (and therefore malice) from its species. But a human act has species from the object, because it is a movement toward it as its term. Therefore the human act, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, has its species from the object by which it is terminated.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures and in the doctrine of Tradition it is often affirmed that good things are to be done, all evil things to be avoided; this must at least be understood of those things which are good or evil by reason of matter. Thus, for example, Ps. XXXIII, 14: Turn away from evil and do good; Prov. III, 7: Fear (that is, worship) God and depart from evil; Is. I, 16-17: Cease to act perversely, learn to do good. Alluding to these, the prince of the apostles says, I Pet. III, 10-12: He who wills to love life and to see good days, let him restrain his tongue from evil and his lips lest they speak deceit; let him turn away from evil and do good; let him seek peace and follow it, because the eyes of the Lord are upon the just and his ears unto their prayers, but the face of the Lord is upon those doing evil.

Hence Christ, replying to the young man asking, "What good shall I do that I may have eternal life?" (Mt. XIX, 16), answers (vv. 17-19): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments:... Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness. Honor thy father and thy mother, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; and these are evil or good precisely from the object.

141. Principle II. Moral circumstances as such give goodness and malice to human acts, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: a) moral circumstances, because they are not considered in themselves and physically, but morally, that is, 1) as to this act, insofar as it is conformable or difform to the rule of reason that the act be placed with these circumstances; and 2) insofar as this is known by the agent.

b) as such, because sometimes they also confer the first and essential goodness or malice, as if a work indifferent from the object becomes good by reason of a circumstance, for example, to drink moderately; but then the circumstance is intended first and per se and becomes the object, or that which is first attained.

c) secondary and accidental morality, because circumstances as such supervene upon the act in its being and moral species already constituted.

It is proved 1) by reason: fullness of being and goodness in things is not had only from that which gives them species, but also secondarily from supervening accidents, for example in man from figure, virtue, color, etc.; if something of these is lacking which ought to be present, or if something else is present which ought not to be present, according to this the thing will be evil. Therefore also in human acts the fullness of being and goodness does not consist wholly in the species which comes from the object, but is added secondarily from the arriving accidents which are circumstances; and if some due circumstance is lacking or an undue one is present, according to this the action will be evil.

It is confirmed: circumstances can imply a habitude of agreement or disagreement with the rule of reason just as the object itself can, for example, it is not only unfitting to steal but also to steal in a sacred place; it is not only fitting to pray but also to pray on bended knees. Therefore.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures, Christ himself (Mk. XII, 41-44) declared that the poor widow who gave two mites gave more than the rich who gave many things, because she gave from her want.

And 3) from Tradition we know that in confession the circumstances of sin must be declared which change the species, or so aggravate or diminish that they make a venial sin mortal or the reverse (which the Council of Trent defined, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7). But there would be no reason for this if they did not increase or diminish malice.

142. Principle III. The extrinsic and adjoined end as such and morally regarded gives goodness or malice to human acts, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: 1) extrinsic end: for the end of the work, or intrinsic end, is the same as the object; hence it is a question of the extrinsic and accidental end which is added by the one acting to the object;

1. St. Thomas: "The proximate end is the same as the object... but the remote end is posited as a circumstance," De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, ad 8.

2. as such: for the end sometimes assumes the notion of a moral object and gives the first morality, as if someone does an indifferent act on account of a good end or an evil end, or an act good from the object solely on account of the extrinsic end alone;

3. morally regarded, that is, insofar as it is conformable or difform to reason that such a thing be intended as an end and that such an act be chosen as a means to obtain it.

IX. Lust indirectly voluntary, which the will does not procure nor intend, to which it neither positively consents nor resists, but toward which it behaves negatively, and which it only permits because it does not repress it when it can and ought to repress it, is of itself venially evil; per accidens, sometimes mortal on account of danger of consent.

It is proved: in this a man sins, because reason and will are lacking in their office of directing and repressing the motions of the lower powers, nor can he bear himself indifferently to whether his motions and acts are inordinate or not; but:

a. per se he does not sin mortally, because positive consent of the will is lacking;

b. per accidens he would sin mortally if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to venereal pleasure.

Hence man is bound to resist those motions positively, insofar as is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the motions:

1. ordinarily not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, such as suppression of imagination, compression of the members, chastisement of the body, and so forth, because this is not necessary for the aforesaid end, or is too difficult, or even excites more;

2. but indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompatible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind, for example by interrupting the work, pursuing business, an external occupation requiring special attention, praying, and so forth; indeed:

3. sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise and for not repressing the motions, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices. This act is not to be frequently repeated, since until it is retracted it is judged morally to persevere. Thus if someone has experienced that other resistance is useless for checking the motions, or excites and increases them more; or if the motions have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as was said in the preceding number, c, and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example on account of duration; or if the motions are light and transitory, both because the causes exciting such motions are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are repressed better and more effectively by contempt: for solicitude about impeding them is accustomed to excite imaginations and increase the motions. All these things are easily verified in the scrupulous person, who therefore will show sufficient displeasure by simply despising the motions.

The sources of morality are named those principles which bestow upon human acts their species, or a modification of the species, in the genus of morals.

Three sources of morality are numbered, namely: 1st, the object of the act; 2nd, its circumstances; 3rd, the end of the agent. These three are altogether required for a good act; if even one is bad, the act will become bad. Hence the well-known axiom: Good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever.

By principles of morality we understand all those things from which it comes about that act be good, or evil, or indifferent. The Author assigns three here q. 18, a. 2, 3 et 4, namely object, circumstances and end. For although the end is also a circumstance, since nevertheless it influences action most greatly, therefore the Holy Doctor treats specially of it, and with him commonly theologians. But those things which are wont to be disputed concerning these three principles of morality we shall weigh in this article through several paragraphs. Whence be

§ I. — Whether the first and specific goodness or malice of human act is from the object ?

By object we understand here not whatsoever is objected to the will, for thus the very circumstances would also be its object; but that which is first and per se attained by the will.

I say 1° : The first and essential goodness, or malice of human act, is drawn from the object morally considered¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 2, c.

It is proved. As in naturals first and essential goodness is taken from form which gives species, as in man from rational form, and the first evil from defect of form which gives species, as if generated thing does not attain specific form, suppose man be not generated but something in place of man ; so in morals first and essential goodness is regarded from form giving species to human act, and first malice from defect of this form. But form giving species to human act is the object. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Human act is motion and tending toward object as toward term. But motion and tending regards term as proper form; for it is compared to it as potency to act, perfectible and determinable to perfective and determinative. Therefore.

I said : « From object morally considered, » because around same object physically considered acts specifically diverse can turn, good and evil: as around same thing alien, act of injustice, taking away, act of justice, restoring; around same wife adultery and conjugal act; around same man love and hatred.

Object must therefore be taken morally, and as it stands to directing reason, and is conformable or disconformable to it.

You will say. Human act draws first and specific morality from what it first regards. But it regards the end, as St. Thomas teaches here a. 6, c., and above q. 1, a. 3, c. And it is clear because object is willed on account of end. Therefore end is prior willed.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Human act first regards end of work, I concede; end of worker, I deny. End of work, which also is called intrinsic, coincides with object; end of worker comes to it from extrinsic and accidentally, so that without it the same act could stand.

Whether and how human act takes goodness or malice from circumstances and from end ?

TO BE NOTED BEFOREHAND

1° Circumstance is « an accident of human act, morally affecting it already constituted in moral being ¹ ». ¹ Here q. 7, a. 1, c.

It is explained ². It is called accident, because circumstance is said metaphorically from place. Therefore as in local things that is said to stand around something which is indeed extrinsic to it, yet attains it or approaches it; so in morals circumstance is said to be that which is outside substance of act, yet attaining it somehow. But what is outside substance of thing, as being such that without it the thing can be and be conceived, pertains nevertheless to itself, is called its accident. So is, e.g., circumstance of sacred place respecting theft. ² Ibid.

It is said, « affecting human act already constituted in moral being, » because, if it gave first and essential moral species, it would no longer be circumstance, but would pass into condition of object and essential difference.

It is said, « morally affecting it, » that is, modifying it in ordine to rules of morals; because, if it affect physically, it will indeed be circumstance of act qua physical, not qua moral, as that one give alms in gold or silver, morning or evening, with right or left hand; of which there is not question here.

2° Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly assigned, comprehended in this verse: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando¹. For in acts must be considered, who did it, with what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how he did it, and when he did it. ¹ Ibid., a. 3, c. — These circumstances were enumerated by Aristotle in III Ethic., c. 2 vel 3, and by Cicero in his Rhetorica.

Note, these things which we recounted, in order that they be circumstances, are not to be taken insofar as substance of act depends upon them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Whence

Quis, signifies not substance of agent, but its quality, e.g., that he be priest, religious or layman, unmarried or married, rich or poor, superior or subject.

Quid, denotes likewise not substance of effect, but some accident joined to it, suppose quality or quantity : e.g., in theft, it denotes not that stolen thing be alien, for that pertains to substance of theft, but that it be sacred or profane, that it be of great or small quantity; in homicide, that slain one be parent or cleric; in lust, that partner be kinswoman or wedded one, etc.

Ubi, signifies not bare place, certain it is that act done somewhere is done somewhere, but quality of place: as that it be public, sacred, etc.; for if fornication take place in public place, scandal arises, if in sacred place, it is sacrilege.

Quibus auxiliis, signifies accidental instruments or means which the agent used; as if he used help of devil or witchcraft, if he killed by poison or sword, etc.

Cur, denotes end, not intrinsic and of work, for that pertains to substance of act, but extrinsic and of working : as if someone steal to get himself drunk.

Quomodo, signifies accidental mode whereby act is done, e.g., intensely or remissly, from contempt or levity, from ignorance or fear, from malice or passion.

Quando, signifies accidental condition of time, namely either quality, as if work be done on feast day, or day of communion; or quantity, as if act endure long or little.

Question is resolved.

I say 1° : Human act draws some goodness or malice from circumstances¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 3, c.

It is proved 1°. Concerning goodness or malice of human acts judgment must be made in same mode, at least analogically, as concerning goodness and malice of natural things. But in natural things whole goodness and perfection is not taken from sole form giving species, but also from accidents: thus, e.g., whole goodness and perfection of man is not taken from his sole substantial form, but from various accidents, as from color, figure, due proportion of members, etc. Therefore whole goodness of human act is not taken from sole object giving species, but also from circumstances which are its accidents.

2° Therefore human act draws goodness or malice from object, because it says habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason. But circumstances also can import habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason: thus, e.g., not only is it disconvenient to reason to steal, but also to steal in sacred place.

I say 2° : Human act sometimes draws from circumstances species of good or evil, sometimes only aggravation or diminution of goodness or malice within same species ; or, as commonly is said : Certain circumstances are changing species, certain only aggravating within same species¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 10 et 11, c.

Changing-species circumstance is that which of itself adds onto human act special and distinct goodness or malice; only aggravating, that which increases only presupposed goodness or malice and modifies it within same species.

Among aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. It is held notably aggravating in quantitative matter, or which consists in number, weight and measure, when separately taken and separated from act it would suffice unto mortal sin : as he who stole beyond twenty-five aurei would sin mortally: as he who beyond twenty-five asses, which I suppose suffice unto mortal sin, stole another twenty-five. In other matters however it is held notably aggravating, when it notably exceeds ordinary measure of sinning in suchlike matters: as if anyone spend whole night in impurities with woman, if anyone persevere through months and years in fraternal hatred, if anyone killed enemy cutting him limb from limb, etc.

If neither of these occur, it is held lightly aggravating : suppose thief filched thirty asses; that after quarrel someone angry remained in hatred for some small time.

Species-changing circumstances certainly must be accused in confession. That notably aggravating circumstances also must be accused holds the more common and safer opinion², of which in treatise on Penance. ² The contrary is now common, because it seems more probable. This question will be resolved in its place.

I say 3° : Human act draws goodness or malice from end³. ³ Here q. 18, a. 4, c.

Clear from what was said, because end, like other circumstances, can say order of conformity or disformity toward reason. So conformable to reason is it, not only to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as repugnant to reason is it, not only to steal, but also to steal to get oneself drunk.

§ III. — Certain little questions concerning preceding paragraphs briefly resolved.

You will ask 1° from what act good from object, commanded unto good end, draws specific and essential goodness.

I answer. Commanded act taken in itself and specifically draws its specific and essential goodness from object, accidental from end: 1° Because what comes upon act constituted in its species is accidental to it. But command and ordering of act good of itself unto extrinsic end comes upon it already constituted in its species. Therefore. 2° Act takes essential species from what it primarily and immediately regards. But commanded act, considered in itself and specifically, primarily and immediately regards object: thus e.g., volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards honesty of mercy, only secondarily and mediately honesty of penance. Therefore.

But if commanded act be taken formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has essential species from end; because, as such, it is reckoned one and same with commanding act, and regards same object.

Nevertheless, because it happens to that act, considered in itself, that it be commanded, and command and ordering unto extrinsic end supervenes upon it already constituted in its species, simply speaking, comparison made between those species, it must be said that that which it has from object is essential, and that which it has from end accidental.

Titius and Caius, priests, sometimes converse about matters pertaining to morals. One day they enter into a conversation about the subject in which the morality of human acts resides. “I venerate,” says Caius, “the practice of the Church, for, as the Angelic Doctor says, ‘The custom of the Church has the greatest authority and is always to be emulated in all things, because even the doctrine of Catholic doctors has authority from the Church’ (II–II, question 10, article 12). Nevertheless, I have never been able to understand the necessity of confessing the external act of sin; rather, it seems to me that it ought to suffice to confess the internal act, because the malice of sin is from the will, and the species of the internal and external sin is the same: ‘Everyone who has looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.’” Titius admits that he has the same difficulty, increased by the fact that, according to several doctors, the effect of a sin does not have to be confessed, although it would seem that the effect, as at least voluntary in its cause, should be confessed rather than the external act. It is asked:

1. Is the morality of human acts in the internal act or in the external act?

2. How do the effect of a sin and the external act of sin differ?

3. How are the difficulties of Caius and Titius to be answered?

1. Is the morality of human acts in the internal or in the external action?

The morality of human acts, or their goodness and badness, is there where freedom resides, for it is only because an action is freely produced by the agent that it is imputable to him. Freedom, however, is formally and strictly only in the will, and an external act is only called free inasmuch as it proceeds from a free will.

2. How do the effect of a sin and the external act of sin differ ?

Three stages may be distinguished in a bad action, as, for example, murder. First of all there is the deliberate purpose to commit the crime; then the blow is struck; finally, perhaps after an interval of some days or weeks, death ensues. The internal and the external act, or the purpose and the blow, form together one complete human action, of which the formal part is the purpose and the blow is the material. From this complete human act we must distinguish its effect which follows after some time, as we here suppose for the sake of clearness. The effect is due to a free exercise of will, and is therefore imputable to the agent, but it is not a human act; it is the consequence of a human act.

3. What is to be said in answer to the difficulties of Caius and Titius? Caius does not see the reason why the external act should be confessed if the malice of sin is in the internal act of the will. Caius confounds two different things — sin and the malice of sin. The malice of a purpose to commit murder is the same as that of actual murder, but a purpose is an internal act and actual murder is a complete human act made up of the internal and of the external act of execution of the purpose. They are, then, two different human acts, and therefore they are two different sins; for sin is a bad human act, and so one must not be confessed for the other.

Titius has the same difficulty, and in his case it is increased because many theologians allow that the effect of a sin need not be confessed, although it is voluntary in its cause. In answer to this it may be said that the effect of a sin is not itself sin, and only sins need be confessed. On the contrary, an inordinate external act is a sin, for sin is any word, deed, or desire against the law of God. The effect of an action may follow while he who put its cause is asleep, and a man can not commit sin while he is asleep. The effect might even follow after the death of the person who caused it, and certainly a man can not commit sin when he is dead.¹

1 Cf. Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 16, sec. 9.

1. The morality of any given action is determined by three elements, the end in view, the means taken, and the circumstances that accompany the taking of the said means. Whoever knows this principle, does not thereby know the right and wrong of every action, but he knows how to go about the enquiry. It is a rule of diagnosis.

2. In order to know whether what a man does befits him as a man to do, the first thing to examine is that which he mainly desires and wills in his action. Now the end is more willed and desired than the means. He who steals to commit adultery, says Aristotle, is more of an adulterer than a thief. The end in view is what lies nearest to a man's heart as he acts. On that his mind is chiefly bent; on that his main purpose is fixed. Though the end is last in the order of execution, it is first and foremost in the order of intention. Therefore the end in view enters into morality more deeply than any other element of the action. It is not, however, the most obvious determinant, because it is the last point to be gained; and because, while the means are taken openly, the end is often a secret locked up in the heart of the doer, the same means leading to many ends, as the road to a city leads to many homes and resting-places. Conversely, one end may be prosecuted by many means, as there are many roads converging upon one goal.

3. If morality were determined by the end in view, and by that alone, the doctrine would hold that the end justifies the means. That doctrine is false, because the moral character of a human act depends on the thing willed, or object of volition, according as it is or is not a fit object. Now the object of volition is not only the end in view, but likewise the means chosen. Besides the end, the means are likewise willed. Indeed, the means are willed more immediately even than the end, as they have to be taken first.

4. A good action, like any other good thing, must possess a certain requisite fulness of being, proper to itself. As it is not enough for the physical excellence of a man to have the bare essentials, a body with a soul animating it, but there is needed a certain grace of form, colour, agility, and many accidental qualities besides; so for a good act it is not enough that proper means be taken to a proper end, but they must be taken by a proper person, at a proper place and time, in a proper manner, and with manifold other circumstances of propriety.

5. The end in view may be either single, as when you forgive an injury solely for the love of Christ: or multiple co-ordinate, as when you forgive both for the love of Christ and for the mediation of a friend, and are disposed to forgive on either ground separately; or multiple subordinate, as when you would not have forgiven on the latter ground alone, but forgive the more easily for its addition, having been ready, however, to forgive on the former alone; or cumulative, as when you forgive on a number of grounds collectively, on no one of which would you have forgiven apart from the rest.

6. Where there is no outward action, but only an internal act, and the object of that act is some good that is willed for its own sake, there can be no question of means taken, as the end in view is immediately attained.

7. The means taken and the circumstances of those means enter into the morality of the act, formally as they are seen by the intellect, materially as they are in themselves. (See what is said of ignorance, c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27.) This explains the difference between formal and material sin. A material sin would be formal also, did the agent know what he was doing. No sin is culpable that is not formal. But, as has been said, there may be a culpable perversion of the intellect, so that the man is the author of his own obliquity or defect of vision. When Saul persecuted the Christians, he probably sinned materially, not formally. When Caiphas spoke the truth without knowing it, he said well materially, but ill formally.

8. In looking at the means taken and the circumstances that accompany those means, it is important to have a ready rule for pronouncing what particular belongs to the means and what to the circumstances. Thus Clytemnestra deals her husband Agamemnon a deadly stroke with an axe, partly for revenge, partly that she may take to herself another consort; is the deadliness of the blow part of the means taken or only an accompanying circumstance? It is part of the means taken. The means taken include every particular that is willed and chosen as making for the end in view. The fatal character of the blow does make to that end; if Agamemnon does not die, the revenge will not be complete, and life with Aegisthus will be impossible. On the other hand, the fact that Clytemnestra is the wife of the man whom she murders, is not a point that her will rests upon as furthering her purpose at all; it is an accompanying circumstance. This method of distinguishing means from circumstance is of great value in casuistry.

9. It is clear that not every attendant circumstance affects the morality of the means taken. Thus the blow under which Agamemnon sank was neither more nor less guiltily struck because it was dealt with an axe, because it was under pretence of giving him a bath, or because his feet were entangled in a long robe. These circumstances are all irrelevant. Those only are relevant which attach some special reasonableness or unreasonableness to the thing done Thus the provocation that Clytemnestra had from her husband's introduction of Cassandra into her house made her act of vengeance less unreasonable: on the other hand it was rendered more unreasonable by the circumstance of the dear and holy tie that binds wife to husband. The provocation and the relationship were two relevant circumstances in that case.

10. But it happens sometimes that a circumstance only affects the reasonableness of an action on the supposition of some previous circumstance so affecting it. Thus to carry off a thing in large or small quantities does not affect the reasonableness of the carrying, unless there be already some other circumstance attached that renders the act good or evil; as for instance, if the goods that are being removed are stolen property. Circumstances of this sort are called aggravating—or, as the case may be, extenuating—circumstances. Circumstances that of themselves, and apart from any previous supposition, make the thing done peculiarly reasonable or unreasonable, are called specifying circumstances. They are so called, because they place the action in some species of virtue or vice; whereas aggravating or extenuating circumstances add to, or take off from, the good or evil of the action in that species of virtue or vice to which it already belongs.

11. A variety of specifying circumstances may place one and the same action in many various species of virtue or vice. Thus a religious robbing his parents would sin at once against justice, piety, and religion. A nun preferring death to dishonour practises three virtues, chastity, fortitude, and religion.

12. The means chosen may be of four several characters:—

(a) A thing evil of itself and inexcusable under all conceivable circumstances; for instance, blasphemy, idolatry, lying.

(b) Needing excuse, as the killing of a man, the looking at an indecent object. Such things are not to be done except under certain circumstances and with a grave reason. Thus indecent sights may be met in the discharge of professional duty. In that case indeed they cease to be indecent. They are then only indecent when they are viewed without cause. The absence of a good motive in a case like this commonly implies the presence of a bad one.

(c) Indifferent, as walking or sitting down.

(d) Good of itself, but liable to be vitiated by circumstances, as prayer and almsgiving; the good of such actions may be destroyed wholly or in part by their being done out of a vain motive, or unseasonably, or indiscreetly.

13. It is said, "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome." (St. Matt., vi., 22.) The eye is the intention contemplating the end in view. Whoever has placed a good end before him, and regards it steadily with a well-ordered love, never swerving in his affection from the way that reason would have him love, must needs take towards his end those means, and those only, which are in themselves reasonable and just: as it is written: "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." (Deut. xvi., 20.) Thus I am building a church to the glory of God; money runs short: I perceive that by signing a certain contract that must mean grievous oppression of the poor, I shall save considerable expense, whereas, if I refuse, the works will have to be abandoned for want of funds. If I have purely the glory of God before my eyes, I certainly shall not sign that contract: for injustice I know can bear no fruit of Divine glory. But if I am bent upon having the building up in any case, of course I shall sign: but then my love for the end in view is no longer pure and regulated by reason: it is not God but myself that I am seeking in the work. Thus an end entirely just, holy, and pure, purifies and sanctifies the means, not formally, by investing with a character of justice means in themselves unjust, for that is impossible,—the leopard cannot change his spots,—but by way of elimination, removing unjust means as ineligible to my purpose, and leaving me only those means to choose from which are in themselves just.

14. With means in themselves indifferent, the case is otherwise. A holy and pious end does formally sanctify those means, while a wicked end vitiates them. I beg the reader to observe what sort of means are here in question. There is no question of means in themselves or in their circumstances unjust, as theft, lying, murder, but of such indifferent things as reading, writing, painting, singing, travelling. Whoever travels to commit sin at the end of his journey, his very travelling, so far as it is referred to that end, is part of his sin: it is a wicked journey that he takes. And he who travels to worship at some shrine or place of pilgrimage, includes his journey in his devotion. The end in view there sanctifies means in themselves indifferent.

15. As a great part of the things that we do are indifferent as well in themselves as in the circumstances of the doing of them, the moral character of our lives depends largely on the ends that we habitually propose to ourselves. One man's great thought is how to make money; what he reads, writes, says, where he goes, where he elects to reside, his very eating, drinking and personal expenditure, all turns on what he calls making his fortune. It is all to gain money—quocunque modo rem. Another is active for bettering the condition of the labouring classes: a third for the suppression of vice. These three men go some way together in a common orbit of small actions, alike to the eye, but morally unlike, because of the various guiding purposes for which they are done. Hence, when we consider such pregnant final ends as the service of God and the glory of a world to come, it appears how vast is the alteration in the moral line and colouring of a man's life, according to his practical taking up or setting aside of these great ends.

16. We must beware however of an exaggeration here. The final end of action is often latent, not explicitly considered. A fervent worshipper of God wishes to refer his whole self with all that he does to the Divine glory and service. Yet such a one will eat, drink, and be merry with his friends, not thinking of God at the time. Still, supposing him to keep within the bounds of temperance, he is serving God and doing good actions. But what of a man who has entirely broken away from God, what of his eating, drinking, and other actions that are of their kind indifferent? We cannot call them sins: there is nothing wrong about them, neither in the thing done, nor in the circumstances of the doing, nor in the intention. Pius V. condemned the proposition: "All the works of infidels are sins." Neither must we call such actions indifferent in the individual who does them, supposing them to be true human acts, according to the definition, and not done merely mechanically. They are not indifferent, because they receive a certain measure of natural goodness from the good natural purpose which they serve, namely, the conservation and well-being of the agent. Every human act is either good or evil in him who does it. I speak of natural goodness only.

17. The effect consequent upon an action is distinguishable from the action itself, from which it is not unfrequently separated by a considerable interval of time, as the death of a man from poison administered a month before. The effect consequent enters into morality only in so far as it is either chosen as a means or intended as an end (nn. 2, 3, p. 31), or is annexed as a relevant circumstance to the means chosen (n. 9, p. 34.). Once the act is done, it matters nothing to morality whether the effect consequent actually ensues or not, provided no new act be elicited thereupon, whether of commission or of culpable omission to prevent. It matters not to morality, but it does matter to the agent's claim to reward or liability to punishment at the hands of human legislators civil and ecclesiastical.

18. As soul and body make one man, so the inward and outward act—as the will to strike and the actual blow struck—are one human act. The outward act gives a certain physical completeness to the inward. Moreover the inward act is no thorough-going thing, if it stops short of outward action where the opportunity offers. Otherwise, the inward act may be as good or as bad morally as inward and outward act together. The mere wish to kill, where the deed is impossible, may be as wicked as wish and deed conjoined. It may be, but commonly it will not, for this reason, that the outward execution of the deed reacts upon the will and calls it forth with greater intensity; the will as it were expands where it finds outward vent. There is no one who has not felt the relative mildness of inward feelings of impatience or indignation, compared with those engendered by speaking out one's mind. Often also the outward act entails a long course of preparation, all during which the inward will is sustained and frequently renewed, as in a carefully planned burglary.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2ae, q. 18, art. 1; ib., q. 18, art. 2, in corp., ad 1; ib., q. 18, art. 3, in corp., ad 2; ib., q. 18, art. 4-6; ib., q. 18, art. 8, in corp., ad 2, 3; ib., q. 18, art. 9, in corp., ad 3; ib., q. 18, art. 10, 3; ib., q. 18, art. 11, in corp.; ib., q. 20, art. 4, in corp.

46. To know whether an individual human act is morally good, we must consider it with reference to these three things which, because they determine the moral character of acts, are called the determinants of morality: 1st. The object of the act; 2d. The end, or purpose; 3d. Its circumstances. That the act may be morally good, all three determinants must be without a flaw, according to the received axiom: "Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu," — " A thing to be good must be wholly so; it is vitiated by any defect."

47. I. The object of an act is the thing done. In reality, it is not distinct from the act itself; for we cannot act without doing something, and the something done is the object of the act; say, of going, eating, praising, etc. The act or object may be viewed as containing a further specification —e. g., going to church, praising God, eating meat. Now, an act thus specified may, when considered in itself, be good, bad, or indifferent; thus, to praise God is good in itself, to blaspheme is bad in itself, and to eat meat is in itself an indifferent act. But that an individual act may be good, its object, whether considered in itself or as further specified, must be free from all defect; it must be good, or at least indifferent.

48. II. The end, or purpose, intended by the agent is the second determinant of an act's morality. The end here spoken of is not the end of the work, for that pertains to the object, but the end of the workman or agent (No. 11). No matter how good the object of an act may be, if the end intended is bad, the act is thereby vitiated. Thus, to praise God is good in itself, but, if in so acting the intention be to play the hypocrite, the act is morally bad. And this holds true whether the vicious end be the nearest, remote or last end (No. 9); whether it be actually or only virtually intended (No. 12). On the other hand, a good end, though ever so elevated, cannot justify a bad act; in other words, we are never allowed to do evil that good may result therefrom.²

² The doctrine that the end justifies the means has been falsely attributed to the Catholic Church, and particularly to the Jesuits. No institutions in the world have more strenuously opposed the pernicious tenet either in their theory or their practice.

49. The circumstances of time, place and persons have their part in determining the morality of an individual act. The moral character of an act may be so affected by attendant circumstances, that an act good in itself may be evil when accompanied with certain circumstances; for instance, it is good to give drink to the thirsty, but if the thirsty man is morally weak, and the drink is intoxicating, the act may be evil.

50. Under the head of circumstances certain effects of an act may be included; not such effects as are directly willed or intended, for these go with the second class of determinants (No. 48). But there may be other effects which the agent foresees or can foresee so related to the act, that, though he does not intend them, yet he consents to their taking place, inasmuch as he wills the act which, to his knowledge, is the cause or at least the occasion of these effects. Thus, in ordering a city to be bombarded, a general brings about, however reluctantly, the death of many non-combatants. Such an effect, he is said to permit, or to will indirectly.

51. If besides the good effects directly intended in an act evil effects are foreseen as likely to result, the act is not licit unless it fulfills the following conditions: 1. That the evil effect be not directly intended; 2. That the good effect intended be not produced by means of the evil effect, for we are never allowed to do evil that good may come therefrom. The general in the foregoing example does not kill the noncombatants in order that by their death he may destroy the combatants; 3. That the good directly intended exceed the evil effects. No one could licitly bombard a city for the sake of a slight advantage; 4. That the doer of the act be not under the obligation of averting the evil consequences in question.

52. The external action commanded by the will derives its good or evil character from the internal, elicited act of the will; hence, outward action does not of itself increase the right or wrong of the act. Indirectly, however, it may readily do so; because outward action is apt to protract or intensify the inward disposition of the will, and thus increase the moral good or evil of the act.

We need not go beyond the words of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. vi. 22; vii. 17), for a proof of the important bearing of our intention | on the morality of our actions. In the sight of God the aim, the intention, with which we perform our actions, is of more importance than what we do. This is a commonplace of theology and of asceticism, and it is admitted by all who profess to guide their conduct by the maxims of the Gospel. But though it be admitted on all hands that the intention is the principal part of our deliberate actions, there is considerable difference of opinion among theologians on several points in the general doctrine of intention. Theologians do not usually discuss these points together, but it may be worth while to consider them together as forming a portion of one body of doctrine, every part of which throws light on every other part. I propose, then, to take St. Thomas principally for my guide, and bring together for the purposes of comparison and mutual illustration a few points in the doctrine of intention.

Intention is nothing more than an efficacious wish or desire of an object; it is a movement of the will towards an end, with reference to the means which must be taken in order to attain that end.

The ends of our intentions are manifold and various as are human nature and human actions, but there is one which is common to all men, and in regard to which we are not free. Man necessarily desires happiness, and if happiness be taken in the abstract, it forms the object of all our endeavors. The will is attracted only by what seems good; it is moved only by what seems likely to contribute to our well-being; in every action, then, we seek for happiness, and cannot do otherwise. If we found ourselves in presence of an object which was wholly good, we could not but love and desire it; and so when the blessed find themselves face to face with God, the infinite source of all goodness and beauty, they are necessarily ravished with love of Him; they cannot but love Him.

However, as no other object but God is wholly good, and as in this world we cannot see Him face to face, and the attainment of the possession of God is accompanied by labor and difficulty, so while we live on earth, though we necessarily seek happiness, yet we do not seek it necessarily in any one object; in other words, we are free to determine the end of our intentions according to our choice.

If we accept the teaching of St. Thomas, we are under a moral obligation to direct all our actions to the honor and glory of God.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Sum. I.-II., q. 100, a. 10 ad 2.

In this sense he interprets the words of St. Paul.² However, this must not be understood as imposing on us an obligation to form ‘an actual intention of doing our every action for God. This would be requiring more than man’s weakness can bear. It will be sufficient if we refer every action to God virtually. St. Thomas explains his mind very fully and clearly on this point in various places of his works. Thus in De Caritate, a. 11, ad 2, he says:

² I Cor. x. 31.

To the second it must be said that it is not possible in this life actually to refer all things to God, just as it is not possible always to think about God, for this belongs to the perfection of the heavenly homeland; but that all things be referred virtually to God belongs to the perfection of charity to which all are bound. To make this evident, it must be considered that, just as in efficient causes the power of the first cause remains in all subsequent causes, so also the intention of the principal end remains virtually in all secondary ends. Hence whoever actually intends some secondary end virtually intends the principal end; thus, while a physician actually gathers herbs, he intends to prepare a potion, perhaps thinking nothing about health; nevertheless he virtually intends the health for which he gives the potion. Thus, therefore, when someone orders himself to God as to his end, in all the things which he does for his own sake there remains virtually the intention of the last end, which is God; hence he can merit in all things, if he has charity. Therefore it is in this way that the Apostle commands all things to be referred to the glory of God.

In the next paragraph St. Thomas distinguishes a virtual from an habitual intention of pleasing God:

To the third it must be said that it is one thing habitually to refer to God and another virtually. For even one who does nothing and actually intends nothing, such as one sleeping, habitually refers to God; but virtually to refer something to God belongs to an agent acting for an end ordered to God. Hence habitually to refer to God does not fall under a precept; but virtually to refer all things to God falls under the precept of charity, since this is nothing other than to have God as the last end.

It is then necessary and sufficient, according to St. Thomas, to refer all our actions to God virtually. What he means by virtually is clear enough from the passages just quoted, but he explains his meaning more fully and more clearly in other places, especially in his commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences, Dist. xl., q. 1, a. 5. There we read the following passages:

To the sixth it must be said that a wholly habitual ordering of an act to God does not suffice, because no one merits from what is in habit, but from what he actually does. Yet it is not necessary that the actual intention ordering to the last end always be joined to every action which is directed to some proximate end; rather, it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the last end, as happens when someone resolves to direct his whole self to the love of God: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God. And if it is asked when it is necessary to refer an act to the last end, this is nothing other than to ask when it is necessary for the habit of charity to go forth into act; because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, the whole man is ordered to the last end, and consequently all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him.

To the third it must be said that not only an act of charity is meritorious, but also acts of the other virtues insofar as they are informed by grace; although they cannot be meritorious except insofar as they are brought back to the end of charity. It is not necessary, however, that acts always be brought back to that end; rather, for the efficacy of meriting it suffices that they be actually brought back to the ends of the other virtues. For one who intends to preserve chastity, even if he thinks nothing about charity, certainly merits if he has grace. Now every act tending to some good, unless it tends to it inordinately, has as its end the good of some virtue, because the virtues sufficiently perfect a person concerning all things which can be human goods.

It is clear, then, that St. Thomas teaches that it is of obligation to refer all our actions to God, our last end. However, this obligation is sufficiently fulfilled by one who acts from any motive that is not bad; for in thus acting he intends something which he sees to be good, as every human act is either good or bad, according to St. Thomas. But in directing his intention to something that is good, he is necessarily, though only virtually, not actually, directing his intention to God, his last end; for the very notion of moral goodness implies conformity to man’s last end.

St. Thomas further teaches that in him who is in the grace of God, in him who fulfils all the obligations which bind him under pain of grave sin, every act that is ethically good is also meritorious of life eternal. For among our other obligations there is the positive precept of charity, by which we are bound at times to think of God, and elicit an act of love towards Him. By this act of charity we have referred ourselves and all our actions to God, and so unless it be recalled by one that is contrary to it, or by mortal sin, which destroys the bond of friendship between God and the soul, it continues to exert its influence on our subsequent actions, and informs them with the spirit of charity. It thus makes them supernatural and meritorious of a crown of glory in heaven.

The precept of charity obliges us to love God with all our heart, mind, and strength, but our condition here on earth does not permit us to be always engaged in actually thinking of God and forming acts of love towards Him. The limitations of our nature and the necessities of life, as a rule, only permit us to observe this greatest of all commandments by never doing anything directly contrary to it, and by fulfilling it virtually, that is, by virtually directing our every action towards God in the sense explained by St. Thomas. However we are bound at all events occasionally to think of God explicitly, and to give Him the service of our explicit love and affection. This St. Thomas teaches, as we have already seen, and it is certain doctrine, approved and enforced by the Church. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to say when and how often we are bound under pain of sin to form explicit acts of the love of God. St. Thomas³ teaches that at least when a man begins to have the use of reason he then begins to think about his last end, and that he is then bound under pain of mortal sin to refer his whole being and all his actions to God. If he do this, he thereby obtains the sanctifying grace of God if he was still in original sin; if he fail to do it he commits his first sin, so that one who is still in original sin cannot commit venial sin before he has committed mortal sin.

³ Sum. I.-II., q. 89, a. 6.

Although this opinion of St. Thomas has always had its supporters, especially among his followers, yet it does not seem ever to have won the common assent of theologians. The opinion seems not sufficiently grounded in revelation, reason, or experience. At some time, indeed, after coming to the use of reason, and after learning his obligations towards God, his Creator and Lord, every man is bound to give himself to the service of God by an act of love; but other theologians think that the particular time when this obligation must be fulfilled under pain of grave sin cannot be so exactly determined as St. Thomas lays down. All are agreed that we must frequently during our lives form explicit acts of the love of God, but it seems impossible to determine more accurately at what intervals this obligation must be fulfilled under pain of sin.

Intimately connected with the obligation of referring our actions to our last end is the question concerning the influence of our intention on the moral quality of our actions. Some early Christian writers misled by a false interpretation of the words of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount, taught that the intention with which we perform our actions is everything, the actions themselves are of no moral quality. Thus the unknown author of the Opus imperfectum on St. Matthew, generally published with the works of St. Chrysostom, says:

Therefore a servant of God cannot do evil; and if it sometimes seems to you that he has acted badly, consider carefully his evil itself, and you will find him inwardly good. For from a good purpose even what seems evil is good, because a good purpose excuses an evil deed; but an evil deed does not condemn a good purpose.

Cassian, too, in his Collationes writes:

For God is not only the examiner and judge of our words and deeds, but also the examiner of our purpose and determination.

4 Hom. xix.

If He sees anything done or promised by anyone for the sake of eternal salvation and with a view to divine contemplation, although it may seem harsh and unjust to men, nevertheless He, looking into the inward piety of the heart, judges not the sound of words but the resolve of the will, because the end of the deed and the disposition of the doer must be considered; by reason of this some, as was said above, could even be justified through a lie, and others through an assertion of truth could incur the sin of eternal death.

Peter Lombard had perhaps these and other authors in mind when he wrote in the Second Book of the Sentences:

But it is asked whether all the works of a man are good or bad from their effect and end. Some think that they are, who say that all acts are indifferent, so that they are neither good nor bad in themselves; but every act is good from a good intention and bad from a bad one.

As it is clear from these extracts, the doctrine that the end justifies the means had its supporters in very early times among Christian writers; it was indignantly and triumphantly refuted by the great St. Augustine, whom St. Thomas and orthodox teachers in the Church have always followed on this point.

In order to have a clear notion of what influence the intention has on the morality of an action, it may be worth while briefly to summarize St. Thomas’s doctrine on the point.

He first of all examines the human act in its totality,’ and teaches that it derives its moral quality from the object, the end, and the circumstances. The object is that about which the human faculty is engaged when the action is produced, or it is that which the faculty produces or does; it is the substance of the action considered in the abstract, and apart from its circumstances. Thus, in the act of theft, the object is the taking away of something which belongs to another, and if this be considered in relation to right reason, it is obvious that it is an act which is contrary to it; or theft is morally wrong because the object of the action is against right reason, which is the rule of human actions.

5 Collat. xvii., c. 17.

6 Dist. xl.

7 Sum. I-IL, q. 18.

The end, on which the morality of an action also depends, is the motive of the action, the reason why it is done. It is obvious from what has been said above that the moral quality of an act depends on its motive or on the intention with which it is done; it is bad to steal, it is worse to steal in order to be able to commit adultery, according to the well-worn illustration.

Finally, the circumstances which accompany an action give it its moral quality, as well as the object and the end. It is wrong to steal, but to steal the Church plate, or the pittance on which a poor man depends for the support of himself and his family is worse.’ To play in the field at the proper time is right, to play in church is wrong. After laying down these principles about the morality of human acts in general, St. Thomas considers in detail the morality of the two chief component parts of a complete and consummated act, the interior act of the will and the exterior act. When a theft is committed, the thief first of all determines to commit the crime, and then sets about its execution. The crime morally considered is one completed human action, but physically it is composed of many, both interior and exterior acts. The will determines upon the theft, and then sets the external faculties in action to accomplish it. We are chiefly concerned with the interior act of the will.

The will is set in motion by some object or end which it wishes to attain. Thus one may come to know of a case of distress, and natural good feeling prompts the desire to relieve it. The relieving of distress in the case is the object towards which the will tends, and which causes the will to form the intention of giving relief. This object, therefore, is the cause of the action of the will, it is the term from which the action starts, and it is the goal towards which the action is directed. And as all motion is specified by the term to which it is directed, so the motion of the will, which we call intention, receives its moral quality from the object or aim to which it tends. So the intention to relieve distress is an act of virtue, and an intention to do an injury is vicious. In other words, the morality of the intention depends upon the object or end in view.

When the will has formed the intention of relieving the case of distress, the next step is to discover the means. If the means are not at hand, it is necessary to work to obtain them, the work undertaken for so charitable a purpose will be colored by the object for which it is undertaken, and itself become an act of charity. The means are desired for the sake of the end, they become the object of the will because of their connection with the end, they therefore put on the moral quality of the end. In the same way, if the end be bad, means, though good in themselves, taken with a view to attain such an end, become corrupted and bad. And so to work in order to obtain money to indulge in debauchery is itself wrong and wicked.

And here we touch upon the celebrated question whether a good end justifies wrongful means. In the sphere of politics there is too much reason to suppose that the view that the end does justify the means is largely acted upon by statesmen of all parties and nationalities. Machiavelli, who has given his name to the theory, lays down the principle with the utmost candor:

A prince, therefore, is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occasions, they are extremely prejudicial, whereas having them only in appearance, they turn to better account; it is honorable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion. And this must be premised, that a prince, especially if he come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things inhumane, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs and variations of his fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whilst it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. . . . Let a prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life, and continue his supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honorable, and be commended by everybody, because the people are always taken with the appearance, and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people: those few who are wise, taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon.⁸

⁸ The Prince, c. 18.

More briefly, but perhaps still more to the point, he says in his Discourses on Livy:

And this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his country; for where the safety of that is in question no other consideration ought to be coincident, as whether the way be just or unjust, merciful or cruel, honorable or dishonorable, but postponing all other respects, you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your country, and preservation of its liberty.⁹

⁹ Book III., c. 41.

It is by no means an uncommon thing to meet with an almost equally explicit approval of the doctrine that the end justifies the means in the daily press and in modern periodical literature. Such approvals are specially frequent in more or less appreciative accounts of the careers of such men as Bismarck and Rhodes. But Machiavellianism is not confined to politicians, nor of course did unscrupulousness first appear in the days of the crafty Florentine. As we have already seen there are traces of the doctrine that the end justifies the means in several writers of the early ages of the Church.

However, with a few obscure exceptions, theologians have constantly rejected the view. They point out with St. Thomas that an action is not morally good merely because the end or intention is good; it must be good in all particulars; Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu, was the axiom applied in the case. And so if a man steals in order to relieve a case of distress, he does wrong though his intention be never so praiseworthy. It is wrong to steal, and it remains wrong though the theft be committed with a good intention, and the otherwise good action of relieving distress is vitiated by the wrongful means employed to do it, for the will to relieve distress by robbery is a vicious will. As the Society of Jesus is constantly being attacked on this point, it may not be out of place to quote the words in which Vasquez, one of its greatest divines, sums up the doctrine which it has always taught: