Third Article. On The Sources Of Morality

69. On the sources themselves. 1. The sources, or also the principles, of morality are called those elements of human acts which constitute a moral action in the concrete as fitting to the moral order or discrepant from it: these elements are object, circumstances, and end. Therefore three sources of morality are numbered: object, circumstances, and end.

a. Namely, the morality of actions in general is taken from their fittingness or discrepancy with the moral order; but moral acts, both good and evil, are diverse. Now it is asked what constitutes actions as fitting to the moral order or discrepant from it; and since there are three things which constitute actions in the concrete as conformable or difform to the moral order - object, end, and circumstances - and no other element is found in the action, rightly and deservedly it is said that morality is derived into an action from a threefold source.

b. That the morality of actions is derived from this threefold source does not signify that morality in any given action is taken from these three things simultaneously, but that it is derived from one of these three: therefore in the concrete, according to the diversity of acts, it is taken now from one or another, now from all simultaneously.

2. In order that an act be good, all the principles on which morality depends must be conformable to rational nature; if even one is difform, the action becomes evil. Hence the axiom has prevailed: good from the whole cause, evil from any defect. Therefore, if an act from object, from end, and from circumstances is fitting to rational nature, it is good simply; but if either from object or from circumstances or from end it is unfitting to rational nature, it is evil simply.

Whether and when this principle, good from the whole cause, evil from any defect, must be restricted, will be said in its proper place; for it is asked whether an act good from its object always loses its whole goodness through an evil end or through an evil circumstance.

1. On The Object

70. Notion and principle. 1. The object of a moral act is called that about which the tendency of the will is proximately and primarily concerned.

a. That about which the tendency of the will is concerned is diverse according as the act of the will is merely elicited or elicited and at the same time commanded: a. some thing; thus God is the object of love of God, money the object of avarice for money; b. some external action, as in these acts: to will to bestow alms, to will to steal, to will to walk; c. some internal act, as in these acts: to will to love God, to will to believe.

b. It is said proximately and primarily because also the end and circumstances are that toward which the will tends, but not proximately and primarily.

c. To the object of an act pertain all those things which constitute its substance, considered not physically but morally; moreover, all those things constitute the substance of an act which are so essential and necessary to it that, if something is lacking or another thing is added, the act becomes diverse. Thus the object of theft is a thing of another taken while the owner is reasonably unwilling: for if the thing is not another's, or if it is not taken while the owner is unwilling, or not while he is reasonably unwilling, there is no theft.

d. The proximate object is the commanded act of the will itself (to steal, to believe), or the object of the elicited act (God, money); the remote object is that about which the commanded act is concerned (the thing of another in theft, revealed truth in an act of faith).

2. Human acts receive their first and essential morality from the object: for the object, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, gives species to acts per se and primarily, because powers are moved to act by the object per se and primarily.

Therefore it happens that the morality which belongs to an act from the object is conceived before every other which belongs to it from the end or from the circumstances. One who from love of God gives alms to relieve the misery of the poor exercises an act of mercy, and one who steals in order to become drunk places an act of theft, because the object, not the end, primarily constitutes the moral species of the act. Therefore the morality which acts receive from the object is called objective, essential, and substantial.

71. Division. 1. The object is called good if it is consonant with rational nature, as to adore God, to will to give alms; it is called evil if it is dissonant from it, as to blaspheme, to will to steal; it is called indifferent if neither obtains, as to eat, to walk, to write, which of itself is neither fitting nor unfitting to rational nature.

2. One object is internally and per se good or evil, another is per accidens and by reason of a precept good or evil. The former is from itself and by its nature conformable or difform to rational nature, as to love or to hate one's neighbor; the latter is not from itself and by its nature, but only by reason of a supervening law, good or evil, as to eat meats or to abstain from them.

Objects of the former kind are commanded because they are good, and prohibited because they are evil; but objects of the latter kind are good because they are commanded, and evil because they are prohibited.

3. Objects evil in themselves are of two kinds: some are evil absolutely and independently of any condition whatever, because of themselves they are so repugnant to rational nature that not even God Himself can change them, for example hatred of God, perjury; others are evil conditionally, that is, by reason of some condition which lies under the power of God because of the dominion which He exercises over created things; if God removes this condition, they cease to be evil and become licit, as to take another's thing, to kill a man, etc.

4. The material object is called that about which the act of the will is concerned, for example another's money which is desired, the taking of another's thing; the formal object is called the same material object insofar as it is attained freely by the agent with knowledge of its morality, for example the desire or taking of another's thing done with knowledge of moral malice.

2. On Circumstances

72. Notion and number. 1. Circumstances are conditions which are added to the substance of a moral act and affect it morally, as in theft the circumstance of a sacred place or of a sacred thing. Because circumstances are added to the moral act already constituted in its substance, they are called accidents of moral acts.

a. Only those conditions are customarily called circumstances of moral acts which are added to the moral substance of the act, or to the act already constituted in its moral species. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing, not the being another's, but only the being sacred, is called a circumstance of the act.

b. Those circumstances affect the object morally which contain some relation to rational nature or to the moral order.

2. Seven circumstances are customarily numbered, which are presented in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.

Who indicates the special quality of the person who acts, for example that he is a cleric, bound by vow or by marriage.

What denotes the quality or quantity of the object itself: whether a striking is grave or light, of a father or of a stranger; whether a thing taken by theft is great or small, sacred or profane.

Where signifies the aspect of place: whether it was sacred or profane, hidden or public, so that scandal could arise.

By what aids signifies the special character of the means which the agent employed, as to become drunk with money taken by theft, to wound with prohibited weapons.

Why indicates the end of the one operating, as to steal in order to become drunk. Although the end pertains to the circumstances, nevertheless because of its peculiar influence on morality it deserves a peculiar consideration.

How signifies the mode of the action, both interior, as to act intensely or remissly, advertently or inadvertently, in good or evil faith; and exterior, as to kill by poison or by the sword, to cut up limb by limb with cruelty.

When denotes the quantity and quality of time: whether something was done for a long time or briefly, in sacred time or non-sacred.

3. Not only objects are indifferent, but also many circumstances must be called indifferent, which do not influence the morality of an act nor confer any morality upon it, because they are neither fitting nor unfitting to rational nature, as to give alms with the right hand or the left, to steal on the second feria or the third.

73. Principles. 1. A human act receives morality also from circumstances, which determine the object in the concrete: for circumstances can bring it about both that an act is or is not fitting to rational nature, and that it is more or less fitting. Thus to refresh oneself temperately is fitting to rational nature, but to refresh oneself intemperately is unfitting to rational nature; to worship God fervently is more conformable to rational nature than to worship Him remissly; to kill a brother is more difform to rational nature than to kill a man.

2. Circumstances confer morality upon human acts in a fourfold way, in that:

a. an act indifferent from its object becomes good or evil from circumstances; thus to eat meats on a day of abstinence is evil, to refresh oneself temperately is good;

b. an act good from its object becomes evil from a circumstance; thus it is evil to pray against the precept of a superior;

c. an act good or evil from its object receives a new goodness or malice from circumstances; thus one who abstains from meats by vow places an act of temperance and religion, and one who steals a sacred thing places an act of injustice and irreligion;

d. an act good or evil from its object becomes more or less good or evil from circumstances; thus if a poor man gives alms, the act of mercy is greater, and if a priest sins, the malice of the sin, other things being equal, is greater.

It must be noted that those circumstances which confer the first moral species upon an action indifferent from its object are commonly referred to the object itself and are not distinguished from the object, so that an act is said to be objectively good or evil when, indifferent from its object, it is constituted good or evil from some circumstance; thus to eat meats on a fast day is customarily called an act evil from its object.

3. A gravely evil circumstance removes the whole goodness of the act, but a lightly evil circumstance accompanying an act (to attend remissly, to act precipitately, to pray tepidly, to give alms with distaste) does not remove the whole goodness of the act. The reason for the first is that an act which fully turns away from the ultimate end cannot conduce to the end. The reason for the second is that an act of this kind does not turn away from the ultimate end, and therefore the tendency of the will toward evil does not destroy the whole goodness of the act; and indeed, unless this were so, very few good acts would be found even in holy men.

With the circumstances of actions, which affect the actions themselves, there must not be confused actions, whether internal or external, which occur during an action but are in no way referred to the action itself, as a pious sigh or idle word while studying, an act of impatience or of prayer while working. Acts of this kind, whether they are good or evil, neither increase nor diminish the merit or demerit of the action, but have their own morality in themselves.

74. Division of circumstances. Circumstances are divided:

1. Into those changing species and those not changing species, according as they modify an action only within the same moral species, or make the moral species of the action diverse, or rather add another moral species to the action.

2. Circumstances not changing species are either aggravating or diminishing, according as they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice, as if someone performs acts which endure for a longer or shorter time, or if one committing a grave theft takes a greater or lesser sum. These circumstances increase or diminish the morality of the act either lightly or gravely, or notably.

We are indeed accustomed to speak of diminishing circumstances, but when the matter is considered more accurately, there are properly no diminishing circumstances. Thus if, with regard to an act of prayer, the circumstance of longer duration is lacking, nothing is taken away from the act, or the act is not diminished, but rather a greater perfection is not added to it. Likewise, if with regard to the evil act of theft the circumstance of a greater quantity is lacking, properly the objective malice of the act is not diminished, but a greater malice is not added.

3. Circumstances changing species change the theological species of the action if they bring it about that an action which from its object is a light sin becomes grave, and one which is a grave sin becomes light, for example because of smallness or greatness of matter; but other circumstances change the moral species if they confer upon the action a new species of goodness or malice besides that which it has from the object, as if someone steals a sacred thing.

3. On The End

75. Notion. 1. The end of a human act is that on account of which the agent operates. There is distinguished the end of the work and the end of the one operating, or the internal and external end.

a. The internal end, or end of the work, is called that into which the act per se and by its nature is ordered, as alms to relieving the misery of the poor. The end of the work, or internal end, is not distinguished from the work itself or from the object; therefore it does not confer upon the act a morality distinct from that which it has from the object. The external end, or end of the one operating, is that to which the act is ordered by the one operating, as alms to making satisfaction for sins. Now it can happen that only the internal end is intended by the one operating, or the internal end and at the same time some external end, or, with the internal end neglected, only some external end; as if someone bestows alms only to relieve another's misery, or also to draw another back from sin, or only to draw another back from sin.

b. The discussion here is only of the end of the one operating, because only that end can introduce into a human act a morality distinct from the object.

2. Ends indifferent in themselves must be admitted, which confer no morality upon acts, because they are neither conformable nor difform to rational nature, as to sing in order to make profit, to go into a field for the sake of relaxing the mind.

76. Division. The end of the one operating is divided in multiple ways:

a. Into proximate end and remote end: the proximate is that which is intended with no other intervening; the remote is that which is intended by means of another end. Thus if someone sings so that, after receiving a stipend, he may procure support for himself, the stipend is the proximate end, support the remote.

b. Into ultimate end and intermediate end: the ultimate is that which is intended for its own sake, in which therefore the agent rests without referring the act to a further end; the intermediate is that which is intended for a further end. Thus if someone composes books in order to acquire for himself money to be spent on the salvation of neighbor and on the glory of God, the glory of God is the ultimate end, while money and the salvation of neighbor are intermediate ends.

c. The ultimate end can be simply or absolutely ultimate, besides which there is no other to which the work is referred; and ultimate in a qualified sense, which is ultimate only in some order of things or in some series of actions. Thus knowledge is the ultimate end in a qualified sense in the order of studies; the glory of God is the simply ultimate end.

d. The ultimate end (in a qualified sense) is either positively or negatively ultimate, according as a further end is excluded, or indeed is not excluded, but neither is intended.

a. For one who studies only in order to acquire knowledge for himself, knowledge is the positively ultimate end, because he excludes a further end, for example the glory of God. For one who studies in order to acquire knowledge for himself and does not think about a further end, knowledge is the negatively ultimate end, because he neither intends nor excludes a further end, for example the glory of God.

b. The ultimate end can be excluded not only explicitly and formally, but also implicitly and virtually, namely by the fact that an action, as disordered and sinful, cannot be referred to the ultimate end. Thus one who eats intemperately for the sake of pleasure excludes (virtually) the ultimate end of the glory of God, even if he does not think about the ultimate end.

e. Into total end, which alone moves to the action, so that, if it were not present, the action would not be done; and partial end, which moves to the action together with another. A partial end can be so constituted that it is equal with another, or equally principal, if each is sufficient to move to the act; or so that one is primary, which is first intended, and the other secondary, which is intended only with subordination to the primary and moves to the act. The former is called moving and alone would suffice for the action; the latter is called impelling and indeed influences the action, but alone would not suffice for the action.

For a priest who celebrates Mass only to worship God, the worship of God is the total end of the Mass. If he celebrates Mass both to worship God and to gain a stipend, the worship of God and the stipend are partial ends of the Mass. But if the priest is so disposed that he would celebrate even if he did not have the stipend, the worship of God is the primary end; if, with the stipend lacking, he would not celebrate, the stipend is the primary end of celebrating.

77. Principles. 1. A human act receives morality also from the end on account of which it is done: for the end to which an action is ordered by the one operating can bring it about that, by reason of this ordering, the action is conformable or difform to rational nature. Thus not only to give alms, but also to give in order to redeem sins, is conformable to rational nature; and not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk, is difform to rational nature.

The end which confers the first moral species upon an act indifferent from its object is said to enter the object itself and to pertain to the object; thus to bestow money in order to relieve misery, to sing in order to praise God, are called actions good from their object; and to sing in order to create annoyance for another is called an action evil from its object.

2. It can happen in diverse ways that the end confers morality upon an action: for an act good, evil, or indifferent from its object can be referred by the agent to a good, evil, or indifferent end.

a. An act good from its object receives from a good end a new goodness, indeed as many species of goodness as there are diverse good ends which the agent intends. If someone, for example, bestows alms for the honor of God and to redeem sins, the action has a threefold goodness: of mercy from the object, and of religion and penance from the end.

b. If an act good from its object is ordered to an evil end, one must distinguish:

a. If the evil end is the total end, or the sole and adequate cause of the action, whether it is gravely or lightly evil, it corrupts the goodness of the act and renders the whole work either gravely or lightly evil; for example, to give alms to a poor man in order to turn him away from the faith, or to pray only for vainglory, is evil, because the will does not intend the good except under the aspect of evil, or as a means to an evil end, and therefore wills only evil.¹

b. If the evil end is a partial end, or if the action is done on account of a good end and an evil end which is only lightly evil, whether it is primary or secondary, it does not vitiate the whole act, but the act is partly good and partly evil. For the will can will both at the same time, good and evil; but the tendency toward good is not destroyed by a lightly evil tendency, because the will is not turned away from the ultimate end by it, as if someone gives alms to relieve the poor and at the same time to catch the praise of men.

This partial end can relate itself to a good action in three ways: antecedently, so that it does not influence the action afterward to be placed, but rather is its occasion, as if someone from human respect approaches the sacred rite, at which he then assists with due intention; this occasional end does not vitiate the action. Concomitantly, so that together with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if someone plays the organ to praise God and for vainglory; this vitiates the action in part. Consequently, if, when an action has already been begun from a good end, an evil end is added, as if someone began to sing in order to worship God and then something of ostentation also creeps in; this end likewise vitiates the action in part.²

Authors explain in diverse ways how the will can will both at the same time. For some teach that the same act can be at once good and evil; others say that in the will there can be at the same time, concerning the same object, two acts, one good and the other evil.³ Commonly, however, we are accustomed to consider acts of this kind as one act, even if composed of several.

c. If the evil end is a partial end and gravely evil, it vitiates the whole work and constitutes it evil, for example to extinguish a fire in order to help one's neighbor and at the same time to commit a grave theft; for it is impossible that an action be pleasing to God by which man is totally turned away from God.

c. An act good from its object does not become evil from an indifferent end to which it is ordered by the agent, whether the indifferent end is the partial reason of willing the good object or the total reason, as if someone sings in church either solely or also in order to earn money.

d. An act evil from its object cannot receive goodness from a good end, but is and remains evil: for if the object is evil, the good end does not prevent the will from really willing evil; but good is from the whole cause, evil from any defect. Hence that saying of the Apostle: let us not do evils that goods may come.⁴ Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the action, as if someone steals in order to do good, because the affection toward evil is less, since the will does not seek it except from love of some good.

From these things it is clear that he offends against the first principles of ethics who teaches that the end sanctifies the means, that is, that a good end constitutes an action good when it is evil from its object or from its circumstances. For although a good end can bring it about that an action indifferent from its object or circumstances is good, nevertheless it cannot bring it about that an action evil from its object or circumstances is good.⁵

e. An act evil from its object receives from an evil end a new malice, indeed as many malices as there are evil ends into which the action is ordered by the agent. If someone, for example, steals in order to become drunk, the action has a twofold malice, of injustice and of intemperance.

f. An act evil from its object is not changed by an indifferent end to which it is referred by the agent, but retains its malice.

g. An act indifferent from its object receives moral goodness from a good end to which it is ordered by the agent; for example, to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion.

h. An act indifferent from its object receives moral malice from an evil end to which it is ordered by the agent; for example, to sing in order to create annoyance for another is a sin against charity.

i. An act indifferent from its object, which is ordered by the agent to an indifferent end, for example to sing in order to earn money, remains indifferent in the abstract; whether also in the concrete will be said presently.

In the manner of a proverb it is said that the value and merit of our works do not depend on what is done, but on how it is done. In order that this may be rightly understood, it must be noted: a. If there is question of two works, of which one from its object is nobler and more perfect than the other, other things being equal, that is, if they are performed with equally perfect intention (from obedience, from charity), the work more perfect from its object is of greater merit, provided that the objective goodness is also intended by the agent. b. Of two works equal from the object, that is of greater merit which is performed with a more perfect intention (end of the one operating), whether as to substance or as to intensity. c. It can happen that a work less perfect from its object (indifferent) has greater merit than a work more perfect in itself, if the end of the one operating is more perfect in one than in the other, whether as to essence or as to intensity.

¹ Cf. Matt. 6:1, 5, 22, 23.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 98.

³ Cf. Billuart, De actibus humanis, art. 4, n. 2.

⁴ Rom. 3:8.

⁵ Cf. Reichmann, Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel (Freiburg: Herder, 1903). Supplement to Stimmen aus Maria-Laach 68.