Virtue in General

28. Whether they exist. Supernatural virtues are habits infused by God, by which man can connaturally exercise supernatural acts. That virtues of this sort are infused by God is demonstrated by theological reason and is established from the Council of Trent.

a. It is required that nature, elevated to the supernatural state, be able connaturally to produce acts by which it tends to the supernatural end. But for this it is required that not only the external and transient principle, actual grace, but also the internal and permanent principle, namely power, be supernatural; and this is supplied by infused habits. Therefore God has adorned man with the habits of supernatural virtues.

Therefore, what in the order of nature are the powers of the soul, intellect and will, in the supernatural order are infused habits, namely the proximate principle of supernatural life; just as sanctifying grace, from which infused habits proceed, must be called the remote principle of supernatural life.

b. If it is asked only in general whether there are infused virtues, it must be answered that from revelation it is certain that supernatural virtues are infused into the soul: for from the Council of Trent we know that in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these gifts infused at once through Jesus Christ, to whom he is joined: faith, hope, and charity.² Infused virtues are some theological virtues, others moral virtues.

These virtues are called theological, or divine, by reason of divine origin, because they are known only by divine revelation and are not acquired unless they are infused into us by God; by reason of essence, because they are supernatural in themselves; but especially by reason of the formal object, which is some divine perfection. On the contrary, the formal object of the other virtues is some created good. Yet the material object of the theological virtues, namely the true which we believe and the good which we hope for and love, at least the principal and primary object, is God Himself.

¹ St. Thomas I-II, q. 62-67. Suarez, De gratia l. 6, c. 4. Mazella, De virtutibus infusis^2 (Rome: Forzani, 1894). Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae (Freiburg: Herder, 1898), VIII, I. Tepe, Institutiones theologiae moralis generalis (Paris: Lethielleux, 1898), De virtutibus II, p. 147 ff. Kirschkamp, Der Geist des Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1895).

² Sess. 6, c. 7.

29. On the theological virtues. 1. The theological virtues are those whose motive, or formal object, is God or some divine perfection.

2. There are three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity; and these indeed are required and suffice for us to come to the ultimate end.

a. St. Paul, writing concerning the theological virtues, says: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."¹ He is speaking of a genus of virtues distinct from all other virtues. Therefore the Council of Trent declares: "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these infused at once through Jesus Christ, to whom he is joined: faith, hope, charity."²

b. Since we are destined to the supernatural end, God willed to render us capable of tending toward Him by proportioned acts, namely acts intrinsically supernatural and connatural to us. For this it was necessary that the habits of the theological virtues be infused into us. For in order that we may be able to tend to God, our supernatural end, it is necessary that we know Him supernaturally, that we be borne toward Him by a supernatural desire, and finally that we be supernaturally conformed to Him. But the first is had through faith, the second through hope, the third through theological charity, and therefore through the infused habits of the theological virtues (Ecclus. 2:8 ff.).

3. Several say that it is certain by faith from the cited place of the Council of Trent that the theological virtues are infused into us by God. They are infused all together at the same time with sanctifying grace, but they are not all lost together.

4. As often as sanctifying grace is increased, together with it the theological virtues also are increased with the remaining virtues: for so great is the connection between grace and the virtues that they are infused, preserved, and increased with it. But sanctifying grace is increased by reception of the sacraments and by good works.³

5. Although the theological virtues are all infused together with sanctifying grace and flow from it, nevertheless they are not all lost with it, but perish through acts opposed to them.

Charity, together with sanctifying grace, is lost through any mortal sin whatever; but faith and hope are lost only through mortal sin directly opposed to these virtues. For faith and hope precede charity by nature, dispose to it, and lead to it; for which reason, when charity has been lost, its prior dispositions are not lost, but remain in the sinner so that they may help him in recovering charity. Through the mortal sin of despair, hope is lost together with charity and sanctifying grace, but not faith, which is a prior disposition to hope and the foundation of all supernatural virtues. Finally, through the mortal sin of heresy, faith is lost together with sanctifying grace and all infused virtues.

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7.

³ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 24.

30. On moral virtues. Moral virtues are those whose formal object is the uprightness of actions.

a. Since it is not certain by faith that moral virtues also are infused into us by God, there are theologians, the Scotists, who deny this; nevertheless their doctrine is rejected by others as erroneous. And indeed if it is established that the theological virtues are infused, this cannot be denied concerning the moral virtues. For if God infuses the theological virtues so that their acts may be exercised connaturally through internal principles, for the same reason He must also infuse the moral virtues. Therefore the Roman Catechism teaches: "To this grace there is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."¹

b. It is not established how many infused moral virtues there are. It seems one must say that the four cardinal virtues are infused, but no more. For since the remaining moral virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues as their integral or subjective parts, the habits of the latter suffice also for eliciting the acts of the former.

¹ On baptism, n. 51.

31. What the virtues effect. Infused habits, according to the common and truer opinion of theologians, give the very power, but not also the facility, of eliciting supernatural acts, because they indeed incline to their acts, but do not remove their impediments.

a. From these things the chief difference which exists between infused and acquired virtues is already clear: a. infused virtues give the very faculty, but not also the facility, of operating supernaturally. For when they are infused, they do not remove the impediments of operating which arise from concupiscence and from bad habits. Facility of operating is acquired through exercise of the infused habit. Acquired virtues, however, do not bestow the power but the facility of operating: for the power of operating is already present by nature; but since they are acquired by repeated acts and not without struggle, by this very fact they lessen or even entirely remove the difficulties of operating which arise from concupiscence or from a depraved custom. b. Infused virtues are infused with sanctifying grace in an instant of time, are increased by their acts not effectively but meritoriously, and are destroyed by mortal sin with sanctifying grace in an instant of time. Acquired virtues, however, are acquired not by one act but by repeated acts; by the same acts they are effectively increased, and by non-use or contrary acts they are gradually lessened and finally disappear.

b. Hence we sometimes see sinners, for example the impure, excel in some virtue, for example in justice; for not all acquired virtues are destroyed through mortal sin. On the contrary, we see just men having to fight against diverse and very vehement inclinations to evil: for infused virtues do not remove natural depraved habits, which are gradually weakened by contrary acts.

254. Definition. 1. Virtue in general is defined as a habit perfecting a power for operating well.²

a. A twofold habit is distinguished: substantive, which inheres in the substance of the soul and gives to it a new mode of being, of which kind is sanctifying grace; and operative, which inheres in the powers of the soul and perfects them for acting, of which kind is virtue.

b. Virtue is an operative habit, which perfects a power for acting. But this perfection can be of two kinds: either it inclines a power, already complete for its operation, to acting, so that it can exercise its acts with a certain facility; or it elevates and completes a power incomplete and insufficient in itself for exercising an operation. Habits of the former kind give to a power that it can operate easily; habits of the latter kind give that it can operate simply.

c. Virtue, which is a good habit, cannot elicit anything except good acts, just as vice, which is a bad habit, cannot elicit anything except bad acts. Therefore virtue is customarily defined as a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly.³ Although virtue cannot be the principle (elicitive) of a bad act, nevertheless it can be the object of a bad act, as if someone hates virtue or is proud about it. But man can use other habits, which are distinguished from virtues, such as knowledge and art, for good and bad acts.

2. Three things must be considered in virtues: the efficient cause, the subject, and the object.

a. The efficient cause of a virtue is said to be that by which the virtue is produced. By reason of the efficient cause, virtues are divided into natural and supernatural, infused and acquired.

b. The subject of a virtue, and that the proximate subject, is said to be that power of the soul in which the virtue is present and from which the acts of a certain virtue are elicited. The remote subject is the very person having the virtue.

The powers in which virtues inhere are the intellect, the will, and the sensitive appetite; in this appetite namely there are those virtues which turn about moderating the passions, of which kind are temperance and fortitude.

c. The material object of a virtue is that about which the act of virtue turns; the formal object is the reason or motive on account of which it turns about its material object. Thus the material object of faith is the truths revealed by God; the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing.

¹ St. Thomas I. II. q. 55-61. Suarez, De virtutibus. Lessius, De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus. Greg. de Valentia, Commentar. scholast. II. disp. I. q. 5. A. Tanner, Theologia scholast. II. disp. 3. q. 2. ss. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis (Romae. Forzani. 1894). Waffelaert, De virtutibus cardinalibus (Brugis. Beyaert, 1889). Tractatus de virtutibus ad usum seminarii Mechliniensis (Mechliniae. Dessain 1896). E. Muller, Theologia moralis^7 (Vindobonae. Mayr. 1894) I. § 104 ss. Hilarius a Sexten, Compendium theologiae mor. l. c. 4. I. B. Scaramelli, Directorium asceticum t. 3. De virtutibus moral. (Augustae Vindel. 1770). I. E. Pruner, Katholische Moraltheologie^4 (Freiburg, Herder. 1902) I. S. 117-175.

² A habit is a quality inhering in a power in order to its act (St. Thomas).

³ St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio l. 2. c. 19.

255. Division of virtues. a. According to the diverse subject in which virtue is present, virtues are divided into intellectual virtues, which perfect the intellect for knowing the true, and appetitive (moral) virtues, which perfect the will for pursuing the good. The intellectual virtues are numbered by the philosophers as five: understanding, wisdom, knowledge, art, and prudence, to which theological faith is added by the theologians; but the appetitive virtues are numbered as very many.

Of the intellectual virtues, three are speculative habits: understanding, wisdom, and knowledge; two are practical habits: art and prudence. Understanding perfects the mind for knowing the true which can be known immediately and of itself; wisdom for knowing the true which is known through discourse and is simply ultimate (the first cause); knowledge for knowing the true which is known through discourse and is ultimate in some determined genus.

b. By reason of effect, virtues are divided into moral virtues, which make a man good simply or morally, and intellectual virtues, which make a man good in a qualified respect, e.g. a good philosopher, a good craftsman. The former are present in the will and in other powers only insofar as they are ruled by the will; the latter are present in the intellect independently of the command of the will.

To the moral virtues accepted in this sense belong also the theological virtues and prudence; to the intellectual virtues accepted in this sense belong understanding, wisdom, knowledge, and art.

c. By reason of the efficient cause, they are divided into infused and acquired virtues: the former are produced immediately by God in the powers of the soul; the latter are obtained by man through acts more often repeated. Some infused virtues are called infused per se, others infused per accidens: the former can be had only from God infusing them, of which kind are all supernatural virtues; the latter can also be had by human effort, since they are of the natural order, but sometimes are infused by a special gift of God.

That virtues are acquired by repeated acts is established by experience; but by revelation we are taught that virtues are infused into us immediately by God (n. 28). Acquired and infused virtues agree in this, that they are habits by which we are disposed for operating well; but they differ both in origin and in effect (n. 254).

d. With the preceding division there almost coincides as regards the thing that by which virtues are divided into natural and supernatural: the former are acquired by natural powers through repeated acts and are ordered to a natural end, namely natural beatitude; the latter are exercised by the help of supernatural grace and are ordered to a supernatural end or supernatural beatitude.

e. By reason of the object, they are divided into theological and moral virtues: the former have for their immediate object some divine perfection and therefore turn immediately about God; the latter have for their immediate object a created good, i.e. the honesty of actions. Thus the material object of mercy is the relief of the needy person, and the formal object is the moral honesty which shines forth in the relief of the needy person.

Therefore moral virtue is taken in two ways, according as it is opposed to theological virtue, and according as it is opposed to intellectual virtue.

f. By reason of perfection, they are divided into common and heroic: the former are exercised in a common or ordinary mode; the latter are exercised promptly, expeditiously, and above the common mode of operating.

g. By reason of the remote subject, namely the person having the virtue, they are divided into formed and unformed, according as the person having the virtue is in the state of grace or in the state of mortal sin; grace or charity is called the form of the other virtues.

256. On the mean of virtue. 1. The mean of virtue is called the measure by which excess and defect are excluded from it; thus liberality is in the mean between prodigality and avarice, fortitude is the mean between rashness and timidity, because it preserves the due mode between excess and defect.

a. The chief property of virtues is that by which they are said to be in the mean between excess and defect. For the acts of virtues, in order to be such, must be conformed to right reason; but they would not be conformed to right reason if either through excess or through defect they turned aside from the mean of right reason; therefore virtues consist in the mean in this, that their acts by reason of object and circumstances are conformed to right reason.

b. The mean of virtues can be considered on the part of the object about which it turns, and on the part of the subject, or by reason of the mode by which virtue is exercised. In the mode of exercising virtue one can turn aside from the mean if it is exercised rashly, inopportunely, with excessive effort, etc. Moreover all virtues have and require a mean on the part of the subject.

c. The mean of virtues on the part of the object is twofold: the mean of the thing and the mean of reason. The mean of the thing is the measure which is determined by nature itself and therefore is the same for all; the mean of reason is the measure which reason, by prudent estimation after considering the person and circumstances, determines, and therefore is not the same for all, but is diverse in diverse cases.

2. All moral virtues have a mean on the part of the object, and indeed justice has the mean of the thing, but the other moral virtues have the mean of reason.

What he ought to do who intends to observe justice strictly is not determined by prudent estimation, but has already been defined by nature: namely he must give as much as is owed. For justice requires that he who owes a hundred also pay a hundred, whoever he is, rich or poor, and whoever his creditor is. The mean of the other moral virtues is the mean of reason: for what matter in these is conformed to right reason must be determined by reason according to the quality of the person; for what is suitable for one in taking food can be too much or too little for another, and what is suitable for a man in undergoing danger is too much for a boy or a woman.

3. Theological virtues do not have a mean on the part of the object but only on the part of the subject or by reason of the mode: for since the object of these virtues is God himself, it is impossible to sin against them by excess; and indeed we cannot believe and hope too much in God or love God too much. But in the mode by which these virtues are exercised, sin can occur even by excess.

257. On the connection of virtues. Those virtues are called connected of which one cannot exist without another.

1. Theological virtues are connected among themselves insofar as, in the order of generation, charity supposes hope and faith, and hope supposes faith, and all are infused together; but they are not connected insofar as one can be without another: for when charity has been lost, hope and faith remain, and when hope has been lost, faith can remain (n. 29, 5).¹

2. Infused moral virtues are connected among themselves insofar as they are infused together with grace and charity, and when these have been lost the virtues are lost at the same time. But infused virtues are not necessarily connected with acquired moral virtues; for infused virtues can be without acquired virtues, as in baptized little ones, and acquired virtues can be without infused virtues, as in adult sinners: for when infused virtues have been lost through sin, acquired virtues are not also lost.

3. Acquired moral virtues are not necessarily connected as long as they are imperfect; but if they are perfect, they are necessarily connected with one another, so that he who perfectly possesses one likewise has all the others.

In order that a virtue can be called perfect, it is not necessary that it be exercised in a heroic degree, but this is required: that it be exercised easily, promptly, and constantly in every event, even in ordinary difficulties. Virtue can be imperfect in two ways: either a. because it has not yet come to the nature of a habit, but either is a certain natural and innate inclination to the good or is a certain disposition to the habit of virtue arisen from some imperfect acts; or b. because it indeed reaches the nature of a habit, but does not yet firmly inhere in the power nor dispose to exercising virtue constantly even in difficulties.

a. Imperfect acquired virtues are not connected among themselves: for by experience it is established that many, either from innate disposition or from some habituation, are prompt for works of mercy, who nevertheless are not prompt for works of chastity; likewise that some are prompt for exercising chastity who are not prompt for exercising liberality or humility.

b. Perfect acquired virtues are necessarily connected among themselves; therefore he who lacks one has none perfectly. The internal reason seems to be this: because there is no perfect virtue without perfect prudence; but where there is perfect prudence, there all the other virtues are more or less perfect: for that prudence is not perfect which at the same time is not just, temperate, and brave.

It is not required that all perfect virtues reach the same degree of perfection, but both in the same man and in diverse men one can be more perfect than another; hence it comes about that in one saint this virtue, in another that virtue, especially shines forth and is praised.

¹ By what reason it can happen that, after sanctifying grace has been lost, faith and hope remain in the soul, although grace is the foundation and principle of these, cf. Suarez, De gratia l. 6. c. 13. Kleutgen, Theologie d. Vorzeit II. n. 200 ff. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis n. 184 ss.

258. The specific distinction of moral virtues is taken from their formal object. For every moral virtue turns about an honorable good; therefore as many virtues specifically diverse will have to be distinguished as there are special reasons of the honorable good about which virtue turns; but the special honesty which any virtue pursues is its formal object.

The diverse reasons of honesty or of the honorable good are found either in operations which are toward another, or in moderating the passions; therefore there are two great genera of moral virtues: virtues which turn about operations toward another, as justice and those which are annexed to it, and virtues which turn about the passions, as fortitude and temperance and those which are annexed to these.

259. Among moral virtues there are four which are called cardinal or principal: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, to which all other virtues are reduced as parts annexed to them.

a. They are called cardinal because among the virtues they are chief and in the moral life of man very necessary and very commonly used, just as in a door the hinge is the chief thing, on which the door turns and on which its use depends.

St. Ambrose is said to be the author of this name (l. 5. in Luc. 6, 20). Sacred Scripture commemorates them where concerning divine wisdom it says: It teaches sobriety (temperance) and prudence, and justice and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men;¹ but wisdom (God) teaches these virtues by infusing them.

b. Their number is taken both from the fourfold object (honesty, honorable good) about which they turn, and from the fourfold subject in which they are principally present.

a. Object. In order that man may act in all things according to virtue or according to right reason, first he must judge rightly concerning the things which are to be done, which happens through prudence; then he must preserve the order of reason toward others, which happens through justice; then he must preserve the order of reason toward himself, both by overcoming difficulties which draw back from right reason, which happens through fortitude, and by moderating the passions which in the use of created things incite one to acting against the order of reason, which happens through temperance.²

Briefly, St. Thomas sets forth the object of the moral virtues in this way: prudence, which bears the light before the others, is in things to be chosen; justice in things to be distributed; fortitude in things to be endured; temperance in things to be used.³

b. Subject. Prudence is in the intellect, justice in the will, fortitude in the irascible sensitive appetite, temperance in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.

Nevertheless all moral virtues are also in the will as in a subject, because their acts are either elicited or commanded by the will. Hence some virtues (such as prudence, fortitude, temperance) are in a twofold power, and consequently a complete virtue consists of two habits, of which one is in the will, the other in the intellect or in the sensitive appetite; but each constitutes morally one virtue because of the relation by which one habit is ordered to the other.

¹ Wis. 8, 7.

² Summa I. II. q. 61. a. 2.

³ Summa I. II. q. 61. a. 4.

260. Annexed parts of the cardinal virtues. According to St. Thomas, to each cardinal virtue there pertain three classes of moral virtues which are its annexed parts, as a whole has annexed parts: for some virtues are subjective parts of the cardinal virtues, others integral parts, others potential parts.

a. Subjective parts of a virtue are called those which are referred to it as species to a genus;

b. integral parts are called those which are required so that virtue may be integral, or so that it can operate more easily and more perfectly;

c. potential parts are called those which indeed are akin to the cardinal virtue, but in some respect fall short of the perfect nature of that virtue. They are called potential parts as if not having the whole power of the principal virtue.

261. Diverse perfection of virtues. Virtues are not all of the same dignity and perfection; nevertheless their greater or lesser perfection cannot be determined absolutely: for under one respect this virtue, under another respect another, is of greater perfection.

a. If the object is regarded, theological virtues are more perfect than moral virtues, because the immediate object of the former, both material and formal, is God himself, the ultimate end; but the immediate object of the latter is not God, but a created good, not the ultimate end, but a means to the end.

b. Among the cardinal virtues, under some respect prudence is most perfect, both because it directs all the other virtues and is the leader of all, in that it assigns to each the mean which they must hold, and because it perfects the intellect, not the will; but according to St. Thomas the intellect is more perfect than the will.

Under another respect, however, justice occupies the first place among the cardinal virtues, both because its works fulfill obligations which are owed to God and neighbor, and because it perfects the will, since its subject is the will; on the contrary, fortitude and temperance perfect the lower appetite, since their subject is the sensitive appetite; besides, their works render what man owes to himself.

Under another respect finally, among moral virtues obedience stands out: for if that virtue is called more perfect which offers a greater good to God, obedience must be called the most perfect moral virtue, because through it man offers the noblest good which he possesses, his will.

c. Finally, among the virtues of justice those are more excellent whose remote and mediate object (the object to whom) is God, namely those which fulfill an obligation owed to God, of which kind are religion, which exhibits due worship to God; penance, which satisfies for an offense and injury inflicted upon God; obedience, which executes the will of God.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas I. II. q. 66. II. II. q. 141. a. 8. II. II. q. 161.

I. The name habit is said to be derived from the verb to have, insofar as by this verb is indicated the manner in which something has itself in itself, either well or badly. A habit can be defined: A quality stable of itself, by which a subject is disposed well or badly, either according to itself or in order to operation. It is said:

1. A quality stable of itself, i.e., a quality by its nature difficult to move, since its subject is of the immaterial order; and thus it is distinguished from a disposition, "to which it belongs according to its proper nature that it be easily lost, because it has a changeable cause, as sickness and health do" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3).

2. By which a subject is disposed well or badly, i.e., according as the subject has a certain mode either fitting or unfitting to its nature.

3. Either according to itself or in order to operation, i.e., either according to its essence, and it is called an entitative habit; or according to its powers, and it is called an operative habit (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49).

II. In what follows we shall discuss only operative habits. But since the things to be said about the habits of virtues are easily applied to habit as such, it is pleasing to abstain here from further investigation of habit, but to insert it into those things which we shall present concerning virtues in general. And thus it will happen that we avoid saying the same things twice, and that we bring greater light to the virtues themselves.

Moreover, there will not be a special discussion of bad habits, partly because enough has been said about them above, and partly again because many things to be said about the habits of virtues are easily applied to bad habits.

III. Good operative habits are virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Hence:

(St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 55-67; II-II, qq. 1-170; disputed questions On Virtues in Common; On the Cardinal Virtues; In III Sent., dist. 33.)¹

We shall speak first of virtues in general, then of virtues in particular.

¹ Cf. Cajetan, In I-II, qq. 55-67; In II-II, qq. 1-170; Suarez, In I-II; In II-II, De virtutibus et peccatis; Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, tract. XII, De virtutibus; Pegues, Commentaire francais litteral de la Somme theologique, vols. VII and VIII; Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. VIII, tract. I, De virtutibus infusis in genere; vol. IX, tract. I, De virtutibus moralibus; Billot, De virtutibus infusis; Schiffini, Tractatus de virtutibus infusis.

In order that full knowledge of virtues in general may be had, six chapters chiefly occur that must be elucidated: namely, the notion of virtues and their division, the subject in which they immediately inhere, the cause from which they take their origin, the manner by which they are increased or destroyed, their permanence in the other life, and their diverse properties.

I. Notion of Virtue. With respect to the etymology of the word, virtue seems to be derived from the word force. Now, as Aquinas teaches: "Force is said according as some thing, through the complete power which it has, can follow its impulse or motion" (De virtutibus in communi, a. 1); whence "virtue, according to the meaning of its name, designates the complement of a power," or "a certain perfection of a power" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 1).

"But the perfection of each thing is considered chiefly in order to its end; and the end of a power is act" (St. Thomas, cited place). Hence "the complement of a power is attended to according to this, that it receives complete operation" (St. Thomas, De virtutibus in communi, a. 1), or is best disposed for acting rightly and perfectly.

Although the word virtue, understood in this way, can be applied to every power of every creature, whether rational or irrational, by long usage it has been sanctioned that by the name virtue there is no longer designated that which perfectly disposes the power of an irrational creature to its operation, but only that which in such a way disposes the powers of man, insofar as he is a rational creature, or those powers of man by which he can elicit the best operation consonant with human nature as such, namely an honorable or morally good action. Therefore this human virtue, with which alone we must now deal, is defined: An operative habit disposing one to act honorably. It is said:

1. Habit, i.e., a stable disposition, not a passing inclination.

2. Operative, i.e., a stable disposition which perfects man not according to being, but in order to his operation.

3. Disposing one to act honorably, i.e., to act well in the moral order. For virtue is perfect when it renders not only the work good, but also the one working.

Note. Habits which perfect the intellect of man only in order to truth, and are called intellectual virtues, are not virtues simply, but only in a qualified sense, since they do not regard a morally good act. Such are wisdom, understanding or the habit of first principles, science, and art, or right reason about things to be made; but not prudence, which, although it is in the intellect, nevertheless does not perfect it in order to truth alone, but in order to the good to be pursued by the will, and therefore is virtue simply. Intellectual virtues do not pertain to the object of this treatise; hence we shall scarcely speak further of them.

II. Object of Virtue. The object is distinguished as twofold, material and formal. The material is called that about which the virtue is occupied; and it is twofold, remote and proximate, according as the virtue regards it remotely or proximately. The formal object is the reason under which the proximate material object is considered, or the motive on account of which the said object is chosen. Thus, for example, the remote material object of justice is a thing owed to another according to equality; the proximate material object is the actions which are prescribed by reason of the thing owed to another according to equality; the formal object is the very notion of debt.

III. Division of Virtues. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of origin, into infused and acquired. Infused virtue is that which is infused by God Himself, without us effecting it; it can be either per se or per accidens infused. It is called per se infused when as to its essence it is supernatural, since it can have its origin only from God. It is called per accidens infused when as to its essence it is natural, and therefore could be acquired by natural acts, but in fact has been infused by God. Acquired virtue is a virtue which arises from the repetition of acts.

2. By reason of principle, into natural and supernatural. Natural virtue is a virtue which proceeds from a natural principle and tends toward a natural end. Supernatural virtue is a virtue which proceeds from a supernatural principle and tends toward a supernatural end.

3. By reason of perfection, into formed and unformed. Formed is said of that virtue which is joined to charity and informed by it. Unformed is said of a virtue which is in a subject lacking charity, and which therefore is not informed by it.

4. By reason of object, into theological and moral. Theological virtue is an infused and supernatural virtue whose immediate material object, at least principal, is God Himself, as He is the author and end of the supernatural order, and whose formal object is God Himself or His attributes. Moral virtue is that whose material object regards the honorable good of an intermediate end, and whose formal object is the conformity of this honorable good with the rule of right reason. If the honorable good regards a natural intermediate end, and its conformity is regulated according to natural principles, it is a natural moral virtue; on the contrary, if it regards a supernatural intermediate end, and its conformity is regulated according to supernatural principles, it is a supernatural moral virtue.

5. By reason of degree, into common and heroic virtues. They are called common when they follow the ordinary mode of acting; heroic, when they surpass the ordinary mode of acting.

Note. Certain persons, extolling natural virtues beyond measure,¹ divide virtues into active and passive. They call, for example, zeal for souls, liberality, etc., active virtues; and, for example, obedience, patience, etc., passive virtues. They add that the former are more fitting to the present age, while the latter were better suited to past ages. Now the division into active and passive virtues is contrary to the very notion of virtue; for a virtue which is truly passive neither is nor can be, since the end of every virtue is act (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 1). But what they add, that active virtues are more fitting to the present age and passive virtues to a past age, is contrary to the Evangelical Spirit: "Christ is the teacher and exemplar of all holiness; to His rule it is necessary that all should be conformed, as many as desire to be inserted into the seats of the blessed. Now Christ has not changed as the ages have progressed, but is the same yesterday and today and forever. Therefore to men of all ages belongs that saying: Learn from Me, for I am meek and humble of heart²... and in every age the Apostle's saying is valid: those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences."³

¹ This is the principal error of the system which by some is indicated, less happily, by the general name Americanism; it rests on the false supposition that supernatural virtue would stand in the way of virtue which perfects the natural powers of man, whether in order to himself or in order to society. But grace does not destroy nature; it perfects it. Cf. Letter of Leo XIII to the Archbishop of Baltimore, 22 January 1899 (Acta Leonis XIII, XIX, p. 13).

² Matt. 11:29.

³ Gal. 5:24; cited Letter of Leo XIII.

IV. Specific Distinction of Virtues. This is to be taken from the specific distinction of formal objects. For specific distinction must be drawn from the specific distinction of the honorable good which virtue is apt to attain. But the specific distinction of the honorable good depends on the formal object, or on the reason under which the material object is attained. Thus, for example, the three theological virtues, whose material object is God, are specifically distinguished because their formal objects, or the reasons under which they regard God, are specifically distinct.

Note. Acts of virtues are distinguished into elicited and commanded acts. An act is called elicited if it is immediately elicited by a certain virtue. But it is called commanded when it is not immediately elicited by that virtue to which, as commanded, it is ascribed, but by another, by force of the one commanding. Thus, for example, if someone, moved by charity toward God, elicits an act of abstinence, this act is an elicited act of the virtue of abstinence, and a commanded act of the virtue of charity.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3; Salmanticenses, De virtutibus, disp. 2, dub. 1, n. 8 (tract. 6, p. 241).

I. In asking about the subject of inherence of virtues, we inquire which powers of the soul can be perfected by virtues; for virtues are in their subject as perfecting accidents. I said the powers of the soul; for from the notion of virtues handed down, it is easily clear that their proximate subject of inherence is not the soul itself, but its powers. For virtue imports the perfection of a power; and perfection is in that of which it is the perfection (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1). Therefore, just as sanctifying grace, which is an entitative habit, inheres in the soul itself, so virtues, which are operative habits, have the powers of the soul as their proximate subject of inherence.

Now it is clear that the intellect alone is the subject of intellectual virtues, since these regard only truth, i.e., the object of the intellect alone. Hence it remains to inquire which powers can be the subject of virtues strictly so called. Now only those powers can be the subject of these virtues which both consummate the honorable good, i.e., actively concur in constituting it, and in their activity are not determined to that good. For powers which either do not consummate the honorable good, or are determined to it, cannot be perfected by virtues.

Hence the subjects of inherence of virtues are:

1. The will. That the will consummates the honorable good is clear in itself. Moreover, although the will by reason of its power is determined to good in general and to its own good, nevertheless it is not determined to the good owed to another; therefore it can be perfected by virtues which render it capable of desiring the due good promptly, uniformly, and delightfully (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 6).

2. The intellect, both speculative and practical.

a) The speculative intellect, which under the motion of the will, or freely, tends toward truth, manifestly consummates the honorable good. Moreover, although the said intellect can attain truth, nevertheless it is not determined to this, but has itself indifferently either to truth or to falsity; therefore it can be perfected by virtues by which it may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully attain truth.

b) The practical intellect, which under the motion of the will judges what must be done in a particular case, likewise, as is clear, consummates the honorable good. Moreover, since it is not determined to judging rightly, it can be perfected by virtues by which it may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully form a right judgment (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 3).

3. The sensitive appetite, both irascible and concupiscible, which under the motion of the will have themselves rightly toward sensible good, likewise consummate the honorable good. Moreover, since of themselves they are often opposed to reason, they can be perfected by virtues by which they may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully conform themselves to reason (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 5).

But the other powers of the soul, for example, the apprehensive internal senses, such as imagination, memory, and common sense, are not the subject of virtues, because they do not consummate the honorable good, but rather prepare for the acts of the powers which are consummative of that good (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 5).

II. Which virtues the enumerated powers are in fact the subject of will be stated in its own place.

I. Origin of Natural Virtues. Natural virtues are generated from the repetition of acts, whence they are also called acquired. For upon powers which by their nature are not determined to one mode of acting, through individual acts, at least acts proportionally equal or superior in intensity, there is impressed a certain inclination toward this mode of acting. This inclination, by repetition of acts, as experience establishes, passes into a stable disposition or habit; and the more intensely these acts are placed, the more quickly stability of inclination arises from them.

From this origin of natural virtues it becomes clear of itself that dispositions which are often born with a man, and which render him inclinable to this or that act, for example, of mercy, by no means deserve the name of virtues. For virtue is a stable disposition arisen from the repetition of honorable acts, or acts which have been placed according to the norm of right reason; but those dispositions are not subject to reason. They can, however, be called virtues inchoatively, insofar as the soul is thus more disposed to acquire similar virtues for itself.

II. Origin of Supernatural Virtues. 1. Supernatural virtues are generated by infusion from God; whence they are also called infused. Now:

a) With regard to the theological virtues, this doctrine according to some must be held as of faith; according to others, it is so certain that the contrary must be held erroneous. It is proved: 1. from the Council of Trent, which teaches thus: "In this justification, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these gifts infused at the same time through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity."¹ Now it is clear from the context that the Council intends not acts of faith, hope, and charity, but habits, since it speaks in the same way of these as of sanctifying grace. It is proved: 2. from the Catechism of Trent, which, speaking of grace infused in Baptism, adds: "To this is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."² 3. It is confirmed by reason. For all supernatural gifts wholly exceed the natural faculties of man; hence they can be bestowed on us by God alone (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 3; De virtutibus in communi, a. 10).

b) As regards moral virtues, that they too have their origin only from divine infusion is taught by the more common and more probable opinion, against Scotus and the Scotists. This opinion is founded on the mind of the Church. For the Council of Vienne,³ choosing as the more probable the opinion teaching that even in little children grace and virtues are infused in Baptism as to habit, openly supposes this opinion. For that by those virtues are understood not only theological virtues but also moral virtues is clear from the fact that the Council chooses that opinion which in those times theologians admitted with St. Thomas against the Scotists, namely, that moral virtues also are infused, and which Innocent III had mentioned in his own time but had left undecided. Now Innocent says that this opinion maintains that "faith and charity and the other virtues" are infused into little children. There is added the authority of the Catechism of Trent, which teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace] is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."⁴ It then calls them "an abundance of virtues," and again "so great an abundance of virtues." But these things cannot rightly be said of the three theological virtues alone. Moreover Leo XIII, in the Letter to the Archbishop of Baltimore,⁵ openly distinguishes supernatural moral virtues from natural acquired virtues; once this is posited, they must be called infused and not acquired. The proposed opinion is confirmed by reason. For the order of grace is more perfect than the order of nature, and perfects it. Now in the order of nature man is perfected in operations concerning intermediate ends by natural moral virtues; therefore, a fortiori, in the order of grace by supernatural moral virtues.

2. Once the doctrine is supposed that all supernatural virtues take their origin in souls from infusion, it is further investigated at what time this infusion takes place. Now:

a) All agree that the virtue of charity is infused together with sanctifying grace.

b) With regard to supernatural moral virtues, theologians who teach that they arise in the soul by infusion also affirm that they are always infused together with sanctifying grace.

c) As regards the virtues of faith and hope, a distinction must be made between little children and adults. For little children all assign the infusion of sanctifying grace as the moment of infusion. For adults, different authors establish different moments of their infusion.

alpha) Some teach that the virtues of faith and hope are infused by God into the souls of adults as soon as they elicit, by the help of actual grace, acts of these virtues; therefore even before justification itself. On the one hand they say that these virtues can exist without sanctifying grace, as is clear; on the other hand the infusion of these virtues seems more fitting if the soul is sufficiently disposed by elicited acts of these virtues.

beta) Others teach that these virtues also are always infused at the moment of justification, with one case excepted, namely when the sacrament of Baptism is received validly but unformed; because the sacraments, they teach, produce their effect insofar as no obstacle is opposed to it. Now just as adherence to mortal sin is not an obstacle to the permanence of these virtues, so neither does it seem to be an obstacle to their infusion in valid but unformed Baptism.

gamma) Finally others, and indeed more probably, say that the infusion of these virtues takes place only together with sanctifying grace, as was said about the virtue of charity. This opinion is defended by St. Thomas (III, q. 69, a. 4), and is proved from the Council of Trent, which teaches that for adults, in order to obtain justice, a disposition is required which also contains faith;⁶ and nevertheless these adults receive the virtue of faith and hope in justification. This is also clear from the same Council, which declares: "Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at the same time through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity."⁷ Therefore God had not yet infused the enumerated virtues into these adults already believing before Baptism. This opinion is clear besides from the authority of Clement V in the Council of Vienne,⁸ and is supported by reason. For it seems improbable that the powers of the soul should be elevated earlier by a habitual supernatural quality than the very essence of the soul has been enriched with sanctifying grace, and this all the more since all supernatural virtues must more probably be said to result from sanctifying grace by a physical emanation (St. Thomas, III, q. 62, a. 2).

Note. Although in justification the sinner receives together with grace all infused virtues, nevertheless he does not at once lose acquired bad habits, as experience makes clear. The reason is that infused virtues do indeed complete the elective powers of acts, and thus bestow facility of acts per se and intrinsic facility, but not extrinsic facility, which is had from the removal of impediments and depraved dispositions. Only acquired virtue does that; yet not formally and reduplicatively as virtue, as if it were formally the removal of impediments and indispositions, but only concomitantly, because such virtue is generated by the repetition of acts, and thus by force of these acts depraved dispositions and those impediments are taken away. Moreover, infused virtues are not directly contrary to vices, since they are not of the same order, nor do they exist in the same subject taken formally.

¹ Session 6, chapter 7.

² Part II, chapter 2, q. 39.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

⁴ Part II, chapter 2, q. 39.

⁵ 22 January 1899.

⁶ Session 6, chapters 5 and 6.

⁷ Cited place, chapter 6.

⁸ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

Virtues, whether acquired or infused, are not immutable, but can either be increased, diminished, or destroyed; therefore we shall say something briefly about each of these.

I. Increase of Virtues. 1. Notion. The increase of some habit or quality is either extensive or intensive. Extensive increase is taken in order either to the parts of the subject in which it exists, as, for example, when heat in the hand is extended to the feet; or to the parts of the object, as, for example, when knowledge is extended from fifty conclusions to sixty. Intensive increase is taken in order to the same indivisible subject. Now, speaking of the increase of virtues, we intend intensive increase. Concerning the essence of this intensive increase, authors do not agree, and there are chiefly two opinions about it. Suarez with his followers explains the essence of the intensive increase of some habit by the addition of degree to degree; some think these degrees are of the same nature, others of a different nature. But in this opinion it is difficult to preserve the simplicity of an immaterial habit. Hence the opinion which is that of St. Thomas and his school seems much more reasonable; according to them, the increase of a habit takes place through the greater rooting in the subject of the same form produced from the beginning: "It must be said that the infusion of charity imports a change according to having charity and not having it; and therefore something must arrive which was not there before. But the increase of charity imports a change according to more and less, and therefore it is not necessary that something be present which was not present before, but that what was previously present less be present more" (St. Thomas, De virtutibus in communi, aa. 11 and 12; I-II, q. 52).

2. Mode. Just as there is one origin of natural virtues and another of supernatural virtues, so also the mode of their increase is diverse.

a) Natural virtues are increased by acts whose "intensity is proportionally equal to the intensity of the habit, or even exceeds it... But if the intensity of the act proportionally falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to the increase of the habit, but rather to its diminution" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3).

b) Supernatural virtues are increased by God alone, and indeed by reason of the increase of sanctifying grace, from which infused virtues more probably physically emanate. Therefore, because the just man by each individual supernatural good work done in God's service certainly merits a right to an increase of sanctifying grace, even if the works are of less intensity than the habit of virtue, and more probably also gains an actual increase, therefore he also certainly merits a right to an increase of supernatural virtues, and more probably also an actual increase of them. This increase is added not only to the virtue by whose help the good work was placed, but equally to all infused virtues, both theological and moral. Hence just as all are infused together with sanctifying grace, so together with the increase of this grace all are increased. It does not stand in the way of this doctrine that in various saints certain virtues shine externally more than others. For this arises either from greater habituation in eliciting acts of such virtues, or from a better disposition of nature, or finally from the grace of the Holy Spirit, who divides to each as He wills and impels toward more frequent operations of such virtues (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3).

It should be noted that by the repetition of supernatural acts in a just agent, besides the increase of supernatural virtues by reason of the increase of sanctifying grace, there also arises a certain natural habit with respect to those determined acts; this habit, or acquired faculty of acting, destroys the opposite natural habit and assists the agent by removing difficulties.

II. Diminution of Virtues. 1. Natural virtues are diminished directly and indirectly. Directly, by placing acts contrary to the virtues, by which, as is clear, the stability of the disposition is diminished; indirectly, by ceasing from act. For St. Thomas says: "When someone does not use the habit of virtue for moderating his passions or proper operations, it is necessary that many passions and operations arise beyond the mode of virtue, from the inclination of the sensitive appetite and from other things which move externally; whence virtue is corrupted or diminished through cessation from act" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3). Indeed, as we noted above, acts less intense than the habit already in some measure dispose to diminution.

2. Supernatural virtues are not diminished directly but only indirectly. Not directly, for this diminution would occur either effectively, through contrary acts; which cannot happen, since a thing is made and diminished by the same one, and therefore God alone could effect this; or it would occur on account of demerit; which also cannot happen, since mortal sin removes the infused virtues to which it is contrary, while venial sin is not a demeritorious cause of the diminution of grace, and therefore not of virtues either. Nevertheless they are diminished indirectly, insofar as the acts of infused virtues are neglected, by which negligence, because of rising passions, man is disposed to mortal sin, by which the infused virtues to which it is contrary are removed. Hence St. Alphonsus rightly says, "Each virtue lives by its acts" (II, 6).

III. Destruction of Virtues. 1. Natural virtues are destroyed directly and indirectly. Directly, by the repetition of acts which are contrary to the virtues, and by which there arise bad habits which destroy the opposed good habits. Indirectly, in the same way as was said above concerning diminution.

2. With regard to supernatural virtues a distinction must be made:

a) The virtue of charity and all moral virtues are destroyed by any mortal sin whatever. With respect to charity this is clear from the contrary opposition which exists between charity and any mortal sin whatever. For charity is a union of friendship, by which man is actually turned or habitually turned toward God as the ultimate end; mortal sin actually and habitually turns man away from God as the ultimate end. As regards supernatural moral virtues, they are habits which regard intermediate ends, or ends which necessarily involve a relation to the ultimate supernatural end; therefore, when the habitual supernatural relation to the ultimate supernatural end has been lost, habitual supernatural relations to intermediate ends cannot remain.

b) The said reason of destruction, which is present in any mortal sin, does not touch the supernatural virtues of faith and hope; therefore these virtues are not destroyed by every mortal sin, but only by sins directly or indirectly contrary to them: faith, namely, by the sin of heresy; hope by the sin of despair, heresy, and presumption joined with heresy or infidelity (nn. 357, 362). With regard to faith this is clear from the Council of Trent;¹ with regard to hope theologians commonly deduce it from the analogy of faith and hope (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 4).

¹ Session 6, chapter 15 and canon 28.

I. Permanence of Virtues in the Blessed. As a general rule it can be established: in the blessed there remain all virtues which are, and insofar as they are, compossible with their state of beatitude. For God, as most highly loving the blessed, does not take away their perfections; now that virtues are perfections is clearer than light. Hence we conclude:

1. Among the theological virtues, in the blessed there remains only charity, and this most perfect. For this follows of itself from the perfect intellectual apprehension of God. But the virtues of faith and hope do not remain. Faith, as such, concerns things not seen and cannot be combined with the light of glory; and hope, since it is occupied around things not possessed, cannot be combined with the apprehension of God itself. And since in the beatitude of the soul the future glorification of the body is already possessed as in an absolute cause, the act which the blessed place with respect to the glorification of the body is not an act of hope, but properly of desire; hence for this reason the virtue of hope is not required.

2. With regard to moral virtues it must be said that in the blessed they do not remain according to their material being. "For in the future life there will not have place concupiscences and delights of foods and venereal things; nor fears and daring concerning dangers of death; nor distributions and communications of things which come into the use of the present life." Nevertheless they remain according to their formal being, or according to their being in accord with the order of reason, "insofar as the reason of each one will be most right concerning those things which pertain to him according to that state, and the appetitive power will be moved wholly according to the order of reason in those things which pertain to that state; whence Augustine says that prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude without the trouble of enduring evils; temperance without the rebellion of passions; so that it belongs to prudence to prefer or equal no good to God, to fortitude to adhere to Him most firmly, to temperance to be delighted by no harmful defect. Concerning justice, however, it is more manifest what act it will have there, namely, to be subject to God; because even in this life it pertains to justice to be subject to a superior" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 67, a. 1). It must be observed, however, that before the day of resurrection moral virtues, such as fortitude and temperance, which have the sensitive appetite as their immediate subject of inherence, do not remain actually in the separated soul, but only in the root, insofar as radically they are in the intellect and the supernatural will; but after the resurrection they will exist actually, just like the other virtues (St. Thomas, De virtutibus in communi, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3; I-II, q. 67, a. 1).

II. Permanence of Virtues in the Damned. No virtue remains in them, neither natural nor supernatural. For they are so confirmed in evil that at least there is in them a strictly so called moral impossibility of ever placing a naturally honorable act; and certainly there is a physical impossibility with respect to any supernatural act, since grace is entirely lacking. Now a state of soul so perverse, in which no honorable act at all, either supernatural or natural, is ever admitted, certainly does not admit a habit which inclines solely to honorableness.

III. Permanence of Virtues in Souls Being Purified. Since they are in the state of sanctifying grace, they have charity and all moral virtues in that manner in which the Blessed have them before the day of resurrection. Moreover faith and hope remain in them, since they still lack the light of glory, which removes faith in the Blessed, and they still tend toward the fruition of God, who in prison has remained for them a good absent and arduous.

I. The Being of Virtues in a Mean. 1. Notion. "The good of some thing," says St. Thomas, "consists in a mean, according as it is conformed to a rule or measure which can be transcended and fallen short of" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 3). Therefore the mean of virtue is the conformity of the act of virtue with its rule.

2. Division. The mean of virtues is twofold: either determined from the nature of the thing, or to be determined by reason. The first regards exterior things, and indeed their objective equality; therefore it is the same mean for all. The other regards interior passions, "in which the right cannot be established in the same way, because men have themselves differently toward passions" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 2); hence this mean is not the same for all.

3. Existence. a) Theological virtues, whose measure is God Himself, do not per se have being in a mean; for no one can believe God too much, hope in Him too much, or love Him too much. I say per se, for per accidens they have being in a mean, namely on our part, "because although we cannot be borne toward God as much as we ought, nevertheless we ought to be borne toward Him by believing, hoping, and loving according to the measure of our condition" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 4).

b) Moral virtues, whose rule is right reason, per se have being in a mean; for acts of moral virtues cannot be conformed to right reason except by avoiding defect from it or excess beyond it. But since justice regards exterior things, the mean of reason in this virtue necessarily coincides with the mean of the thing, and therefore is the same mean for all. The contrary occurs in the remaining moral virtues, whose mean must be determined by right reason according to diverse circumstances.

II. Mutual Connection of Virtues. There is one mutual connection of acquired virtues, another of infused virtues; there is also one connection of acquired virtues if they are considered in a perfect state, another in an imperfect state.

1. Acquired virtues in a perfect state are so connected among themselves that one cannot exist without the others. For the perfection of acquired virtues, as moral, depends on perfect prudence, since prudence must establish the mean in any given case; therefore, when perfect prudence is absent, the other acquired virtues are not perfectly present either. St. Augustine excellently illustrates this, saying: "Virtues which are in the human soul, although each is understood in one way or another, are nevertheless in no way separated from one another, so that whoever are equal, for example, in fortitude, are equal also in prudence, temperance, and justice. For if you say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of this one is less prudent, and by this very fact they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the other is more prudent. And thus you will find concerning the other virtues, if you run through all of them by the same consideration."¹

2. Acquired virtues in an imperfect state can exist one without the others. For someone can elicit more frequent acts of some virtue while neglecting acts of other virtues; but by acting thus he acquires for himself the virtue corresponding to the acts frequently placed. Therefore St. Thomas says: "We see someone... from some custom to be prompt for works of liberality, who nevertheless is not prompt for works of chastity" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1).

3. Infused theological virtues are so connected among themselves that charity cannot exist without faith and hope; but faith and hope can indeed exist without charity. The first is clear from this, that charity is infused only with sanctifying grace; and the virtues of faith and hope always coexist with sanctifying grace. The second, with regard to the virtue of faith, is taught by the Council of Trent;² moreover, when the virtue of faith remains, there also remains the foundation of hope, which is not destroyed by every mortal sin, since mortal sin as such is opposed only to charity. Nor should it be said that faith and hope perish for this reason, that together with charity sanctifying grace is lost, which is the root of the origin of faith and hope. For even though it is true that faith and hope take their origin from sanctifying grace, nevertheless, once they have arisen, they no longer inhere in sanctifying grace as in a subject; rather, their immediate subject of inherence is the powers of the soul. Therefore the loss of sanctifying grace is not the reason for the loss of these virtues.

4. Infused moral virtues: 1. are so connected among themselves that one cannot exist without another; for all proceed equally from sanctifying grace and regard their intermediate ends on account of the ultimate end. 2. Infused moral virtues are so connected with charity that they cannot exist without it; for when man's habitual relation to the ultimate supernatural end perishes, habitual supernatural relations to intermediate ends also perish.

¹ Augustine, De Trinitate, bk. 6, c. 4, n. 6; cf. Salmanticenses, De virtutibus, disp. 4, dub. 1, whole (t. 6, p. 374 ff.).

² Session 6, canon 28.

III. Inequality of Virtues. By inequality of virtues is understood their diverse moral goodness. Now the moral goodness of virtues in human acts is attended to according as they are regulated by the due rule; the higher the rule, the nobler the moral goodness. But if diverse virtues are regulated by the same rule, the magnitude of their moral goodness must be measured by their diverse nearness to this rule; the nearer some virtue is to the rule, the greater its goodness. From these things the following conclusions result:

1. Theological virtues surpass moral virtues in dignity, because their rule, which is God Himself, surpasses in dignity right reason, which is the rule of moral virtues. But among theological virtues, charity surpasses in dignity, since it is nearer to the rule. Now St. Thomas says: "That which is through itself is greater than that which is through another. But faith and hope indeed attain God according as from Him there comes to us either knowledge of truth or acquisition of good; but charity attains God Himself, so that it rests in Him, not so that something may come to us from Him; and therefore charity is more excellent than faith and hope" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, a. 6).

2. Among moral virtues, which are all regulated by the same rule, namely right reason, whether illuminated only by natural light or by supernatural light, prudence surpasses in dignity, because it perfects reason itself and attains it according to itself. Then follows justice, as residing in the will, which is nearer to reason and has as its object a good proposed by reason. Fortitude follows next; for it resides in the irascible appetite, which acts according to the cogitative power. Finally comes temperance, since as its subject of inherence it has the concupiscible appetite, which acts according to imagination (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 66, aa. 1 and 4; II-II, q. 123, a. 12).

I. Natural and supernatural virtues differ very greatly:

1. By reason of origin, as was explained in nn. 339, 340.

2. By reason of end, because natural virtues tend toward a natural end, supernatural virtues toward a supernatural end.

3. By reason of motive or formal object; for the motive of natural virtue is the honorable, insofar as it stands under natural reason; but the motive of supernatural virtue is the honorable, insofar as it stands under reason illumined by faith.

4. By reason of material object, insofar as supernatural virtue regards, besides the objects of natural virtue, many other things which have been established by God by positive law.

5. By reason of increase, diminution, and destruction, as we have explained.

6. By reason of the powers required for exercise; for the exercise of natural virtues the natural powers of themselves suffice; for the exercise of supernatural virtues grace is required.

7. By reason of merit, insofar as the just man, by an act of supernatural virtue, merits an increase of sanctifying grace and glory; for these things natural virtue is unfit.

II. Natural virtues assist supernatural virtues, insofar as by repetition of acts they remove contrary dispositions, and in that sense conduce to the exercise of supernatural virtues (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2).¹

¹ With regard to the supernatural virtues of fortitude and temperance, there is dispute about the subject of inherence. Cf. Potters, Compendium Philosophiae moralis, n. 293 sq., and the dogmatic theologians.

After the things that occurred to be said concerning virtues in general have been completed, we now pass to those things which must be demonstrated concerning them in particular. By reason of object, as we indicated at the beginning, virtues are divided into theological and moral virtues; therefore Part II contains two chapters, the one which treats theological virtues, the other which deals with moral virtues.

I. Notion. The principles, as St. Thomas teaches, by which man is ordered to supernatural beatitude are called theological virtues, "both because they have God as object, insofar as by them we are rightly ordered to God; and because they are infused into us by God alone; and because only by divine revelation in Sacred Scripture are virtues of this kind handed down" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62, a. 1).

Therefore for a threefold reason these principles are called theological virtues: by reason of object, by reason of cause, and by reason of cognition. The first reason, as being of greatest importance for our scope, will be explained briefly.

In order that a virtue, by reason of its object, may claim for itself as proper the name theological virtue, it must on the one hand have God Himself as its immediate material object. Otherwise moral virtues, which mediately, i.e., by means of an intermediate end, also attain God as the ultimate end, would have to be called by an equal name. From this, however, it does not follow that God must be the adequate material object, but only the primary; for the things which are attained by reason of the primary object are reduced as a secondary object to the same virtue. Thus, for example, one's neighbor must be called the secondary object of the virtue of charity, since he is attained by reason of the primary object, which is God.

On the other hand, God Himself also, or His perfections, must constitute the formal object of theological virtue; for it belongs to the formal object to constitute a virtue in its species. Hence, in order to constitute some virtue in the species of theological virtue, God Himself or His divine attributes must be the formal object of that virtue.

From what has been said it follows that theological virtue is aptly defined: A virtue whose immediate object, both material, at least principal, and formal, is God Himself as author and end of the supernatural order.

II. Number. That the theological virtues are only three in number, namely faith, hope, and charity, the universal Church has always held as certain, and in this sense also interprets the words of the Apostle: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity."¹ For no reason can be assigned why the Apostle enumerates these virtues as three distinct species of one genus, distinct from all other virtues, unless because these three are theological exclusively.² It is also confirmed by reason. For in order that man may arrive at the supernatural end, he must tend stably toward it by operations of intellect and will proportioned to this end. Now for this, three theological virtues are required: faith, namely, which perfects the intellect for knowing the supernatural end; hope, which perfects the will for firmly desiring the same end as possible of attainment and perfective of the one desiring; and charity, which perfects the will for firmly desiring the aforesaid end as a good in itself, to which man must order himself and whatever else.³

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² Cf. Origen, bk. 4, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, c. 4, n. 6; St. Augustine, sermon 27, n. 1; Enchiridion, c. 6, n. 1 and c. 9, n. 2, at the end; St. Gregory the Great, bk. 1, Moralia, c. 27, n. 38.

³ Cf. Salmanticenses, commentary on I-II, q. 62, a. 3; Mazzella, nn. 43-44.

I. Notion of a Supernatural Moral Virtue. Just as the theological virtues immediately regard the supernatural ultimate end, so supernatural moral virtues immediately regard intermediate supernatural ends. From this it follows that the material object of these virtues can be constituted only by those actions which immediately touch intermediate ends. But since such acts of themselves have their being in a mean, which can be predicated of the theological virtues only per accidens, it is also clear that their morality must be measured according to reason illumined by the principles of faith. From this doctrine it follows that a supernatural moral virtue is suitably defined: a supernatural virtue inclining or disposing one to exercise supernatural acts concerning the means to the supernatural end.

Note. Since natural virtues in their own order, both as to objects and as to number, agree entirely with supernatural virtues, therefore, with due qualifications, the things which we shall say about supernatural virtues can be applied to natural virtues. But since we have been called to the supernatural order, when in the future we speak of moral virtue, of itself we understand supernatural virtue.

II. Existence of Supernatural Moral Virtues. Scotus and the Scotists deny that there are supernatural moral virtues, and say that natural moral virtues, that is, acquired virtues, suffice even in the supernatural order, because they can receive a rule from faith and be commanded by charity, and thus can attain a supernatural end. Nevertheless this opinion has become obsolete, and the existence of supernatural moral virtues is now almost commonly admitted.

It is proved:

1. By the mind of the Church. The Council of Vienne,¹ choosing as more probable the opinion teaching that grace and virtues, as to habit, are infused even into little children in baptism, openly supposes the proposed opinion. For that by those virtues are understood not only theological virtues but also infused moral virtues is clear from the fact that the Council chooses that opinion which: a) theologians at that time, with St. Thomas against the Scotists, admitted, namely that even moral virtues are infused; and b) Innocent III in his own time had mentioned but left undecided. But Innocent says that this opinion asserts that "faith and charity and other virtues" are infused into little children.² The Roman Catechism teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace] is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace." Then it calls them "an abundance of virtues," and again "so great an abundance of virtues";³ these phrases are less suitably applied to only the three theological virtues. Leo XIII, in the letter to the Archbishop of Baltimore given on January 22, 1899, openly distinguishes supernatural moral virtues from natural acquired virtues and teaches that the former must be preferred to the latter.

2. By the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Thus teach St. Augustine,⁴ St. Clement of Rome,⁵ St. Polycarp,⁶ Origen,⁷ St. Basil,⁸ St. Gregory Nazianzen,⁹ St. Hilary,¹⁰ St. Ambrose,¹¹ St. Prosper,¹² and St. Gregory the Great.¹³

3. By theological reason. Man constituted in the supernatural order must be perfected both as to essence and as to operation in relation to the supernatural ultimate end, and also as to operation in relation to the intermediate ends through which he must tend toward this ultimate end. But as to essence he is perfected by habitual grace; as to operations in relation to the ultimate end, by infused theological virtues. Therefore it is connaturally necessary that he be perfected as to operation in relation to intermediate ends by infused moral virtues.

Confirmation. The order of grace is more perfect than the order of nature and perfects it. But in the order of nature man is perfected not only in operations concerning the natural ultimate end by the habit of first principles and by the natural rectitude of the will and inclination toward that end, but also in operations concerning intermediate ends by acquired moral virtues.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

² Corpus Iuris, book 3, Decretals of Gregory, title 42, chapter 3, Maiores.

³ Part 2, chapter 2, questions 39-40.

⁴ Enarratio in Psalmum 83, v. 8, n. 11 (ed. G., 4, col. 1267).

⁵ Epistula I ad Corinthios, cc. 35 and 58 (M.P.G. 1, cols. 278 and 327).

⁶ Epistula ad Philippenses, c. 12 (M.P.G. 5, cols. 1015-1016).

⁷ Book 10, In Epistolam ad Romanos, n. 7 (M.P.G. 14, col. 1261 B).

⁸ Homily on Psalm 29, n. 5, § 8 (M.P.G. 29, cols. 315-318 inclusive).

⁹ Oration 21, c. 1 (M.P.G. 35, cols. 1082-1083 A inclusive); book 1, theological poems, section 2, poem 49-51 inclusive (ibid. 37, cols. 949-950); cf. Oration 14, cc. 1-5 inclusive (ibid. 35, cols. 859 A-863 B inclusive).

¹⁰ Commentary on Matthew, c. 11, n. 9 (M.P.L. 9, cols. 982 C-983 A inclusive).

¹¹ Book 6, Hexaemeron, c. 7, n. 42 (M.P.L. 14, col. 258 B); De paradiso, n. 14 (ibid., col. 280).

¹² Contra Collatorem, c. 9, n. 3 (M.P.L. 51, cols. 237 B-238 A inclusive).

¹³ Book 2, Moralia, c. 49, nn. 76-77 (M.P.L. 75, cols. 592-593); book 1, Homily 5 on Ezekiel, n. 11 (ibid. 76, col. 825).

III. Number of Moral Virtues. As concerns the number of moral virtues, take the following:

1. Since the distinction of virtues is taken from the specific distinction of formal objects, there exist as many specifically distinct moral virtues as there are formal objects of them distinct in species. Therefore, since the formal object of moral virtues is their conformity with reason illumined by faith, there are as many specifically distinct moral virtues as there are specifically distinct reasons of conformity.

2. Among moral virtues some are distinguished as principal, not because they are more perfect than all the others, but because human life is more principally occupied in them and the other virtues are founded on them. These principal virtues are called cardinal, from the hinge on which a door turns, because moral life too in some way turns and is founded on these virtues as on certain principles (St. Thomas, De virtutibus cardinalibus, q. 1, a. 1). Four cardinal virtues are enumerated: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "And if anyone loves justice, her labors have great virtues: for she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful to men in life."¹ This doctrine is confirmed by the holy Fathers, among whom, for example, St. Augustine teaches: "For the virtues of our active life are described by many as four, and they are found in Scripture. Prudence is said to be that by which we distinguish between good and evil. Justice is said to be that by which we render to each one his own. ... Temperance is said to be that by which we restrain lusts. Fortitude is said to be that by which we bear all troublesome things."² Finally it is proved by reason, and indeed in two ways: first, from the side of the formal principle of virtue; second, from the side of the subject.

Therefore from the side of the formal reason of virtues it is shown thus: the formal reason of virtues is the good of reason, and this good can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is in the very consideration of reason alone, and thus there will be the virtue of prudence. In another way, insofar as the good of reason is placed concerning something. And this is considered in two ways: either as it is concerning operations, and thus justice is posited; or as it is placed concerning passions. And this in two ways: either concerning passions impelling toward the contrary of what reason dictates, and thus temperance is posited; or concerning passions drawing one back from the good of reason on account of difficulties, and thus fortitude is posited.

But from the side of the subject the conclusion is proved as follows. For the subject of virtue is twofold: either rational by essence, which is the intellect, and in this prudence is posited; or rational by participation, and this is either the will, which is the subject of justice; or the concupiscible appetite, which is the subject of temperance; or the irascible appetite, which is the subject of fortitude.³

But that the things said above may be taken more rightly, observe the following:

a) The cardinal virtues can be considered under a twofold aspect: either as general modes or properties of all virtues, or as special virtues. Taken in the former sense, they are not special and distinct habits, but properly general conditions of every virtue. Thus prudence so considered is nothing other than a certain rectitude of discretion in any act and any matter; justice, a certain rectitude of soul by which a man works what he ought in any matter; temperance, a certain disposition of soul which preserves measure for every passion and operation, lest they be carried beyond what is due; fortitude, a certain disposition of soul by which a man is formed according to reason against any impulses of passions or labors of operations whatever (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61, a. 4).

Taken in the other sense, the cardinal virtues are special and distinct habits, and as their material object they have that matter in which the general mode of which we have spoken above is especially evident. Now rectitude of discretion appears especially in the command of reason; therefore prudence is the virtue commanding what things are to be done or omitted. Rectitude of soul in performing what is due is especially evident in those things which are with equality toward another; hence justice is the virtue which renders to each one his right. The disposition of soul preserving measure in operation and passion appears especially in restraining the pleasures of touch; therefore temperance is the virtue which moderates these pleasures. The disposition of soul sustaining the impulses of passions and the labors of operations is especially evident before all else in undergoing dangers of death; hence fortitude is the virtue by which we undergo dangers of death (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61, a. 3). Considered in this way, the cardinal virtues are opposed to the four wounds of original sin: prudence is opposed to the wound of ignorance, justice to malice, fortitude to weakness, and temperance to concupiscence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 3).

b) The other moral virtues are reduced to these cardinal virtues, indeed either as subjective parts, or as potential parts, or as integral parts, according as they participate in their reason in different ways.

alpha. Subjective parts of some cardinal virtue are called those virtues which truly participate in the general reason of that cardinal virtue, although they nevertheless have their own specifying object. Thus, for example, sobriety is a subjective part of the cardinal virtue of temperance; for just as temperance moderates the passion of touch, so sobriety moderates the passion for intoxicating drink. But because subjective parts participate in the general reason of their cardinal virtue, there cannot exist subjective parts of a cardinal virtue which already has an entirely specific notion, as happens in relation to the cardinal virtue of fortitude, which has a plainly determinate matter, namely dangers of death.

beta. Potential parts are called those virtues which agree with a cardinal virtue in the general formal mode of attaining their object, but differ from it insofar as they do not have as their object that matter in which the general formal mode is especially evident. Thus meekness, which moderates anger, is a potential part of temperance; just as temperance moderates the pleasure of touch, so meekness moderates the passion of anger.

gamma. Integral parts of a cardinal virtue are not virtues of themselves, but only conditions or dispositions which, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "must concur for the perfect act of virtue" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48, single article). Thus, for example, shamefacedness is fear of a base act insofar as it is reproachable. It primarily regards reproach, and therefore, by suffusing the soul with horror of baseness, it helps the virtue of temperance to place a perfect act; therefore it is an integral part of this cardinal virtue.

¹ Wis. 8:7.

² Enarratio in Psalmum 83, v. 8, n. 11 (ed. G., 4, col. 1267).

³ Hieronymus de Medicis, on I-II, q. 61, a. 2; nevertheless, with regard to the supernatural virtues of temperance and fortitude, there is dispute concerning the subject of inherence (n. 370).

IV. Subject of Inherence of Moral Virtues. The subject which and total of moral virtues, equally with that of theological virtues, is, as is clear, the person himself who possesses the said virtues. It remains, therefore, that we speak of the subject by which of inherence. Now:

1. As regards natural moral virtues, the following hold:

a) The cardinal moral virtues inhere as follows: prudence, since as a perfection of practical judgment it is right reason concerning things to be done, inheres in the practical intellect; justice, as perfecting the rational appetite in the pursuit of the neighbor's good, inheres in the will; fortitude, which perfects the sensitive appetite in overcoming dangers, inheres in the irascible sensitive appetite; temperance, perfecting the sensitive appetite in moderating pleasures, inheres in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.

b) Moral virtues which are subjective parts of a cardinal virtue have the same subject by which of inherence as the cardinal virtue itself, because a species is never outside its genus.

c) Moral virtues which are potential parts do not of themselves inhere in the subject in which the cardinal virtue is, whose formal mode of attaining the object they agree with. Thus, for example, humility is in the irascible sensitive appetite and yet is reduced to the cardinal virtue of temperance, which is in the concupiscible sensitive appetite, because it follows not the formal mode of fortitude, which is in the irascible appetite, but that of temperance.

2. As regards supernatural moral virtues, the following hold:

a) The cardinal moral virtues inhere as follows: prudence inheres in the practical intellect; justice inheres in the will. With regard to fortitude and temperance there is dispute. According to some, they inhere in the will;¹ according to others, fortitude inheres in the irascible sensitive appetite, and temperance in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.²

b) Moral virtues which are subjective parts of a cardinal virtue have the same subject of inherence, because, as we said above, a species is never outside its genus. Hence the subjective parts of prudence inhere in the practical intellect, the subjective parts of justice in the will; the subjective parts of temperance, according to some, in the will, and according to others, in the concupiscible sensitive appetite. Fortitude lacks subjective parts.

c) Moral virtues which are potential parts of a cardinal virtue, according to those who teach that the sensitive appetite is not a subject of inherence of supernatural virtues, according to them, I say, the potential parts of prudence are in the practical intellect, and the potential parts of the other cardinal virtues are in the will. But those who think that the sensitive appetite is also a subject of inherence of supernatural virtues teach the same here as was said above concerning the potential parts of natural virtues (IV. 1. c).

¹ Cf. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, p. 128 sq.

² Cf. Gonet, Manuale, second part, tract 3, chapter 4.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 49-54.)

Definition.—A habit is a perfect and stable quality by which a being is well- or ill-affected in itself, or with regard to its motions. It differs from mere disposition or tendency, which is an imperfect and transitory quality. Thus, a sallow complexion is a habit; a blush, a disposition.

Division.—Habits are variously divided, as follows:

(a) From the viewpoint of their subject, they are either entitative or operative, according as they affect directly the nature or the powers of a being. Thus, in the soul there are the entitative habit of sanctifying grace and operative habits like science and virtue; while in the body are entitative habits of health, beauty, etc.

(b) From the viewpoint of their object, habits are good (i.e., virtues) or evil (i.e., vices);

(c) From the viewpoint of their cause, habits are infused or acquired, according as they are supernaturally produced by God, or are naturally obtained by man through repeated acts, or result from nature without repeated acts. Faith in a baptized infant is an infused habit; knowledge obtained through study is an acquired habit; the perception that the first principles of truth are to be granted is natural.

Operative acquired habits are defined as qualities not easily changed, by which a faculty that is able to act in various ways is disposed to act in one way with ease, readiness and pleasure. Thus, by training a man acquires a correct carriage, and is able to walk straight without difficulty.

Operative infused habits are enduring qualities that give to a faculty the power to perform acts that are supernatural. Thus, the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity give to the intellect and the will the ability to elicit acts with reference to supernatural truth and good. Facility and promptitude with respect to these acts come through the use of the infused power.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 55-70.)

Definition.—A virtue is a good habit of the free powers of the soul, that is a principle of good conduct, and never of conduct that is evil. Hence, the following are not virtues: (a) an occasional inclination to good, for this is not a fixed habit; (b) good habits of the body or of the vegetative powers, etc. (such as beauty and health), for these are not free; (c) knowledge of the right or affection for it without any reference to practice, for virtue is a principle of right living; (d) habits that can be applied indifferently to good or bad conduct, such as human opinion.

Division.—The virtues are divided: (a) according to their different causes, into infused and acquired virtues (cfr. 134 sqq.);(b) according to their different objects, into intellectual, moral and theological virtues.

The intellectual virtues are those habits that perfect the intellect with reference to its good—i.e., truth, speculative or practical.

The speculative virtues are three: understanding, knowledge and wisdom.

(a) Understanding or intelligence is the habit of perceiving truths that are not in need of proof, as being self-evident. Axiomatic truths or first principles are the object of this virtue.

(b) Knowledge or science is the habit of perceiving truths that are learned from other truths by argumentation, and that are ultimate in some category of being. The object of this virtue embraces the various sciences (like astronomy) which are conclusions from principles.

(c) Wisdom is the habit of learning through reasoning the truth that is absolutely ultimate; it is the knowledge of things in their supreme cause, God. Examples are theology and philosophy in their highest sense.

The practical intellectual virtues are two: prudence and art.

(a) Prudence is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases what is to be done or what is to be omitted, in order that one may act according to the requirements of good morals.

(b) Art is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases how one must act in order to produce things that are useful or beautiful (e.g., music, painting, building, etc.).

The intellectual virtues, except prudence, are not perfect virtues, since, While they make an act good, they do not necessarily make the agent good. A man may have great knowledge about morality, or be able to produce excellent works of art, and at the same time be not virtuous, or have no love for his work.

Prudence is an intellectual virtue, since it resides in the intellect; but it is also classed among the moral virtues, since its object is the direction of human acts to their right end.

The moral virtues are those habits that perfect the will and the sensitive appetite with reference to their immediate and respective objects; that is, they are habits concerned with acts as means to the Last End. They make the act good, and make good also him who performs it; and they are thus superior as virtues to the intellectual habits.

There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.

These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the other moral virtues hinge on them.

The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

Causes of Virtues.—The causes of virtue are three: (a) nature, which is the cause of the inchoative intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the theoretical and practical principles that are naturally known, and of the inclinations to virtue that arise from an individual’s bodily constitution; (b) practice, which is the cause of perfected intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the good habits that are formed by repeated acts (e.g., knowledge obtained through study, temperance fixed in the character through continued effort); (c) infusion from on high, which is the cause of the virtues that surpass nature (i.e., of the theological virtues and of the moral virtues that are concerned with our acts as ordered to the supernatural).

Properties of the Virtues.—From the definition of virtue given above certain properties result.

(a) Since a virtue makes conduct agree with a certain fixed standard, it does not allow of excess or defect. Hence, virtue follows the golden mean.

(b) Since the other moral virtues would go to extremes without the guidance of prudence, and since prudence would not judge aright without the right dispositions of the other virtues, it follows that the four moral virtues, at least in their perfect state, must always be together. And because charity is the fulfillment of the whole law, he who has charity has also all the other infused virtues.

(c) Since the virtues are directed towards objects of varying degrees of excellence, and since they are habits, and are capable of increase and decrease (137 sqq.), it follows that both virtues of different species, and those of the same species, are or may be unequal.

(d) Since some of the virtues imply conditions that will not exist in the life to come, it follows that these virtues will be somewhat changed in the blessed. Thus, temperance, which subdues the rebellion of the passions, will not be exercised in heaven, where the passions do not rebel.

The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.

(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others, neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor, whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.

(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and defect.

(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness, cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what is not due to one’s condition.

Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three groups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most excellent, since they deal directly with man’s supernatural end; (b) By reason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are superior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular goods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as virtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the appetites, they are more properly principles of action.

The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

The Complements of the Virtues.—The virtues are habits that supply the soul with an internal guide (prudence), and with inclinations to follow its direction (moral virtues). But there is also a higher Guide who speaks to the soul, and it is necessary that the inclinations of virtue be carried out in a suprahuman mode. Hence, the virtues are completed by certain adjuncts. These are: (a) the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are habits infused into the soul, making it sensitive to the guidance of the Holy Spirit and docile under His direction; (b) the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, which are acts that grow out of the virtues and have a special spiritual sweetness attached to them; (c) the Beatitudes, which are activities of special excellence having a corresponding special reward attached to them, The acts are produced by the infused virtues and the Gifts, especially by the Gifts.

The properties of the seven infused virtues are chiefly four:

(a) In the first place, these virtues may be increased: “This I pray, that your charity may more and more abound” (Phil, i. 9). The increase takes place ex opere operato through the Sacraments, or ex opere operantis through meritorious works—that is, whenever sanctifying grace, their root, is increased.

(b) A second property of the infused virtues is that they may be lost: “I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity” (Apoc., ii. 4); “Some have made shipwreck concerning the faith” (I Tim., i. 19). The loss is caused by the contrary of the virtue: faith is lost by disbelief, hope by despair; charity and the moral virtues are lost by any mortal sin, for they are built on sanctifying grace, which mortal sin destroys.

(c) A third property of the infused virtues is that they cannot be diminished directly. If we leave out of consideration their opposites (which, as just said, remove these virtues entirely), there is nothing else that can act directly upon them. Mere failure to exercise them cannot lessen them, since they are caused by divine infusion, not by human exercise; venial sin cannot lessen them, since it does not lessen grace on which they depend.

(d) A fourth property of the infused virtues is that they are diminished indirectly. Failure to practise them or venial sin does diminish the ease and fervor with which the acts of these virtues are exercised; and thus indirectly—that is, by preparing the way for acts that are directly contrary—neglect or venial sin diminishes the habits themselves.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 1-9.)

The order of the theological virtues here followed is that given by St. Paul in I Cor., xiii. 13—viz., faith, hope, charity. The order of these virtues is twofold: (a) according to dignity the order is charity, hope, faith; (b) according to time, the order is that of I Cor., xiii. The habits of these three virtues are infused at the same time (i.e., at the moment when grace is conferred), but their acts are not simultaneous, and one must believe before one can hope or love.

There are various points of view from which virtues may be compared one with another.

(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are received in Baptism.

(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.

(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue in excellence as a habit, when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend, and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus, the habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of accumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.

(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the general concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence exercised on one’s acts (as the word “virtue” or “power” intimates), and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.

The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.—As the divisions of parts correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative whole.

(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats, horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.

(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral or complete.

(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives, accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different power, in none of them all its powers.

It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having the full efficacy of the latter.

Integral Parts of Prudence.—The integral parts of prudence, considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge. (a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.

The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.—Prudence in general is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into the particular good of the individual and the common good of the multitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal prudence and social prudence.

(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.

(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.

The Potential Parts of Prudence.—As was explained in 1636, the potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633). Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:

(a) wise deliberation (eubulia), which is a habit of debating with oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for virtuous choice;

(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for virtuous conduct.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 61, 62.)

The Three Species of Justice.—The subjective parts of a virtue are those that partake of its essence and that are the subordinate species into which it may be distinguished, as prudence is divided into individual, domestic and political (see 1639). There are three species of justice, and their division is taken from the threefold relation that exists in a whole.

(a) Thus, legal justice directs the parts to respect the rights of the whole, and it is exercised by all those who promote the common good of a society by fulfilling well the duties which pertain to their position and rank in the society.

(b) Distributive justice regulates the whole in reference to the parts, and it is exercised by all those who seek for such a distribution of the common things of a society as accords with the inequalities of merit and ability of the members. Hence, distributive justice is found not only in the heads of a state, or family, or other body, but also in the subordinates who are content with the fair distributions made by the heads.

(c) Commutative justice orders the relations between the parts, and it is exercised by all who practise fair dealing with their equals, that is, by states with states, families with families, societies with like societies, individuals with individuals; or with those who act as their equals, as when a society acting as a moral person makes a contract with one of its members as another moral person.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 79-100.)

The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.—The integral parts of a virtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the virtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are needed for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These parts are called here “quasi-integral,” so as not to be confused with the properly integral parts, or divisions of quantity, in a material composite. In its first use “integral part” is spoken of bodily things; in its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two previous articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present article will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the opposite sins.

The Potential Parts of Justice.—The potential parts of justice, that is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary to justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature or activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise decision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the government of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its principal act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as potential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which must be assigned to justice, since they regulate man’s will towards others, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because they do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential notes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal to a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal right (see 1692).

The Parts of Fortitude.—As has been said above, the parts of a virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree (e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers (i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack, requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued opposition).

(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as exercised in reference to minor dangers.

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

What have been the vicissitudes of Moral Theology? - There have been various vicissitudes of Moral Theology, both as regards its didactic development and as regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases.

As regards its methodical form, various ages can be distinguished in it, and they are the following six.

The first age, from the beginning, in the time of the Apostles, was when moral doubts were resolved by the decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, by the decrees of Councils, and by the opinions of the Fathers, who especially in their homilies and sermons to the people explained those things which are necessary for rightly informing morals and for salvation.

The second age succeeds a little later, when in the first centuries of the Church the use of canonical penance became established, and Penitential Books were employed. Special treatises on moral matters were gradually multiplied in this age, either together with speculative doctrines or separately, up to the twelfth century, when, after St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in the year 1033, and after St. Bernard, first Abbot of Clairvaux, who died in 1153, Peter Lombard, called the Master by antonomasia, wrote the books of the Sentences, in the third of which he treats of the virtues and of vices; he died in 1164. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 11; Decree of Gratian, at the end.

The third age extends from the thirteenth century to the fourteenth. In this age sacred practical doctrine made great progress, especially through the work of William of Paris, who died in 1249, St. Bonaventure, O. Min., who died in the year 1274, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., who died in the year 1274, called the Angelic Doctor, St. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, who died in the year 1275, and Peter Paludanus, O.P., who died in the year 1342, who for St. Alphonsus is a doctor of perfect knowledge.

The fourth age embraces the two following centuries, the fifteenth and the sixteenth; and it is distinguished by the notable saints who flourished in this age. Among others are celebrated St. John of Capistrano, O. Min., who died in the year 1440, St. Bernardine of Siena, O.S. Fr., who died in the year 1444, St. Lawrence Justinian, who died in the year 1455, St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, O.P., who died in the year 1534, a man of most subtle genius, Francis de Vitoria, O.P., who died in the year 1546, Dominic Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1560, Peter Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1563, Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who died in the year 1581, St. Charles Borromeo, who died in the year 1584, Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus, who died in the year 1590, Cardinal Francis Toletus, S.J., who died in the year 1596, and Louis Molina, S.J., who died in the year 1600.

The fifth age embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth century up to St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, and it is distinguished by many learned scholastic theologians who expressly expounded and illustrated moral questions in copious treatises. Among many others there excel Thomas Sanchez, S.J., who died in the year 1610, Francis Suarez, S.J., who died in the year 1617, Leonard Lessius, S.J., who died in the year 1623, Basil Pontius, O.S. Aug., who died in the year 1629, the Salmanticenses, O. Carm. Disc., from 1631 to 1722, Martin Bonacina, who died in the year 1631, Giles Coninck, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Ferdinand De Castro Palao, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Paul Laymann, S.J., who died in the year 1635, Francis Sylvius, who died in the year 1649, Augustine Barbosa, who died in the year 1649, Cardinal John De Lugo, who died in the year 1660, Peter Marchant, O. Min., who died in the year 1661, Antoninus Diana, Cleric Regular Theatine, who died in the year 1663, Zacharias Pasqualigo, Cler. Reg., who died in the year 1664, Hermann Busembaum, S.J., who died in the year 1668, Henry Pirhing, S.J., who died in the year 1670, Thomas Tamburinus, S.J., who died in the year 1675, Anacletus Reiffenstuel, O.S. Franc., who died in the year 1703, Claude La-Croix, S.J., who died in the year 1714, Patrick Sporer, O. Min., who died in the year 1714, Prosper Lambertini, Benedict XIV, who died in the year 1758, and Lucius Ferraris, Ord. Min., who died in the year 1760.

The sixth age takes its beginning from St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, who died in the year 1787, and extends down to our own times. St. Alphonsus, most outstanding in genius and doctrine as well as in sanctity of life, and divinely given for exterminating Jansenist errors and severities, wrote a Moral Theology in which he treats all questions learnedly, eruditely, and with the highest prudence, recounting almost all that had been handed down before him; hence he was deservedly adorned by the Church with the title of Doctor. Hence it happened that in more recent times Moral Theologians followed St. Alphonsus as leader and master. In our age very many compendia of Moral Theology have been published.

The name indeed is modest, but the works are certainly of notable merit. For in these compendia the whole doctrine of Moral Theology is handed down briefly and in order, and in them is contained, accurately set forth, not only the doctrine of the old theologians accumulated in the course of time, but also that which has been acquired for Moral Theology either from the more recent Acts of the Holy See and of the Sacred Roman Congregations, or also from the progress of the natural sciences. Nor indeed have more expansive treatments been lacking in this age, as can be seen in the treatises On Justice and Law and On Contracts of D. Carriere, and in the scholia, annotations, and dissertations of Fr. Anthony Ballerini, S.J. Zitelli, Enchirid.;

Hurter, Nomenclat.; D'Annibale, Summ., 4th ed., p. 1, n. 2 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction V.

As regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases, for several centuries each one defended his own opinion, according to the varying weight of the reasons, as seemed better to him. In the year 1572 Antonius Cordubensis first began to contend on behalf of law, because of the authoritative and obligatory prerogative of law, and accordingly he established that in doubt the safer part must always be held. But in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina, professor at Salamanca, began, on the contrary, to contend on behalf of liberty because of the prerogative of its natural right, and accordingly he established that in doubtful matters he acts prudently and licitly who follows an opinion truly probable and favoring liberty, even after leaving aside the more probable opinion in favor of law. He was the first who reduced the doctrine concerning probable opinions into a system. From this Tutiorism and Probabilism arose.

In the following seventeenth century Synnichius, who died in the year 1666, brought Tutiorism down into Rigorism, while Caramuel brought Probabilism into Laxism: for the former denied that we can follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable, which was condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690; the latter, on the opposite side, affirmed that we can follow an opinion even slightly probable, which was proscribed by Innocent XI in the year 1679. Hence in that same century Probabilism was widely diffused, and became a very common and very received doctrine in every school: of almost all the disciples of St. Thomas, of almost all the disciples of Scotus, of almost all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and of other theologians, with few exceptions.

But since many of these probabilists favored liberty too much, asserting that it was lawful to follow even an opinion that was probably and doubtfully probable, the Probabilists were divided among themselves, and there arose moderate Probabilism, standing in an opinion truly and gravely probable, and broad Probabilism, proceeding even to doubtful probability. Hence, while the Fathers of the Society of Jesus commonly remained in Probabilism, the Thomists passed over to Probabiliorism, requiring for liberty an opinion more probable than the opinion favoring law. Zitelli, in his Enchiridion, mentions as the head of the probabiliorists Francis Genet, who died in the year 1702.

In the eighteenth century, to overthrow broad Probabilism and Probabiliorism at the same time, St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori undertook to defend moderate Probabilism, establishing that it is lawful to use a probable opinion even in competition with one more probable for law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. And for that reason the Holy Doctor called his system moderate Probabilism, against rigid Probabiliorists and lax Probabilists, Equiprobabilism, with aeque taken according to the nature of true probability, not according to equality of degree.

But since the word nevertheless was not free from ambiguity in itself, hence after St. Alphonsus another system arose, which the Redemptorist Fathers defend, namely the system of Equiprobabilism, by which it is established that it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty when it is equally or a little less probable than the opinion favoring law; but that it is not lawful when the latter is much more probable than the former, which in truth falls back into Probabiliorism. La-Croix, vol. 1, prodromal book, Franc. Ant. Zachariae and Quaest. facti of Stephen De Champs; Zitelli, Enchir.; D'Annibale, p. 1, n. 8 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction II; E. E. M. n. 114, 119.

What is virtue, how many kinds are there, and is it distinguished from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, from the beatitudes, and from the fruits of the Holy Spirit? - R. To the first. Virtue is a good habit of the mind, by which one lives rightly and no one uses badly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 55, a. 4. A good habit of the mind, namely a good disposition of the soul toward living or operating rightly. If the disposition is simply toward operating holily, it is supernatural and infused virtue, giving the ability to operate. If the disposition is toward operating rightly with ease, it is natural virtue, acquired by repetition of acts. Therefore virtue is not the power itself, but presupposes it, and is in it, giving it the ability to act easily in the natural order, and simply a further ability to act in the supernatural order, beyond the ability to act in the natural order. Habit of the mind, namely of the intellect and will, as are the supernatural virtues of faith, which regards the intellect and attains God, the highest truth; and of hope and charity, which regard the will, of which the one attains God as good for us, the other attains God as the highest good in himself. By which one lives rightly, that is, one operates rightly or operates according to the moral rule of human acts. And thus virtue is distinguished from the habit of vice, which is always toward evil. And no one uses badly; for one can use other intellectual habits, such as the habits of science and art, for good or for evil. Therefore virtue is by no means one kind active, another passive, as the Americanists and Modernists say; since every virtue, as a habit, is a principle of acting rightly, and as an act, is right action.

R. To the second. Virtues, some are theological, so called because they immediately attain God, man's supreme supernatural end; and others are moral, which immediately attain created objects, and through these God. The theological virtues are only three, and they are those three already mentioned, neither more nor fewer; namely faith, hope, charity. But the principal moral virtues are four. For virtue consists in this, that by a dispositive habit it directs our acts according to right reason; and right reason consists in this, that man in his human acts preserves due relations, in intercourse and association with other men and in the use of all creatures. Hence there arises first the most general directive virtue of all, which is prudence, to which it pertains to direct all our operations and all acts of the other virtues according to the dictate of right reason, so that in them there is sin neither by excess nor by defect. There arises second the most noble virtue, which is justice, which renders to others what is owed. There arises third temperance, which inclines us to the moderate use of delightful things. There arises fourth fortitude, by which man reasonably contains and bears himself in the use of things, as regards those things which present difficulty to us and are harmful to us. These four are called cardinal virtues, because all other moral virtues are reduced to these as their parts. Moreover three parts of the cardinal virtues are distinguished: integral, subjective, potential. An integral part is that without which the virtue is not perfect, as a house without a roof, without a foundation, without a wall is not perfect; a subjective part is that which is its species; a potential part is that which is ordered only to certain secondary acts and matters, as not having the whole power of the principal virtue. - Wis. 8:7; S. Th. 1. 2. qq. 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 68; 2. 2. q. 48, a. 1; q. 128, a. 1; q. 143, a. 1.

R. To the third. From infused virtues are distinguished the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are infused habits by which man is rendered promptly movable to receiving divine inspirations and to exercising excellent acts of virtues. Therefore they agree with supernatural virtues in this, that they too are infused habits; they differ from them first in this, that virtues dispose man so that he is promptly moved by reason and follows the dictate of the divine law, but gifts dispose man so that he promptly obeys the Holy Spirit himself as mover and guide. They differ besides in this, that virtues dispose men to doing the ordinary works of the Christian life; but gifts dispose to extraordinary, higher, and more excellent works.

Seven are the gifts, and they are referred to the seven virtues: the gift of fear of God to temperance, the gift of fortitude to the virtue of fortitude, the gift of piety to justice, the gift of counsel to prudence, the gift of understanding to faith, the gift of knowledge to hope, the gift of wisdom to charity. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 68.

R. To the fourth. From virtues and gifts are distinguished the beatitudes, which proceed from the former in a more imperfect mode, from the latter in a more excellent mode. For beatitudes are good, outstanding, and perfect acts, which in a peculiar way lead us to obtaining eternal life, whence we are already blessed in hope. To poverty of spirit the virtue of temperance and the gift of fear dispose. To meekness, the virtue of justice and the gift of piety; to mourning, the virtue of hope and the gift of knowledge. To hunger for justice, the virtue and gift of fortitude. To mercy, the virtue of prudence and the gift of counsel. To cleanness of heart, the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding. To peace, charity and the gift of wisdom. "The eighth beatitude," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 69, a. 3 ad 5, "is a certain confirmation and manifestation of all the preceding. For from this, that someone is confirmed in poverty of spirit and humility and the other following things, it follows that he does not recede from these goods because of some persecution. Hence the eighth beatitude in some way pertains to the seven preceding."

R. To the fifth. The fruits of the Holy Spirit, which the Apostle names in Gal. 5, are distinguished from the habits of virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, for they are their effects or acts; and insofar as they proceed from man, not indeed according to the faculty of his reason, but according to a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Spirit, they are called fruits of the Holy Spirit, as of a certain divine seed. They are also distinguished from the beatitudes. "For for the account of fruit it suffices that it be something having the account of the ultimate and delightful. But for the account of beatitude it is further required that it be something perfect and excellent. Hence all beatitudes can be called fruits, but not conversely. For fruits are any virtuous works in which man delights, but beatitudes are called only perfect works, which also by reason of their perfection are attributed more to gifts than to virtues." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 70, a. 2.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

Is it never licit to cooperate in another's sin? - Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. But insofar as it can be opposed to charity, it is a certain participation in the depraved action of another. Cooperation is: 1. immediate or mediate, according as the one cooperating acts with the one sinning in the very act of sin, or posits other actions having some connection with the sin of another. 2. Proximate or remote, according as the action of the one cooperating is more nearly or more remotely connected, from its nature or from circumstances, with the depraved action of another. 3. Positive or negative, according as the one cooperating either posits some action influencing the sin of another, e.g., by helping him, or omits a due act, e.g., if he does not oppose when he ought to oppose. 4. Formal or material. Formal cooperation concurs in the evil will of another, and cannot exist without sin, as intending cooperation itself toward the depraved action of another, either by the explicit intention of the one operating, or by an implicit intention in the work itself, which by its nature is ordered to the depraved action. Material cooperation concurs only in the evil action of another, without any intention of cooperating in sin, neither in actu signato nor in actu exercito.

As scandal, so cooperation can be had in two ways: 1. by inducing another to sin, and this is properly scandal; 2. by acting in some way together with him who sins, and this is properly cooperation; and it has the same malice in species as scandal, namely both against charity and against the virtue which another injures by sinning, when the cooperation is formal. It is certain that formal cooperation is never licit, since this morally influences the sin of another, and consequently is its moral cause. Material cooperation is licit, provided: 1. the action is per se good, or at least indifferent; 2. one is not bound from office to impede the sin; 3. there is present a just and proportionate cause according to the gravity of the sin of another and the proximity of concurrence toward the execution of the sin. The reason is that when you furnish an honorable or indifferent action, without depraved intention, if another wishes to abuse it for executing sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it; and since charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore by positing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin; for his sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him who abuses your action.

A proportionate cause; for since the obligation of avoiding that action arises from the obligation of the virtue to which the neighbor's sin is opposed, and the obligation of every virtue is not equal, but some things approach more, some less, to sin; besides, there is not always equal certainty that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; nor indeed is the right to the action always the same, but sometimes greater, sometimes less; therefore an equal cause will not always be proportionate for furnishing this cooperation, but sometimes a greater, sometimes a lesser one will be necessary. Hence a more urgent cause is desired when the sin is against justice than against charity alone, and such a cause as can rightly be preferred to another's harm. The reason is that in the former an innocent person unwillingly suffers damage; but in the latter the one sinning alone undergoes spiritual detriment, and this by his own will, which same detriment he suffers when he sins against justice. - But when from the circumstances scandal can be had, and material cooperation in sin can signify consent in sin, a protestation must be premised. - Sanch., l. 1, c. 7, n. 12; L. 59, 63; cf. here 212; E. M. 440.

185. • Virtue is a habit of acting honorably, or according to right order.

Virtues are distinguished into various species, namely:

1º Natural or supernatural, according as they are acquired and preserved by natural powers, or by the aid of supernatural grace.

2º Infused or acquired, according as they are poured into the heart by God himself, or acquired by repeated acts of the agent.

3º Theological or moral, according as they immediately regard God, or have for their immediate object the natural uprightness of an action. Hence it is easily deduced that the theological virtues are more perfect than the moral virtues.

There are four cardinal moral virtues, to which the rest are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Since discourse concerning the moral virtues occurs in almost the whole of moral theology, here we shall treat specifically of the theological virtues, namely of Faith, Hope, and Charity.

37. Since therefore man is destined to a supernatural end, he must tend to it by his own free acts. But since he cannot attain it by his own natural acts, supernatural virtues are therefore infused into man, which supply power to the intellect and will for connaturally producing supernatural acts. And, as in the natural order there is first the nature itself of the soul, and then its natural powers and acts, so in the supernatural order there is sanctifying grace, which inheres in the substance of the soul and elevates man to a supernatural nature; there are infused virtues, which inhere stably in the powers of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, to which they give force and power for eliciting supernatural acts; and finally there are actual graces, by which God actually concurs with each supernatural act of man, to prevent and excite, aid and perfect them. Wherefore an act at once vital and supernatural proceeds from a twofold proximate intrinsic principle, that is, from natural power and from the supernatural habit of infused virtue. This infused virtue is distinguished in two ways, theological and moral. The former has God Himself for its primary material object and some divine perfection for its formal object; the latter generally has for its formal object the very honesty of the human act. And as virtues are infused for the ordinary acts of supernatural life, so also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred for extraordinary and more sublime acts of the supernatural life. To the former man is moved from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit and from the judgment of reason; to the latter he is moved by the instinct of the Holy Spirit alone. Through the infused virtues man is disposed to be made promptly movable according to the common aspect of Christian virtues, or according to their common rule; through the gifts man is disposed to be made promptly movable by divine inspiration. St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 63, 68.

The relation of man to God in human acts constitutes the moral order. Wherefore if human acts are fitting to that end, they will lead man through to God. Now some of these acts order man immediately to God, naturally by natural knowledge and love, supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity. Other acts immediately order man either in himself, so that the higher powers rule the lower and the lower are subjected to the higher; or to other creatures, so that he may use them only insofar as they are useful to him for attaining his end, and so that he may constitute a fitting society with other men, destined to the same end as himself. Wherefore all these other acts also, by preserving the order of nature established by God, although mediately, consequently order and lead man to God as ultimate end; and in this attainment and eternal possession of the ultimate end there is beatitude. Indeed, by destining man to this beatitude of eternal life and supplying him with the means for attaining it, God evidently imposes upon man by His will the necessity of applying the aforesaid means suitable for attaining the aforesaid end. This necessity constitutes moral obligation, which moral Theology attends to and considers in human acts. - Therefore God as the ultimate end of man is the supreme principle of the whole of moral Theology, by which namely all things which must be performed by man are understood and determined, so that he may act licitly and at last attain eternal life.

568. Just as there are vicious habits by which we are inclined to sin, so likewise there are in us good habits, by which we are sweetly disposed to honorable and meritorious acts: but these are called virtues. Habits of this kind can naturally be acquired by repeated acts, or supernaturally be infused into the soul by God. Wherefore, after preliminary notions concerning habits, we will speak:

I. Concerning acquired virtues;

II. Concerning infused virtues.

Since this matter is more philosophical than theological, we will recall only a few things concerning the notion, subject, origin and increase, loss and division of habits, setting forth those things which are more commonly admitted.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLIV; John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, Lyons, 1663, Tr. de Passionibus, habitibus et virtutibus, disp. XIII; Lequeux, De Virtutibus, Paris, 1843, diss. I, c. 2, p. 15-29; Barre, Tract. de Virtutibus, Paris, 1886, p. 93-119; Billot, De Virtutibus infusis, Rome, 1901, Prolegomenon, p. 17-29; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI (1899), p. 529-536; Rabier, Psychologie, p. 571-587; Marion, Lec. de Psychologie, Paris, Colin, p. 140-158.

569. 1. Notion. Habit (from the word habere, to have) in a general sense signifies a mode of bearing oneself. But in a more particular sense it designates a stable quality by which some being is perfected. But this can be completed in two ways: in its being and in its operations; in the former case, the habit is called entitative: thus, for example, health of body with regard to the natural order, habitual grace in the supernatural order; in the latter case, the habit is called operative: such are the virtues of prudence, fortitude, etc.

Here we treat of operative habits. In this sense, habit is usually defined as a stable quality which disposes and helps a potency for act. Therefore it is a certain reality, belonging to the genus of quality, added to some faculty, so that this faculty may become ready for acting. According to St. Thomas, it differs in some way from disposition, which is, as it were, an inchoate habit, but does not yet obtain that stability which is desired for habit properly so called.¹

¹ "Disposition is taken in two ways: in one way according as it is the genus of habit, for disposition is placed in the definition of habit. In another way according as it is something divided against habit. And disposition properly so called can be understood to be co-divided against habit in two ways: in one way as perfect and imperfect in the same species, so that disposition is said to retain the common name when it inheres imperfectly, so that it is lost easily; but habit, when it inheres perfectly, so that it is not easily lost, and thus disposition becomes habit, just as a boy becomes a man... From this it is clear that the name habit imports a certain lastingness, but not the name disposition." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.)

570. Habit helps a potency to act in a twofold way; a natural and acquired habit helps it to perform an operation more promptly, more easily, and more delectably; but a supernatural and infused habit² of itself does not confer facility, but elevates the potency, which by its nature is unfit for certain acts, so that it may be able to perform these acts; thus the infused virtue of faith indeed does not give promptitude for eliciting acts of faith. Yet it must be noted that facility of operating is acquired by the exercise of infused virtues, for example, by repeated acts of faith, insofar as obstacles are removed, and the potencies are rendered more apt for eliciting these acts, as will be explained below.

² To understand rightly the distinction between natural and supernatural habits, there must be recalled to memory the things which we said in Theologia Dogmatica, De Deo Creante, n. 144-146, and above n. 85. Supernatural virtues are infused by God, - tend toward a supernatural end, - are exercised under the influence of actual grace, - and do not of themselves give facility, but only the power for acting supernaturally.

571. 2. The subject of habit. (a) Habits properly so called do not exist in subjects determined to only one thing in operating, or to acting always in one and the same mode: for then it can scarcely be conceived what habit adds to a potency which always does the same thing and acts in the same mode. But it can exist in all subjects which are not determined to one thing, but can operate in diverse ways, and exercise their operations more or less promptly and perfectly: for then it can incline and dispose the faculties toward one or another genus of actions, and toward eliciting those actions more or less promptly and perfectly.

(b) Hence habits can be in the human body, because, insofar as it is substantially united to a spiritual soul, it can be disposed and habituated to serve promptly the operations of the soul.¹ Thus by the assiduous practice of temperance, chastity, and mortification, the body becomes accustomed to obey the command of the will more promptly and more easily; wherefore it is of the greatest moment to subdue the body by good habits, that it may be made a docile instrument of the soul.

¹ Nevertheless St. Thomas holds that habits of this kind are principally in the soul, and secondarily in the body, because the body receives its movement from the soul.

572. (c) The intellectual faculties of the soul are properly the subject of habits, because they are not determined to operating in one way; but the will is the principal subject in which they are rooted, because it, as endowed with free choice, most greatly possesses the power of choosing. Nevertheless also the sensitive powers are the subject of habits, although less principally, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75). This indeed is established by experience; through custom, the imagination is more or less subdued, or on the contrary is accustomed to wander; - through custom, passions are restrained or on the contrary are more easily borne toward illicit things. Indeed, with experience as witness, custom is conquered by custom: thus those prone to anger, by repeated efforts, become meek, the proud learn to cultivate humility, the ambitious turn themselves toward divine things, etc. (above, n. 107). Therefore it matters greatly to acquire good habits already from childhood, but utterly to eradicate evil ones.

573. 3. Concerning the origin and increase of habits. Some are supernaturally infused by God: concerning these below. Others are naturally acquired: and concerning these we must now treat.

(a) That natural propensions transmitted by heredity are given we already noted above, n. 116-117; inclinations of this kind can be called latent habits, insofar as they remain sleeping until, by an external occasion, they are aroused as though from sleep; thus sons born from drunken parents not rarely have contracted an inclination toward alcoholic drinks, which as soon as it is excited by libations passes into habit.

(b) According to St. Thomas,² certain habits are implanted by nature itself, at least inchoatively. Thus, with regard to first principles (for example, the whole is greater than its part, good is to be loved), we are so inclined to knowing them that the habit of these principles can be called naturally implanted. Likewise in certain individuals are found certain natural propensions which are, as it were, inchoate habits: for there are some disposed, from the proper complexion of the body, toward chastity, others toward gentleness, others toward fortitude, as was said above, where temperament and character were treated, n. 120-121.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 1. - Others indeed, with Suarez (Disput. metaph., disp. 44, sect. 13, n. 7), do not wish these propensions to be called habits; but the question is more about the name than about the thing.

574. (c) But especially from multiplied acts habits are generated and increased, as experience establishes: namely, the more frequently, longer, and more intensely acts are repeated, provided nevertheless that the powers are not exhausted, the greater facility and promptitude are obtained for doing the same acts. The first act already produces some disposition, which the second increases; other acts will complete the generation of the habit. The reason for this is that any faculty is at the same time active and passive; insofar as it is active, it impresses a certain movement, and insofar as it is passive, it receives and retains an impression, by force of which subsequent acts become easier.

Nevertheless, according to St. Thomas,¹ an act does not increase a habit unless it is at least equally intense as the habit itself; for if it is more remiss, it does not dispose toward its increase, but rather toward its diminution; thus he who has already acquired the habit of fervor does not increase it, but rather diminishes it, when he prays remissly and tepidly.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3. - Yet some on the contrary hold with T. Raynaud, De Virtutibus, l. I, c. 2, that even remiss acts increase with some proportion the force of the habit.

575. (d) Habits can grow in two ways, extensively and intensively: extensively, when the object with which they are concerned is multiple and is successively amplified; thus the habit of knowledge grows when it extends itself to more things, and humility is increased when the various degrees of this virtue are reached; intensively, when they are rooted more deeply in the soul, so that actions are elicited more easily and more delectably. This indeed can be explained thus: through the repetition of acts, difficulty in acting is diminished, and therefore with the same effort subsequent acts are performed more easily, and consequently more delectably.² But how habits influence liberty we explained at n. 109-110.

² "In proportion as the act no longer requires for being repeated except a lesser effort, the excess of power, which the cause does not expend in reproducing it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts." (Lemoine, apud Rabier, Psychol., p. 587.)

576. 4. Concerning the loss of habits. That acquired habits are diminished or sometimes utterly perish is established by experience. (a) First, according to all, they decrease or perish through contrary acts, especially intense and long-lasting ones; thus the habit of temperance is gradually diminished and finally utterly taken away through often repeated acts of drunkenness. For contraries are destroyed by contraries, and custom is conquered by custom; thus facility of using food and drink moderately soon decreases when someone begins to indulge gluttony and drunkenness: for, just as by repeated acts of temperance a good habit had been acquired, so by frequent contrary acts an evil habit is contracted; now, when contrary habits are present, the stronger destroys the weaker.

577. (b) Moreover they are diminished and sometimes perish through long cessation from exercise, not indeed directly, as the more probable opinion holds, but indirectly, insofar as, exercise ceasing, impediments are multiplied, and little by little contrary habits are introduced which overwhelm the former ones. Thus memory is diminished unless you exercise it. The same must be said of moral habits: for when someone, for a long time, does not use the habit of virtue for moderating passions, these are accustomed to rise up against reason, and to transgress just limits; thus the inclination to good is gradually diminished, and depraved habits are born which can overturn good ones.¹ Nevertheless, if after some time new efforts are made before the habit is utterly extinguished, it revives more easily.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3.

But by accident habits impressed upon organic powers can be altered by an alteration of the organ itself; thus sometimes memory is diminished or perishes.

578. 5. Concerning the division of habits. (a) By reason of the object with which they are concerned, habits are good or vicious, according as their object is good or evil. Good habits are called virtues, but evil ones vices; here we treat only of the former, since we have already spoken of the latter, where sins were treated. (b) By reason of origin and nature, virtues are acquired or infused: concerning these we must treat separately.

579. Preliminary matters. (A) Virtue (from the word vir, man) first indeed designated a quality proper to a man, or fortitude,¹ but afterward any endowment,² especially that by force of which we operate according to the dictate of right reason. In this sense it is usually defined as a habit disposing man's powers to operating rightly,³ or a good habit. Therefore it is a quality added to the faculties, helping them toward acting according to right reason.

¹ Thus Cicero, Tuscul., l. II, 18: "For virtue was named from man: but what is most proper to a man is fortitude, whose two greatest offices are contempt of death and of pain." Cf. Breal and Bailly, Dict. etymol., p. 441.

² Apud Cicero, Brut., 17: "In Cato's orations all oratorical virtues will be found."

³ According to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 4, virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. - These last words can be predicated of infused virtues alone; but the former also regard acquired virtues.

580. (B) Therefore virtues properly reside not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: for these are immediately ordered to act.⁴ Now the faculties in which virtues properly so called inhere are rational powers, namely intellect and will, but especially the will.⁵ For virtues properly so called rightly order our acts in the moral order; now the only truly moral act is that which proceeds from the will with previous knowledge of the intellect (above, n. 66); and therefore virtues properly inhere in those faculties which elicit moral acts, chiefly in the will. Nevertheless other faculties participate in the nature of virtue insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75): for under this respect they are made capable of morality, and therefore secondarily can be the subject of virtue: thus the virtue of temperance in some way inheres in the sensible appetite for moderating sensual passions.⁶

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3 and 6.

⁶ Ibid., a. 4; cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 74, a. 4.

581. (C) Since there is a twofold order, natural and supernatural, virtues are of a twofold kind, namely natural, or acquired, and supernatural, or divinely infused. Here we treat only of the former.

Acquired virtues can be found even in pagans or heretics, since these are capable of good works and consequently of habits, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 34. - But the faithful, who enjoy the gift of true faith and sanctifying grace, ought to cultivate with all their powers these virtues, which of themselves are natural, and indeed in a more perfect manner than unbelievers, so that by examples they may manifestly show that grace does not destroy, but on the contrary perfects whatever good is in human nature.¹ But, that they may be truly Christian, they ought to cultivate these virtues in a supernatural manner, that is, on account of a supernatural end, and under the influence of actual grace: for thus they will pursue not only an honorable end, but the supernatural end to which in fact they are ordered, and will acquire supernatural merits.

¹ Concerning certain natural virtues Cardinal Gibbons excellently discusses, The Ambassador of Christ, Baltimore, 1896, ch. 8-10; translated into French by Andre: L'Ambassadeur du Christ, Paris, Lethielleux; cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introd., 3rd Part, ch. 36; Ribet, Honnete avant tout.

Virtues of this kind are of two species: intellectual and moral: the former perfect the intellect with regard to the knowledge of truth; the latter perfect the will with regard to the pursuit of good: concerning both we must speak separately.

582. 1. Notion. (A) Three speculative intellectual virtues³ are commonly distinguished: (a) understanding, or the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing first principles intimately; for to understand is the same as to read within. (b) Knowledge is the habit perfecting the intellect for logically deducing conclusions contained in first principles. (c) Wisdom is the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing things not only in themselves, but also in their causes, especially in God, who is the highest and ultimate cause of all; wherefore he is called truly wise who knows God as the first principle and ultimate end of all, and judges concerning all things insofar as they are referred to God. - Thus wisdom contains under itself understanding and knowledge, since it judges both concerning principles and concerning conclusions deduced from the same. - Perhaps therefore it can be said that there is one intellectual virtue, namely wisdom, which ascends from created things to God, and uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions for judging concerning created things according to their relation to God.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57-58; Suarez, in I-II, Tr. IV, disp. 3; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. 16; Billuart, De Passionibus et Virtutibus, diss. II; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 33 and 74-81; Barre, op. cit., p. 143-147 and 165-184.

³ Besides the speculative virtues, two practical ones are enumerated, prudence, concerning which below where moral virtues are treated, and art, or the habit disposing the intellect to making artificial things rightly, concerning which nothing special occurs to be said.

583. (B) But wisdom, like the other intellectual virtues, is not properly a virtue except insofar as it is ordered to acting rightly. For virtue has regard to forming morals honorably; therefore if someone is endowed with knowledge and speculative wisdom, but does not use it for a right institution of life, from this he cannot be said to be endowed with virtue; but wisdom which is ordered to acting honorably is deservedly called a virtue;¹ and all Christians indeed ought to cultivate it, but especially those upon whom the office rests of illuminating and teaching others, and most of all the ministers of Christ, to whom it was said: "Going therefore, teach all nations."²

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

² Matt. 28:19.

584. 2. Excellence. Scripture often commends this wisdom, insofar as it rightly orders us to God, and impels us to fulfilling the divine law. (a) Namely, wisdom ought to be preferred to all riches: "I preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I thought riches nothing in comparison with her... But all good things came to me together with her, and innumerable honor by her hands."³ (b) Its endowments are almost innumerable: "For in her is the spirit of intelligence, holy, one, manifold, subtle, eloquent, mobile, undefiled, sure, sweet, loving good, acute, which nothing hinders, beneficent, humane, benign, stable, sure, secure, having every virtue, seeing all things, and who can take in all spirits, intelligible, clean, subtle."⁴ (c) Hence God loves only those who cultivate wisdom: "For God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom."⁵ (d) It operates strongly and at the same time sweetly: "Therefore she reaches from end to end strongly, and disposes all things sweetly."⁶ (e) It teaches the other virtues: "For she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men."⁷ From these and many other things which may be read in the books of Proverbs and Wisdom, the excellence of wisdom can be understood.

³ Wis. 7:8, 11.

⁴ Ibid., 22-23.

⁵ Ibid., 28.

⁶ Wis. 8:1.

⁷ Ibid., 7.

But today not a few, especially positivists, by the name of knowledge understand the cognition of things which can be investigated by experience and induction, and at the same time contend that it is impossible to reach the first cause, and therefore reject not only theological, but also metaphysical knowledge; nevertheless they extol positive knowledge as the only norm of the true and honorable, and the means by which the human race will finally attain perfect happiness.¹ We refuted this error above, n. 43-47. That knowledge of this kind is not a virtue, although it discovers and teaches many useful things, is clear from this, that it turns us away from God, far from directing us to him.

¹ Brunetiere excellently shows the insufficiency of knowledge for the right institution of moral life, and true happiness of heart, in Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 1, 1895; cf. M. d'Hulst, L'empoisonnement de la Science, in Melanges oratoires, t. IV, p. 174-189.

585. 1. Notion. (A) Moral virtues are acquired habits perfecting the will and appetite for acting rightly. - Insofar as they are natural, they rest upon a natural motive, namely honorableness, which comes from conformity with right reason. The end toward which they of themselves tend is the natural perfection of man and his happiness. - Nevertheless, since in fact man is destined to a supernatural end, virtues of this kind, although of themselves natural, can be referred to a supernatural end, and be exercised under the influence of supernatural grace; indeed they can even be supernaturally infused, as will be said below, n. 598.

586. (B) It has been doubted whether the aforementioned virtues are virtues of the true name. Now it is certain that they truly have the nature of virtue, when through charity they are referred to the ultimate supernatural end. It is likewise certain that the same, as long as they remain within the natural order, cannot merit or attain eternal salvation, since there is lacking proportion between the supernatural end and the acts of natural virtues.

Nevertheless it can be said that these are true and perfect virtues in their own genus; for, as Benedict XIV rightly says, "if unbelievers can do honorable works, and frequently exercise themselves in them, they can also acquire for themselves and procure habits of such works, and thus consequently have true and perfect moral virtues in their own genus."²

² Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatific., lib. III, c. 21, n. 6.

587. 2. Division. Among moral virtues, there are four principal ones, which are called cardinal, because on these, as on hinges, the other virtues lean: namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.³

³ Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, 1714.

The Fathers and theologians often gather this division from these words of Wisdom:¹ "For she teaches sobriety (that is, temperance), and prudence, and justice, and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men." There indeed is not handed down a scientific division of virtues, but an enumeration of certain principal ones. - Pagan philosophers likewise numbered four principal virtues consonant with the aforementioned ones.² But this division already from the time of St. Ambrose became common in the Church.

¹ Wis. 8:7.

² Cicero, Tuscul., c. 14; De officiis, lib. I, c. 20.

588. (A) He seems to have been the first who called the four praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that there are four cardinal virtues, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude."³ But afterward he hands down their notion thus:⁴ "In the first place they established prudence, which is concerned with the investigation of truth, and infuses the desire of fuller knowledge; secondly justice, which gives to each his own, does not claim another's, neglects its own utility in order to guard common equity; thirdly fortitude, which both in military matters is eminent by the greatness of an exalted soul, and at home, and excels in the powers of the body; fourthly temperance, which preserves the measure and order of all things which we judge either must be done or must be said."

³ Ambrose, Exposit. in Luc., lib. V, n. 62, P. L., XV, 1653.

⁴ De officiis ministrorum, lib. I, c. 24, P. L., XVI, 57.

589. (B) This theory, generally accepted by the other Fathers, St. Thomas refined, namely by explaining why there are four cardinal virtues, and in what way they are distinguished from one another. He observes first that the cardinal virtues can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, which are found in all virtues; thus prudence is a certain rectitude of practical judgment, by which discretion is preserved in individual acts; justice is a rectitude of soul by which man bears himself rightly in all things to be done; fortitude is a certain firmness against any impulses of the passions or labors of operations; temperance is understood as a certain moderation in all things. In this sense, these virtues are not distinguished from one another, but are called cardinal, because they are the general conditions or properties of any virtue, which must be at the same time prudent, just, moderate, and strong. (b) But the aforementioned virtues can be considered in another way, according as they are concerned with formally diverse objects, and are subjected in various powers. Thus prudence resides in the practical intellect, and perceives and suggests the means to be used for attaining the honorable end in individual acts; justice inclines the will to bearing itself rightly concerning actions due to another, or to rendering to each his own; fortitude perfects the irascible appetite, so that it may stand firmly against all dangers; temperance is in the concupiscible appetite for restraining sensual delectations, especially those which arise from touch. According to this acceptance, the aforementioned virtues are truly and really distinguished, although they are in some way connected.

590. Moreover in the cardinal virtues there can be distinguished integral, subjective, and potential parts. Integral parts are certain conditions or dispositions which, although they do not constitute the virtue essentially, are required for its integral perfection; thus for the perfection of prudence memory, understanding, providence, etc., are desired. - Subjective parts are called the various species of some virtue; thus justice is divided into commutative and distributive. - Potential or annexed parts are called certain less principal virtues which are joined to another more principal one, although they do not perfectly attain its nature; thus religion and piety toward parents are potential parts of justice, because they incline us to rendering to God and parents whatever is due to them, yet in such a way that we cannot render to equality what is due to them.

That this division is sufficiently intricate is clear from the mere consideration of the tree of virtues which certain Scholastics delineated. And indeed, for the perfection of Christian life, it is not necessary to hand down an accurate notion of all virtues with all their parts; but it is enough to set forth and cultivate the principal ones; for since many are connected, he who strives to acquire the principal ones, by that very fact makes progress in the others.

591. 3. Concerning the properties of moral virtues. Here we will explain two things, namely in what sense moral virtues are connected, and what is understood by the axiom: virtue stands in the middle.

(A) Concerning the connection of virtues. Already in his time Augustine thought that the four cardinal virtues are so connected among themselves that one cannot truly and properly be cultivated without the others:¹ "Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has had one virtue has all, and all are lacking to him to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate: for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Furthermore if there will then be prudence, if it also is strong, and just, and temperate, certainly where it will be, it has the others with itself. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, and temperate. Thus where some one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."

¹ St. Augustine, epist. 167 (al. 29) ad Hieronymum, P. L., XXXIII, 735.

The Scholastics embraced this theory, in the sense that perfect moral virtues are so connected among themselves that, when one is lost, the others lose their perfection. But virtues are called perfect when they are not mere inclinations, but firm inclinations to following reason, and have all things required for their integrity. Then it can truly be said that these virtues are connected, because we cannot persevere long in one unless we are also adorned with the others; thus no one can be just for a long time unless he is prudent, temperate, and endowed with fortitude. Hence he who perfectly and stably cultivates one of these, by that very fact makes progress in the others, as we were saying just now.

592. (B) Concerning the mean of moral virtues. Virtues of this kind consist in the middle: (a) insofar as they avoid opposed excesses;¹ for example, fortitude stands in the middle between cowardice and rashness. For they are moral because they are conformed to the rule of morals; now they can deflect from the rule in a twofold way, either by exceeding the measure, or by falling short of it; therefore, to avoid this twofold excess, they ought to consist in the middle. (b) Moreover, when there is a collision of rights or duties, the mean of virtues consists in this, that one virtue is tempered by another: thus, if justice inclines to punishing the guilty strictly, sometimes clemency counsels that, all circumstances attended to, the penalty be mitigated. - But it belongs to prudence, insofar as it is the charioteer of the virtues, to suggest this mean.

¹ This was the doctrine of the Stoics, with Horace as witness, Ep. 18, 9:

"Virtue is the middle of vices, and drawn back from each side."

593. 4. Concerning the increase, diminution, and loss of acquired moral virtues, the principles handed down above concerning acquired habits are valid, n. 573-577.

594. Besides acquired virtues, in the soul of the just there are supernatural habits divinely infused, by which it is directed toward choosing meritorious acts and attaining the supernatural end. For, by a certain analogy with natural life, three things are required for supernatural life: (a) a vital principle, which is nothing other than habitual grace, perfecting and elevating the substance of our soul, so that it can be the remote principle of supernatural actions; (b) operative faculties, or infused virtues, by which the powers naturally implanted in us are so elevated that they can be the proximate principle of supernatural acts; (c) the supernatural concurrence of God, namely actual grace, by force of which our faculties, strengthened by infused virtues, are excited and helped toward eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62-63; Suarez, De Passionibus et habitibus, diss. III; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XVI; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 40-49 and passim; Muller, § 114-119; Pesch, Praelect. dogmaticae, t. VIII, n. 19-96; Billot, op. cit., th. 1-5.

595. (A) Infused virtues are supernatural habits implanted by God, by which the faculties of the soul receive the power of eliciting supernatural acts. (a) For in this they are primarily distinguished from natural virtues, that they are not acquired by repeated acts, but are divinely infused. Certain virtues are called infused of themselves, because they cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone, and therefore cannot exist unless they are infused; but others are infused by accident, because, although they can be acquired by repeated acts, nevertheless they are conferred by God from his special benevolence. (b) Moreover, according to the common opinion, they do not furnish facility, but only the power of acting supernaturally: for experience seems to establish that those who received infused virtues in baptism are not conscious of this facility for acting supernaturally, - and on the contrary, through repeated acts of these virtues, they are soon sweetly inclined to eliciting the same more easily and delectably.

596. (B) Infused virtues can be theological or moral. (a) The former are so called because they are referred immediately to God; for the material object with which they are concerned is not a created thing, but God himself supernaturally known; but the motive (formal object) on which they rest is one of the divine attributes. There are three, namely faith, hope, charity, concerning which we will soon discuss.

(b) Moral virtues are immediately concerned with some created object (for example, justice renders to each his own), and the motive on account of which they are cultivated is the honorableness of the supernatural act itself. They are recalled to four, which are called cardinal; these do not differ on the part of the object from the four acquired cardinal virtues of which above; but only by reason of origin, since they are divinely infused, by reason of exercise, since they are exercised under the influence of actual grace, and by reason of end, because of themselves they tend toward a supernatural end.

597. Thesis: It is certain that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification itself, and commonly the same is held concerning the moral virtues, especially the cardinal ones.

(A) Scripture rather clearly intimates this with regard to charity, and more obscurely with regard to the others: "The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us";¹ for there charity (of God toward us, and therefore our charity toward God, since charity is mutual) is said to be infused by the Spirit at the very instant in which he is given to us, that is, in which we are justified. The other virtues likewise are exhibited as a gift of God: "For God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of sobriety."² - The Fathers, although they do not expressly uphold our thesis, not rarely assert that Christian virtues are the gift of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, given through grace. Thus, among others, Augustine: "Grace will come after the Law; it is itself the blessing. And what has this grace and blessing furnished to us?" He answers that through grace many virtues are given, which he enumerates, and, after describing the four cardinal virtues, adds: "These virtues now in the valley of weeping are given to us by the grace of God."³

¹ Rom. 5:5.

² 2 Tim. 1:7.

³ St. Augustine, in Ps. 73, n. 11, P. L., XXXVII, 1065-1066.

598. (B) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was supposed as certain that virtues are infused with habitual grace in adults, but it was doubted whether the same must be said of little ones, and some said that by the virtue of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones, but grace is not conferred, nor virtues.⁴ The matter was afterward brought to the Council of Vienne (A.D. 1311), and there it was declared:⁵ "But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have thought that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon little ones as upon adults, as more probable and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the saints and modern doctors of theology, should be chosen, with the sacred council approving."

⁴ Decretal. Gregor., l. III, tit. 42, c. 3.

⁵ Denzing., n. 411.

The Council of Trent declared the same as certain with regard to the theological virtues:¹ "In justification itself, with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused together through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The Catechism of the Council of Trent holds that the same must be said concerning the other virtues; for, after describing sanctifying grace, it says: "But to this is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul with grace."²

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

² Catech. Trent., De sacram. baptismi, n. 42. The Catechism certainly does not possess the authority of the Council itself, but hands down the commonly accepted doctrine.

599. (C) Reason counsels this. In the natural order, God furnishes to man not only nature as the remote principle of acting, but also faculties by which he is immediately disposed to act. Now there is a certain analogy between natural life and supernatural life; and therefore it is deservedly inferred that God infuses into man not only habitual grace, which is the remote principle of acting supernaturally, but also proximate principles, or virtues. For although supernatural acts can be elicited through merely actual helps, it seems more consonant with divine wisdom that supernatural habits be infused, by whose aid these acts may be regularly produced.

600. 1. That virtues can be increased together with grace, Trent thus declares:³ "Thus therefore, having been justified, and having been made friends and members of the household of God, going from virtue to virtue, they are renewed, as the Apostle says, from day to day;⁴ that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh, and exhibiting them as arms of justice unto sanctification, through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in the justice itself received through the grace of Christ, faith cooperating with good works, they grow and are more justified... But the holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and charity."

³ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10, apud Denzing., n. 685.

⁴ 2 Cor. 4:16.

601. 2. Virtues of this kind are increased through the worthy reception of the sacraments, and through merit de condigno.

(A) For the sacraments confer sanctifying grace, and indeed ex opere operato,¹ upon all who place no obstacle, and therefore they increase it in all who have received first grace; but grace growing, by that very fact the infused virtues which are connected with it grow.

¹ Synops. Theol. Dogmat., De Sacramentis, n. 45.

(B) Likewise supernatural good works, with Trent as witness,² truly merit the increase of grace, and consequently the increase of virtues which flow from it.

² Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, apud Denzing., n. 724; cf. Synops. dogmat., De Gratia, n. 193.

602. 3. But theologians dispute concerning the mode by which infused virtues are increased. (A) All indeed hold that they grow intensively, and indeed through divine infusion; for since they are supernatural, and are produced in the soul by God, they cannot be increased by the proper efforts of the will, but only by divine action. Wherefore the repeated acts of these virtues do not concur directly toward their increase, but only as a meritorious cause, insofar as God, in view of these merits, increases grace and virtues.

But when the question concerns the intrinsic reason of this increase, theologians do not agree: (a) Thomists hold that the increase of habits happens not by the addition of a new form or reality, but by a greater rooting in the subject, which the habit more subjects to itself, by more easily reducing its potentiality into act.³ (b) But Scotists⁴ think that the increase happens through the addition of a new reality, or of a new degree, which accedes to the former and with it effects something one and more perfect. - A question of this kind is more philosophical than theological, and modern philosophers generally declare that nothing certain can be defined about this matter.

³ Thus John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XIII, art. 6.

⁴ Scotus, in Sentent., lib. I, dist. 17, q. 3; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLVI, sect. I, where he enumerates the various opinions and critically weighs them.

603. (B) But it is certain that by the exercise of infused virtues facility in exercising acts of the same virtues is gradually acquired. This indeed arises especially from a twofold head: (a) From the removal of impediments; for by the exercise of infused virtue the passions are moderated, prejudices are put away, difficulties are overcome: but, obstacles removed, by that very fact the acts of virtues become easier. (b) From custom itself: for just as, through the frequent repetition of natural acts, a greater facility is acquired for doing the same, so likewise, at least indirectly, through the repetition of supernatural acts, the facility of doing the same is increased: for thus the potency is better disposed and, as it were, inclined to act. Hence a sinner recently converted indeed with difficulty works acts of temperance, chastity, fortitude, etc.; but, provided that, helped by grace, he elicits acts of these virtues, gradually he will perform the same more easily and delectably.

604. 1. Infused theological virtues are lost through acts directly and gravely contrary to them; thus faith is destroyed through the grave sin of apostasy or heresy, - hope through the mortal sin of despair, - charity through any grave sin whatever, since it is opposed to divine charity.

(a) That faith is lost by infidelity (that is, by any grave sin against faith), but not by other grave sins, is clear from Trent:¹ "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which faith itself also is lost, but also by any other mortal sin whatever, although faith is not lost, the received grace of justification is lost."

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, apud Denzing., n. 691. Cf. Synopsis Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, n. 141-147.

(b) But that charity is destroyed by any mortal sin whatever is likewise gathered from Trent; for, on the one hand, in the text alleged, it is declared that the grace of justification is lost by any mortal sin whatever; and, on the other, it is defined that justification happens "while through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is poured forth in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them";² from which it is deservedly inferred that charity does not inhere in sinners. - This is otherwise clear from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is asserted that sin is opposed to dilection, and that by charity the sons of God are distinguished from sinners,³ as was said above, n. 449. And in reality, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 139-140, such is the nexus between grace and charity that one cannot subsist without the other.

² Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

³ John 14:21; 1 John 2:3-11; 3:7-12.

(c) Concerning hope nothing is expressly defined; but the common and true opinion holds that it is not destroyed when sanctifying grace is lost, on account of the analogy with faith, but is lost through despair or through an act contrary to faith; for since, with the Apostle as witness,¹ faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, with faith hope necessarily perishes; for what can we hope, when the foundation of hope, namely faith in God the remunerator, has already failed?

¹ Heb. 11:1.

605. 2. It is commonly held that infused moral virtues are lost, together with habitual grace, through any mortal sin whatever.

(A) This St. Prosper, disciple of Augustine, had already taught, writing against the semi-Pelagian errors of Cassian: "Virtues cannot dwell with vices: for what participation," says the Apostle,² "has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? For virtue principally is God: to whom having virtue is not something other than being virtue. When we are participants of this, Christ dwells in us, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God;³ faith dwells, hope, charity, continence, understanding, counsel, fortitude, and the other virtues. But when we withdraw from this good, all things opposite arise to us from us."⁴

² 2 Cor. 6:14.

³ 1 Cor. 1:24.

⁴ St. Prosper, Contra Collatorem, c. 13, P. L., LI, 247.

606. (B) Theologians commonly hold the same, led by this reason: infused moral virtues are, as it were, properties and the most noble company of grace, and therefore are infused so that they may order our life toward the supernatural end. Now, sanctifying grace having been lost, its properties are logically taken away; and since, through mortal sin, man is turned away from the supernatural end, he is consequently deprived of the virtues which tend toward the supernatural end. - It is indeed true, from what was said above, that faith and hope are not taken away by any grave sin whatever; but this happens from the special benevolence of God, who does not permit the very foundation of the spiritual building to be utterly overturned through mortal sin, but wishes faith and hope to remain in the sinner so that more easily he, moved by true penance, may return to the good Shepherd of souls.

Moreover if there are any naturally acquired virtues, they do not necessarily perish when grace is lost; thus he who has obtained the virtue of temperance or justice by repeated acts does not lose it by the very fact that he falls into a grave sin of lust.

The present volume of this work is assigned to an argument which the moral theologian will deservedly claim as especially his own. For in it the principles of fundamental moral theology continually come to be used; in it there must be set forth the moral order which, Christ the Redeemer reigning, is appointed to be observed by human liberty; in it the immutable divine law, and the law most intimate to us, must chiefly be questioned and consulted, so that human decrees have only the secondary parts of complement to fulfill. Yet we confess that these are not of slight moment in the treatise On Justice, which, together with the treatises On the Theological Virtues and On Religion, must truly be called principal. In what way positive laws seem to us to have to be sketched for the use of a truly international school, we shall explain at the very threshold of the treatise on justice. A business, certainly difficult enough, had to be undertaken by us: that of comparing the dictates of conscience with the demands of many civil laws. Yet the labor was in part lightened for us by several modern works which, as general or special studies of Aertnijs, Arregui, Cholly, Duijnstee, Ferreres, Gariepy, Lehmkuhl, Piscetta-Gennaro, Prummer, Slater, Van Gestel, either allege legal definitions, or, what is of greater value, in some measure explain them. The bibliography of volume IV will teach what books we have employed. But much more profitable to us was the kindly work of learned friends who, from various parts of Europe and of both Americas, either supplied texts of law, or learnedly answered our inquiries concerning law. We intended here especially to render them the thanks due.

Now we should wish that our book be judged and read with the same mind with which it was written, that is, with sincere zeal for pursuing the truth. Therefore we proposed neither to deny due honor to authority, nor to abstain from an intrinsic examination of causes, nor to withdraw the mind from attending to circumstances which, in their responses and counsels, the greatest doctors did not omit to consider. By this way alone, unless we are mistaken, can that always desirable progress of science be hoped for. But that scientific progress itself may bring that increase with which alone cultivators of sacred science can be content, an increase, I say, profitable to the gospel of peace, God alone will give. We ask from divine munificence such spiritual usefulness for our humble effort, through the holy youth who once was a hearer of theology in this Institute, on whose feast day we make an end of writing.

Rome, on the feast of St. Aloysius, June 21, 1924.

As we wrote at the beginning (I, 25), we are sanctified by a twofold way, that is, by the use of the sacraments and by our cooperation with the grace of God. Volume II is assigned to explaining this cooperation.

Moreover, there has already been occasion more than once to admonish this. Although the state of grace is the condition and principle, and the habit of charity is the root of our merits, nevertheless we shall properly be judged according to our acts, not according to our habits: through acts, not through habits, we merit and demerit; in acts consists our cooperation with the grace of God. Nevertheless, the habitual dignity of the agent contributes to the quantity of merit; and the habits themselves, as fountains of acts, are something principal in the spiritual life. Therefore moral theologians are accustomed to entitle their treatises On the Virtues, unless they prefer to distribute their arguments according to the various precepts of the Decalogue. That its own honor might remain to the virtues, and yet that we might vindicate for moral theology its own proper object in this volume, we have called it On the Exercise of the Virtues: the exercise of virtues at once denotes acts, and expresses the relation of acts to the various virtues.

Moreover, we gave the necessary notions concerning the virtues in volume I, nn. 493-497.

Division of the volume. The volume will conveniently be divided into two books. The one will treat of the theological virtues, the other will be assigned to the moral virtues.

Observation Concerning the Order. - What the moral virtues are and how they are divided, we said in I, nn. 495, 496. Moral theologians are not accustomed to prepare a place for the individual virtues. But, according to their practical intention, when they treat of the first three precepts, they are accustomed to weigh acts which pertain to the virtue of religion; they explain the virtue of piety under the fourth and fifth precepts; they refer the virtue of chastity to the sixth and ninth precepts; they ascribe the virtue of justice to the seventh and tenth precepts. Yet in the exposition of the fifth precept fortitude and justice itself claim certain parts for themselves. Furthermore the virtue of chastity is a subjective part of temperance; its exposition completes the things which were said in I, 475-484 concerning gluttony and drunkenness, concerning the virtue for which the name of temperance is reserved as proper; to restrain anger and to shake off sloth are also parts of fortitude.

We, imitating St. Thomas in 2, 2, shall formally refer to the virtues the things which we have to propose. And after prudence, to which, as directive, we shall assign the first place, in order we shall treat first of religion, of piety, to which observance comes nearest; then of justice, of which the virtues just named are potential parts; then of truth and sincerity, which are also placed under the cardinal virtue of justice; finally of temperance and humility, and of the cardinal virtue of fortitude. The treatise on chastity and the opposite vices is reserved to Tome IV.

We have already warned that the distribution of virtues into cardinal and potential is not of an ontological but of a logical order, so that logical subordination prejudices no excellence of virtue. Indeed, on account of honor to be rendered to the nobler virtue, we shall treat of religion and piety before the cardinal virtue of justice, to which both are logically referred.

Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. theol. 1, 2, q. 49-70; Quaest. disp. de virtut. in communi; John of St. Thomas, Curs. theol. disput. XIII; E. Muller, Theol. mor. lib. I, tract. 4, cap. 2, sect. 2; Lud. Barre, Tract. de virtut. (Paris 1886); Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de virtut. in communi; Fr. X. Mutz, Christl. Aszetik; Gopfert, Moraltheol. I, § 42 sq.

437. Preliminary note. After we have treated human acts and the rules determining their morality, namely law and conscience, we must now treat the principles of human acts. Such principles are of two kinds:

1. Intrinsic principles, namely the human powers furnished with habits.

2. Extrinsic principles, namely all extrinsic causes which move man to acting, that is, the devil, the world, God. Although the world and the devil are able vehemently to allure man to voluntary acts, nevertheless they cannot infallibly induce him. For even under a most vehement temptation man remains free and is able to refuse consent. Indeed, if a man's reason is disturbed, or if under the influence of exterior violence an act of man is extorted, the extrinsic cause obtains its effect, but such an act is now not human. Hence the Angelic Doctor most truly says: "That his [namely man's] voluntary motion should be from some extrinsic principle which is not the cause of the will, is impossible."¹ But since God alone is the cause of the will, he alone is able sufficiently and infallibly to move man to any acts whatsoever of the will, with human liberty unharmed. God does not move man to evil acts, or to sin, because he himself has hatred for sin; but he moves him to good acts by bestowing manifold graces. Therefore divine grace is the principal extrinsic cause of good acts. - According to the usage of schools today, grace is commonly treated rather in Dogmatic theology than in Moral theology, perhaps both because the tract on grace is intimately connected with the tract on predestination, which certainly pertains to Dogmatic theology, and because the Church has defined several dogmas about grace against heretics, for example against the Pelagians, Lutherans, Calvinists, Jansenists, etc. These dogmas are commonly explained more broadly in dogmatic theology. Following this usage of the schools, we leave the complete tract on grace to dogmatic theology, and above at n. 136 we touched on only a few points concerning this matter.

The intrinsic principles of human acts are the powers of the soul insofar as they have been perfected, or at least inclined, by habits. These powers are the intellect, the will, the sensitive appetite, etc.; all of these are treated in psychology, and St. Thomas treated them in the Summa theol. 1, q. 79 sqq. Therefore, with the doctrine concerning the powers presupposed, it remains that we treat habits, which perfect the powers. But habits are either good, namely virtues, or evil, namely vices. Since according to the common adage, "Contraries have the same account," vices, as being contrary to virtues, are easily judged from the virtues themselves once known; at the same time, under the guidance of the Angelic Doctor, we shall treat virtues and the vices opposed to them. First, therefore, virtues in general must be treated; then the individual virtues and the opposed vices.

The tract on virtues in general is divided into three chapters: 1. on the nature of virtue; 2. on acquired moral virtues and their properties; 3. on infused virtues and their properties. Yet in a preliminary chapter habits in general are treated very briefly, because the nature of virtue cannot be perfectly known unless one first knows what a habit is.

¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 9, a. 6.

379. DEFINITION. Virtue, in a broad sense, is taken for any perfection whatsoever, especially for that which consists in the power or faculty of operating. In the stricter sense, virtue is defined by St. Augustine (de lib. Arb., l. 2, c. 19, n. 50): "a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly." And by others commonly: a habit perfecting the rational power, and inclining it to good operation.

It is called 1. Habit, that is, a quality or stable disposition, differing both from power and from act, inclining the power to act, and rendering it able for it.

Whence good acts which do not proceed from the habit of virtue are not, in the strict sense, acts of virtue, although it is usual for the name of that virtue to be imposed on acts of this kind, from whose formal motive they are elicited.

2. Perfecting the rational power. Under the name of rational power here come also the powers of the sensitive soul, according as they operate from the command of reason (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 50, a. 3).

3. Inclining to good operation. For virtue is not only a dispositive habit, as health is, but also and chiefly an operative one, essentially inclining the power to acting well and perfectly.

Thus virtue is distinguished both from habitual grace, which immediately affects the essence of the soul, giving it supernatural being; and from those habits which sometimes have themselves toward good, sometimes toward evil, for example, from opinions, which have themselves toward true and false (1.2, q. 55, a. 4).

From these things gather: a) Perfect virtue renders man victor over himself and unconquered toward all things; or, as St. Bernard speaks (in Cant., serm. 85), it is vigor of soul forcing and directing all things to reason.

b) The more perfect virtue is, the more easily it restrains the movements of the passions; whence the arduousness of restraining passions denotes the imperfection of virtue more than its perfection. The greatness of virtue is to be measured more according to the notion of good than according to the notion of the difficult (2.2, q. 123, a. 12, ad 2).

380. DIVISION. Virtues are distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of object, some are divine or theological: these have God as their immediate object, as the author of grace and glory; others are human: these have for their immediate object the good which can be attained by human reason (1.2, q. 62, a. 1).

2. By reason of subject, human virtues are divided into intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtues perfect the intellect in the knowledge of truth. They are four in number, namely: understanding, science, wisdom, and art. Moral virtues perfect the will in pursuit of the good. Four likewise are numbered, namely: prudence (which also belongs to the intellectual virtues, because it pursues the honest good under the aspect of truth), justice, fortitude, and temperance. All the rest are referred to these four (cf. n. 390).

3. By reason of efficient cause, virtues are either infused, which are produced immediately by God in the soul, as faith, hope, charity; or acquired, which are obtained by the powers of nature through frequentation of acts, as temperance, etc.

But some infused virtues are called such per se, which namely can be had from God alone; others per accidens, which, although they can be prepared by human effort, nevertheless sometimes by a special gift of God are infused into the soul. But a virtue of this kind does not differ in species from an acquired one (Polman, Brev. Theol., 2.2, n. 20).

4. By reason of perfection, some virtues are formed by charity, others unformed. Virtue formed by charity is that which is joined with habitual charity. Virtue is called unformed when it is in a subject destitute of charity. Nevertheless it is true virtue, although not perfect, for example, faith, hope in sinners.

5. By reason of grade, virtues are common or heroic. Common is said of virtue which operates in an ordinary or common way. Heroic, which operates expeditely, promptly, delectably, and with abnegation of oneself, above the common mode of operating, that is, impelling to an act befitting a superior nature (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 54, a. 3, and 3, q. 7, a. 2, ad 2; Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. 3, c. 21, n. 10 and 11).

Besides virtues, there are given in the just soul certain other habits, which are called GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. These are infused habits by which man is well disposed to receiving and executing divine inspiration promptly (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 68, a. 1 and 2). See Muller, Theol. mor., I, § 120.

With these things premised concerning the notion of virtue, we shall briefly treat: 1. of certain properties of virtues; 2. of the specific distinction of virtues; 3. of the acquisition of virtues and their loss.

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 55 seqq.; 2.2, q. 47; St. Alphonsus, in ascetical works throughout, especially Vera Sposa, Prat. d'amar G. C.; Lessius, de Jure et Just.; Schiffini, de Virt. infusis, disp. 1; Mazzella, on the same matter; Muller, Theol. mor., I, § 104 seqq., where many useful things.

The properties of virtues which it helps to weigh here are: mediocrity, connection, and order; concerning these in two articles.

381. Virtue is said to consist in mediocrity, or in the mean, insofar as it is placed between excess and defect. Hence that common saying: Virtue is in the middle; and: The blessed have held the mean.

One must distinguish the mean of the thing, which namely is determined from the nature of the thing, and consequently is one and invariable; and the mean of reason, which reason determines by prudent estimation, the circumstances of place, time, and person being attended to.

382. PRINCIPLES. I. The theological virtues do not consist in a mean, per se and on the part of the object. The reason is because one cannot sin against them by excess: since no one can believe God too much, hope in God too much, love him too much.

But per accidens, or by reason of the subject, theological virtues have a mean; because although man cannot be borne into God as much as the notion of the object demands, nevertheless he ought to be borne according to the measure of his condition. Thus, for example, we ought to hope in such a way that our hope is a mean between presumption and desperation (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 64, a. 4).

383. II. All moral virtues consist in a mean. The reason is because these virtues are occupied about a finite good, to be pursued moderately, concerning which it is said (Wis. 11:21): Thou hast disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight: and therefore, just as it is vice to be deficient in the pursuit of this good, so also to exceed. Thus fortitude is between rashness and cowardice: temperance between intemperance and insensibility, etc. (St. Thom., l. c., a. 1).

Nevertheless justice holds the mean in one way, and the remaining virtues in another.¹ For:

1. JUSTICE ought to attain the mean of the thing, that is, equality according to the thing, so that as much be rendered as is owed. Hence the mean of justice is the same for all, nor can it vary: whence if you owe 100, you ought to render 100; if you render only 99, you wound justice; if you give 101, it will be an act of liberality (cf. n. 398 and 404).

2. The other moral virtues hold only the mean of reason, according to the estimation of prudence, regulating and measuring all things. The reason is because they are occupied about passions, in which the mean cannot be constituted in the same way for all, but in a diverse way according to the quality of persons. Thus, for example, in temperance, what is the mean or right for one will be little or too much for another; and so concerning the other virtues (St. Thom., l. c., a. 2). Cf. n. 391.

384. I. The connection among the virtues has itself thus:

1. The theological virtues are so connected that charity, in the state of the way, supposes faith and hope, but not conversely. For faith generates hope, and hope charity. But the generating is prior to the generated, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope, and hope and faith without charity.

2. Infused moral virtues (likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit) are connected among themselves insofar as they are rooted in charity; for without charity such habits can neither be acquired, nor increased, nor preserved, as will be seen below (n. 417). But they are not necessarily connected with acquired virtues: because they can exist without these, as is clear in baptized infants; on the contrary, acquired virtues are not immediately lost when the infused virtues are lost (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 65, a. 2).

3. Acquired moral virtues (which can exist without faith, hope, and charity) are not necessarily connected among themselves, if they are imperfect; otherwise, if they are perfect.

The reason for the first is because imperfect virtue is like a movable disposition, which does not furnish a firm faculty of conquering impediments: whence we see many, from natural temperament or even from some custom, to be prompt for works of mercy, who nevertheless are not prompt for works of chastity. The reason for the second is because perfect virtue causes someone, in every circumstance, willingly and without delay to operate the proper acts of that virtue; but there is no one who, destitute of even one virtue, so conducts himself. This can easily be seen, for example, in a woman chaste, but avaricious or fearful; for if an immense sum of money is offered to her, or threats of death are intended, she will not with difficulty suffer detriment of chastity (St. Thom., l. c., a. 1).

385. Note. Nevertheless false is the opinion of the Stoics, who denied that there is any virtue unless it is in the highest degree (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 66, a. 1). Hence: 1. The same virtue, even perfect, can be unequal, or greater and lesser, according to diverse times in the same man. 2. It can be unequal in diverse men. Thus diverse Saints are praised especially for diverse virtues, as Abraham for faith, Moses for meekness, Job for patience; indeed concerning any Confessor the Church sings: There has not been found one like him, who kept the law of the Most High; because each had the prerogative of some virtue (ibid., a. 1, ad 2).

386. II. A twofold order of virtues is distinguished: 1. of perfection or dignity, by reason of object; 2. of generation or acquisition, by reason of subject.

1. In the order OF PERFECTION, in the first place come the theological virtues, by which the human mind is joined to God; then the gifts, which perfect the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit moving to acts especially extraordinary; afterwards the intellectual virtues, which perfect reason according to itself; lastly the moral virtues, which perfect the will, or the sensitive appetite, in order to reason.

Similarly, among the theological virtues, first in dignity is charity, second hope, third faith. Among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the first is wisdom, the last fear of God. Among the merely intellectual virtues, in the first place comes wisdom, in the second understanding, in the third science and art. Among the moral virtues, prudence first, justice second (to which religion belongs), fortitude third, temperance fourth.

Nevertheless humility, which renders man well subject to the ordination of reason as to all things, in dignity precedes the other moral virtues, which render man subject to this order as to some special matter; or, it comes immediately after legal justice, which universally executes this ordination made by prudence in reason itself (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123, a. 12; q. 141, a. 8; q. 161, a. 5).

2. In the order OF GENERATION, moral and intellectual virtues precede, or can precede, theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit; because by the fact that man has himself well concerning his own reason, he is disposed to this, that he have himself well in order to God.

Likewise, in the exercise of Christian virtues, although the habits of these virtues are infused at the same time, nevertheless according to acts, faith precedes hope, and hope charity: for through faith the intellect apprehends those things which the mind hopes and loves; and from this very fact that man hopes concerning God, he proceeds to love him (cf. n. 1675, 4). See St. Alph., VI, n. 442, obj. 3.

Indeed, love of neighbor, as to act, precedes love of God; and in the same way humility is said to be prior to other virtues, insofar as it removes their chief impediment, that is, pride, which God resists; and it renders man subject and open to receiving the influence of divine grace (2.2, q. 161, a. 5, ad 2).

Toletus, 2.2, q. 18, a. 6; Pesch, de Virt., n. 34; Mazzella, de Virt., p. 17; Tanquerey, Synopsis, ed. 3, p. 342; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 843.

387. "Since virtue is ordered to good, where there is a special notion of good," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 81, a. 4), "there must there be a special virtue."

From this general principle it follows first of all that the theological virtues differ in species from the moral virtues: for by these latter man pursues the honest good proportioned to human nature; by the former, however, the divine good, exceeding the nature of man. But this first distinction is followed, both in the natural order and in the supernatural order, by many other distinctions, which must be weighed individually.

388. DEFINITION. Virtues of the natural order are those which are acquired by repeated acts, and are ordered to the natural end, that is, to beatitude proportioned to nature. Some are intellectual, others moral.

Moral virtues are divided into principal or cardinal virtues, by which, namely, as by hinges supporting it, the whole human life is turned; and into adjunct or companion virtues, which flow from the cardinal virtues, or are referred to them.

389. PRINCIPLES. I. There are four cardinal virtues, namely, PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, FORTITUDE, TEMPERANCE. This doctrine rests upon these words of Sacred Scripture: For she teaches sobriety (temperance) and prudence, and justice, and virtue (fortitude), than which there is nothing more useful in life for men (Wis. 8:7).

Now this number of four is had both by reason of the subject and by reason of the object (1.2, q. 61, a. 2).

1. It is had by reason of the subject: for a fourfold subject of virtue is given, namely: the rational by essence, which prudence perfects; and the rational by participation, which is divided into three, that is, into the will, which justice orders; into the concupiscible appetite, which temperance rectifies; and into the irascible appetite, which fortitude rightly disposes.

2. It is also had by reason of the object: for either virtue has for its object the very consideration of reason, namely that it assign measure and mode in every operation, and this is prudence; or it is occupied about operations, which it makes right, and thus it is justice; or it is occupied about passions which impel toward something contrary to reason, so that it may repress them, and thus temperance is had; or it is occupied about passions which draw back from that which reason dictates, so that it may despise them, and thus fortitude obtains.¹

390. II. The other moral virtues can be reduced to the four cardinal virtues. Thus commonly.

They are reduced in a threefold way. For some virtues help a cardinal virtue, so that its act may become perfect; and these are called integral or integrating parts: because without them the virtue cannot be whole, just as a house without foundation, wall, and roof would not be whole. Others are subjected to a cardinal virtue as species to a genus, and therefore are called subjective parts of the same virtue: because a genus is predicated of a species as of a subject. Others finally serve a cardinal virtue in certain secondary acts or matters, and in these observe the mode which that virtue observes in principal matters; and therefore they are named potential parts, as if not having the whole power of the principal virtue (2.2, q. 48, a. 1).

Now concerning the several virtues.

391. NOTION. Prudence is defined by the Angelic Doctor (2.2, q. 47, a. 2): right reason of things to be done. By others: "A habit of the practical intellect, for rightly determining, through an act of command, what is to be done in any particular case."

Hence: 1. The material object of prudence is particular human actions. But the formal object is the mean of reason, between defect and excess; or practical rectitude, as a form to be impressed upon each action (cf. n. 383, 2).

2. Prudence, by reason of its subject, is an intellectual virtue; for it resides in the intellect, so that it may decide what we ought to pursue and from what we ought to decline. But by reason of its object it is moral; for it is occupied about morals, all of which it directs, and over which it commands, although it does not elicit them: whence it is an essentially practical virtue (St. Thom., l. c., a. 5).

392. Acts of prudence. There are three acts or functions of prudence: 1. Prudence consults well, that is, it diligently and without precipitation investigates and deliberates what means, what circumstances, are necessary, so that the work may be done honestly and virtuously. 2. Prudence judges rightly, that is, after diligent deliberation, it firmly concludes and pronounces what means, among those sought and found, are good and fitting. 3. Prudence commands efficaciously, namely by moving the moral virtues to the execution of those things which have been diligently deliberated and firmly judged (Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. 3, c. 24, n. 5).

But these acts, so that they may be done duly, must be exercised with solicitude and fitting diligence; and if someone has applied this, and has done what he could, although he speculatively errs, nevertheless the judgment will be prudent, and he will not sin (cf. n. 21). See Billuart, de Prud., Diss. 1, a. 2.

From these things you will gather: 1. Prudence, in its functions, depends much upon the moral virtues: partly because the virtues restrain the passions, which disturb reason in the consideration of the honest, and display a delectable good; partly because they so dispose the subject that the honest work exhibits itself as most congruous to him, as drink to the thirsty, food to the hungry. "For each one judges according as he is affected." And: "As each one is, so does the end appear to him."

2. Perfect prudence cannot exist except in upright men, who have the affection rightly disposed in every matter of virtue. For these alone, in any business that occurs, are able to judge rightly. But in men who are not upright, or who are given to some vice, only imperfect prudence can exist: namely that maimed prudence by which they only consult and judge well toward some particular good, but not toward the end of the whole of human life; or by which, although they consult and judge well as regards this whole end, they by no means bring to effect the things which they consult and judge (cf. Lessius, de Prud., c. 1, n. 30-35).

393. Parts of prudence. I. The integrating parts, or endowments of perfect prudence, are eight, namely:

1. Memory, or recollection of past things; for past things teach us; whence that worn saying: "Believe Robert, the experienced one." 2. Understanding, that is, full knowledge of the state of the matter here and now to be done, and of the moral principles which ought to concur for judging prudently. 3. Providence, which, as if seeing from afar, considers the end of the work and future events. 4. Shrewdness, that is, sudden and ready discovery of a fitting means. 5. Docility, or promptness of soul for taking hold of others' counsels. 6. Reason, that is, a certain promptness in reasoning and gathering one thing from another. 7. Circumspection, or attention to all the circumstances of the work, lest some requisite be lacking. 8. Caution, or care of avoiding evils and impediments by which, from without, the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 48 and 49).

394. II. The subjective parts, that is, the species of prudence, are numbered as two, namely:

1. Personal or monastic prudence, through which man rules himself; this alone can absolutely and simply be called prudence. 2. Governing prudence, by which man rules others. This is manifold, namely domestic, civil, pastoral, military, etc. (2.2, q. 50). It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better (2.2, q. 47, a. 11, 12).

395. III. The potential parts of prudence, that is, the companion virtues which prudence uses, are numbered as three:

1. Eubulia, which is the habit of consulting rightly, that is, of finding good counsel in doubtful matters. 2. Synesis, or the habit of judging rightly concerning things consulted. Through this, men are called well-sensed. 3. Gnome, that is, the habit of judging rightly, when there is need, from higher principles, beyond the common rules of things to be done, yet according to the mind of the legislator. The act which corresponds to this in the will is called epikeia (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 51). Cf. n. 173 and n. 403, 3.

396. Vices opposed to prudence. I. Imprudence is opposed to prudence THROUGH DEFECT; under this name commonly come: 1. Precipitation, by which someone undertakes some work without sufficient deliberation. 2. Inconsideration, by which judgment concerning means is made without due attention. 3. Inconstancy of mind, that is, change of opinion on account of no cause or a slight cause. 4. Negligence, or omission of the diligence required for urging the execution of the matter deliberated (2.2, q. 53 and 54).

What kind of sin, you will ask, is imprudence? - Resp. Imprudence can be taken in three ways: 1. negatively, for the mere lack of prudence; and thus it can be without sin, as is clear in children; 2. privatively, for the lack of due prudence; and in this way it is a general sin, which is found in every theological fault; 3. contrariwise, when the counsels of prudence are positively spurned and repudiated; and in this way imprudence is a special sin, and indeed mortal, if there is grave contempt of divine rules; otherwise it will be venial.

397. II. Those things which have a likeness with prudence itself are opposed to prudence THROUGH EXCESS, namely:

1. Prudence of the flesh, which is the diligent devising of means for fulfilling the instincts of corrupt nature; and these can regard external goods, or the delectations of the senses, or one's own excellence. This prudence is of itself mortal, according to that saying (Rom. 8:6): The prudence of the flesh is death.

Indeed, moderate solicitude concerning temporal goods is not condemned, but that solicitude which is superfluous and disturbs the soul: because it imports distrust in the providence of God, and is a grave or venial sin according to the gravity of the matter (2.2, q. 55, a. 1).

2. Astuteness (or craftiness, or cunning), which is knowledge and use of depraved means for deceiving, with the intention of attaining what is intended, whether good or evil. Yet properly astuteness is taken in an evil sense (St. Thom., l. c., a. 3).

398. NOTION. Justice, taken generally, designates the complex of all virtues. For that is called just which equals its measure.

But justice, as a cardinal virtue, is customarily defined: "The constant and perpetual will of giving each one his right." Thus defined, it comprehends all moral virtues which are toward another, that is, toward God or toward one's neighbor (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 57).

The material object of justice is a thing or action in some way owed to another. But the formal object is the notion of debt, or the special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own (Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 1).

For true and perfect justice three things are required, namely: 1. that it be altogether toward another; for, since the name of justice imports equality, from its nature justice has this, that it is toward another; for nothing is equal to itself, but to another; 2. that it be occupied about a rigorous debt, that is, about a debt from whose violation not only moral baseness is contracted, as in all those things which are owed from the title of honesty (for example, of gratitude), but a strict obligation of restitution or reparation arises; 3. that it render to equality, that is, as much as is owed (2.2, q. 58, a. 2).

Between father and son, husband and wife, Creator and creature, there is not justice properly and simply so called in those things, namely, which they owe as son, as father, etc.; because the son, as son, is not considered diverse from the father, but something of the father; similarly the wife is considered one flesh with the husband, etc. It is otherwise if such persons should come together in some contract, as fellow citizens and distinct parties; for then the status of the persons would be something secondary, and their agreement would regard a debt of justice alone. Likewise, if a son should kill his father, he would violate not piety alone, but also justice, because the father, considered as a man, has a right to life, as do the rest.

399. Parts of justice. I. The integral parts are: 1. to do good under the aspect of debt; 2. to decline from evil under the aspect of injury. Whence St. Ambrose (de Offic., l. 1, c. 24, n. 115): "Justice assigns his own to each one, does not claim what is another's."

400. II. The subjective parts, or species of justice, are assigned as three, namely commutative, distributive, and legal justice.

The reason of the division is that there is a threefold respect under which justice gives to another what is his: namely, the respect either of part to part, or of the whole to the part, or of the part to the whole. For the first is established commutative justice, through which a part renders to a fellow part what is his. For the second is placed distributive justice, through which the superior of the community dispenses the common goods according to the merits of individuals. For the third is assigned legal justice, through which all and each give what is owed to the community by reason and force of the laws (St. Alph., III, 486).

1. COMMUTATIVE justice is the virtue inclining a private man to render to another private man his strict right, an absolute equality of the thing to be rendered to the thing accepted being preserved (cf. n. 383). Nevertheless commutative justice can intervene between a private person and the community, but only where the community has itself after the manner of a private man.

It is called commutative, because it is founded chiefly upon various contracts and upon the innumerable exchanges which are accustomed to take place among men. It is also called strict or rigorous, because those three things which are required for perfect justice are present in it, and in it alone (n. 398, 2).

Note. Various species of injuries are opposed to commutative justice, concerning which in the last six precepts of the Decalogue.

2. DISTRIBUTIVE justice is the virtue which inclines the community, or its prince as minister, to distribute rewards, dignities and honors, and also common burdens, according to the proportion of merits or capacities.

This differs specifically from commutative justice, because it has a diverse formal object, namely the debt of the community, as such, to the parts; whence it comes about that it establishes or regards a diverse equality. For commutative justice regards arithmetical equality, such as there is between two equalities, for example ten and ten. But distributive justice looks to geometrical equality or proportion, which consists in the proportion of the thing to be distributed with the dignity and merit, or capacity, of the person to whom it is to be distributed, comparison being made to others to whom right also belongs in the distribution of goods or burdens. It is imperfect justice, because it is not founded upon strict right, but upon a debt of fittingness (2.2, q. 61, a. 2).

Note. Acceptance of persons is opposed to distributive justice; concerning this we shall speak when discussing the offices of the Bishop, prince, judge, etc. If something to be divided equally among several by strict right were divided unequally, for example a common treasury, a public foundation, etc., commutative justice also would be violated.

3. LEGAL, or GENERAL, justice is the virtue which inclines a private person, or a prince, to render all those things which are owed to the community, in order to the common good. It is called legal, because it is occupied about all things established by laws for the common good. It is called general, insofar as it commands and directs the acts of all virtues to the general prosperity of the commonwealth.

Nevertheless it is a special virtue, because it has a special object, namely public right, or the good of the whole, to be procured by the part, namely by the head or by a member. It is true justice, because between the community and citizens there is true equality, while one renders to the other all that he owes him according to the laws. But it falls short of the notion of perfect justice, because it is not perfectly toward another, since this other is something of the whole. Yet it is nobler than the other species of justice, since the common good, which it regards, is superior to the private good; and since the common good must be procured, or at least preserved, in such a way that private good is always subordinated to it.

Note. To legal justice is opposed: materially, every transgression of laws; formally, and as a special sin, contempt of law, or of the common good, whether on the part of private persons, when deliberately they act against it, as, for example, internationalists, socialists; or on the part of the prince, and of other persons set over others, when they neglect the common good which is endangered, or prefer private good to it (Lessius, l. c., l. 2, c. 1, n. 11).

It is asked: What is VINDICATIVE justice?

Resp. It is the virtue inclining the prince or magistrate of the community to punish the guilty according to the laws. The object of this justice is punishment to be done according to merit; the subject is the judge constituted by legitimate authority, to whom alone it belongs to take vengeance concerning delicts.

This justice primarily pertains to legal justice. Yet often it also pertains to commutative justice: both because the judge, from office and on account of salary, is bound to protect and preserve the public good; and because he ought so to punish delicts that he also exact and procure reparation of the damage which has been inflicted upon private persons. Hence not rarely judges, on account of their negligence in punishing, are obligated to restitution, whether toward the community or toward private persons (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 62, a. 7).

401. III. The potential parts, or virtues annexed to justice, are those which indeed regard another, but in some way fall short of the notion of perfect justice. Nine virtues of this kind are numbered, distributed into three classes (2.2, q. 80, a. un.).

The FIRST CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice for this reason, that the debt which they render to another cannot be rendered to equality. These virtues are: religion, piety, and observance. See the things to be said at n. 530 and 687 seqq.

402. The SECOND CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice because the debt which they render to another is not indeed required by force of justice, but only from the honesty of virtue; yet it is so required that its omission is a sin. - Of this kind are: truthfulness, gratitude, and vindication.

1. TRUTHFULNESS, or truth, inclines to always saying what is true. To this virtue are recalled: a) FAITH or fidelity in promises; b) SIMPLICITY, by which someone exteriorly exhibits himself in words and deeds as he is interiorly.

2. GRATITUDE inclines to compensating a benefit received. But recompensation is made: a) by affection, through kindly acknowledgment, or estimation, of the benefit received; b) by effect, through opportune giving of thanks and requital of the benefit.¹

3. VINDICATION, or severity, repels force or injury, and whatever is going to harm, by defending or avenging. The special object of this virtue is vengeance, required and to be taken by a legitimate judge; not with the mind of harming, but either from zeal for recovering honor unjustly taken away, or from love of that honesty which shines in the punishment of the malefactor, to whom punishment is owed of itself, just as thanks to a benefactor. See the things said (n. 400) concerning vindicative justice.

Related to vindication is penance, concerning which we shall speak at n. 1644.

403. The THIRD CLASS comprises those virtues which regard a certain debt contributing to greater honesty, and whose omission of itself involves no sin. The virtues of this third class are liberality and affability; to which equity can be numbered, although this is rather referred to legal justice.

1. LIBERALITY moderates the love of money, so that we may freely and promptly expend it for our own usefulness and our neighbor's, and for God's honor. To this is referred MERCY, insofar as it is a moral virtue inclining to relieving another's misery.

2. AFFABILITY (to which friendship, urbanity, and benevolence are referred) renders conversation with one's neighbor pleasing and decent. For man is bound, says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 114, a. 2, ad 2), from the natural debt of honesty, to live pleasantly with others.

3. EQUITY, or epikeia, inclines to acting contrary to the words of the law, when some higher consideration demands it. See the things said at n. 173.

404. Vices opposed to justice. Besides formal injustice, which, either by damaging or by taking away, wounds the goods of man, there are given multiple other vices which are opposed to the potential parts of justice, whether by excess or by defect.

To religion are opposed those things concerning which the first three precepts of the Decalogue treat.

To piety are opposed impiety, cosmopolitanism (defect), and nationalism (excess). Cf. Muller, l. 2, § 34, 40.

To observance are opposed irreverence and disobedience.

Contrary to truthfulness are: lying, simulation, and revelation of a secret.

To gratitude are opposed: indiscreet gratitude (excess) and ingratitude (defect).

Severity not tempered degenerates into cruelty or excessive lenity.

Enemies to liberality are prodigality (excess) (cf. n. 363) and avarice (defect).

Affability is a mean between flattery (excess) and moroseness (defect) or envy.

405. NOTION. Fortitude, taken broadly, is firmness of soul in operating good. Taken strictly, it is a cardinal virtue, confirming the soul of man for duly undertaking or sustaining difficult things, chiefly dangers of death (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123-140). Cf. Lessius, de Jur. et Just., l. 3.

The material object of fortitude is dangers and labors; but the formal object is the honesty which firm constancy of soul in undertaking or sustaining arduous things contains.

There is a twofold act of fortitude: to undertake and to sustain with firmness of soul. But this latter is the more principal, because (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123, a. 6) it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring. - To this second act pertains martyrdom, concerning which at n. 1452.

406. Parts of fortitude. I. There are no subjective parts or species of fortitude (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 128, a. 1): because this virtue, taken strictly, is occupied about matter contained within narrower limits and entirely specified, namely about dangers of death: and these dangers, although some are greater than others, nevertheless are contained in the same genus.

II. The integrating parts of fortitude (which can also be called potential, when and insofar as they are extended to less arduous matters) are four, namely: magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance.

1. MAGNANIMITY is a virtue inclining to great and heroic works in every genus of virtues. To this virtue pertain confidence or trust and security. The difference between security and confidence consists in this, that security imports a certain perfect quiet of soul from fear; but confidence imports a certain strength of hope. - Goudin treats excellently concerning magnanimity, Philosoph., P. III, q. 6, a. 4.

2. MAGNIFICENCE is a virtue inclining to great works (chiefly to those which pertain to the worship of God) to be completed with great expenses, according to the prescription of right reason. It differs from magnanimity because this latter intends great things in every matter, while magnificence regards only things to be made. St. Thomas (2.2, q. 134, a. 2, ad 3).

3. PATIENCE is a virtue strengthening the soul in the toleration of afflictions. Through it, the good of reason is preserved against sadness, lest reason succumb to affliction. This virtue is most necessary to man, because in this mortal life evils must be tolerated by him, immense in number and gravity, and because the passion of sadness has much power for impeding the good of reason, according to that saying (2 Cor. 7:10): The sadness of the world works death; and (Eccli. 30:25): Sadness has killed many, and there is no usefulness in it. To patience is joined LONGANIMITY, which is the equanimous toleration of affliction arisen from the delay of a hoped-for good.

4. PERSEVERANCE is a virtue by which man firmly persists in a good work, notwithstanding annoyances and difficulties which arise from the long duration of the act. Related to it is CONSTANCY, a virtue which bestows so great an immutability in good that man preserves an even mind in all things, and perseveres unchanging against whatever difficulties arise.

Vices opposed to fortitude. To fortitude are opposed rashness (excess), by which someone undertakes arduous things contrary to the prudent dictate of reason, and cowardice (defect), which flees from undertaking what is fitting for repelling evil. Also opposed are fearlessness (excess), which does not fear when it ought, and timidity (defect), which grows afraid inordinately.

Furthermore, considering the potential parts of fortitude, we have the following:

Contrary to magnanimity are: presumption, ambition (excess), and pusillanimity (defect).

To magnificence are opposed: parvificence (defect) and profusion (excess).

To patience are opposed: impatience (excess) and insensibility (defect).

Perseverance is wounded by: pertinacity (excess), inconstancy and softness (defect).

407. NOTION. Temperance, taken broadly, is that moderation of soul which pertains to all parts of life, and is common to every virtue. Taken strictly, it is a cardinal virtue which, according to the rule of reason, moderates the appetite in those things which most allure, namely in the delectations of taste and touch (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 150-170). Cf. Lessius, de Just., l. 4.

The material object of temperance is bodily delectations, namely those which are ordered to the preservation either of the individual or of the species, and are perceived from foods, drinks, and venereal things. The formal object is the honest use of the same, or the honesty of moderation which is applied in these, such as is consonant with the dignity of human nature.

The rule or measure of temperance, which reason assigns, is taken according to the necessity of the present life. St. Augustine beautifully expresses this thus (de Mor. Eccl., c. 21): "The temperate man has a rule in the things of this life..., that he love none of them, think none to be sought for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of life and of duties, as much as is enough, with the modesty of one using, not with the affection of one loving." Yet under the name necessity, understand also usefulness or fittingness, according to the condition of the person, state, occupation, etc.

408. Parts of temperance. I. The integral parts which concur for the perfection of temperance are shamefacedness and honesty.

1. Shamefacedness is fear or flight from a base act, and from the confusion arising from it. It is not properly a virtue, but rather a certain passion, yet good and praiseworthy. 2. Honesty is love and pursuit of decorum. Indeed honesty (the state of honor), generally, does not differ from virtue, nor from decorum or moral beauty; nevertheless, honesty and beauty are attributed by a special title to temperance, because it belongs to this virtue to repel altogether that which is most base in man.

409. II. The subjective parts, or species of temperance, are: abstinence and sobriety in the matter of taste; chastity and modesty about venereal things (St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 8; Lessius, opusc. Hygiasticon). Cf. the things to be said at n. 757, 764, and 1218.

410. III. The potential parts of temperance are secondary virtues which imitate this principal virtue in an easier matter. Whence moderation of any inordinate movement is a potential part of temperance.

Virtues of this kind are especially numbered as seven, namely: continence, meekness, clemency, humility, modesty, studiousness, and eutrapelia.

1. CONTINENCE is a virtue which resists movements of concupiscence provoking to intemperance. To contain oneself (2.2, q. 155, a. 1, ad 2) is the same as to hold oneself in oneself, according to reason. Continence differs from temperance as the imperfect and begun differs from the perfect and complete. The temperate man has already overcome the concupiscences of foods, drinks, and venereal things; but the continent man so restrains the same concupiscences, still rebellious, that the superior part of the soul is not conquered.

2. MEEKNESS is a virtue which moderates anger according to the dictate of right reason, namely so that man does not grow angry except when, and as much, and in the way that he ought (St. Alph., Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 6 and 12).

3. CLEMENCY is a virtue mitigating punishments within the limits of right reason; or, it is the lenity of a superior toward an inferior, remitting something from due punishment, as much as justice, the good of discipline, the salvation of the delinquent, and public edification permit.

4. HUMILITY is defined by St. Bernard (de Grad. hum., c. 1, n. 2): "A virtue by which man, by the truest knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself." And by St. Thomas (2.2, q. 161, a. 1): "A virtue tempering and restraining the soul, lest it tend immoderately to lofty things." A twofold humility is usually distinguished: humility of judgment or cognition, by which we know that we are nothing before God; and humility of affection or of heart, by which we tread underfoot the glory of the world. Wherefore St. Thomas (ibid., a. 6) says: "Humility consists essentially in appetite, according as someone restrains the impulse of his soul, lest he tend inordinately toward great things; but it has its rule in cognition,"

"namely, that someone not judge himself to be above that which he is; and the principle and root of both is reverence which one has toward God." See St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 11.

Note. HUMILITY pleases God exceedingly; for it is a certain profession of truth, which especially redounds to his honor. But how necessary it is to man for obtaining eternal salvation is gathered from the words of Christ the Lord saying (Matt. 18:3): Unless you become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Cf. also ibid., 11:29. Whence St. Augustine (Ep. ad Dioscorum) says: "The first virtue is humility; the second, humility; the third, humility; and as often as you would ask, I would say this" (cf. n. 386, 1).

5. MODESTY is defined: A virtue by which someone keeps himself within the mode and limits congruous to him, as regards internal and external movements (2.2, q. 160 and 168). Yet only moderation of externals pertains to modesty strictly so called. It is twofold: a) Modesty OF MOVEMENTS, which arranges the movements of the body, in words and actions, according to the mode of reason. b) Modesty OF CULT, which applies the moderation of reason in exterior arrangement, or in clothing, furniture, banquets, according to the condition of person, time, place, etc. See St. Thom., l. c., q. 169.

This virtue indeed has humble matter, but by right great praise: for the exterior man is the indicator of the interior, nor easily can man in exterior habit act constantly according to the norm of right reason, unless interiorly he has all things well ordered and is furnished with other virtues. But on the contrary, the exercise of modesty also helps much toward acquiring, preserving, and increasing other virtues (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 876).

6. STUDIOUSNESS is a virtue which moderates the appetite of knowing, and study itself, according to right reason. The office of this virtue is: a) to restrain the excessive appetite of knowing; b) to incite to diligently learning matters fitting to the condition and capacity of each one (St. Alph., H. Ap., VII, 52); c) to refer study and acquired knowledge to the due end, namely to one's own or another's usefulness, and to the glory of God (2.2, q. 166).

7. EUTRAPELIA (modesty in playful things) is a virtue preserving mode and decorum in sayings and deeds instituted for the recreation of the soul (2.2, q. 167). - "I will that at last you spare yourself," says St. Augustine (de Musica, l. 2, at the end): "for it pleases that the wise man sometimes relax the attention decently intent on things to be done." Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 178; ed. G., I, p. 483.

Vices opposed to temperance. To temperance are directly opposed: a) by excess, insensibility toward delectable things, such that one refuses to use them even if one ought. Of itself, this is venial, but for some persons (for example, for spouses) it can become mortal; b) by defect, intemperance, by which someone immoderately pants after pleasures, contrary to the rules of reason (2.2, q. 124, a. 4).

To the SUBJECTIVE PARTS, the species of temperance, many vices are opposed, namely: to abstinence, gluttony (cf. n. 364); to sobriety, drunkenness (cf. n. 757); to chastity, lust (cf. n. 767); to modesty, immodesty (cf. n. 769).

To the POTENTIAL PARTS of temperance several vices are opposed, whether by defect or by excess:

To meekness are opposed irascibility (defect) and excessive indulgence (excess).

Clemency holds the mean between cruelty (defect) and lenity (excess). Cf. n. 403, 3.

To humility is opposed inordinate self-abjection (excess), for example, if a father casts himself down beneath a son, and pride (defect), concerning which we have already spoken at n. 360.

To modesty are opposed both courtliness and luxury (defect), and rusticity and neglect of fitting arrangement.

Studiousness holds itself as mean between curiosity (excess) and negligence of studies (defect).

Finally, eutrapelia is equally hostile to moroseness (defect) and to buffoonery (excess), concerning which the Apostle speaks to the Ephesians, 5:4. See n. 2231, concerning games prohibited to a cleric.

411. The supernatural habits which God infuses into the soul for the attainment of the supernatural end are the following: 1. theological virtues; 2. infused moral virtues; 3. gifts of the Holy Spirit. We shall say a few things concerning each of these habits.

I. The theological virtues are fittingly assigned as three: FAITH, HOPE, CHARITY.

For the theological virtues order man to supernatural beatitude, just as through natural inclination man is ordered to the end connatural to him. Now natural inclination toward the end is exercised, as regards the intellect, through first principles and reasonings known by the light of reason: to these are superadded supernatural, credible principles, concerning which is faith. Natural inclination is exercised besides through the right will, which tends toward the good of reason: this right will is aided and perfected by hope, by which the possible supernatural good is desired; it is also aided and perfected by charity, which impels the will to this, that it be united with the ultimate end and transformed into it. Cf. St. Thom., 1.2, q. 62, a. 3; Bouquillon, de Virt. theol. See below the things to be said at n. 420 seqq.

412. II. Besides the theological virtues, there are given moral virtues infused in us by God per se, which are commonly called CHRISTIAN. This is the common opinion with St. Thomas against Scotus. - It is proved from Scripture (Wis. 8:7), where it is said: She teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice, and virtue, etc....; but for God to teach and to infuse something is the same; for God does not teach as man does, by only proposing objects, but by infusing light. Reason supports it: for the theological virtues order us into the supernatural end according to a certain beginning only, that is, as regards God himself immediately, but not as regards creatures: and therefore it is necessary that through other infused virtues the soul be perfected concerning other things, yet in order to God.¹

Let it be noted. 1. Infused moral virtues differ from acquired virtues not in matter, but in species. They do not indeed differ in matter, as they commonly teach with St. Thomas (1.2, q. 63, a. 4); but they altogether differ in species, that is, as regards the formal object, or mode of operating. The formal object of acquired virtues is natural honesty, which befits man insofar as he is man and citizen of human society; but the formal object of infused virtues is a more sublime or supernatural honesty, which befits us insofar as we are Christians, that is, imitators of Christ, citizens of the Saints, and members of the household of God. Thus, for example, acquired temperance is established in food and drink for this reason, that the body may be well and the act of reason not be impeded; but according to the rule of the evangelical law, temperance is required so that man may chastise his body and bring it into servitude. And so concerning the others. To these add abnegation of oneself, love of poverty, and similar virtues, which are known and ruled only by the light of faith.

2. They differ further in facility of operating; for infused virtues of themselves indeed give the power (and probably also a certain facility) of operating supernaturally; yet they do not of themselves remove the impediment which comes from concupiscence, or from evil custom; whence "it ought not seem wonderful to anyone" (says the Roman Catechism, de Baptism., n. 52), "if, although we have been furnished and adorned with so great an abundance of virtues, nevertheless not without great difficulty and labor do we begin, or at least complete, pious and honest actions." But acquired virtues, which are obtained by repeated acts, at the same time remove or diminish the impediment; for they are not exercised without struggle, nor except by acts contrary to concupiscence. Therefore, infused virtue confers the very faculty of producing supernatural acts, with a certain intrinsic facility scarcely perceptible; but acquired virtue does not give the faculty, which is already had, but provides facility, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, of placing good acts in the natural order (Mazzella, de Virt. infus., n. 58 seqq.).

413. III. There are present besides, in all the justified, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, or supernatural habits specifically distinct from the virtues. These are, according to the prophet Isaiah (11:2), the gift of wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear of the Lord.

We said 1. The seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are present in all the justified; this is the common opinion, resting upon many reasons, from which it suffices to bring forward this one: it befits the justified person to be easily movable by the Holy Spirit in those things which are either necessary or fitting for his own salvation. But the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are ordered to these things (St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., P. II, c. 14).

2. They are habits specifically distinct from the virtues. For the gifts dispose man so that he is promptly movable by God, beyond the common and ordinary rules of operating; but the virtues (whether acquired or infused) only dispose him so that he is movable by reason, both natural and disposed by supernatural perfection (1.2, q. 68, a. 1). The gifts of the Holy Spirit therefore are a certain summit and complement of the supernatural state to which we are raised by the grace of God (Mazzella, n. 528).

Note. From these virtues and gifts proceed the more excellent acts, which are called the fruits of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes. On these see the Dogmatic and Ascetical writers (cf. St. Thom., in Matt. 7:20, and in Galat. 5:22).

St. Alphonsus, Vera Sposa, I, c. IV; Contenson, Theol. mentis et cord. (ed. Vives), II, p. 453 seq.; Alvarez de Paz, II vol., de Adept. virt., l. 3, p. 593; Dosda, Union a Dieu, I vol., p. 405.

Preliminary Matters. - There inheres in the powers (n. 1) a certain quality by which they are inclined to acting in one mode rather than another, whether well or badly.¹ A quality of this sort is called a habit, and is added over and above the power, and completes or perfects this in order to its operation.² As far as our matter is concerned, one habit is acquired, another infused; the former is generated from acts multiplied, the latter (we are speaking of the supernatural) exceeds the faculty of human nature and is obtained from immediate divine action, without a natural principle, as the habits of Faith, Hope, Charity, and of all the supernatural virtues. - The chief effects of habits are: 1° Uniformity³ in the operations of the powers in which they inhere, so that the operations are exercised constantly in the same mode. Thus, for example, the will, by force of the habit of virtue, constantly chooses that which is agreeable to the rule of morals, and for this reason a habit is called a second nature;⁴ yet in this sense only, that by a habit the power is inclined to acting in a similar mode, not that it is compelled.⁵ 2° Facility in exercising operations, since a habit consists in a certain propensity to acting.⁶ 3° Delectability in performing operations, because a habit "renders the operation proper to itself as it were natural" (a second nature), "and consequently delightful, for congruence is the cause of delight."⁷ Sanseverino, Comp. Dynam. n. 26-29, 31. - Hence:

247. • Virtue is a habit of acting honestly or according to right order.

It is called: 1° A habit, that is, a stable quality or disposition, infused or acquired. For it is not the same thing to be virtuous and to posit an act of virtue, which can be done without a habit. - But that habit is not only dispositive, as for example beauty is, but also, and indeed especially, operative, namely inclining the power to acting honestly.

It is called: 2° of acting honestly or according to right order. But right order, among other things, also demands this, that the mean of virtue be preserved, namely by avoiding defect and excess in the exercise of virtue. But that mean is either of the thing, or of reason. The mean of the thing is so determined and fixed that it is always one and indivisible, and therefore is not varied according to place, time, and person. This must be preserved in commutative justice. Thus, for example, if I owe you 100, I also ought to give you 100, and I fall short of the virtue of justice if I give you only 99 3/4; on the contrary, if I return 110 to you, I will posit an act not only of justice, but also of liberality. - But the mean of reason, which must be preserved in the other virtues, is divisible, and is varied according to place, time, and person, according to the estimation of the prudent; and therefore it is called of reason.

That virtue consists in the mean can indeed rightly be said of all virtues, yet not in the same sense; for there are virtues which, by reason of their object, do not admit a mean, namely the theological virtues, and that moral virtue which is called Religion. For we never pursue God, the object of these virtues, enough or too much by Faith, Hope, Charity, or worship (Religion). Yet these same virtues, by reason of the circumstances which accompany their acts (by reason of mode, time, place, etc.), are rightly said to consist in the mean. Thus one sins by excess through presumption against Hope, and through superstition against Religion.¹

Virtues are distinguished in various species, namely:

1° Natural, which are also called human and philosophical; or supernatural, which are also called Christian, according as they tend to perfecting man in order to a natural or supernatural end or happiness.

2° Infused or acquired, according as they are infused by God Himself into the heart, or are acquired by repeated acts of the agent.

3° Theological or moral, according as they immediately regard God, or have for their immediate object the honesty of an action. There are three theological virtues, namely Faith, Hope, Charity. There are four cardinal moral virtues, to which the others are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

4° Intellectual, which reside in the intellect as in their proximate subject, as Faith and prudence; or appetitive, which reside in the will as in their proximate subject, as the other two theological virtues and the three remaining cardinal virtues.

5° Formed or unformed, according as they are joined or not joined with habitual Charity or sanctifying grace.

Quaer. 1° Whether and in what sense are virtues connected among themselves?

Resp. 1° The theological virtues are connected among themselves in this sense: a) that Charity in this life cannot be without Faith and Hope; for it is infused with these,² and when these are lost through infidelity and despair, Charity also is lost; for Charity cannot stand with mortal sin. b) That Hope cannot be without Faith; for "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,"³ that is, their foundation. But Hope can be without Charity; for a sinner who has not yet despaired, although Charity has been lost, nevertheless retains Hope, as is clear from proposition 57 among the condemned Quesnellian propositions: "... there is no Hope in God where there is no Love of God." Likewise Faith can be without Hope and Charity; for even if someone sins by the mortal sin of despair, if he does not become an unbeliever, after Hope has been lost, as also Charity, he retains Faith, because this is lost only by infidelity.¹ Nor say that without Charity true Faith and Hope are not given; for Trent² condemns those who say that "when grace has been lost through sin, ... the Faith which remains is not true Faith." For although Charity is the form of Faith and also of Hope, nevertheless it is only an extrinsic form, insofar as it gives them accidental life, or the force of meriting de condigno.³

Resp. 2° Natural moral virtues are not necessarily connected with the theological virtues, and are often in heretics and unbelievers, who, although they lack theological virtues, nevertheless are often just, temperate, etc. This is clear from proposition 25, condemned among the Baian propositions (p. X).⁴

Resp. 3° Moral virtues are necessarily connected among themselves if they are perfect, or such as are habits which have all their effects, namely uniformity, facility, delectability. Cf. above the Preliminary Matters. Someone, for example, is just but not liberal: since this man loves money too much, he would easily inflict injury on the neighbor, or would pay a debt to another only with difficulty (therefore neither easily nor delightfully). - If they are imperfect, they are not necessarily connected, as is clear.⁵

Yet from this, that one who lacks one moral virtue is destitute of the others, it does not follow that he is altogether unequal to acting well; for perfect virtue does not denote the possibility for an act of virtue, but the constancy and facility of operating rightly. Thus even those who do not have the virtue of temperance can nevertheless posit acts of temperance.⁶ On the contrary, from the fact that someone has perfect virtue, it does not follow that the acts of all virtues are found in him. "Hence the act of magnanimity does not belong to every virtuous man"; for it suffices if he has "the habit of greatness," or a proximate disposition toward exercising it, in the case in which this, according to his state, would be licit for him.⁷

Note. - Perfect virtue is also called by Ascetics solid, at least in this sense: that by difficulties occurring in the exercise of virtues it is not hindered in its acts.

Quaer. 2° Whether virtues are unequal, or some more perfect than others?

Resp. 1° Virtues, according to their diverse species, are absolutely unequal, that is, with regard to the good to which they are ordered; for that good, according to the diversity or species of the virtues, is greater or less. Wherefore theological virtues, according to their species, are more perfect than moral virtues, because the good to which the former are immediately ordered, namely God, is greater than the good to which the latter are ordered. But among the theological virtues, under this reason Charity is more perfect;¹ among the moral virtues, prudence, "because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man bears himself well not only in himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man on account of the good contemns the dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man on account of the good contemns the greatest delights of bodily things."²

Resp. 2° The same species of virtue, considered in itself, is equal, because "whoever has some virtue," namely perfect virtue, "for instance temperance, has it as to all things to which temperance extends."³

Resp. 3° By reason of the subject which participates in virtue, the same species of virtue can be unequal; for virtue consists in the mean, but in reaching this mean "one is better disposed than another, either because of greater habituation, or because of a better disposition of nature, or because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason." Therefore the same virtue can be unequal "either according to diverse times in the same person, or in diverse men."⁴

Quaer. 3° How are virtues acquired?

Resp. Supernatural virtues are acquired through infusion, natural virtues through the exercise of acts. I say: of acts, and not of an act; for through one act a habit is not customarily acquired. I said, not customarily; for it could be acquired if perhaps the act were so intense and lasting that it would be equivalent to several. - I said, supernatural virtues are acquired through infusion; this is not to be understood as if our acts contributed nothing to this; for they contribute by way of preceding dispositions, not however as efficient causes. For God alone is the efficient cause of the acquisition of these virtues; yet, according to His ordinary law, He does not work these virtues in us except either through the Sacraments, as instrumental causes, or with our previous cooperation with His grace; and this in adults is necessary as a dispositive, or meritorious, cause. Trent clearly explains these things.¹

If sometimes natural virtues are said to be infused by nature, this is to be understood: a) of a certain inchoative aptitude for virtue, which aptitude is in the intellect, insofar as it knows the good of virtue, and in the will, insofar as it naturally seeks that good; likewise sometimes in the sensitive appetite, insofar as it is naturally subject to reason; likewise at times in the complexion of certain persons, insofar as this in them resists the good of virtue less. b) Of that aptitude alone, not of the perfection of virtues, as is clear even from this, that what is from nature is determined to one thing, while on the contrary perfect virtues bear themselves in diverse ways, according to the diversity both of the matter about which they are conversant and of the circumstances in which they are exercised.²

Quaer. 4° How are virtues lost?

Resp. They are lost directly and indirectly. - Directly through acts directly and gravely contrary to them, for example Faith through infidelity; or through long non-use, that is, through lasting negligence in exercising them. In this way both acquired and infused virtues are lost, which St. Thomas explains in this manner:³ "When someone does not use the habit of virtue for moderating the passions or proper operations, it is necessary that many passions and operations arise outside the mode of virtue, from the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other things which move exteriorly; whence virtue is corrupted" (lost) "through cessation from act." Indirectly, through the loss of another virtue which is their foundation and principle; and in this way supernatural virtues are lost. Thus, when Faith is lost, Hope is lost; when Charity is lost, all supernatural or infused moral virtues are lost. - I said: supernatural. Hence one sinning mortally, for example by the sin of drunkenness, not only loses the virtue of temperance, but, since Charity, which is lost through any mortal sin whatever, is the foundation of the supernatural virtues, he also loses the supernatural virtues of chastity, humility, etc.; but he would not lose these virtues insofar as they were natural. For natural virtues are not necessarily connected with Charity, as was said in Resp. 2° to Quaer. 1°.

Quaer. 5° How are virtues increased and diminished?

Resp. Since the increase and diminution of virtues signifies nothing other than their greater or lesser perfection, but not an addition or subtraction of them,¹ therefore virtues can be increased only insofar as their acts are exercised more intensely, and diminished insofar as they are exercised more remissly. Yet natural virtues differ from infused virtues in this: that the former can be increased and diminished both as to the intensity of the habit and as to the fervor of the act; the latter, only as to the fervor of the acts, but not as to the intensity of the habit. This is certain if the discussion is of Charity, and it seems it must also be said of the other infused virtues; for although absolutely it is not repugnant for these also to be increased and diminished as to the intensity of the habit, nevertheless in this providence no cause of an increase or diminution of this sort can be assigned. For these virtues are infused together with Charity. Wherefore through mortal sin they are not diminished, but lost; but through venial sin the habit of Charity, or sanctifying grace, is not diminished, as something to which it is not opposed; therefore neither is the habit of the other infused virtues. But since, as has been said, even infused virtues can be diminished as to exercise and fervor of acts, and in this way, as was explained from St. Thomas in Resp. to Quaer. 4°, certain dispositions can be contracted which conduce to their corruption or loss, it is clear that through venial sins, or even through cessation from the acts of Charity, a certain disposition toward the corruption of Charity can be induced.²

If you ask by what means virtues are increased, I answer that both natural and supernatural or infused virtues are increased by the multiplication or frequentation of acts; supernatural virtues principally by the same divine infusion by which they were produced; instrumentally through the Sacraments, especially those of the living; dispositively and meritoriously through good works.

556. Object of the treatise. - Moral theology considers human acts by which man is moved toward God, the supernatural ultimate end: for it is the science concerning human acts in order to God the supernatural end, from revealed principles. Hence it treats of our ultimate end itself, and of the human acts by which we come to the end or beatitude, and of all things which pertain to those acts. Now acts need rules (an exemplar principle) to which they ought to be conformed, namely, both the proximate rule, or conscience, and the remote rule, or laws; and if they are not conformed to these, they are evil and are called sins. But acts also have (efficient) principles from which they are produced: the extrinsic principle is God through grace; the intrinsic principles are the powers and habits. Whence, after the treatises on the end, on human acts in themselves, on conscience, on laws, on sins, - with the doctrine on grace from dogmatic theology and the doctrine on the powers of the soul from psychology being supposed, - there rightly comes the consideration of habits, especially of good habits, the chief of which are virtues.

557. Division of the treatise. - Just as in a human act physical being, moral being, and supernatural being can be distinguished, so also in a habit. Hence the treatise is divided into three parts, and each into four questions.

The first part is on habits according to physical and psychological being, or on habits in general, that is, on their 1. essence, 2. subject, 3. cause, 4. distinction;

the second is on habits according to moral being, or on acquired virtues, that is, on their 1. essence, 2. subject, 3. distinction into intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues, 4. properties: mean, connection, equality, duration;

the third is on habits according to supernatural being and on infused virtues, that is, on their 1. existence and essence, 2. distinction into theological virtues, moral virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit, 3. cause, 4. properties, as above.

558. The treatise is at once theological and philosophical. - The first part is merely philosophical, and provides the notions necessary for understanding the other parts. The third part is wholly theological, as treating of the supernatural element. The second part is at once philosophical, founded upon human reason; and theological, because it is partly confirmed by divine revelation or by the authority of the Church, and is employed as a means for explaining supernatural habits.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, in Quaestiones disputatae de Virtutibus; and I-II, q. 49-70, with the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, and Pegues; also in part Billuart; - Goudin, Philosophia, in Logic and in Moral Philosophy; - Lehu, Philosophia moralis et socialis; - Satolli, De Habitibus; - de Roton, Les Habitus, leur caractere spirituel; - Waffelaert, De Virtutibus Cardinalibus; - Mazzella, Schiffini, and Billot, all of the Society of Jesus, each of whom wrote De Virtutibus Infusis; - Prummer, Th. M. I, n. 437 sq.; - Sertillanges, La Philosophie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin; - Gardair, Les vertus naturelles; - Massoulie, Meditations sur les Vertus; - Janvier, Conf. de N. D.: La Vertu; - Masi, De Virtute Fidei, where an introduction on virtues in general is found.

On virtues, the modern authors of manuals are not accustomed to have many things; they are wholly occupied in distinguishing, numbering, and measuring sins, so that someone rightly said that their moral theology is now nothing but a catalogue or code of sins. And if this is true of the special virtues, it is verified much more of virtues in general. On this argument, for example, St. Alphonsus, Gury, Ballerini, Genicot, Lehmkuhl, and Aertnijs have nothing; Vermeersch almost nothing; Haine few things. But many things are found in Marc, Tanquerey, and Noldin; nevertheless their doctrine is not complete nor always accurate. Better and more completely than all these, Prummer wrote. In the last editions of the work of Aertnijs, Fr. Damen added a good treatise on virtues.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49; Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1.

559. Habit (hexis, hebbelijkheid) is said from the verb to have; whence it signifies the quality or mode by which a thing has itself in this or that way, in itself or toward another. But something can have itself in many ways; whence the signification of the word is restricted to indicating only the first species of quality, that is, the mode by which a thing has itself in order to its nature and consequently to its end, and therefore well or badly; and indeed a perfect and permanent mode, which firmly inheres in the thing and therefore is lost with difficulty: thus it is distinguished from a simple disposition, which is a mode easily lost, by which a thing has itself in order to its nature. Therefore habit is a quality difficult to move, according to which a subject has itself well or badly according to itself or toward another; - or a stable disposition determining the subject to having itself well or badly according to itself or toward operation, in being or in operating.

"Habit," says St. Thomas, C. G. IV, 77, "differs from power in this, that through power we are able to do something, but through habit we are not rendered able to do something, but apt or inapt for doing well or badly that which we can do. Therefore through habit there is not given to us, nor taken away from us, any being able, but through habit we acquire this, that we do something well or badly."

560. Habit is divided a) into good and bad habit, according as it is a mode suitable to nature or not suitable;

b) into substantive or entitative habit, and operative habit, according as it is the mode by which nature has itself well or badly according to itself, as to being, - or by which it has itself well or badly toward another, as to its operation, or by which it is disposed to acting suitably or not suitably to its end.

The first immediately inheres in substance and is ordered principally to being, and not to operating, except mediately insofar as being itself is ordered to operating: such are beauty, health, sickness, and sanctifying grace; - the other immediately inheres in an operative power and therefore is immediately ordered to operation: such are aptitude and inaptitude, science and art, virtue and vice. "Something is disposed well or badly in two ways: namely, according to itself or by relation to something. Thus healthy is that which is well disposed according to itself, but robust is that which is well disposed for doing something." St. Thomas, in V Metaph., lect. 20.

561. Necessity of habits. - That there are operative habits is known by experience: for operations which are very difficult afterward become very easy, as is clear from one who plays the lyre, or dances, or writes, or reads, or studies science, or exercises himself toward temperance or toward drunkenness. - They are necessary in those things which are indifferent: for habit is good or bad; whence nothing has habit except that which can be disposed in several and diverse ways in order either to its nature in itself or to operation. Therefore habits are in those things which 1. are in potency, 2. to many, diverse, and contrary things, and therefore 3. can and ought to be disposed well or badly in several or diverse ways to their nature or operation. These three conditions are required in order that something need a habit. Hence:

1. Habit is not given in God, because in no way is He in potency, but He is His being and His operation, and consequently He can be disposed to nothing beyond Himself.

2. Nor is habit given in powers wholly determined to one thing, because they are sufficiently determined to act and cannot be determined in several ways, nor be more or better or less well disposed; whence the powers of nature do not acquire a habit by their exercise, but always act as much as they can.

3. But habits are in powers which are not wholly determined to one thing, and therefore do not have the whole propensity which they can have toward operation, but can be proportioned to this in diverse ways. Through habit such a power acquires a greater inclination, and thus constancy, facility, and sweetness in performing its acts. This mode becomes as it were connatural to it, and therefore habit is called a second nature.

Whence operative habit can be defined: A quality difficult to move by which man is disposed to operating easily, promptly, and delectably;¹ - or a permanent quality superadded to an operative power, facilitating it and inclining it to operating either well or badly, that is, suitably or not suitably to the end.

¹ It should be noted that infused habits give elevation to the power, but not so great a facility: they confer only the power of acting in higher things and a certain inclination toward them. See below n. 619.

562. Observations. - 1. From the aforesaid definition it follows:

a) that operative habit is the first (proximate) act of a power, and operation is the second act (q. 49, a. 3, ad 1);

b) that habit is a mean between pure operative power (remote first act) and perfect act (operation, second act);

c) that habit does not give to the power that it can operate, but that it operates perfectly, that is, constantly and uniformly, - promptly, easily, and expeditiously, - and delectably (Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1; C. G. IV, 77);

d) that operative habit is found truly and properly in an active power which properly operates; but in a merely passive power through which the active power operates, it is not found except improperly and secondarily, insofar as there is there a rather passive quality by which this power easily serves the active power (q. 50, a. 1).

2. Operative habit, while it inheres in an indifferent power, nevertheless does not completely take away its indifference, nor consequently necessitate it to act; whence St. Thomas says that someone uses a habit when he wills (q. 49, a. 3 sed contra; q. 50, a. 3, ad 2; a. 5).

According to moral being, that is, in order to the ultimate end and the rule of morals, operative habits are good and are virtues, or evil and are vices, according as they are suitable or not suitable to rational nature and its ultimate end.¹ Concerning vices enough has been said in the treatise on sins: for as many sins as there are diverse completed species, so many habits caused from them and inclining to them, or vices, can also be had. Therefore it remains that we speak specially of good habits and virtues.

¹ Moral theology treats of the motion of the rational creature toward God. We approach God by acts of virtues. Therefore virtues pertain per se to moral theology, not to dogmatic theology.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57; De Virt. q. 1, a. 6 and 7.

588. Principle. Five distinct species of intellectual virtues are enumerated:

A. Three are in the speculative intellect, which rests in the contemplation of truth, by which namely it is perfected for knowing truth:

1. The habit of principles, by which it is disposed for knowing first principles, whether speculative, and then it is called simply understanding (nous), or practical, and then it is called synderesis.

2. Science (episteme), by which it is perfected for knowing evident conclusions in some genus of knowable things through their proper causes.

3. Wisdom (sophia), by which it is perfected for knowing conclusions of whatever genus through the highest causes, through which it also judges concerning principles.

B. In the practical intellect, which orders truth to work, there are two, by which it is perfected for directing and regulating human operations:

4. Art (techne), which rules transitive operations by which something is made in exterior matter, such as building, cutting, etc.

5. Prudence (phronesis), which rules operations remaining in the agent himself, such as willing, loving, becoming angry, etc.

Art is defined as right reason of things to be made, which directs the works themselves or effects to be made according to certain rules; prudence, as right reason of things to be done, which directs human acts.

589. In what sense they are virtues. - The first four are virtues in a qualified sense, because they do not incline to acting honorably: for they give only aptitude for operating well, not good use, because this pertains to the appetite, whence the work of art can be morally worst; - on the contrary, prudence, by which human reason is well disposed for ordering human acts in the appetite as means to an honorable end, is a virtue simply so called.

This virtue is most necessary to man. For in order to live honorably, it is not enough that man will some good end (what he is to do), but it is also especially required that he order suitable means to the end (how he is to act). Toward the due end man is disposed in the appetite through moral virtue; but for the means to be ordered suitably to the end, reason, moved by the will, also must be well disposed, which is done through prudence: for to deliberate, judge, and command concerning means precisely to be chosen are acts of reason; but prudence disposes us well to doing these rightly.

590. Corollary. - Hence, although prudence according to essence and by reason of the subject is an intellectual virtue, by reason of the matter, which is an honorable human act, it agrees with the moral virtues. Whence it is numbered among them when they are opposed to the theological virtues.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 58-60; De Virt. q. 1, a. 4, 5, 12.

591. Moral virtue is said from custom, that is, an inclination to acting, which properly belongs to the appetite; whence moral virtue is a habit by which the appetite is well disposed so that it may be conformed to reason. In fact, it is a habitual conformity to right reason. But since to choose is an act proper to the human appetite, hence moral virtue is a habit elective according to right reason, and it is defined by Aristotle, Eth. VI, c. 6: an elective habit consisting in a mean relative to us, determined by reason as the wise man will determine.¹ It is said:

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, in Eth. VI, c. 6, lect. 7.

Virtue, generally, is a habit of acting according to right order. Virtues are distinguished in many ways; for they are 1st. natural or supernatural, according as they are acquired and increased by natural powers, or by the aid of supernatural grace; 2nd. infused or acquired, according as they are infused by God himself, or are acquired by repeated acts of the agent; 3rd. theological or moral, according as they have for their formal object either God immediately, or the honesty of the action.

There are four cardinal moral virtues to which the others are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But since discourse concerning the moral virtues is made here and there throughout this whole Compendium of Moral Theology, here we shall treat specifically of the theological virtues, namely of faith, hope, and charity.

D. Thomas, q. 55.

1. Virtue in its most transcendental sense means the excellence of a thing according to its kind. Thus it is the virtue of the eye to see, and of a horse to be fleet of foot. Vice is a flaw in the make of a thing, going to render it useless for the purpose to which it was ordained. From the ethical standpoint, virtue is a habit that a man has got of doing moral good, or doing that which it befits his rational nature to do: and vice is a habit of doing moral evil. (See c. i., n. 5.) It is important to observe that virtue and vice are not acts but habits. Vices do not make a man guilty, nor do virtues make him innocent. A man is guilty or innocent according to his acts, not according to his habits. A man may do a wicked thing and not be vicious, or a good action and not be virtuous. But no man is vicious who has not done one, two, aye, many wicked things: and to be virtuous, a man must have performed many acts of virtue. Children do right and wrong, but they have neither virtues nor vices except in a nascent state: there has not yet been time in them for the habits to be formed. When sin is taken away by God and pardoned, the vice, that is, the evil habit, if any such existed before, still remains, and constitutes a danger for the future. The habit can only be overcome by watchfulness and a long continuance of contrary acts. But vice is not sin, nor is sin vice, nor a good deed a virtue.

2. The name of virtue is given to certain habits residing in the intellect, as intuition or insight (into self-evident truths), wisdom (regarding conclusions of main application), science (of conclusions in special departments), and art. These are called intellectual virtues.

It was a peculiarity of Socrates' teaching, largely shared by Plato, to make all virtue intellectual, a doctrine expressed in the formula, Virtue is knowledge; which is tantamount to this other, Vice is ignorance, or an erroneous view. From whence the conclusion is inevitable: No evil deed is wilfully done; and therefore, No man is to blame for being wicked.

3. Undoubtedly there is a certain element of ignorance in all vice, and a certain absence of will about every vicious act. There is likewise an intellectual side to all virtue. These positions we willingly concede to the Socratics. Every morally evil act is borne of some voluntary inconsiderateness. The agent is looking the wrong way in the instant at which he does wrong. Either he is regarding only the solicitations of his inferior nature to the neglect of the superior, or he is considering some rational good indeed, but a rational good which, if he would look steadily upon it, he would perceive to be unbefitting for him to choose. No man can do evil in the very instant in which his understanding is considering, above all things else, that which it behoves him specially to consider in the case. Again, in every wrong act, it is not the sheer evil that is willed, but the good through or with the evil. Good, real or supposed, is sought for: evil is accepted as leading to good in the way of means, or annexed thereto as a circumstance. Moreover, no act is virtuous that is elicited quite mechanically, or at the blind instance of passion. To be virtuous, the thing must be done on principle, that is, at the dictate of reason and by the light of intellect.

4. Still, virtue is not knowledge. There are other than intellectual habits needed to complete the character of a virtuous man. "I see the better course and approve it, and follow the worse," said the Roman poet.³ "The evil which I will not, that I do," said the Apostle. It is not enough to have an intellectual discernment of and preference for what is right: but the will must be habituated to embrace it, and the passions too must be habituated to submit and square themselves to right being done. In other words, a virtuous man is made up by the union of enlightened intellect with the moral virtues. The addition is necessary for several reasons.

(a) Ordinarily, the intellect does not necessitate the will. The will, then, needs to be clamped and set by habit to choose the right thing as the intellect proposes it.

(b) Intellect, or Reason, is not absolute in the human constitution. As Aristotle (Pol., I., v., 6) says: "The soul rules the body with a despotic command: but reason rules appetite with a command constitutional and kingly": that is to say, as Aristotle elsewhere (Eth., I., xiii., 15, 16) explains, passion often "fights and resists reason, opposes and contradicts": it has therefore to be bound by ordinances and institutions to follow reason's lead: these institutions are good habits, moral virtues, resident there where passion itself is resident, in the inferior appetite. It is not enough that the rider is competent, but the horse too must be broken in.

(c) It is a saying, that "no mortal is always wise." There are times when reason's utterance is faint from weariness and vexation. Then, unless a man has acquired an almost mechanical habit of obeying reason in the conduct of his will and passions, he will in such a conjuncture act inconsiderately and do wrong. That habit is moral virtue. Moral virtue is as the fly-wheel of an engine, a reservoir of force to carry the machine past the "dead points" in its working. Or again, moral virtue is as discipline to troops suddenly attacked, or hard pressed in the fight. ³ Video meliora proboque,/Deteriora sequor. (Ovid, Metamorph., vii., 21.)

5. Therefore, besides the habits in the intellect that bear the name of intellectual virtues, the virtuous man must possess other habits, as well in the will, that this power may readily embrace what the understanding points out to be good, as in the sensitive appetite in both its parts, concupiscible and irascible, so far forth as appetite is amenable to the control of the will, that it may be so controlled and promptly obey the better guidance. These habits in the will and in the sensitive appetite are called moral virtues, and to them the name of virtue is usually confined.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 71, art. 1, in corp.; ib., q. 58, art. 2; ib., q. 58, art. 3, in corp., ad 3; ib., q. 56, art. 4, in corp., ad 1-3.

1. St. Thomas (1a 2æ, q. 56, art. 3, in corp.)⁴ draws this difference, that an intellectual virtue gives one a facility in doing a good act; but a moral virtue not only gives facility, but makes one put the facility in use. Thus a habit of grammar he says, enables one readily to speak correctly, but does not ensure that one always shall speak correctly, for a grammarian may make solecisms on purpose: whereas a habit of justice not only makes a man prompt and ready to do just deeds, but makes him actually do them. Not that any habit necessitates volition. Habits do not necessitate, but they facilitate the act of the will. (s. i., nn. 1, 2, 8, pp. 64, 68.)

⁴ By doing good St. Thomas means the determination of the appetite, rational or sensitive, to good. He says that intellectual virtue does not prompt this determination of the appetite. Of course it does not: it prompts only the act of the power wherein it resides: now it resides in the intellect, not in the appetite; and it prompts the act of the intellect, which however is cot always followed by an act of appetite in accordance with it.

2. Another distinction may be gathered from St. Thomas (1a 2æ, q. 21, art. 2, ad 2), that the special intellectual habit called art disposes a man to act correctly towards some particular end, but a moral habit towards the common end, scope and purpose of all human life. Thus medical skill ministers to the particular end of healing: while the moral habit of temperance serves the general end, which is final happiness and perfection. So to give a wrong prescription through sheer antecedent ignorance, is to fail as a doctor: but to get drunk wittingly and knowingly is to fail as a man.

3. The grand distinction between intellectual and moral habits seems to be this, that moral habits reside in powers which may act against the dictate of the understanding,—the error of Socrates, noticed above (c. v., s. ii., n. 2, p. 70), lay in supposing that they could not so act: whereas the power which is the seat of the intellectual habits, the understanding, cannot possibly act against itself. Habits dispose the subject to elicit acts of the power wherein they reside. Moral habits induce acts of will and sensitive appetite: intellectual habits, acts of intellect. Will and appetite may act against what the agent knows to be best: but intellect cannot contradict intellect. It cannot judge that to be true and beautiful which it knows to be false and foul. If a musician strikes discords on purpose, or a grammarian makes solecisms wilfully, he is not therein contradicting the intellectual habit within him, for it is the office of such a habit to aid the intellect to judge correctly, and the intellect here does correctly judge the effect produced. On the other hand, if the musician or grammarian blunders, the intellect within him has not been contradicted, seeing that he knew no better: the habit of grammar or music has not been violated, but has failed to cover the case. Therefore the intellectual habit is not a safeguard to keep a man from going against his intelligent self. No such safeguard is needed: the thing is impossible, in the region of pure intellect. In a region where no temptation could enter, intellectual habits would suffice alone of themselves to make a perfectly virtuous man. To avoid evil and choose good, it would be enough to know the one and the other. But in this world seductive reasonings sway the will, and fits of passion the sensitive appetite, prompting the one and the other to rise up and break away from what the intellect knows all along to be the true good of man. Unless moral virtue be there to hold these powers to their allegiance, they will frequently disobey the understanding. Such disobedience is more irrational than any mere intellectual error. In an error purely intellectual, where the will has no part, the objective truth indeed is missed, but the intelligence that dwells within the man is not flouted and gain-sayed. It takes two to make a contradiction as to make a quarrel. But an intellectual error has only one side. The intellect utters some false pronouncement, and there is nothing within the man that says otherwise. In the moral error there is a contradiction within, an intestine quarrel. The intellect pronounces a thing not good, not to be taken, and the sensitive appetite will throw a veil over the face of intellect, and seize upon the thing. That amounts to a contradiction of a man's own intelligent self.

4. It appears that, absolutely speaking, intellectual virtue is the greater perfection of a man: indeed in the act of that virtue, as we have seen, his crowning perfection and happiness lies. But moral virtue is the greater safeguard. The breach of moral virtue is the direr evil. Sin is worse than ignorance, and more against reason, because it is against the doer's own reason. Moral virtue then is more necessary than intellectual in a world where evil is rife, as it is a more vital thing to escape grievous disease than to attain the highest development of strength and beauty. And as disease spoils strength and beauty, not indeed always taking them away, but rendering them valueless, so evil moral habits subvert intellectual virtue, and turn it aside in a wrong direction. The vicious will keeps the intellect from contemplating the objects which are the best good of man: so the contemplation is thrown away on inferior things, often on base things, and an overgrowth of folly ensues on those points whereupon it most imports a man to be wise.

To sum up all in a sentence, not exclusive but dealing with characteristics: the moral virtues are the virtues for this world, intellectual virtue is the virtue of the life to come.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 58, art. 2, in corp.; Ar., Eth., I., xiii., 15-19; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 66, art. 3.

1. Moral virtue is a habit of doing the right thing in the conduct of the will and the government of the passions. Doing right is opposed to overdoing the thing, and to underdoing it. Doing right is taking what it suits a rational nature to desire, and eschewing what is unsuitable under the circumstances. (c. i., n. 5.)

But a thing may be unsuitable in two ways, by excess, and by defect: the rational choice is in the mean between these two. The moral order here is illustrated from the physical. Too much exercise and too little alike impair the strength; so of meat and drink in regard to health; but diet and exercise in moderation, and in proportion to the subject, create, increase, and preserve both health and strength. So it is with temperance, and fortitude, and all varieties of moral virtue. He who fights shy of everything, and never stands his ground, becomes a coward; while he who never fears at all, but walks boldly up to all danger, turns out rash. The enjoyer of every pleasure, who knows not what it is to deny himself aught, is a libertine and loose liver; while to throw over all the graces and delicious things of life, not as St. Paul did, who counted all things dross, that he might gain Christ, but absolutely, as though such things were of themselves devoid of attraction, is boorishness and insensibility. Thus the virtues of temperance and fortitude perish in excess and defect, and live in the mean. It is to be noticed in this illustration that the mean of health is not necessarily the mean of virtue. What is too little food, and too much exercise, for the animal well-being of a man, may be the right amount of both for him in some higher relation, inasmuch as he is more than a mere animal; as for a soldier in a hard campaign, where a sufficiency of food and rest is incompatible with his serving his country's need.

2. The taking of means to an end implies the taking them in moderation, not in excess, or we shall overshoot the mark, nor again so feebly and inadequately as to fall short of it. No mere instrument admits of an unlimited use; but the end to be gained fixes limits to the use of the instrument, thus far, no more, and no less. Wherever then reason requires an end to be gained, it requires a use of means proportionate to the end, not coming short of it, nor going so far beyond as to defeat the purpose in view. The variety of good that is called the Useful lies within definite limits, between two wildernesses, so to speak, stretching out undefined into the distance, wilderness of Excess on the one side, and wilderness of Defect on the other.

3. A true work of art cannot be added to or taken from without spoiling it. A perfect church would be spoiled by a lengthening of the chancel or raising the tower, albeit there are buildings, secular and ecclesiastical, that might be drawn out two miles long and not look any worse. The colouring of a picture must not be too violent and positive; but artistic colouring must be chaste, and artistic utterance gentle, and artistic action calm and indicative of self-command. Not that voice and action should not be impassioned for a great emergency, but the very passion should bear the mark of control: in the great master's phrase, you must not "tear a passion to tatters." It is by moderation sitting upon power that works of art truly masculine and mighty are produced; and by this sign they are marked off from the lower host of things, gorgeous and redundant, and still more from the order of "the loose, the lawless, the exaggerated, the insolent, and the profane."

4. On these considerations Aristotle framed his celebrated definition of moral virtue: the habit of fixing the choice in the golden mean in relation to ourselves, defined by reason, as a prudent man would define it. All virtue is a habit, as we have seen—a habit of doing that which is the proper act of the power wherein the habit resides. One class of moral virtues is resident in the will, the act of which power is properly called choice. The rest of the moral virtues reside in the sensitive appetite, which also may be said to choose that object on which it fastens. Thus moral virtue is a habit of fixing the choice. The golden mean between two extremes of excess and defect respectively has been already explained, and may be further shown by a review of the virtues. Besides fortitude and temperance, already described, liberality is a mean between prodigality and stinginess; magnificence between vulgar display and pettiness: magnanimity between vainglory and pusillanimity; truthfulness between exaggeration and dissimulation; friendship between complaisance, or flattery, and frowardness,—and so of the rest. The golden mean must be taken in relation to ourselves, because in many matters of behaviour and the management of the passions the right amount for one person would be excessive for another, according to varieties of age, sex, station, and disposition. Thus anger that might become a layman might be unbefitting in a churchman; and a man might be thought loquacious if he talked as much as a discreet matron.⁵ The golden mean, then, must be defined by reason according to the particular circumstances of each case. But as Reason herself is to seek where she is not guided by Prudence, the mean of virtue must be defined, not by the reason of the buffoon Pantolabus, or of Nomentanus the spendthrift, but as a prudent man would define it, given an insight into the case.

⁵ Ar., Pol., III., iv., 17, says just the converse, which marks the altered position of woman in modern society.

5. The "golden mean," as Horace named it (Od., ii., 10), obtains principally, if not solely, in living things, and in what appertains to living things, and in objects of art. A lake, as such, has no natural dimensions: it may be ten miles long, it may be a hundred; but an elephant or an oak-tree cannot go beyond a certain growth. There is a vast range between the temperature of a blast-furnace and the temperature of the ice-pack on the Polar Sea, but very limited is the range possible in the blood of a living man. Viewed artistically, a hill may be too low, or a lake want width, for man's eye to rest upon it with perfect satisfaction. The golden mean, then, is an artistic conception, and what I may call an anthropological conception: it suits man, and is required by man, though Nature may spurn and over-ride it. The earthquake, the hurricane, and the angry ocean are not in the golden mean, not at least from a human point of view. If man chooses to personify and body forth the powers of nature, he creates some monstrous uncouth figure, like the Assyrian and Egyptian idols; but if man makes a study of man, and brings genius and patient elaboration to bear on his work, there emerges the symmetry and perfect proportion of the Greek statue. No people ever made so much of the beauty of the human form as the ancient Greeks: they made it the object of a passion that marked their religion, their institutions, their literature, and their art. Their virtues and their vices turned upon it. Hence the golden mean is eminently a Greek conception, a leading idea of the Hellenic race. The Greek hated a thing overdone, a gaudy ornament, a proud title, a fulsome compliment, a high-flown speech, a wordy peroration. Nothing too much was the inscription over the lintel of the national sanctuary at Delphi. It is the surpassing grace of Greek art of the best period, that in it there shines out the highest power, with nothing too much of straining after effect. The study of Greek literary models operates as a corrective to redundancy, and to what ill-conditioned minds take to be fine writing. The Greek artist knew just how far to go, and when to stop. That point he called, in his own unsurpassed tongue, the [Greek: kairos]. "The right measure (kairos) is at the head of all," says Pindar. "Booby, not to have understood by how much the half is more than the whole," is the quaint cry of Hesiod. Aeschylus puts these verses in the mouth of his Furies;

The golden mean is God's delight:
Extremes are hateful in His sight.
Hold by the mean, and glorify
Nor anarchy nor slavery.

Characteristic of Socrates was his irony, or way of understating himself, in protest against the extravagant professions of the Sophists. In the reckoning of the Pythagoreans, the Infinite, the Unlimited, or Unchecked, was marked as evil, in opposition to good, which was the Limited. From thence, Plato, taking up his parable, writes: "The goddess of the Limit, my fair Philebus, seeing insolence and all manner of wickedness breaking loose from all limit in point of gratification and gluttonous greed, established a law and order of limited being; and you say this restraint was the death of pleasure; I say it was the saving of it." Going upon the tradition of his countrymen, upon their art and philosophy, their poetry, eloquence, politics, and inmost sentiment, Aristotle formulated the law of moral virtue, to hold by the golden mean, as discerned by the prudent in view of the present circumstances, between the two extremes of excess and defect.

6. There is only one object on which man may throw himself without reserve, his last end, the adequate object of his happiness, God. God is approached by faith, hope, and charity; but it belongs not to philosophy to speak of these supernatural virtues. There remains to the philosopher the natural virtue of religion, which is a part of justice. Religion has to do with the inward act of veneration and with its outward expression. To the latter the rule of the mean at once applies. Moderation in religion is necessary, so far as externals are concerned. Not that any outward assiduity, pomp, splendour, or costliness, can be too much in itself, or anything like enough, to worship God with, but it may be too much for our limited means, which in this world are drawn on by other calls. But our inward veneration for God and desire to do Him honour, can never be too intense: "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." (Ecclus. xliii. 33.)

7. The rule of the mean, then, is a human rule, for dealing with men, and with human goods considered as means. It is a Greek rule: for the Greeks were of all nations the fondest admirers of man and the things of man. But when we ascend to God, we are out among the immensities and eternities. The vastness of creation, the infinity of the Creator,—there is no mode or measure there. In those heights the Hebrew Psalmist loved to soar. Christianity, with its central dogma of the Incarnation, is the meeting of Hebrew and Greek. That mystery clothes the Lord God of hosts with the measured beauty, grace, and truth, that man can enter into. But enough of this. Enough to show that the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is a highly suggestive and wide-reaching doctrine beyond the sphere of Morals. It throws out one great branch into Art, another into Theology.

8. The vicious extremes, on this side and on that of a virtue, are not always conterminous with the virtue itself, but sometimes another and more excellent virtue intervenes; as in giving we may pass from justice to liberality, and only through passing the bounds of liberality, do we arrive at the vicious extreme of prodigality. So penitential fasting intervenes between temperance in food and undue neglect of sustenance. But it is to be noted that the central virtue, so to speak, as justice, sobriety, chastity, is for all persons on all occasions: the more excellent side-virtue, as liberality, or total abstinence, is for special occasions and special classes of persons.

Readings.—Ar., Eth., II., ii., 6, 7; ib., II., cc. 6-9; Hor., Odes, II., 10; Ruskin, Modern Painters, p. 3, s. i., c. x.

72. Habits are defined as more or less permanent qualities which dispose a faculty to act readily and with ease. A habit results naturally from frequent repetition of the same act. Thus, by constantly restraining the passion of anger, a person gains facility in doing so; or, in other words, he acquires the virtue of meekness. A habit is said to be "a second nature," because though not constituting nature it greatly facilitates certain operations of the natural faculties. Good habits, or those inclining us to do what is morally right, are called virtues; bad habits, or tendencies to what is wrong, are called vices. Brute animals are incapable of moral acts; hence they cannot form moral habits. Their power of imitation or the influence of peculiar circumstances may, it is true, enable them to acquire ways of acting which are not ordinary, which may indeed seem unnatural; as, when a bird is made to pronounce words. The power to act thus may be termed a habit, but, of course, not a moral habit. Man may also acquire habits that are more or less mechanical; but, besides these, he can form moral habits by the frequent repetition of free acts; and in Moral Philosophy we are concerned with only the latter class of habits.

73. Certain habits may be supernaturally infused into the soul, and in no other way can the supernatural virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity be obtained; so that natural acts, though ever so numerous, cannot of themselves produce a supernatural habit. Even natural virtues may be supernaturally infused or strengthened by Almighty God. Philosophy, however, considers only natural virtues and the natural mode of acquiring and developing them, all of which depend on the repetition of virtuous acts.

74. Virtue and vice necessarily imply freedom of action; no one is truly said to be virtuous for doing what he cannot help doing, nor can any one be called vicious for doing what he cannot possibly avoid. Now, freedom is a power belonging peculiarly to man's will; therefore all vices and virtues must, in some manner, be referred to the will. Besides, the will can influence the intellect considerably, not in regard to such judgments as are immediately evident, but in regard to the less immediate conclusions of reasoning. In this way it can so bend the intellect to consider certain motives for action to the exclusion of other motives that, after repeated acts of the same kind, the intellect finds great ease in certain modes of action rather than in others.

The will can also control the sensitive appetites or passions; and, as these are of two kinds, the concupiscible and the irascible, the relation of the passions to the will gives rise to two classes of virtues and vices. Accordingly, the moral virtues are reducible to four heads, called the four cardinal virtues; namely, justice, a habit belonging directly to the will; prudence, dwelling in the intellect; temperance, regulating the concupiscible passions, and fortitude, commanding the irascible passions.

75. I. Justice perfects the will, inclining it to choose always that which tends to our true good and the attainment of our last end. As such it is a general virtue, and includes all the virtues. In a more restricted sense, justice inclines us to give to every one his due — to God by the virtue of religion, to our parents by filial piety, to our benefactors by gratitude. To other men we give their due by acts of what is commonly understood as justice. This, in turn, is of two kinds: commutative justice, by which we give to other men quid pro quo, i.e., an exact equivalent in return for what they give us; distributive justice, a virtue of the ruler, by which he distributes the honors, rewards, burdens, etc., of the community according to the merits and conditions of his subjects.

76. II. Prudence perfects the intellect, directing it to discern on all occasions what is best suited for the attainment of our last end. Thus defined, prudence is a general virtue, which includes: (a) Clear-sightedness, or a quick, accurate perception of the true value of means to an end; (b) Caution, which bids us take time to notice difficulties and to provide against them; (c) Self-distrust which disposes us to examine matters with care, and to accept the advice of others, especially if our own case is in question.

77. When clear-sightedness is perverted to the attaining of a morally bad end, it degenerates into the vice of craftiness or cunning; when carried to excess, caution becomes timidity, self-distrust turns into pusillanimity, and docility is changed into simplicity. In these, as in other matters, it is the part of prudence to indicate the proper mean, or middle course between excess and defect — "virtus in medio," "virtue holds the middle course" — the golden mean between too much and too little. "Avoid extremes" is an important maxim in moral conduct.

78. III. Temperance governs the sensible appetites in the use of things that especially attract them — namely, sensible pleasures. The will can restrain these appetites and accustom them to follow the guidance of reason. When this is brought about, they are said to be well ordered, and as such they contribute to man's perfection. The virtue of temperance does not consist in an entire abstinence from what the sensible appetites crave, but rather in the golden mean of moderate use. A higher degree of restraint belongs to the virtue of mortification. Still, the golden mean of temperance cannot be kept perfectly without constant checks upon the cravings of the passions — that is, without sometimes practising mortification by denying ourselves allowable pleasures. Concupiscence is like a fiery horse, which must be early broken in and controlled ever afterwards with a firm hand.

79. IV. Fortitude is the virtue by which the will commands the irascible passions to attempt what is lofty, though the means are arduous and even perilous, and to bear evils with composure. It thus embraces courage and patience. To attempt what is lofty is magnanimous; to contemn difficulties in the way is brave. Cowardice is the absence of fortitude; but fortitude, when carried to excess, i.e., beyond the bounds prescribed by prudence, grows into rashness. Thus, fortitude, like other virtues, must adhere to the golden mean. In this or that person, each of these four virtues may have different degrees of strength; nevertheless, no virtue can be perfect without the companionship of the others.