Part — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Treatise III. On Those Things which Dispose Toward Human Acts, or on Habits
I. The name habit is said to be derived from the verb to have, insofar as by this verb is indicated the manner in which something has itself in itself, either well or badly. A habit can be defined: A quality stable of itself, by which a subject is disposed well or badly, either according to itself or in order to operation. It is said:
A quality stable of itself, i.e., a quality by its nature difficult to move, since its subject is of the immaterial order; and thus it is distinguished from a disposition, "to which it belongs according to its proper nature that it be easily lost, because it has a changeable cause, as sickness and health do" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3).
By which a subject is disposed well or badly, i.e., according as the subject has a certain mode either fitting or unfitting to its nature.
Either according to itself or in order to operation, i.e., either according to its essence, and it is called an entitative habit; or according to its powers, and it is called an operative habit (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49).
II. In what follows we shall discuss only operative habits. But since the things to be said about the habits of virtues are easily applied to habit as such, it is pleasing to abstain here from further investigation of habit, but to insert it into those things which we shall present concerning virtues in general. And thus it will happen that we avoid saying the same things twice, and that we bring greater light to the virtues themselves.
Moreover, there will not be a special discussion of bad habits, partly because enough has been said about them above, and partly again because many things to be said about the habits of virtues are easily applied to bad habits.
III. Good operative habits are virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Hence:
Within this part
Dissertation I. On Virtuesnn. 334–468
Part I. On Virtues in Generalnn. 334–351
- Section I. On the Notion, Object, Division, and Specific Distinction of Virtuesnn. 334–337
- Section II. On the Subject of Inherence of Virtuesn. 338
- Section III. On the Origin of Virtuesnn. 339–340
- Section IV. On the Increase of Virtues and on their Diminution and Destructionnn. 341–343
- Section V. On the Permanence of Virtues After This Lifenn. 344–346
Part II. On Virtues in Particularnn. 352–468
Section I. On Theological Virtuesnn. 352–366
- Chapter I. On Theological Virtues in Generalnn. 352–353
Section II. On Supernatural Moral Virtuesnn. 367–468
- Chapter I. On Supernatural Moral Virtues in Generalnn. 367–370
Chapter II. On Supernatural Moral Virtues in Particularnn. 371–468
- Article I. On Prudencenn. 371–376
Article II. On Justicenn. 377–415
- § I. On Justice in Generalnn. 377–379
- § II. On the Subjective and Integral Parts of Justicenn. 380–383
§ III. On the Potential Parts of Justicenn. 384–415
- Point I. On Religionnn. 385–388
- Point II. On Penancenn. 389–393
- Point III. On Pietynn. 394–396
- Point IV. On Observancenn. 397–400
- Point V. On Truthnn. 401–403
- Point VI. On Gratitudenn. 404–406
- Point VII. On Vindicationnn. 407–409
- Point VIII. On Liberalitynn. 410–412
- Point IX. On Affabilitynn. 413–415
Article III. On Fortitudenn. 416–431
- § I. On Fortitude Itselfnn. 416–418
§ II. On the Parts of Fortitudenn. 419–431
- Point I. On Magnanimitynn. 420–422
- Point II. On Magnificencenn. 423–425
- Point III. On Patiencenn. 426–428
- Point IV. On Perseverancenn. 429–431
Article IV. On Temperancenn. 432–468
- § I. On Temperance in Generalnn. 432–434
§ II. On the Subjective Parts of Temperancenn. 435–444
- Point I. On Abstinencenn. 435–437
- Point II. On Sobrietynn. 438–440
- Point III. On Chastitynn. 441–444
- § III. On the Integral Parts of Temperancen. 445
§ IV. On the Potential Parts of Temperancenn. 446–468
- Point I. On Meeknessnn. 447–449
- Point II. On Clemencynn. 450–452
Point III. On Modestynn. 453–468
- I. On Humilitynn. 454–456
- II. On Studiositynn. 457–459
- III. On Modesty of Conductnn. 460–462
- IV. On Eutrapelynn. 463–465
- V. On Modesty of Attirenn. 466–468