Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Section IV. On the Increase of Virtues and on their Diminution and Destruction
Virtues, whether acquired or infused, are not immutable, but can either be increased, diminished, or destroyed; therefore we shall say something briefly about each of these.
I. Increase of Virtues. 1. Notion. The increase of some habit or quality is either extensive or intensive. Extensive increase is taken in order either to the parts of the subject in which it exists, as, for example, when heat in the hand is extended to the feet; or to the parts of the object, as, for example, when knowledge is extended from fifty conclusions to sixty. Intensive increase is taken in order to the same indivisible subject. Now, speaking of the increase of virtues, we intend intensive increase. Concerning the essence of this intensive increase, authors do not agree, and there are chiefly two opinions about it. Suarez with his followers explains the essence of the intensive increase of some habit by the addition of degree to degree; some think these degrees are of the same nature, others of a different nature. But in this opinion it is difficult to preserve the simplicity of an immaterial habit. Hence the opinion which is that of St. Thomas and his school seems much more reasonable; according to them, the increase of a habit takes place through the greater rooting in the subject of the same form produced from the beginning: "It must be said that the infusion of charity imports a change according to having charity and not having it; and therefore something must arrive which was not there before. But the increase of charity imports a change according to more and less, and therefore it is not necessary that something be present which was not present before, but that what was previously present less be present more" (St. Thomas, De virtutibus in communi, aa. 11 and 12; I-II, q. 52).
- Mode. Just as there is one origin of natural virtues and another of supernatural virtues, so also the mode of their increase is diverse.
a) Natural virtues are increased by acts whose "intensity is proportionally equal to the intensity of the habit, or even exceeds it... But if the intensity of the act proportionally falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to the increase of the habit, but rather to its diminution" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3).
b) Supernatural virtues are increased by God alone, and indeed by reason of the increase of sanctifying grace, from which infused virtues more probably physically emanate. Therefore, because the just man by each individual supernatural good work done in God's service certainly merits a right to an increase of sanctifying grace, even if the works are of less intensity than the habit of virtue, and more probably also gains an actual increase, therefore he also certainly merits a right to an increase of supernatural virtues, and more probably also an actual increase of them. This increase is added not only to the virtue by whose help the good work was placed, but equally to all infused virtues, both theological and moral. Hence just as all are infused together with sanctifying grace, so together with the increase of this grace all are increased. It does not stand in the way of this doctrine that in various saints certain virtues shine externally more than others. For this arises either from greater habituation in eliciting acts of such virtues, or from a better disposition of nature, or finally from the grace of the Holy Spirit, who divides to each as He wills and impels toward more frequent operations of such virtues (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3).
It should be noted that by the repetition of supernatural acts in a just agent, besides the increase of supernatural virtues by reason of the increase of sanctifying grace, there also arises a certain natural habit with respect to those determined acts; this habit, or acquired faculty of acting, destroys the opposite natural habit and assists the agent by removing difficulties.
II. Diminution of Virtues. 1. Natural virtues are diminished directly and indirectly. Directly, by placing acts contrary to the virtues, by which, as is clear, the stability of the disposition is diminished; indirectly, by ceasing from act. For St. Thomas says: "When someone does not use the habit of virtue for moderating his passions or proper operations, it is necessary that many passions and operations arise beyond the mode of virtue, from the inclination of the sensitive appetite and from other things which move externally; whence virtue is corrupted or diminished through cessation from act" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3). Indeed, as we noted above, acts less intense than the habit already in some measure dispose to diminution.
- Supernatural virtues are not diminished directly but only indirectly. Not directly, for this diminution would occur either effectively, through contrary acts; which cannot happen, since a thing is made and diminished by the same one, and therefore God alone could effect this; or it would occur on account of demerit; which also cannot happen, since mortal sin removes the infused virtues to which it is contrary, while venial sin is not a demeritorious cause of the diminution of grace, and therefore not of virtues either. Nevertheless they are diminished indirectly, insofar as the acts of infused virtues are neglected, by which negligence, because of rising passions, man is disposed to mortal sin, by which the infused virtues to which it is contrary are removed. Hence St. Alphonsus rightly says, "Each virtue lives by its acts" (II, 6).
III. Destruction of Virtues. 1. Natural virtues are destroyed directly and indirectly. Directly, by the repetition of acts which are contrary to the virtues, and by which there arise bad habits which destroy the opposed good habits. Indirectly, in the same way as was said above concerning diminution.
- With regard to supernatural virtues a distinction must be made:
a) The virtue of charity and all moral virtues are destroyed by any mortal sin whatever. With respect to charity this is clear from the contrary opposition which exists between charity and any mortal sin whatever. For charity is a union of friendship, by which man is actually turned or habitually turned toward God as the ultimate end; mortal sin actually and habitually turns man away from God as the ultimate end. As regards supernatural moral virtues, they are habits which regard intermediate ends, or ends which necessarily involve a relation to the ultimate supernatural end; therefore, when the habitual supernatural relation to the ultimate supernatural end has been lost, habitual supernatural relations to intermediate ends cannot remain.
b) The said reason of destruction, which is present in any mortal sin, does not touch the supernatural virtues of faith and hope; therefore these virtues are not destroyed by every mortal sin, but only by sins directly or indirectly contrary to them: faith, namely, by the sin of heresy; hope by the sin of despair, heresy, and presumption joined with heresy or infidelity (nn. 357, 362). With regard to faith this is clear from the Council of Trent;1 with regard to hope theologians commonly deduce it from the analogy of faith and hope (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 4).