Vows

Personal sacrilege is committed in three ways:

(a) By violating the privilege of the canon, by which it is forbidden under pain of excommunication to lay violent hands on the clergy or on religious (Can. 2343).

(b) By violating the privilege of the immunity of the clergy from civil jurisdiction, as far as this is still in force (Can. 120).

(c) When persons consecrated to God by the vow of chastity violate their vows. Such persons are all those who are in sacred orders, and all religious who take public vows even though they be simple and not solemn. All sins, therefore, against purity, whether internal or external, which these persons commit, or which others commit with them, are sacrileges. It is a disputed point among theologians whether a private vow of chastity makes the person sacred, so that sins committed against the vow are sacrilegious. Both opinions are extrinsically probable, though the negative view seems more in accordance with what was said above, in keeping with the common teaching of divines. The question is not of great practical importance, since sins committed against chastity by those who are under a private vow have certainly a twofold malice, one against chastity, and the other against religion; and sins against religion are called sacrileges in a wide sense,

Vol. I, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Chapter IV. Vows

A vow is a promise made to God about something which is good, possible, and better than its omission.

It is, then, a promise, a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of a new obligation which binds the conscience; and in this it differs from a mere purpose to do better, which imposes no new and special obligation. Such an act must be perfectly human, performed with full knowledge and with complete use of reason, so that a vow taken by a man who was half drunk, or who had not the full use of reason, would not be valid. A vow, however, does not require actual and explicit consent when the obligation is assumed; it will be sufficient if there is virtual and implicit consent. A person who receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows that the Church has annexed a solemn vow of chastity, takes the vow by the very fact of being ordained, though at the time he is not thinking of it.

A vow in the strict sense is an act of divine worship offered to God alone, and so we cannot take a vow to the Blessed Virgin Mary or to the saints.

The matter of a vow must, of course, be something which is lawful and good; it would be an insult to God to promise him to do something wrong. It must be something which is possible, both physically and morally, for there can be no obligation to do what is impossible. A vow, then, to avoid all sin, even the slightest, would be invalid, for without a special privilege of God it is impossible. The matter of a vow must not only be good, but better than its omission or its opposite. For what is promised to God in a special manner and under a fresh obligation must be something that will be pleasing to him, but a promise to do something which had better not be done cannot be pleasing to God, who desires our perfection.

A vow is absolute when it has no condition attached to it, otherwise it is conditional.

A personal vow makes a promise of some action to be performed; a real vow dedicates a thing to God.

Vows are perpetual if the obligation is undertaken for life; otherwise they are temporary.

A solemn vow is one which is invested by the Church with special force and stability, together with certain legal effects; others are simple. The vows taken by religious in regular orders specially approved by the Pope, and by those who receive sacred orders, are solemn.

Substantial mistake about the matter of a vow or about the circumstances which are regarded as entering into the substance of the matter invalidates a vow. For substantial mistake hinders consent of the will; consent was given to something which was not there, and so there was no contract. A vow, then, dedicating to God a chalice which is thought to be silver, while in reality it is gold, would be invalid, just as a sale of it would be under the same mistake. Merely accidental mistake about things of little moment which were not really the motive for taking a vow does not invalidate it. However, according to St Alphonsus,¹ it is a probable opinion that a mistake about something connected with a vow, which if it had been known before would have prevented its being taken, is sufficient to invalidate it. This doctrine may be applied to private vows, but it cannot be extended to the vows of religion, which place the religious in a permanent state of life. In order to invalidate these, mistake must be substantial. For just as the perpetuity of the state of marriage, the good of the parties concerned, and the public good, require that only substantial mistake should invalidate marriage, so for the same reasons only substantial mistake invalidates the vows of religion, by which the religious enters into mystical espousals with Christ.

Fear arising from natural causes, provided that it does not take away the use of reason, does not invalidate a vow. If, however, grave fear be unjustly caused with a view to compelling another to take a vow, the vow is null and void (Can. 1307). The same is probably true even if the fear be slight. For God cannot be supposed to accept a promise which has not been freely given, but on the contrary extorted by unjust violence,

¹ Theol. Mor., 3, n. 226.

A vow, as we have seen, imposes a special obligation on him who has taken it to perform what he has promised: “ If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him: but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it.¹ If a special time was fixed for the fulfilment of the vow, with the intention that it should be fulfilled then, and at no other time, it must be fulfilled at the time appointed under pain of sin, and it no longer binds after the time has elapsed. If, on the contrary, it was intended that it should continue to bind even after the time fixed had elapsed, then the obligation still remains, The obligation should be fulfilled at the proper and reasonable time, and unreasonable delay will be sinful: ‘‘ When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... . And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”² It is not clear, however, whether even notable delay in the execution of a vow is always mortally sinful. Notable delay without just cause would be a mortal sin if the obligation of the vow were grave, and if the delay endangered its execution altogether or made the matter of the vow notably less than was promised. On the other hand, if a rich man vowed to give a large sum of money to the poor, assigning no particular time for the execution of the vow, it is probable that he would not commit a grave sin, even if he deferred giving the money until his death, and then gave it by his will. For in these circumstances the matter of the vow is not seriously affected by the delay, which therefore cannot be a grave sin.

The measure of the obligation of a vow is the will of him who takes it, much in the same way as the obligation of a law depends on the will of the lawgiver. Ordinarily it will be presumed that in grave matter, such as the Church considers to be sufficient for a precept to bind under mortal sin, a vow also binds under pain of grave sin, for the intention of him who took the vow is presumed to accommodate itself to the matter. Nothing, however, prevents him from limiting the obligation of a vow even in grave matter, so that transgressions of it will be only venial sins, if he expressly intended it. This, however, must not be understood of the essential vows of religion, nor of the solemn vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders. These vows are regulated by the Church, and according to her intention they bind under pain of grave sin in grave matter. Another exception must be made to the general rule that the obligation of a vow depends on the will of him who takes it; for if the matter be light it cannot form the ground for a grave moral obligation, when this is imposed by a human will. As a contract binds only the parties who agree to it, so no one can be bound by a vow made by someone else. In former times it was not uncommon for parents to vow a child to religion. Such a vow put no obligation on the child, but the parents were bound by it to give the child the opportunity of entering religion if he desired to do so. There are also instances of communities who have jointly taken a vow to observe a certain day as a fast or a feast. Thus the Romans, in the year 1703, vowed to observe as a fast day the vigil of the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary in thanksgiving for being preserved from an earthquake. The successors of those who took such a vow are bound to fulfil it, much in the same way as they are bound to pay interest on the National Debt. Their predecessors had the power to bind themselves and their successors, for the community remains the same moral entity.

We saw above that the matter of a vow must be something which is physically and morally possible. It may happen that he who took the vow may be able to fulfil it in part only and not wholly. He will be bound to do at least this when the matter is capable of being divided and is usually so treated, for the obligation of the vow then falls on the whole and on its several parts. Otherwise he will not be bound, nor will he be bound to do something which was a mere accessory of the substance of the vow, even if it be possible. And so one who should vow to fast for a week, if he found this impossible, would not be excused from fasting on the days that he could do so. But if he had vowed to build and decorate a church and afterwards found this to be impossible, he would not be bound to build a portion of it, nor to decorate some other church.

¹ Eccles. v 3.

² Deut. xxiii 21.

A vow may cease to bind for intrinsic or for extrinsic reasons. It will cease to bind intrinsically if the matter cease to be a better good or become impossible. Thus if a young man had vowed to enter religion, but his parents afterward became dependent on him so that he could not leave them without a violation of duty, his vow would cease to bind as long as the same conditions lasted. Or if a wealthy man vowed to spend a considerable sum of money in charities every year, if he became poor his vow would no longer bind him. And generally a vow, like any other promise, will cease to bind if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken. A vow ceases to bind extrinsically if it is annulled or dispensed or commuted. We will treat of these extrinsic causes of the cessation of a vow in the following paragraphs.

The annulment of a vow may be direct or indirect, By direct annulment the obligation of a vow is altogether removed by one who has authority over the will of the person who took the vow. For those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground (Can. 1312).

By indirect annulment the obligation is suspended by one who has authority over the matter of the vow. For it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of someone else. And so if a servant took a vow to hear Mass every morning, her mistress, whose rights are infringed thereby, might suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the servant remains with her, for no service is rendered to God by injuring a fellow-creature. When the term of service expired, the obligation of the vow would revive.

The annulment of a vow will be valid even when it is done without just cause and against the will of the subject, for even then a condition is wanting on which the validity of the vow depended. It will be lawful as well, if there be a reasonable cause, which need not necessarily be a very serious one.

All religious superiors can directly annul the vows taken by their subjects after their religious profession, and indirectly the vows taken by them previously, as far as they prejudice religious discipline or the rights of superiors. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—the essential vows of religion by the taking of which a person becomes a religious—cannot be annulled; for it is only by them that religious superiors receive their authority over the wills of their subjects, and authority is powerless against its own source.

Parents can directly annul the vows of their children taken before the age of puberty, when children become independent of the authority of their parents in matters relating to the service of God. They can indirectly annul the vows of their adult children as long as they continue to live with them.

A husband can directly annul the vows of his wife taken after marriage, and indirectly those taken previously. A wife can annul the vows of her husband only indirectly, as far as they prejudice her rights.

A dispensation from a vow is a remission of the vow made in the name of God for a just cause by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. The Church has always understood that the power to dispense vows is contained in the authority granted by our Lord to his Church.¹ She exercises this power in the name of God, not arbitrarily, but for just cause, which is required not merely for the lawfulness, but also for the validity of the act. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken without sufficient deliberation or in immature age.

The power of dispensing vows belongs to the public authority granted by God to the Church in order that she may rule and legislate for her people. It does not belong to the power of remitting sins which is exercised in the sacrament of Penance. All ecclesiastical prelates, then, who exercise jurisdiction in the external forum in their own name can dispense from vows, except in so far as their authority has been limited by a superior. Other ecclesiastics can only dispense from vows by delegated authority and according to its terms and conditions, (a) The Pope can for just cause dispense any of the faithful from any vow.

(b) For a good reason and provided that the dispensation does not injure the rights of others, local Ordinaries can dispense their subjects and also strangers from private vows which are not reserved to the Holy See. The only private vows which are now reserved to the Holy See are a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and a vow of entering into a religion of solemn vows, if they were taken absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309, 1313).

(c) Prelates of Religious Orders have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over their own subjects, and as a general rule have the same power over these as a Bishop has over his subjects. Besides, they receive by their privileges ample delegated authority to dispense not only their own subjects, but seculars and lay people as well. The privileges granted to the respective Orders should be consulted concerning this special authority and the conditions of its exercise.

(d) Parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum, and can only dispense from vows by delegated authority. They should consult their faculties to know what powers they have received from their Bishop, When a vow has been made in favour of a third person and accepted by him, such a vow cannot lawfully be dispensed without his consent, otherwise justice would be violated. And so, although a Bishop has power to dispense members of diocesan congregations from the vows of religion, he cannot do this lawfully without the knowledge and consent of the superiors of the Order.² The religious vows of congregations which have in any way been approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Pope.

The vow of chastity imposes a serious and arduous obligation which should not be undertaken without mature deliberation and knowledge of one’s own strength. A confessor should be slow to approve of such a vow being taken, especially if it is to be perpetual. When there is just cause for a dispensation being granted, it is the practice of the Church to commute, rather than altogether to dispense, a perpetual vow of chastity. This practice, though not of obligation, should be adhered to by those who have authority to dispense from this vow. It may be commuted into the obligation of receiving the sacraments at least once a month, saying the rosary every day, or other works of piety.

¹ Matt. xvin 18.

² Constitution of Leo XIII, Conditae, December 8, 1900.

A vow is commuted when another good work to be performed under the same obligation is substituted for that which was promised.

All who can dispense from a vow can also commute it, for the less is contained in the greater. It is obvious, however, that it must not be done to the injury of a third person. person who is under vow may commute it into some The good work which is evidently better than what was promised, for, as the rule of canon law has it, he does not violate his promise who changes it into something better (Can. 1314). He may also commute his vow into something that is of equal merit; but to avoid the danger of self-deception, and because it is not easy to say when good works are of equal merit, it is better to have recourse to one’s confessor. Special authority is required to commute a vow into something which is less good, for such a commutation is a sort of dispensation from the vow. In order that commutation into something which is less good may be lawful, a just cause is required, though less than is required for dispensation; probably, however, if there be no just cause the commutation will be valid, but the obligation will remain of supplying the deficiency as in human transactions. No special cause is required for commuting a vow into something which is evidently better; greater readiness in fulfilling one’s obligation will be a sufficient cause for commuting a vow into something of equal merit.

One whose vow has been commuted is always at liberty to return if he pleases to the observance of his vow, for the commutation was made in his favour, and he may renounce it.

When a vow has been commuted by competent authority its obligation is extinguished or transferred to the new work, and it does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, in case the performance of the substituted work is impossible, the original obligation revives.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter I. Nature of the Religious State

WE learn from the Gospels that, besides the ordinary way of the Commandments to be followed by all who wish to save their souls, our Lord proposed the way of perfection to the select few who wished to follow him more closely.¹1 This way of perfection consists in renouncing the goods of this world and the cares of family life, and following our Lord’s example of perfect obedience to the will of our heavenly Father. From the first ages of the Christian Church there were many who accepted our Lord’s invitation and lived in voluntary poverty and chastity. Comparatively few historical documents of the earliest centuries of the Christian era have survived, but we find traces of a body of ascetics and virgins to whom a place of special honour was assigned in the Church. At first they seem to have lived in the bosom of their families, but soon they fled to the deserts of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, and for guidance and encouragement put themselves under the rule of some experienced hermit. Nothing was then wanting to the essence of the religious state except vows and a rule. When the counsels of perfection began to be practised under vow cannot be determined exactly; the first formal religious rules are the work of St Basil and St Benedict. Thus in its essence the religious state has been instituted by Jesus Christ, and, as historically evolved under the guidance of his Church, it may be defined as a fixed and stable way of life approved by the Church for the faithful who, under a certain rule and a common way of living, wish to aim at perfection by the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with the entire surrender of one’s self to God. Thus those who devote themselves to works of piety and charity without vows, or with only private vows, are not in the religious state, nor are they technically called religious. They want the necessary stability. This stability is given by the profession of public vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the chief of the counsels of the Gospel, by which a person renounces the attractions of this world which draw so many away from God, in order to give himself wholly and entirely without let or hindrance to the love and service of God. The Church has always watched over and fostered the practice of religious life. In the thirteenth century there was danger of the great variety of religious orders causing confusion, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran forbade any new orders to be founded. The practical effect of this law was to prohibit new orders without the approbation of the Holy See. It is still in force as regards orders with solemn vows, which cannot be founded without the special approbation of the Pope. According to the new Code, bishops, but not Vicars Capitular or Vicars General, can found religious congregations with simple vows, but they are forbidden to found them or allow them to be founded without consulting the Holy See. If there is question of founding tertiaries living in common, the leave is also required of the General of the first order to which the tertiaries are to be affiliated (Can. 492).

A religious congregation founded by a bishop may in process of time acquire houses in other dioceses, but it remains diocesan and is wholly subject to the local Ordinaries, according to law, until it obtains a decree of the Holy See in praise of its end and scope, or one of formal approbation.

The end of religious life is perfect union with God, in which man’s perfection consists, and this union the religious disposes himself for by the constant practice of works of sublime charity and of renunciation of all that could be an obstacle to charity. Thus the religious state is the state of perfection; not that religious are supposed to be already perfect, but because perfection of Christian charity is the end aimed at, and suitable means are furnished therein for obtaining that end.

¹ Matt. xix.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter IV. Religious Poverty

Poverty in general is the want of temporal goods that have a money value. It is not a virtue of itself, but rather a physical defect, for a suitable provision of temporal goods is very useful and necessary for men to lead a decent life. Poor human nature, however, is inclined to attach itself too much to wealth, and for the sake of wealth to forget why man was created by God and placed in this world. Jesus Christ taught that detachment from worldly possessions was a necessary condition for being his disciple: “‘ Every one of you that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple.”¹ And for such as were not content to follow him in the ordinary way of the observance of the Commandments, but aimed at perfection, he proposed not only detachment from wealth or spiritual poverty, but actual poverty, the actual renunciation of wealth for his sake in order to imitate him more closely: “ If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me.² Hence voluntary poverty in imitation of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the religious state. Voluntary poverty, however, does not constitute the essence of religious perfection; all Christian perfection consists in charity, to which poverty is but a means. Hence there is not an absolute and uniform standard of religious poverty, but it varies with the different ends which religious orders propose to themselves. Indeed, religious poverty is personal; it is the voluntary renunciation of personal and individual wealth, so that the love of wealth may not be an obstacle to the perfect following of Christ. Its essence consists in the renunciation of personal and independent ownership and use of property, for this it is which constitutes a snare for men’s affections and a hindrance to perfection, So that religious poverty does not of itself prevent property being owned in common by religious, and if the end for which an order was founded requires it, there is nothing to prevent it having large possessions in common, provided that the individual religious practises poverty and is imbued with its spirit.

The effects of the vow of poverty depend to a great extent on the rules and constitutions of the various religious orders and on the positive law of the Church. The chief distinction is that between solemn and simple vows of poverty, due to positive ecclesiastical law. The legal effects of a solemn vow of poverty are to render the religious incapable of individual and personal ownership of any property that has money value. So that after taking a solemn vow of poverty the religious cannot own any property in his own personal right. As a member of a religious community he may be a joint owner of vast possessiens, but individually he is incapable of having anything as his own.

Ownership may be absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership is the moral right to dispose of property and of all its uses for one’s own advantage. Qualified ownership is the right to dispose of the property or of its uses for one’s own advantage. Divines call the qualified ownership of the thing itself direct ownership, and the qualified ownership of its uses they call indirect ownership. A religious, even though solemnly professed, retains his personal rights to life, good name, and honour; he can still dispose of his personal actions, such as the celebration of Mass, and such personal rights as that of presenting to a benefice; he may own a relic and dispose of it by gift, for it has no money value. As a solemnly professed religious is incapable of owning property in his own right, so he cannot acquire it for himself; whatever he gains by his labour, or whatever comes to him by gift or inheritance, becomes the property of the community to which he belongs; “ whatever a monk acquires he acquires not for himself, but for his monastery,” as the old adage had it. By the special constitutions of their respective orders, Capuchins, Observantines, and professed Jesuits cannot take property, even in the name and for the benefit of the community to which they belong, if it come to them by any hereditary title or by operation of law. They may, however, take gifts and legacies, and these become the property of their communities (Can. 582).

The simple vow of poverty does not deprive the religious of the direct, but of the indirect, ownership of property; so that he cannot lawfully use or dispose of anything that has a money value without the leave of his superior. Notwithstanding, then, the simple vow of poverty, religious retain the direct ownership of all the property that they had before profession, and of all that comes to them afterwards by any legal title or gift.

Several Canons of the new Code affect the matter of religious poverty. By Canon 568, if during the novitiate a novice in any way whatever renounces his benefices or his property or encumbers them, such a renunciation or encumbrance is not only illicit but also null and void.

Canon 569 prescribes: Sec. i. Before the profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must cede, for the whole period during which he will be bound by simple vows, the administration of his property to whomsoever he wishes, and dispose freely of its use.and usufruct, unless the constitutions determine otherwise.

Sec. ii. If the novice, because he possessed no property, omitted to make this cession, and if subsequently property come into his possession, or if, after making the provision, he becomes under whatever title the possessor of other property, he must make provision, according to the regulations of Sec. i, for the newly acquired property, even if he has already made simple profession.

Sec. iii. In every religious congregation the novice, before making profession of temporary vows, shall freely make a will of all the property he actually possesses or may subsequently possess, While safeguarding this latter canon, Canon 580 prescribes that all those who have made profession of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless the constitutions declare otherwise, retain the ownership of their property and the capacity to acquire other property. But whatever the religious acquires by his own industry or in respect of his institute, belongs to the institute.

As regards the cession or disposition of property treated of in Canon 569, sec. 2, the professed religious can modify the arrangement, not, however, of his own free choice unless the constitutions allow it, but with the permission of the Superior General, or, in the case of nuns, of the local Ordinary, as well as with that of the Regular Superior if the monastery be subject to regulars; the modification, however, must not be made, at least for any considerable part of the property, in favour of the institute; in the case of withdrawal from the institute this cession and disposition ceases to have effect.

Except within sixty days preceding the solemn profession, the professed of simple vows cannot validly renounce his property, but within this time, he must, saving special indults from the Holy See, renounce in favour of whomsoever he wishes all the property which he actually possesses on condition of his profession subsequently taking place. 47 The profession having been made, the necessary measures must be immediately taken to insure that the renunciation be effective also according to the civil law (Can. 581).

‘After profession of solemn vows, likewise without prejudice to special indults of the Apostolic See, all the property which comes in whatever manner to a regular— (1) In an order capable of ownership, goes to the order, to the province, or to the house, according to the constitutions: (2) In an order incapable of ownership, such as the Capuchins, it becomes the property of the Holy See (Can. 582).

Those who have made profession of simple vows in any religious congregation: (1) May not abdicate gratuitously the dominion over their property per actum inter vivos. This phrase is technical, and signifies any way of disposing of property except by will. So that after profession of simple vows the professed cannot lawfully make a gift of his property to anyone.

(2) May not alter the will made according to the terms of Canon 569, sec. 3, without the permission of the Holy See, or if the case be urgent and time does not admit of recourse to the Holy See, without the permission of the higher superior, or, if recourse cannot be had to him either, without the permission of the local superior (Can. 583).

Within the limits indicated above, a religious, with the leave of his superior, may lawfully use and dispose of property. In order to justify such use and to excuse it from sin against the vow, the presumed leave of the superior is sufficient, which consists in a reasonably founded judgement that the act contemplated is not against the superior’s wish. Much more will the actual, virtual, or tacit leave of the superior excuse an act of ownership on the part of a religious and prevent it from being a violation of the vow.

¹ Luke xiv 33.

² Matt. xix 21.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter V. Vow of Chastity

THE Catholic Church, following the teaching and example of our Lord and of St Paul, esteems very highly the beautiful virtue of chastity. According to her teaching, the state of marriage is indeed good, and Jesus Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, but the state of virginity is better. For such as wish to follow Jesus Christ more closely and to dedicate themselves wholly to God, celibacy and absolute chastity are proposed as a counsel of perfection. There is no fear that the number who embrace this counsel will ever be so great as seriously to interfere with the proper increase of “ the population. There will always be a sufficient number left in the world to enter upon the married state. Nor is the heroic renunciation of the pleasures of married life made by religious lost upon the world. As long as there are numbers of men and women to be seen who for love of God and chastity lead solitary lives, it should be more easy for people in the world to curb their fleshly appetites so as to keep within the bounds of reason and virtue.

By the vow of chastity the religious promises Almighty God. that he will altogether abstain from all venereal pleasure, whether of thought or deed. In consequence he is bound to observe perfect chastity of body and mind, so that any act which he commits contrary thereto will be a double sin, against the virtue and against his vow. We saw, when treating of the Sixth Commandment, that sins by which venereal pleasure is directly sought or consented to are always grave, and so, when such sins are committed by religious, their grievous malice will be twofold.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter VI. Vow of Obedience

MEN of the world find it difficult to understand how one man can surrender his liberty and bind himself by vow to obey another. And yet this counsel of perfection, too, is contained in the life and teaching of the divine Founder of the Church. He did not intend that all the members of his Church should be equal; he placed some in authority over the others, and he gave them power to teach, instruct, correct, and guide those who were subject to them. He therefore laid a duty of obedience to spiritual rulers on all the faithful. Those who were content to observe the Commandments were bound only to obey such positive precepts as the rulers of the Church judged it expedient to impose on all Christians; but those who aimed at perfection became as a consequence subject to the teaching and authoritative guidance of their rulers in matters which pertain to perfection as well. Those who were content with observing the Commandments reserved some liberty for themselves; those who aimed at Christian perfection gave themselves wholly to obedience after the example of him who was obedient even unto death. The prelates of the Church are therefore the superiors of religious men and women, and even if some are exempt in some matters from the jurisdiction of the ordinaries, all are subject to the Pope, not only as the Supreme Head of the Church on earth, but as their highest religious superior.¹ In approving of a religious order or congregation the Pope and the bishops delegate the necessary authority to the lawful superiors of the order, and give them power to command their subjects in all that pertains to the observance of the rule.

A religious, therefore, who takes a vow of obedience binds himself thereby to obey all the precepts which his superiors lay upon him according to the rule of the order.

In order, then, that the obligation of the vow may become operative, a precept must be given by the superior, And here we must distinguish between the vow and the virtue of obedience. The virtue of obedience inclines to the most perfect conformity of will and judgement of the subject with the will and judgement of the superior. A subject who has the virtue of obedience will strive to execute the known will of his superior without waiting for a strict command. The obligation of the vow is not so extensive as the virtue of obedience. The vow will be saved if precepts are externally executed, for, according to the more common opinion, the vow of obedience does not extend to merely internal acts.

The superior’s authority is limited and defined by the rule, and so the subject is only bound to obey such commands of the superior as are sanctioned by the rule directly or indirectly. It is not, however, necessary that the precept should be expressly sanctioned by the rule in order to enable a superior to impose it with authority: it is sufficient if it be implicitly and indirectly sanctioned, as it will be if its imposition conduces to the better and more perfect observance of the rule.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 186, a. 5; can. 499, sec. 1.

Vol. II, Bk. IX, Chapter IX. The Prohibitory Impediments

There are several simple vows which are so many prohibitory impediments of marriage.(Can. 1058).

A vow of chastity hinders marriage, for he who has taken such a vow exposes himself to the danger of violating it if he marries, or of depriving the other party of his marital rights. Even after marriage has been contracted the obligation of the vow remains, unless a dispensation is obtained or the obligation of the vow is indirectly annulled by the other party.

By a vow of virginity he who takes the vow promises God that he will not commit a consummated sin against chastity. He will sin, therefore, by marrying, because he exposes himself to the danger of breaking his vow or of defrauding the other party of his rights. If by a consummated sin against chastity his virginity has been destroyed, the vow can no longer be observed, and ceases.

The same rules hold with regard to a vow of celibacy which is violated by marriage, but after marriage has been contracted no further obligation remains.

Chastity, virginity, and celibacy are loosely used one for the other, and if a case arose in the confessional the intention of the penitent would have to be inquired into in order to discover what obligation he wished to take upon himself by his vow.

One who has vowed to receive sacred orders would commit sin by marrying, for by marriage the other party obtains rights which are incompatible with the observance of the vow. Canon 987 lays down that marriage is an impediment to the reception of orders, and so the obligation of the vow will ordinarily cease as being impossible of fulfilment, though per se it is only suspended, and revives on the death of the other party.

Similarly, one who has taken a vow to enter religion commits sin by marrying, as he makes the observance of his vow difficult or impossible. Before consummating marriage he is still bound by his vow if it bound him to enter a religious order in the strict sense. After marriage has been consummated he may use his marital rights, and the vow usually ceases on account of impossibility of observance.

Vol. II, Bk. IX, Ch. X, Article VII. Adoption

In England the Adoption Act, 1926, sanctions adoption by order of the Court, but it does not seem to make it an impediment of marriage. In most of the States of the Union there seems to be a form of adoption recognized by law sufficient to make it the basis of the ecclesiastical impediment.¹

¹ Smith, Marriage Process, n. 263.

Vol. II, Bk. X, Pt. III, Ch. I, C.—Excommunications Simply Reserved to the Holy See

n. 26.

Duellum.—A single combat with deadly weapons undertaken. by agreement. Those who actually fight or challenge, or accept a duel, or afford any assistance or favour to those who do, incur this censure. Spectators of set purpose, those who permit it or do not stop it as far as they can, though they be kings or generals of armies, also incur it. Canon 2388 VIII. Clerici in sacris constituti vel regulares aut moniales post votum sollemne castitatis, itemque omnes cum aliqua ex praedictis personis matrimonium etiam civiliter tantum contrahere praesumentes, incurrunt in excommunicationem latae sententiae Sedi Apostolicae simpliciter reservatam. (Clerics constituted in sacred orders, or regulars or nuns after a solemn vow of chastity, and likewise all who presume to contract marriage, even merely civilly, with any of the aforesaid persons, incur an excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Apostolic See.)

Vol. II, Bk. X, Pt. III, Ch. I, D.—Excommunications Reserved to the Ordinary

Canon 2350 IV. Procurantes abortum, matre non excepta, incurrunt, effectu secuto, in excommunicationem latae sententiae Ordinario reservatam.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 27 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § III, Point I. On Religion

n. 387.

III. Acts of Religion. The acts of religion are distinguished into internal and external acts. The internal acts are devotion and prayer. External acts are those by which we worship God either through one's own body, and this is adoration; or by offering to God some external thing, and these are sacrifice, oblation, and vow; or by assuming something pertaining to God, namely either the Sacraments or the name of God, which can be assumed either by invocation, or by oath, or by adjuration (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 84, Preface). Concerning each of these, discussion will be had in Book II.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Section II. On the Vow

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Vows · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Cessation of Vows · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Obedience · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, The Vows

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, lib. III, nn. 194-262; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, nn. 21-50.)

We shall speak first about the notion, division, and morality of a vow, then about the requisites for a vow, then about the obligation, and finally about the cessation of a vow. Having set these things forth, in a scholion we shall speak of reserved vows in particular.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. I, Division, and Morality of a Vow

n. 639.

I. Notion. A vow strictly so called is a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good (can. 1307, § 1). It is said:

Promise, that is, the giving of faith, from which an obligation of faith arises. Therefore a vow differs from a mere proposal or will of doing something; indeed, a promise of doing something can be composed with the proposal of not doing it.
Deliberate and free; these will be explained more opportunely soon.
Made to God; a promise made to the Saints, if it rests in them, is not a vow strictly so called or an act of latria, but of dulia or hyperdulia. Nevertheless the promises which are said to be made to the Saints, as it seems, are commonly vows strictly so called, because for the most part they are made to God alone in honor of a Saint, or at least are primarily referred to God (St. Alphonsus, III, 194; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 3).
Concerning a possible and better good; these also will soon be clarified.

n. 640.

II. Division. A vow is divided:

Into public and private. A public vow is one which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private.
Into solemn and simple. A solemn vow is one which has been recognized by the Church as such; otherwise it is simple.
Into reserved and non-reserved. A reserved vow is one whose dispensation only the Apostolic See can grant; otherwise it is non-reserved.
Into personal, real, and mixed, according as an action of the one vowing, or some thing, or both together, for example alms to be distributed by the one vowing, is promised.
Into explicit and implicit, according as it is emitted in proper terms, or is contained in another act or vow, or is judged annexed to it.
Into perpetual and temporary.
Into absolute and conditional, according as someone obliges himself absolutely, or dependently on some condition: either a condition suspensive of the obligation, as if someone vows entrance into Religion if he recovers health; or resolutory, as if someone vows entrance into Religion unless his sister enters marriage (St. Alphonsus, III, 195).

n. 641.

III. Morality. A vow is an honorable act. This is established against Wyclif; likewise against Luther and Calvin, who hold as honorable only vows concerning things already otherwise prescribed; finally against those who at least disapprove religious vows.³ But the honorableness of a vow is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which commends the making of vows both expressly⁴ and by narrating the examples of holy persons;⁵ 2. from the fact that a vow, by inducing an obligation, confirms the will in good.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Confessarius rite institutus ad impugnandam blasphemiam; Aertnys, De imprecatione "Deus damnet"; Brahm, Dissertatio de formula: G. v. d., Deus damnet me.

² Cf. Kirchberg, De voti natura, obligatione, honestate.

³ Letter of Leo XIII, Testem benevolentiae, January 22, 1899.

⁴ Ps. 75:12.

⁵ Gen. 28:20; Acts 18:18.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Chapter II. On the Requisites for a Vow

n. 642.

I. Requisites on the part of the one vowing. There are required a will to bind oneself, sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow, and perfect liberty.

A will to bind oneself, at least implicit; for this belongs to the essence of a vow. When the aforesaid will is lacking, there is a mere proposal (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 201).

Corollary I. One who is ignorant of the obligation of a vow vows invalidly, because he lacks the will to bind himself; for the will is not borne toward what is unknown. Except one who wills to vow as others are accustomed to do, even if he merely is ignorant that an obligation arises; for he has an implicit will to bind himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Corollary II. One who wills to vow, but positively excludes the obligation, does not vow; for although the obligation itself is the effect of a vow, nevertheless he who positively excludes the obligation does not have the mind, not even implicitly, of binding himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow; namely, distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices; yet this, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se. I said:

a) Distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices. The reason is that vague knowledge suffices for the one vowing to consent to the object, that is, to those things by which the object is constituted. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity is valid when the one vowing knows that by this vow carnal pleasures are renounced, although he is ignorant of precisely what these pleasures consist in; likewise even if he is ignorant of the "mysteries of life," as they are called.

b) Vague knowledge, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se; for, when this too is lacking, the one vowing does not consent to the object, since it is in no way known. It is said per se, because even vague knowledge does not seem to be required if the one vowing expressly intends to vow what others vow; for then he implicitly consents to the object. Hence one who, for example, in vowing chastity, expressly intends to vow what is vowed by others seems to vow validly, even if he is ignorant, for example, that by a vow of chastity carnal pleasures are renounced. But a defect even of vague knowledge seems almost hypothetical.

Corollary I. Error obstructs validity if it concerns the substantial elements of the thing promised, that is, whether its substance,¹ or the final cause,² or a circumstance which notably changes the substance.³ The reason is that, while error concerning substantial elements remains, consent to the substance is lacking. That a circumstance which notably changes the thing also must be referred to the substantial elements follows from the fact that in this case, according to common estimation, there is a substance or thing morally diverse (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary II. Error does not obstruct validity if it concerns either circumstances of lesser moment,⁴ or the impulsive cause.⁵ The reason is that consent to the substance of the thing promised is not lacking. And this holds even if the error gave occasion to the vow;⁶ for the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did. But the fact that, once the error was removed, he would not have consented, does not prevent the fact that he consented (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary III. Religious vows, no less than other vows, are void because of error concerning substantial elements, because the reason given above, being drawn from the nature of the thing, must hold here too. Nevertheless, in practice, the said vows will scarcely be void except because of error concerning the very substance of the vows, because, when that error is lacking, error generally will not be such as to constitute a morally diverse object.

Perfect liberty, that is, such as is required for sinning gravely; for only an act fully human or fully deliberated suffices for undertaking an obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 196). Hence vows are invalid when made before the age of discretion, or by one semi-insane, semi-drunk, semi-asleep, or arising from fear which so disturbs the use of reason that full deliberation is impeded. But vows emitted in fervor of devotion are valid, and generally also those which are emitted from sudden passion or levity of mind, because sufficient deliberation generally is present.

Fear which does not impede full deliberation influences a vow in this way:

a) The following do not obstruct validity: 1. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) struck from within, that is, by a cause that is not free; hence a vow emitted in danger of shipwreck is valid; 2. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) justly struck. The reason is that in each case, on the one hand, full deliberation is supposed, and on the other hand no injury has been done to the one vowing, so that no reason exists why the vow would be invalid; 3. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) unjustly struck, but not for extorting a vow, does not obstruct validity; hence a vow emitted so that God may rescue you from the hands of robbers is valid. The reason is that, in relation to the vow, no injury is inflicted on you (St. Alphonsus, III, 197).

b) At least by canon law, grave fear struck from without, unjustly, and for extorting a vow, obstructs validity (can. 1307, § 2). It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow. Some affirm, and they extend this also to light fear, because God does not accept a vow of this kind, lest He give force to unjust compulsion. Others deny, because, in their opinion, a sufficiently solid reason cannot be alleged why God would not accept a fully deliberated act (cf. St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ For example, someone vows a thing of his own which he judges to be glass, when it is a gem.

² Someone vows a Mass for the health of his father, when he is dead.

³ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues, when it is six leagues.

⁴ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues; but it is three and a half leagues.

⁵ Someone vows alms to be given to poor Peter, whom he judges to be religious, when he is irreligious.

⁶ Suppose that in the cases set forth under 4 and 5, had the error been absent, he would not have vowed the pilgrimage or the alms.

n. 643.

II. Requisites on the part of the thing promised. The thing promised must be possible, morally good, and better than its contradictory.

Let it be possible, and indeed physically and morally. For there can be no obligation to physically impossible things; but an obligation of morally impossible things, since it would tend to detriment, is not accepted by God. If the thing promised is partly possible, partly impossible, the vow is valid for the possible part, if the matter both is divisible by its nature, and by the intention of the one vowing has been promised dividedly. If in the matter of a vow one thing is principal and another accessory, the vow is valid as to the possible principal thing, although the accessory is impossible; but not the converse (St. Alphonsus, III, 202).
Let it be morally good, because God is offended by an evil thing and is not worshiped by an indifferent thing; hence a promise of things of this kind is not accepted by God. An indifferent thing indeed can be done in an honorable manner; but the thing, not the manner, is supposed to be vowed. Otherwise one must speak if an act indifferent in itself becomes good because of a circumstance; in that case, as clothed with that circumstance, it can be vowed.
Let it be better than its contradictory; and this either in itself, or with the circumstances considered, because a promise of abstaining from a thing by which God is worshiped more is not accepted by Him.

Corollary I. A vow of not sinning at all, whether perpetually or for a notable time, is null. For that is impossible without a special privilege of God.¹ But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid; likewise a vow of employing special care to avoid all sins; likewise - but only in a person of solid virtue - a vow of avoiding either all fully deliberated venial sins, or a certain species of venial sins not so difficult to avoid, for example a vow of not stealing. Otherwise one must speak concerning a certain species of venial sins which scarcely can be avoided, as are, for example, idle thoughts (St. Alphonsus, III, 203). A vow of always doing what is held to be more perfect is valid in a person of very great virtue, insofar as it is understood of fully deliberated acts.

Corollary II. A vow of not marrying, or of chastity, is generally valid. I said generally, because it is disputed whether it is valid if it is pronounced in the world by one for whom, because of peculiar frailty, a peculiar danger of incontinence is imminent. Some deny, because marriage seems better, all things considered. More commonly it is affirmed, because, since other means of preserving continence are available, celibacy is better and remains so. A vow of a thing prescribed, since it is morally good, is valid, and effects that a transgression is also opposed to religion (St. Alphonsus, III, 213). A vow emitted against the precept of a superior is valid if the superior only forbade vowing; in that case the act of vowing is evil, but the object which is vowed is good, as is supposed. Otherwise one must speak if a thing forbidden by the superior is vowed.

A vow made concerning a good work, but for an evil end:

a) It is valid if only the act of vowing is elicited for an evil end, for example if someone publicly vows alms in order to gain vainglory (St. Alphonsus, III, n. 206).

b) It is not valid if a good work is vowed as to be directed to an evil end alone, or from a mere affection for an evil thing, for example alms to be given for vain glory alone, or only for seducing someone to sin. The reason is that the thing promised, as it is intended - that is, as a means of attaining an evil end - is evil. If a good work is vowed as also to be directed to a good end, the vow is valid, and the thing promised seems to have to be performed for the good end alone, because the thing promised, as it is intended, is also good (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

A vow made concerning a good work, but for an indifferent end (for example if someone vows fasting in order to save expenses): such a vow is not valid if a good work is vowed as to be directed to an indifferent end alone; if a good work is vowed as also to be directed to a good end, the vow seems to be valid, as was said concerning a good work to be directed to an evil end and to a good end.

A vow emitted from affection for a good thing, even if joined with an evil cause or condition, seems to be valid, because the thing promised, as it is intended - that is, as a means of obtaining a good or licit thing - is good; for example if you vow alms so that you may not be caught in a crime (St. Alphonsus, III, 206).

Corollary III. A vow of marrying is not valid per se, because the opposite is better; it is valid per accidens: 1. if someone is otherwise bound to marriage; 2. one who, because of a particular danger of incontinence, emitted the said vow, more probably is bound by the vow, but only conditionally, namely unless he wishes to use other means; 3. likewise, per se, a vow of marrying a poor girl is valid if one is going to marry someone (St. Alphonsus, III, 207, 209; VI, 75). Likewise, a vow of passing to a laxer Religion is invalid. Likewise, a vow not to vow is invalid, because to vow is better; nevertheless a vow of not vowing without the counsel of the confessor is valid. He who has emitted this vow and nevertheless, without consulting the confessor, vows, acts validly but illicitly; besides, in that case, more probably he would also vow invalidly if the one vowing had intended from the beginning that vows emitted without the counsel of the confessor would be null, and without attending to this intention emitted a vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 210).

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 23.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Chapter III. On the Obligation of a Vow

n. 644.

I. The existence of the obligation is clear from Sacred Scripture: "If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases Him; but whatever you have vowed, pay."¹ And indeed the reverence due to God requires that we fulfill the things which we have promised Him.

¹ Eccl. 5:3.

n. 645.

II. The subject of the obligation is only the one vowing, so that no one can be bound directly by force of a vow emitted by another (can. 1310, § 1). I said directly, because the obligation of a real vow, and of a mixed vow insofar as it is real, passes to heirs through inheritance, as we shall explain shortly. I said by force of a vow emitted by another, because if a community has emitted a vow, successors are not bound by force of the vow, but can be bound by reason of a pact, statute, or custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 213, 214, 216, 217).

n. 646.

III. The object of the obligation, or the matter to which the obligation extends, depends on the intention of the one vowing; this is especially to be deduced from the words pronounced or comprehended in the mind, with attention also to common estimation and the norm for interpreting ecclesiastical law in similar matter (St. Alphonsus, III, 222, 180).

Corollary. One who has vowed to recite the Rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, unless something else is clear from the mind of the one vowing. For so the word Rosary is commonly taken. One who has vowed to fast for a month is not bound on Sundays. One who has vowed to fast on each Friday or Saturday, if on such a day, for example, the Nativity of the Lord falls (cf. can. 1252, § 4), is not bound to fast. One who has vowed to hear Mass for a month is not bound on Sundays and feast days to two Masses. Except, as to individual cases, if a contrary mind is evident (St. Alphonsus, III, 224). One who has emitted an indeterminate vow: if it is indeterminate as to time - as if someone has vowed to recite the Rosary daily - is bound perpetually, unless another mind is clear; if it is indeterminate as to the quality or quantity of the thing, he can define it at will, provided the thing defined is not such that it should be judged rather to mock God than to satisfy the vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 221).

n. 647.

IV. The quality of the obligation. The obligation of a vow, that is, of a promise made to God, is an obligation of religion as to genus (can. 1307, § 1), and of fidelity toward God as to species. Namely, the reverence due to God, as we noted under I, requires that we perform the things promised to Him. But here note the difference between fidelity due to men and that by which we are bound toward God. Fidelity is owed to men lest they be deceived; but to God, lest there be derogation from the reverence due to Him. Moreover, all violations of vows are of the same species; hence if another malice is added, for example, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicated, he can confess separately the violation of the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

n. 648.

V. The quantity of the obligation. The obligation of a vow generally is grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns grave or light matter. I said generally, because the one vowing can emit a vow, which is like a law, under light obligation,¹ just as a legislator can impose a grave thing under light obligation (n. 149); nevertheless, the one vowing is presumed not to have done this. A matter light in every respect cannot be vowed under grave obligation (n. 149; St. Alphonsus, III, 211, 213). Moreover:

Matter is judged grave which, considering the thing and the circumstances, would be prescribed by the Church under grave obligation. If it is a question of a thing to be given, that matter is held grave which, if a reason of justice intervened, would have to be given under grave obligation. Yet the said norms should be understood so that greater matter is required if someone were to vow a series of objects or a great quantity to be bestowed. Hence, for example, one who promises to hear 20 Masses does not seem to sin gravely by neglecting one or another.
If someone has vowed something to be repeated often, which is not grave (as if someone vows that he will bestow a franc on the poor every week), there cannot be grave matter unless several matters coalesce. But several matters coalesce if the one vowing intended them after the manner of one thing, as in the example set forth; otherwise if he intended them separately. But if the intention of the one vowing is doubtful, several matters are presumed to have been intended after the manner of one thing if it is a question of a real vow; otherwise if it is a question of a personal vow.

¹ Except if it is a question of public vows, which, when emitted under light obligation, are rejected by the Church and therefore are not accepted by God.

n. 649.

VI. Fulfillment of the obligation; concerning this it must be seen when and how a vow ought to be fulfilled.

The time for fulfilling a vow. a) If the time is determined, this must be observed. If a vow has not been fulfilled at the determined time, the obligation ceases or does not cease according as the time was attached for ending the obligation, or for urging its execution. Moreover, the time is judged attached for ending the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the time itself, as if someone emits a vow of fasting on the Vigil of some Saint. Nor then, if an impediment is foreseen, is there an obligation of anticipating it (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). It is judged attached for urging the execution of the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the vow to be fulfilled, as if someone emits a vow of fasting next Thursday, without regard to any special character of that day. In that case the vow must afterward be fulfilled if it was not fulfilled at the appointed time; indeed, generally there is an obligation of anticipating it if it is foreseen that the vow can be fulfilled neither at the appointed time nor afterward.¹ In doubt whether the time has been determined for ending the obligation or for urging its execution, the former is presumed in personal vows, the latter in real vows (St. Alphonsus, III, cited place); nevertheless the circumstances should be attended to. One who emitted a vow of doing this or that within a determined time, for example of receiving Communion within this month, if after the time has begun he foresees an impediment, certainly is bound to fulfill the vow now.

b) If the time is not determined, the vow ordinarily must be fulfilled as soon as it can be fulfilled morally. This is clear from Sacred Scripture,² and from the fact that a vow has the character of a debt. I said ordinarily, because sometimes one might rightly say that the obligation of fulfilling the vow as soon as morally possible is not undertaken by the one vowing, but that the matter can be taken more broadly. Moreover, delay, unless there is a just cause, is a grave sin: 1. when it is done with grave danger of omission or of inability to fulfill the vow; 2. when the delay is notable, and it concerns a vow in which delay involves diminution of the proximate matter, as happens, for example, in a vow of entering Religion; in this vow a delay beyond half a year is held by St. Alphonsus (III, 221) to be mortal. It is disputed whether one sins gravely if the delay is notable, say for two or three years, and it concerns a vow in which the delay does not involve diminution of the matter promised, as happens, for example, in a vow of making a pilgrimage, etc. But with St. Alphonsus (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 33) it seems it must be affirmed, because so great a delay of execution against the will of the creditor, that is, God, seems to contain grave disorder. Deuteronomy seems to favor this.³

The manner of fulfilling a vow. a) A personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself. Hence it cannot be fulfilled through another; nor, if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, must another be substituted by him (St. Alphonsus, III, 217).

b) "Real vows are to be discharged from one's own property; hence one who cannot do so from his own property is not bound to beg from another. But if he can do so from his own property, and yet another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to discharge it for him, this is valid.... Indeed, he sufficiently satisfies a vow or oath of alms who, after learning of it, ratifies alms given by another for that purpose while he himself was unaware of it; because then the vow is already fulfilled with the consent of the one vowing" (St. Alphonsus, III, 217). The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, and likewise the obligation of a mixed vow for the part by which it is real (can. 1310, § 2). It is disputed, however, of what nature the obligation of the heir is. But the real obligations of the testator seem indirectly to affect his goods themselves, so that the said obligations, whether of justice, or of fidelity, or of religion, or of a manifold title, pass to the heirs by the same title by which the testator was bound by them.

c) A mixed vow, as to the personal and real part respectively, must be fulfilled as was said under a and b. But if the obligation of the vow ceases insofar as it is personal, for that reason its obligation does not cease insofar as it is real, unless the real part was promised only accessorily.

¹ Sometimes, however, from the circumstances the intention of the one vowing not to bind himself before the attached time can be gathered.

² Deut. 23:21.

³ Deut. 23:21.

n. 650.

VII. The obligation of certain vows in particular. 1. A vow under a suspensive condition - for example, "I vow entrance into Religion, if my father consents" - obliges in this way: the one vowing is bound:

a) Once the condition has been fulfilled, to execute the vow. Nevertheless he is not bound until the condition has been fulfilled specifically, not merely equivalently. For example, "you vowed Religion if your sister married; it does not suffice if she dies" (St. Alphonsus, III, 219); except if another intention of the one vowing is sufficiently clear.

b) Not to render himself unable to execute the vow.

c) Not maliciously to impede the condition from being fulfilled. But one who impedes that does not act maliciously if it is a question of a condition which depends on the will of the one vowing. Hence if someone vowed to enter religion if within a year he had not entered marriage, he can enter marriage, and thus impede the condition from being fulfilled. "Likewise, you vowed chastity; if you fall from frailty, you do not sin with respect to the vow; otherwise, if you sin deliberately in order to be freed from the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 218). One who impedes the condition from being fulfilled is bound to remove the malicious influence if the condition still can be fulfilled; if it can no longer be fulfilled, he is not bound to execute the vow, unless it is evident that the intention of the one vowing extended more broadly (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

A penal vow - for example, "I vow Religion if I shall have perpetrated such a sin again" - after the sin has been committed does not oblige if fully deliberated consent was lacking.
A vow concerning the deed of another is understood thus: that the one vowing ought prudently to take care that the other perform it (St. Alphonsus, III, 216).

Corollary I. In strict doubt whether someone has vowed, or has taken up a mere proposal, he is not bound by the obligation of a vow (n. 228). In doubt whether a prepubescent person, otherwise normal, could omit a vow with sufficient deliberation, the faculty is presumed if he has completed the seventh year; otherwise, if he has not completed the seventh year (cf. can. 88, § 3).

Corollary II. One who has performed the thing promised while unmindful of the vow more probably has satisfied the vow, because everyone is judged to have the habitual will of satisfying a debt before what is not a debt. Otherwise one must speak of him who, mindful of the vow, intends not to satisfy it (St. Alphonsus, III, 224, at the end).

Corollary III. In strict doubt whether the act by which the vow is fulfilled has been placed, there is an obligation of observing it; otherwise if it is doubted whether the act placed suffices for fulfilling the vow (n. 231).

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Article I. On Simple Cessation

n. 652.

I. Lapse of time, namely time attached for ending the obligation. When time ought to be judged attached in this way, see n. 649.

n. 653.

II. Substantial change of the matter promised. This has place if the matter becomes evil, indifferent, or less good than its omission. Likewise if the matter is notably changed because of a supervening and unforeseen circumstance. The reason is that the intention of the one vowing is judged to be interpreted in this way; indeed, not without foundation is notable change said to constitute a morally diverse object (St. Alphonsus, III, 226). Hence one who has vowed, for example, to build a church, is not bound by the vow if and as long as, because of damage following in the state of his fortune, the execution of the vow is rendered difficult. Except from the rule stated: 1. if it is a question of public vows, which are: religious vows, solemn as well as simple, perpetual as well as temporary, substantial as well as those which are annexed to them; likewise a vow annexed to Sacred Order; 2. if the discussion concerns a supervening difficulty which the matter of the vow carries with it by its nature, or which follows from the changed disposition or will of the one vowing. The reason is that in the former case, since the common good demands it, every supervening circumstance is judged to have been comprehended in the vow; in the latter case, the circumstance of grave supervening difficulty, since the very nature of the thing carries it with it, is judged to be contained in the vow. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity, even one emitted in the world, does not cease because of a difficulty afterward arising, even if it was unforeseen (St. Alphonsus, IV, 50). Besides, note:

If the matter of the vow has become unsuitable or impossible in part, the obligation also ceases as to the other part if the matter of the vow is either indivisible by nature, or was intended undividedly by the one vowing; but it persists if the matter of the vow both is divisible by its nature and was intended dividedly by the one vowing. Hence one who vowed 100 Masses and can offer only 50 is bound to these. If in the matter of the vow principal and accessory can be distinguished, when the principal falls, the accessory falls, but not conversely.
One who has emitted a disjunctive vow - for example, "I vow that I will undertake a pilgrimage or cause 10 Masses to be celebrated" - in the case in which one part has become unsuitable or impossible, is bound in this way:

a) If before election one part becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing is per se immune from every obligation. For the circumstance that the one vowing now cannot choose is not judged to have been comprehended in the vow. Except: 1. if with sufficient certainty he intended one or the other part absolutely, that is, whatever might happen; 2. if the other part became unsuitable or impossible through the fault of the one vowing (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

b) If after election the part not elected becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing is bound to perform the part elected, because in that case the election seems to have to be regarded as validly determinative of the prior vow (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) If the part elected, not yet put into execution, becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing per se is bound to nothing, according to what was said under a).

Corollary. One who has chosen one part can sufficiently probably commute it with the other part, because the election is not judged to have been intended in such a way that the one vowing deprived himself of the faculty of choosing the other part (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

n. 654.

III. Defect of the condition, namely the condition on which the vow depends; for example, if someone vows a pilgrimage if this or that should succeed: when the thing does not succeed, the vow collapses.

n. 655.

IV. Defect or cessation of the final cause, that is, of the cause for which the vow was emitted uniquely or principally, and without which it would not have been emitted; as if someone vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining his father's health, and the father dies before the vow is fulfilled.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Article II. On Irritation

n. 656.

I. Notion. Irritation is the annulment of a vow, validly emitted, made by one who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing. Irritation is customarily distinguished as twofold, direct and indirect; but indirect irritation is rather called suspension, which is also more conformable to the Code of Canon Law (cf. can. 1312, § 2).

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Article III. On Suspension

n. 663.

I. Notion. Suspension of a vow is relaxation of the obligation of a vow for a time, made by one who has power over the matter of the vow. By authors it is commonly called indirect irritation.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Article IV. On Dispensation

n. 668.

I. Notion. Dispensation of a vow is "the absolute condonation of the obligation of a vow, made in the name of God" (St. Alphonsus, III, 250). It is said made in the name of God, because the Church, in dispensing in vows, does not condone her own right, but God's; this she cannot do except in the name of God. The difference between irritation and dispensation consists especially in this, that one irritating acts in his own name, whereas one dispensing acts as taking the place of God and therefore as using vicarious power.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Article V. On Commutation

n. 673.

I. Notion. Commutation is the substitution of another honorable work, in place of that which had been promised by vow, under the same obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 243). It can be made into something lesser, into something equal, and into something better.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Art. V, Scholion. On Reserved Vows

n. 678.

I. Notion of reservation. The reservation of a vow consists in this: that the power of dispensing and commuting, not of irritating, certain vows is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, so that no one enjoys the said power unless he has received a special faculty.

n. 679.

II. Reserved vows. Private vows reserved to the Apostolic See are only the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and the vow of entering a Religion of solemn vows, when these have been emitted absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (can. 1309). Nevertheless, only the substance of the vow is reserved, not the time, for example, of entering Religion, or the circumstance, for example, of a stricter Religion; nor is the matter into which a reserved vow has legitimately been commuted reserved (St. Alphonsus, III, 258).

Besides the private vows just enumerated, public vows are also reserved to the Roman Pontiff. Such are: 1. the vow of chastity emitted in receiving the subdiaconate; 2. religious vows, solemn as well as simple, perpetual as well as temporary, emitted in a Religion approved by the Holy See.

n. 680.

III. Conditions of reservation. Reservation, since it is odious, is to be interpreted strictly. Hence for a vow to be reserved, it must be a true vow, absolute, not disjunctive, perfect as to act, obligation, and matter.

True, that is, a promise made to God. Therefore a promise made either to a man, or to a Saint while stopping at him, is not reserved; nor is an oath, unless it is confirmed by a vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 259).
Absolute, as can. 1309 expressly states. Hence it must not have been emitted under a condition concerning a future contingent thing;¹ nor is a vow of this kind reserved after the condition has been fulfilled, because it was not emitted absolutely, which canon 1309 requires. Hence a vow emitted in this way is not reserved: "I vow Religion, if I shall have sinned again"; or: "if I shall have been rescued from danger." Otherwise, however, one must speak "if someone has vowed Religion with a condition, for example, if his mother dies, because then the vow is rather absolute; although it does not oblige to execution while the mother is alive; for the particle if not rarely is equivalent to the particle when" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).
Not disjunctive, namely, in such a way that someone binds himself to reserved matter or to non-reserved matter; as if someone says: "I vow Religion or the reception of sacred order." Nor after the election of matter reserved in itself does the chosen part become reserved, unless someone confirms it by a new vow. The reason is that the one vowing, by choosing one part, does not deprive himself of the liberty of choosing the other (St. Alphonsus, III, 224, 258). Otherwise, however, one must speak if the vow indeed is disjunctive, but each part is reserved.
Perfect as to act, obligation, and matter. It is said perfect:

a) As to the act; hence a vow emitted from fear, even light fear, unjustly struck, is not reserved (St. Alphonsus, III, 258).

b) As to the obligation; therefore a vow emitted under light obligation is not reserved (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) As to the matter, that is, what is vowed must be perfectly that which is assigned as reserved.

Hence the following are not reserved: 1. a vow of not marrying, since not marrying is not the same as preserving perfect chastity; 2. a vow of conjugal chastity, or 3. of virginity, if it is taken for integrity of the flesh alone, because perfect chastity extends further than conjugal chastity and virginity so taken;² 4. a temporary vow of chastity; 5. a vow emitted by a married person, because it cannot be a vow of entire chastity; except if the spouse either has lost the right of asking the debt, for example by adultery, or has renounced it; likewise if each spouse by mutual consent has emitted a vow of chastity and has explicitly or implicitly renounced the right to the debt (St. Alphonsus, VI, 986); 6. a vow of receiving Sacred Order, since it is not a vow of chastity, but a vow of embracing a state which has a vow of chastity annexed to it; 7. a vow of entering a Religion of simple vows. Moreover, "if someone has vowed to enter a monastery, or if a girl has vowed to become a nun, and has not expressly thought of an order strictly so called, from present-day circumstances it must be judged that that vow is not reserved, since there are so many religious congregations or Orders in the broader sense, by entering which the one vowing must be judged to have fulfilled the vow."³

¹ Vows under a condition concerning the past or the present are immediately absolute or null, according as the condition exists or does not exist. Vows under a condition concerning a necessary future thing are immediately absolute (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

² A vow of virginity also, according to the mind of those vowing, often contains a vow of perfect chastity.

³ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 627.

n. 681.

IV. Cessation of a reserved vow. First compare and apply what we have said about the cessation of a vow taken generally (n. 651). But as to the dispensation and commutation of a reserved vow, certain special things must be noted.

Dispensation. a) Bishops and those who have episcopal jurisdiction can dispense, but only insofar as it is necessary, "if access to the Pope is not easy and there is danger of grave harm in delay" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; VI, 987). I said insofar as it is necessary; "hence if it suffices that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Likewise, if someone is dispensed from a vow of chastity with the restriction that he marry a certain woman to repair her honor, he cannot marry another" (St. Alphonsus, III, 258).

b) Regular confessors probably can do the same as Bishops, namely by a privilege which probably persists (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 258; VI, 987, 1128), so that at least the Church supplies. Dispensation, however, can be granted even outside confession.

Commutation. Insofar as those mentioned under 1 can dispense in reserved vows, to that extent they can also commute them.

Warning. The people should be advised not to emit vows without consulting the confessor. But the confessor should not permit vows so easily, especially a vow of chastity, above all of perpetual chastity, because ecclesiastical authority is not accustomed to dispense in this vow, when it has been maturely emitted, unless a very great commutation has been attached. If that vow seems fitting, let a temporary vow be permitted the first time, or several times, from one feast of the Blessed Virgin to another, and so at last, after much and serious testing, a perpetual vow¹ (cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 93).

¹ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 631.

Vol. III, Bk. II, Pt. I, Sect. I, Ch. I, Art. III, § 1. On a Promise Made to the Partner

n. 85.

II. Cessation of the impediment. A promise made by one party can be remitted by the partner; one made by both can be removed by the consent of both.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 19 passages

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Vows

n. 2191.

Vows

Vows.—A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is better.

(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4), Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of performing one’s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses (e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one who swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow of chastity (see 2234, 2262).

(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the vow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one vows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the Saint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow principally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of obliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to the virtue of veneration (dulia), but it would not be an act of religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn circumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.

(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since a vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence, it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one’s steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood, for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Cessation of Vows

n. 2226.

Cessation of Vows

Cessation of Vows.—Since a vow is a private law, it may cease, just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are, therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.

(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God. It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).

(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made (dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).

n. 2228.

Annulment of Vows

Annulment of Vows.—The annulment of a vow is made in two ways, directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.

(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts. Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law (Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.

(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow, when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due the master.

n. 2229.

Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow

Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.—Is a just reason necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.

n. 2230.

Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment

Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.—(a) Direct annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service elsewhere.

(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it, or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no longer under his control.

n. 2231.

Dispensation

Dispensation.—A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted in the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.

(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401). Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation that a law is not binding.

(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total removal of the vow.

(c) It is granted in the name of God; that is, the dispenser acting for God remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow.

(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a vow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of those whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or domestic power.

n. 2232.

Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation

Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.—A dispensation is granted in the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise cannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason. A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient for a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult, if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).

n. 2233.

Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows

Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.—(a) The superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has become harmful or useless.

(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to the superior.

n. 2234.

Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation

Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.—The Church has the power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this power when He said: “Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of dispensation are the following:

(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;

(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not made principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of chastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been made for marriage (see Canon 1045).

n. 2235.

Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity

Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.—Does the Church dispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in the reception of Sacred Orders?

(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are granted from the religious vow of chastity.

(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical powers.

n. 2236.

Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third Party

Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third Party.—(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.

(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but is made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is dispensable.

(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions, however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope, in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just and sufficient reasons.

n. 2238.

Commutation of Vows

Commutation of Vows.—The commutation of a vow is the substitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage, but one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do what is less.

n. 2239.

Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows

Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.—(a) The good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which, if not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in favor of one’s father who is also poor.

(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance. But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.

(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into a Rosary.

n. 2240.

Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow

Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.—(a) The commutation of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally served. But ordinarily one should not commute one’s own vows, since for most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal or a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.

(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing (e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.

n. 2241.

The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow

The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.—(a) For commutation into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value, some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore displeasing to God to give over one’s promises without good reason. But a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value, a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for a full dispensation.

n. 2242.

Reversion to Original Vow

Reversion to Original Vow.—The return to the original vow by one whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may be obligatory.

(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.

(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is immediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however, that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the vower’s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast, there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the institute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the vows revive (Canon 1315).

n. 2243.

Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows

Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.—(a) A confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows, since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation. A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of (see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow, the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a year or other fixed period.

(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations, and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment (e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Obedience

n. 2364.

Obligation of the Vow of Obedience

Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.—(a) The vow obliges a religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225, 2237).

(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the imposition of a grave precept.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, The Vows

n. 2612.

The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows

The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows.—(a) Poverty is a renunciation of the independent use of external corporal goods, such as money and lands and chattels (simple vow), or also of the radical dominion (see 1697) or right of ownership of such goods (solemn vow). Grave matter in the unjust violation of poverty seems to be the same as in other acts of unjust damage or acquisition, and hence in thefts from outsiders a less amount is grave matter, in domestic thefts from the monastery a greater sum is required (see 1900, 1903). Grave matter in the violation of poverty that is not unjust (e.g., in use of money without permission) seems to be the same as absolutely grave matter for thefts, unless the constitutions rule otherwise; but grave matter here does not coalesce from many small violations. The virtue, but not the vow, of poverty is offended by purely internal acts (e.g., attachment to wealth), and there is no offense at all in dominion over spirituals (such as fame, good reputation) which are not renounced by the vow of poverty, and in certain acts of disposition (e.,g., acceptance of deposit, distribution of alms) or proprietorship (e.g., of manuscripts) permitted by rule.

(b) Chastity is a renunciation of all venereal pleasure, internal and external, lawful and unlawful. Grave matter is the same as for the virtue of chastity, but the vow could be violated without the violation of the virtue (e.g., in the use of marriage by one simply professed). For the protection of this vow the Church has made the law of cloister, which forbids under certain conditions the entrance of outsiders into a religious house or the egress of the religious (Canons 547, 598, 600-604, 679, 2342).

(c) Obedience is the renunciation of one’s own will with the duty of submission to commands of a Superior given according to the rules and constitutions. There is grave matter against the vow if one disobeys in an important matter imposed by the Superior in the name of obedience and according to the rite prescribed by the rule or constitutions (see 2364). The virtue, but not the vow, is offended by internal insubordination (see 2357); neither virtue nor vow is offended when a Superior commands what is above the rule (e.g., the accomplishment of the impossible, heroic acts that do not pertain to the nature of the institute), or against the rule, unless he has power to dispense, or probably what is beneath the rule (such as things manifestly ridiculous and useless). Since obedience is vowed to the precepts of the Superior, the vow is not broken by transgression of points of the rule not expressly included under the vow, nor by transgressions of the general precepts of God and the Church.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 74 passages

Vol. I, On Laws, IV. On the Obligation of Law · Vol. I, On Laws, IX. Privileges of Clerics, Bishops, Regulars · Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, VII. On Sacrilege · Vol. I, On the Second Precept of t…, IV. On Vow

Vol. I, On Laws, IV. On the Obligation of Law

n. 215.

Note: He does not satisfy who performs the work of a vow or oath while expressly intending not to satisfy; because it depends upon the will of the promiser that such an obligation remain. But the obligation of obeying law proceeds from the will of the legislator, and therefore is not extended beyond his intention, i.e., beyond the substance of the commanded work. While expressly intending; for even in those things which proceed from one's own will, the one acting would satisfy if he merely negatively did not have the intention of satisfying, for example because, forgetful of the obligation undertaken, provided nevertheless that he does not apply what he does to another thing. For each person, from a general prior intention, intends to satisfy a debt before satisfying those things which he has imposed upon himself by free will. And this holds also concerning sacramental satisfaction, namely if he does the work imposed by the confessor, yet not intending to fulfill the penance. L. 30, 163; l. 3, n. 700.

Vol. I, On Laws, IX. Privileges of Clerics, Bishops, Regulars

n. 269.

As regards vows and oaths. - Bishops can dispense: 1. In all simple private vows, except the five reserved to the Pope, namely of perpetual chastity, of Religion, and of pilgrimages to Jerusalem, to the thresholds of the Apostles, and to St. James of Compostella. - 2. In all oaths, if you except oaths accepted by a third party, which were not extorted by fear or fraud. - Hence Bishops cannot dispense in vows, whether perpetual or temporary, of Institutes of simple vows, after the Holy See has commended them at least by Decree of Praise. C. cited Conditae a Christo.

269 bis. Are there also privileges of other Prelates? - The privileges of Protonotaries are many. Four orders of these are had: Apostolic Protonotaries of the Number of Participants, seven, who exclusively constitute the College; supernumerary Apostolic Protonotaries; Apostolic Protonotaries after the likeness of Participants; titular, or honorary, Apostolic Protonotaries outside the City. The privileges of all these are contained in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 21 Feb. 1905, concerning Apostolic Protonotaries, concerning Urban Prelates, concerning dignities, canons, and others who enjoy some privileges proper to Prelates. Cf. Declar. S. R. C., 14 Mar. 1906, n. 4182. There are also privileges of the Common Chaplains of the Pontifical Chapel, S. R. C., 16 Mar. 1907, Acta S. Sed., vol. 40, p. 311; of the Loreto Chaplains, S. R. C., 11 Dec. 1912; of Apostolic Missionaries, Decr. S. O., 21 Apr. 1909.

269 ter. Note: 1. A canon duly enrolled in a Chapter which collegially enjoys privileges or insignia and rights pertaining to Apostolic Protonotaries, either supernumerary or after the likeness of participants, acquires no right by which he is numbered by the Supreme Pontiff among Domestic Prelates with the expedition of a Brief. S. R. C., 24 May 1911. - 2. To perform sacred rites in pontifical rite belongs to Bishops. From privilege this is also conceded to Protonotaries after the likeness of Participants, and to other inferior Prelates, but with more moderate adornment. The Constitution of Benedict XIV, In throno iustitiae, 28 Feb. 1752, establishes the manner of using the Indult of Pontificals. - 3. Since precedence is a sign of honor, it is to be deduced from the grade of dignity and from the power of jurisdiction and dominion. A collegiate church has precedence over pastors and a college of pastors. S. R. E., 23 Mar. 1619, n. 372; 5 Feb. 1639, n. 664; 6 Apr. 1647, n. 908. Collectan. S. R. C., Ind. v. Praecedentia.

Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, VII. On Sacrilege

n. 500.

Is the violation of a person bound by a simple vow of chastity sacrilege? - The first probable opinion affirms, because a sin of a sacred person which is directly done against that sanctity by which he is consecrated and dedicated to God is true sacrilege. But a person is dedicated to God not only through sacred ordination or profession of the religious state, but also through participation in this state, such as a simple vow of chastity is, especially perpetual. Therefore. Indeed, any violation of a vow is truly and properly sacrilege, because anyone vowing dedicates himself to God as to that thing, if the vow is personal, and thus the person is sanctified as to the things promised by such vows; and similarly, if the vow is real, the thing promised to God is sanctified. Thus the Salmanticenses, tr. 21, c. 12, n. 22.

The second opinion, of Suarez and others, also probable, denies, because through a simple and private vow neither a thing nor a person is made sacred, but a public deputation of the Church is required, in order to preserve chastity. And the same holds as to other vows. In order, etc.; for even clerics constituted in minor orders are sacred persons, and priests of the Greek rite are also sacred persons; but because they have not been consecrated by the Church in order to preserve chastity, but only in order to divine worship, they do not incur the guilt of sacrilege properly such. Moreover, whoever is bound by a vow of chastity, as often as he violates it, certainly commits a twofold sin, namely against chastity and against religion, by not preserving fidelity to God. And the same is true in other vows. L. 47; l. 6, nn. 808, 809; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3; q. 97, proem.; q. 99, a. 3 ad 3; q. 154, a. 1 ad 3, a. 10 ad 2 and 3; 4 D. 38, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, 3; Suarez, de Sacril., l. 3, c. 3; de Vot., l. 5, c. 3, n. 45; Laym., l. 4, tr. 10, c. 7, n. 4; Less., l. 2, c. 40; Struggl 9, 10.

n. 501.

Is a merely internal sin against chastity by a sacred person sacrilege? - There are not lacking those who deny, as Gury affirms, v. 2, n. 165, since chastity, according to which man is consecrated to God, regards rather exterior acts, which the Church is accustomed to touch by her laws, than interior acts per se. But the doctors commonly affirm, because through chastity the very person is consecrated to God. Yet this reason does not seem to prove the matter demonstratively. For although the very person is consecrated to God through that vow, nevertheless not every internal sin is therefore sacrilege, which would be the case if in reality the person himself were absolutely consecrated to God. Therefore it must altogether be held that the person himself is indeed consecrated to God through that vow, but as to chastity to be preserved. But that this extends also to internal acts is to be demonstrated; and it seems that it can be demonstrated from this, that since a simple vow of perfect chastity is so understood that it comprehends both internal and external acts, a fortiori it is necessary that a solemn vow, through which the person becomes sacred, comprehend both; and this vow is certainly more perfect. L. 554, 457; cf. here v. 2, n. 301.

Vol. I, On the Second Precept of t…, IV. On Vow

n. 570.

What is the nature of a vow? - A vow is: a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Made to God; for a vow is an act of religion, indeed it is an act of latria, owed to God alone. "A promise can also be made to man; and the promise itself of good which is made to man can fall under a vow insofar as it is a certain virtuous work. And in this way must be understood a vow by which someone vows something to the Saints or to Prelates; so that the promise itself made to Saints or to Prelates falls under the vow materially, insofar namely as man vows to God that he will fulfill what he promises to Saints or Prelates." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 5. Therefore a vow is made principally to God, secondarily in honor of the Saints, just as temples and altars which are principally dedicated to God are also said to be dedicated to them. Therefore two conditions are required for the validity of a vow: true intention of a vow, and apt matter. L. 194; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 1-6; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 281 seqq.; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 2; E. M.

n. 571.

Of how many kinds is a vow? - A vow is distinguished: 1. as absolute or conditioned. The former is that which is made without any condition; but the latter is that which is made with a condition, so that, unless this is posited, no obligation arises. Hence a penal vow is specially distinguished, namely when a good thing is vowed as a penalty or penance, for example, I will give alms if I become drunk.

A vow is of some determinate thing, or disjunctive of some thing to be determined afterwards from several at one's judgment. If in this one part is apt and another part inept, for example, either to pray or to play, the whole vow is not valid. L. 203. 3. Personal or real, according as an action or omission of the one vowing, for example, a pilgrimage, or some thing separable from the action of the person, for example the donation of a chalice, alms, etc., is promised. 4. Temporary or perpetual, according as it is promised to be observed only for a certain time, or through one's whole life. 5. Public or private, according as it is made with the Church accepting the vow, or without this authority of the Church accepting intervening. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 Aug. 1889. 6. Solemn or simple, according as it is made solemnly and is accepted by the Church as solemn; or, solemnity and this acceptance of the Church being excluded, it is emitted. Therefore the solemnity of a vow is had in this acceptance and approval of the Church, by which, by that vow, someone is totally bound over to divine worship as to preserving chastity, obedience, and poverty, through the blessing and consecration of the Church, implicit in that acceptance and approval. But the Church annexed this blessing and consecration to the reception of sacred order, by which someone is applied to divine ministry, and to the profession of a certain rule, by which, through renunciation of the world and of one's own will, someone assumes the state of proper perfection. But since solemnity signifies a certain exterior apparatus and ceremony which is employed when someone is totally bound over to some thing, hence a vow is said to be solemnized through reception of sacred order and through profession of a religious rule, to which the Church has annexed a solemn vow. Therefore only the vow of chastity annexed to major orders and the vow of religious profession is solemn. L. 195; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 7, 11; Cajetan on this place; Struggl 28; cf. here v. 2, n. 248.

n. 572.

What sort ought the intention of a vow to be? - For the validity of a vow a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow is required, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation from the virtue of fidelity. For a vow is in the likeness of a certain law which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But no one is judged, short of sufficient deliberation of mind, to oblige himself. Hence a vow essentially differs from a purpose, because a purpose means a deliberate will of doing or omitting something, without the mind of obliging oneself. Therefore a purpose, however firm, produces no bond of obligation, nor is omission of the thing proposed a sin, unless perhaps sometimes per accidens, for example, on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which per se do not exceed venial sin. C. Litteraturam 3, de Vot.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 1; L. 196-199; Struggl 3, 16.

n. 573.

You will resolve: For the validity of a vow, not just any will and deliberation suffice which would suffice for mortal sin. For grave sin, it is enough to know confusedly the gravity of guilt and to have the voluntary at least indirectly and in the cause; but a more perfect cognition and willing of the burden to which one obliges oneself is required where the matter concerns a promise and an obligation to be contracted. For good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect. "Since the obligation of a vow is most grave, intention, deliberation, and perfect liberty are required, by which someone freely and directly in himself has willed to promise with the mind of obliging himself." L. 196. Therefore a vow made with half-full advertence or deliberation does not oblige. Likewise vows made in drunkenness, even foreseen beforehand, and thus willed in the cause, are not valid, since they are not willed in themselves and directly.

Yet for this full and perfect deliberation it is not required that someone weigh exactly all the circumstances which can allure toward a vow or deter from it; but it suffices that someone has sufficiently recognized the burden and obligation of the vow as to substance. Likewise virtual intention suffices, which proceeds from a previous actual intention. Hence one who, from a previous intention of religious profession, emits the three vows of religion, although altogether distracted in mind, is truly bound by them. But if someone vows with the positive mind of not promising, nor obliging himself from religion, certainly the vow is null. If someone also wishes to promise, knowing the obligation of a vow, but does not wish to oblige himself to the promise and vow, more commonly and probably he is not held by the vow. But thus to vow without the mind of obliging oneself, Sanchez, etc., say is ordinarily only venial on account of a certain disorder. Ordinarily, because in religious profession and reception of sacred orders it would undoubtedly be mortal, because it would be deception in a most grave matter. L. 196, 201; S. Th. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ad 2; Struggl 5, 6; Laym., l. 4, t. 4, c. 1, n. 4.

n. 574.

Note: "For a vow an implicit promise suffices, as is clear in the reception of sacred orders, where, although it is not said, I vow, or I promise chastity, nevertheless this vow is made implicitly, by this very fact, that, knowing that the Church has annexed this vow to orders, you receive them. But whether, if someone plainly were ignorant of this, he would still be judged to vow from implicit intention, is doubtful. Some affirm, but others more probably deny, and say that such a person is bound to chastity, not from a vow, but from the precept of the Church." L. 200; Struggl 6.

n. 575.

Is a vow made through error valid? - R. Negatively, if the error concerns the substance of the thing, or substantial circumstances, or those which are principally intended, or pertain to the substance, or notably change it; because then the thing promised is not sufficiently known and willed. Indeed St. Alphonsus, n. 198, adds: "it is certain that error concerning the substance invalidates a vow, even if it was concomitant, that is, not giving cause to the vow, for example, if even when the error was known, you would still have vowed; and even if the error was however crass." For even such ignorance renders the act non-voluntary.

R. Affirmatively, if the error is only concerning an impulsive cause. "The vow is valid, because that is only a secondary cause, and if it is set aside, the act is sufficiently voluntary according to its substance. Nor does such an error vitiate the act in other contracts; for example, someone vowed a pilgrimage to Rome with zeal for worshiping God, and at the same time also had a secondary impulsive cause, that he might visit his brother, whom he thought to be at Rome; even if afterwards he understands that the brother is not there, he does not therefore cease to be obligated by the vow." L. 198.

R. Affirmatively also, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment, which would not have stood in the way of the vow if, the error being excluded, they had been known; for one who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergo merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. Thus St. Liguori, who nevertheless in n. 198 does not deny that it is probable that error invalidates a vow in accidental circumstances, if these are of great moment, and if, had they been known, the vow would not have been emitted. Cf. 563, 567, 597, 598.

Yet vows must be excepted which are emitted after the novitiate in any approved order; for these are not void because of any error, except only substantial error, concerning the substance. For by their nature they constitute a stable and irrevocable state; and therefore one dependent upon no other error than substantial error. Moreover, because otherwise it would follow that many Professions would be invalidated, to the grave damage and scandal of the commonwealth. This also holds concerning marriage. L. ib.; Lugo, de Iust. et Iure, d. 22, n. 88; Sanch., de Matr., l. 10, d. 9, n. 20.

n. 576.

Is a vow made through fear valid? - R. Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, inflicted from without in order to extort the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is violently extorted from someone through injury, since the law of nature demands that right be restored entirely. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, moreover, from canon law as to solemn vows of religion, and probably also as to other vows. C. Perlatum 1, de His quae, etc.; L. 197.

Unjust; for if the fear is just, the vow is valid, since there is no true coercion in that which one ought to do, nor is the one vowing reasonably unwilling. Inflicted in order to extort the vow; for otherwise the vow is valid, for example, if someone, fearing death which robbers threaten, made a vow to God that he might be delivered. Grave; whether a vow emitted from light unjust fear is invalid, "Busembaum here affirms with Suarez and Filliucci. Likewise Navarrus and many others cited by Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 3, n. 24. The reason, as they say, is that fear therefore annuls a vow because it takes away full liberty of consent; therefore light fear also will annul it, when it takes away the same liberty and is the cause that the vow is made. And Sanchez calls this opinion probable. But the opposite opinion is more probable, which Sanchez holds, n. 24, with Soto, Valentia, Sa, Azor, etc., and the Salmanticenses, ibid., n. 161, who call it common, and prove it from C. Perlatum, de His quae vi, etc. The reason is that light fear, which can easily be cast off, is not judged to be the cause of so grave a thing as a vow, just as we shall likewise say concerning contracts, n. 718." L. 197.

R. Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away the use of reason from the one vowing; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary.

n. 577.

Is one bound by a vow who doubts whether he emitted the vow; whether he emitted it with sufficient deliberation; whether he has fulfilled the vow emitted? - R. To the first: negatively; and the same must be said if you doubt whether something is comprehended by the vow; you are not bound as to the part about which you doubt. For an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly established.

R. To the second: it is certainly impossible that, while a true and positive doubt remains concerning sufficient use of reason and sufficient deliberation, a certain obligation of a vow should be had from it. For a vow essentially includes perfect deliberation of reason. Therefore if this is doubtful, consequently the vow is doubtful, and its obligation doubtful. Suarez, l. 4, c. 6, n. 10. In a negative doubt, before the seventh year the presumption is for defect of deliberation; after the seventh year, the presumption is for sufficient deliberation.

R. To the third: negatively, for the same reason as to the first, if the doubt is positive. But affirmatively if the doubt is negative, because possession then stands for the vow. L. 196; Elbel, de Actib. human., 156 seqq.

n. 578.

Must the matter of a vow be something morally possible? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obliging oneself; but no one can oblige himself to something morally impossible for him. But if the thing is divisible and in part possible, the vow is valid for this part. Except, however, if it were clear that the one vowing wished to oblige himself to both parts by way of one thing, and had both before his eyes indivisibly. The reason is that a vow is a particular law, which is not extended beyond the intention of the one vowing; and therefore if the one vowing collectively promised both parts, and one depending upon the other, if one is impossible, the whole vow remains void. Thus the Salmanticenses, tr. 17, c. 1, n. 74, who soon after, ibid., nn. 75, 76, add several examples of vows which either are to be observed in the part which remains possible, or are judged void because of the impossibility of some part. But a vow is not valid if the thing is morally indivisible. L. 202, 225.

n. 579.

You will resolve: A vow of doing whatever is more perfect is not valid without a special impulse of the Holy Spirit; nor a vow of avoiding all sins, even venial sins, even half-deliberate ones; because this is morally impossible without special grace and privilege. Trent, sess. 6, c. 23. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid, or even all fully deliberate venial sins, because this is morally possible with the ordinary help of divine grace, and does not need a special privilege, provided, however, that the matter concerns persons truly pious. "But a vow," adds St. Alphonsus, n. 303, "of abstaining from venial sins in some determinate matter is commonly valid, especially in persons of great virtue; but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed in some matters, for example of unchaste thoughts, idle thoughts, etc., since they are unavoidable for all, the vow is null." But the Salmanticenses and others cited by the same St. Alphonsus, l. c., assert on the contrary that a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even if it were concerning fully deliberate sins, is altogether invalid, as concerning a thing morally impossible, from c. 23, sess. 6, Trent. But in this canon the discourse is not only about fully deliberate sins. Sanchez, in Decal., l. 4, cap. 5, n. 17.

n. 580.

Must the matter of a vow be something morally good, indeed concerning a better good? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that otherwise the promise of a vow would not be pleasing and acceptable to God. "Vows which are concerning vain and useless things are more to be mocked than to be kept." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3; L. 204. Likewise a promise which impedes a greater good, under this respect, detracts from the worship of God, and consequently cannot be pleasing and acceptable to him, so as to beget an obligation in conscience from the motive of religion, or divine worship. But this better good is not to be understood comparatively to any good whatever, but comparatively to its opposite, so that this good is such that its positing is better than its omission. Likewise a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to the circumstances. Cf. the formula of the oath of certain Colleges of the City. M. E., v. 21, pp. 351 seqq.

n. 581.

You will resolve: A vow of a good thing from an evil end is not valid, if the evil end stands on the side of the vow itself, namely if the vow itself is ordered to an evil end; for example, if you vow alms in order to obtain the successful outcome of theft. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as though God would furnish help for sinning. Likewise a vow is not valid from a cause evil in itself, as for example if you make a vow because you have won an unjust lawsuit, or have killed an enemy.

It must be said otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the bad end only accompanies the vow accidentally, and stands entirely on the side of the one vowing; for example, if someone vows on account of the glory of God, but with some vanity, and from vain ostentation more gladly vows externally.

Likewise a vow of a good thing with a bad condition is valid, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, although joined with a cause or occasion and bad condition; as if someone vows alms because he was not caught, or if he is not caught, in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not being harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the bad condition; as if someone vows alms if and as often as he blasphemes.

A vow concerning a thing otherwise prescribed is valid, because a vow of this sort is concerning a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to be prescribed, and is concerning a better good, since it can confer a new bond and greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. L. 206, 213; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 6; Laymann, l. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 7.

n. 582.

Is a vow invalid concerning a good which impedes a greater good? - These are the words of St. Alphonsus, nn. 207, 209: It is invalid and a venial sin to vow a good which is an impediment of a greater good, as especially are vows against the evangelical counsels, for example, to remain in the world, to take a wife, to go to military service, to engage in trade. Yet if some good, lesser per se and absolutely, should become by accident a greater good, then to vow such things is valid; for example, if someone saw that reception of orders would be harmful to him. Hence a vow of marrying, speaking per se, is null, even if it is concerning marrying a poor woman, a prostitute, or for removing the sins of others, because celibacy is always more pleasing to God. It is otherwise if the vow was emitted in order to repair scandal, or the honor of a girl from obligation, or for the common good; or also, far more probably, because of experience of one's own frailty, supposing that such a person does not wish to use other remedies. For in such a case marriage is a greater good, since it was granted by God for calming concupiscence for him who does not wish to take up other better remedies. 1 Cor. 7:9. Cf. 554, 558.

n. 583.

Does he sin, and how, who vows an evil thing? - These are the words of St. Alphonsus, nn. 204, 205: He who vows a vain, useless, indifferent thing sins venially. He who vows a mortal sin sins mortally. He who vows a venial sin, some say sins venially, others mortally. "It seems more probable to me that it is a grave fault, since of itself it is blasphemy to will that evil should redound to the honor of God; but commonly because of ignorance this is only venial." Cf. 554.

n. 584.

Whether and how does a vow oblige? - The response is contained in the following propositions: A vow is obligatory. For a promise made to a man certainly obliges; how much more, therefore, one made to God. Hence the breaking of a vow is a certain species of infidelity. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3. And the Scriptures most evidently persuade this: When you have vowed a vow ... you shall not delay to pay it, etc. Deut. 23:21. If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it, etc. Eccles. 5:3. It is heretical, says St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, aa. 1, 2, to assert that a vow does not oblige.

n. 585.

A vow obliges per se, like a law or precept of the Church, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter. For a vow is as it were a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself. Struggl 17; L. 211, 213.

n. 586.

A vow obliges according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of the obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light obligation in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or superior can oblige only lightly in grave matter, so also he who vows can impose only a light obligation upon himself in a grave thing. Yet, conversely, he cannot oblige himself gravely in a light thing, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation. But in the vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders, and in the vows of religious profession, the Church specially requires the will of obliging oneself gravely. Hence religious profession is void when it is expressly emitted without the will of obliging oneself gravely. Struggl 18; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3; L. 211, 212.

n. 587.

Note: That matter is judged grave which, when prescribed by the Church, obliges gravely, such as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave; or which contributes notably to the end of the vow, or to the worship of God.

n. 588.

No one can be obligated by another's vow by force of the vow, because a vow is a personal burden voluntarily undertaken, and therefore no one can promise another's thing or action. S. R. C., 18 Apr. 1643; 23 Jun. 1703.

By force of the vow; for 1. from justice an heir is bound to pay the real vows of the deceased, just as he is bound to pay his other debts, legacies, etc. The reason is that a real vow affects the thing itself, and therefore it remains bound into whatever hands it comes. Hence such vows must be satisfied before legacies, because the obligation of real vows is prior to a free legacy by reason of death, but after debts of justice, because the deceased is judged to have emitted real vows to be paid only from that part of his goods concerning which he was able to dispose freely and without injury to others. Hence a necessary heir can lawfully reserve the legitimate portion, or the portion due according to law, not only for himself but also for other descendants, and therefore he is bound to pay the real vows of the deceased only from the remaining substance.

From obedience, subjects, both those who now live and those who in the future will become members of the community, are bound, by force of a certain pact or statute or custom, and from the motive of religion, to fulfill a vow which has been emitted in their name by the civil magistrate, with the Bishop consenting, or by the superiors of a religion. Struggl 24, 26; Suarez, de Voto, l. 4, c. 1, 9; Tamburini, Expl. Decal., l. 3, cap. 12, § 4; cap. 16, § 2, n. 12; 7; Scav., ed. 12, Mediol. 1874, l. 2, n. 219; L. 213, 214, 216; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 98, a. 2 ad 2, ad 4; E. M.

n. 589.

You will resolve: Real vows are to be paid from one's own goods; but he who cannot pay from his own goods is not bound to beg from another so that he may be able to satisfy them. Yet he satisfies if another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to pay for him, even though he himself is able to satisfy; because what the other gives, with the consent of the one vowing added, or with ratification if he gave without his knowledge, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow was determined; for then that thing must be given in its individuality, when namely a particular reason moved him to vow this thing in its individuality.

Personal vows can be fulfilled only by the one vowing himself, nor do they pass to heirs. Hence he who vowed a pilgrimage does not satisfy if he hires another; nor is he bound to hire someone if he himself cannot go.

The vows of parents, devoting their children to some religion, or imposing upon them an obligation, for example, of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. But although children are not bound by the vow of parents who devoted them to religion or to some obligation, nevertheless the vow obliges the parents so that, as far as lies in them, with the freedom of the children preserved, they move them to embrace that which they vowed for them; and much more, that they not stand in the way of children wishing to embrace it. L. 213, 216, 217, 220.

n. 590.

Conditional vows do not oblige when the condition ceases, even if the one vowing himself was the cause that the condition is not posited, provided he did not impede it by deceit, force, or malice; for then someone sins indirectly against the vow, but the vow no longer subsists. The reason is that the condition is now not fulfilled, although by the fault and fraud of the one vowing.

In a disjunctive vow, "if each part is apt matter, that which is chosen must be performed, even if after the election the other part perishes, or is rendered impossible. Conversely, if one part perishes, or is rendered impossible before the election, you are not bound to the other, unless the thing perishes by your fault, or you were in delay in delivering or determining it." L. 224, 218, 219.

n. 591.

He who vows something to be done at a certain time, after that time has passed, whether with fault or without fault, is bound to nothing, if the day was added to terminate the obligation, as, speaking per se and regularly, it is to be judged in personal vows, unless the contrary is established, as very commonly they say. For transgression of a vow does not oblige to compensation. Hence one who did not fulfill on one day is not bound to fulfill on another day.

It is otherwise if the day was added only to urge fulfillment, just as conversely it must be judged, per se and regularly, in real vows, unless again the contrary is established, since that day has no more special reason than others. But if the vow is indeterminate as to time, for example concerning a daily rosary, etc., the vow obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. Suarez, l. 4, c. 15; Sanch., in Decal., l. 4, c. 14, n. 25; Struggl 17; L. 212, 220.

n. 592.

Vows are to be interpreted according to the more benign part, since they are laws of a free will. L. 224.

n. 593.

You will resolve: One vowing that he will hear Mass for a month is probably not bound to hear two Masses on feast days; just as this is also probable if it is imposed by a Confessor for penance. One vowing that he will observe fasting can eat milk foods. One vowing fasting for a month is not bound on Sunday. One vowing fasting on the vigil of some Saint which falls on Sunday can anticipate the fast on Saturday. One vowing fasting on each Saturday is probably not bound to the vow if Christmas Day falls on Saturday, unless he expressly intended that he still wished to be obligated on that day, because then he is bound beyond doubt.

But since the matter or substance of fasting is divisible, if the fasting is strict, namely one which includes both one meal only and abstinence, so that those also are bound to one meal who in any way, whether culpably or inculpably, have eaten meats, he who vowed fasting, if he eats meats, and the obligation of the vow is ended on the same day, is bound at least to observe the one meal; but if the obligation of the vow is not ended on that day, if indeed it is not affixed to the day, he is bound to fast on another day.

One vowing that he will recite the rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, because it is commonly so understood; and he satisfies by reciting it alternately, because such a vow obliges after the manner of the divine office; and he also satisfies by dividing the decades. If someone, forgetful of the vow or of the imposed penance, etc., performs the work due, he satisfies well by the general will which each person is judged to have of satisfying first his obligations.

Whether a Religious who has vowed, when he asks license from his superior to fulfill the thing promised by vow, is bound to manifest his vow to him? It is controverted. Some affirm, because this manifestation of the vow conduces, regularly speaking, to obtaining license more easily. Others more probably deny, because a vow is of strict interpretation, and consequently the one vowing is judged to oblige himself only to that which is a necessary and commonly sufficient means for obtaining license. Thus Schmalz., in h. t., nn. 23-25; L. 222-224, 226.

n. 594.

Can light matters in vows coalesce with each other so as to make grave matter? - Either those light matters are vowed separately and by way of several things disjoined from each other, say from a diverse end; or they are vowed in a mass, and by way of one thing. If the first, omissions, even if multiplied, will never be able to combine into grave matter, because they are in no way united with each other. If the second, they can certainly, for the contrary reason, constitute grave matter and arrive at mortal sin.

But matters are judged to be vowed by way of several things disjoined from each other in personal vows; but by way of one thing and in a mass in real vows, unless the contrary is established. For personal vows are commonly judged to be affixed to the day, whence transgression of one does not coalesce with another; not likewise real vows. Thus, for example, a real vow is judged to exist if someone vows to give one little coin daily for a year; but it would be a personal vow if he vowed to recite one Pater on each day of the year. Therefore by omitting to recite this prayer even for a long time, it would be a venial sin; but by omitting that small alms, it would be grave when it had arrived at grave matter. Hence an omission of this sort will always have to be supplied, since by the lapse of time the obligation of the vow does not cease. Yet if the intention of the one vowing were truly doubtful, the vow is judged affixed to the day, so that its matters do not coalesce, but each is terminated in the day. For each person is judged to oblige himself as little as he can. Struggl 17, 33; L. 212, 220.

n. 595.

What delay is to be judged grave? - Per se, any delay of a vow gravely obliging is grave when it is affixed to a determinate time, as is a vow of fasting on such a vigil, etc., because once the time has elapsed the obligation of the vow ceases from the general principle that transgression of a vow does not oblige to compensation.

But if a determinate time was not set, or was set only to urge, not also to terminate, the obligation of the vow, either the delay diminishes the matter promised or it does not. If the first is verified, grave delay in a grave thing will be a grave sin, unless a reasonable cause excuses, as if someone meanwhile awaits a suitable time for the end which he proposed to himself. Hence, for example, if someone has vowed religious life, then, says Tamburini, "the time, or age, of the one vowing must be considered; for if the one vowing is, for example, in his fifteenth year, I would not judge a delay of three or even four years notable. For youths are accustomed to take up religious life around the fifteenth and twentieth year, namely when a state of life is usually assumed. Therefore, while someone in his fifteenth year vows perpetual religion, unless he determines the time for entrance, he does not seem to have renounced the customary manner and time in assuming a state of life... But if the one vowing had reached, for example, the fortieth year of age, I freely admit that a delay beyond six months is sufficiently notable; for such an age does not permit a longer delay."

But if the second is verified, the same Tamburini says that "it does not seem improbable that any delay whatever, provided there is not probable danger of omitting the vow altogether, is only venial. The reason can be that no one, when he gives the whole which he promised and causes no damage to the creditor from delay, seems to be condemned of grave fault, but only of light negligence; but no damage comes to God from the aforesaid delay, etc." And soon after he adds: "That is deservedly certain, when there is no danger of diminution of service, that a vow made without determination of time can be delayed, even without venial sin, until the time in which someone believes he will fulfill it with greater devotion; because this redounds to the greater honor of God, to which the vow is ordered; therefore that greater hoped-for devotion is to be judged a sufficient cause of delay." Explic. Decal., l. 3, c. 12, § 3, n. 11. But others assert generally that it is grave to defer temporary vows beyond two or three years, and perpetual vows beyond six months. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 3; L. 221, l. 4, n. 72 seqq.; Struggl 19, 21.

n. 596.

How manyfold is the sin committed by one who violates a vow? - Either the vow concerns a thing otherwise prescribed, or not. If the first, there will be a double sin, one against the virtue to which the thing promised by vow pertains, the other against the virtue of religion; for a double precept is violated. If the second, there will be one sin, against religion, because the one vowing in this case does not wish to impose upon himself another obligation than that which arises by force of the vow itself.

But the malice of this sin against religion is perfidy, or violation of the fidelity owed to God, which violation directly pertains to irreverence toward God. But whether violation of any vow whatever, that is, even not solemn, also takes on the malice of sacrilege strictly such, that is, induces another sin against religion directly pertaining to irreverence toward sacred things, some affirm, others deny. Cf. 500. But violation of a solemn vow contains infidelity and violation of a person consecrated to God. From the fact that violation of a vow as such is not of diverse species from diverse matter, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicates, he can accuse separately the breaking of the vow." L. 224. Roncaglia, tr. 7, q. 2, c. ult., quaest. 5; L. 213, 224.

n. 597.

How does a vow cease from within? - The obligation of a vow can cease from within and from without.

It ceases from within: 1. If the matter formerly possible becomes impossible, formerly honorable becomes shameful, formerly a better good becomes indifferent and an impediment of a greater good, by reason of the destruction of the thing itself, prohibition, and a new circumstance. For the obligation is extinguished if it falls into that case from which it could not begin. 2. If you change the vow into a work evidently better; for each person can do this even by himself, provided no special prohibition is present in the particular case. Cf. 623. 3. If the state of the thing is notably changed. "It is the common opinion," says St. Alphonsus, n. 226, cited by the Salmanticenses, "that in every promise, as also is a vow, a change of matter notable of itself takes away the obligation. The reason is that through the change the thing becomes diverse from that which was promised." Understand, "except the simple vow of chastity and of religion." L. l. 4, n. 50. 4. If the thing vowed has become useless for the intent, especially if it is more destructive of it. 5. If those conditions also so bear, which are understood in any vow whatever. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 2. 6. If its final cause ceases; but otherwise if only an impulsive cause ceases. Cf. 566. 7. When the condition is not fulfilled, if the vow was conditioned; when the determinate time has elapsed, if the vow was affixed to a certain time. Cf. 590, 591. Struggl 32, 36; L. 225, 243.

n. 598.

Is that change sufficient of itself, even not notable, which nevertheless, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the vow? - The first opinion affirms, and St. Thomas expressly holds this; he teaches: "That frees from the obligation of a vow or oath which, if it had been known from the beginning, would have prevented them from being made"; 4 D. 38, q. 1, a. 3. The reason is that then the intention of obliging oneself is lacking, or it is so interpreted according to what was said in the preceding number, in the fifth place.

The second opinion denies, because, in order to exempt the one vowing from the obligation of the vow, attention must not be given to what he would have promised if he had remembered, but rather to what he actually promised. Now St. Alphonsus, n. 226, speaking of the first opinion, says: "This opinion seems to me not less probable, indeed perhaps more probable." And he hands it down as quasi-certain, l. 3, n. 720. Cf. here 563, 567, 575, 597, 3.

n. 599.

How does a vow cease from without? What is annulment, and of how many kinds is it? - A vow ceases from without through annulment, dispensation, commutation.

Annulment of a vow is its nullification or suspension made by him to whose dominative power the will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject. It is 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow. In the former case the vow is altogether annihilated, nor does it afterwards revive any longer; but in the latter its obligation is only suspended as to matter subject to the power of another, and it revives when the one vowing has become perfectly his own master. Struggl 30, 31, 43.

n. 600.

What is direct annulment? - Since the dominion of anyone ought not to be violated, and any master can use his own liberty, hence, if the will of someone is subject to the dominative power of another, that one can directly annul, validly, all the vows of that subject, of whatever sort they are, emitted during the time of subjection, at his own pleasure, without any cause; that is, he can will and pronounce that those vows are null, so that in no case does the obligation afterwards revive. For this annulment is not the placing of some impediment to the execution of an act of the will, but the nullification of its value, on account of the implicit condition in the act itself: if he to whose power it pertains does not contradict; if it is not revoked by the superior. And this holds even if the vow is in favor of a third party, and perhaps accepted. This right comes from natural law, and also from positive law, by which legitimate dominative power over the will of another is given to someone. Dominative power is distinguished from jurisdiction in this, that the latter arises from the right of a public office, but the former from the right of a private office, whence it also is usually called economic power.

Schmalz., l. 1, t. 32, n. 4; Laym., de Leg., c. 5, n. 1; L. 227; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; q. 88, aa. 8, 9; q. 189, a. 5; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, l. 6, cc. 6, 7; Bouix, de Iure Reg., v. 2, pp. 481-505; Ferraris, v. Votum, art. 3, n. 10 seqq.

Dominative power: It is the power of a master over his own things; and besides this, it is that power over persons which is similar to the aforesaid power over things; such as the power of a father over a son, who is something of the father, the power of a master over a slave, who is something of the master, and also the power of a regular prelate over his own religious, by force of religious profession, by which someone has consecrated and handed over himself wholly and totally to God in a religious Order. Therefore it is well distinguished from the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and from the power of jurisdiction properly such, and from the power which is properly called economic. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; C. He. 331. And by force of this power the same St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5, grants that the vows of children can be annulled by parents.

n. 601.

What is indirect annulment? - If indeed not the will of the one vowing, but the matter of the vow is subject to someone, so that he has a right over it, that one can, by indirect annulment, suspend such a vow, at whatever time it was emitted, that is, suspend its obligation, insofar as prejudice is done to his right; and this from the law of nature teaching that no one can promise something to another to the prejudice of a third party. Hence the vow, when the state of things has changed, revives. But per accidens it can be extinguished, if the vow, for example, obliges for a certain time, and license is denied for that time, or the matter is prohibited. L. 241; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

n. 602.

Can a superior annul vows if these have been ratified by him, or after the time of subjection has passed? - R. To the first: affirmatively, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. But, on the contrary, one who once annulled a vow, if afterwards he does not wish this, the vow is not therefore revalidated. The reason is that through annulment the vow is extinguished. But that an extinguished vow may revive, the repentance of the superior who annulled it contributes nothing; rather the will of the subject is required, who would again oblige himself by vow. L. 239.

R. To the second: Vows made in the time of subjection can still be annulled after that time, for example, when a son is now pubescent, and this, says St. Alphonsus, n. 238, is the more probable opinion. Moreover, Sanchez hands down a double rule in this matter, in Decal., l. 4, c. 30, nn. 7, 8. "The first is: When the power of the superior, during whose time the vow was emitted, is not altogether extinguished or altogether suspended, but remains as to some things, he can annul a vow emitted in the time of his subjection, even if that time has now passed; provided, after it has passed, it has not again been confirmed (understand confirmed, in such a way that he then knows the vows were infirm, as St. Alphonsus has, l. c.). The later rule is: When that power of the superior is altogether extinguished or altogether suspended, he cannot annul those vows."

n. 603.

Is some cause required for the annulment of vows? - To annul the vows of subjects without cause is of itself no sin, because they are judged to have been emitted under the condition of the superior's consent; whence obedience stands in place of cause. Of itself, because in practice it can with difficulty be excused from venial sin; for it would be an idle act, and the progress of another would be irrationally impeded. Nevertheless this commonly does not exceed venial sin. But any reasonable cause suffices for excusing from venial sin.

Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, l. 6, c. 7, n. 16, warns that for annulling a lesser cause suffices than for dispensing. Hence, from the opinion of all, he infers that a subject who asks annulment of a vow from his Prelate, when he does not have a cause which would suffice for a just dispensation, does not sin, because, as he says, he uses his right, because the vow was not absolute, but conditioned, and through it he did not oblige himself to beware lest the condition be impeded, or not to take precautions that it not be posited, as is clear from the common manner of vowing. But he who feels the burdens of religion can, without sin, enjoy its advantages. Therefore, just as a Prelate does not sin by annulling, so neither does a subject by asking. L. 228; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

n. 604.

Who can annul the vows of religious? - The Pope indeed can directly annul all vows of religious; and the Bishop can annul the vows of nuns subject to him. Moreover, besides the Pope, abbots, guardians, priors, and rectors, even secondary Prelates in the absence of the primary ones, and probably also abbesses, can directly annul the vows of religious, whatever they are, even internal vows, even those emitted under predecessors. Yet exception is made, besides the very vows of religious profession, cf. Trent, sess. 25, c. 1, de Reg., of the vow of passing to a stricter religion, as is established in C. Licet 18, de Regul. For from that profession arises the power of annulling. And because the accessory follows the principal, other vows annexed to profession are also excepted. The aforesaid vow not even the Pope can annul, insofar as he is supreme Prelate of the religious order, although not only the Pope, but also a regular Prelate, can dispense from it. C. Monacho 2, can. 20, q. 4; L. 233, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; Struggl 37, 38; cf. here 616.

Of religious; the matter concerns religious of solemn vows. Superiors can annul the vows of religious of simple vows only indirectly. For by force of a solemn vow a religious no longer has to will and not to will; by force of a simple vow a religious is bound only to obey a superior legitimately commanding in the matter of the Rule and Constitutions. Can annul; therefore the vows are valid in themselves before they are annulled. L. 231, 233; S. C. EE. et RR., 28 Jun. 1901, n. 132, Normar.; Monit. Eccles., v. 16, pp. 367 seqq.

Nor is it valid to object against this that these Institutes are themselves also approved by the Holy See. They are indeed approved by the Holy See, but not as religious Institutes of solemn vows. They are approved only in an altogether inferior grade, namely as Institutes of simple vows, by which there is certainly not that perfect handing over of oneself and surrender of oneself, so that a religious is said to have neither to will nor not to will, as is expressly contained in C. Religiosus 2, de Testam., and ult. vol. in 6, C. Religiosi ult., de Sepult. in 6, C. Si Religiosus 27, de Elect. et elect. potest. From this, moreover, it is that the solemn vow of obedience so subjects the will of the one vowing to the Prelate that without his consent it is ineffective for contracting any civil or natural obligation through contract or any other mode. But the simple vow of obedience does not have such an effect, neither by force of its natural obligation alone, nor by force of the approval of the Church. For by force of this vow the religious only "assumes the obligation of obeying the precept of a legitimate superior, in those things which pertain directly or indirectly to the life of the Institute, that is, to the observance of the vows and Constitutions." Norm. S. C. EE. et RR., 28 Jun. 1901, art. 132. Now the obligation alone of obeying the precept of a Prelate, according to the Constitutions of the Institute, is not of itself sufficient to annul any will whatever of obliging oneself to another in matter not contrary to them. Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, de Voto, l. 6, c. 7, n. 5; tr. 7, l. 13, nn. 4, 5; Congr. Gener. S. I. 1, Can. 22.

n. 605.

Note: A Prelate can licitly and validly annul the vow of a subject confirmed by an equal or inferior predecessor, but not by a superior. L. 239.

It is certain that the vows of religious are extinguished through solemn profession, as is had from C. Scripturae 4, de Voto: "He is not held guilty of a broken vow who is known to commute temporal service into the perpetual observance of religion." L. 237; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 12. The same vows of religious are suspended through profession of simple vows; and therefore they revive if someone returns to the secular state. As to novices, regular Prelates can indirectly annul the personal vows of a novice when the execution of these prejudices the exercises of probation. But they cannot annul their real vows, because these do not prejudice the exercises of probation. Struggl 42.

…and 34 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 56 passages

50. On a Vow

"A Protestant emitted a vow of chastity, and also of poverty and obedience, by voice and in writing before an Anglican minister. It is asked whether it has at least the force of a simple and private vow, or whether it must be held as altogether void in the case of conversion to the Catholic religion?

R. The vow of which there is question in the prayers is simple, and the one vowing is held to observance of the vow, if he had a true intention of vowing." Sacred Penitentiary, 29 Nov. 1842; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2086; I. M. 570-574.

Benedictus, having a depraved habit of speaking badly about everyone, in order that he may be corrected efficaciously, emits a vow of speaking well about everyone, insofar as this can be done from prudence and from rightly ordered charity. Fearing nevertheless lest he transgress the vow and sin, he does not bind himself by that vow under sin, but only under imperfection.

Q. 1. Is a vow of this sort valid? 2. Does it have at least some effect?

R. To the first. The aforesaid vow is in no way valid. For a vow is essentially a promise made to God. But a promise essentially contains an obligation from fidelity. Therefore a vow without any obligation is a vow without a promise; namely, it is a vow without a vow, or it is not a vow. Therefore a vow of this sort can be nothing else than a mere proposal of not speaking badly about others, but well, according nevertheless to prudence and due charity. I. M. 570, 572, 573; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 88, a. 1.

To the second. Moral imperfection, as it is distinguished from mortal and venial sin, is nothing else than the privation or mere negation of a more perfect act, which ought to be placed for the better, or could only be placed. Now the aforesaid proposal does not have this effect, that it renders the act itself more perfect; for the act has this from the object and from the circumstances. And thus, if to speak well of neighbor in these or those circumstances is a more perfect act, this indeed does not arise from the proposal made, as a grave or light obligation arises from the vow itself; but because that act of speaking well about others is more perfect in itself by reason of the object and circumstances about which it is concerned. Hence, choosing not to speak, even independently of the proposal made, would be less perfect. But the aforesaid proposal has only this effect, and one proper to itself: that by not choosing at some time to speak well about others, when one can do this according to prudence and charity, someone incurs the mark of inconstancy and instability, which in the genus of morals is at least a not light imperfection. Hence it is that, although someone does not propose under imperfection, or under the penalty of imperfection, thinking nothing about it, nevertheless he still incurs that mark of imperfection and of inconstancy and instability. And, if someone firmly proposes and repeats the proposal, by failing in it he incurs not only the common imperfection from the lack of a more perfect act, but still incurs a special imperfection from the lack of constancy and stability in the proposal firmly established before and often confirmed before God; whence by force of a proposal of this sort the more perfect act not only could, but also ought to be done, and the lack of it is not a mere lack and negation, but a privation, namely in relation to the proposal made. - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 6, d. 8; I. M. 572, 573.

Bibiana, a very religious woman, vowed that on Sunday, in the evening after visiting the church according to her pious custom, and after reciting the rosary there, she would be free for pious reading for half an hour, and then for mental prayer for an hour. But forgetful of this vow, on the occasion of the first communion of some poor little girls, she vows that she will teach them the rudiments of the Christian Faith at those same hours.

Q. Which vow of those incompatible ones must be observed?

R. Fr. Gury, 313, says: "the prior vow must be observed. For that vow, affecting a determined time, binds the will of the one vowing, and prevents her from being able to take up another obligation affixed to this same time. Therefore the second vow by this very fact is void, since it regards a will already obliged in a diverse way. For it is made concerning a thing no longer free, and therefore concerning an impossible thing." - But Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 220, says: "She ought to observe what is more worthy, even if made later. For the vow is judged to have been commuted into something better.... If they are nearly equal, or if there is doubt, let her prefer the prior to the posterior vow; for the former possesses." But that presumption of commutation is not in fact commutation. But presumption yields to truth. Wherefore, when the memory of the prior vow occurs, someone can indeed commute it into something better; but, if then in fact she is unwilling, the prior vow remains, since no commutation of it had been present, and that preceding will, in the case, was predominant and prevailing. For the rest, cf. I. M. 627. And Scavini himself, n. 228, ibid., raises the question concerning an oath: "Does an oath made against a first oath oblige?" and responds: If the second oath is opposed to the first in matter already sworn, it does not bind, as if you swore marriage to Caia, and afterward swear it to Titia; because it would be concerning something illicit."

Ludentius, addicted to play and accustomed to sin against chastity, vows that he will never, through his whole life, apply himself to play, if for a whole year he abstains from every sin of impurity. The matter succeeds very well for the greater part of the year. But toward the end of the year, bearing the vow made with difficulty, in order to be freed from it, he sins against chastity by design.

Q. Has Ludentius violated the vow, and is he still held by the vow?

R. Negatively to both. For first, by sinning against chastity he did not properly violate the vow; for the vow was not about preserving chastity. Nevertheless he sinned gravely by the sin of sacrilege, or against religion, by impeding by design and fraud lest he afterward be held by the vow; since from the same virtue of religion he was held to do nothing directly for impeding the vow. But although chastity was violated by design and fraud, nevertheless in fact the condition was not fulfilled. The condition not being fulfilled, the conditioned thing does not subsist. Besides, since the condition had been added generally, if for a whole year he abstains from every sin of impurity, this very thing had to be verified: that he not sin against chastity even by design and fraud in order to be freed from the vow, since evidently Ludentius ought especially to have intended this implicitly in his vow, lest the vow which he wished to apply as a means for not sinning become for him an occasion of sin, although from his malice. - Suarez, de Voto, l. 4, c. 17, n. 11, 14; Laymann, l. 4, t. 4, c. 6, n. 4; St. Alph., l. 2, n. 218; G. 320; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 218; D'Annib., ed. 3, v. 2, n. 309.

Aurelius, seized by a grave infirmity, emitted a vow in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary, that, if he were restored to health, through his whole life on each Saturday he would either fast or give alms to some poor person. Fully convalescing from the infirmity, he began to fast on each Saturday, and faithfully furnished this for three years. These having passed, he was affected with such pain of the head and weakness of the stomach that he could no longer fast. Hence, anxious, he asked of his confessor whether he was held at least to give alms on each Saturday, since he could no longer fast.

Q. What as to the case?

R. If a disjunctive vow has been made of furnishing one of two things, the vow is null if someone disjunctively vows a good or evil thing, or a vain or impossible thing. But if each part is apt matter, as in the case, the vow will be valid; and the choice is made by the will, which reserved it to itself. But whichever part is chosen will have to be furnished, even if after the choice the other part perishes or becomes impossible; for the vow is now determined by the choice. Conversely, if one part perishes or is rendered impossible before the choice, you are not held to the other, unless the thing perishes by your fault, or you were in culpable delay; for then, from your manner of conducting yourself, you are tacitly judged to have wished to determine your obligation to that part. Wherefore, all the more, if the very thing chosen perishes or becomes impossible after its choice, altogether independently of the will, as in the case, one is not held to the other. Lig. 224.

Trepidantius, doubting about a vow of perfect chastity emitted, seeks and obtains dispensation from the bishop. Then, weighing the matter better, he becomes altogether certain concerning the vow made.

Q. Must he seek dispensation again from the Supreme Pontiff?

R. Negatively. The reason: for a doubtful vow of chastity is not reserved. Therefore the bishop could dispense from it, who legitimately used the power which he had of dispensing in doubtful vows. "This," says Lugo, "seems to me most true: because otherwise the dispensation would have been vain; for dispensation is not made under the condition, if there was not a vow; but rather under the condition, if it was truly a vow; for if it was not a vow, it is not dispensable. Therefore, if the bishop can then dispense, he can remove the obligation, in the case in which it existed." De Poenit., d. 20, s. 2, n. 22. Cf. also Sanchez, who holds the same doctrine, In Decal., l. 4, c. 44, n. 3, 11; I. M. 620.

Chrysophilax, addicted to play, with great detriment to his affairs and immense loss of money, in order to meet these evils, emits a vow of not playing for a whole year. But, while it is running, more than once he gives money to a friend, with which the friend may play while he himself sits by and rejoices with him. Sometimes also he plays in another's name, but twice in his own name for about an hour, but with only a few obols exposed.

Q. Has Chrysophilax gravely violated the vow in these cases?

R. Negatively. For in the first case, although Chrysophilax plays through another and what someone does through another he does through himself in the moral estimation of things, nevertheless in fact he himself does not play, but another for him. But vows are proper and to be understood by strict interpretation. Besides, the thing is evident, that the mind of Chrysophilax in that vow regarded play through himself, since another case of playing through another is altogether extraordinary, which perhaps first occurred to his mind then, when he had already made the vow. And this is confirmed from the fact that Chrysophilax in fact played thus through another and not through himself because he thought that he would not thus transgress the vow; and therefore in that vow he intended only personal play; for otherwise he would not have used this art and contrivance. For the rest, "in doubt," says Busembaum, "concerning the mind of one vowing, interpretation ought to be made according to the propriety of the words which he used, or rather their common and usual acceptance." And St. Alph. says: "it must be noted that vows are always to be interpreted according to the more benign part." L. 2, n. 222, 224.

In the other case, when Chrysophilax played in another's name, and consequently with another's gain or loss, he did not violate the vow. For vows are to be understood according to the intention of the one vowing. Now the thing is evident from the case, that Chrysophilax did not regard play, materially such, or mere recreation for him, but regarded play as gainful or harmful for him, for averting detriment to his own affairs. Wherefore, just as he would not have transgressed the vow by playing for the sake of mere recreation, no wager of money having been added for the victor, so neither did he transgress the vow by playing in another's name, that is, with another's gain or harm.

Finally, in the third case, when for about an hour he played in his own name, he transgressed the vow. But, if the time is inspected, the matter is not grave. Wherefore from this head he sinned only lightly. But if the quantity of money which he exposed is inspected, since this also was not grave, not even from this head did he sin gravely.

Ioannes, in the twelfth year of his age, emitted a vow of approaching a certain sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin Mary. His father impeded the fulfillment of the vow, saying that the vow was null. Ioannes again emitted the same vow in the seventeenth year of his age; but again his father was unwilling that Ioannes fulfill the vow, declaring that the vow was altogether invalid. His father finally having died, Ioannes asks of his confessor whether he is held by the obligation of the vow emitted.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Since the father, on the one hand, did not speak clearly, and seems to have spoken rather historically or doctrinally, for instructing his son about his obligation, the obligation of the vow could seem still to persist. But, since, on the other hand, he altogether prohibits the son from the execution of the vow, which the son certainly would not licitly do in that hypothesis in which the father would not use his power; and according to the theological rule, sins are not to be presumed, but proved, the father seems in fact to have spoken altogether authoritatively. Hence, since

Ioannes is in the twelfth year of his age, and consequently has not reached puberty, the vow was directly annulled; and therefore, the father having died, its obligation, as not reviving, does not subsist. But since Ioannes in the seventeenth year of his age again emitted the same vow, he must be asked whether he wished to ratify that former vow emitted by him; or wished to bind himself by vow altogether independently from that prior vow. If the first is verified, he is free from every obligation for a twofold reason. The first is because, since the prior vow does not subsist, the ratification of a null vow is null. The other is because the father still directly annuls the vows of pubescent children which they emitted during impuberty, although they had ratified them after puberty had now been attained. For that which did not subsist from the beginning is not made firm, and therefore is not made firmer, by the passage of time. Chap. 18, de R. I. in 6. If the second is verified, then since the vows of the pubescent are annulled by the father only indirectly, the father having died, the vows revive, and therefore Ioannes is bound by the obligation of the vow. But D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 3, n. 206, thinks that by more recent law the father could still directly annul the vow of a pubescent son; wherefore then Ioannes would not be held by the vow. For by more recent law the distinction between the pubescent and the impubescent is not acknowledged, and paternal power is acknowledged in parents up to the greater age of the children or emancipation. Neither is verified in Ioannes. - I. M. 599 seqq.; G. 328, 329; La-Croix, l. 3, p. 1, n. 488, 489.

Claudina, in order to refuse a marriage offered to her by her father, emitted a vow of entering a certain Congregation of Sisters, and of never seeking and accepting dispensation from such a vow. But after three months, another marriage having been offered to her, in good faith she seeks and obtains dispensation from the vow of entering the aforesaid Congregation, not attending to the other vow of neither seeking nor accepting dispensation. After the betrothal had been entered upon, on the day immediately preceding the marriage, attending to that second vow, she manifests the matter to the confessor.

Q. 1. Was each vow of Claudina valid? 2. Is there need of a new dispensation for entering marriage?

R. To the first. The vow of entering the Congregation of Sisters was valid. For due intention and deliberation was not lacking on the part of Claudina; for nothing is had in the case from which the contrary could be gathered. The matter of the vow is certainly of a better good; indeed this good is best. Nor indeed does that circumstance render the vow null, namely, that she might more efficaciously and firmly reject the marriage offered by her father, less pleasing to her. For this circumstance in itself is not evil, but good: for a marriage contracted not from one's own inclination but from the inclination of the father will have difficulty having a good outcome. Nor indeed was the vow made by Claudina as by motive on account of this end alone, so that it could be said that, this end ceasing, the vow ceases, as though a vow either conditioned, namely if the father persists in offering that marriage, or a disjunctive vow, namely either of entering a Religious Congregation, or of abstaining from that marriage. Nothing of this sort appears from the case. Claudina simply and absolutely emitted the vow, indeed impelled by repelling from herself that marriage very disagreeable to her; choosing that it was better to enter religion than to enter that marriage; but at the same time choosing religion simply and absolutely; whence she emitted another vow of never seeking and accepting dispensation; and, another marriage having been offered to her, she simply sought dispensation of the vow emitted, raising no question about the value of the vow itself. Wherefore that vow was altogether valid, and was still so when another marriage was offered to her.

Concerning the other vow of Claudina, of never seeking and accepting dispensation, there is a question, says St. Alph., l. 3, n. 208, "whether the vow of not seeking dispensation, commutation, or annulment of a vow is valid, even with just cause; for without just cause it is certain that it is valid. The first opinion denies.... But the second affirms.... And this seems more probable; noting that in the case in which it is more useful on account of spiritual good to seek dispensation, the vow does not oblige, although it was valid. Yet this vow can always be relaxed by a superior, for whom his power is always saved.... But it must be noted that one vowing not to seek dispensation can seek commutation; and conversely." Thomas Sanchez, in Decal., l. 4, c. 8, n. 21, says: "I judge it more probable that that vow or oath furnished to God is not valid, and therefore obliges in no event.... I am led, because vows emitted generally, which in certain cases are apt for inducing obligation and are useful, but in others are inept and useless, by no means oblige, unless when, either by law or by the common understanding of men, they have a tacit condition, that they be extended to useful cases alone, such as the vow of obeying a superior in all things has included. And the reason is that those vows are emitted by way of one thing, and equally comprehend useful and useless cases."

To the second. There is no need of a new dispensation; wherefore, especially if there is danger in delay, Claudina will be able with a quiet conscience to enter marriage. The reason is: 1. because that vow made absolutely and universally of never seeking and accepting dispensation is at least probably null. 2. Because, although it was valid, it has now become impossible. For in good faith dispensation has already been sought and accepted. 3. Because the vow which alone can stand in the way of marriage is the vow of entering religion, not the vow of never seeking and never accepting dispensation. Now although Claudina had even sinned by seeking and accepting dispensation, the dispensation obtained and accepted would be valid. Therefore at most she would have to do penance for the other vow violated, but would by no means be prohibited from entering marriage. For her other vow neither takes away in any way from the superior the faculty of dispensing, nor makes it the case that there was not a just cause of seeking dispensation, if this in fact was present, and therefore the dispensation given and accepted was and is altogether valid. Cf. Sanchez, l. c., n. 26. 4. Finally, if she had adverted to her other vow, she could still have sought not simple dispensation, but commutation of the prior vow; for she had made a vow concerning not seeking dispensation, and, ignorant of the distinction, perhaps she had not even thought about commutation.

n. 10.

Antonius, a parish priest, is accustomed to dispense and commute the vows of the faithful of his parish, whether within or outside sacramental confession, judging that this power belongs to him, both on account of the jurisdiction which he himself has in his parish, and on account of the equal power with which he is endowed, from the common doctrine of theologians, of dispensing with subjects for particular cases in fasts, in abstinence, in works prohibited on a feast day, and in other similar things. I. M. 245. But, a doubt having arisen concerning this manner of acting, he asks whether he can persist in it.

n. 10.

Q. What as to the case?

n. 10.

R. Antonius cannot persist in that practice. The reason is that the power of dispensing from vows, special privilege or legitimate custom being excluded, belongs only to prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum. The parish priest does not have this jurisdiction, nor in this matter is there present a special privilege or legitimate custom favoring him. Let Busembaum be heard, whom St. Alphonsus tacitly approves: "The power of dispensing belongs to all prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum or privilege.... Hence a bishop can dispense with respect to his subjects; but not a parish priest, because he has only jurisdiction of the internal forum," l. 4, n. 456. But the distinguished Doctor has these things concerning this matter: "A parish priest or proper priest does not have ordinary power for dispensing or commuting vows. It is the certain and common opinion of theologians.... The reason a priori is that this dispensation is an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction distinct from the jurisdiction of the sacrament of penance; but in a parish priest and similar persons there is no such jurisdiction; for by no law is it conceded to them, nor can it be gathered from the nature of the thing or custom.... Hence the argument taken from dispensation of law can be turned back, because a parish priest cannot dispense in laws; but if in some law he could by special custom, it is not to be extended to other laws, much less to vows." T. 9, de Relig., l. 6, c. 10, n. 11, 12. Hence the response to the twofold reason of Antonius the parish priest is clear. To the first it is responded that the parish priest indeed has jurisdiction in his parish in the administration of the sacraments, but by no means ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the external forum, the act of which is dispensation of vows. To the second it is responded that the parish priest can indeed dispense in those ecclesiastical laws for particular cases only; but he can do this from custom, which custom is not present also for dispensation of vows. - I. M. 615.

Theotimus emitted a vow of perpetual chastity. An occasion of an excellent marriage having been offered, he sought dispensation from the Holy See for entering marriage, which he obtained. After a year his wife dies, and another marriage to be entered is offered to him. Hence Theotimus, uncertain, asks of his confessor whether he needs a new dispensation, and from whom it is to be sought, in the affirmative case.

Q. Does the vow of chastity remain reserved to the Supreme Pontiff after dispensation has been obtained for the effect of contracting marriage?

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter III. On Vow · Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article I. On the Conditions Required for a Vow · Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Art. I, § I. On the Intention Required for a Vow · Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Art. I, § II. On the Matter of a Vow · Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article II. On the Obligation of a Vow

R. Affirmatively. Thus Card. de Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 6, c. 1; G., v. 2, n. 331; and others. The reason is that, when, on account of various causes which are customarily alleged, dispensation is conceded for the effect of contracting marriage, the preceding vow of chastity, just as it is not annulled, so neither is it commuted according to its whole self into other pious works. For, just as the matter of that vow was divisible, so also its obligation was divisible. Through the aforesaid dispensation only the obligation of not contracting this first marriage is taken away, and is commuted into a new obligation to other pious works. Although, therefore, this new obligation according to a probable opinion is not reserved, that other part of the preceding obligation prohibiting a second marriage, and all other things which are opposed to chastity except the first marriage, is not a new obligation, but is altogether the same one which was before, and which was never taken away. Therefore this part of the obligation retains the same nature and quality of reservation which it had from the beginning. But that, from the intention of the Supreme Pontiff dispensing, the same vow in fact remains, and is dispensed only as regards the effect of contracting marriage, but by no means as regards the remaining effects, is gathered from the express clause added to the dispensation, that, if the spouse dies, he who had emitted the vow must remain celibate. Cf. Lugo, l. c., n. 1 and 8; G., l. c. The same is signified still more by those words which are customarily added in the commission of dispensing directed to a discreet confessor. For at the end of the commission the penitent is again said to be admonished concerning the perseverance of the vow in these words: If he should again contract and consummate marriage, or ever fornicate outside marriage, let him know that he will act against a vow of this sort. Cf. Lugo, l. c., n. 8. Whence adultery committed during that first marriage contracted by dispensation is also against a vow of this sort.

n. 12.

Carolina emits a vow of entering a more recent Congregation of Sisters. But, an occasion of a good marriage having been offered to her, she sought from the bishop dispensation from the aforesaid vow, which the bishop conceded without difficulty.

n. 12.

Q. What as to the case?

…and 16 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 100 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter III. On Vow

Definition. A vow is a deliberate promise made to God ¹ concerning a better good.

¹ A vow is an act of latria due to God alone. Wherefore when we vow certain things to the Saints, the sense is that these things are vowed to God in honor also of the Saints; just as we build churches and altars to God in honor of the same. St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 194.

Division. A vow is distinguished:

Into solemn or simple, according as it is made solemnly and accepted by the Church, or held ratified, or is emitted with solemnity and the acceptance of the Church set aside ².

² And hence there is also the distinction between violation of a simple and a solemn vow, as we touched upon where sacrilege was discussed. Other things which pertain to a solemn vow are more conveniently reserved to the tract on particular states.

Into personal or real, according as an action or omission, or some thing separable from the action of the person, is promised.

Into temporary or perpetual, according as it is promised to be observed only for a certain time, or throughout the whole of life.

We must treat: 1. of the conditions required for a vow; 2. of the obligation of a vow; 3. of its cessation.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article I. On the Conditions Required for a Vow

The conditions required for the validity of a vow are contained in the very definition of a vow, and there are two principal ones: 1. true intention; 2. suitable matter.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Art. I, § I. On the Intention Required for a Vow

n. 320.

For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation; for a vow is after the likeness of a certain law, which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But the will and deliberation which are required for mortal sin suffice ¹.

¹ These words do not mean that, for the validity of any vow whatsoever, that discretion and maturity of judgment suffice which suffice for sinning mortally. For for grave sin it is enough to know confusedly the gravity of the guilt, just as for merit a general and confused notion of moral good suffices; but for assuming an obligation a general and confused notion of obligation does not suffice; rather, a more perfect knowledge is required of the burden to which one obliges himself. Certainly this knowledge demands that the adjuncts necessary to be known for prudent deliberation be present to the mind of the one deliberating. Thus, then, understand that equal advertence of mind suffices in each case, although for assuming either the obligation of a vow or of betrothal, prudent deliberation and advertence is more difficult, and therefore demands a greater discretion of judgment.

n. 320.

Hence a vow differs essentially from a purpose; because a purpose, however firm, does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is omission of the proposed matter a sin, except perhaps sometimes by accident, for example on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which per se do not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus, n. 196-199.

Questions. Q. 1. Whether a vow made with ignorance of the obligation, or with inadvertence to the obligation already known, is valid?

Resp. To the first. A vow made with every kind of ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid; because without the intention of obliging oneself there is no vow.

Resp. To the second. It is valid if the person who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although he does not actually attend to it; or also if he who vows, although he does not clearly know the obligation, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly, or wills it implicitly, when, for example, he wishes to vow this or that, just as others are accustomed to vow ². Nevertheless it must generally be held that no greater obligation is induced beyond that which a person wills to impose upon himself and has apprehended. - St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

² An implicit promise can suffice for a vow. Thus certain religious emit vows merely by professing obedience according to the rule. This is more clearly evident in the reception of sacred orders; for although one does not say, "I vow," or, "I promise chastity," nevertheless this vow is made implicitly by this very fact: that, knowing the Church has annexed that vow to those orders, you receive them. But if someone were entirely ignorant of this, St. Alphonsus judges (lib. 6, n. 809) that more probably he is not bound by the vow; and this can scarcely seem doubtful, for the obligation of a vow is wholly from the will which imposes that obligation on itself; but there is no will where there is no knowledge. Nevertheless the Church could compel such a person either to abstain from sacred ministry, or to observe chastity, and indeed by emitting a vow (as St. Alphonsus more probably holds, lib. 3, n. 200, after Laymann), or certainly so that he be guilty of sacrilege unless he observes it, because she commands it from the virtue of religion, as the same St. Alphonsus observes (lib. 6, n. 809).

Q. 2. Whether a vow emitted from error is valid?

Resp. 1. It is denied, if the error concerns the substance of the matter, or substantial circumstances, or those which are chiefly intended, or pertain to the substance, or notably change it ³; because then the promised matter is not sufficiently known and willed. - St. Alphonsus, n. 198, and others.

³ Error concerning a merely impulsive cause does not vitiate a vow; because this is only a secondary cause, and when it is set aside, the act is sufficiently voluntary according to substance. For example, someone vowed a pilgrimage to Rome with zeal for worshiping God, and at the same time also had a secondary impulsive cause, namely to visit his brother, whom he thought to be in Rome. Even if afterward he understands that he is not there, he does not for that reason cease to be bound by the vow. St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 198. Nevertheless Sanchez rightly observes (Decal., lib. 4, c. 2, n. 51) that, because of an error of this sort, an easier cause for dispensing is furnished.

Resp. 2. It is affirmed, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment which would not have stood in the way of the vow if they had been known with the error set aside; for he who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergoing merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. - Thus St. Alphonsus ⁴, Elbel.

⁴ Nevertheless St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 198) does not deny that it is probable that error invalidates a vow even in accidental circumstances, if these are of great moment, and if, had they been known, the vow would not have been emitted.

Nevertheless vows must be excepted which are emitted after the novitiate in any approved order; for these are not void because of any error, except only a substantial error concerning the substance. St. Alphonsus, l.c. The reason is, as Lugo says (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 22, n. 88), "because in those things which constitute a state firm and irrevocable by its own nature, such as profession and marriage, the will, according to the nature of the thing in question, accommodates itself and consents without restriction or condition, but entirely absolutely and independently of other conditions besides those which are of the substance of the same contract. For from these conditions marriages and professions would remain uncertain, and therefore the state itself, which is not according to the nature of the thing in question." And, as Sanchez adds (De Matr., lib. 10, disp. 9, n. 20), from dependence of this sort it would follow that many professions and most marriages would have to be judged void, which would redound to grave damage and scandal of the commonwealth.

Q. 3. Whether a vow made from fear is valid?

Resp. 1. It is denied, if the fear is grave, unjust, and inflicted for extorting the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is extorted by force from someone through injury, when the law of nature demands that the right be restored in full. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, however, from canon law with regard to solemn vows of religion, and more probably also with regard to other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians. - St. Alphonsus, n. 197.

Resp. 2. It is affirmed, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away from the one vowing the use of reason; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary. Likewise if the fear proceeds from a light cause, because light fear is not judged to influence the act efficaciously, and is rather the occasion than the cause of the vow. - Thus commonly with Sanchez ⁵, Azor, the Salamancans; and St. Alphonsus says this is more probable, n. 197.

⁵ Nevertheless Sanchez (In Dec., lib. 4, c. 3, n. 23) judges probable the opinion of those who hold that vows are invalid when fear, even relatively light, yet unjust, was in reality the cause of vowing; which they affirm both of simple vows and of religious profession, at least with regard to the forum of conscience; for in the external forum light fear is not presumed to be the cause of a vow.

Q. 4. Whether he is held by a vow who doubts whether he emitted a vow or a mere purpose, or whether he had sufficient deliberation?

Resp. To the first. No. It is clear from what has been said about probabilism. But if in promising he believed that he would sin if perhaps he did not carry out the proposed matter, it can be judged that he truly vowed ⁶. - St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

⁶ Except, however, the uneducated, who not rarely falsely think that they sin when they break a purpose, especially if the matter concerns certain pious works to be performed at their own time, for example reciting the crown of the Blessed Virgin Mary daily, or fasting on individual Saturdays, etc.

Resp. To the second. No, for the same reason, when he positively and gravely doubts concerning sufficient deliberation. For the most part the matter is to be decided from the circumstances considered. - St. Alphonsus affirms, n. 196 ⁷. - See Cases, n. 305 and following.

⁷ Suarez, after he has reviewed various causes on account of which there can be doubt concerning defect of sufficient deliberation, namely either because of weak age, or because of a state of drunkenness or madness, or because of a vehement affection either of anger or of fear, rightly concludes that the disagreement, if there is any among the doctors, does not concern principles, namely whether a vow is valid where sufficiency of deliberation is uncertain, but when that defect ought to be supposed or not supposed. Thus he says (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 4, c. 6, n. 10): "I observe... that it is one thing to ask whether, with a true doubt standing concerning actual use of reason and sufficient for free consent, an obligation arises; but it is another thing to ask when there is, or is not, such doubt. In the former question it is always true, with the hypothesis standing that such doubt is true, that the vow does not oblige, because it is doubtful whether it is a vow, and thus all the things said above proceed. Therefore the said authors properly treat the second question, and in that sense say that a vow made from the heat of anger, if it is not positively and by an almost certain judgment clear that it took away the use of reason, obliges; because the heat of anger alone by itself does not suffice to constitute moral doubt about sufficient use of reason, unless other circumstances accede."

** The Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 11) rightly affirm with others that it is not a sufficient indication of defect of liberty and deliberation that someone immediately repents of his vow. For this can arise from levity and inconstancy of mind. But they themselves (ibid.) give another reason, namely that it often happens that acts fully deliberate are immediately retracted by us because of a new difficulty, consideration, or circumstance. St. Alphonsus seems to be looking to these things (lib. 3, n. 196), where, alleging this place of the Salamancans, he says that it must be seen whether other joined circumstances are present.

But these things need some suitable explanation, so that they can be reconciled with another doctrine which the Salamancans have (ibid., n. 152), and which after them St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 226) thus presents: "The Salamancans themselves, c. 1, n. 152, judge that that is a notable change which, if it had been known from the beginning, a person would not have obligated himself. This opinion," namely that in the case there is no obligation of the vow, "seems to me no less probable, indeed perhaps more probable, than the first... Because when a circumstance not foreseen supervenes, by which the vow is rendered more burdensome, the matter of the vow becomes different from that promised."

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Art. I, § II. On the Matter of a Vow

n. 323.

Principles. I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, indeed concerning a better good. The reason is that God is not worshiped by an indifferent action, or one whose placing is not better than its omission. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to the circumstances.

n. 323.

II. The matter of a vow must be morally possible; because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obliging oneself; but no one can obligate himself to something morally impossible to himself. But if the thing is divisible and in part possible, the vow is valid for this part ¹; but it is not valid if it is morally indivisible. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 202.

¹ Except, however, if it were clear that the one vowing wished to obligate himself to each part by way of one whole, and had each indivisibly before his eyes. The reason is that a vow is a particular law which is not extended beyond the intention of the one vowing; and therefore if the one vowing collectively promised each part, and one dependent on the other, if one part is impossible... the whole whole remains void. Thus the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 74), who soon after (ibid., n. 75-76) add many examples of vows which either must be observed from the part which remains possible, or are judged void because of the impossibility of some part.

Questions. Q. 1. Whether a vow concerning matter already prescribed from another source is valid?

Resp. It is affirmed, first because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obligated by diverse titles; then because a vow of this sort concerns a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to be prescribed, and it concerns a better good, since a new bond can confer greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law ². - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 213. - Salamancans.

² Moreover, to actions placed from a vow of this sort there accedes the nobility which flows from the virtue of religion and the notion of richer merit.

Q. 2. Whether a vow of a good thing with an evil end, or an evil condition, is valid?

Resp. To the first. No, if the evil end holds itself on the part of the thing vowed, for example if you vow alms in order to obtain a successful outcome to theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as though God were bringing aid for sinning. It must be said otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accompanies the vow accidentally, and the wicked end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself entirely on the part of the one vowing; for example if someone, vowing for the glory of God, then more willingly vows externally from vain ostentation. - St. Alphonsus, n. 206 ³.

³ At this place St. Alphonsus also intimates the opinion of the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 66-68), namely that a vow is invalid even if the wicked end is only impulsive, yet such that without it the vow would not have occurred; and these things indeed can seem contradictory. For when the cause of an act is of such a kind that without it the act would not happen, it is called not only impulsive, but motive, principal, and primary. Besides, if the end is merely impulsive, it is therefore an end joined to another principal end. Therefore this end is not the total nor principal cause of the thing vowed or of vowing. But an end of this sort, thus added to the principal end, does not wholly corrupt an act formally good from its object, but can be held as something coming accidentally and extrinsic to the act. Therefore it does not take away the validity of the vow.

** The VV. rebuke us (p. 919) because in the Note it is said that he speaks contradictory things who calls that cause impulsive without which the matter would not occur; and they wish to prove this by the example of a man who from a desire for eternal salvation wishes to embrace the religious state, and from a desire for fish chooses the Carthusian order. Resp. Since otherwise this man would have chosen not the Carthusian order but another religious order, the desire for fish will be called the motive cause of choosing that order, no differently than the desire for eternal salvation will be called the motive cause of choosing the religious state in general; and only abusively will either desire be called merely impulsive.

Resp. To the second. It is affirmed, if the vow is made from affection toward a good thing, as good, although joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not to be harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more, however, does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition; as if someone vows alms if and whenever he blasphemes. - Laymann, lib. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 7.

Q. 3. Whether a vow of not sinning is valid?

Resp. 1. A vow of avoiding all sins, even the very slightest, is not valid, because this is impossible. - Trent, sess. 6.

Resp. 2. But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or all fully deliberate venial sins, is valid, because this is possible with divine grace and without a special privilege, if, however, the matter concerns pious persons ⁴. Likewise a vow of not committing venial sins of a certain kind is valid, for example of never lying, although because of the excessive difficulty of execution, vows of this sort are not expedient for most people. - Bouvier, and not a few others.

⁴ Understand persons not professing piety in just any way, but, as St. Alphonsus has it (lib. 3, n. 203), striving intensely for Christian perfection. Say the same of a vow of avoiding venial sins of a certain kind; for it will be valid, as St. Alphonsus says (ibid.), "in persons of great virtue," that is, in those long exercised in solid virtue; "but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed," St. Alphonsus goes on, "in some matters, such as dishonorable thoughts" (understand as to any subreption whatever or even the slightest, not as to plainly deliberate fault), "idle thoughts, etc., since they are unavoidable for all, the vow is null." And to this pertains a vow of avoiding acts of impatience or anger. For since the passion of anger is indifferent to good and evil, to be angry at times is not only in accord with reason, but plainly necessary; but otherwise to hold the mean in such a way that one sins neither by excess nor by defect is most difficult, not to say morally impossible.

Others add (in Suarez, De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, n. 2) that a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or mortal sins of a certain kind, is not valid if the matter concerns a fragile person. Although Suarez himself does not adhere to this opinion, he nevertheless approves what Navarrus says, that vows of this sort are neither useful nor expedient, and that sufficient cause for dispensation or commutation is present. On this matter, what some object is childish: that a dispensation of this sort is equated with a license to sin, which therefore must be denied. For this dispensation is neither sought nor granted so that one may sin more freely, but so that the bond may be taken away which, considering the fragility of the one vowing, does not hold him back from sinning, and thus redounds solely, rather than to his spiritual utility and the glory of God, indeed to him as a snare and to God as a graver offense.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article II. On the Obligation of a Vow

n. 325.

Principles. I. A vow obliges per se, like a law or precept of the Church, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter; for a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself.

n. 325.

II. A vow obliges according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of the obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light obligation in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or superior can oblige in grave matter only under light obligation, so also he who vows concerning a grave matter can impose on himself only a light obligation. - Nevertheless, conversely, he cannot bind himself gravely in a light matter, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation ¹. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 211 and 213.

¹ It pertains to the prudence of the confessor to admonish penitents on this matter who have vowed spontaneously; namely, lest, as sometimes happens, they sin gravely from an erroneous conscience even where the matter of the vow does not admit grave obligation. To the same prudence it pertains that the confessor persuade a penitent eager to vow that, even if the matter is grave, he should nevertheless assume only a light obligation of the vow, so that the occasion of offending God gravely may be very far away. And this cause existed why many most holy and most wise founders of religious orders, although most desirous of regular observance, nevertheless, in order to avert occasions of divine offense, decreed that rules founded by God's impulse should induce no obligation per se and by their own force which would bind violators by guilt of sin.

And indeed nothing prevents a vow under light obligation from being pronounced also in that matter which, considered according to natural law, obliges under grave obligation, for example in the matter of chastity.

Questions. Q. 1. What matter is judged light or grave per se in a vow?

Resp. That matter is judged grave which, when it is prescribed by the Church, obliges gravely, such as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave; or which contributes notably to the end of the vow or to the worship of God. - Reuter.

Q. 2. Whether several light matters coalesce to make grave matter?

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 1: Definition of a Vow · Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 2: Division of Vows · Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 3: Object of Vows · Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 4: Conditions of Validity

Resp. No, if the light matters are vowed separately, so that the obligation is attached precisely to the time or day, or to sanctifying that day. - But it is otherwise if the light matters are vowed by way of one thing, so that the determination of the day accedes only for urging the execution, as happens generally in real vows; nevertheless make an exception unless something else is clear from the intention of the one vowing, on which the whole obligation and the reason of the obligation depend.

n. 327.

Q. 3. Whether someone can be bound by another's vow?

n. 327.

Resp. No, at least by reason of the vow; the reason is that a vow is a personal burden voluntarily undertaken, and therefore no one can promise another's thing or action. - Hence the vows of parents dedicating their children to some religion, or imposing an obligation on them, for example of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. Although children are not held by the vow of parents who have dedicated them to religion or to some obligation, nevertheless the vow obliges the parents, so that, as far as is in them, with the freedom of the children preserved, they move them to embrace that which they vowed on their behalf, and much more so that they not stand in the way of children who wish to embrace it ².

² Vows of this sort have annexed the condition: if the children are willing. But ratification must not be judged to consist in the silence alone of the children; rather, true and real consent must accede when they have reached the years of discretion, because silence in those things which are burdensome and laborious does not indicate consent. Salamancans, tr. 17, c. 1, n. 117.

Nevertheless this doctrine, namely that it denies that anyone is bound by another's vow because a vow is a law which each imposes on himself by his own will, must not stand in the way of this: that by vows which the magistrate or religious superior emits in the name of the whole community, all the citizens or subjects are bound, and not only those present, but also those who afterward become members of that community; and indeed they are bound in such a way that, if they violate the vow, they sin against the virtue of religion. Now since different authors have said different things for giving the reason for these vows (see Suarez, De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 4, c. 9), that doctrine seems preferable which the same Suarez attributes to Navarrus (l.c., n. 6-7), namely that these vows are to be compared with other agreements by which a community binds itself, and whose obligation passes to posterity. For magistrates, as heads of the community, can bind it by this kind of obligation also. And since it flows from the nature of a community that the members ought to conform themselves to the head by obeying, and obedience transfers the obligation to the kind of virtue in view of which it is induced, from this the obligation arising from it, as Suarez himself says, is an obligation to accept such a vow with respect to the obligation of the vow.

n. 327.

I said, at least by reason of the vow; for from justice an heir is bound to fulfill the real vows of the deceased. - St. Alphonsus, ibid. - See what is to be said in the tract On Contracts, where promise is treated.

…and 60 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 19 passages

Vol. II, On the Virtue of Religion …, Chapter II: On Oaths and Vows

n. 965.

1. A true promise made to God. (A) The promise of which there is question here is a sincere will of obliging oneself to do or omit something; accordingly it differs from a mere proposal, or intention of doing something, which is elicited without the will of assuming a true obligation. The faithful sometimes doubt whether they have emitted a proposal or a vow; for solving this doubt, attention must be paid not only to the words which they used, but also and especially to their intention. For not rarely the word "I promise before God" signifies nothing other than a proposal; indeed "I vow" does not necessarily import a vow; but if there is the intention of obliging oneself under penalty of sin, there is a vow, whatever words were employed.⁸ If, all things considered, the matter remains truly doubtful, in practice there is not a strict obligation of fulfilling the vow, because its existence is not established.

⁸ The will of fulfilling the thing promised is not essentially required for the existence and obligation of a vow, but it is required that the vow be honest and an act of religion; for he who intends to contract an obligation, but not to fulfill it, by no means honors God, but offends Him, and therefore commits a sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter itself.

n. 966.

(B) A promise of this kind ought to be true, or deliberate: for no one imposes upon himself any moral obligation unless he sincerely wills this; but for this there is required a deliberate volition, namely that which is necessary for a truly human act (above, n. 78-84). Indeed, since a vow is an act grave in itself, a greater deliberation is required for its validity than for other common acts; and the graver the obligations which it imposes, the greater deliberation it requires. Nevertheless, in order that a vow be valid, lengthy and mature deliberation is not necessary, but only that which, according to the common estimation of prudent men, is proportioned to the gravity of the obligation to be undertaken. But when mature deliberation is lacking, the obligation contracted is less strict, and is more easily dispensed or commuted.

Therefore invalid are vows emitted by children not yet perfectly masters of themselves, - by the half-drunk or half-asleep, - by those who are wholly ignorant of the obligations which vows induce, or conceive them only imperfectly and confusedly: for in these and similar adjuncts, there is not found a deliberation proportioned to the gravity of the obligation.

n. 967.

(a) But an attentive consideration of all the circumstances of the thing promised is not required, but only of those which morally pertain to its substance. Thus he who emits religious vows, understanding sufficiently clearly what they substantially import, vows validly, even if he has not maturely considered all the burdens which naturally follow from them.

(b) Nor for a vow is there required an actual and explicit will of undertaking the obligation, but a virtual and implicit will suffices, provided it be true. A virtual will suffices, namely one which truly was had and still perseveres, although not actually elicited; thus an adolescent who freely resolves to receive the subdiaconate and, by force of this proposal, receives ordination, truly emits the vow of chastity, which he knows to be annexed to this order, even if at the time of ordination he does not actually think about it; the same must be said of him who emits religious profession. - An implicit will likewise suffices, namely one which is included in the general volition of undertaking all the obligations annexed to such a promise; thus he who wills to profess the religious state, by that very fact implicitly vows poverty, chastity, and obedience annexed to this profession, when he has sufficiently understood that all these things are included in the religious state.

n. 968.

(c) From this it also follows that all those impediments which harm the liberty of human acts obstruct the validity of a vow: if liberty is thoroughly destroyed, the vow is by that very fact invalid; if it is diminished, yet so that the one vowing enjoys liberty proportioned to the gravity of the obligation, the vow is indeed valid, but dispensation in it is easier.

Thus he who emitted a vow from error is not held to fulfill it, if the error is truly the cause of the vow, so that, the truth having been known, he would not have vowed the thing; for example, one who promises chastity, in no way knowing of what matter there is question, - one who vows a pilgrimage to a sanctuary which he thinks to be distant one hundred miles, while in reality it is distant one thousand, - one who vows a Mass for the health of his father, whom he falsely heard to be ill. - On the contrary, an error of less moment about the circumstances of the matter, knowledge of which would not have impeded the vow, does not render it invalid.

When there is question of religious vows, it is commonly held that they are not invalidated except by error concerning their substance: for since there is question of a complex of obligations, it suffices that their substance be sufficiently understood.

If an invalid vow is renewed because it was believed valid, by this it does not become firmer, because it was renewed only from error.

A vow emitted from grave fear unjustly inflicted for extorting the vow is not valid,⁹ because it lacks due liberty, and besides God cannot accept a promise of this kind, lest He seem to approve the very injury brought upon the one vowing. But it is otherwise if it is from light fear,¹⁰ or from fear justly inflicted, or not for extorting consent. Thus a vow emitted from fear of shipwreck or of another danger is valid: for then it is not made unwillingly, but from the soul, for obtaining the grace of safety.

⁹ This can be inferred from cap. 1 Perlatum, lib. I, tit. 40, and also from Trent, sess. XXV, c. 19.

¹⁰ Thus always in public vows; but in private vows, if it were established in fact that fear, even light fear, was the true and sole cause of vowing, the vow more probably would not be valid in the forum of conscience.

n. 969.

(C) A promise made to God: for a vow properly so called is an act of religion by which we furnish service to God and acknowledge His supreme dominion, and so it pertains to the worship of latria. Nevertheless, sometimes vows are said to be pronounced to the saints, that is, to God in honor of the saints, just as altars are dedicated to the saints, that is, to God in their honor: for the honor rendered to them redounds upon God Himself. - But if someone should directly intend to promise something to the saints themselves, it would not properly be a vow, but a religious promise, pertaining to the worship of dulia.

n. 970.

1. Apt matter, that is, honest, concerning a better good, and possible.

(A) Honest, or morally good; for since a vow is emitted for furnishing service to God, nothing can be promised except a thing pleasing and acceptable to Him. Therefore a vow concerning a thing altogether indifferent is void, unless from the end or circumstances it becomes good: thus the one vowing sins venially, as taking the name of God in vain; and, a fortiori, a vow concerning a morally evil thing is void: thus the one vowing sins gravely in itself, unless he is excused by ignorance or inconsideration (as often happens), because he supposes that an evil thing can please God: which in itself brings a grave injury upon Him.

Here it is asked whether a vow of a good thing is valid, but from an end of the one vowing which is in some way evil. (a) It is indeed not valid, if the depraved intention is the motive and total cause of the vow, because then the act becomes totally evil (above, n. 150); for example, if someone vows alms that he may successfully commit injustice: for such an end renders the vow evil and impious. (b) But it is valid if the depraved intention is only the impulsive and partial cause of the vow, because then the whole act is not vitiated; for example, if someone vows alms both that he may please God and that he may be praised by men: for notwithstanding a vain intention of this sort, the action remains good in part and can be offered to God. - The same must be said concerning an evil condition added to a vow, for example, if someone promises a rich alms, on condition that he come out unharmed from a duel; for although the duel is evil, to preserve life unharmed is good, and the vow is not concerned with the evil thing, namely the duel, but with safety, which is certainly good.

n. 971.

(B) Concerning a better good, that is, concerning a work which is more perfect than its opposite, all the circumstances being considered; for since a vow is made for pleasing God, one cannot promise Him a good which impedes a greater good: for if a lesser good is promised, by that very fact the one vowing obliges himself to omit the greater: which surely cannot please God. Moreover, a better good must be estimated not only in itself and absolutely, but also in relation to the one vowing and all the adjuncts.

Thus a vow of marrying is not valid in itself, because it is opposed to a better good, namely virginity. But in special adjuncts matrimony can be the matter of a vow, for example, if someone, under the hope of matrimony, has corrupted some virgin, or if such a matrimony is very useful to the republic. Likewise a vow of not vowing is not valid in itself, because it concerns a lesser good; but a vow of not vowing except with the permission of a confessor is valid, since it is an act of prudence.

An action already prescribed can be the matter of a vow, because a thing prescribed is good; besides, from what is to be said, to do something from vow is better than to perform the same thing without vow. Nevertheless, that which already falls under a precept should not be vowed without reason, lest bonds be multiplied rashly in this way.

n. 972.

Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even semi-deliberate ones, is not valid, since this is impossible without a special privilege of God, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 63; but a vow of avoiding all fully deliberate venial sins is valid, because persons firmly rooted in virtue can fulfill this, with the help of grace; but such a vow cannot be permitted to others, since it is above their strength. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is also valid, but is by no means to be counseled to the frail, lest perhaps by violating it they commit a double sin.

Since the matter of a vow ought to be in the power of the one vowing, we cannot properly vow the deed of another, or something to be performed by another; thus a mother cannot vow that her son will enter religion. If in reality such a vow has been emitted, it ought to be explained thus: that the mind of the one vowing was to oblige herself to take care, insofar as she can, that the other perform it; but his liberty remains intact. Vows made by cities, monasteries, or colleges do not bind posterity, unless the obligation arises from elsewhere, for example from a statute, law, or custom having the force of law.

n. 973.

If the matter of a vow is partly possible and partly impossible, before all else the intention of the one vowing must be explored: if he promised both indivisibly, or in the manner of one thing, he is held to nothing when either part is impossible; otherwise, if he promised two things divisibly, or independently from one another, because the useful is not vitiated by the useless. If the intention of the one vowing is not established, it ought to be presumed from the matter itself of the vow: when this is divisible, the possible part must be fulfilled; thus he who vowed ten fasts, and can fulfill only two, is held to these two. If the matter is indivisible, or if the impossible part is altogether principal in relation to the other, no obligation subsists; thus he who vowed a Roman pilgrimage, and can travel only half the way, is held to nothing; but if he promised to make the journey on foot (which he cannot do), yet can easily go to Rome by railroad, he should indeed do this, since the Roman pilgrimage itself is principal, and the mode of going is accessory.

n. 974.

II. Concerning the Various Species of Vows.

1. By reason of the object about which it is concerned, a vow is: (a) personal, if the thing promised is some action to be placed or omitted, such as the recitation of some prayer, a pilgrimage, etc.; (b) real, when the thing promised is directly some thing external to the one vowing and estimable by price, such as alms, the donation of a chalice, etc.; (c) mixed, if the object of the vow is at the same time an action and a thing, for example, a vow of going to Loreto, and there offering a chalice.

By reason of duration, it is called temporary or perpetual according as it is promised to be observed for a certain time or throughout one's whole life.

n. 975.

1. By reason of the mode in which it is made, it is called absolute or conditioned, according as it is made simply, without any restriction, or with some condition added: an example of this is had if someone vows a rich alms on condition that he receive such an inheritance. - If the condition added is joined by way of a penalty to be inflicted, the vow is penal, as if someone promises alms, on condition that he shall have relapsed into such a sin.

n. 976.

1. By reason of form and effects, a vow is public when it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private; - solemn, if it has been recognized as such by the Church; otherwise simple (Codex, c. 1308). - As to the fact, the Church regards two genera of vows as solemn: the vow of chastity emitted in sacred orders, and religious vows emitted in those orders which have been approved by the Church as solemn.

n. 977.

Hence arises the question, long debated among canonists and theologians, whence the solemnity of vows comes, or in what a solemn vow differs from a simple one. All today indeed confess that this distinction arises only from the authority of the Church, since neither Christ nor the Apostles established anything concerning this matter. This, moreover, Boniface VIII declared in the single chapter De Voto, in the Sext: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow has been found by the constitution of the Church alone"... Nevertheless it is further asked whether this solemnity is situated in the will alone of the Church, or in some special effect which, by the Church so establishing, has been annexed to a solemn vow.

(a) According to St. Thomas¹ and many others, the solemnity of a vow consists in a certain spiritual consecration, by force of which the person or thing designated by the vow is thoroughly withdrawn from human uses and, of itself irrevocably, is dedicated to God, so that it cannot be converted to profane uses without sacrilege. (b) According to others,² however, the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow is merely external, and consists in this, that the Church dissolves solemn vows far more difficultly than simple ones. - Nevertheless we hold the former opinion, rightly understood, as the more probable; for, although the solemnity of vows depends on the Church, it produces some effects permanent in themselves which do not proceed from a simple vow: thus acts contrary to solemn vows are rendered not only illicit, but also invalid; for example, a marriage contracted by him who has emitted a solemn vow of chastity is invalid. This can be declared thus: just as, in civil matters, those contracts are called solemn in the making of which public authority intervenes, which confers upon them a special firmness on account of the public good; so likewise, in our matter, the public authority of the Church intercedes, so that it may concede a special indissolubility to solemn vows, which it publicly recognizes as such. Moreover this indissolubility proceeds from this, that publicly, and from the very authority of the Church accepting and confirming the vows emitted, persons vowing are consecrated to God in a special and indissoluble manner, as regards those acts which they promised to do or omit.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 7 and 9; Lehmkuhl, n. 500.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 603; Noldin, n. 210.

Moreover, since this indissolubility arises from the authority of the Church, it is not so firm that dispensation cannot be made in it from a most grave cause.

n. 996.

III. Concerning Dispensation from a Vow.

1. Notion and required conditions. Vows, even firm in themselves, sometimes it is expedient to remove by dispensation, which is defined as the relaxation of an obligation induced by vow, made in the name of God by him who has the power of jurisdiction.

(A) From this the distinction between invalidation and dispensation is clear: (a) for the latter is made in the name of God, while invalidation is made in the proper name of the one invalidating; (b) the latter requires the power of jurisdiction, while the former supposes only dominative power: for since, by force of the vow, a man has contracted an obligation before God, this cannot be dissolved except by him who has divinely received the power of jurisdiction, by force of which he can dissolve spiritual bonds in the name of God Himself; (c) hence a just cause is required for a valid dispensation, which is not necessary for invalidation; (d) invalidation can be made even when the one vowing is unwilling, while dispensation supposes the consent of the one vowing, who imposed the obligation upon himself.

n. 997.

(B) That the power of dispensing in vows belongs to the Church is clear: (a) from the general concession of dissolving all spiritual bonds which can obstruct the salvation of souls: "And whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven";⁴ for sometimes it happens, on account of human frailty, that vows even maturely emitted can be observed only with difficulty, with the greatest danger to souls; therefore it is of the greatest interest that they be able to be relaxed, so that those vowing may provide for their salvation more easily. Wherefore Christ conferred upon the Church the power of dispensing in vows, in the name of God Himself, who alone can condone an obligation contracted toward Himself. (b) From the long-standing and universal practice of the Church, which very often, for just causes, is accustomed to dispense in vows.

⁴ Matt. 16:19.

n. 998.

(C) But because one dispensing acts not in his own name, but in the name of God, a just cause is required for dispensing validly, and indeed a cause graver according as the vow is more excellent. The sufficiency of this cause must be left to the prudent judgment of superiors; and the faithful, who in good faith have set forth the whole matter, ought not be disquieted concerning this. - The general causes which can move superiors to grant a dispensation legitimately are the honor of God, the utility of the Church, and the necessity of the one vowing.

Among particular causes, certain ones stand on the part of the vow, and others on the part of its execution. (a) On the part of the vow, namely if someone vowed indiscreetly, from anger, sadness, before puberty, without deliberation; or under compulsion, from fear even light fear, deceit, etc. (b) On the part of the execution, if this becomes too arduous, or impedes a greater private or public good, or becomes an occasion of spiritual or temporal evil; for example, if, the frailty of the one vowing being considered, it is an occasion of frequent violation.

If the vow was made for the utility of a third party, dispensation can be made as long as the promise has not been accepted, because this does not produce an obligation toward neighbor; but, if it has already been accepted, generally dispensation cannot be made without the consent of the third party, because otherwise his rights would be violated. Nevertheless, if the promise was made principally in honor of God, and only secondarily in favor of the third party, it can be dispensed by the Sovereign Pontiff, because the accessory follows the principal.

n. 999.

1. Concerning those who are able to dispense. All and only those are able to dispense in vows who have jurisdiction in the external forum: for such dispensation pertains to the government of the Church.

(a) The Sovereign Pontiff can dispense in all vows for the universal Church: for supreme and universal jurisdiction belongs to him. He grants this power to the Major Penitentiary for the whole Christian world, and to Apostolic Legates in the provinces to which they are sent; and this power, although by commission of the Pontiff, is judged to be ordinary, and not merely delegated, since it has been handed over to them by reason of office and by ordinary law.

(b) Ordinaries and all having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction are able to dispense in all vows of their subjects, except those which are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff; and therefore also capitular vicars when the see is vacant. - Vicars general enjoy this power from the Code (c. 1313) by force of their office; but pastors do not, because they do not enjoy jurisdiction in the external forum, except by delegation.

(d) By special privilege, regular confessors can commute the non-reserved vows of the faithful by dispensing; indeed, according to many, they can also dispense simply, from the privilege granted by Julius II to the Canons Regular of St. Saviour, and by Leo X to the Camaldolese hermits, which, by force of the communication of privileges, passed to other regulars. - Secular confessors sometimes obtain the same privilege by delegation. - In both cases, this privilege can be exercised even outside confession, unless the contrary is declared in the concession.

n. 1000.

1. Concerning vows reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff. The Sovereign Pontiff has reserved to himself certain vows, in which he alone can dispense; these are:

(a) Solemn vows of religion; indeed, from recent law,¹ simple religious vows which precede solemn profession, and those which are emitted in congregations approved by the Holy See, whether perpetual or temporary.

¹ S. Cong. Bishops and Regulars, June 12, 1858.

(b) The vow of entering a religion of solemn vows.

The vows of a Roman pilgrimage, to the thresholds of the Apostles; of a Jerusalem pilgrimage, to the sepulcher of the Lord; of a Compostelan pilgrimage to the relics of St. James, are no longer reserved.

n. 1001.

Yet these vows are not reserved except in the strict sense set forth above; - and indeed when they are perfect, that is, obliging under grave sin; - fully free and emitted after the completed eighteenth year of age; - absolute, but not conditioned or disjunctive; - and certain, but not doubtfully emitted or doubtfully reserved. The reason is that, since reservation is hateful, it is to be interpreted strictly.

Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not sinning against chastity, of conjugal chastity, of temporary chastity, of virginity (as distinguished from a vow of perfect chastity), of receiving sacred orders, of entering a congregation in which only simple vows are emitted, ought by no means to be held reserved. - Likewise even reserved vows are reserved only as regards substance, but not as regards circumstances; thus he who vowed to enter a stricter religion can be dispensed by the Bishop so that he may enter a milder one.

Besides, when necessity urges, namely when grave spiritual or temporal harm is imminent and, on the other hand, the Sovereign Pontiff cannot be approached at once, Bishops can dispense in reserved vows. - When, by force of an apostolic concession, a reserved vow has been commuted into other works, these works indeed have the nature and obligation of a vow, but not of a reserved vow.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 88 passages

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 1: Definition of a Vow

A vow (εὐχή, votum) is a free and deliberate promise made to God to do something that is good and possible, and better than its omission.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 1: “A promise proceeds from a purpose of doing. But a purpose presupposes some deliberation, since it is an act of the deliberate will. Thus, therefore, three things are necessarily required for a vow: first, deliberation; secondly, a purpose of the will; thirdly, a promise, in which the nature of a vow is perfected.”—Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 1307, § 1.

A vow is essentially an act of divine worship (cultus latriae) because it is, so to speak, a contract which a man makes with God and by which he deliberately assumes a new obligation that binds him in conscience.²

² St. Thomas, ibid., art. 5: “A vow is a certain ordination of the things which one vows to divine worship or service. And thus it is clear that to vow is properly an act of latria or religion.”

As a rule the taking of a vow is accompanied by prayers and sacrifices offered for the purpose of obtaining some particular grace. Pious persons wishing to be relieved from evil, or to secure the divine assistance in circumstances of particular difficulty or danger, have long been wont to add to their prayers the promise of some sacrifice, e. g., to perform a work of charity or self-denial, in order to make the appeal to God’s mercy stronger and more efficacious. The vows of which we read in the Old Testament were all hypothetical, i. e., subject to the fulfilment of some condition.³

³ Gen. XXVIII, 20–22; Numb. XXI, 2; Judg. XI, 30 sq.; 1 Kings I, 10 sq.; 2 Kings XV, 7 sq.—Cfr. A. Aust, die Religion der Römer, pp. 29 sq., 126.

Being a formal promise, a vow differs from the mere purpose of doing or omitting something, because a purpose does not per se oblige in conscience, whereas a vow does.⁴

⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., l. II, p. 12, c. 3 says: “A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which is more properly referred to God alone and to those things which are God’s. For to vow is, by the attestation of a spontaneous promise, to bind oneself to God and constitute oneself His debtor. For he who promises simply pledges that he will do something; but he who vows solemnly affirms his promise and confirms the promise itself. Where it is a promise, he is held; where it is an attestation, he is bound.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 521).

The mere intention of making a vow is not sufficient to constitute a vow, and involves no obligation. The essential constituent of a vow is an obligation assumed in conscience. This is a matter in regard to which the faithful ought to be instructed in confession, lest they erroneously believe that the mere resolve of making a vow or performing some virtuous act entails the same obligations as the vow itself. To fail to keep a good resolution may be a sin, if the failure results from carelessness, sloth, or sensuality; but it is a sin (usually venial) only per accidens, because the sinful character of the omission lies in the cause, not in the act itself.⁵

⁵ Cfr. F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 464.

To deny the religious and moral character of vows is to doubt or deny the value of prayer and the significance of sacrifice. To promise God to do something one is not obliged to do, is manifestly a religious act, which derives its moral quality from the fact that it may be made a powerful means of acquiring virtue. By a vow the will, which is so easily moved, is directed toward goodness, i. e., toward God, and thus a fruitful source of heroic virtue is opened.⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 6: “For three reasons to perform the same work with a vow is better and more meritorious than to perform it without a vow. First, because to vow is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious.... Secondly, because he who vows something and performs it subjects himself more to God than he who only performs it. For he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than one who gave him only the fruits. And thence it is that thanks are also given to those who promise. Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good. But to do something from a will confirmed in good belongs to the perfection of virtue.”—Ibid., qu. 189, art. 2.

It is true that a vow binds the will, but this very fact constitutes it a positive instrument for the acquisition of true Christian liberty, which is the result of self-control, and thus makes a vow a powerful aid to human frailty.

Christ never made a vow because he was God and confirmed in goodness.⁷ But for men vows are expressly approved alike in the Old and in the New Testament.⁸ We read in the Acts of the Apostles that St. Paul and other early Christians shore their heads in pursuance of a vow.⁹ St. Ambrose,¹⁰ St. Augustine,¹¹ and others of the Fathers warmly recommended the practice of making vows.¹²

⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 4, ad 3: “To Christ, considered in Himself, it was not fitting to vow, both because He was God and also because, inasmuch as He was man, He had a will confirmed in good, as one possessing comprehension.”

⁸ Gen. XXVIII, 20; Lev. XXVII, 2 sqq.; Ps. XLIX, 14 sq.; LX, 9; LXXV, 12.

⁹ Acts XVIII, 18; XXI, 23 sqq.—Cfr. J. E. Belser, Die Selbstverteidigung des hl. Paulus, pp. 141 sqq.; and the same author’s Beiträge zur Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, pp. 89 sqq.

¹⁰ De Offic., l. III, c. 12, n. 76–81 (Migne, P. L., XVI, 137 sqq.).

¹¹ Enarr. in Ps., 75, n. 16: “Let each one vow and render what he can. Do not vow and fail to render, but let each one vow and render what he can. Do not be slow to vow. For you will not fulfil it by your own powers.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 967).—IDEM, ibid., 131, n. 3: “Let no one presume to render by his own powers what he has vowed; He who exhorts you to vow, Himself helps you to render.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1717).

¹² J. B. Wirthmüller, Über das Sittengesetz, pp. 52 sqq.; Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, pp. 167 sqq., 195 sqq.

That abuses have arisen in connection with vows proves nothing against their legitimacy.¹³

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2, ad 3: “To vow entrance into religion is a certain confirmation of the will toward better things, and therefore, of itself, it does not give man an occasion of falling, but rather removes it. But if one who transgresses a vow falls more gravely, this does not detract from the goodness of a vow, just as the fact that some sin more gravely after baptism does not detract from the goodness of baptism.”—Cfr. H. Denifle, O. P., Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 61 sqq. (English ed. by Volz, I, 73 sqq.); A. Schulze, Das Gelübde in der neueren theologischen Ethik, Gütersloh 1906.

The Church by esteeming and recommending vows imposes no yoke on any one. The vowing individual imposes a yoke upon himself, and this act of self-denial, if prudently and deliberately performed, is truly moral. The Church by her legislation on vows and the binding force thereof does not impair liberty; on the contrary, her laws are liberty’s best guarantee, for, in the first place, they prevent the faithful from binding themselves thoughtlessly and without a divine call; and, secondly, they interpret the obligations incurred by vows leniently and dispense from them when fulfilment would prove harmful. This is a great advantage, especially when we consider that, had not the Church the power to interpret vows, individual Christians would often be sorely troubled in conscience when they wished to withdraw from such an obligation merely on the strength of their own private judgment.¹⁴

¹⁴ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 331.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88.—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., IV, dist. 38.—IDEM, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 138.—F. Suarez, De Religione, tr. VI, l. 1–6.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 194–262 (ed. Gaudé, I, 495).—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 538 sqq.—C. Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, Obligatione, Honestate, Münster i. W., 1897, pp. 5 sqq.—Marsot, Traité Pratique des Voeux, 9th ed., Paris 1919.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 273 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 27th ed., pp. 229 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 222 sqq.—Th. Bouquillon, De Virtute Religionis, Part II, Bruges 1880, n. 302–502.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 170 sqq.—J. d’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., Vol. III, 5th ed., pp. 178 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 321 sqq.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 2: Division of Vows

Vows may be divided according to substance, form, or effect.

With regard to substance vows are (a) personal, real, or mixed; (b) perpetual or temporary.

a) A personal vow is a promise of some act to be performed, e. g., fasting, nursing the sick, going on a pilgrimage.

A real vow is one by which a thing (e. g., a sum of money) is dedicated to God.

A mixed vow combines the qualities of both personal and real vows. Such a mixed vow would be a promise to fast for the purpose of being able to give alms to the poor.¹

¹ Codex Iuris Can., can. 1308, § 4.

b) In respect of time, vows are secondly divided into perpetual and temporary. They are called perpetual if the obligation is assumed for life; temporary, if it is assumed for a limited time only.

With regard to form, vows are (a) absolute or conditional; (b) explicit or implicit.

a) An absolute vow (votum absolutum) is one that has no condition attached to it; a conditional vow is one that has.

In conditional vows the fulfilment of the promise is made to depend upon some definite event, e. g., a prayer being heard. Consequently there is no obligation to keep the vow until that event has happened. To this class belongs the so-called penal vow (votum poenale), which is a promise made to God to perform a definite penance if one should have the misfortune to commit, or fall back into, a certain sin.

b) An explicit vow (votum explicitum) is one in which the promise is clearly expressed. An implicit vow (votum implicitum) implies an act necessarily connected with the act expressly promised, as, for instance, according to a theological opinion, the vow of chastity is implied in major orders.

With regard to their canonical effects, vows are divided into solemn and simple (vota solemnia et simplicia). The basis of this distinction is not the greater or less measure of solemnity wherewith the vow is taken, but solely the positive law of the Church.²

² Codex Iuris Can., can. 1308; cfr. Wernz, Ius Decretalium, III, 572.

The classification of vows into temporary and perpetual, simple and solemn, in reference to religious profession, is comparatively new. In the middle of the sixteenth century the only acknowledged form of profession was the solemn vow, which was supposed to be taken after the novitiate. With the exception of the Society of Jesus, this practice was followed by all religious orders until 1858, when the S. Congregatio super Statu Regularium enacted³ that, after the novitiate, the members of male religious institutes should take simple vows, which were to be continued for three years from the date of simple profession, or longer, according to the prudent judgment of the superiors, but not beyond twenty-five years. Leo XIII⁴ extended this decree to nuns with solemn vows. Yet up to a few years ago it was always the opinion of canonists and the practice of the Roman Congregations to consider these simple vows as perpetual. Lately the Roman Court commenced to regard them as temporary (triennial), and this view has been embodied in the new Code.⁵

³ Decree “Neminem latet.”

⁴ “Perpensis,” May 3, 1902.

⁵ Cfr. P. Augustine, O.S.B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. III, p. 254, St. Louis 1919.

n. ¶13.

Solemn vows are those recognized by the Church as such. They are perpetual and are made only in religious orders properly so called. They include the three essential elements of the religious life,—poverty, chastity, and obedience.

n. ¶14.

Temporary profession does not involve such an absolute and lasting contract as perpetual profession. In regard to the latter the difference between simple and solemn vows is most important. Simple perpetual profession implies no absolute and irrevocable covenant, whereas solemn per- petual profession, by its very nature, spells irrevocable consecration to God and acceptance of the act by a religious superior in the name of the Church.⁶

⁶ Op. cit., III, 259.

n. ¶15.

The distinction between reserved and non-reserved vows belongs to Canon Law rather than to Moral Theology. Of private vows, the only ones reserved to the Holy See under the New Code are that of perfect and perpetual chastity and that of entering a religious institute with solemn vows, provided the vow has been taken unconditionally after the eighteenth year of age completed.⁷

⁷ C. I. C., can. 1309.

n. ¶16.

A public vow is defined by the Code as one accepted by a legitimate religious superior in the name of the Church. All vows not thus accepted are private.⁸ A solemn vow is always public, but not vice versa.

⁸ C. I. C., can. 1308, § 1.

n. ¶17.

READINGS.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., p. 273.—IDEM, Las Religiosas, com. IV, n. 1 sq.—P. Chas. Augustine, O.S.B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. VI, St. Louis 1920.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 224 sqq.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 3: Object of Vows

By the object of a vow we understand its matter, or, in other words, that which is promised to God.

This object must be good, nay something better than its opposite.¹ It may be something that is not a matter of duty, but merely of counsel, or something which is a duty, as, e. g., patience in suffering or chastity corresponding to one’s state of life.² Vows of the last-mentioned kind are often made with the intention of insuring special fervor in the fulfilment of one’s duties. To the original obligation arising from the law a vow adds the additional one resulting from the promise made. The so-called baptismal vow, or a promise made in the confessional to avoid the occasion of sin, to keep the holydays of obligation, etc., are in themselves mere resolutions, but partake of the nature of vows if they are accompanied by a solemn promise to employ extraordinary means of grace.

¹ Ths. Slater, S.J., Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 247.

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2: “One and the same work done by vow is more praiseworthy than if it were done without a vow.”—Cfr. qu. 88, art. 6.

Nothing that is sinful, unjust, incompatible with one’s higher duties, or physically or morally impossible, can be made the object of a vow.

The matter of a vow, by its very nature, must be something which is physically and morally possible, for no one can reasonably assume an obligation which it is beyond his power to fulfil.³

³ Cfr. Matt. XV, 5 sq.; Mark VII, 11–13.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 315: “I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, indeed a better good, because God is not worshipped by an indifferent or less good action; for by a vow special worship is promised to God, which cannot be given except in the promise of a better thing. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to various circumstances. II. The matter of a vow must be a morally possible thing, because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of binding oneself; but no one can bind himself to something morally impossible for him. But if the thing is divisible and possible in part, the vow is valid for that part; it is not valid, however, if it is morally indivisible.”

If a vow can be kept only in part, and the matter is capable of being divided (materia divisibilis), the vovens is bound to do as much as he can, unless he has promised different acts as parts of one inseparable whole. Thus if a husband or wife had vowed to observe chastity, he or she would at least have to refrain from demanding the debitum. If one had made a vow to give a certain sum to the poor, and found that he was unable to give all he had promised, he would have to give as much as he could.

A similar rule governs all circumstances which may enter into the substance of a vow. Thus, if one has vowed to make a pilgrimage on foot, and finds himself unable to walk, he must go on horseback, or by train, or in some other way, if he can.⁴

⁴ F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 471.

A vow to avoid all, even the slightest venial sins, would be invalid because the matter promised is impossible. The case would be different if the vow referred to mortal sins, or to deliberate venial sins, or to venial sins of a determined species. Such vows are valid, though on account of the difficulty involved in keeping them, they are not expedient for all.⁵

⁵ Ferreres, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, p. 277; cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia, disp. 2, art. 5.

A vow to marry or get married would be, per se, invalid, even if it referred to some poor and pious person. The reason is that, for the vovens, the celibate state would be bonum maius. If, however, marriage is necessary for any individual, either to remove scandal or to escape the danger of incontinence, it would be for that person a bonum melius and hence a fit object for a vow. The same is true if one who had already made up his mind to enter the matrimonial state, would vow to marry a poor girl in order to rescue her from poverty.⁶

⁶ Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 231.

To vow absolutely never to make a vow would be invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow. To vow never to make a vow except with the permission of one’s confessor, on the other hand, would be valid, because it is better to make a vow without danger of imprudence than with that danger present. If one who has vowed never to make a vow except with the consent of his confessor would afterwards break his promise by making a vow without consulting his confessor, the act would be sinful indeed, but the vow would be valid, unless the vovens had expressly stipulated that any future vow thus taken should be invalid.⁷

⁷ Ibid.; cfr. P. Laymann, S.J., Theol. Mor., l. IV, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 5.

READINGS.—Gury, Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 315–318.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 549 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 471 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 276 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 229 sqq.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Section 4: Conditions of Validity

The conditions required to make a vow valid and licit, are the following:

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. I, Conditions, Division, and Utility of a Vow · Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Article II: The Obligation and Execution of a Vow · Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Article III: Cessation of a Vow

He who makes a vow must have the serious and deliberate intention (animus vovendi) of binding himself by his promise under pain of sin, because every vow is a kind of particular law which the vovens takes upon himself before God.¹

¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 310: “For the validity of a vow there is required both a true and deliberate intention of making the vow, or a true promise made to God under pain of sin, because a vow is a kind of particular law which the vower imposes upon himself before God. However, the will and deliberation required for mortal sin suffice.”

…and 48 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 21 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. I, Conditions, Division, and Utility of a Vow

n. 209.

I. What it is and with what conditions. A vow is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good," c. 1307 §1. (Cf. 2, 2, q. 88.)

A promise, therefore not a mere purpose. The criterion of distinction is not taken from the word alone, "I purpose" or "I promise," but from whether one intended to assume a special obligation or not. Hence doubts in this matter will have to be solved by the question: "Did you will to oblige yourself before God?"; and in doubt, the minimum is to be held.
Deliberate, with at least that deliberation which is sufficient for sinning mortally. Nor is every age or every deliberation sufficient for mortal sin sufficient for every vow. For he sins mortally who has known the gravity of the guilt, although he has not weighed the magnitude of the sin; but in order that you spontaneously assume an obligation, it is necessary not only that you know what an obligation is, but that you have perceived sufficiently clearly the quantity of the object ¹. Thus excellently Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 6, n. 605. From a sudden movement of the soul, from a custom such that the tongue anticipates the mind, sometimes from the heat of anger, either consideration or deliberation can be impeded. If a solidly probable reason suggests that there was only half-full deliberation, it is licit to answer in favor of liberty. With such a reason excluded, a vow made after the seventh year is presumed deliberate. Minds vexed by a scrupulous obsession of vowing are to be ordered by the confessor to care in no way for vows which they think they have made. Cf. I, 85 and 382. - Because direct deliberation is lacking, vows made in drunkenness do not oblige.
Free. For "a vow made through grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself." Thus at least from the positive disposition of c. 1307 §3. In the external forum, it is not presumed that light fear gave cause to the vow. If someone, from light but unjust fear alone, and for no other reason, has vowed, the vow probably is not valid, because God is not judged to accept such a vow, lest He pave a way for unjust coercion. Yet this is controverted. But when fear is not extrinsic or not unjust, nothing stands in the way of the value of the vow.

Error concerning the substance of the promised matter: the one vowing thinks that a chalice which he vows to be golden is silver; - concerning a substantial condition, that is, one so implicitly supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted: the thing promised is of twice greater price or is far graver than it was estimated; - concerning the final cause: the vow is made for the health of a person who is dead or was not sick; - errors of this sort make the vow null, since free consent is lacking. Indeed, any error which has given cause to the vow is of itself sufficient that you be judged immune from the obligation. Nevertheless, excepting properly substantial error, error does not vitiate religious profession. For both private and public good demand that those things which constitute a firm and irrevocable state should not easily waver and should be liable to few conditions. Moreover, the will of the one professing is judged to have accommodated itself to the nature of the thing, and therefore to have held the profession ratified, notwithstanding other errors. Ignorance or error concerning sexual matters also vitiates profession less: both because the force of that vow, as excellent, approved by God and the Church, emitted by many, and containing a renunciation of certain delights, is sufficiently apprehended through true elements; and because, as the young man is disposed by fervor itself, knowledge of the carnal act would not change his mind. For then he does not experience those grave and troublesome temptations which afterward suggest repentance for the obligation undertaken to certain less fervent persons. Although it is regularly expedient that those who profess the religious state be sufficiently instructed concerning the matter, and be warned that grave difficulties can arise afterward.

Made to God. A vow is properly made to God, and is an act of latria. But the cause of a vow can also be the honor which we thus render to the saints, while their worship impels us to acts of religion; just as we can promise certain things to God in order to obtain that the Saints be more honored: for each reason the vow is made in honor of the Saints. We can also confirm by a vow a promise made to a Saint (2, 2, q. 88 art. 5 ad 3).

Finally, nothing prevents us from promising to the Saints themselves, simply or conditionally, certain honors or services ¹. Then an obligation of dulia or hyperdulia arises, distinct from a vow, yet nevertheless analogous; this more approaches the obligation of a vow than the debt of human fidelity, and therefore remains grave in its genus. Cf. Quaest. de religione, 137.

Concerning a good. For a promise of an evil thing can neither honor God nor be acceptable to Him.
Concerning a possible good. For an impossible thing cannot be intended or promised efficaciously. This also seems to have to be transferred to those things which are morally impassable, because that obligation, as in itself harmful to the soul, cannot be acceptable to God or honorific to Him.

Here, however, prudent discretion is needed. The reason is well valid when someone directly vows those things which he cannot physically or morally carry out. Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins is not valid if it is so understood that, once one sin has been committed, the vow itself ceases to be. For to avoid all venial sins is not now in our power without an extraordinary privilege; nor is sufficient utility discerned in such a vow. But, as it seems to us, they pronounce too absolutely who say that such a vow is not valid even if it merely confirms the obligation which we all have of avoiding every sin: an obligation which perseveres even after sin. For, as Suarez excellently observes, Relig. tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, nn. 13 and 16, the vow is reasonably understood of avoiding venial sins insofar as it can be done, or of diligence to be applied in fleeing every sin. This care and diligence will of itself be very useful for every man. Wherefore we do not well understand why such vows are judged by Suarez, l. c. nn. 3 and 4, to be per se, or at least for many, little useful, to be disapproved, and simply to be dispensed. Nor can we assent to those who contend that a vow of avoiding deliberate sins can validly be made only by those who are of sufficiently proved virtue. Moreover, they admit the validity of a vow by which a positive good is promised to God, with which the obligation of avoiding all venial sins is connected, as is the vow of always doing the more perfect things, which is permitted to approved persons; nor is the validity of a vow of chastity, even imprudently emitted by the too fragile, doubted. Therefore rather than the vow itself, the negative form can displease, which can generate confusion and disturb the soul.

In practice also it will be expedient to conceive or circumscribe the vow in such a way that, with scruples avoided, it may increase the pursuits of virtue. Finally, because of the authority of others, we shall be able to treat as null a vow of avoiding all venial sins, or a vow emitted by a person not approved of avoiding all deliberate sins; indeed perhaps a vow of avoiding all grave sins, if it has been pronounced by a person too fragile.

And better. Every good indeed of itself pleases God. But since certain goods can obstruct better goods, it will always be acceptable to God that someone do what is better. Wherefore, by force of a vow, you will never be obliged to a less good, so that a vow concerning a lesser good, as such, would not be valid. In general, therefore, a vow of marriage will not be valid, since it remains intact for one to desire and choose honorable celibacy, which in itself is a better state. Therefore a good is understood which is better than the voluntary omission of it.

¹ At least if knowledge of the greater quantity would have prevented the vow. And this is the difference between sin and a vow. He who had known better would not have made the sin; nevertheless, now he has sinned. But if he had known the thing better, he would not have vowed; then, with the exception of vows by which a state is entered, he did not vow. And because the vow of chastity of religious would not be prevented by more perfect knowledge, the vow subsists from that very fact, even apart from that knowledge.

¹ But these things are not accustomed to be done in promises which affect the whole life. Wherefore he who vows chastity to the Blessed Virgin Mary is judged to vow it to God, moved by piety toward the Blessed Virgin Mary.

n. 210.

An implicit promise sometimes suffices: thus, in the Latin Church, the voluntary reception of Sacred Order, according to the common opinion, brings in a vow of chastity (nor is that step which those to be ordained to the subdiaconate who are not yet bound by the vow of chastity are ordered to make an essential rite). He who has not wished to vow, or has plainly been ignorant of that connection of the vow, as is more like the truth, will not be bound by the vow, but from the precept of the Church he will have to observe chastity from the motive of religion. Express mention of the vow is not had in cc. 132 and 211.

He who habitually has known the obligation of a vow, and deliberately promises something to God, makes a true vow, although he seems to himself not to have adverted to the obligation. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 201.

Yet he does not vow who has the intention indeed of promising, but not of obliging himself; but he does vow to whom only the mind of fulfilling the obligation is lacking.

n. 211.

II. Division of a vow. 1. A vow is absolute or conditioned. A penal vow is so called by which some expiation of penance or of a good work is promised if some less right act has been done.

A personal, real, and mixed vow. Strictly speaking, a vow from its very essence is the personal act of the one vowing, like every promise; nor, because it terminates in a thing, does that promise, which is of a certain fidelity toward God, affect the patrimony any more than a promise of fidelity to a man does. Nevertheless it is called personal, objectively, if one's own action or omission is promised: fasting, a pilgrimage, abstinence from luxury, from a certain drink; real, by which some external thing is promised; finally it will be mixed which is formed from each element: whether both can be separated, as if you promise a pilgrimage with a liberality; or whether they are joined by an individual bond, as if care of a sick person to be had by one's own hands is promised.
A public vow, which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior: thus the vows of religious profession; and a private vow.
A solemn and simple vow. It is solemn "if it has been recognized as such by the Church" (c. 1308 §2). Another vow is simple. Concerning the essence of solemnity, cf. the work Quaest. de religione.
A reserved vow, whose dispensation the Holy See alone can concede, and a non-reserved vow.

Besides public vows, whose dispensation or commutation is arranged by the legal regime itself (cc. 214, 633-636, 640, 648, 669), the reserved private vows are: "the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, and the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age" (c. 1309). Before the Code, absolute vows of the three pilgrimages also were reserved.

n. 212.

III. The utility of vowing. A vow supposes a will which can fall away from the good or change its purpose. Wherefore neither for Christ, whose will was always most firmly fixed in the good, nor for an Angel, who stands immovable by his decrees, was there ever a reason why they should vow. Nor does it belong to the blessed comprehensors in heaven to vow, since their will is altogether fixed in loving God.

To us vows of a twofold genus can prudently be advised: a) vows by which some peculiar necessity or weakness is met, such as certain medicinal vows; and vows, generally momentary, with which we are not rarely accustomed to surround petitions made to God; b) vows which are fruitful seeds of good works, such as vows of abnegation, of seeking the more perfect things, and especially vows by which the more perfect discipline of Christ is confirmed in the religious life.

Moreover, although a vow is praiseworthy and meritorious, discretion must nevertheless be observed in advising or multiplying vows. And generally it is better not to have vowed than to have been released from vows by dispensation: that is accustomed to diminish confidence in God. Wherefore, the more a vow is of an arduous and lasting thing, with the greater caution it must be advised or admitted. Cf. Quaest. de virtute rel., 140.

But by the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God, while by an oath we honor and cultivate His infinite veracity. Cf. Quaest. de virtute relig., n. 141.

n. 213.

Divine fidelity in promises. Since the divine will is altogether immutable, God is faithful eminently rather than formally. Therefore God promises us the things which He signifies that He wills to give us, nor can a distinct obligation of perseverance be conceived. And the divine benevolence and liberality, which is confirmed by no formal obligation just as by no translation of right from God to us, is perceived to be more gratuitous.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Article II: The Obligation and Execution of a Vow

n. 214.

Nature of the obligation. The obligation of a vow is not of the same ratio as the obligation of a promise which is made to men. We ought to be faithful to men lest they be deceived, while God, better than the man promising, knows what is going to be. But a man can offer to God the future action itself, or a series of goods and perseverance in the purpose of a good work. Moreover, reverence owed to God, and therefore the virtue of religion, requires that an oblation once made not be revoked. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 124, 128.

n. 215.

Force of the obligation. Now the force of the obligation is that which the matter demonstrates, unless the one vowing has wished to assume a lesser obligation. For he who could promise nothing could also lessen the force of his obligation. Except vows which are required in the undertaking of a state. The intention also of the one vowing brings it about that small matters coalesce or not, according as the one vowing intends to vow to God a certain notable whole by parts, or to offer individual performances as such. Coalescence is easier in real vows than in personal vows.

For a vow, although it induces a graver obligation than that of fidelity, admits smallness of matter, because negligence in observing a vow of small matter is explained from a slight esteem of the thing, not of God.

Judgment concerning grave or light matter must be made prudently, by observing what the vow contributes to divine worship either directly or indirectly. Directly, when a grave act of religion is vowed; indirectly, when a thing grave in another order, by the vow itself, is referred to divine worship. Cf. Suarez, Rel. Tr. 6, L. 5, c. 4.

When a singular action has been promised to God, this rule can be admitted, that the matter is thought grave which, for the intended end, would of itself be urged under mortal guilt by divine or ecclesiastical law. Therefore grave matter is judged to be: hearing Mass, fasting, abstinence of one day, etc.

But when a series of actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; moreover, one action which, taken in itself, would be notable can be a slight part of the promised series; finally, the very object of such a vow must be defined accurately.

Thus a vow of doing the more perfect things concerns not so much the things in themselves as insofar as they are more perfect; but the excess of perfection of itself seems light matter. Thus he who substitutes another honorable action for the Mass which it would have been more perfect to hear, is not guilty of omitted Mass but of neglected more perfect action; and this is thought light. Wherefore scarcely in a singular act which is not mortal fault will there be grave guilt against such a vow. He also will have sinned gravely who often, as if habitually and with a clear mind, has done things which he has certainly known to be imperfect. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 129.

n. 216.

Is there an acquired right from a vow?. A right is sometimes said to be acquired for another from a vow. Properly speaking, however, an obligation of religion cannot, as such, transfer rights: only an obligation of justice can do that. Therefore, if after a vow a right has been acquired for someone, the cause of the right will be either an accompanying promise from justice made to a physical or moral person, or the execution itself which placed the thing in another's patrimony. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 130.

n. 217.

The extension of the obligation is to be taken from the words of the one vowing and from their reasonable or common acceptance, always inclining to the more benign parts. Wherefore he who vows the rosary satisfies, saving a different expressed intention, by reciting the third part; he who vows Mass or fasting for a month does not have to fast or hear two Masses on Sunday; he who vows the fast of a vigil will have to neither fast on Sunday nor now anticipate the vigil on Saturday, since from c. 1252 §4, vigils are now not anticipated.

He who has made a conditioned or penal vow will be able, according to his varied intention, to impede the condition, to do the action to which the penalty is annexed, or will be prohibited from doing so.

He who has not appointed a day for fulfilling the vow must execute the vow as soon as he conveniently can. Yet a lesser cause is required for deferring than for omitting. But an illicit delay of execution will be judged grave if the one vowing exposes himself to danger of forgetfulness or of inability, or if the matter is notably diminished, for example in the vow of entering religion which a person already super-adult has made.

He who doubts whether he made a vow is presumed free; he who doubts whether he was fully in possession of himself in a vow certainly emitted is presumed to have been conscious, unless a positive reason renders probable the defect of deliberation: in which case, a probable opinion permits that the vow be neglected; although then it is better to ask a dispensation.

n. 218.

II. Execution of the vow. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow also through another, although he who does not have his own ought not therefore to beg another's. If another has spontaneously done it for you, your ratification will suffice. The intention of fulfilling the vow is not necessary.

The burden of a real vow which the one vowing has imposed upon an heir by a valid testament must be fulfilled by the heir from justice toward the testator. Likewise the heir must satisfy from justice a real vow by which a third party has acquired a right. With this omitted, canonical law obliges the heir from religion to fulfill real vows: "The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, likewise the obligation of a mixed vow, for the part by which it is real" (c. 1310 §2).

By what title is the heir obliged? From the Code the obligation is said to pass. But it cannot pass except as the obligation which held the one vowing: this, however, was an obligation of religion. Yet most induce an obligation of justice. By what right, this plainly escapes us. Will you say with Suarez (Relig., Tr. 6, Lib. 4, c. 11, n. 7) that goods are received by the heir "liable to the payment of his debts"? But it must be denied that here there is a debt properly so called, which belongs to justice. For a promise from fidelity does not bind goods; and the obligation of a vow is from fidelity toward God (2, 2, q. 88 art. 3): it works no tradition of right. By what miracle, then, would an obligation from religion be converted, in the heir, into an obligation of justice? Why should goods be burdened in the case of an heir rather than in the case of him who made the vow? Therefore this must briefly be said: without positive law, an obligation of promise from fidelity, whether to God or to a man, even if it is personal, would not pass to heirs; now, because of positive law, the obligation of a real vow indeed passes to heirs; but, since the Code determines nothing else, it passes such as it was, i.e., as an obligation of religion. Cf. Quaest. de virtute religionis, n. 138.

n. 219.

He who has vowed the deed of another must merely strive in an honorable manner that the other voluntarily do the thing promised.

n. 220.

A vow of a community or for a community. Concerning this matter, in which no little labor is expended ¹, we think it must be said briefly as follows. Governors who represent a community, just as they can perform other things, can thus vow for the community. After the vow has been made, the obligation of religion passes to the successors of those who vowed, because through them acts the moral person, which remains the same. And if the promised act is one which does not demand the intervention of subjects, the execution itself will be liable to no difficulty. But if the subjects themselves must act, since they themselves promised nothing, they will have to be obliged by law or precept. If, however, the vow is not an action of those who represent the community, but is proposed to the very community of persons that they vow, certainly only those will be held by the vow who truly emitted the vow; nor, without a positive law, will successors be held.

¹ Cf. Op. theol., Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 634.

n. 221.

Specification. The violation of a simple vow differs specifically from sacrilege, concerning which below. It is graver than sacrilege, insofar as it is more directly against God; it is also graver than perjury strictly such.

n. 222.

Obligation of a purpose. A good purpose itself induces a certain light obligation proportioned to human constancy. For it is not reasonable that someone recede without reason from a prudently made choice. Cf. Lugo, De iust. d. 23, n. 1, against Suarez, Tr. 6, L. 1, c. 2, and Quaestiones de religione, n. 141.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Article III: Cessation of a Vow

n. 223.

I. Cessation from within. The obligation of a vow is taken away from within, not only by execution, but also by the extinction of the condition on which it depended, and by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good, or impossible, absolutely or morally. Cf. c. 1311.

An equivalent but not specific fulfillment of a condition does not suffice for the obligation, unless the intention of the one vowing carried something else. When the determinate thing which was promised perishes, another thing is not to be supplied ¹. But when the thing has been sold, generally the price is owed, because the one vowing is judged to have promised the thing with all its utility. Yet if a peculiar use, now impossible, was intended, for example of a mitre to be used by a bishop in a certain first solemnity, the obligation is taken away by sale of the mitre. But by voluntary sale against the vow he will sin. He who vowed something to be done at a certain time, when that time has passed, owes nothing, unless the time was added for urging the obligation; for example in a fast of thanksgiving.

A vow of a thing partially impossible obliges to the possible part, if the thing can and usually does conveniently be divided; otherwise it does not oblige. And the one vowing owes nothing who intended the whole by indivisibility, for example a church with a tower. Nor, if the principal part has become impossible, will the accessory parts remain: he who had determined to make an impeded pilgrimage in a hair-shirt does not have to wear the hair-shirt.

The vow also ceases when the final cause ceases, as was said concerning an oath.

¹ What if the promise was disjunctive: I shall give this or that, and either has perished? Although a disjunctive obligation does not of itself cease when one of the two remains possible, nevertheless it will often happen in vows that the loss of one of the two things renders the execution of the vow much more onerous, so that the obligation is thought to be taken away. Indeed many with St. Alphonsus himself, III, 224, admit that the vow always ceases if you have not yet chosen one of the two parts. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 620 and 651.

n. 224.

II. Cessation from without. From without, or by the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, a vow ceases by irritation, dispensation, and commutation.

Irritation of a vow is an act by which, with legitimate use of a power or right over the will of the one vowing, the vow is made void. In irritation, that general principle is applied: that one who is subject to the power of another cannot oblige himself validly by a vow, except insofar as this is not prejudicial to the right of the one to whom he is subject. Therefore the right of irritation belongs: to the father, with respect to children who are minors and not emancipated; to the tutor and mother, with respect to minors who are not emancipated; and probably also to paternal grandparents with respect to grandchildren who, lacking parents, remain under their power ¹. It belongs also to Superiors of religious, as to vows made after religious profession, excepting vows which are part of the religious profession and found the very faculty of irritating, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion: because that matter is withdrawn from the universal subjection of religious.

This faculty is not had with respect to novices. For c. 561, by which a novice is said to be subject to the power of the Master and Superiors, does not suffice for attributing that firm dominion which is required for irritation; and power under a higher law was denied. Cf. Suarez, De relig. Tr. 6, L. 6, c. 7, n. 11 and c. 11, n. 8; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, 233. The reason is that the power of irritating belongs to the Superior from the vow of obedience, which the novice lacks (Suarez, l. c.); nor can the private vow of a novice have the force of a religious vow and create a true Superior with dominative power ².

Does it belong to the husband with respect to the wife? The matter was controverted, nor did the Code settle the controversy. It depended on the way in which c. Noluit, C. XXXIII, q. 5, was to be interpreted. - This power affects all and only vows which were made during the time of subjection. But the fact that the one irritating consented to the vow does not stand in the way. If there is a right over the matter of the vow, the one irritating can suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow brings prejudice to him (c. 1312). For the one vowing could not detract from the rights of another or strip himself of his own obligations. Wherefore this irritation can be used by a Superior and by the Master of novices with respect to novices.

¹ Why authors also mention the paternal grandfather we do not know. Cf. Arregui, n. 213; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 235.

² The case would be different of a religious passing over, who, from c. 635 §1, is bound to obey the Superiors and even the Master of novices also by reason of the vow of obedience. For although he can return to his former religion, this is in no way by a precarious title, such as that of other novices, but by the firm bond of obedience by which he is bound as a religious.

n. 225.

2. Dispensation of a vow. flows from the power which ecclesiastical authority has of relaxing, in the name of God, the debt on which is founded the application of the divine law which urges the fulfillment of a vow. This power is contained in the words: "Whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. 16, 19).

The faculty of dispensing non-reserved vows, provided that a right acquired by others is not injured, is conceded by canon 1313: 1) to local Ordinaries as to all their subjects, even pilgrims; 2) to the Superior (therefore also the local Superior) of an exempt clerical religion, as to professed religious, novices, or others equated in this matter by c. 514; 3) to others to whom the power of dispensing has been delegated by the Apostolic See.

Since dispensation is made in the name of God, it is always an act of an inferior, and therefore requires a just cause, such as, in this matter, besides the common good of the Church, of the state, of the family, the greater progress of the one vowing himself; danger of transgression, great difficulty of execution, great scruples in execution; the imperfection of the act which was effected inconsiderately.

Lest excessive scruples arise, authors judge valid the dispensation which is conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. The difficulty and inconveniences of retraction seem to complete the cause. Something else would have to be said if no cause had truly existed.

An acquired right, which an inferior to the Pope cannot take away, is had in vows in which a certain ratio of onerous contract intervenes, as in vows which are made in religion; it is had also in vows accepted by a third party and made principally for his utility. For if the honor of God was the principal cause of the obligation, the other did not acquire a right except dependently on God to whom the promise is to be kept. (Cf. St. Alphonsus, L. 3, 255; Lehmkuhl, I, 622.)

As c. 1309 itself insinuates, reservation is to be understood strictly. And therefore, in order that vows of chastity and of entering religion be reserved, they must be perfect by reason of the end, insofar as they are made from love of the work itself or virtue, and by reason of the object, insofar as the matter is had perfectly. The end is imperfect in vows made under a condition concerning the future (and this even after the condition has been fulfilled); in penal vows; in vows made from fear, even light fear.

Matter is lacking in vows under a light obligation, under a disjunctive obligation, unless each vow was reserved; in a vow of not marrying, of preserving virginity, if these are conceived as distinct from the vow of chastity, in a vow of temporary chastity.

By the new disposition of law, no vow is reserved of him who has not yet completed the eighteenth year of age.

Among those who are accustomed to be delegated by the Holy See are numbered confessors of mendicant Orders or of those similarly privileged, according to the concession and moderation of their Superiors; and the power can be exercised outside the Sacrament (St. Alphonsus, De privil., n. 109).

n. 226.

3. Commutation. is not, as dispensation is, an absolute condonation of a vow, but is the substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow.

"A work promised by a non-reserved vow can be commuted by the one vowing himself into a better or equal good; but into a lesser good by him to whom there is the power of dispensing according to the norm of c. 1313." These last words are added in order that they indicate the necessity of a just cause when a lesser work is substituted, and the caution to be observed of not injuring an acquired right. Commutation into a better work demands no cause. A light cause suffices that commutation be made into an equal work. Indeed, when this is done by authority of a Superior, a greater inclination to that work, a lesser danger of transgressing, suffice. And in doubt concerning equality, notable trouble in fulfilling the work suffices. That one may act more prudently, it is to be advised that commutation by one's own authority be done with the counsel of a confessor. "A better or equal good is that which, the circumstances having been considered, especially the condition of the one vowing, appears more or equally to conduce to the glory of God" (Arregui, n. 217). Therefore the absolute excellence of the work is not a sufficient criterion.

A faculty given of dispensing-commuting extends the faculty of commuting to some dispensation; a faculty of commuting-dispensing restricts the faculty of dispensing, since some work must be substituted.

Reserved vows, however, are excepted from the faculty of commuting just as from the faculty of dispensing.

For him whose vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work, since the commutation was made in his favor. But he does not have to return to it if the work commuted by authority has become impossible or useless.

When the cause does not seem sufficient for dispensing, the promised work can be partly dispensed, partly commuted.

N. B. If the obligation of the heir to the very real vow has passed and is of religion alone, whoever can dispense or commute the vow will be able to relax it; but if, from the testament of the one vowing, an obligation of justice has arisen, he alone will be able to take away the obligation who can condone pious legacies.

n. 227.

From c. 1315, by every religious profession vows emitted before are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion. Before the Code, all prior vows were taken away by solemn religious profession. Concerning simple profession nothing had been established in law. Therefore the present law is of greater extension but of milder efficacy.

But, just as before the Code, now also the religious will be able to commute all prior non-reserved vows into the profession, at least perpetual, or to obtain that they be authoritatively commuted into it.

n. 228.

Counsels concerning dispensation and commutation. 1. In the internal forum, it generally is better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation. 2. In prescribing commutations, care must be taken, without anxiety, that we preserve the intention of the one vowing and the spiritual utility of the prior work promised. Wherefore: 3. Although a work which the one vowing was already accustomed to do can juridically be imposed, this is regularly not to be done, because the intention of the one vowing was that he add something to his accustomed works. Except perhaps a vow, such as not marrying, by which mere permanence in a state already admitted is promised. Wherefore, binding to monthly confession already customarily being made will well supply such a vow. - 5. Commutation can be made into a work of a similar ratio, or into a work of a better ratio, according to the hierarchy of virtues, of which charity is queen. Thus more frequent Communion of itself surpasses simple abstinence. - 6. If the work has the ratio of remedy, a medicinal work is to be prescribed. Let fasting be converted, for example, into abstinence; - abstinence from meats into abstinence from wine, cider, use of tobacco, sweetmeats, with some prayer; - exterior penance, assumed for chastity, into suppression of dangerous reading (for example, of a love story), or of some worldly festivity. - 7. The difficulty to be avoided must also be attended to. If a distant pilgrimage has been promised, business or expenses can at times stand in the way of execution. If business, it will best be commuted into a nearer pilgrimage, with the monies that will be spared being given to the poor or to a pious work. If costs stand in the way, let a nearer pilgrimage be substituted, with a lesser alms or visitation of the poor added. - 8. Where a work has been promised merely as one of devotion, then these are almost commuted among themselves: a rosary, confession, communion, Mass, abstinence, fasting.

n. 229.

Summary

I. A vow,. 1. is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good" (c. 1307). A promise supposes the will of obligation; deliberation is necessary at least that which is required for sinning mortally, besides a capacity of estimation proportioned to the gravity of the thing. In order that it be wholly free, it must be immune from unjust fear and from error. And a vow vitiated by grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself, at least from c. 1307 §2. Probably null also is a vow which has been emitted from light but unjust fear alone. Error concerning the substance of the thing promised, concerning a condition so supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted, concerning the final cause: makes the vow null. Indeed, in a merely individual vow, any error giving cause takes away the obligation; but a public vow is weakened only by substantial error. - A vow is made properly to God, but can be made in honor of the saints, when it has a cause in the honor rendered or desired for the saints. Besides, promises, approaching the obligation of a vow, can be made to the Blessed Virgin and to saints. - A vow can be made concerning only a good and one at least physically possible. And the good must be better, insofar as it is to be preferred to the voluntary omission of it, nor can the vow impede the faculty of doing what is better.

A vow is distinguished as absolute and conditioned, to which the penal is ascribed; real, personal, mixed; public and private; solemn and simple; private reserved and non-reserved. The relaxation of a public vow is defined by the legal regime. Reserved to the Holy See are private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entering a religion of solemn vows, which were emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age.
The reason for vowing proceeds from our inconstancy or mutability. Certain medicinal vows are to be advised, which, generally momentary, fortify petitions made to God; and vows which are fruitful seeds of good works.

By the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God.

II. 1. The nature of the obligation is of religion, by which we are forbidden to revoke an oblation made to God; its extension is gathered from the reasonable understanding of the formula applied, always inclining to more benign things; its force is demonstrated by the matter, unless someone, in private vows, has wished to lessen the obligation. According to the intention of the one vowing, matters coalesce or not. In a promised singular action, grave matter is thought to be that which, for the intended end, would be urged under grave obligation by divine or human law. But when a series of performances or actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; and several things must be distinguished according to that supreme rule of considering the gravity of the object from its intrinsic end, and of the parts from their relation to that end as to a whole. - He who doubts whether he has made a vow is presumed free; but he who, in a vow certainly emitted, doubts whether he was in possession of himself, is presumed to have been conscious. Yet if a positive reason makes probable a defect of deliberation, by a probable opinion he is excused from executing the vow.

Execution: a) When. A vow without a day must be fulfilled as soon as it conveniently can, yet in such a way that illicit delay does not become grave except because of danger of forgetfulness, inability, or notable diminution of the matter.

b) Through whom. A vow, as such, is always a strictly personal act. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow can also be fulfilled through another. A real vow, from c. 1310 §2, passes to heirs, who nevertheless, without a testament of the author or a right acquired by another, seem to be held by religion alone, not otherwise than the one vowing himself; cf. Quaest. de religione, n. 138. A vow of a community strictly and immediately obliges the Superior or those who vowed.

The violation of a vow differs specifically from sacrilege, and is graver than sacrilege or perjury, insofar as it more directly touches God. - Inconstancy itself in good purposes is not immune from light fault.

III. Cessation. A vow ceases from within by execution, by the removal of the condition or final cause, by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good or impossible. - From without it ceases: a) by irritation, or the use of a contrary right, which, with respect to a non-emancipated minor, the father, tutor, or mother has; the religious Superior has with respect to subjects for vows made after profession, and probably the husband with respect to the wife. These have a right over the person; wherefore they can validly irritate all vows, even internal and for future time, which were made during the time of subjection: this irritation is called direct. If the right falls upon the matter alone, the one irritating can merely suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow would harm his right; - b) by dispensation, or full condonation, which, divinely conceded by the words "whatever you shall loose," always demands a just cause, whether of the public or private order, yet is judged valid if it was conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. However, an acquired right of a third party, only the Pope can take away, on account of a public cause. Non-reserved vows, by canon 1313 itself, can be dispensed by local Ordinaries, by the Superior of an exempt clerical religion, by others (for example confessors of mendicant Orders) to whom the Apostolic See has delegated the power. This also is not rarely extended to reserved vows; - c) by commutation, or substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow. A non-reserved vow can be commuted into a better or also equal work by the one vowing himself; into a lesser good, by him to whom the faculty of dispensing belongs. For him to whom the vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work. - Moreover, by religious profession all vows previously emitted are suspended, as long as the one vowing remains in religion (c. 1315); he can also commute the same into religious profession, at least perpetual. It is generally better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 31 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, CHAPTER III: On Vow · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: On the Requisites for a Vow · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: On the Obligation of a Vow · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, ARTICLE III: On the Cessation of a Vow · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Irritation of Vows · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2. On Dispensation of Vows · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 3. On Commutation of Vows

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, CHAPTER III: On Vow

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 88; St. Alphonsus, III, 194; ed. G., I, p. 495; H. Ap., V, 21; Suarez, de Relig., tr. VI; Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 40; Billuart, Diss. IV; Aertnys, l. III, n. 83; Lehmkuhl, I, 575; Berardi, Theol. mor. (ed. 1905), I, n. 489; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Virt. Relig. et Piet. (1912), q. 1, c. 4, n. 119 ff.

n. ¶623.

DEFINITION. Vow, accepted in a broad sense, designates both desire, in which sense baptism is said to be received in desire; and suffrage, which is cast in deliberations; and purpose, which indeed is a simple will of doing something.

VOW, as an act of religion, is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. It is a private law which the one vowing establishes for himself.

It is said: 1. Promise, that is, the will of obliging oneself, an act by which true obligation is undertaken; and by this reason it is distinguished from simple purpose, which indeed denotes a present disposition of the will to do something, but of itself induces no obligation, not even under light matter; 2. deliberate, namely proceeding from free election, with due cognition both of the thing promised and of the obligation undertaken; 3. made to God; for a vow is an act of latria owed to God alone. Wherefore, when we vow certain things to the Saints, the sense is that they are vowed to God in honor of the Saints, just as in their honor we build temples and altars to God; 4. concerning a better and possible good; for the matter of a vow must be pleasing and acceptable to God, as will be explained below.

Note. a) The common people often confuse purposes with vows. "To distinguish these things it will help little to ask him, as some are accustomed, whether he ever had the intention of binding himself by vow under grave sin; for rude persons when questioned thus easily deny it. It will be better to ask whether then, when he emitted the vow, he thought that he would have sinned gravely, or not, if afterward he had not satisfied it" (Prax., n. 25).

b) The heroic vow, as they call it, is not a vow in the true sense; it is always revocable at will. Cf. Beringer, P. II, n. 328.

c) Nor are those promises vows which children publicly make after solemn communion has been completed, although the words are employed: I promise, I vow, and the holy Gospel is touched. For the intention of the faithful of imposing a new and special obligation on themselves is lacking.

DIVISION. Vow is distinguished: 1. By reason of object, into personal, real, and mixed vow. It is personal when some action of man, or cessation from action, is promised, as a vow of pilgrimage, fasting. - It is real when an external thing estimable by price is promised, as a chalice, alms. - Mixed, when both are promised, for example a pilgrimage for offering a chalice in such a church.

By reason of mode, into absolute and conditioned vow, according as it is done either simply, for example I vow alms; or with a condition attached, for example I vow alms if I am restored to health, etc.

A conditioned vow is called penal when a penalty to be undergone is promised in vengeance and hatred of sin, so that the one vowing may thus be drawn back from sinning by fear of the penalty, for example I vow alms if I commit this or that sin again.

By reason of manifestation, into express and tacit vow, according as it is sufficiently declared by word or writing; or is made by the very fact that someone voluntarily does something to which he knows a vow to be connected, as happens in the reception of subdiaconate, to which by the law of the Church a vow of chastity is annexed.
By reason of duration, into temporary and perpetual vow, according as it is promised to be kept for a certain space of time, or through one's whole life.
By reason of authority, into solemn and simple vow, according as it is accepted by the Church as solemn, or is emitted with such acceptance of the Church excluded. Each has the same firmness before God; yet they differ as regards effects (n. 2129). Cf. A. S. S., III, p. 37; Ami du Cl., 1911, p. 14.

n. ¶624.

EXCELLENCE OF A VOW AND RULES TO BE OBSERVED. How acceptable vows are to God is gathered from several places of Sacred Scripture, chiefly from these words (Isai., 19, 21): They shall worship him in victims and in gifts; and they shall vow vows to the Lord, and shall pay them. A threefold reason for this excellence is assigned: 1. Because works promised by vow, as being commanded by the virtue of religion, now pertain to divine worship, as certain sacrifices of God. Whence the execution of a vow, besides the goodness which shines in the work itself, also obtains the goodness which emanates from the vow. 2. Because he who has vowed something and does it subjects himself more to God than he who only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as regards the act, but also as regards the power, since he cannot do otherwise. 3. Because through a vow the will is immovably fixed in good; but to do something from a will fixed in good pertains to the perfection of virtue (2.2, q. 88, a. 6).

Therefore the faithful are not indiscriminately to be turned away from pronouncing vows; but they are to be moderated in such a way that they never vow anything imprudently, for example fasts, chastisements of the body, alms not accommodated to their means. Generally, this RULE must be held: let temporary vows be permitted more easily than perpetual ones, for example a vow of fasting on one day in a month, of chastity for a year, or better from one feast to another, or even with the condition added: until it seems good to the confessor for the time (Scavini, l. II, n. 214; cf. H. Ap., tr. ult., n. 40).

The confessor will act prudently especially if he does not show himself easy in permitting lay persons the vow of poverty or obedience toward the confessor. See what is to be said n. 626 at the end.

These things having been set down, there must be treated: 1. of the requisites for a vow; 2. of obligation; 3. of the cessation of a vow.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: On the Requisites for a Vow

The conditions required for a vow can be referred either to the one vowing himself, or to the matter of the vow.

n. ¶625.

PRINCIPLES. I. For the validity of a vow there are required, on the part of the one vowing, the capacity of vowing and a free or deliberate will of obliging oneself. For a vow is after the likeness of a law which man imposes on himself. But no one can impose a burden on himself who is not his own master; besides, no law is imposed without the mind of obliging, nor is any man considered to assume some obligation without free and full deliberation. But free will and deliberation, whether actual or virtual, are required, namely such as is necessary for the perfect and direct voluntary; because for a good act the thing willed is required in itself, as we said n. 309. See St. Alph., III, 196.

Hence: 1. By defect of CAPACITY, the insane, the half-sleeping, the half-drunk, even if previously they had foreseen that they would emit a vow, and children not yet seven years old, cannot vow validly, unless perhaps they already possess that discretion of good and evil which suffices for sinning mortally. For he who can oblige himself to the demon through sin can also oblige himself to God through vow. - But in doubt whether a child emitted a vow before or after the seventh year, the vow is valid: for every act is presumed to have been done duly (H. Ap., V, 22). As regards a vow of entering Religion, it is not valid unless the various conditions placed by the Church (cf. n. 2137) are fulfilled. - Nor likewise are vows of the impubes valid when emitted against the will of parents, nor vows of religious emitted against the express will of their prelates.

By defect of INTENTION, a fictitious vow is not valid, that is, one emitted either without the mind of promising, or without the mind of obliging oneself. Indeed, such a vow regularly is a venial sin, on account of a certain irreverence. But in religious profession and reception of sacred order it would be mortal, because it would be deception in a most grave thing. But if someone had the mind of vowing and obliging himself, but not of fulfilling, the vow would be valid; but he would commit a sin of fraud, grave or light according to the quantity of the matter (III, 201). Recall what was said n. 603.
By defect of COGNITION, a vow made with complete ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid. - But it is valid if the one vowing is conscious of the obligation of the vow, although he does not reflectively advert to it, or if he adverts to it confusedly, for example if he wished to vow in the ordinary way in which others vow; for then he implicitly wills to contract the obligation (H. Ap., V, 21).

Nor is a vow valid which is emitted FROM ERROR in such a way that the thing is morally diverse from that which someone intended to vow. But this happens when error turns either upon the substance of the thing, for example if you vowed to give your chalice, which you thought was silver, although it is gold; or upon a substantial condition, for example if you vowed a pilgrimage to some sanctuary, thinking that it is distant only a hundred miles, although it is distant three hundred; or upon the final cause, for example you vowed something in thanksgiving for health restored to a parent who in reality was not sick, or is already dead. But the vow is valid if the error turns upon accidental circumstances of lesser moment, so that, these things being known, the vow would still have been emitted (III, 198). Cf. n. 617. But vows of Religion are not void except on account of error concerning the substance alone; and the reason is that, if it were otherwise, the firmness which is essential to the religious state would not be sufficiently provided for. See other things n. 635, 4.

By defect of DELIBERATION and LIBERTY, a vow emitted in such a heat of passion or devotion that it impeded the use of reason required for mortal sin is not valid (Billuart, de Relig., Diss. 4, a. 1, n. 3).¹ - Similarly, a vow made from fear is null: a) if the one vowing was not in possession of himself, whatever the cause of the fear may have been (cf. n. 286); b) if the vow was emitted from grave fear unjustly struck into him by another for extorting the vow; because God is not considered to accept a promise extorted by injury from someone by force. And this is certain from canon law if it is a question of a solemn vow, but more probable if of a simple vow. - But otherwise one must speak if the fear was either light, or justly struck, or not struck for extorting the vow (III, 197; H. Ap., V, 23).

n. ¶626.

II. On the part of the matter, it is required that a vow be concerning an honorable, just, possible thing and concerning a better good. That honorable, just, and possible matter is required is evident of itself; for this is required in the matter of any obligation whatsoever. But that matter concerning a better thing is required is proper and peculiar to a vow. Therefore the matter must be:

HONORABLE; because the intrinsic end of a vow is to worship God. But God is not worshiped by an indifferent or evil action; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him (Eccl., 5, 3).

Hence a vow concerning an indifferent thing is void, unless the thing becomes good from the end or circumstances; indeed, he who vows an indifferent or vain thing sins venially. A fortiori, a vow concerning an evil thing is void; and one thus vowing sins gravely of itself, although that thing is only venially evil, since of itself it is blasphemy to wish that evil fall to the honor of God. Yet commonly, on account of ignorance, this is only venial (III, 204).

When the thing accidentally becomes evil from a depraved end, the vow is void if the malice of the end holds itself on the part of the thing vowed, namely if the thing promised is directly ordered to the depraved end, for example if someone vows something in thanksgiving for the happy outcome of theft: for this would be virtually blasphemy, as if God promoted sins. But if the malice of the end holds itself rather on the part of the act alone of the one vowing, for instance if the evil end is only connected with or added to the vow, the vow is valid, for example if someone vows a fast and at the same time hopes that he will be praised for this. The vow remains good in itself; only let the evil circumstance which infects the act be put away (III, 206).

JUST; that is, something which can be furnished without wounding the rights of anyone.

Thus spouses, without mutual consent, cannot vow perfect chastity, because neither has power over his own body. He who vows separately cannot ask for the debt, but is held to render it (cf. n. 2096).

POSSIBLE; for no obligation can be given to the impossible.

Hence a vow of avoiding all venial sins through one's whole life is held as nothing, since this cannot be done without a special privilege. But a vow of avoiding all perfectly deliberate venial sins would be valid; for this is not impossible, and those who love perfection avoid them sufficiently. Likewise, generally a vow of abstaining from venial sins in some determined matter would be valid (III, 203).

When a vow concerns a thing partly possible, partly impossible, let the rules to be established below (n. 634) be observed.

CONCERNING A BETTER GOOD; namely concerning a thing not impeditive of a greater good, because a promise which would impede a greater good would detract something from divine worship, and therefore could not be pleasing to God. But a vow can concern a better good in a thing otherwise prescribed; because the new bond of a vow can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law (III, 207-209).

Corollaries. CONCERNING CERTAIN VOWS IN PARTICULAR.

A vow of marrying, of itself, is not valid, because celibacy is better than marriage. - But it would be valid per accidens, if marriage were necessary for removing scandal or repairing the honor of a girl; likewise, if someone, having experienced his frailty, were unwilling to employ other remedies so that he might become continent: for then marriage is concerning a better good.
A vow of not vowing, of itself, is invalid, because it is concerning inept matter; nevertheless per accidens it can concern a better good, if someone, for example, is accustomed to be imprudent in vowing. If therefore a faithful person of this sort vows that he will not emit vows except by permission of the confessor, the vow is valid. If afterward, without consulting the confessor, he emits some vow, he sins; but the vow thus emitted, provided it concerns a possible and honorable object, is valid. - Except, if in eliciting the vow of not vowing without permission of the confessor, he had the intention of making subsequent vows void, and, while he was emitting a new vow, he was forgetful of this clause (III, 210; H. Ap., V, 28).
A vow of not asking dispensation from a vow is invalid, if it is emitted in an unlimited sense; for circumstances can be given where asking dispensation will be concerning a better good (III, 208).
A vow of always doing what is more perfect, wonderful in certain Saints, does not concern a better good for those whose life has not been proved by special vigor of virtues.
A vow of obedience toward a confessor does not concern a better good if through it the penitent promises that he will make confession with no other confessor. But it can concern a better good in determined and rare cases, for example when a secular person, under obedience, wishes to serve God after the manner of religious. Yet a vow of this sort should never be perpetual, always prudently determined (Ami du Cl., 1906, p. 1026). See what is to be said n. 1790.
A vow of poverty to be observed in the world, if it is surrounded with certain limits, for example of not making expenses of greater moment without permission of the confessor, etc., can sometimes be permitted. Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 730.
A vow of not adhering to created things, of itself, concerns a good and possible thing, after the example of the Apostle (Phil., IV, 12). Cf. St. Alph., Prat. d'amar G. C., c. XI. Nevertheless, since merely internal acts are the matter promised there, that vow will have to be permitted only to few persons (Ami du Cl., ibid.).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: On the Obligation of a Vow

n. ¶627.

PRINCIPLES. I. A valid vow obliges from the virtue of religion. It is proved: 1. by Scripture (Deut., 23, 21): That which has once gone forth from thy lips thou shalt observe and do, as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God; likewise Eccl., 5, 3. 2. By reason: every valid promise made to a man obliges by natural law; therefore a fortiori a promise made to God and accepted by him.

Violations of vows are certainly more probably all of the same species. Whence, if someone having a vow of chastity fornicates, he can confess the fornication separately and the violation of the vow separately (III, 34 and 224). Recall what was said n. 581.

n. ¶628.

II. A vow obliges under grave or under light matter, according to the quantity of the matter and according to the intention of the one vowing. For the obligation of a vow is related as the obligation of a law; and therefore it is to be weighed both from the nature of the thing and from the will of the one vowing (III, 211). If therefore the matter is in itself light, the one vowing cannot, even if he intended this, oblige himself under grave matter to it; for the matter is not capable of so great an obligation. Thus a vow under grave matter of not drinking a little drop of unmixed wine cannot be admitted (Ami du Cl., 1905, p. 646).

But if the matter is in itself indeed grave, yet the one vowing intends to oblige himself to it only under venial sin, the vow obliges him only under venial sin.

But if the intention of the one vowing is not established, attention must be given either to the words which he used, or to usual acceptance, or to the matter of the vow. For the one vowing in grave matter is to be considered to have wished to oblige himself under grave matter, unless the contrary is established from elsewhere (III, 211-213).

But matter is judged GRAVE which either of itself or from the adjuncts notably contributes to the glory of God and the utility of the one vowing or of neighbor, and which in the precepts of God or of the Church is held as grave. Hence a vow of fasting, confessing sins, hearing Mass, communicating even once, expending notable money for pious uses, obliges under grave matter. - Otherwise, a vow of expending a modest amount of money, of visiting one's own church once or again, and of reciting brief prayers. Cf. n. 1716, 1.

Note. It was said: a grave thing can be vowed UNDER LIGHT matter. Yet this does not hold as regards the vows of Religion, which from the intention of the Church are absolute, and therefore do not depend upon the intention alone of the one vowing; but the one vowing is held to conform his intention to the intention of the Church; otherwise the vow would be void, as not accepted by the Church (n. 2147).

Corollaries. 1. He who vowed something under light matter, but without the intention of fulfilling it, sins only lightly. - The matter is otherwise in a promissory oath; cf. n. 606. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 593.

Light matters owed from the same vow coalesce if they were promised after the manner of one thing, namely if a day is attached for urging the obligation, lest execution be deferred beyond that day. But this, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, is presumed in REAL vows. Wherefore, if you vowed to give a small alms daily as part of a notable sum which you intend to expend, and you omit it more often, the matters coalesce and can arrive at mortal sin. But it is difficult to determine how great a part is required for grave omission, since the thing depends upon the circumstances.
But the same things do not coalesce if they were promised after the manner of singular things, so that the fulfillment of the work attached to such a day, for example a light mortification on Friday in honor of the Passion, is a substantial condition; in which case the day is said to be attached for ending the obligation: and this is commonly presumed in PERSONAL vows. Whence, he who had vowed to recite the Angelic Salutation on all the days of his life would sin only lightly by omitting it on individual days (III, 212; H. Ap., V, 29).

n. ¶629.

III. The obligation of a vow binds only the one vowing. For this obligation arises from one's own will and intention, and because no one has the right of promising another's thing or action. Whence if someone vows the deed of another, the sense is that he will take care in every licit way that that deed obtain execution, for example that a son enter Religion, to which the father devoted him. Yet it can happen that someone is held to execute another's vow; but an obligation of this sort arises from another title, for example from justice.

As regards practice, the following RULES must be established:

Personal vows are not fulfilled except by the one vowing. - Whence he who vowed, for example, a pilgrimage does not satisfy if he hires another; nor is he held to do this if he himself cannot make the journey.
Real vows must be paid from one's own. - Whence he who cannot from his own is not held to beg from another. But if he can from his own, and yet another wishes to pay for him, this is valid; because then what the other gives becomes his own. Indeed, he probably satisfies a vow of alms who afterward ratifies that alms when he knows that it was furnished by another for that end; because then the vow is already fulfilled with the consent of the one vowing (III, 217).
Real vows, since they inhere in the thing, pass along with it to heirs; because they are held to pay them, not indeed directly by force of the vow, but from the title of the inheritance accepted, just as other debts; and therefore they must be paid before legacies, but after debts of justice (III, 214).
If a community has vowed something, it matters little whether the matter promised regards private acts, as would be the recitation of the rosary, or public acts, as would be a procession to be made; successors are not held from the motive of religion, but they are held from the motive of obedience, pact, or legitimate custom (III, 216). But it must be noted, from the decree of the S. R. C. (n. 834, 932), that new feasts introduced by a Superior from a vow do not oblige successors. For successors to be held, the consent of the Holy See is required. Thus from the Constitution of Urban VIII, Sept. 13, 1642. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 590.

n. ¶630.

IV. A vow must be fulfilled at the time prefixed; or, if determination of time is lacking, as soon as it can conveniently be done. For it is said (Deut., 23, 21): When thou hast vowed a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.

But time is attached either for ending or for urging the obligation. If the first, the vow comprehends both the matter promised and the circumstance of time after the manner of one thing; and therefore, once this time has elapsed, the vow can no longer be fulfilled, and the obligation ceases. If the second, the circumstance of time is an accessory part; wherefore, once the prefixed time has elapsed, the vow always obliges, and must be fulfilled as soon as it can conveniently be done. Doubt standing, in real vows the day is presumed attached for urging the obligation; in personal vows it is presumed attached for ending the obligation (III, 220).

Hence: 1. He who vowed a fast in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be kept on Saturday, if on this day, whether inculpably or culpably, he did not fast, is thenceforth held to nothing; nor is he held to anticipate, if he foresees an impediment that will supervene at that time. 2. But he who vowed a pilgrimage without determination of time is held to perform it as soon as it can conveniently be done; and the obligation, a long delay having intervened, does not cease on that account (III, 220; H. Ap., V, 32).

n. ¶631.

IT IS ASKED. What DELAY, in fulfilling a vow, is to be held grave?

Resp. 1. If a time was attached for ending the obligation, for example in a vow of fasting on this day, any delay of a vow gravely obliging beyond the determined time is grave; because once this has elapsed, the vow can no longer be fulfilled, since it was affixed to the time.

But if the time was not determined, or not except for urging the execution of the vow, notable delay in a grave thing is a grave sin. Moreover, delay seems notable to St. Alphonsus if the fulfillment of a vow emitted for temporary service of God, for example of adorning a church, is deferred without just cause for two or three years; and if the fulfillment of a vow made for perpetual service of God, for example of entering a religious Order, is deferred without reasonable cause beyond six months (III, 221). Cf. n. 2140. Much attention must also be given to the age of the one vowing.

It must be noted. "If someone has published some vow, and afterward fulfills the work promised while forgetful of the vow, he is not held to fulfill it again, provided he can always and certainly presume that, if he had been mindful of the vow, he would have applied the fulfilled work for it. And the Doctors commonly teach this, because then the vow is fulfilled through that first will had in the beginning, when the vow was emitted" (H. Ap., X, 120, end). See what was said n. 212.

n. ¶632.

V. A conditioned vow does not oblige unless the condition is fulfilled. For the one vowing did not wish to bind himself otherwise. And this holds even if he himself was the cause why the condition was not fulfilled; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, even if maliciously through fraud, deceit, etc., he had brought an impediment; for even in this case the condition attached is not fulfilled. "But if you impede deceitfully, you sin: for example, you vowed Religion, if your father approves: if you by prayers or reasons impede the consent of your father, you do not sin; otherwise, if you impede by force or fraud. Likewise, you vowed chastity, if God frees you for a year from mortal sin: if from frailty you fall, you do not sin with respect to the vow. Otherwise, if you sin studiously so that you may be released from the vow. And so concerning the rest" (III, 218).

But as regards the CONDITIONS of vows, it must be noted: 1. All shameful or impossible conditions render vows null.¹ 2. For the obligation of a vow, it is not sufficient that the condition be fulfilled equivalently, but it must be fulfilled specifically: for example, you vowed Religion if your sister marries; it does not suffice if she dies (III, 219).

IT IS ASKED. What is to be judged concerning the obligation of a disjunctive or penal vow?

Resp. 1. The essential condition of a DISJUNCTIVE vow, for example of fasting on Saturday or giving alms, is election between apt matters. Hence: a) If either part is not apt matter, the vow is null. b) If before election one part becomes impossible, the vow does not oblige, because election is not possible. But if this happened by fault of the one vowing, he is bound to the other part, as that to which he tacitly consented by his fault. c) If, election having been made, the part elected becomes impossible, the one vowing is held to nothing; but if the other part becomes impossible, he is held to the elected part. d) After election, while each part is still whole, it is probable that the one vowing can always choose that part which he prefers. The reason is that, notwithstanding the election made, the vow still remains disjunctive; nor did the one vowing by his election deprive himself of liberty of choosing the other part (III, 224).

A penal vow is either simple, concerning the payment of a penalty, for example if I play cards; in which case it suffices to pay the penalty for the first time; or it is twofold,

concerning not playing and concerning the payment of the penalty: and in this case, as often as the vow is violated, so often the penalty is to be paid, unless this is very grave, as a pilgrimage, the bestowal of a great alms, which is not commonly accustomed to be repeated. Except also if such a one, while playing, was altogether forgetful of the vow (III, 223; H. Ap., V, 30).

n. ¶633.

VI. The interpretation of vows is the same as the interpretation of laws. For a vow is a certain particular and private law.

Hence: 1. A vow indeterminate as regards time, for example concerning the daily rosary, concerning fasting to be kept on individual Saturdays, obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. In doubt whether a vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or a year, you are held only to the lesser thing.

He who vowed something without determination of place, for example entrance into some Order, satisfies by entering any monastery of the same Order in which the substantial things of the rule are observed; nor is he held to seek admission in places situated outside the province if he has not been admitted in a monastery of the province. Cf. n. 2140.
He who vowed something without a certain quality, for example a chalice, a church to be built, must fulfill the vow according to common use.
He who vowed something without a certain quantity, for example alms, money, wheat, etc., satisfies by giving as much as he wishes, provided he does not give so little that he seems rather to mock God than to fulfill the vow.
He who vowed the recitation of the rosary satisfies by reciting the third part, because it is commonly understood thus; and he satisfies by reciting alternately, and similarly by dividing the decades, because such a vow obliges after the likeness of the Divine Office.
He who vowed daily hearing of the sacred rite for a month or year probably is not held on feast days to hear two sacred rites. Nor is he held to fast on Sunday who vowed fasting for a month, a year, or the whole life; because the custom of the Church has it thus. Except, if he expressly bound himself to this.
He who vowed a fast for the vigil of some Saint, if this falls on a Sunday, can fulfill his vow on Saturday according to the custom of the Church (III, 221-224).
A vow of doing that which is more perfect does not of itself extend to sins to be omitted. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1906, p. 59.

For resolving DOUBTS concerning the existence, extension, and cessation of vows, one must stand by the rules established where doubtful and probable conscience is treated (n. 46, 55 and 89).

n. ¶634.

IT IS ASKED. What must be said concerning a vow of a thing partly possible, partly impossible?

Resp. 1. A vow whose matter cannot or is not accustomed to be divided is null. Thus, for example, you vowed to build a temple: if you cannot build the whole, you are not held to a part, unless nevertheless another should wish to complete it.

In divisible matter, the one vowing is held to the possible part, even if lesser, provided this is not considered merely accessory in the vow.

Thus, he who vowed to fast for the whole week, if he can only on some days, is held to this. But on the contrary, he who vowed to perform a pilgrimage with bare feet, but is incapable of the pilgrimage, is not held, as is evident, to baring of the feet. Yet he is held to the pilgrimage itself if he is only impeded from walking with bare feet (III, 225).

Finally, this remains to be noted: He who emitted several incompossible vows must keep that one which excels the others in dignity; otherwise the prior is preferred to the later (III, 210, end).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, ARTICLE III: On the Cessation of a Vow

Just as the obligation of a law, so also the obligation of a vow can cease in a twofold way: 1. intrinsically, on account of a change of matter; 2. extrinsically, on account of the intervention of human authority (III, 225).

n. ¶635.

PRINCIPLES. I. The obligation of a vow ceases intrinsically where a notable change of matter supervenes. This holds in every promise. A sign of a change of this sort is given if the one vowing can say: I did not intend to vow this, but another thing morally diverse. But this happens:

If by reason of a new circumstance or prohibition the matter becomes illicit, or impeditive of a greater good; for in these cases the vow is no longer concerning the better good: for example, a vow of promoting a work which at the beginning is believed very good, but then is not approved by the Church, as would be a vow of crowning a statue of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus (Ami du Cl., 1908, p. 811).
If it becomes impossible, absolutely or morally, even by fault of the one vowing, for instance if the state of the one vowing in relation to the matter of the vow becomes morally diverse: for example, if someone had vowed the building of a church, but then suffered such a loss in fortune that he could no longer satisfy the vow without notable detriment to his state.
If it becomes useless in relation to the intended end: whether through total cessation of the final cause, as if you had vowed that you would give alms to such a poor man and this man suddenly became rich; or through remission of the debt made by one having a right. But both he in whose favor the vow was emitted and he under whose power are both the person in whose favor the vow was made and the promised matter itself have the right: for example, the Supreme Pontiff, if it is a question of a vow in favor of a religious Order or ecclesiastical goods. For such a condonation is equivalent to payment of a debt, so that this becomes altogether useless (III, 192 and 255). Cf. n. 1026.
If some notable circumstance supervenes which, if foreseen, the vow would not have been emitted; "because when a circumstance not foreseen supervenes by which the vow is rendered more onerous, the matter of the vow becomes diverse from what was promised" (III, 126). Thus also D. Thomas (4, D. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1).

Except: a) If the supervening inconvenience could reasonably have been foreseen from the very nature of the thing. Hence a vow of chastity in no way ceases through vehement temptations which supervene, since few are found who are always immune from temptations of that sort; therefore other remedies must be employed against them, or, if danger of breaking the vow threatens, dispensation is to be obtained. Likewise, you vowed to serve in a hospital: you are not freed from the vow, even if through a supervening pestilence danger of death threatens you; because since such danger is accustomed of itself to accompany a duty of this sort, you at least foresaw it confusedly and implicitly wished to undergo it.

b) If the public good demands firmness of the vow for itself. Hence, by no changes of matter or circumstances do solemn vows emitted in religious profession or in the reception of Orders cease by the fact itself; nor simple vows which are emitted in religious congregations, especially if the oath of perseverance is added: for then an onerous contract intervenes. Whence, just as the congregation cannot dismiss the alumnus on account of supervening changes, except in a case in which the congregated one would no longer be for edification; see n. 2173; so neither can the alumnus leave the congregation (IV, 50).

n. ¶636.

II. The obligation of a vow ceases extrinsically in three ways: through irritation, through dispensation, through commutation. The reason is that human authority, God consenting, can touch either the act of the one vowing himself or the matter dedicated by the vow.

To this cessation can be referred the extinction of all vows which had been emitted before religious profession and which are totally removed by it (cf. n. 2150, question 2). Through non-solemn religious profession, antecedent vows indeed are not extinguished, but in many things they remain suspended.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Irritation of Vows

n. ¶637.

DEFINITION. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension, made by him who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing, or over the matter of the vow.

DIVISION. One irritation is direct, or properly so called: this touches the very will of the one vowing, and rescinds his vow in such a way that the obligation of the vow never revives. Another is indirect, and this does not fall precisely upon the act of the one vowing, but upon the thing promised by him; and it impedes execution of the vow, yet in such a way that, once the impediment has been removed, the obligation revives: whence it is rather suspension of a vow than irritation.

n. ¶638.

PRINCIPLES. I. Direct irritation can be made by any Superior in whose possession there is dominative power over the will of another. The reason is sought from natural law itself; for an inferior whose will, by force of a positive act, is fully subjected to the will of a Superior cannot, with the Superior's right preserved, dispose concerning himself.¹ Whence his vows, whatever they are, always imply this condition: unless the Superior shall have contradicted. Therefore, as long as he has not contradicted, emitted vows are indeed valid, but weak, so that when the Superior contradicts, they are destroyed, and the obligation undertaken is altogether extinguished. And thus indeed all vows in general, even reserved or onerous vows, even future vows, even with the inferior refusing, can be validly irritated (III, 227, 228, 231).

Yet vows about which it is doubted whether they were emitted before or after the time of begun subjection cannot be directly irritated; but they can be irritated indirectly, if namely their matter is subject to the Superior (III, 237).

Hence: 1. The superiors of regulars and nuns can directly irritate all vows, even internal and unknown to the Superior, which were emitted after profession; because a religious has transferred his whole will and refusal to the prelate (III, 233). Therefore this power is possessed: a) by the Supreme Pontiff, as the supreme prelate of all religious; b) by the Superior General of the Order, provincial and local Superiors; indeed, these primary Superiors being absent, by secondary Superiors, and finally, according to a probable opinion, by Abbesses;² c) by the Bishop, if the house or congregation is not exempt from his jurisdiction. Yet vows approved by a prelate of a higher grade must be excepted, as also the vow of passing into a stricter Religion. For no Superior has power from God of impeding a greater good. But see n. 642, 3, and n. 2178.

But a prelate cannot irritate the vows of a religious if he is no longer subject to him (III, 238).

The father, and in defect of the father the paternal grandfather or tutor, can directly irritate the vows of the impubes, both personal vows, even of chastity and Religion, and real vows, even concerning military or quasi-military peculium; indeed also the mother, in the presence of the father or tutor, provided the father or tutor does not contradict, as is evident from can. Puella (Can. 2, caus. 20, q. 2). The reason is that in such an age perfect deliberation for so great an obligation is lacking. Wherefore natural law has provided for this defect by giving parents the faculty of irritating such vows. Moreover, the father or another having paternal authority can, as long as he possesses dominative authority (cf. n. 698), irritate a vow emitted by a son in the time of impuberty, even if the son has already become pubescent, provided he has not confirmed the vow in puberty, knowing that it was weak (III, 229, 230; H. Ap., V, 36). - But what the father can do toward the pubescent, see below (n. 639, 3).
More probably, according to D. Thomas (2.2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3) and many others, a husband can directly irritate the vows of his wife emitted during the time of marriage, although they do not prejudice the use of matrimony, or the education of offspring, or domestic governance, even vows emitted now but to be executed after the death of the husband, for example of Religion, chastity. The reason is "because it is very expedient for the peace of the family, for fostering mutual love, that the wife have her will totally dependent on the husband, and thus the impulses of women be checked" (III, 234; H. Ap., V, 36; Conf. dir., V, 10). - But the wife cannot irritate the vows of the husband, unless they prejudice her, as a vow of a long pilgrimage, or of not asking the debt (III, 235).

Yet the man cannot irritate the vows of the wife once formal divorce has been made.

n. ¶639.

II. Indirect irritation can be made by every Superior who has power over the matter of the vow. It is a question of vows by which the power of the Superior would be wounded. But by force of natural law it is licit for no one to promise any thing which tends to the harm of a third person who possesses a right in it.

The power of indirectly irritating vows often arises from dominative power, sometimes also from power of jurisdiction.

Hence vows can be indirectly irritated: 1. by the Pope, the vows of all the faithful, and by Bishops, the vows of subjects, insofar as they prejudice them (cf. A. A. S., III, p. 391); 2. by Superiors of religious Orders, the vows of novices, in those things which impede regular observance; 3. by the father, the real vows of the pubescent, insofar as they do not have administration of their goods, and the same must be said of the mother, of the tutor, of the curator, etc.; but he cannot irritate personal vows, for example a vow of keeping chastity, of receiving the sacraments, unless perhaps they prejudice domestic governance, as would be a vow of a long-distance pilgrimage, a vow of keeping such a manner in fasting which would differ too much from the manner of living observed in the family; 4. by masters, the vows of servants which are opposed to owed services; 5. by the husband, vows emitted by the wife before matrimony, insofar as they stand in the way of his rights with respect to governance. And by like reason the wife can indirectly irritate vows of the husband opposed to her rights (III, 242; H. Ap., V, 36).

From what has been said it is evident that INDIRECT irritation is not valid unless a just cause is present. Except, if it is a question of indirect irritation which arises from dominative power.

n. ¶640.

IT IS ASKED. Whether DIRECT irritation can be made without just cause?

Resp. 1. It is certain that, for the value of the irritation, no cause is required, since the vow of the inferior was made under the condition: if the Superior shall have consented. Indeed, this seems certain even if the Superior previously held the vows as ratified; because he cannot take away from himself the dominative power which he has over subjects.

Yet if he who wishes to obtain irritation from a Superior does not proceed sincerely, conceals the circumstance of the vow, and asks only permission to perform such a thing, the irritation ordinarily will not be valid; because the Superior, by mere denial of permission, is not supposed to will to irritate a vow whose existence he altogether does not know.

It is truer that such irritation, of itself, is no sin, unless the Superior has positively approved the vow. - We say: a) Of itself, or by reason of the power; for with difficulty from another side can he be excused from venial sin, both because one irritating thus does an idle act, and because he irrationally impedes the progress of the inferior. But any reasonable cause suffices for excusing from venial sin. We say: b) Unless the Superior has positively approved the vow; for in that case, if he irritates without just cause, he certainly sins; but, according to the more probable opinion, only venially, scandal or contempt being excluded. Whence it is evident that a graver cause is required for the irritation of vows if the Superior has held them as ratified than if he has not approved them (III, 239).

From this doctrine, some Doctors deduce that the husband can irritate the vow of the wife, even if by mutual consent they have vowed chastity; because he is able to irritate vows approved by himself. Nor does a certain reason appear why this opinion should be condemned. Nevertheless, since it was against the common opinion, St. Alphonsus left the matter to be decided by the wiser (ibid.; cf. VI, 944, 948). Now several authors today expressly approve this opinion. Thus Lehmkuhl, I, 612; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 689; and others. See what is to be said n. 2096.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2. On Dispensation of Vows

n. ¶641.

DEFINITION. Dispensation is the absolute condonation of the obligation of a vow, made in the name of God by him who has the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction (III, 250). - It differs from irritation, which is made in the proper name of the one irritating, and for its validity does not require another cause than the will of the one irritating.

n. ¶642.

PRINCIPLES. I. For valid dispensation of a vow, legitimate power is required. For since the obligation of a vow has been accepted by God and consecrated by his law, it can be relaxed only by divine authority. But this authority was conceded to those to whom Christ said (Matt., 16, 19 and 18, 18): Whatsoever thou shalt loose ... whatsoever you shall loose ... etc.; namely to those to whom spiritual and ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum was conceded (cf. n. 229). Such a power is necessary in the Church, on account of the mutability of the human will and the great number of doubts which must be resolved.

Hence by ORDINARY RIGHT they can dispense:

The Supreme Pontiff, with respect to all the faithful, in all vows whatsoever. Nor are solemn vows to be excepted, whether of clerics in sacred orders or of religious; for this is rightly judged to have been conceded to the Pontiff, to whom God conceded the government of the whole Church; and it is established from the practice of the Roman Pontiffs, especially of Julius III in the time of the Anglican schism, and of Pius VII in the time of the French disturbance¹ (cf. n. 2176).
Bishops, capitular Vicars, Abbots having episcopal jurisdiction, with their subjects, and the Apostolic Nuncio in his province, in vows not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. But both the Vicar of the Bishop and the parish priest and other priests need special delegation. What the Bishop can do concerning vows of pilgrims, see n. 235, q. 1.
Regular prelates, not Abbesses, with their subjects, even novices, although the vows were emitted in the world, or the vow was one of passing into a stricter Order, provided it is known to be more useful for the religious to remain in his own. But vows of novices can also be dispensed by their own Bishop. Cf. III, 256, 257.

n. ¶643.

Let it be noted: 1. All Superiors who enjoy ordinary power can DELEGATE it to anyone initiated at least by first tonsure. 2. Those who can dispense with others can also do this with themselves. 3. Regular confessors, from privilege, have the right of dispensing in all non-reserved vows of any faithful whatsoever, whether within or outside confession. 4. With spouses joined in valid matrimony, both Bishops and Mendicants can dispense from the simple vow of chastity, whether emitted after or before matrimony. But concerning these things see n. 1992, 2096, 2191.

n. ¶644.

II. For valid and licit dispensation of a vow, a just cause is required.² For vows are made to God alone; therefore man cannot dispense in them except as a secondary Superior; but a secondary one cannot validly dispense without sufficient cause (n. 239). Yet in doubt whether the cause was sufficient, possession stands for the validity of the dispensation already conceded (cf. n. 241, q. 2).

JUST CAUSES of dispensing are: 1. The good of the community, or of the church, or of the family, or of the subject himself; for example, if dispensation is judged to be for his greater progress, if grave danger of violating the vow threatens him, if he is harassed by scruples. 2. Notable difficulty of fulfilling the vow. 3. Imperfect deliberation and liberty in the emission of the vow; for example, if the vow proceeded from sadness, anger, intrinsic fear, for instance of fire or shipwreck, or from extrinsic but light fear; likewise, if the vow was emitted in the time of impuberty. 4. If the impulsive cause of the vow ceases: in which case some commutation is to be mixed with the dispensation, as St. Alphonsus notes. 5. If such circumstances occur that it is doubtful whether the vow still subsists or obliges; for in such a doubt possession stands for the vow, and dispensation is needed (III, 251-252). Cf. above n. 248.

n. ¶645.

Questions. QUES. 1. Whether a Superior can dispense in vows which redound to the utility of a third person?

Resp. 1. In the affirmative, if it is a question of a gratuitous promise, or one not yet accepted by the promisee, or indeed accepted, but made principally in honor of God. The reason is that, according to a probable opinion, the promisee in such a case either does not acquire a true right, or if he acquires one, he acquires it dependently on God, to whom the promise was chiefly made.

Negatively, if the promise is onerous or mutual, as in the vow of perseverance which is emitted in certain congregations; or if it is indeed gratuitous, but made principally in favor of a third person, for example in favor of such a determined poor person, and duly accepted by him or by another in his name. For in these cases the vow follows the nature of the contract to which it is annexed, so that it cannot be dissolved without the consent of both parties (III, 225; H. Ap., V, 44). Cf. n. 615.

Note. The Supreme Pontiff can certainly dispose concerning the right which a religious congregation has acquired by reason of a vow of perseverance.

QUES. 2. Whether certain vows are RESERVED to the Supreme Pontiff, and what kind?

Resp. Besides vows emitted in a religious community, even temporary ones which precede perpetual vows, five are reserved: a) The vow of perfect and perpetual chastity. b) The vow of entering Religion in which solemn vows are emitted. c) The vow of making pilgrimage to Jerusalem, to the sepulcher of Christ. d) The vow of making pilgrimage to Rome, to the thresholds of the Apostles. e) The vow of making pilgrimage to Compostela, to St. James.

These five vows, that they may be reserved, must be PERFECT: a) By reason of liberty; wherefore they are not reserved if they were emitted from fear, even light fear, struck in by another. b) By reason of matter; on which account, a vow of making pilgrimage to Rome to the thresholds, etc., is not reserved unless it is from devotion and precisely of those places. Whence if someone vows to go to Rome to visit the image of St. Mary Major, or other sanctuaries, the vow is not reserved; nor is a vow of chastity reserved unless it is perpetual and excludes every venereal act, even internal. Thus, for example, vows of not marrying, of not fornicating, of not asking the debt, or of keeping the prerogative of virginity are not reserved, if the one vowing does not intend to promise abstinence from every venereal act; nor is the vow of entering Religion reserved if the one vowing intends an institute where simple vows are emitted.³ c) By reason of form; that is, they must have been made principally in honor of God, absolute and determined. Whence penal or disjunctive vows are not reserved, for example of Religion or of fasting, and this according to the more probable opinion, even if the reserved part has already been chosen, unless each part is among the reserved things; nor conditioned vows, that is, under a condition concerning a future contingent, for example I vow chastity if I come out unharmed. It is said: concerning a future contingent; because a vow under a condition concerning the past or present, or concerning a necessary future, is equivalent to an absolute vow; likewise a vow emitted from mere affection for virtue, if a condition was added only because of an impediment which, while it stands, makes execution of the vow impossible: for example if someone were to vow Religion with the condition: if my mother shall have died, that is, when she shall have died. d) By reason of obligation: for they would not be reserved vows if the one vowing had intended to oblige himself only under light matter (III, 258, 261; H. Ap., V, 45-46). - In doubt whether vows are reserved, they can be dispensed by the Bishop and by regular confessors (cf. n. 242, 1).

Let it be noted: 1. Vows are reserved as regards substance, not as regards circumstances. Hence, if someone, for example, had vowed entrance into a stricter Religion, the Bishop or regular prelate can dispense in such a way that it is licit for him to enter into a milder one. Likewise, if he had emitted a vow of entering without delay, the Bishop, with cause, can dispense so that the entrance be deferred (III, 258, note 3).

The faculty of dispensing over one reserved vow is valid for other reserved vows if these are less noble; otherwise not. Thus, for example, he who can dispense over reserved vows, even of chastity, possesses the same faculty as regards other reserved vows of inferior dignity, but not as regards the vow of religion. Nevertheless, on account of a special reason, he who has the right of dispensing over reserved vows, even of religion, cannot dispense over the vow of chastity, because its observance is more difficult; for he who vows religion is held only to make an attempt. In the formula: of dispensing from vows, even of chastity, other reserved vows are not included.
In reserved vows, Bishops and those having similar jurisdiction can also dispense or commute when and insofar as necessity urges.

We said: a) when necessity urges, that is, if there is not easy access to the Pope, and in delay there is danger of grave harm, whether spiritual or temporal, one's own or another's; b) insofar as necessity urges, because if it suffices that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Likewise, if dispensation is given in a vow of chastity so that someone may marry with a certain woman for repairing her honor, he cannot marry another. There are also other faculties, even for the vow of chastity, which are accustomed to be conceded to Bishops when they ask (ibid., note 2).

QUES. 3. Whether an OATH of chastity, or of Religion, is reserved equally with a vow?

Resp. The more probable opinion denies that such an oath is reserved, if namely someone wished to oblige himself by the bond of oath alone; for an oath induces a lesser obligation than a vow, as St. Thomas teaches (2.2, q. 89, a. 8). But if he wished to bind himself by two bonds, namely by vow and oath, the vow indeed is reserved, but not the oath. But in doubt whether a vow was added to an oath, the common rule now holds: a vow doubtfully emitted does not oblige (III, 259).

From what has been said you will resolve: To one conceding dispensation it must be established: 1. that the vow, in the case, is not certainly reserved to a Superior; 2. that by dispensation a right acquired by a third person is not wounded; 3. that a just cause is given; in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, it must be supplied by some commutation. For the rest, some commutation is laudably joined to any dispensation. - Recall what was said concerning dispensation from law (n. 237).

QUES. 4. Whether one having a delegated faculty of dispensing in vows can also dispense in oaths?

Preliminary note. It is not a question of vows to which an oath has acceded in the same matter, sworn vows; it is a question of oaths which were emitted independently from a vow in the same matter.

Resp. It is disputed. The first probable opinion denies, because the bond of a vow and of an oath is diverse. The second opinion, no less probable, to which many moderns assent, affirms, because in order to dispensation a vow and oath are equated.

The former opinion, which St. Alphonsus (III, 190) says must altogether be held, by force of the principle of possession, is favored by the declaration of the S. C. de P. F., May 19, 1845: "The faculty of dispensing from vows does not of itself include the faculty of dispensing from an oath." Cf. also the response of the same Congregation, May 3, 1828 (Coll. Prop. Fide, n. 2085 and 2087). This opinion is also favored by a vehement conjecture, arising from this, that from the style of the Curia the faculty as regards oaths is specially conceded. Cf. Vind. Alph., I, p. 307.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 3. On Commutation of Vows

n. ¶646.

Definition. Commutation is the substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow, under the same obligation.

DIVISION. Commutation can be done in three ways: into a better work, into an equal work, into a less good work. But that is called BETTER which is such in relation to the spiritual utility of the one vowing and more pleasing to God (III, 243; Lehmkuhl, I, 625).

It is useful to add some examples of commutations into an equal work from Reuter, II, n. 374. One can commute: the fast of one day into one confession; daily recitation of the Rosary into weekly confession; a vow of avoiding external sins of lust, or a vow of not marrying, into monthly confession for life; a pilgrimage to be made into fasting, etc. See Lehmkuhl, I, 632.

n. ¶647.

PRINCIPLES. I. Commutation of a vow into an evidently better work can be made by the one vowing himself, even without a special cause. For the lesser is contained in the better. It is established from Canon Law (c. de Jurej.): "For he does not break his purpose or promise who commutes it into something better."

Hence he who, for example, vowed to offer a candle in a church will be able by his own authority to change this vow into the offering of a chalice. Yet vows in favor of a third person and accepted by him are excepted; likewise reserved vows, unless the change is made into the religious state (III, 243).

n. ¶648.

II. Commutation of a vow into an equal or less good work must be made by ecclesiastical authority. The reason for the first is that, a vow having been posited, it is more pleasing to God that the promised thing be furnished than another thing, even if equal, but not promised. Besides, in commutation, as D. Thomas says (in 4, D. 38, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 4), there is a certain contract which cannot be perfected without the consent of him who acts in place of God on earth, namely the prelate. - The reason for the second is that commutation into a less good work is a species of dispensation (III, 244; H. Ap., V, 38; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 8).

In either case, a reasonable cause is required. If this is lacking, only commutation into a less good work would become invalid. Yet commutation into an equal work made without cause would not exceed venial sin. - But if commutation into an equal work has already been made by one's own authority, and the commuted matter has already been furnished, it suffices that the one vowing supply something.

n. ¶649.

Let it be noted: 1. He who can dispense, even from delegation, can likewise commute vows: for "he to whom what is greater is licit, to him indeed what is less is licit"; but not vice versa, because the greater power is not included in the lesser (Reg. 53 in VI).

He who can dispense or commute the vows of others can likewise do so for himself (III, 249).
He who enjoys the faculty of commuting, but not dispensing, must commute the vow into an equal work; because if he changed it into a lesser one, he would already dispense in part. Nevertheless, equality is to be estimated not mathematically but morally; for otherwise the matter would become liable to innumerable difficulties and scruples (III, 247).
Just as a lesser cause is required for commuting than for dispensing, so a lesser cause suffices for commuting a vow into an equal work than for commuting it into a less good work. Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus says thus: "Any reasonable motive can be held as a cause. It is sufficient that from the commutation of the vow there be less danger of transgression ... Let the confessor ask the penitent what works he is accustomed to exercise besides those owed from precept, or toward which he has greater inclination; and into those let him commute the vows" (Praxis, n. 26). But in doubt whether the cause of commutation was sufficient, D. Thomas teaches that the one vowing can acquiesce in the judgment of the one commuting (III, 245, end).
A personal vow can be commuted into a real one, and vice versa; likewise a perpetual one into a temporary one. But the safer commutation, in every kind of vows, will be the frequency of the sacraments (III, 247 and 248).
When a reserved vow has been commuted by a Superior or his delegate, the substituted matter more probably is not reserved, although it has the same bond of vow. Thus commonly (III, 249).
Sometimes the faculty of commuting by dispensing is granted, sometimes of dispensing by commuting. In the first case, commutation into a less onerous thing is rather regarded; in the second, dispensation, not indeed total, but with some burden.

n. ¶650.

Questions. QUES. 1. Whether, commutation having been made, it is licit to return to the first work?

Resp. In the affirmative, because the commutation of a vow conceded by a Superior is a favor; but no one is held to use a favor. Nevertheless, although the one vowing has returned to the first work, he can go back to the second substituted one. - But if he has vowed the first or second work again, in this case he would be held to either one by a new bond of vow (III, 248).

QUES. 2. Whether the one vowing ought to return to the first work if the second becomes impossible?

Resp. 1. In the affirmative, if the one vowing by his own authority commuted into something better; because, in this case, the obligation of the vow has not been extinguished.

Negatively, if the commutation was made by a legitimate Superior; for then the bond of obligation has been transferred into the substituted thing, and therefore the first obligation is extinguished. This holds even if the substituted thing, by fault of the one vowing, has been made impossible. He indeed sinned by rendering it impossible, but he is not held to return to the first vow, truly extinguished (III, 249).

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 1 passage

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Ch. II, Article IV. On Vows

n. ¶60.

We divide this article into eight paragraphs: 1. on the nature and division of a vow; 2. on the subject of a vow; 3. on the object of a vow; 4. on the obligation of a vow; 5. on the intrinsic cessation of a vow; 6. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through invalidation; 7. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through dispensation; 8. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through commutation.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 22 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, CHAPTER III: ON VOW

n. ¶378.

Definition. - A vow is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a better and possible good.

It is said: 1) promise, that it may be distinguished from a simple purpose; - 2) deliberate; for a vow induces an obligation, which no one is judged to take upon himself without sufficient deliberation; - 3) made to God; for a vow is an act of latria, due to God alone. Wherefore, when we vow certain things to the Saints, the sense is that they are vowed to God at the same time in honor of the Saints; just as we build temples and altars to God in their honor; 4) concerning a better and possible good. Concerning a good; for otherwise it would not be pleasing to God; - better, that is, what is either absolutely or relatively better than its opposite; for a promise which impedes a greater good detracts from the worship of God, nor can it be acceptable to Him; - possible, lest the promise be ridiculous.

Division. A vow is distinguished:

1° Solemn or simple, according as it hands over the one vowing to God, and therefore renders him incapable of acts contrary to this handing over, and as such is accepted by the Church absolutely and perpetually; or, with that handing over and incapacitation and such acceptance by the Church excluded, it is emitted with a simple promise. Thus St. Alphonsus¹ as more probable.

2° Personal, real, or mixed, according as an action or omission, or some thing separable from the action of the person, or each is promised.

3° Temporary or perpetual, according as it is promised to be kept only for a certain time, or through the whole life.

4° Absolute or conditioned, according as its obligation depends on some condition or not. To the conditioned is also referred the penal vow, to which a penalty is annexed by way of condition.

5° Express or implicit, according as it is uttered in words or is contained in something which someone advertently wills and to which he knows a vow is annexed, as the vow of chastity in him who receives the subdiaconate.

We must treat: 1° of the conditions required for a vow; 2° of the obligation of a vow; 3° of its cessation.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR A VOW

The conditions required for the validity of a vow are contained in the very definition of a vow, and two are principal: 1° true intention; 2° apt matter.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, Art. I, § I. On The Intention Required For A Vow

n. ¶379.

- For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation; for a vow is like a certain law which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But the will and deliberation are required which are necessary for the perfect and direct voluntary. Wherefore a vow emitted in drunkenness, even if foreseen beforehand, is invalid.

Hence a vow differs essentially from a purpose; because a purpose, however firm, or even uttered with some solemnity - as the purpose among our people of abstaining from every intoxicating drink (the pledge) - does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is the omission of the thing proposed a sin, except perhaps sometimes accidentally, for example because of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin.¹

n. ¶380.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is a vow valid when made with ignorance of the obligation, or with inadvertence to the obligation already known?

Resp. to the first. A vow made with complete ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid, because without the intention of obligating oneself there is no vow.

Resp. to the second. It is valid if he who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although he does not actually attend to it; or also if he who vows, although he does not know the obligation clearly, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly, or wills it implicitly, when, for example, he wills to vow this or that as others are accustomed to vow. Yet generally it must be held that no greater obligation is induced than that which someone shall have willed to impose upon himself and shall have apprehended.

Quaer. 2° Is a vow emitted from error valid?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the error concerns either the substance of the thing, as if you vow a chalice to some church which you believed silver, when it is gold; - or concerning substantial circumstances, as if someone vows a pilgrimage to the House of Loreto, thinking that it is distant only so many leagues, when it is distant by many more; - or concerning the final cause of the vow, as a vow of giving alms to poor Titius because he is a blood relative, when he is not.²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment, which would not have stood in the way of the vow if, error excluded, they had been known, as if you vow alms to poor Caius, whom you think upright, when he is not.³

Yet note that vows which are emitted in any approved religious institute are not invalid because of any error, unless only a substantial one concerning the substance. St. Alphonsus.⁴ "The reason is," says Lugo,⁵ "because in those things which constitute a state firm and irrevocable by its own nature, such as profession and matrimony, the will, according to the nature of the thing in question, accommodates itself and consents without restriction or condition, and altogether absolutely and independently from other conditions besides those which are of the substance of the same contract. For from those conditions marriages and professions would remain uncertain, and therefore the state itself, which is not according to the nature of the thing in question." And, as Sanchez¹ adds, "From dependence of this kind it would follow that many professions and most marriages would have to be judged invalid; which would yield to the grave harm and scandal of the commonwealth."

n. ¶381.

- Quaer. 3° Is a vow made by fear valid?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, and inflicted for extorting the vow. The reason is that what is extorted from someone by force through injury cannot be acceptable to God, when the law of nature postulates that the right be restored in full. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by the law of nature. But it is established from Canon Law as to solemn vows of Religion, and more probably also as to the other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians.²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away from the one vowing the use of reason; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary. Likewise if the fear proceeds from a light cause, because light fear is not judged to influence the act efficaciously, and is rather the occasion than the cause of the vow. - Thus commonly with Sanchez, Azor, the Salmanticenses; and St. Alphonsus says this is more probable.³

Quaer. 4° Is he bound by a vow who doubts: 1. whether he emitted a vow or a mere purpose; 2. whether he had sufficient deliberation; or whether he was compelled by grave fear?

Resp. to the first. Negatively. This is established from what was said on Probabilism (n. 67. 1°). But if while he promised he believed that he would sin if perchance he did not execute the thing proposed, it can be judged that he truly vowed.⁴

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, in any doubt, according to what was said n. 67. 2°, unless certainly he had vowed before the seventh year.⁵

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, Art. I, § II. On The Matter Of A Vow

n. ¶382.

Principles. - I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, because God is not worshiped by an action indifferent from every side; indeed it must be concerning a better good, that is, better than its opposite; otherwise it would impede a greater good, which cannot be pleasing to God. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to circumstances; and thus the vow of entering matrimony which someone emits because of experienced fragility is valid, although celibacy in itself is better.

II. The matter of a vow ought to be a morally possible thing; because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obligating oneself. But no one can obligate himself to something morally impossible for himself. But if the matter is divisible and in part possible, as a sum of money, for this part the vow is valid; but it is not valid if it is morally indivisible, as the parts of a church; or if it is indeed divisible, but it is established that the one vowing willed to obligate himself to each part by way of one thing, and had each indivisibly before his eyes. Thus commonly.¹

n. ¶383.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is a vow concerning matter already prescribed from elsewhere valid?

Resp. Affirmatively; first, because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obligated by diverse titles; then also the vow of this sort concerns a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to have been prescribed; and finally it concerns a better good, since the new bond can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. - Thus commonly.²

Quaer. 2° Is a vow of a good thing with an evil end, or an evil condition, valid?

Resp. to the first. Negatively, if the evil end, although only impulsive, provided the vow would not be made without it,³ holds itself on the part of the thing vowed; for example, if you vow alms to obtain a happy success of theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as if God furnished help for sinning. Otherwise it must be said, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accidentally accompanies the vow, and the depraved end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself wholly on the part of the one vowing, for example if someone, vowing for the glory of God, afterward more gladly vows externally from vain ostentation.⁴

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, although joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although the theft is evil, nevertheless not to be injured is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. But much more does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition, as if someone vows alms if and as often as he blasphemes. - Laymann.¹

Quaer. 3° Is a vow of not sinning valid?

Resp. 1° A vow of avoiding all sins, even the slightest, is not valid, because this is impossible.²

Resp. 2° But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or all fully deliberate venial sins, is valid, because this is possible with divine grace and without a special privilege, and persons who love perfection avoid them sufficiently. Likewise a vow of not committing venial sins of a certain kind is commonly valid, for example never lying, especially in persons of great virtue; but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed in some matters, for example of dishonest thoughts, as to any and even the slightest subreption, of idle thoughts, etc., since they are inevitable as to all, the vow is null.³

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON THE OBLIGATION OF A VOW

n. ¶384.

Principles. - I. A vow obligates of itself, as a law or precept of the Church does, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter; for a vow is as it were a certain private law which one imposes on himself.

II. A vow obligates according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light sin in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or Superior can obligate under light sin only in grave matter, so also he who vows a grave thing can impose only a light obligation upon himself. - Yet conversely he cannot obligate himself gravely in a light thing, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation. - Thus commonly.⁴

n. ¶385.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° What matter of itself is judged light or grave in a vow?

Resp. That matter is judged grave which, when prescribed by the Church, gravely obligates, as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave, or contributes notably to the end of the vow or to the worship of God.

Quaer. 2° Do several light matters coalesce to make grave matter?

Resp. Negatively, if the light matters are vowed separately, so that the obligation is attached precisely to the time or day, or to sanctifying that day. - But otherwise, if the light matters are vowed by way of one thing, so that the determination of the day accedes only to urge execution, as generally happens in real vows; except nevertheless unless something else is established from the intention of the one vowing, on which the whole obligation and reason of obligation depend.

n. ¶386.

- Quaer. 3° Can someone be bound by another's vow?

Resp. Negatively, at least by reason of the vow; the reason is that a vow is a personal burden voluntarily taken up, and therefore no one can promise another's thing or action. - Hence the vows of parents devoting children to some Religion, or imposing on them an obligation, for example of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. But although children are not bound by such vow of the parents, the vow nevertheless obligates the parents so that, as much as in them lies, preserving the liberty of the children, they move them to embracing that which they vowed for them, and much more that they not hinder children willing to embrace it.

I said: at least by reason of the vow; for from justice the heir is bound to fulfill the real vows of the deceased (n. 874), and a law or custom can obligate descendants to a fast or feast introduced by a public vow.

Quaer. 4° What delay is to be judged grave?

Resp. 1° Of itself any delay of a vow gravely obligating is grave, when it is affixed to a determined time, as is the vow of fasting on such a vigil, etc.; because when the time has passed, the obligation of the vow ceases, which cannot be compensated.

Resp. 2° But if a determined time was not present, or was fixed only for urging execution of the vow, a notable delay in a grave thing will be a grave sin, according to St. Alphonsus and others. But a delay without just cause beyond two or three years in a temporal vow, and beyond six months in a perpetual one, is judged notable, as for example in a vow of entering religion made by one who is no longer quite young.²

n. ¶387.

You will resolve. - 1° Real vows must be fulfilled from one's own goods; but he who cannot fulfill from his own is not bound to beg from another in order that he may be able to satisfy. Yet he satisfies if another, either asked or spontaneously, wishes to fulfill for him, although he himself can satisfy; because what another gives, with the consent or ratification of the one vowing acceding, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow was determined by the one vowing for a peculiar reason; for then it must be expended in the individual thing.

2° Personal vows can be fulfilled only by the one vowing himself, nor do they pass to heirs. Hence he who vowed a pilgrimage does not satisfy by inducing another to it.

3° A vow indeterminate as to cessation of time, for example concerning a daily rosary, or a fast to be kept on each Saturday, obligates perpetually, unless something else is gathered from circumstances. In doubt whether the vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or a year, the minimum must be held.¹

4° He who vowed something without a certain quantity, for example alms, money, etc., satisfies by giving that which he wills, provided he does not contribute so little that he seems rather to mock God than to fulfill the vow.

5° He who vowed to hear Mass through a month or year more probably is not bound on feast days to hear two Masses, unless he explicitly vowed this; because the end of the vow is that on each single day he should gather the fruit of the Sacrifice. Likewise he is not bound to fast on Sunday who vowed to fast for a month, a year, or his whole life, unless he expressly obligated himself to this; because he is judged to vow fasting according to the custom of the Church.³

6° He who vowed fasting on the vigil of some Saint, if this falls on Sunday, can fulfill the vow on Saturday according to the custom of the Church.⁴

7° In a disjunctive vow (namely in a vow of furnishing one of two or several things, for example either fasting or giving alms on Saturday), the part which is chosen must be furnished, even if after the choice the other part becomes impossible. But if before the choice one part has become impossible without fault of the one vowing, the vow falls; otherwise the obligation remains for the surviving part.⁵

8° He who has emitted a conditioned vow, and impedes the verification of the condition by reasons or prayers, does not sin; otherwise if by force or fraud. But although in this case he sinned, nevertheless more probably he remains free from the vow, unless the contrary intention of the one vowing must be presumed, as it must be presumed for example in a son who vowed that he would enter Religion unless his father contradicted; for his intention seems to have been unless he contradicted from himself, spontaneously, with the son left to himself.¹

9° A vow of not striving either directly or indirectly for ecclesiastical dignities, which is emitted in certain Religious Institutes, according to Suarez: a) of itself is not violated by a merely internal desire of those dignities, although ambitious and therefore sinful from this heading; for to desire is not to strive;² b) neither is he to be said to strive indirectly who from this desire does something which is ordered only to this, that greater capacity for the dignity be obtained, for example to study more diligently;³ c) this vow is violated by him who through an external action, even indirect, for example a display of capacity, endeavors effectively to move another so that the dignity be conferred on him or procured for him by that other.⁴

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, ARTICLE III: ON THE CESSATION OF A VOW

n. ¶388.

- The obligation of a vow can cease:

I. Because of intrinsic causes, namely: 1° by cessation of the end or motive cause; 2° by substantial change of the matter; and 3° by impossibility, whether physical or moral, as was said above concerning laws, n. 137, III, 138, 165.

It is said: 1° by cessation of the motive cause. Titius, for example, a son of the family, when he was playing, having been caught by his father and vehemently rebuked by him, to turn aside his anger vowed that he would play no more. With the father dead, the obligation of the vow ceases; for the anger of the father to be turned aside was the cause of the vow, not only impulsive, but motive and principal, as appears from the case.

It is said: 2° by substantial change of the matter, and 3° by impossibility, whether physical or moral. - This happens: a) if the matter becomes illicit, or indifferent, or impeditive of a better good; b) if it becomes altogether impossible; c) if the state of the one vowing, relative to the matter of the vow, becomes morally diverse, for example if someone had vowed the building of a church, but afterward his wealth is so diminished that he cannot satisfy his vow without notable detriment of his state. - It is plain that the changes under a) and b) take away force from a vow, which ceases to be about a good, and a better and possible one (n. 378, 382). - As to the changes under c), the common opinion is that in every promise, and therefore also in a vow, the obligation is taken away through a change of matter notable of itself, since the thing becomes diverse from that which was promised; indeed probably, and perhaps even more probably, says St. Alphonsus,¹ a vow ceases if a circumstance supervenes which, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the vow, although it would not induce a change notable of itself. Yet in doubt one must stand for the vow, which possesses.

Except nevertheless: 1) If that inconvenience from the nature of the thing could reasonably have been foreseen. Hence even a simple vow of chastity does not cease through vehement stimuli of the flesh supervening, since there is scarcely anyone who does not sometimes suffer grave temptations in this matter; therefore against those stimuli other remedies must be employed,² or dispensation must be obtained. 2) If the public good demands the firmness of the vow. Hence through changes of this sort solemn vows emitted in religious profession or in the reception of Orders do not cease; nor simple vows which are emitted in religious Congregations, especially if an oath of perseverance is added; for then an onerous contract intervenes. Hence, just as a Congregation cannot dismiss an alumnus because of supervening changes, except those by which he would cease to be for edification, so neither can the alumnus desert the Congregation.³

II. Because of extrinsic causes, namely irritation, dispensation, and commutation, concerning which it remains to speak singly.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, Art. III, § I. On The Irritation Of Vows

n. ¶389.

- Definition. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him to whose power the will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject.

Division. It is: 1° direct, or annihilation of the vow, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; 2° indirect, or its suspension, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow.

Principles. - I. Every Superior furnished with dominative power over the will of another (as a Regular Superior by force of the vow of obedience) can directly irritate all vows of subjects; nor do they ever revive once irritated. Therefore the vows of inferiors, whose will, by force of their state, is perfectly subject to the Superior, always involve this tacit condition: unless the Superior shall have opposed.

Hence, with the exception of the vow of passing to a stricter Religion, the other particular vows of Regulars and Nuns can be irritated: 1° by the Supreme Pontiff as supreme Prelate of all Regulars; 2° by the Superiors of the Order or house.¹

II. Every Superior or lord can irritate indirectly all vows of subjects in those things in which his power is injured; because anyone has the right not to be injured in things subject to his dominion; but these vows revive when they can be fulfilled without prejudice to another.

Hence: 1° A husband can irritate the vows of a wife which prejudice conjugal right, the education of children, or the governance of the house.

2° A wife can irritate the vows of a husband which injure the rights of matrimony, as a vow of chastity, of a long pilgrimage, of putting on the habit of a hermit, etc.

3° A master can irritate or suspend the vows of servants which impede or diminish owed service, as a vow of hearing Mass daily.²

III. All vows of the impubescent, even vows of chastity and Religion, can be directly irritated by paternal power. This is established from Canon Law.³ But males are pubescent when the fourteenth year is completed, and girls when the twelfth is completed.

Hence vows of the impubescent can be directly irritated by the father, and, in defect of the father, by the paternal grandfather, by a tutor, and, these failing, by the mother, and probably even when the father is present (provided however that he does not contradict), or the tutor.¹

n. ¶390.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can a husband irritate all vows of a wife?

Resp. It is disputed. Some deny, and say that the husband can irritate only indirectly those vows which stand in the way of his rights. For as to the others the wife is not subject. - Thus Voit,² Laymann, etc. - Yet others better, with St. Thomas³ and St. Alphonsus,⁴ attribute to the husband the right of irritating even directly vows emitted while the marriage stands.

Quaer. 2° Can a father directly irritate the vows of pubescent children emitted before puberty?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided the children, after reaching puberty, have not confirmed them; indeed probably even if they have ratified them, not knowing that they are irritatable.⁵

Quaer. 3° Can irritation be made without cause?

Resp. Affirmatively, as to validity, because the lord validly disposes concerning his own thing; but negatively as to liceity, because the spiritual progress of the subject is impeded irrationally, etc. Yet this commonly does not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus,⁶ and others commonly.

Quaer. 4° Can a Superior directly irritate vows ratified by himself?

Resp. Affirmatively, as to validity, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects.⁷

Quaer. 5° Can spouses mutually irritate a vow of continence emitted by mutual consent?

Resp. In this case the wife cannot irritate the vow of the man; for the wife has only the right of indirectly irritating the vows of the husband, and she renounced this right by ratifying his vow. But since the man can directly irritate any vows whatsoever of the wife and cannot renounce this right, as was said in the first question above, a solid reason why he cannot do this seems hardly able to be brought forward; yet since the opposite opinion in this case is common, St. Alphonsus⁸ leaves the matter to be decided by wiser men.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, Art. III, § II. On The Dispensation Of Vows

A dispensation from a vow is its absolute condonation, made in the name of God by a legitimate Superior.

n. ¶391.

Principles. - I. The Church has true power of dispensing in vows, as also in oaths. This is established from the words of Christ, Whatsoever thou shalt loose, etc.;¹ and from the constant practice of the Church. - Common.

II. Only Prelates to whom jurisdiction in the external forum has been given can, by proper and ordinary right, dispense from vows, because this power pertains to the external governance of the Church, like the power of making laws and censures. Hence the Pope alone can dispense from vows, even solemn ones, for the whole Church; but Bishops or Regular Prelates only for their respective subjects (see however n. 155), and only in vows not reserved to the Pope.²

But by delegated or subdelegated right those dispense in vows who have obtained that faculty from those who can delegate or subdelegate it. Concerning these, n. 1144. III, 1203. I. But since it is doubtful whether he who has delegated power of dispensing in vows has by this very fact also the power of dispensing in oaths made without any vow or independently of it, the obligation of an oath, already certainly contracted, cannot be taken away by that doubtful power.³ (P) p. 479.

III. For the validity of dispensation a just cause is always required, because since vows are made to God alone, man cannot dispense from them except as delegated; but one delegated cannot validly dispense without a just cause, as was said concerning laws. - Thus commonly.⁴

n. ¶392.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are just causes of this dispensation?

Resp. The good of the Church, of society, of the family, and also of him who is bound by the vow; for example, if because of the vow he is oppressed by scruples or grave temptations; if he experiences notable difficulty in fulfilling the vow; if the vow was emitted immaturely, namely with too great facility, or from imperfect deliberation, or without perfect liberty.... For this reason vows of the impubescent can be dispensed absolutely without any commutation and without another cause.... The same must be said if the vow was emitted because of light fear inflicted from without.... The same, when imperfect deliberation or liberty in vowing proceeded from sadness, or anger, or intrinsic fear of shipwreck, death, or another evil.

Quaer. 2° Can a Superior dispense in vows made for the utility of a third party?

Resp. Affirmatively, as to a gratuitous promise not accepted, or accepted but primarily made to God. Negatively, as to an onerous promise, or a gratuitous one primarily made in favor of a third party and accepted by him.¹

Quaer. 3° What vows are reserved to the Pope?

Resp. Besides vows emitted in a religious Community, concerning which more precisely there will be treatment in the Treatise on Particular States, there are reserved to the Pope: 1° the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, but not the vow of virginity only; 2° the vow of entering Religion in which solemn vows are pronounced. Thus from the Response of the Holy See of January 2, 1836, to the Bishop of Le Mans apud Gautrelet.³ From this and the preceding vow even our Bishops can dispense (p. LXX. 4). 3° The vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem to the sepulcher of Christ; 4° the vow of Roman pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles; 5° the vow of Compostellan pilgrimage to St. James. Yet this reservation, since it is odious, must be taken strictly; and therefore it ought not to be extended except to vows:

Properly so called. Hence a vow of emitting a reserved vow would not be reserved, because it would not be a vow made, but to be made; nor a vow emitted not principally in honor of God.
Absolute. Hence vows are not reserved to the Pontiff if they are penal; or conditioned, and this more probably even when the condition has been fulfilled. See nevertheless L. IV. 260. q. 3.
Altogether free. Hence vows are not reserved if they were emitted under light fear even inflicted by another.
Perfect. Hence they would not be reserved if they had been emitted under light obligation, or if they were not complete in their genus. Hence a vow of chastity, if it does not exclude every venereal act, is not reserved; wherefore a vow of not marrying, of not committing adultery, of not fornicating, of not seeking the debt, is not judged reserved; nor a vow which only indirectly regards chastity, such as would be a vow of receiving Sacred Orders.
Determined. Hence a disjunctive vow would not be reserved.
As to their substance. Hence the circumstances of reserved vows are not reserved, as of making a pilgrimage by begging; and if someone vows entrance into a stricter Religion, the Bishop will be able to dispense that he also enter a milder one.¹

Quaer. 4° Can a Bishop dispense a spouse from a vow of perpetual chastity emitted both before and after matrimony, in order to seeking the debt?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion against some; because he can dispense from every impediment hindering the exercise of the conjugal act.² Except, however, an impediment from a vow of perpetual chastity emitted by both spouses and by mutual consent; which nevertheless we think can be taken away by Bishops who, as ours, have the faculty of dispensing in the vow of chastity (p. LXX. 4).

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. III, Art. III, § III. On The Commutation Of Vows

n. ¶393.

- Commutation of a vow is the substitution of some work in place of the promised one. It can be done in a threefold manner, namely into a better good, into an equal one, into a lesser one.

Principles. - I. Whoever has the power, even simply delegated, of dispensing from vows, has by that very fact the faculty of commuting them; for he who can do the greater can also do the lesser in the same genus. - But not conversely, because the greater power is not contained in the lesser.³

II. Anyone can by private authority, and without a special cause, commute his vow into a work evidently better, provided that the Church has not prohibited this in a particular case; because while someone performs a work more perfect than the thing promised, by this very fact he preserves what he had promised, since the perfect is included in the more perfect. It is established moreover from Canon Law.¹ But that is judged better which conduces to the greater spiritual utility of the one vowing, or to the greater service of God. Except, however, vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state.²*

III. He who has emitted a vow cannot commute it into a lesser good by his own authority; for he ought to give to God whatever he promised. - Thus all. - But whether he can change his vow into an equal good is disputed. For St. Alphonsus³ the much more probable opinion is that of St. Thomas denying this, because God rather wills the thing promised than another, even if equal.

IV. A priest delegated merely to commute vows cannot commute them into a notably lesser work; because otherwise he would dispense in great part, and thus would exceed the faculty received. Nevertheless the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly that it is confined to a work altogether equal, but is to be taken in a broader sense, so that it extends itself to a work somewhat lesser; otherwise it would be liable to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Moreover, commutation almost ought to be made for the alleviation of him who has bound himself by vow.⁴

n. ¶394.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is some cause required for commuting a vow into an equal or slightly lesser work?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, as to liceity, because otherwise the delegated person would commute prodigally, by using the power of commuting in vain.

Resp. 2° Probably also affirmatively as to validity, because the delegated person commuting without cause seems to exceed the limits of his power. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus⁵ calls the opposite opinion probable. Yet a lesser cause is required for commuting than for dispensing; and again a lesser cause is required for commuting into an equal work than into a lesser one; for greater propensity of the person, or less danger of transgressing the vow, suffices.¹

Quaer. 2° Once a commutation has been made, is it licit to return to the first work?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the commutation was made into a lesser or equal work, because the first work is equally pleasing to God, indeed it seems more pleasing. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, more probably, even if it was made into a better work, because commutation is made in favor of the one vowing.²

n. ¶395.

- Quaer. 3° Must you return to the first work, if the second becomes impossible?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the change was made by another's authority, even if by your fault it became impossible; because the prior obligation was dissolved by the commutation itself.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if you made the commutation according to your own judgment, because then the prior obligation is not dissolved, but is only supposed to be supplied by a better one. - Thus most commonly.³

Quaer. 4° When a reserved vow has been commuted, does the substituted matter also remain reserved?

Resp. Negatively, more probably, because that matter which is substituted is not reserved of itself, although it has the same bond of vow.⁴

For the rest, the faithful, especially women and adolescents, are diligently to be exhorted never to emit vows except by the counsel or approbation of a confessor, especially if there is question of the vow of chastity. But a confessor ought to grant leave or counsel of emitting a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity only with the greatest difficulty and only to persons long proved and of mature age; and often he will act prudently if he grants that leave with the condition added: until it shall seem good to the confessor for the time.

Likewise those vows to which an obligation of justice is joined, as the vow of perseverance which is customarily emitted in certain religious Congregations; - real vows emitted principally in favor of a third party and accepted by him (n. 392, q. 2°); - and penal vows preservative from sin, unless the commutation is made into another penal work which conduces equally to preserving, as is plain from the Bulls of Jubilee. Cf. Heine, T. I. p. 256. q. 97.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section B: On the Acts of …, Ch. III, Question Three: On Vow, Article I: On the Essence of Vow · Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section B: On the Acts of …, Ch. III, Question Three: On Vow, Article II: On the Matter of Vow

ON THE THIRD PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

Remember that thou sanctify the Sabbath day.¹

n. ¶396.

- The third precept of the Decalogue is natural insofar as it prescribes that some time be dedicated to public divine worship; but insofar as it determinately designates the Sabbath day, it is ceremonial, and in the new law abrogated, since for the Sabbath day the Church substituted the Lord's day in memory of the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Besides the Lord's Day, the Church instituted other feast days for recalling the benefits of our Redemption, or the merits and examples of the Saints, and commands that they, no less than the Lord's Day, be sanctified.

This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, prescribes certain works, and, insofar as it is negative, prohibits certain others; hence a double Chapter.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 35 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section B: On the Acts of …, Ch. III, Question Three: On Vow, Article I: On the Essence of Vow

714. To vow is useful and of counsel, not indeed for those who are in the state of perfection or of the term, as Christ or the angels, but for those who are in the state of the way and of imperfection, so that their will can be strengthened in good. And indeed:

on the part of the act of vowing, because by vowing we immovably strengthen our will in the good of virtue (a. 4);

on the part of the promised work, because it is better and more meritorious to do something from a vow than without a vow: a) because to vow is an act of religion, which is nobler among the moral virtues; b) one who does something by vow subjects himself to God not only as to the act but also as to the power of acting, because henceforth he cannot licitly do otherwise; c) because it is more perfect to do something from a will more firmly established in good (a. 6). Cf. Ps. LXXV, 12; CXXXI, 1-2; Is. XIX, 21.

Yet per accidens, on account of special circumstances, a vow is often not expedient; hence it should not be emitted except according to the rules of prudence.

715. It is objected: A vow removes liberty, since by it the moral power of choosing between contraries is removed; and this is especially true of the vows of religious profession, by which the whole life is bound, so that it is perpetual servitude.

Resp. 1. Liberty is not removed by moral obligation, but this is a help to it for tending toward the end and pursuing good better, more easily, and for a longer time, so that liberty is perfected and freed from the passions which impede it; - otherwise it would have to be said that the power of choosing evil is a perfection essential to liberty, although it is an imperfection, because it does not exist in God and in the blessed. Hence St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 1: "Just as not being able to sin does not diminish liberty, so also the necessity of a will strengthened in good does not diminish liberty, as is plain in God and in the blessed; and such is the necessity of a vow, having a certain likeness with the confirmation of the blessed. Hence Augustine...: happy is the necessity which compels to better things."

This holds a fortiori if the moral obligation was freely undertaken, as happens in a vow; otherwise it would have to be said that liberty is destroyed by all human promises and contracts; which however no one affirms. Namely, a work freely undertaken is not against liberty.

Obligation does not impede us from fulfilling an obligatory work in a fully free and meritorious mode, but just as we contracted the obligation altogether freely, so we can fulfill it from full liberty: for this it is enough that we be so disposed that we would do the work even if we were not bound. And thus it is understood that religious perfectly faithful to their vows are the freest men.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section B: On the Acts of …, Ch. III, Question Three: On Vow, Article II: On the Matter of Vow

S. Th. II-II, q. 88, a. 2.

n. 716.

716. Conditions required on the part of the matter for the validity of a vow. - By the matter of a vow we understand the action itself which is promised to God. If it is a mere action or omission of the one vowing, for example, a pilgrimage, fasting, the vow will be personal; but if the operation is concerned with an exterior thing, as almsgiving with money, the vow is real, in which case the proximate matter will be the action, but the thing the remote matter; but if a mere action is promised and at the same time an operation concerning an exterior thing, the vow is mixed (can. 1308, § 4).

n. 716.

Moreover, on the part of the matter three conditions are also required for the validity of a vow: for the promised action must be morally good, better than its opposite, and possible (can. 1307, § 1).

717. The matter of a vow must be morally good. - For it would be vain to promise to someone what would not be acceptable to him; but a work acceptable to God exists only if it is virtuous; therefore a vow can be made concerning nothing illicit, nor concerning anything indifferent, but only concerning a virtuous act. Hence:

A vow concerning an evil act is invalid, whether it is prohibited by the law of nature or by positive law, unless in this latter the exception of a vow is understood; whether it is evil from the object, or from the end or circumstance, which hold themselves on the part of the promised work and therefore fall under the vow: for these affect the very matter of the vow, that is, the promised work, and render it evil.

Thus a vow is not valid concerning alms to be given solely for seducing a girl or for committing theft, for acquiring victory in a duel, for obtaining vain glory by it, in thanksgiving for theft committed, or concerning the sacrifice of Mass to be performed on Good Friday, etc. - On the contrary, if a circumstance or evil end holds itself on the part of the one vowing and therefore does not fall under the vow, these do not render the very matter of the vow or the promised work evil, but only the act of vowing, for example, if the evil end is only secondary and an impulsive cause of the vow, or an evil circumstance is added to the vow, or the vow is emitted on the occasion or under the condition of some evil.¹ Examples are: a vow formed from ambition, the vow of one who is prohibited from vowing, a vow emitted before several persons so that vain glory may be obtained from hearing of the vow, a vow of giving alms if I escape healthy from the duel, a penal vow.

¹ And so an evil circumstance on the part of the promised work, because it affects the matter of the vow, renders the vow invalid; an evil circumstance on the part of the one vowing alone or of the promise renders the vow only illicit, because it does not affect the very matter of the vow.

A vow concerning a licit work incompatible with the fulfillment of a precept is invalid.

Thus a vow concerning a pilgrimage to be undertaken while Mass of precept is to be heard.

A vow concerning an indifferent work is invalid, except insofar as it is employed for a good end, not indeed from the mere intention of the one vowing, but from itself as a proportionate means for better attaining that end: for by this reason it is good by the goodness of the end.

Thus, for example, a vow not to approach a house which is an occasion of sin for someone is valid. But eating, drinking, walking, not mounting a horse, passing through such a street, playing, are not matter of a vow; but in these things to avoid excess is matter of a vow.

718. The matter of a vow must be better than its opposite. - For it is not pleasing to God that someone oblige himself to omitting what is more pleasing and acceptable to Him, "nor does it pertain to reverence for God that a less good work be done, while its better opposite is omitted." The better good is:

a) a work of counsel, which by excellence is better than its contrary and is maximally voluntary or in the power of the one vowing, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow, principal and spontaneous;

b) a work of precept, which is also better than its contrary, at least insofar as it is prescribed: for nothing prevents someone from adding the voluntary bond of a vow to the necessary bond of a precept;

c) indeed even a work which is not in itself, but in these circumstances for the one vowing, better than its contradictory, that is, than its omission.

Hence per se and generally a vow is invalid concerning a good which is impeditive of a greater good, for example, not to undertake the clerical or religious state, to marry, to practice trade, to go into the military, etc.; nevertheless some good which per se and absolutely is lesser can per accidens and relatively become a greater good, and then the vow is valid, for example, if someone sees that the reception of orders would become harmful to himself, or if someone vows marriage for repairing scandal, or fulfilling a promise, or on account of the honor of a girl, or for legitimizing offspring, or on account of great fragility as a remedy of concupiscence, or on account of the common good. Nor is a vow not to vow valid, but a vow not to vow without the permission of the confessor is valid; in which case, if nevertheless someone vows without consulting the confessor, he does this illicitly indeed but validly, unless he intended the vows to follow not to be valid, and had not retracted this prior will. Nor is an unlimited vow not to petition dispensation from vows valid; nor a vow of obeying the confessor in all things in such a way that confession could not licitly be made with any other.

719. The matter of a vow must be possible, or in the power of the one vowing. - For the impossible cannot be efficaciously intended, and no one is bound to it, nor can he oblige himself to it. Hence a vow is invalid:

concerning a necessary thing, for example, a vow of dying, of not flying, etc.;

concerning another's thing insofar as it is not in our power, for example, a father vowing his son to a religious order. Namely, concerning the deed of another it is not valid, except insofar as it is in the power of the one vowing and he promises that he will take care, as much as he can, that the work be placed by the other;

concerning a thing physically or morally impossible; hence a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even the very slightest, collectively, or of never sinning venially, is invalid.

But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid; likewise a vow of avoiding fully deliberate venial sins, or a certain species of venial sins, or of always choosing that which seems more perfect, unless it is a question of persons of modest virtue, or of matter which absolutely no one can avoid, for example, indecent, idle thoughts, etc.

n. 720.

720. A vow whose matter is only partly honorable, better, or possible, if one intended the parts undividedly after the manner of one thing, as in a disjunctive vow, is wholly null; - but if dividedly after the manner of several things, so that the vow is equivalent to several and is virtually multiple, or if someone wished to oblige himself as much as he can, he is bound to the possible part. But if he explicitly intended nothing, he is judged to have vowed according to the nature of the thing and common estimation: when the parts of the thing promised cannot or are not accustomed to be separated, the vow ceases, for example, a vow of celebrating Mass, of building a church, of undertaking a pilgrimage, etc.; but when they can and are accustomed to be separated, it obliges to the part, for example, a vow of fasting the whole week, of giving 100 francs; or also if the principal part is possible and the accessory impossible, it obliges to the possible part, otherwise conversely, for example, a Roman pilgrimage with fasting or a hair-shirt (a. 3, ad 2).

n. 720.

One vowing to avoid all venial sins is bound to nothing, unless he intended to oblige himself as much as he can; a spouse vowing chastity is bound not to ask the conjugal debt.

n. 720.

One who has emitted several incompatible vows ought to keep the more worthy; if such is not present, the earlier is to be preferred to the later.

721. How great a sin it is to vow invalid matter. - These principles are valid: 1. To vow a mortally evil thing is a grave sin.

To vow a lightly evil thing, even per se, seems a grave sin: for it is a great direct irreverence toward the most holy God, to will that He have even the slightest evil as acceptable; but per accidens, on account of ignorance or inadvertence, it is often venial.

To vow an indifferent thing or a lesser good is only venial.

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter III. On Vow · Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article I. On the Conditions Required for a Vow

No one seriously vows an impossible thing, except from ignorance, which can be lightly culpable; to do this from jest and levity is venial.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 11 passages

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter III. On Vow

n. 227.

A vow is a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. - It is distinguished in four ways, namely:

§ 1. A vow is public, if it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise private.

§ 2. Solemn, if it has been recognized as such by the Church; otherwise simple.

§ 3. Reserved, the dispensation of which only the Apostolic See can grant.

§ 4. Personal, by which the action of the one vowing is promised; real, by which some thing is promised; mixed, which participates in the nature of the personal and the real (Can. 1308).

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article I. On the Conditions Required for a Vow

Dissertation I — On the Vow · Diss. I, Chapter I — The errors of the heretics against vows · Diss. I, Chapter II — A review of condemned opinions, and of the laxer views of certain recent authors

The conditions required for the validity of a vow are contained in the very definition of a vow, and there are two principal ones, namely, true intention and suitable matter. Wherefore:

n. 228.

I Say 1st. For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise of itself suitable to inducing an obligation; for a vow is like a certain law, which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. Hence a vow essentially differs from a proposal, because a proposal, however firm, does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is omission of the thing proposed a sin, except perhaps sometimes by accident, for example, on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 196 and following.

I Say 2nd. The matter of a vow ought to be not only morally possible, but also morally good, indeed better than its opposite. The reason of the first is that no one can oblige himself to something morally impossible to him; and the reason of the second is that God is not worshiped by an action whose placing is not better than omission. But a better good is here understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to circumstances. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 202.

I Say 3rd. § 1. A vow, that is, a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good, must be fulfilled from the virtue of religion.

§ 2. Unless they are prohibited by law, all possessing suitable use of reason are capable of a vow (Can. 1307).

n. 229.

Questions

Question 1. How great ought deliberation to be in emitting a vow?

Response. It is commonly taught by theologians that the deliberation which suffices for mortal sin suffices for a vow. But this is indeed so if in each case the relation of the deliberating mind to the object is considered; but if attention is given to the fact that it is more difficult to deliberate about some obligation to be assumed than about the violation of some law, it must be said that greater discretion of judgment or deliberation is required for emitting a vow than for perpetrating mortal sin. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 313.

n. 229, Q. 2.

Question 2. Is a vow valid which has been made with inadvertence to an obligation already known?

Response. Affirmatively, if he who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although actually he does not attend to it; or also if he who vows, even if he does not know the obligation clearly, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly and wills it implicitly, while, for example, he wills to vow this or that, as others are accustomed to vow. - Nevertheless it must generally be held that no greater obligation is induced beyond that which someone wills to impose upon himself and has apprehended. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

n. 229, Q. 3.

Question 3. Is a vow emitted from error valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the error regards accidental circumstances of lesser moment; for he who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergoing merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. But one must answer otherwise if the error concerns the substance of the thing, or accidental circumstances indeed, but which are principally intended, or notably change the substance itself, or are of such a nature that, if they had been known, the vow would not have been emitted; for then the promised thing could not be said to be sufficiently known and willed. - Nevertheless vows emitted after the novitiate in any approved order must always be excepted; for these are not invalid except by error properly and strictly substantial. The reason is that otherwise they would not be sufficiently accommodated to the firmness which is essential to the religious state. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 198. - Lugo, de jure et just., disp. 22, n. 88. - Baller., note (b), p. 314, and note (a), p. 315.

n. 229, Q. 4.

Question 4. Is a vow made through fear valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the fear, however grave, provided it does not remove the use of reason, arises from within, or from a necessary extrinsic cause; for those things which are done from fear are simply voluntary. But can. 1307, § 3, says that a vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself. The reason is that the law of nature, which demands that an injured right be restored in its entirety, dictates that what is extorted from someone through injury cannot be acceptable to God. It is also clear from canon law as regards solemn vows of Religion, and more probably also as regards other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians. - I said if it is grave; for light fear never invalidates a vow, at least for the external forum. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 197. - Baller., note (b), p. 315.

n. 229, Q. 5.

Question 5. Is he who doubts whether he emitted a vow or a mere proposal held by the vow?

Response. Negatively, as is clear from what has been said concerning probabilism. Nevertheless it must be noted that if he who thus doubts believed, in promising, that he would sin if perhaps he did not carry out the proposed thing, it can be judged that he truly vowed. I say can, and not ought, because simple people who propose before a priest to recite some pious prayers at their proper time, or never to drink a certain kind of liquor, surely think that they would sin if afterward they violated that promise, and yet it is certain that they emit no vow. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 316.

n. 229, Q. 6.

Question 6. Is a vow not to sin valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the vow regards all mortal sins or fully deliberate venial sins, or sins of a certain kind, for example, a vow never to lie. But a vow of avoiding all sins, even the very lightest, would not be valid, because without a special privilege this is impossible. Cf. Mazzella, de Gratia, disp. 2, art. 5.

n. 229, Q. 7.

Question 7. Is a vow concerning matter already commanded from elsewhere valid?

Response. Affirmatively, both because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obliged by different titles, and because a vow of this kind concerns a thing good in itself, otherwise it could not have been commanded; it is also concerning a better good, since the new bond can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 203.

n. 229, Q. 8.

Question 8. Is a vow of a good thing with an evil end or an evil condition valid?

Response to the 1st. Negatively, if the evil end holds itself on the side of the thing vowed, for example, if you vow alms in order to obtain the successful outcome of a theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as if God were bringing help for sinning. - But one must answer otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accidentally accompanies the vow, and the evil end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself entirely on the side of the one vowing, for example, if someone, vowing for the glory of God, afterward from vain ostentation more willingly vows externally. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 206.

Response to the 2nd. Affirmatively, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, even if joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not to be harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more, however, is this valid if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition; as if someone vows alms, if and as often as he blasphemes. - Cf. Laymann, lib. 4, tract. 5, chap. 2, n. 7.

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 14 passages

Dissertation I — On the Vow

Tr. IV, Prologue · Tr. IV, Disputation I: On the Vow

Proem

[Introductory remarks] Vows which men make to God pertain to the first commandment of the Decalogue, as far as our present concerns are relevant. The sanctity and piety of vows, by their very nature, are self-evident. God is worshipped by our vows, and tokens of a grateful spirit are shown for benefits received. Sometimes to obtain divine clemency, and to secure graces; sometimes to appease and mitigate the severity of justice, we offer our vows to God. These are the chief duties of the Christian religion, and tokens of our servitude toward God. It is an innate inclination of our souls, either to implore divine aid by vows in calamities, or to adorn temples with tablets of thanksgiving for benefits received, to the glory of the divine majesty. Even before God gave us the written Law, the Patriarch Jacob offered his vows to God — for he made a vow, saying, "If God shall be with me..." (Gen. 28). The Prophet Isaiah, describing the offering of vows as a signal prerogative of God's people, says: "They shall worship him with victims and offerings; and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them" (ch. 19). What of the fact that Marcus Tullius himself notes the frequency of the pagans' vows, and the votive tablets which they hung in the temples of the gods — either those who had escaped shipwreck, or those who had obtained some notable benefit? And from this he infers the providence of the gods, and their governance of the world. Thus he represents himself addressing his friend Diagoras: "You, who think that the gods take no notice of human affairs, do you not observe how many, by so many painted tablets, have poured out their vows in the face of the storm's violence, and arrived safely in port?" (Bk. III, On the Nature of the Gods, near the end).

Undertaking, then, in this Book, a treatise on vows, I shall set forth all the difficulties which theologians commonly discuss. Monastic vows I omit for the present, referring them to the treatise on the religious state. Of vows in general, then, I shall now speak.

Diss. I, Chapter I — The errors of the heretics against vows

n. I.

I. Among the heretics who condemned vows, first are those called the Waldensians. These rejected all vows, on the grounds that vows impose necessity and coercion upon men. This impiety, long buried, was dug up again by the pseudo-apostles, into whose hands John Wycliffe placed it. Luther, a more shameless disciple of Wycliffe, disseminated this heresy of his to his own disciples. Yet he vomited forth his blasphemies chiefly against monastic vows above all others. Therefore, when we come to discuss these, I shall refute his impious sophistries. John Calvin, who adopted the principal errors of both Wycliffe and Luther, mixing in his own besides, and adding a yet more pestilent heresy, sharpens his pen — dipped in his own gall and ungovernable spite — against the making of vows, which he calls rash (Bk. IV, Institutes, ch. 13). He divides this entire chapter into two parts: in the first he treats of vows in general; in the second, of monastic vows. At the outset he laments and bewails that the Church, whose freedom was purchased at the inestimable price of the blood of Christ Jesus, has been oppressed under the weight of man-made traditions, and torn apart by the cruel tyranny of vows and human ingenuity. As is his custom, he twists the vilest and most scurrilous reproaches against Catholics, and audacious fabrications, striving to embellish them with the flowers of his elegant style and eloquence, which he wickedly abuses. But the more polished he is in the surface of his diction, the madder he is in the pursuit of truth. Sometimes he condemns all vows; sometimes he admits some; now he condemns only rashly made vows, now even those made cautiously and with deliberate mind. His aim throughout, however, is to consign all Catholic vows to superstition and idolatry. I will cull a few passages from among the many he writes, so as to refute him by his own teaching, and by the words of his own impudence and folly.

n. II.

II. Calvin says (loc. cit., n. 4): "No one can disapprove of a vow, provided some holiness resides in it — if it looks to some end not perverse. Who is there, at least among Christians, who recognizes any holiness at all in abstinence from wine, once every other good end is removed? The Turks abstain from wine; many other nations abstain. No one would say that abstinence from wine constitutes holiness." Abstinence from wine, if vowed simply because it is abstinence, contains no holiness at all in itself, at least by natural necessity. But one who vows it does not vow it as though some sanctity resided in the mere absence of wine; rather, one who vows it to God takes it up as a means by which he might restrain his own concupiscence, and subject it to the spirit; and might dispose himself more securely to keep the law of God, and more easily and abundantly obtain from God the heavenly aids by which he might govern his appetites. This is what the vows of Catholics aim at. What, then, does this heresiarch slander in Catholics who vow abstinences and fasts to God? We do not recognize sanctity in fasting as such; but we call fasts holy insofar as they are instruments by which the sanctity of the soul is either acquired or increased — chiefly through charity, and the theological virtues — if the fasts are directed to God's glory. What superstition is there in this?

n. III.

III. Calvin distinguishes four kinds of vows, of which two look to time past, whereby we either testify our grateful spirit toward God for benefits received, or, exacting punishment from ourselves for sins committed, seek to soften the divine vengeance — the former he also calls exercises of thanksgiving, the latter, of penance. The other two kinds look to future time, whereby we are rendered more cautious concerning some evil already committed, or spurred on to some good. "To future time," he says (n. 5), "belong those vows which partly tend to render us more cautious, partly to spur us on, as it were by certain goads, to duty. Someone sees himself so prone to a certain vice that in an otherwise indifferent matter he cannot restrain himself, but immediately slides into evil; he will do nothing absurd if he cuts himself off, by a vow, from the use of that thing for some period. As, if someone recognizes that a certain bodily adornment is dangerous for him, and yet desires it with vehement allurement — what better could he do than free himself from all doubt by imposing a curb upon himself, by vowing to abstain? Likewise, if someone is forgetful, or slothful, in the necessary duties of piety, why should he not, having undertaken a vow, sharpen his memory, and shake off his sluggishness? In both cases, I admit this has the appearance of a kind of pedagogy; but for this very reason — because they are aids for weakness — they are employed by the rude and imperfect, not without some benefit. Accordingly, we should say that vows which look to one of these ends, especially in external matters, are legitimate, provided they are supported by God's approval, and are limited according to the measure of grace given us by God, and suited to our calling."

n. IV.

IV. I wished to quote this at greater length than perhaps was strictly necessary, so that I might draw arguments against Catholic vows from Calvin himself, rather than from elsewhere, to stop his own slanderous mouth. For at the beginning of this chapter, discussing the vows made in the Catholic Church, he said this: "Moreover, so that it may better appear how grievous a mischief has been brought in by vows, let readers keep in mind the principles laid down earlier. For we have taught, first, that whatever can be desired for establishing a pious and holy life is contained in the Law." From this arises a difficulty concerning vows made otherwise than by the express word of God — where are they to be placed? Let Calvin tell us now: is it held by the express word of God in Scripture that one may vow abstinence from choice foods, and from splendid attire? Let him tell us where it is expressed that the forgetful and the slothful should take up vows, by which, sluggishness shaken off, they might become more diligent in the duties of piety owed to God. Let him tell us how he himself can know that such vows are suited to his calling, and to the gift of divine grace. Are all these things defined by the express word of God? If he says yes, then why does he rail against Catholics for offering vain acts of worship to God through vows, contrary to the express word of God? If he denies it, why then does he find fault with Catholics for vowing to God things not explicitly found in Scripture? What more is there to say? If vows displeased God, he would certainly not command their observance, as in fact he does command in Ecclesiastes 5: "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." Likewise, Psalm 75: "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God." And again, Psalm 55: "I will render to thee sacrifices of praise... I will pay thee my vows, which my lips have uttered."

n. V.

V. To evade these most manifest testimonies somehow, the Lutherans and Calvinists concede that vows may be made for a defined time, but not in perpetuity — since, says Calvin (loc. cit., n. 6), "If you bind yourself by a perpetual vow, either you will grow weary from great tedium, and dislike it, or, worn down by its long duration, you will one day dare to violate it." He gives another reason: that such perpetual vows are contrary to Christian liberty — than which nothing more inept could be said. For if temporary vows do not conflict with the liberty of Christians, why should perpetual ones conflict with it? Tell me: where in Scripture is it expressly stated that it is lawful to make temporary vows to God, but not perpetual ones? Indeed, the perpetuity of vows is most clearly gathered from Scripture itself. For Hannah, Samuel's mother, dedicated a perpetual vow to God (1 Kings 1): "And Anna, being in bitterness of soul, prayed to the Lord, shedding many tears... and made a vow, saying: O Lord of hosts, if thou wilt look down on the affliction of thy servant... and wilt give to thy servant a man-child, I will give him to the Lord all the days of his life." And this vow was so pleasing to God that he immediately granted the one who made it her request. If a mother can dedicate a perpetual vow to God concerning her son, how much more can the son himself concerning himself — since everyone has greater right over himself than a mother has over him! Moreover, to utterly demolish Calvin's sophistry: it is the slavery of sin that is opposed to the liberty of the sons of God — not the slavery of justice and honor, as the Apostle says (Rom. 6): "But being made free from sin, you became servants of justice." The liberty of the new law, then, frees us from sin, and from the most grave yoke of vice. To this Christian liberty, the things that bind us to God are not only not opposed; they rather perfect it — as Augustine expressly says (Bk. On the Greatness of the Soul, ch. 34): "This is the true, this is the perfect, this is the only religion, by which the soul is reconciled to God, whose greatness we inquire into, and by which it is made worthy of the liberty it seeks. For he alone sets us free from all things, whom it is most useful to serve in all things, and in whose service, to find favor, is perfect liberty itself." The vows which all Christians make even in baptism, even according to Calvin, are perpetual, and yet do not for that reason offend against Christian liberty. The bond of matrimony is perpetual, and graver than any vow, and yet it in no way conflicts with the liberty given us through Christ. Why, then, should a perpetual vow conflict with it? These wretched men do not understand that... to serve God is to reign. It is, indeed, often burdensome and laborious to pay vows made to God. But this happens both in temporary and in perpetual promises. What of the fact that Calvin himself recommends the making of vows to shake off sluggishness, and to spur on a torpid will? It could indeed happen that not a few of these vows would be violated. What of it? Did not Christ foresee the difficulty of his law, and the innumerable transgressions of it, from its very promulgation? If the difficulty of keeping a promise, or the danger of violating it, ought to deter men from promising, no covenants would ever be made, no promises ever given. Vows which are made to God concerning things commanded by God himself are, Calvin admits, licit acts of religion; but not, he says, vows concerning things not commanded. He contradicts himself at every turn. He abstains from lavish living, from wine, and similar things — and vows to shake off sluggishness — are not about commanded matters. The vows that the Patriarch Jacob, Hannah, and many others recorded in Sacred Scripture made were not concerning commanded things, but free ones, as anyone who reads can see. And yet that these vows pleased God is gathered from the fact that he severely exacted their fulfillment. But we need not dwell longer on so plain a matter, especially since we shall discuss it further when the subject of monastic vows recurs.

Diss. I, Chapter II — A review of condemned opinions, and of the laxer views of certain recent authors

n. I.

I. Among the propositions of Miguel de Molinos proscribed by Pope Innocent XI, two concern the subject of vows. The first is proposition 64 of the said propositions, and reads as follows: "Fates concerning anything are impediments to perfection." The other: "Obedience to superiors in externals, and the strictness of the vow of obedience, extends only to the exterior. In the interior, however, the matter stands otherwise, wherein God alone, and direct [inspirations], enter." Both propositions plainly contradict the holy word of God. It was shown in the preceding chapter, from Isaiah 19, that God is worshipped with sacrifices and vows: "They shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them" — from which the falsity of the first condemned proposition is clear. St. Paul likewise condemns the other (Hebrews 13): "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them; for they watch, as being to render an account for your souls." If prelates must render an account for souls, they must necessarily have knowledge and oversight of their governance. But more on this in its proper place. Now certain opinions of some recent authors, which seem to us excessively lax, must be reviewed.

n. II.

II. "Can a married person, hindered by a vow, by an oath, or by spiritual kinship, from requesting the marital debt, request it whenever he is troubled by vehement stirrings of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust?... I follow the affirmative opinion... if a married person is so troubled by vehement fleshly stirrings that he is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into the sin of fornication, or something worse, unless he requests the debt... For when someone, through the observance of a vow, exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust intrinsically evil, requesting the debt from one's own spouse is not intrinsically evil; and then neither the vow, nor the observance of the vow, is manifestly a matter of the better good..." etc., and much more to this effect in the very learned Quintanadueñas... "It seems to me exceedingly difficult now to deny all practical probability to the opinion of Quintanadueñas. So the most experienced casuist Gobat, with whom I rightly agree." Fr. Patritius Sporer (tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, sect. 2, §3, n. 65, p. 234). See below, ch. 5, n. 12.

n. III.

III. "Is a vow of chastity, of the religious life, or of not marrying, made by one for whom marriage would be more salutary on account of incontinence, valid, and does it prevent marriage from being lawfully contracted? The negative opinion — namely, that such a vow is not valid, nor an impediment to marriage — can be argued for on these grounds... because a vow of chastity, or of the religious life, made by one whom the troubles of the flesh, and the frequent danger of ruin precede, is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; indeed it is rather made contrary to St. Paul's counsel... The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same in the case where, having made the aforesaid three vows, or one of them, it would be more advisable, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh, and subsequent lapses into venereal matters, for someone to contract marriage... because what, prior to the vow being made, renders the promised matter unsuited matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the preceding vows... This opinion is probable speculatively... But I answer, probably, that the aforesaid opinion is also probable in practice... Here and now, such an opinion can also be embraced practically, in some sense, and safely by one who now finds it speculatively probable, speaking somewhat probably. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana may unjustifiably doubt) that what is here probable will also be practically probable. Therefore it can safely be held that marriage will also be, for him for whom it would be more salutary on account of his incontinence than remaining in religion or chastity, etc. Therefore he can, without dispensation, enter marriage." So expressly held the aforesaid John Sanchez. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 9, on Marriage, disp. 23, q. 2 and 3, pp. 324 and 325). See below, ch. 5, n. 17.

n. IV.

IV. "Sometimes a vow to run bulls in honor of the Saints can be valid, even in Spain... Whence in Spain we see canonizations of Saints solemnized with bull-runnings, in addition to solemn processions, thousands of Masses, and the like." John Martinez de Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, §4, summary n. 30, and at the end of that number, p. 640). See below, ch. 5, n. 11.

n. V.

V. "A vow to perform an act of thanksgiving for a shameful deed already done is valid." Leander (tract. 2, on vows, disp. 4, q. 31, p. 341), from Filliucci (tract. 26, on vows, ch. 2, q. 6, n. 54).

n. VI.

VI. "What of a vow to abstain from wine? It obliges under grave fault only if one drinks that quantity of wine which would suffice, for those using wine temperately, for a single meal." Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 12, n. 21, p. 72). See Diss. 2, ch. 6, n. 1.

n. VII.

VII. "It is probable that one who vows virginity is not bound to perpetual chastity, but only to preserve the integrity of the flesh, which that word 'virginity' properly signifies." Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 39), from Burghaber, cent. 1, case 59. See Diss. 2, ch. 6, n. 22.

n. VIII.

VIII. "If you vowed to redeem lost time, you included even moderate play, and likewise playing on behalf of another — since you would truly be playing away time. You may not, however, play through another, though by watching you lose time... If you made the vow with the end of avoiding quarrels, blasphemies, oaths... it will be lawful for you to play under another's name, or through another; indeed, it will even be lawful to play through another, even though these inconveniences might be feared, since in reality you are not playing." La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 454, p. 175), citing Tamburini, Palao, and others. See below, ch. 5, q. 16, n. 48 and following.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 8 passages

Bk. III, Diss. IX, Chapter I — The condemned and lax propositions are recounted

n. I.

I. The Wycliffites, Lutherans, and Calvinists have raved against sacred vows, especially the monastic ones, whose errors the Council of Trent condemned. Michael Molinos too was impious concerning vows, of whom Innocent XI proscribed these two following theses, the first of which is: Vows about anything to be done are impediments of perfection. The other is: Superiors are to be obeyed in exterior matters, and the breadth of the vow of obedience of Religious extends only to what is exterior. But in interior matters the thing stands otherwise, into which God alone and the director enter.

n. II.

II. "Can a married person, impeded from asking the debt on account of a vow, or incest, or spiritual kinship, ask for it, whenever he is agitated by vehement stimuli of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust? ... I follow the affirmative, if a married person is so agitated by vehement stimuli of the flesh that he exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into the sin of fornication, or something more shameful, unless he asks for the debt ... Because since, from the observance of the vow, one is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust intrinsically evil, and then the non-observance of the vow (namely, asking the debt from one's own wife) is not intrinsically evil, it is manifest that neither the vow nor the observance of the vow is of a better thing, etc. This and far more the most learned Fr. Quintanadueñas [teaches] on this matter ... It seems to me most difficult now to deny all practical probability to Fr. Quintanadueñas's opinion ... So the most expert Casuist Gobat, to whom I rightly assent." Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second precept of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 2, § 3, number 65, page 234.

n. III.

III. "Whether a vow of chastity, or of Religion, or of not marrying, hidden from the one to whom marriage was promised, on account of incontinence, is valid, and impedes marriage from being licitly entered upon? The denying opinion — namely that such a vow is neither valid, nor impedes marriage — can be urged by these arguments... Because a vow of chastity or of Religion made by one whom frequent troubles of the flesh and ruinous falls precede is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; nay rather it is against the counsel of St. Paul.

"The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same thing in the case where, the three said vows having been made, or one of them, it would be wiser for someone, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh and supervening lapses into venereal matters, to contract marriage ... Because what, before the vow was made, causes the promised thing to be an unfit matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow ... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the antecedent vows ... This opinion is more probable speculatively ... But I answer that the aforesaid opinion, speaking even practically, is probable to some degree, and can be safely embraced. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana doubts undeservedly) that what is here and now speculatively probable is also practically so ... Therefore here and now such an opinion will also be practically probable. Therefore it can be safely embraced by one for whom marriage is more wholesome than the vows of Religion or of chastity are on account of his incontinence, etc. Therefore he will be able to enter marriage without dispensation. So expressly held the aforesaid Juan Sánchez." Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 9 on marriage, disputation 24, question 2, page 324, § 3, page 325.

n. IV.

IV. "Sometimes a vow of running bulls in honor of the Saints can be valid, even in Spain ... Whence in Spain we see the canonizations of Saints solemnized with bull-runnings, besides the solemnities of Processions, Masses, and the like." Juan Martínez de Prado, Tome II, chapter 31, § 4, summary number 30, and at the end of it, page 640.

n. V.

V. "A vow made in thanksgiving for a shameful act already done is valid." Leander, treatise 2 on the vow, disputation 4, question 31, page 341, from Filliucci, treatise 26 on the vow, chapter 2, question 6, number 54.

n. VI.

VI. "What obliges a vow of abstaining from wine? It would suffice under grave fault that wine be drunk temperately, in that quantity which is used by those who drink for one meal." Castropalao, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, page 72.

n. VII.

VII. "It is probable that he who has vowed virginity is not bound to perpetual chastity, but only to preserving the integrity of the flesh, which that word 'virginity' properly signifies." Marín, treatise 9, disputation 3, section 2, number 39, from Burgh, century 1, case 9.

n. VIII.

VIII. "If you wished to redeem the loss of time, you comprehended even moderate play, and likewise play for another's sake: because you would truly be playing with a loss of time. Yet you can play through another, although you lose time watching ... If you vowed to this end, that..."

that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit for you to play under another's name, or through another; nay, it will even be licit to play through another, even if these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." La-Croix, book 3, part 1, number 454, page 175, from Tamburini, Palao, and others.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 2 passages

Tr. IV, Prologue

RELIGION is the Golden Chain by which we are bound to God; and the Vow is the knot of this chain, by which we are bound more tightly to Him. For man is of so unstable and wandering a nature that, straying continually from his Creator, he is compelled not only by scourges and many blows to return, but, once returned, is restrained by chains and knots, so that he may depart no more; yet of his own accord, and with his own execution of it, he submits his neck willingly to his own bonds. Heretics, coveting a detestable liberty of wandering, detest these chains, which they hold so suspect that they do not even strive to draw near to God by them; hence, vagabonds, running outside the Church, they cast against us revilings and the empty darts of petty reasonings; these I shall blunt below, treating of solemn Vows; here, however, before I come to the quiddity and conditions of the Vow in general, I shall first set out the solution of certain arguments by which not so much sectarians as men of more easy judgment, in the name indeed of Christian, dissuade from vowing, thinking it to be the condition of slaves, and equal for Christians; so that, just as they [slaves] cannot validly confer on their Masters the dominion of any thing or the promise of obedience, since they are wholly His with their goods and services, so man, however free, is wholly God's, who, as he can abdicate nothing from himself, so can acquire nothing anew: Moreover, if the vow is a bond of obligation by which we are held to give something to God which we have not before given, we owe all things to God by a better right, both by force of that precept by which we are held to love Him with the whole heart, and by reason of so many benefits with which He is wont to heap us daily; In addition, the Evangelical law proclaims that we are free sons, not to be pressed down by the necessity of vows: These, like scarecrows of birds, are easily driven away; for who does not know that, although God absolutely disposes of us and ours at His pleasure, He nevertheless leaves to us that dominion over our acts and things by which we can freely use or abuse them, for His glory or our own ruin; whence although He be the universal Lord of all things, He does not therefore exclude the particular dominion founded in the liberty of each; And although the servant is wholly his Lord's, he nevertheless possesses the natural liberty by which he can devote or deny his fidelity to him: Nor does the precept of Divine love so press, that for its execution we must do all whatsoever things are possible of doing: But suppose it were so; it is not incompossible with the Vow that a thing otherwise precepted be taken up into its object, as we shall demonstrate in its own place: Nor will anyone of even moderate mind deny that there are many acts in individuo which do not fall under a precept; for it befits a rational and free creature that, as it does certain things under another's command, so also it do some things of its own free and free-willed choice; which votive promise does not violate; partly because it is undertaken voluntarily; partly also because, once undertaken, it suffers no necessity other than that of the precept, which in no way opposes the liberty of the sons; since, in that very respect in which they are the just sons of God, they are of necessity subject to the precepts of loving, honoring, obeying God and the like. And let these things have been said even of simple vows: But from solemn Vows (of which there will be question in the following disputation) how great a profit and increase the Church of God has always reaped from the very beginning of her existence, who even half-blind would not see? And although in our own tempestuous age many keep watch over the censured manners of Monks with Vigilantius; yet no one solicitous even in the least degree for his own salvation will deny that the eminence of the Religious state is such that, while the Monastic life is assaulted with chaff, the secular life meanwhile is crushed under beams: and however much worldly men trust in their own strength, there can be set against them that saying of Augustine, reported by D. Bonavent. Apolog. paup. resp. 1. cap. 2.: Slippery is the hope by which, amid the fomentations of sinners, he hopes to be saved; uncertain the victory to fight amid hostile arms, and impossible the deliverance to be surrounded by flames and not to burn; and that I may speak with Saint Jerome, contra vigilantium epist. 53.: There is no security in sleeping near a serpent, nor is it necessary to dismiss what is certain and pursue what is uncertain; for if I flee, I have escaped the sword; if I stand, I must either conquer or fall. Add the Scriptures, which counsel to sell or to destroy all the emoluments of this world; as the Seraphic Doctor shows most fully everywhere in his works. But this matter, inasmuch as it is sufficiently copious, we shall better cut into several disputations and questions.

Tr. IV, Disputation I: On the Vow

Slater, Cases I, The Second Commandment, Case 1. Anglican Vows · Slater, Cases I, The Second Commandment, Case 3. Dismissed from His Order

BEFORE I assign the Definitions and Conditions of the Vow, I shall note something of its name; for it is taken in various ways in Sacred Scripture; for not rarely it is used for a good purpose, or pious desire, in which sense Exodus 36: Every morning the people offered their vows. So also in Proverb. 31 it is said: What, my beloved, of my vows, that is, of my desires, as Suarez notes tract. de voto in proaemio; likewise when in the Mass it is said: and to you they render their vows; for in every Mass we do not always fulfill some promise from the obligation of a vow: It is also often taken for a spontaneous promise, inducing an obligation, as num. 13. Psal. 49. Psal. 65. and Eccles. 5, in which places there is frequent mention of rendering the vow; because it obliges the one vowing; whence in the last-cited place we have: If you have vowed anything to God, you will be mindful to render it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him; this is the proper acceptance of the vow, now approved by very many writers: Sometimes also it is taken for the very thing which is either vowed or offered; as in Deuteronom. 12: You shall offer Holocausts, vows, and gifts; this too is not unusual in other words, that the matter about which the action is concerned transfers to itself the denomination of the action, and conversely, as is clear: these things having been premised, let us come to the rest.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 24 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Slater, Cases I, The Second Commandment, Case 1. Anglican Vows

Lucia, an Anglican, makes the three perpetual vows of religion in a certain congregation of Anglican women called Saint Margaret’s. While she was faithfully observing her vows, by reading Catholic books she gradually became persuaded that the Catholic religion alone was true. Therefore she left the Anglican Church and the congregation without any permission of the superioress, and was received into the Catholic Church by Julius, a Catholic priest. She asked Julius whether and to what extent she was still bound by the vows made in the Anglican Church, and what she must do if she were bound; he answered that she was by no means bound by them, inasmuch as they had been made from error, and that even if she were bound, he dispensed her from them in such a way that she remained entirely free. Hence it is asked:

What is a vow, and to what extent is it invalid from ignorance or error?

What is the obligation of a vow, and how does it cease?

Who are able to dispense from vows?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

What is a vow and how far is it rendered invalid by ignorance or mistake? A vow is a promise made to God concerning something which is possible and better than its opposite. Ignorance and mistake about the substance of the vow, or about some quality of it which is of great importance, makes the vow invalid; ignorance and mistake about accidental qualities of small moment do not invalidate the vow.

What is the obligation imposed by a vow and how does it cease?

A vow produces an obligation to perform what was promised to God. This obligation, like that of a law, depends partly on the matter of the vow, partly on the intention of him who takes the vow. If the matter is serious, the obligation will be grave, unless he who made the vow expressly limited the obligation, and willed it to be light. The obligation of a vow ceases intrinsically or extrinsically. It ceases intrinsically if the matter of it becomes impossible, useless, or immoral; if it undergo a change of importance; if the final cause of it cease to exist; and on the non-fulfilment of a condition if the vow was conditional. It ceases extrinsically if it is annulled, dispensed, or commuted by competent authority.

Who can dispense vows?

Those who have spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum can for good cause dispense from vows which are not reserved to a higher authority. The Pope, bishops, and Religious superiors can dispense by their ordinary authority; confessors and others who are capable of exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by delegated authority.

The case. Lucy, an Anglican, took the perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, in an Anglican order of St. Margaret. From reading Catholic books she became convinced that the Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ, left her convent without leave of her superioress, and asked Julius, a Catholic priest, to receive her into the Church. She further asked Julius whether and how far she was bound by her vows, and he answered that she was not bound at all, because they were taken under mistake, but in any case he said that he would dispense her from them as far as was necessary, so that she might be free.

Julius was wrong in saying that the vows were invalid on account of mistake. Lucy was under mistake about the true Church, but not about her vows, as far as the case allows us to see. She was also in error about the Religious congregation to which she belonged, and if she only took her vows as a member of the order, and conditionally on her remaining in it, they would lapse on her leaving it. But as they were perpetual we must not presume such a condition; they were taken to God independently of the order in which she took them. She had promised God to observe during her life poverty, chastity, and obedience, and we must presume that she knew and intended what she promised. The Anglican Church, however, had no legitimate claim on her, nor had the Anglican sisterhood. Hence they will be private vows, not vows of religion in the strict sense. Julius, as confessor, would usually have faculties to dispense the vows of poverty and obedience; the perpetual vow of chastity is reserved to the Holy See, though special powers are often granted to bishops to dispense in it. If Lucy wants a dispensation from this vow, she may have recourse to the bishop either directly or through her confessor. The Sacred Penitentiary, Nov. 29, 1842, answered that the vows of a Protestant made orally and in writing before an Anglican minister are simple vows, and that the one vowing is bound to the observance of the vow if he had a true intention of vowing.¹

1 Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 959. 2d ed.

Slater, Cases I, The Second Commandment, Case 3. Dismissed from His Order

Caius, a priest formerly a regular, approaches Julius, a confessor of the same Order, to whom he lays open the scruples and anxieties of his conscience. For he said that he was troubled about the manner in which he had obtained dismissal from the Order. For, on account of various difficulties which he experienced, he lost love of his vocation and urgently sought dismissal; at first, however, the superiors exhorted him to persevere, but after repeated petitions they finally granted him dismissal. For some time he applied himself to the duties of a secular priest, and then, when he thought himself not safe in conscience, he hastened to Julius, formerly his confrère. Hence it is asked:

What kind of obligation arises from perpetual vows of religion?

Who can dispense from religious vows, and is a cause required?

If a fictitious cause is alleged, is the dispensation valid?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

What sort of obligation arises from the perpetual vows of religion?

By his vows a Religious binds himself to observe poverty, chastity, and obedience, and moreover to persevere to the end in the observances of religious life according to the rule of his order. These obligations are grave of their own nature, but sins against the vows may be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

Who can dispense in the vows of religion, and is a cause required for dispensation ?

The substantial vows of religion taken in an order approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Holy See, and can only be dispensed by the Pope or by his authority, and for grave and just cause. Such cause is the good of Church or State, or the notable good of the Religious himself.

If a fictitious cause is alleged for a dispensation, is this valid ?

No; the Pope acts in the name of God to whom the vows are made, and he can not dispense them unless for a sufficient cause. Hence if a false cause is assigned as a reason for dispensation, the dispensation is void.

The case. Caius, a regular and a priest, on account of the difficulties he met with in his order, asked for his dismissal. At first his superiors refused his request and urged him to persevere. At last, however, by repeatedly making his request he obtained his dismissal, but after some time he became so uneasy in conscience about the way he had obtained it, that he went to Julius, a confessor of the order which he had left, and consulted him on the matter. Julius will tell Caius that there may have been fault in the determined obstinacy with which he demanded his dismissal. But we must presume that Caius acted in good faith, and did not give fictitious reasons for obtaining his dismissal. On that hypothesis he should be sorry for any fault there may have been on his part, but there is no reason why he should be uneasy about the validity of his dispensation. The difficulties which he experienced, the dissatisfaction which he felt in his state of life, and his great desire to change it, were sufficient reasons to justify his superiors in granting the dispensation, though perhaps Caius should not have asked for it.

Slater, Cases II

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 9 passages

Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 11. Solemnity of Vows

Caius, a solemnly professed religious, after preaching with the applause of all in a certain secular church, is asked by Paul, the missionary who serves that church, to preach there again at Easter, and Paul is unwilling to accept any excuses. Caius therefore seriously promises that he will come. Nevertheless, having returned home and remembered the opinion of the Doctors according to which a solemn vow renders invalid every obligation undertaken by a subject independently of the superior’s will, he doubts whether he is bound to anything by reason of the promise. Hence it is asked:

In what does the solemnity of vows consist?

What difference exists between a simple and a solemn vow of obedience?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

In what does the solemnity of vows consist?

This is a disputed question among canonists and divines. The better opinion seems to be that it consists in a certain efficacy by which a Religious who is solemnly professed is thereby firmly and perpetually devoted and bound to the service of God in religion and to his Order. It may be called a consecration with St. Thomas.¹

1 Lehmkuhl, vol. i, n. 647.

What is the difference between a solemn and simple vow of obedience?

All must admit that there is a difference inasmuch as the solemn vow is dispensed with greater difficulty than the simple vow. Besides this greater firmness in the solemn vow, some authors maintain that the solemn vow renders the Religious incapable of binding himself by promise or contract except with leave of his Superior, while the simple vow does not render a Religious incapable of binding himself, but he can not bind himself lawfully independently of the will of the Superior who can annul the obligation. Other authors deny that there is such a difference between the solemn and the simple vow of obedience, though it certainly exists between the solemn and simple vow of poverty. Génicot, vol. ii, n. 103.

Vol. I, Case XIV: Commutation of the Simple Vows of Celibacy · Vol. I, Case LVIII: The Vow to Enter an Order · Vol. III, Case LXVI: Incorrect Definition of Vow · Vol. IV, Case XLIX: Release from a Vow · Vol. V, Case XXVIII: Husband’s Power over the Vows of his Wife

The case. Caius, a solemnly professed Religious, seriously promised a secular priest to come and preach for him. The promise was made without his Superior’s knowledge, but not against his orders. Caius would certainly be bound by such a promise to do what in him lay to fulfil his engagement. The utter invalidity of such promises made by one who is solemnly professed is not necessary for the end Sof religious life, and it can not be shown to exist. Caius therefore should, tell his Superior of his promise, and unless the Superior uses his authority to forbid him, he should fulfil it.

The Casuist

Various; ed. S. Woywod, O.F.M., and J. A. McHugh, O.P. — 44 passages

Vol. I, Case XIV: Commutation of the Simple Vows of Celibacy

Alexius, a pious youth, has privately made a vow of perpetual celibacy. A number of deaths, which unexpectedly happened in his family, compel him to get married. For this he receives through the mediation of his bishop the necessary dispensation from Rome. This dispensation is given him through apostolic authority by his confessor in the confessional in this manner that his vow of celibacy is changed into the obligation of receiving the sacraments of Penance and Communion once a month, with the express stipulation that this dispensation is valid only for the duration of this marriage, and only in regard to his conjugal duties; that outside of this, and in case of a termination of this marriage by the death of his wife, his vow remains in force, and for the contracting of a new marriage another dispensation would be necessary. Some questions may arise in regard to the meaning and effect of this commutation, which we shall try to solve in the following:

Is Alexius bound to monthly reception of the sacraments, each time under pain of mortal sin, and, in the instance of Confession, even if he is not conscious of a voluntary sin since his last Confession?

Is it reserved to the Apostolic See to grant a dispensation from the duties which are substituted in place of the vow of celibacy?

How long will Alexius be obliged to receive the sacraments every month?

Is Alexius in his marital state, in his relation to his wife, freed from his vow of celibacy?

The question whether Alexius is obliged to receive the sacraments every month, each time sub gravi, we must answer to the effect that the reception of the sacraments as an object of a formal vow certainly is a materia gravis (see Marc n. 628), and that in our case Alexius is without any doubt bound in each separate case sub gravi, as a substitute for his vow. Nor is there doubt that the authorities in Rome have meant this obligation sub gravi, for as Lehmkuhl remarks (P. I. n. 480); The Roman courts, as a rule, do not grant dispensations from the vow of perpetual celibacy except adjuncta permagna commutatione.

The duty imposed in this case, to receive the sacraments every month in the application to each separate instance, is not lessened by considering all these Confessions and Communions as one whole, of which a single Confession and Communion would form only a parvitas materiae. The words once a month, put down evidently ad finiendam obligationem (see Sanchez I. VIII. disp. XXXIV. n. 37), make each monthly duty a distinctive whole, and render each separate Confession and Communion a materia gravis. Even in the case of welding separate parts into one whole, there could be, as a rule, only an absolute parvitas materiae, but not a materia in se gravis as part of a whole be considered binding sub veniali.

Even in case that Alexius should not be conscious of a voluntary sin since his last Confession, it is to be supposed from the wording of the rescript, as also for other reasons, that the authorities intended to bind him under any circumstances to monthly Confession; for the finis gravis, which was the object of prescribing monthly Confessions, can be reached perfectly by an inclusion of sins previously confessed.

The obligation of monthly receiving the sacraments, in commutation of the vow of celibacy, is, according to St. Alphonsus, not a matter reserved for the Holy Father.

The question, how long will Alexius be held to the monthly reception of the sacraments, we would explain thus: In a recently published similar case, the petitioner, a woman, had to bind herself for her whole lifetime to receive the sacraments every month. Lehmkuhl says (P. I. n. 480) of the vow of celibacy, even if made in secret, “The Roman tribunals are not accustomed to dispense except with a very great commutation attached.... and that for the whole period of life.” In our case, however, the confessor was directed to inform Alexius that this commutation would be granted only for the duration of this marriage, and nothing is said of extending its duties for a whole lifetime. Therefore Alexius may not be considered bound to the monthly reception of the sacraments beyond the duration of his marriage.

Regarding the effect of the dispensation upon his relation to his wife, the words of the apostolic rescript are plain: "That the dispensation is valid only with regard to his conjugal duties, but that outside of that the original vow remains in force." Therefrom arise de licitis et de illicitis in matrimonio for our case the following rules:

(a) Whatever is contrary to the end of marriage, or whatever opposes the generation of offspring, e. g. onanism, voluntary pollution, etc., is a grave sin against chastity and the married state, and also against the vow, because the dispensation obtained does not extend at all to that which is contrary to the conjugal duty.

n. ¶13.

(b) Whatever accords with the end of marriage is not a sin, because it pertains to the conjugal duty, for the rendering and seeking of which Alexius has duly been dispensed from the vow of chastity.

n. ¶14.

(c) Whatever lies outside the end of marriage, considered in itself and if one regards only the words of the rescript, is not included in the dispensation obtained, since it lies outside the conjugal duty; but since, according to St. Alphonsus, book III, no. 933, the married state makes intercourse honorable, even touches and looks, if there is no danger of pollution, cannot be gravely unlawful by reason of the purpose of the dispensation; the same must hold for Alexius, otherwise he would continually be placed in the proximate danger of sinning gravely against the vow. Therefore, whatever Alexius commits outside the end of marriage is ordinarily a venial fault both against chastity and against the vow, but an honorable purpose can excuse him from either fault.

Vol. I, Case LVIII: The Vow to Enter an Order

Paul, a college-graduate, has taken a vow, from religious motives, to enter an Order. In fulfilment of his vow he entered an approved congregation, and after passing a few weeks in the novitiate he comes to the conclusion that his health will not stand the strain of the many spiritual exercises and tasks prescribed in this community, and he leaves of his own accord.

^* By J. Schwienbacher, C.SS.R.

Question: Has Paul satisfied the obligations of his vow?

A vow in general is a particular law which the votary imposes upon himself, for the glory of God, and it must for this reason be interpreted according to the spirit that prevailed in the taking of the vow. There ensues for Paul, therefore, the following rules governing the fulfilling of his vow.

If he has not expressly intended to enter an Order sensu stricto with solemn vows, then his vow is fulfilled by entering an approved congregation with simple vows, so the Doctors universally teach, and in that case the votum ingrediendi religionem does not belong to the vows reserved by the Pope.

With regard to the time the vow is to be fulfilled soon if the obligation is present and the opportunity given, and this applies especially to personal vows, among which belongs the vow of entering the religious state. Hence St. Alphonsus says (Homo Apostolicus): "If the vow is perpetual, such as entering the religious life, then the theologians teach that one sins grievously if the fulfilment is delayed more than six months without just cause," and in his Moral Theology (lib. III n. 221) he adds: Sporer also agrees if the person making the vow is over forty years old. Nevertheless, with Tamburino they judge that a young man of fifteen or sixteen years who delays for three or four years is excused from mortal sin; because, as they say, this time seems slight matter in relation to the service of a whole lifetime. But I do not wholly assent to this unless there is a just cause for the delay. Such causae justae are there given by way of example.

Concerning our chief question, Paul's leaving the order, the vow to enter an Order imposes the obligation, under penalty of grievous sin, of employing a moral diligence (not an extraordinary or supreme effort) to obtain admission into an Order, in which at least the essential rules are observed, to enter within due time, to persevere faithfully in the same, and when the vocation has been proved to become professed in the Order. This general rule finds in our case its practical application in the following manner:

I. Paul is not allowed to enter an Order, in which the discipline "quoad observantias principaliores" has become lax. (St. Alph: lib. IV, n. 72.)

II. According to the intention of the votary St. Alphonsus distinguishes in the vow before us three cases, to which correspond different standards of obligation. (Comp. Homo Apost. v, 34.)

In the first case the votary merely obliges himself to an earnest trial of the religious life. In this case the difficulties confronting Paul excuse his action and should they cease later on, he will not be obliged to return because he has fulfilled his vow by making an earnest trial.

Of the second case the Saint says: "If any one vows to make profession, he must set about doing so even under great difficulties unless the religious life becomes absolutely unbearable for him."

The third case, which is to be supposed in our vow unless the first or second are positively ascertained, is according to St. Alphonsus as follows: "If a vow is simply made to enter an Order, one is obliged to enter and remain therein, and it would be a grievous sin to leave again, without just cause. It would be considered a just cause for leaving, if one found a manner of living which exceeded one's strength, or if one had to suffer great and prolonged sadness." Thus the Saint.

Now this just cause for leaving is present in the difficulties which Paul discovered, provided they were really insurmountable for Paul, and for this reason he is not blameworthy, especially if, to avoid self-deception, he has sought the advice of an experienced confessor. With justice Gopfert, however, adds to this the provision: "Should the just cause cease to exist, one must return to the order," for in such case the fulfilment of the vow would no longer be morally impossible. The same authority, however, remarks that "the vow is always subject to the condition that the Superior must accept and retain the votary."

n. ¶13.

III. If Paul in his vow expressly intended a certain Order, and if the fulfilment of this vow is morally impossible in regard to this order, he is of course not obliged to enter any other Order. If, on the contrary, he did not intend any Order in specie, he is, if after prudent counsel these difficulties are not to be looked for in some other Order with discipline, obliged to seek admission there, but after three or four unsuccessful trials, he may safely remain in the world, as Marc, n. 2140 (2) in a similar case justly remarks, because in such case the fulfilment of the vow may be looked upon as impossible.

n. ¶14.

IV. In conclusion the following rule may be quoted, found especially in early authorities: "It should be observed that the one who has vowed to enter an Order and has failed to gain admission in the communities of his province, is not obliged to seek admission away from his country. If a woman she is not obliged to leave her native place if there are convents there" (Homo Apost. v. 34).

n. ¶15.

The reason adduced is that as a rule it can not be presumed that the votary intended to bind himself for such a sacrifice. Lehmkuhl comments on this in view of our modern circumstances: “But what they said in ancient times I would not admit universally under the circumstances of our own time, unless peculiar difficulties existed.” (Casus Consc. vi, n. 294.)

Vol. III, Case LXVI: Incorrect Definition of Vow

Father Sempronius, in his religious instruction, while explaining the second commandment and speaking of the vow, finds in his handbook the definition, “A vow is a well-considered promise, made to God, to do a certain good to which one is not obliged by a commandment.” Father Sempronius considers this incorrect, he omits the words: to which one is not obliged by the commandment, and substitutes therefor, “if one does not thereby prevent something better.” Was Father Sempronius right in his view that the words: to which one is not obliged by a commandment, contain an error, and what about the provision which Father Sempronius puts in their place?

St. Thomas treats of the question in II., II. ae q. 88, Art. 2: Whether a vow must always be made concerning a better good, and in his discussion makes inquiry about what may be the actual object of a vow. Starting from the fact that the vow is a voluntary promise he holds there can never be the object of a vow that which is absolutely necessary to be or not to be. It would be foolish, for instance, to make the vow to die at the end of one’s natural life. St. Thomas then, in second place, mentions things, which, although not absolutely necessary, still are necessary in order to attain a certain end, and adds that such things insofar as they are done voluntarily may be the object of a vow. Here belong those acts ordained, or forbidden, by a divine law: because their practise, or avoidance, is not necessary of their own account, but necessary in regard to eternal salvation. Though, therefore, according to St. Thomas, these things may form the object of a valid vow, there is, according to the same theologian, in the real and strict sense only that a proper object of a vow which is not prescribed by law, but advised, as only the latter depends perfectly upon our free will. Propriissime, and in first place, the object of a vow is some advised act; in second place: something of obligation. This is in our case the doctrine of St. Thomas and it is shared by theologians almost without exception. A divergency between the teaching of St. Thomas and that of other theologians is only found therein that the angelic teacher makes distinction between the object in a narrow and wider sense of the word, whilst this distinction is explicitly made by hardly any other theologian.

Recent authorities are also of opinion that not only the advised act, but also one of obligation may be the object of a vow, as is evident from even a superficial perusal of their works. Lehmkuhl (P. I., n. 498), for instance, considers this view so self-evident that it requires no proof. For those who nevertheless would be tempted to doubt, he refers to the votum castitatis as approved by the Church, the matter of which is not only celibacy, etc., but also acts always and under all circumstances forbidden to all men.

To hold the view that whatever is of obligation cannot be the object of a vow, would be to deny that all such acts are included in the votum castitatis, and consequently their commission by a person who had made the votum castitatis would be no violation of the vow, although, of course, a sin against the Sixth Commandment. That this would contradict the general conception of the vow of chastity is obvious; it appears, indeed, improbable that those who do not share our view have considered the logical consequence of their theory. Like Lehmkuhl, so does Gury (tom. I, n. 324) answer our question, and bases his affirmative answer on the fact that it does not at all conflict if the obligation to perform, or to omit, a certain act has different sources, and he continues: then indeed a vow of this kind concerns a thing good in itself, since the precept is presupposed, and it concerns a better good, since it can confer a new bond toward greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. P. Ballerini agrees with this in his note to Gury’s remark, and he adds: Moreover, to actions performed from a vow of this kind there is added the nobility which flows from the virtue of Religion and the character of more abundant merit. Upon the same ground as Gury, Müller bases his view (I., II., § 52), and he explains that it is more meritorious to do something: by virtue of a vow than to do the same thing without a vow. For one who acts by the force of a vow acts from the motive of religion and with a firmer and more constant purpose. Schwane decides in the same sense, in his Moral Theology (I., §65), and explains that such an act of obligation receives from the vow a new specific merit, and its omission an additional specific wrong which must be confessed as a breach of the vow.

It is, furthermore, certainly the sententia communis theologorum which affirms the validity of a vow not to commit a grievous sin. All authors who defend the validity of this vow must agree with our opinion, because the avoidance of grievous sin is surely something to which we are obliged. The question to what extent such a vow in respect to venial sins has validity is here without importance, for, if the validity of such a vow is disputed, it is done for another reason.

Father Sempronius, therefore, was perfectly right when he considered it an error that only something advisable, and not something of obligation, may be the object of a vow.

The provision, which Father Sempronius substituted in place of the omitted words, is superfluous in the definition of the vow, for Father Sempronius could simply have based his definition upon that of St. Thomas: est promissio Deo facta, by which the nature of the vow, as Lehmkuhl also observes, is fully expressed. If Father Sempronius, however, wished to give expression to the idea of the bonum melius in the definition, then the words: whereby one does not prevent something better are well chosen, for the essential meaning of this provision is not that the object of the vow must be better than what is of obligation, but that it not be, as Reiffenstuel (Theol. mor. tom. I., tract. VI.) puts it, of itself an impediment to another more excellent work. J. von Grimmenstein.

Vol. IV, Case XLIX: Release from a Vow

A woman takes a vow to enter some religious order, but after her admission to a convent her health breaks down, whilst she is a novice, and she is sent away. Is she now free from the obligation of her vow?

Hitherto the answer given by casuists to this question was in the negative (cf. E. Müller, Theologia moralis, Ed. 9, II. p. 192, casus 1; Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Ed. 6, 1, p. 479, etc.; Lehmkuhl, Theologia mor., Ed. 11, 1, p. 333; Noldin, de praeceptis Dei et ecclesiae, Ed. 8, p. 239), but it has recently been reversed by a decree of the Congregation de Religiosis dated September 7, 1909, affecting all religious orders of men (Acta Apost. Sedis, 1909, no. 17, p. 700, etc.), and extended to orders of women on Jan. 4, 1910 (Acta Apost. Sedis, 1910, no. 2, p. 63, etc.).

The Congregation decided as follows: " No one who has been dismissed from a religious community for any reason whatever can be admitted to the novitiate or to profession, under penalty of invalidating the latter... Novices and religious cannot in future be admitted to the same order or congregation or province." No one can be required to ask a dispensation from what would be a special favor to the applicant and a violation of the law. Therefore the vow is no longer binding, for it cannot be kept without having recourse to extraordinary means, which cannot be obligatory. (The case would be different if a pledge to have recourse to such extraordinary means had been expressly included in the vow.) This conclusion would hold good whether the person who took the vow had intentionally or unintentionally brought about her dismissal.— Dr. Karl Fruhstorfer.

Vol. V, Case XXVIII: Husband’s Power over the Vows of his Wife