Appendix. Excursus: On the Systems of Moralists concerning Solving Doubt of Conscience

Since the right formation of conscience is made by varied application of principles, it is not strange if the doctrine on this matter did not exist from the beginning perfect and complete, but was slowly elaborated.

I. Among the Fathers no definite system is found; nevertheless there are traces of principles which can serve for forming conscience.

Frequently they rather favored the safer part. Namely the safer is to be taken in choosing religion (Lact., De Div. Inst. III, 13), in avoiding danger of nullity in the administration of the sacraments (Aug., De B. c. Don. I, c. 3, n. 5), in admitting the whole truth of faith without regard to the empty opinions of heterodox persons (Greg. Naz., or. XXXVI, 7; Chrys., In II Cor., hom. XIII, 4; Aug., De util. cred. XI), in conforming oneself through all things to the divine law (Tertul., De spect. XX-XXI), in striving to inquire into truth (Aug., De Civ. Dei, l. XXII, 23), in certainly establishing necessary penance for sins and avoiding the uncertainty of penance at the end: "hold the certain and dismiss the uncertain," Augustine cries, serm. 393. He also inveighs against the Academics (l. III, n. 35-36) who say: "when each one does what seems probable to him, he neither sins nor errs," who understood probability as merely subjective and empty, which each one fashioned for himself.

Even outside these cases, they quite generally favored the safer part, both because of the rigorous penitential discipline of those times and because ignorance of law was regularly held by many as culpable (cf. Aug., ep. 194).

On the opposite side, however, certain more benign solutions are found, for sometimes they did not urge an uncertain obligation in practice.

Lactantius says that one must not care about the precepts of the philosophers, as being mere conjectures without solid foundation; on which occasion he writes: "It belongs to a most foolish man to wish to obey their precepts, concerning which it is doubted whether they are true or false; and therefore no one obeys, because no one wishes to labor toward what is uncertain" (De Div. Inst. III, 27).

Gregory Nazianzen, or. XXXIX, 19, replies to the rigorists who did not wish the baptized to be admitted to penance: "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity prevail."

Thus Jerome, in the question concerning bigamists to be ordained, permits an uncertain and less safe opinion to be embraced, "prejudging no one from following what he wishes" (Adv. Ruf. I, 32). And Theodoret repeats the same (P. G. LXXXIII, 136 B C).

Indeed Augustine in various questions: 1. whether it is licit on the Lord's Supper to receive the Eucharist after food, says: "we compel no one to eat before that Lord's supper, but neither do we dare to contradict anyone" (ep. 54); 2. whether it is licit to enter marriage with an infidel: "since," he says, "truly in the New Testament nothing is prescribed concerning this, and therefore either it has been believed to be licit, or it has been left as doubtful" (De fide et op. XIX, 35); 3. whether it is licit to eat food which has been found in an idol's temple, he replies: "Either it is certain to be idol-offering, or it is certain not to be, or it is unknown; if therefore it is certain to be, it is better rejected by Christian truth; but if it is known either not to be or is unknown, it is taken up for the use of necessity without any scruple of conscience" (ep. 47); 4. whether it is licit for a soldier to fight in a perhaps unjust war: "A just man," he says, "...can rightly fight,... for whom it is certain either that what is commanded is not against God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is, so that perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent" (c. Faust. man., l. 22, c. 75).

II. Among the Scholastics the question of the formation of conscience is explicitly proposed; and they especially insist on this, that conscience ought to be certain, so that to act in doubt is sin, for he who acts while remaining in doubt commits himself to risk and to danger of sinning. Thus St. Thomas, Quodl. VIII, 13; IV Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; III, q. 83, a. 6, ad 2; before or after him, William of Auxerre (Sum. l. II, tr. 29, c. 1, q. 3), William of Paris (De coll. benef. a. 8; De legibus, c. 21), Alexander of Hales (Sum. II, q. 112, cas. 8; q. 121, m. 3, a. 1, ad 2), David Augustine (De hom. compositione, l. III, pr. 5, c. 19; pr. 6, c. 43), Henry of Ghent (Quodl. IV, 33), Scotus (in Sent., prol., q. 2, n. 15; l. III, d. 25, q. 1).

They generally did not know the use of a reflex principle in forming conscience, except in cases of epikeia and a few others: for it is admitted that one must also do that which seems rather illicit, both for a soldier in a war not certainly unjust, and for a religious when the superior commands what is not certainly illicit: this last is noted in the decree of Gratian and is handed down by St. Bernard, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, William Peraldus, Paludanus.

Hence in practice they rather often give safer solutions, as St. Thomas in Quodl. VIII, 13. There he asks "whether he who has several prebends sins," concerning which there were then contrary opinions; he replies that he who "is brought into a certain doubt from the contrariety of opinions,... if while such doubt remains he has several prebends, commits himself to danger, and thus without doubt sins." Thus he simply declares that a certain conscience is required and that it is not safe to act in practical doubt; without inquiring or seeming to suspect whether in the case the doubt perhaps could be solved by some indirect principle. Nevertheless they have several things which favor the more benign part. Thus the principle proposed by St. Thomas in Q. D. De Ver. 17, a. 3: "no one is bound by a precept except through knowledge of the precept"; for although there it is adduced to prove that an unknown law does not bind, nevertheless logically the same holds concerning an uncertain law. Besides this, sometimes he holds more benign opinions: thus he denies the necessity either of confessing merely aggravating circumstances (IV Sent. d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5), or of confessing at once after a fall (d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 4), or of repeating an unformed confession (ibid. a. 4); without concluding, on account of the opposite opinions, that to act thus is to commit oneself to danger.

To the safer practice in the thirteenth century a certain corrective was added from the principle of probabiliorism. William of Auxerre seems to have explained this first rather clearly, says Prummer, Th. M. I, n. 345, when he wrote in the treatise on pollution: "That magisterial rule, that one doubting about something, whether it is illicit, and doing that thing while the doubt stands, sins, because he commits himself to danger, is to be understood of such doubt which is vehement, and more, or at least equally, induces the mind to believe that it is mortally illicit, as that it is licit. It is otherwise where the mind inclines more and judges that it is licit than that it is illicit, although it does not have in every way evident or fixed certitude, because not even this itself is required."

St. Albert the Great accepts the principle of probabiliorism (Sum. de creaturis, p. II, q. 70, a. 2), and his disciple Ulrich of Strasbourg; likewise Monaldus; but in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries several do so, as Gerson (De consol. theol., l. IV, pr. 2 and 3), John of Dambach (De consol. theol., l. XIV, c. 8), Nider (Consol. tim. consc., p. 3, c. 11-16), Conradus (De contr.), Gabriel Biel (in IV, d. 15, q. 8, a. 3, dub. 2; and a. 16, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 6); likewise various summae: Tabiena, Trovamala, Angelica. Yet several continued to adhere to the safer part, as Dionysius the Carthusian, Bartholomaeus Fumus, and Adrian VI.

Another corrective is noted among others, when they prescribe to the confessor as a rule: to respect the opinions of the penitent, unless they are openly false. Thus Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodl. IX, a. 16), and Paludanus (in IV, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, n. 5).

III. In canon law various principles are stated which can serve for forming conscience.

1. In doubt the safer part is to be chosen. Thus Eugenius III, decr. l. IV, t. 1, c. 3; Clement III, l. V, t. 12, c. 12; Innocent III, l. III, t. 43, c. 3; l. V, t. 12, c. 18; Honorius III, l. V, t. 12, c. 24. Moreover, it is invoked not as a universal principle, but in certain cases, when namely there is present danger of salvation, or irreverence, or scandal, in one word, of a greater evil; or also by way of an equitable principle in solving certain peculiar difficulties. But sometimes in the law solutions opposed to this saying are found, as was the license of attempting conjugal copulation for three years in doubt of impotence; and it is to be reconciled with other principles admitted in law, such as: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, or Laws are to be interpreted more benignly.

2. In obscure matters we look at what is more like the truth. This was borrowed from Roman law, in which it is a rule for judges for establishing presumptions in certain doubts of fact. In canon law it is invoked as a rule in authentic interpretation of law (l. II, t. 9, c. 4), or as a norm prescribed to judges in interpreting facts, contracts, testaments (l. VI, reg. 45), or it also holds concerning some speculatively more probable opinion to be held; but it is not invoked in questions concerning a law to be observed or concerning uncertain obligation. St. Antoninus is recounted as the first who applied this to these matters (Sum. p. I, t. 20), and indeed for positive laws.

3. In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. Thus l. II, t. 23. The principle holds in many doubts of fact, and is stated under various forms; in doubts regarding the existence of a fact: a fact is not presumed but must be proved; one must stand for that for which presumption stands; one must judge from things ordinarily occurring; in doubt concerning the conditions of a fact: no one is presumed evil unless it is proved; one must stand for the validity of the act; that is judged to have been rightly done which by law had to be done.

Yet it cannot validly be applied in doubts of law: for how can it be solved from presumption whether a contract entered under such a form is just or unjust, whether interest is licitly received from money loaned or not, whether abortion or embryology or vasectomy are ever licit, etc.? Hence we do not understand how some could write that this is the universal principle to which all the others are reduced.

4. A doubtful law does not bind. This is handed down under various forms, for example, in doubt of promulgation: "Unless you have been certain concerning the mandate of the Apostolic See, you will not be compelled to execute it," says Innocent III, decr. l. I, t. 29, c. 31; in doubt concerning the intention of a human legislator: "interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly"; in doubt concerning the sense of the law: "laws are to be interpreted more benignly, so that their will may be preserved," and "in obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30). But since the body of law contains positive laws, it is not strange if the principle does not regard the natural law.

5. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Thus l. II, t. 19, c. 3; t. 26, c. 6; l. III, t. 4, c. 31; l. VI, reg. 65 and 11. It is invoked in doubts of fact for the matter of justice, when possession of the thing or of right or power is present, but not where possession is lacking; sometimes in speculative doubts of law, if from use a presumption can be taken for the force or extinction of a law; besides this in practical doubts whether the accused is to be condemned on account of a crime committed or to paying a debt: his condition is better until the crime or the obligation of paying is certainly demonstrated.

As we noted in n. 84, under the form of the principle of possession can be stated the faculty of neglecting slight reasons and negative doubt.

IV. From the sixteenth century there are well-defined systems. At the beginning several profess probabiliorism, especially from the Dominican school, as Sylvester Prierias and Cajetan; also outside this school, as John Major.

Cajetan explicitly posited the distinction between speculative and practical doubt (op. 31, resp. 13, dub. 7), from which distinction the question received notable progress, so that from this there came to be a broader use of the reflex principle for rendering practical judgment certain.

The Dominican school of Salamanca, with the masters Fr. de Victoria, Melchior Cano, and Dominic Soto as leaders, also stood generally, and with certain cases of the safer part excepted, for the more probable opinion; but at the same time it affirmed that he does not sin who, among truly probable opinions (equal ones), follows whichever he wishes; so that they approached equiprobabilism.

These things were the occasion of a certain longer and diverse evolution.

1. Probabilism arose from this. For Bartholomew de Medina was the first who in the year 1577 formally taught at Salamanca: "if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable." This position was soon accepted not only in Spain, but also in other regions. Thus the Preachers generally held it: Did. Alvarez, Lopez, Bannez, P. de Ledesma, V. Candidus, Gr. Martinez, John of St. Thomas, Arauxo, Barth. de Ledesma, etc., yet with a few excepted, as I. Martinez de Prado; likewise generally the theologians of the Society of Jesus, as is known to all; several Franciscans such as Reiffenstuel, Mastrius, and Herincx; also several Sorbonists and Louvain theologians, as Malderus, Wiggers, Sylvius; likewise the Carmelite theologians of Salamanca.

Yet certain persons continued to think otherwise, as Dr. Navarrus Azpicuelta, Ant. Corduba and Fabri from the Order of Friars Minor, Palacios, also P. Comitoli and A. Bianchi from the Society of Jesus, all probabiliorists; Perez, O.S.B., and Rebello, S.J., equiprobabilists; and Merenda, a tutiorist.

There was not one tendency of probabilists. Some, the moderate, said it was licit to follow a less probable opinion, provided the opposite was not notably more probable. Others, more benign, who are called pure or absolute probabilists, held licit every less probable opinion, provided it was probable in itself, even if the opposite was notably more probable. Hence probabilism gradually became more lax.

2. Laxism followed from this. For certain persons held it licit to act according to thin probabilities, or applied probabilism to cases in which, on account of danger of bringing in harm or frustrating an effect, one must act more safely. Thus, for example, John Sanchez, Bauny, Escobar, Tamburini, Moya, and others from the Society of Jesus; Leander, O.S.Tr.; Diana the Theatine; Caramuel, O.Cist.; etc.

Against those excesses of laxer probabilism a reaction arose, especially at Paris (in the year 1640) and at Louvain (in the year 1649), first in the universities, afterward among bishops and clergy, and among the Jansenists, whose leader was Pascal in the so-called Provincial Letters (1656-1657).

Hence Alexander VII condemned 45 laxer propositions, in the years 1665-66. But in the year 1677 four Louvain professors, M. Steyaert, Chr. Wolf or Lupus, Fr. van Viaene, and P. L. Ledrou, go to Rome so that they might obtain from Innocent XI the condemnation of lax propositions; and in fact he condemned 65 in the year 1679.

3. From this tutiorism was born. The safer practice which had mostly flourished in the middle age was now erected into a general system. Sinnich, a Louvain professor, in the book Saul Ex Rex is said to have defended this opinion: "it is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable," which was condemned by Alexander VIII (in the year 1690).

Wherefore others taught a certain mitigated tutiorism, as Steyaert, van Opstraet, Henricus a S. Ignatio, Dens, Perin, Neesen; to whom there closely approached in France Habert, in Italy Fagnanus and Card. Gerdil.

4. Revived probabiliorism is also taught by many. Alexander VII had commended to the general chapter of the Order of Preachers held at Rome in 1656 that they fight against laxer opinions. This was done. Advancing further, the Preachers from this moment rather generally taught probabiliorism, as Mercorus, Gonet, Natalis Alexander, Contenson, Billuart, Cuniliati, Concina, Patuzzi, etc.; yet not all: thus Bancel, Ferre, and Larraga are probabilists.

But not only among the Dominicans; also in the French clergy many probabiliorists are found, with Bossuet as leader; and in Italy Berti, O.S.A., P. Ballerini, and Benedict XIV hold it. Indeed in the Society of Jesus itself it has defenders. Thyrsus Gonzalez had written the book The Foundation of Moral Theology concerning the Right Use of Probable Opinions, in which he strenuously defended probabiliorism. Since he could not easily publish it, Innocent XI ordered that the general Father of the Society command that he permit Gonzalez himself and other Fathers to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the view that it is licit to follow the less probable. But when Father Gonzalez himself was elected General of the Society, and since Innocent XI and afterward Clement XI favored the more probable opinion, several from the Society now taught probabiliorism, as Antoine, Elizalde, Estrix, Gisbert, Taberna, and others. In the year 1694 the book of Thyrsus Gonzalez was at last published, but it was attacked by the Jesuits Segneri and Rassler.

5. Equiprobabilism, which already before was held by several, was now proposed systematically by Rassler, De Ruvere, Mayr, Biner from the Society of Jesus; by Eusebius Amort, canon regular; by B. Schmier, O.S.B.; and by others.

St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who had been instructed in probabiliorism, when he had learned by experience that that system could not be applied in practice, first (in the year 1755) taught moderate probabilism, although nevertheless he did not specially defend that a less probable opinion could be chosen in practice when a certainly more probable one occurred; afterward (in the year 1762) he perfected and corrected his system with a twofold restriction, namely equality of probabilities and the principle of possession, so that, in order that a law bind, it must be more probable; in order that it cease to bind, it must be more probable that it has been removed or fulfilled. He was vehemently attacked by probabiliorists, especially by Patuzzi, O.P.

And so St. Alphonsus truly was an equiprobabilist, and those err who contend that he never abandoned pure probabilism. But they would err more who tried to bring him into the party of probabiliorism, or who held equiprobabilism as a logical evolution of probabiliorism, forgetful that the holy Doctor chiefly attacked probabiliorism and was sharply attacked by probabiliorists, and that he firmly and broadly defended that principle so hateful to all tutiorists and probabiliorists: A doubtful law does not bind.

V. After St. Alphonsus. The beatification and canonization of St. Alphonsus, with the approval made of his works by which confessors can safely and licitly follow his doctrine, together with the great political disturbances, more profoundly changed ideas and customs.

Gradually the doctrine of St. Alphonsus was admitted more and more. Laxism and tutiorism were theoretically abandoned. Several taught equiprobabilism, not only among the sons of St. Alphonsus, but also among the secular clergy and in other religious institutes.

Probabilism also revived, and indeed in such a way that not only the theologians of the Society of Jesus commonly, but also many others, follow and defend it.

Writers of the Order of Preachers ceased proposing probabiliorism, except P. Pegues, who in some way defends it, and P. Noble. Several among them now hold equiprobabilism, as Moran, Saralegui, Beaudoin, and Sertillanges, or a system which is reduced to it, as Gardeil and Mandonnet; others propose the system of compensation, which is a certain corrected probabiliorism, as Potton, Lehu, and Prummer; recently P. Richard, after he had brought forth many things to show that the question, in the speculative order, is not rightly set forth by more recent writers, nevertheless in practice concludes, for the case of doubt and suspicion, to pragmatic probabilism.

Thus moralists now are less distant from one another, and in practice they still differ less, as we noted in n. 100. And thus peace succeeded the sharper controversies, which through a century and a half had been prolonged to the detriment of souls and of the science of morals itself.