1. In that part of moral theology which is concerning principles, it is shown in general how the moral actions of man ought to be constituted, so that they may be apt for the ultimate end of eternal life. The other part of moral theology, which is concerning precepts, teaches in particular what moral actions, according to the will of God, are to be performed, so that man may through them arrive at the end of eternal life. For precepts proximately and directly determine by what acts man, according to the will of God, ought to tend toward his ultimate end; and since acts of precept are so many acts of some virtue, the precepts at the same time determine what virtues man ought to exercise, in order that he may obtain the end of eternal life. But the precepts with which we must deal are of three kinds: a. the precepts of the theological virtues; b. the precepts of the decalogue; c. the precepts of the Church. d. To the precepts must be added the penalties enacted by the Church against transgressors of the precepts.

With the exposition of laws there must be joined the treatment of virtues: for just as sins committed by transgression of laws, namely their gravity and their specific diversity, are understood better and more perfectly from the virtues to which they are opposed, so the laws to be fulfilled according to the will of God are perceived more clearly and accurately when the virtues are known. Moral theology considers virtues only so far as their acts are acts of precept and therefore necessary for obtaining eternal life. A full treatment of the virtues, even with respect to those acts which indeed are not required for obtaining eternal life, but nevertheless are required for attaining Christian perfection and the holiness of life, belongs to that theological discipline which is called Ascetics.

2. Survey of the precepts. 1. The precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, which differ from the other precepts in this, that they are known only from revelation, that the acts of these virtues immediately attain God, and that they have the divine attributes as their formal object.

2. The precepts of the decalogue, which contain the law of nature to be observed by all even in the New Testament. Almost all of these, except the third and fourth, are proposed in negative form, but in reality each of them is both affirmative and negative.

3. The precepts of the Church, of which some are common to all the faithful, while others are particular for determinate states: clerics, beneficiaries, parish priests, bishops. Those of each kind which are principal are customarily treated in moral theology.

4. The precepts of administering and using the means of grace, by which the moral life becomes supernatural and proportioned to the ultimate end, and by which that same life is preserved and perfected. The third volume, on the sacraments, deals with these.

Note. 1. Some moral authors consider man according to the threefold relation by which he is referred to God, to himself, and to his neighbor, or according to the threefold precept of charity which is founded on those relations, namely of loving God, himself, and his neighbor; and therefore they reduce the precepts and the virtues corresponding to them to three heads:

a. To precepts which determine obligations toward God - the precepts of the theological virtues, the first, second, and third precepts of the decalogue, and the precept of the Church concerning the sanctification of feasts, the precepts concerning the use of the sacraments, and the particular precept of reciting the divine office;

b. To precepts which determine obligations toward oneself - the precept of charity toward oneself, the fifth precept of the decalogue, insofar as it requires the preservation of life, the sixth precept of the decalogue, and the precept of the Church concerning abstinence and fasting;

c. To precepts which determine obligations toward the neighbor - the precept of charity toward the neighbor, the fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth precepts of the decalogue.

2. Others consider man insofar as he is private or individual, abstraction being made from relations with other men, and insofar as he is social and, existing in society, has relations with other men. According to this twofold respect they reduce all the precepts which constitute the object of this part of moral theology to two heads:

a. To precepts which regard man as private - the individual duties of man toward God: the precepts of faith, hope, charity, and individual religion, whose primary acts are prayer, adoration, and sacrifice, and whose secondary acts are oath and vow; the duties of man toward himself with respect to the intellect, the will, the preservation of life, and external goods - and the part which treats of these they call individual morals (Individualethik);

b. To precepts which regard man as social - the social duties toward God: the sanctification of Sunday and of feasts, abstinence and fasting; the duties of charity toward the neighbor; the duties of justice toward other men, and indeed in domestic society, in civil society, with respect to the good of life, with respect to the goods of the person, and with respect to goods of fortune - and the part which treats of these they call social morals (Socialethik).

3. If the precepts were to be distributed and treated according to either respect, an order would arise far different from that which is indicated above. In a book of moral theology which chiefly serves the practical uses of pastoral care, the threefold division into the precepts of the theological virtues, of the decalogue, and of the Church seems to be preferred, although the other division into precepts which determine the duties of man toward God, toward himself, and toward the neighbor, and likewise the other into precepts which regard man as private and into precepts which regard man as social, is more suited to scientific and systematic treatment.

By these things the moral life of the Christian man, elevated by grace to the state of a son of God, is described, both individual and social. In order that the life of the Christian man may be truly supernatural, his soul is adorned with sanctifying grace, his powers, namely intellect and will, are furnished with supernatural habits of virtues, and actual graces flow into his several moral actions. In this way it comes about that all the virtues by which the Christian life is contained shine with that perfection and excellence which the dignity of a son of God and his vocation to eternal life require.

130. The Decalogue (hoi deka logoi) is contained twice in Sacred Scripture.² Concerning its division there is not one opinion among doctors. St. Augustine is the first to enumerate the ten precepts according to the manner which the Catholic Church afterwards preserved.³

a. The supreme importance which belongs to the precepts of the Decalogue is already gathered from the solemn manner in which God commanded the Decalogue to be promulgated and preserved. And indeed it contains the first precepts of the natural law, which, two excepted, oblige all men of all times and places.⁴ The precepts which are called of the first table (the first three) order man to God; and the precepts which are called of the second table (the remaining seven) order man to neighbors, the fourth indeed to superior neighbors, among whom parents obtain the first place, but the remaining six to equal neighbors. The precepts of the Decalogue themselves, as St. Augustine well notes,⁵ blossom forth, as it were from their own seed, from the two precepts concerning the love of God and neighbor.⁶

b. In the precepts of the Decalogue there is supreme social and political importance, since they constitute the foundations of any society and state and protect their highest goods. The first three precepts protect the worship of the supreme Deity, the religious foundation of kingdoms; the fifth and eighth precepts protect the life and reputation of the neighbor; the seventh and tenth the right of property; the fourth, authority, the foundation of the family; the sixth and ninth protect marriage.

Book First. On the First Precept of the Decalogue

"I am the Lord your God ... You shall not have strange gods before Me." Ex. 20:2-3.

This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, commands that the one sole true God be worshiped; therefore it commands acts of the virtue of religion. But insofar as it is negative, it prohibits the worship owed to the true God from being denied, or from being attributed to another besides God; therefore it prohibits sins opposed to the virtue of religion.

¹ St. Alphonsus, bk. 3, nn. 1-1003; Thomas Sanchez, Opus morale in praecepta decalogi, bks. 2-4; Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1901, tr. 2-6; Thomas Tamburini, Explicatio decalogi, bks. 2-40; Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, 3rd ed., Prato: Giachetti, 1899, II, tr. 6, De praeceptis decalogi.

² Ex. 20:2-17; Deut. 5:6-21.

³ Quaestiones in Exodum, q. 71.

⁴ The precept concerning not making a graven thing, and concerning the observance of the Sabbath, insofar as it is ceremonial, pertained only to the Jewish people.

⁵ Quaestiones in Exodum, q. 140.

⁶ Cf. Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., "Decalog"; Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, 2nd ed., Freiburg: Herder, 1893, p. 39.

Morphia may be given to ease pain, and brandy to strengthen a sick person, even though they cause loss of reason. This follows from what has been said and from the principle of a double effect. It is not lawful to administer such medicines in order to deprive a dying man of the use of reason, so that he may die while unconscious. The time just before death is very precious; a sinner may then be reconciled with God and save his soul; one who is in the state of grace may very much increase his merit by a good use of that time. Euthanasia then, in this sense, is unlawful; it is virtually shortening a man’s life.

THE great precepts of the natural law which binds all men are summed up in the Ten Commandments given by God to the Israelites, which not to destroy but to fulfil, our Lord declared that he came They bind all men, and they will continue to do so as long as human nature is what it is; if only they were observed, the blissful state of happiness of which poets have dreamed, and reformers have striven in vain to bring about, would indeed be realized on earth. The first three Commandments lay down our duty toward God and constitute the first table; the rest, forming the second table, contain our duties toward our neighbour and our self-regarding duties.

The First Commandment, in the words of Exodus, is: “ I am the Lord thy God . . . thou shalt not have strange gods before me.’’!

Here God solemnly declares to us that he is our Lord God from whom we have all that we possess, on whom we depend absolutely, to whom we altogether belong. From this, our essential relation with God our Creator, is derived immediately our duty to worship him as our first beginning and last end. The fact that we derive our bodily origin under God from our parents lays upon us certain obligations in their regard; similarly, our relation to God imposes on us our highest duty of worshipping God, our Creator.

The acts of this worship, which natural reason thus prescribes, belong to the virtue which theologians call religion. They are acts such as prayer, worship in the stricter sense, sacrifice, offerings, tithes, vows, oaths, etc. Most of them will be more suitably treated of elsewhere; in this part we will consider the subject of prayer and worship, and then the chief sins against the virtue of religion. Exod. xx 2, 3.

PRAYER sometimes means any pious affection by which the mind and heart are raised to God. More strictly, it is the petitioning of God for what we stand in need of, and this is called the prayer of petition to distinguish it from the more general signification of the term.

Mental prayer is made with the internal faculties of the soul, while vocal prayer is made with the lips also.

Public prayer is offered in the name of the Church by authorized ministers in forms approved by the Church; all other is private prayer. Public worship is subject to the authority of the Church, which has regulated it by a large body of laws and decrees. Unauthorized forms of prayer may not be used in public worship, and it has been prescribed that only the litanies which are found in the Breviary and in the more recent editions of the Ritual, or such as have been specially approved by the Holy See, may be used in public. Moreover, no litanies may be published even for private use without the approbation of the Ordinary (Can. 1259).

For adults, prayer is a necessary means of obtaining salvation; for there are certain graces necessary for salvation, such as final perseverance, which God only grants in answer to prayer, as St Augustine teaches.¹1 Prayer is also of precept: “We ought always to pray and not to faint.² This precept is grave of itself, and for its fulfilment requires that we should pray frequently. Beyond saying this, it is difficult to determine precisely what neglect of prayer is required for a mortal or a venial sin, It would seem certain, however, that grave sin would be committed by altogether neglecting prayer for a whole year. The faithful rightly accuse themselves in confession when they have omitted morning or night prayers, for those times are the most suitable for fulfilling this duty, and if no prayers are said then, they will hardly be said at other times; moreover, the omission will usually be due to sloth or carelessness about spiritual things,

¹ De bono persev., c. 16.

² Luke xviii 1.

Our Lord promised that prayer when rightly made would be heard by God: “‘ I say to you, Ask and it shall be given you: seek and you shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you.¹ We learn from his teaching and from the nature of prayer what qualities it must have in order to be acceptable to God and heard by him. The object prayed for must be necessary, or at any rate useful for salvation. Not only spiritual blessings are proper objects of prayer but temporal blessings as well, as far as they conduce to the welfare of the soul. Prayer must be persevering: God has promised to hear prayer, but he has not promised to hear it at once. The time must be left to his wisdom and providence with due conformity to his holy will. Prayer must come from a humble heart, in which faith, hope, and charity dwell, in order to merit the promises of God. Moreover, God will not do violence to man’s free will, and so if prayer is offered for someone else, its effect to some extent depends on that person’s dispositions and free will. He may, if he pleases, put obstacles in the way, which will prevent the prayer from obtaining the precise effect wished for in his regard. ‘Theologians conclude that prayer must be made for one’s self in order to be infallibly heard by God.

¹ Luke xi 9.

We are obliged by precept only to pray to God, unless we admit with the common opinion that anyone who should never pray to the blessed Virgin Mary would sin venially by neglecting so powerful a means of salvation. We may, however, lawfully and with fruit pray to the angels and saints, more probably to the holy souls detained in purgatory, and in private to anyone whom with reasonable certainty we believe to be with God in heaven, that they may intercede with him for us.

We should pray for all men whom it will benefit without excluding anyone in our private prayers. It is useless praying for the damned, and the Church forbids her ministers to pray publicly for those who are excommunicated,

Worship here signifies any external action by which we show deference and respect to another. Such an act is grounded on the persuasion that the person honoured is worthy of our esteem, and that it is proper to mark our esteem by such an external act of deference.

If the qualities which command our respect belong to the sphere of civil life, our worship is civil; if they belong to the sphere of religion, it is religious worship. Religious worship which is paid exclusively to God on account of his infinite and uncreated excellence is called by divines latria. That paid to the saints is called dulia, while the special worship with which we honour the blessed Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, on account of her created but pre-eminent excellence is called hyperdulia.

Worship is absolute when the excellence which grounds our esteem is in the object honoured; it is relative when paid to some object on account of its connection with a person worthy of our esteem and honour.

In this chapter we will briefly consider the regulations of the Church with regard to the worship of the saints, their relics and images, and the principles which underlie that worship. We suppose the truth of the Catholic doctrine on this subject—that the worship which the Church authorizes to be paid to the saints, to their relics and images—is lawful, praiseworthy, and meritorious. In the first place, then, we are allowed privately to show that inferior worship, which is called dulia, to anyone whom we know with moral certainty to have died in the grace and friendship of God. We may also show marks of relative worship to anything connected with him during life. It is evident that there is nothing reprehensible in such worship; the world is accustomed to show similar marks of its esteem to its great statesmen, generals, poets, and inventors. The Church does not interfere with private worship provided there is nothing in it that is objectionable.

Public worship, however, is subject to the authority of the Church, and she regulates it both as to its manner and objects. No signs of public worship may be used besides those. which are sanctioned, nor may the accustomed and approved signs of honour be shown to any except those who have been canonized or at least beatified by the Holy See. Only the saints, not the beatified, are invoked in the public litanies, and ordinarily it is not lawful to erect churches or altars in honour of the beatified; this mark of honour is reserved for the canonized saints. The pictures of the saints are painted with aureoles, those of the beatified with rays. With the permission of the Ordinary it is not forbidden to place statues of men who have not been canonized or beatified in our churches provided there be no marks of religious worship shown them; and paintings of such men may, under the same condition, be placed on the walls or windows of a church. Such paintings, however, may not be placed over an altar.

The Church is very careful to guard against abuse and fraud in the worship of the saints, their images and relics, as is shown especially by the wise decree of the Council of Trent on the invocation of the saints and the veneration paid to their relics and images (sess. 25). In that decree it is specially prescribed that no new relics or miracles are to be admitted except with the Bishop’s approbation after making a diligent inquiry into the truth of the matter. The question of the authenticity of relics is one of fact and proved by the ordinary rules of evidence. When there seems to be moral certainty of the genuineness of a relic, the Church permits relative honour to be paid to it on account of the spiritual excellence of the person with whom it was connected. The honour is thus referred to the person of the saint and to God who is glorified in all his saints. It is quite possible for mistakes to be made about the genuineness of a relic; the infallibility of the Church does not enter here. When a mistake is detected, of course the honour previously paid to a false relic should stop. No one need be scandalized or distressed when any such discovery is made. The merit of the worship previously paid in good faith is not lost; the saint whose relic it was supposed to be was really honoured by marks of devotion shown to it out of love for him. It is as if a devotee of Shakespeare were to keep a bust in his room, and show it marks of honour because he supposed it to represent the great poet; if he found out that it was a bust of Thomas Cromwell, he would be disappointed, but neither he nor Shakespeare would have suffered any great loss.

Sins may be committed against the virtue of religion by excess or by defect in the same way as against other moral virtues. Sins against religion by excess come under the general term of superstition, of which there are several species. For the sin of superstition may be committed by worshipping the true God in the wrong way or by worshipping false gods. We will first briefly treat of the wrong ways of worshipping the true God, and afterwards of worship paid to false gods.

God may be wrongly worshipped either by false worship or by superfluous worship being paid him. Worship of God is false when its meaning is not in accordance with fact, or when the falsehood is in the person who performs the act of worship, as when a layman performs the duties of a priest, or when someone tries to gain credence for false miracles or false relics. The ceremonies and practices of the Jewish religion signified that the Messiah was to come, and so now, after the coming of our Lord, they could not be employed without superstition. Inasmuch as falsehood in religion is a grave injury to God, this species of superstition is mortally sinful.

Anything in the worship of God which does not tend to his honour and glory, or which is against the ordinances and practice of the Church, to whom the regulation of religious worship exclusively belongs, is superfluous worship and superstition. This sin is committed by attributing an infallible effect to a fixed number of prayers or acts of piety, or to the mere material wearing of scapulars or medals, or by unwarrantably acting against the rubrics while saying Mass or administering the sacraments or sacramentals of the Church. The intention of the Church is that scapulars, medals, and other pious objects should be used by the faithful with confidence in the goodness and power of God, whose aid is invoked on the wearers by the blessing of the Church. Ordinarily, however, this kind of superstition will not be more than a venial sin.

The sin of superstition is also committed by giving divine honour to false gods. This is done by idolatry, divination, vain observance, and magic.

By material idolatry divine worship is given to a creature through fear or for some other reason merely externally, without any intention of honouring it as God. It is a grave sin, for it is directly against the obligation of making external profession of the faith, and contains the grave malice of a lie in matters of religion.

Formal idolatry is perfect or imperfect. The former consists in honouring a creature as God, falsely thinking it to be God. The latter knowingly honours a creature as God, without any excuse of ignorance, out of hatred towards him, or wishing to obtain something thereby. Both are grievous mortal sins, but the latter is the more grievous on account of the greater knowledge and malice.

We here suppose that the devil, a wicked spirit of great intelligence and power, but subject to God, exists and continually interferes in the affairs of men in order to ruin them. This truth belongs to the Catholic faith and cannot be denied without sin. The sin of divination is committed when the devil is invoked expressly or tacitly in order to discover what is secret and hidden. There is express invocation of the devil when his aid is expressly implored. The devil is tacitly invoked when altogether inadequate means are used to find out what is occult, means which are not sufficient for the purpose naturally, and which have not been ordained by God for that purpose. The devil is eager to be appealed to in order the more easily to attain his own ends, and anyone who uses such inadequate means to find out hidden secrets virtually appeals to the devil to help him. A great variety of such means of divination has been in use from the earliest times among all nations; and periods which have witnessed a decay of faith have also witnessed a recrudescence of these superstitions. The following are some of the better known methods of divination practised from the earliest times. The devil sometimes takes possession of the body of a human being and manifests what is secret through it; this was called pythonism. The devil had his prophets as God had. In necromancy the devil answers through the dead called to life again. At certain places he gave oracles through idols. Sometimes he communicated with men through dreams, In all the foregoing methods we have the express invocation of the devil. He is tacitly invoked when the lines of the hand are consulted as indications of the future, as is done in chiromancy; or the course of the stars, as in astrology; or the flight or song of birds, as in augury; or some chance event is taken as foretelling what is going to happen, as in omens.

Divination is mortally sinful, for it is a great insult to God to hold intercourse with and seek aid from the devil, his bitter enemy; and, besides, it is most dangerous to the parties concerned. He is wont gradually to insinuate himself until he has his victim within his power, and then he works on him his evil will. Such practices as those of divination are specially declared to be hateful to God in Holy Scripture: ‘‘ Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire; or that consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens, neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. For the Lord abhorreth all these things, and for these abominations he will destroy them at thy coming.”¹ Although tacit as well as express divination is grievously sinful of itself, yet it is frequently only venial on account of the ignorance and simplicity of those who indulge in it, or because they do not entirely believe that the future can be known by such methods, and they use them in joke or out of curiosity. In this way young people who consult gipsies or palmists are ordinarily excused from grave sin.

¹ Deut. xviii 10-12.

We know from Holy Scripture that almighty God has sometimes made known his will to men by means of dreams, and the devil, too, is able to fill the mind with his suggestions during sleep. If God in some rare instance uses dreams to make known his will, he should of course be lovingly obeyed. The suggestions of the devil, on the contrary, should be repelled and despised. We can distinguish between the two sources by observing whether the impulse received is towards good or evil, whether what is suggested is worthy of God, whether it tends to disturb our peace or leaves us tranquil and disposed to the service of God. Dreams have ordinarily a natural cause, but they are no indication of what the future will bring. We may not, then, guide our conduct by dreams; God has given us our reason and the Church to teach us what we should do; we must follow these and not dreams if we would act aright. Constantly to guide ourselves by dreams would be mortally sinful, to allow them to influence us occasionally and in matters of little moment would not be more than a venial sin.

There is no harm in casting lots to decide a doubtful claim; the parties merely agree to stand by what turns up by chance. It is superstitious and sinful to cast lots in order to discover some secret, or with a view to shaping one’s life according to the issue. Sometimes this method of deciding doubts has been adopted by holy men in consequence of an intimation received from God, or sometimes because no better way out of the difficulty appeared.

The use of the divining-rod under the belief that a stick of a special shape cut from a particular kind of tree or bush will point out hidden treasure, or mines, or springs of water, is superstitious and sinful. For it is certain that there is no natural force which acts in the arbitrary manner in which the divining-rod is said to act under the circumstances. It is not impossible but that particular individuals may be very sensitive to the presence of water or minerals even when hidden under the surface of the earth, and perhaps the frequent finding of springs by dowsers is partially to be explained in this way. Then by practice and experience a power of detecting the presence of underground water from the vegetation or other signs on the surface may be developed. There is also without doubt a great deal of fraud in such matters. Finally, the devil may sometimes intervene.

Modern spiritism is obviously the pythonism, necromancy, and other forms of divination which have been mentioned above. It is gravely sinful, therefore, to act as a medium or to consult one with a view to finding out something which is not known. Crystal-gazing, table-turning, the use of the planchette for occult purposes, is also divination and grievously sinful. It is not impossible that the movements of the table in table-turning and of the planchette are due to the unconscious action of the sitters. On this hypothesis it would not be unlawful to make experiments with a view to finding out the truth; divination comes in when by such means the sitters seek to discover what it is certain none of them knows, consciously or unconsciously.

It is well to bear in mind a remark which St Thomas Aquinas makes after St Augustine, that the devil wishes to excite among men a greater curiosity about occult matters “ so that being implicated in these observances, they may become more curious and get themselves more entangled in the manifold snares of pernicious error,””

The term vain observance is used by theologians to designate various kinds of superstition by which altogether disproportionate means are employed to procure a sure and certain effect. It comprises the use of charms, spells, and cabalistic signs, which are used to preserve persons and things from harm, or cure wounds and diseases, or acquire knowledge without the labour of study. It also signifies the superstitious observance of chance events and days, some of which are considered lucky, others unlucky. Magic is the art of wonderworking by the help of the devil.

Vain observance, or witchcraft and magic, is gravely sinful for precisely similar reasons as divination is. There is only an accidental difference between these kinds of superstition, for while divination uses disproportionate means to discover what is hidden by the help of the devil, witchcraft uses disproportionate means to obtain certain and wonderful effects by his help. Morally, therefore, there is no difference between divination and witchcraft. Like divination, witchcraft may contain an express or tacit compact with the devil, and although if the compact be express there will always be mortal sin, there will frequently be only venial when the compact is tacit. Ignorance or good faith or want of full confidence in the effect will in that case frequently excuse from serious sin. Moreover, there must be advertence to the total inadequacy of the means to obtain the effect desired, and to the danger of the devil’s intervention, otherwise there will not be the sin of superstition. And so people who do not like to undertake any journey on a Friday, or to sit down with thirteen 1 Summa Theol., 2-2, q. 96, a. 3, ad 2. at table, because they have always heard that it is unlucky, and because their fathers had similar scruples, may often be excused from sin.

In a case of doubt whether a particular effect is to be ascribed to natural causes or not, we should rather ascribe it to natural causes than to the devil, for we must not bring in the preternatural without necessity, and we do not yet know all the forces of nature. Thus many believe that telepathy really exists and is due to natural causes. In such a case of doubt, then, we may experiment and investigate the matter; it is advisable to renounce all intention of dealing with the devil as a precautionary measure. If, on the contrary, it is certain that the effect is not attributable to natural causes, it should be ascribed to the devil rather than to God in case of doubt; for God does not work miracles without good reason, and ordinarily the sanctity of the person concerned and other circumstances clearly show divine intervention when it takes place.

Many theologians hold that the phenomena of hypnotism are due to preternatural causes, and consequently they maintain that it is unlawful to induce the hypnotic state or to have any part in it. Others more probably think that the state itself and the susceptibility of the hypnotized subject to suggestion on the part of the hypnotizer, together with those phenomena which affect the bodily organs and the imagination, are due to natural causes. The rarer phenomena of clairvoyance by which scenes and passing events at a great distance are seen, or by which an ignorant medium shows knowledge which is not possessed in the normal state, must be attributed to preternatural causes. For it seems impossible that natural forces should be able to produce effects altogether beyond their range. Even if we admit that the hypnotic state and the bodily phenomena are due to natural causes, it does not follow that anyone may induce the hypnotic sleep merely for the sake of experiment or out of curiosity. Such a practice would be accompanied with grave dangers, moral and physical, and it is not lawful to permit one’s self to be deprived. of the use of reason, and to subject one’s self to another’s control, without good cause and proper safeguards. Medical men, however, and other persons of skill and experience cannot be precluded from using a means which is very probably innocent, with proper precautions and for a good reason,

In this and the two following chapters we will treat of sins against religion by defect. The first of these is tempting God, which a person commits by saying or doing something by way of experiment to discover whether God is wise, powerful, good, or endowed with some other perfection. There is a formal sin of tempting God when there is a positive intention to make an experiment with God; the sin is virtual when that intention is absent, but something is said or done which can have no other meaning than to find out whether God has some perfection or not. Even in this case there must be some reference to God, some desire or wish to implore his help; otherwise there cannot be any tempting of God.

Formal tempting of God is a mortal sin, as is obvious; for it is a grave insult to the divine Majesty, who has graciously given men all the knowledge about himself that they require, and it contains the malice of unbelief as well.

God is virtually tempted when, contrary to the designs of his Providence, we neglect natural means, trusting that he will give us special help. This too is of itself a grave sin, but it often becomes venial on account of want of knowledge, consideration, or advertence. Thus people are guilty of grave sin who refuse to send for the doctor and will not use the ordinary remedies when they or their children are seriously ill, trusting that God will work a miracle. A preacher who neglected to prepare properly for his sermon, or one who exposed himself to some slight danger through improper trust in the divine help, would only sin venially. After doing what we can, or if we can do nothing, then we may at once with full confidence have recourse to God in our necessities. The trials by ordeal, which were in vogue in the Middle Ages, were in the ninth century condemned by the Church as superstitious,

SACRILEGE is defined to be the irreverent treatment of sacred persons, places, and things. The irreverence consists in doing something which is specially repugnant to the sanctity of the object in respect of its sacred character. A person, place, or thing becomes sacred by being dedicated to the service of God by public authority, for it does not seem possible that the dedication of an object to God by private authority should be able to lay an obligation on others to treat it with the reverence due to sacred things. Such an effect requires public authority.

Objects become sacred in consequence of being dedicated to God’s service by an authorized person according to the form prescribed by the Church. Not every form of blessing, however, makes the blessed object sacred. We must distinguish between blessings which invoke the divine favour on the use of certain things, but which do not make them sacred, and blessings which hallow and consecrate the object so that it can no more be lawfully used for profane purposes. Food, or candles, or holy water, which are blessed in the former way, do not thereby become sacred, and may still be used for ordinary purposes; churches, chalices, and baptismal water are consecrated by special blessings and may only be used for the purposes to which they are dedicated (Can. 11471150).

The sanctity which belongs to a consecrated person is different from that which belongs to holy places, and this again is different from that which belongs to sacred things. So that the sins by which sacred persons, places, and things are violated are specifically different from each other. Theologians dispute whether these three species of sacrilege contain other lower species or whether they are themselves the lowest. Many of them hold that they are the lowest, and this seems to be the opinion of St Thomas.

Sacrilege in all its species is a grave sin of itself, inasmuch as irreverence shown to sacred things redounds to the dishonour of God, to whose service they are dedicated.¹

If, however, the matter be trivial, as, for example, some slight irreverence to the Blessed Sacrament, sacrilege will only be a venial sin.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2.

Personal sacrilege is committed in three ways:

(a) By violating the privilege of the canon, by which it is forbidden under pain of excommunication to lay violent hands on the clergy or on religious (Can. 2343).

(b) By violating the privilege of the immunity of the clergy from civil jurisdiction, as far as this is still in force (Can. 120).

(c) When persons consecrated to God by the vow of chastity violate their vows. Such persons are all those who are in sacred orders, and all religious who take public vows even though they be simple and not solemn. All sins, therefore, against purity, whether internal or external, which these persons commit, or which others commit with them, are sacrileges. It is a disputed point among theologians whether a private vow of chastity makes the person sacred, so that sins committed against the vow are sacrilegious. Both opinions are extrinsically probable, though the negative view seems more in accordance with what was said above, in keeping with the common teaching of divines. The question is not of great practical importance, since sins committed against chastity by those who are under a private vow have certainly a twofold malice, one against chastity, and the other against religion; and sins against religion are called sacrileges in a wide sense,

Local sacrilege is also committed in three ways:

(a) By violating the immunity of sacred places as far as this is still in force. (b) By committing certain crimes in a church or public oratory, which has been consecrated or at any rate blessed, by which crimes they are polluted according to canon law. Those crimes are homicide, suicide, any shedding of blood by violence which constitutes a mortal sin, the putting of the church to impious and base uses, and the burial within a church or oratory of an unbaptized person, or of one who has been excommunicated after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence (Can. 1172).

(c) By performing certain actions and by committing certain sins which of their nature or by special disposition of law are especially repugnant to the reverence due to holy places, Sacrilege is thus committed by holding a public market in a church, or a banquet, or using it to stable horses or cattle. There is, to be sure, a special indecency and irreverence in committing any sin in church, but the malice contracted from this circumstance will only be mortal in certain special cases.

On this ground it is probable that only external and consummated sins against chastity contract the grievous malice of sacrilege from being committed in a church; internal or not consummated sins against purity probably do not contract the grave malice of sacrilege if they are committed there.

Real sacrilege is also committed in three ways:

(a) By treating with irreverence sacred things, such as the sacraments, Holy Scripture, relics, sacred images.

It is a sacrilege to administer or to receive the sacraments in a state of mortal sin, to quote the words of Scripture for the purpose of making an obscene joke, to treat sacred images and relics with contempt.

(b) By theft of sacred objects. Sacrilegious theft is committed by stealing a sacred object from a sacred place, or a profane object from a sacred place, or a sacred object from a place that is not sacred, according to an old decree of canon law.¹ In the first of these cases a double sacrilege is committed, local and real, as when a chalice is stolen from the tabernacle; in the last case real sacrilege only is committed, as when a chalice is stolen from a priest’s room. Local sacrilege only is committed in the second case, and, indeed, according to a probable opinion, then only when the object stolen belongs to the sacred place, or has been entrusted specially to the sacred place for safe keeping. If a thief picks a pocket in church, his sin probably has not the malice of a grievous sin of sacrilege, although it may be grievous as against justice.

(c) By committing the sin of simony, the treatment of which is reserved for the next chapter.

¹ c. 21, C. 17, q. 4.

Theft of ecclesiastical property or wilful damage done to it is sacrilege, for although the money or other property belonging to the church is not sacred in itself, still by damaging or stealing it an injury is done to those sacred persons, places, and causes that are supported by church property. The private property belonging to a cleric is not ecclesiastical property, but only that which belongs to a church, Religious Order, or pious institution erected by episcopal authority. Theft, therefore, of the private money of a cleric is not sacrilege.

It is not lawful, except for clerics or others who have care of them, to touch the sacred vessels which are used to hold the Blessed Sacrament. Palls, corporals, and purificators should after use be washed by a cleric preparatory to their being washed in the ordinary manner. A violation, however, of these regulations would not be a grievous sin of itself; indeed, when there was a just cause, it would be no sin at all (Can. 1306).

Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, who, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles, desired to buy with money the power of giving the Holy Spirit. It is defined to be a studious wish to buy or to sell for a temporal advantage something which is spiritual, or which is annexed to what is spiritual. The terms of this definition are technical and require some explanation.

Simony, then, is said to be a studious wish to buy or to sell, in order to emphasize the fact that although no explicit contract is entered into by the parties, there may still be simoniacal dealing between them. Thus, if a person makes a money present to a priest with the intention of obliging him to give him absolution for his sins in return, he commits a sin of simony, though there is no express bargaining between them.

In simony a temporal advantage is exchanged for something which is spiritual. The temporal advantage may be money and whatever is exchanged for money, or a service rendered, or favour, patronage, and defence. The spiritual object which is given for the temporal advantage is whatever has relation to the salvation of the soul. It may, then, be grace or the gifts of the Holy Ghost, or the sacraments and sacramentals, or prayer, or the use of spiritual power for absolving, dispensing, blessing, excommunicating, and so forth.

Something may be annexed to what is spiritual either antecedently or concomitantly or subsequently. The material of which a chalice is made is said to be annexed to a consecrated chalice antecedently, inasmuch as it existed and had its value before the chalice was consecrated. Something is annexed concomitantly and extrinsically to what is spiritual when it is associated with what is spiritual but only accidentally, as the extra labour associated with singing a late Mass. It is concomitantly and intrinsically annexed to what is spiritual when the connection is necessary, as the labour which must of necessity accompany any spiritual function. A temporal advantage is annexed to what is spiritual consequently, when it follows from and is derived from what is spiritual, as the right ? Acts viii 18. to the revenues of the parish is derived from the office of parish priest. There is no simony in buying or selling what is antecedently annexed to something which is spiritual, provided that the price be not increased on account of the connection with, what is spiritual, and provided the Church has not forbidden it. It is lawful to sell consecrated chalices or the fabric of a church for what the materials are worth. The Church has forbidden any money to be received for the holy oils, even so much as the cost of the oil. Similarly it is not simony to receive payment for extra labour spent on some religious function. It is simony to receive money for what is concomitantly and intrinsically annexed to that which is spiritual, for they are regarded as identical. It is also simony to buy or sell that which is consequently annexed to what is spiritual, for the accessory follows the principal.

Although, theory alone considered, in this dissertation the acts of the individual virtues would have had to be set forth, nevertheless, the matter having been considered again, we judge that we must withdraw from that plan - even though already put into execution - and rather discuss the precepts of the Decalogue, the precepts of the Church, and the precepts or duties of states. Now we think thus first because, on the one hand, the cultivation of the moral virtues, insofar as it needs special treatment for the care of souls, is presented by the treatment of the said precepts, at least if the acts to be exercised are explained no less than the sins to be avoided; on the other hand, this method conduces much more to the end chiefly intended, that is, to the formation of good confessors. There is added that several matters seem to have to be set forth in one treatment, which nevertheless pertain to different virtues and therefore, if the other method were admitted, would have to be treated separately. Thus, for example, the duties of parents and children: the former pertain to charity, the others partly to piety, partly to observance; thus the duties of states of life, which are so diverse and manifold that they must be referred to almost all the virtues; and so forth. Add that the method employed by us corresponds especially well to catechetical instruction,¹ and to the method of confessing born from it. Finally it seems not to be passed over that the Decalogue was promulgated by the Lord himself and proposed to the human race as the fundamental law; hence for this reason also one should not so easily withdraw from precisely its exposition. Yet let each abound in his own sense.

With these things premised, we shall speak first of the precepts of the Decalogue, then of the precepts of the Church, and finally of the precepts or duties of states of life.

¹ Also the Catechismus Catholicus, edited in 1930 by Cardinal Gasparri.

I. The precepts of the Decalogue are:

1. "I am the Lord your God... You shall not have strange gods before me."¹

2. "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain."²

3. "Remember that you sanctify the Sabbath day... you shall not do any servile work on it."³

4. "Honor your father and your mother."⁴

5. "You shall not kill."⁵

6. "You shall not commit adultery."⁶

7. "You shall not steal."⁷

8. "You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor."⁸

9. "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife."⁹

10. "You shall not covet your neighbor's house, nor his servant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his."¹⁰

II. The order or connection of the precepts of the Decalogue is this:

1. First are placed the precepts which order man to God; then those which order him to other neighbors.

"As the precepts of human law," thus St. Thomas, "order man to a certain human community, so the precepts of divine law order man to a certain community or republic of men under God. But in order that someone may dwell well in any community, two things are required: the first of these is that he be well disposed toward him who presides over the community; but the other is that man be well disposed toward the other associates and co-participants of the community. Therefore it is necessary that in divine law there first be given certain precepts ordering man to God, and then certain other precepts ordering man to other neighbors living together under God" (I-II, q. 100, a. 5).

2. The precepts which order man to God are distinguished as three, namely of fidelity, reverence, and service, according to the threefold obligation which is owed to the Prince of the community.

"But to a prince," St. Thomas continues thus, "man owes three things: first fidelity, secondly reverence, thirdly service. Fidelity to a lord consists in this, that he not transfer the honor of principality to another; and with respect to this the first precept is taken, when it is said: You shall not have strange gods. But reverence toward a lord requires that nothing injurious be committed against him; and with respect to this the second precept is taken, which is: You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain. But service is owed to a lord in recompense for the benefits which subjects receive from him; and to this pertains the third precept concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of things" (loc. cit.).

3. The precepts which order man to neighbor are distinguished as seven, according to these words of St. Thomas:

"But toward neighbors someone is well disposed both specially and generally: specially, indeed, with respect to those to whom he is a debtor, so that he may render to them what is owed; and with respect to this the precept concerning honoring parents is taken. But generally, with respect to all, so that harm be inflicted on no one either by deed, or by mouth, or by heart. By deed, indeed, harm is inflicted on a neighbor sometimes in his own person, with respect to the consistency of the person; and this is prohibited by the saying: You shall not kill; but sometimes in the person connected with him, with respect to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited when it is said: You shall not commit adultery; but sometimes in the thing possessed, which is ordered to both; and with respect to this it is said: You shall not steal. But harm of the mouth is prohibited when it is said: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. But harm of the heart is prohibited when it is said: You shall not covet" (loc. cit.).

¹ Exod. 20:2-3.

² Exod. 20:7.

³ Exod. 20:8, 10; Lev. 23:3.

⁴ Exod. 20:12.

⁵ Exod. 20:13.

⁶ Exod. 20:14.

⁷ Exod. 20:15.

⁸ Exod. 20:16.

⁹ Exod. 20:17.

¹⁰ Exod. 20:17.

There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

The mere presence, however, of condemned matter in a writing does not cause it to fall under prohibition.

(a) Some works are not forbidden unless the author’s purpose to teach error or attack the truth is known. Hence, books on religion written by non-Catholics which contain errors against the Catholic Faith are not forbidden, unless they deal with religion ex professo (i.e., not incidentally or cursorily, but clearly for the purpose of teaching). It is not necessary, however, that religion be the main theme of the book, Similarly, books that attack religion are forbidden, not when attacks are casual or by the way, but when they are made purposely; and the same is true as regards books that insult the clerical state. The purpose is recognized from the declaration of the author, from the nature of the work, from the systematic treatment, length or frequency of argumentation or attack, etc.

(b) Other works are not forbidden, unless they contain not only agreement with error, but also argument in defense of error. Thus, books in favor of heresy, schism, suicide, duelling, divorce, Freemasonry, etc., are forbidden when they champion wrong causes by disputing in their behalf.

(c) Other works are forbidden, not because they state, but because they approve of error. Such are books that attack or ridicule the foundations of religion or the dogmas of faith, those that disparage worship, those that are subversive of discipline, those that defend proscribed propositions, those that teach and favor superstition, etc.

The Sin of Blasphemy.—So far we have spoken of the sins of unbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come to the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of faith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of ordinary denial of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article of faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will be treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more serious sin is blasphemy, that is, the denial to God of something that is His; or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of this sin we shall speak now.

Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for God. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy, which is contrary to the external profession of faith. External blasphemy is opposed to faith either directly (by denying what is of faith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and hence it is either heretical or non-heretical.

(a) Heretical blasphemy affirms about God something false, or denies about Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when some created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when some divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is heretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin, or that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to deny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true, etc.

(b) Non-heretical blasphemy affirms or denies something about God according to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is opposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be treated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol. II). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: “God is good!”

Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.—(a) Custom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in discovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain common expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to signification the phrase, “Sacred Name of God,” is harmless and might be a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken in French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification, the expression “Ye gods” in English, “Thousand names of God” in French, “Thousand Sacraments” in German, are blasphemous; but according to the sense in which they are used by the people they merely express surprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English language as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions, just as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from obscenity.

(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the presence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter are capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an ambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that no blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed trying to correct his children that he exclaims: “Why did the Lord ever send me such pests?” Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers him: “Who is to blame if they are pests?” Since Titus is habitually religious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former sounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy. Claudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series of calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: “I must be only a step-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever create me?” The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather than of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often addresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that she is the goddess at Whose shrine he worships, his supreme beatitude, etc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by Balbus they are harmless.

The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.—(a) From its very nature (i.e., from the importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures), blasphemy is a mortal sin, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and destroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith itself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15 sqq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished as the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and generally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a public nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society; when printed, it is a libel.

(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But blasphemy is the greatest of the sins against faith, since to inner unbelief it adds external denial and insult.

(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of the smallness of the matter involved, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great when its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say that our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show contempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.

(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of unpremeditation, if at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as murder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a sudden fit of anger. Example: Sempronius has the habit when driving his refractory mules of shouting at them: “You creatures of the devil!” A priest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is blasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules irritate him, making no effort to improve.

Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the duty of confession.

[a] There are three distinct species of blasphemy—non-heretical, which is opposed to the virtue of religion; heretical, which is opposed to religion and faith; diabolical, which is opposed to religion, faith and the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished in confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did not obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint’s picture to the wall, saying: “You have great influence with God!” (non-heretical blasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: “I have lost all faith in Saints” (heretical blasphemy). Sempronia, Whose child has just died, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical blasphemy).

(b) Circumstances may aggravate the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that is directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the Saints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy against other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is greater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy that excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more concealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver than blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require that aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others say this is not necessary (see Vol. II).

According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250), blasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy against the Father, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or weakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy; (b) blasphemy against the Son, which is contumely against God spoken out of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13); (c) blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is contumely against God spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who attributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt, xii. 31).

To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of God that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be reduced to six, there are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (i.e., six kinds of contemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner contempt is a blasphemy.

(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the thought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence, despair and presumption which remove these divine preventives of sin are blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the truth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence, resistance to the known truth and displeasure at the progress of God’s kingdom are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.

(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the nothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former inclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the latter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the resolve not to grieve over sin and obstinate adherence to such a resolve are also sins against the Holy Ghost.

There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to come (Matt., xii. 31)?

(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are unpardonable according to their nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their nature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they also remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus, if one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines not to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance, which is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or ignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.

(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are not unpardonable, if we consider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously a disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which, according to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope and repentance to those who were in despair, for example. Hence, we repeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life.

Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy suddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (i.e., the willing choice of evil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes due to a disorder in the will itself which has a strong inclination towards wrong, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It is clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly, Example: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This argues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong attachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to the fact that the will has lost certain protections against sin, and hence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the Holy Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God’s gifts contained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but follows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3); but, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that one should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been careful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however, that a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or malicious sinner.

Remedies Against Blasphemy.—(a) Those who blaspheme maliciously should be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the absurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and ejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b) Those who blaspheme through habit or out of sudden anger or passion should be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make themselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden outbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be performed each time blasphemy is uttered.

Absolution of Blasphemers.—(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no censure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every confessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy is heretical, excommunication is incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may be granted as explained there.

Homicide.—Life destroyed is either that of an irrational being (i.e., of a plant or beast) or of a rational being. In the latter case we have homicide, which is defined as follows: “an act or omission of a human being that is the efficacious cause (see 1763) of the death of a human being.” A parent who denies his child the food, remedies or climate which it needs and which he can afford commits homicide by omission; a physician who practises abortion commits homicide by act. The following distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its substantial morality (i.e., its lawfulness or unlawfulness):

(a) in reference to the intention, homicide is either voluntary or involuntary, and voluntary homicide is intended either as a punishment or as a defense;

(b) in reference to the slayer, homicide is either the act of a public or of a private person, of a cleric or of a layman;

(c) in reference to the person slain, homicide is either the killing of one who is guilty or of one who is innocent, either the killing of a neighbor or of self (suicide);

(d) in reference to the manner, homicide is either direct or indirect, according as the action from which death results is from its nature (finis operis) productive of death or of some other effect. Thus, it is directly homicidal to practise embryotomy (i.e., the destruction of the vital organs of a fetus) or abortion (i.e., the ejection of a fetus at a stage of development when it is unable to live outside the mother), but it is not directly homicidal to give a pregnant woman remedies necessary for her life, although harmful to the fetus; for the object or purpose of the former is to kill, of the latter to cure.

Other distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its added or accidental malice.

(a) A new species of sin is added to that of injustice when other virtues are offended against. Thus, the virtue of piety is violated when the victim is a person to whom the slayer owed special respect and devotedness, as in parricide, regicide, fratricide, uxoricide; the virtue of religion is offended when murder is committed in a church.

(b) An aggravating circumstance is added by the greater deliberation with which the homicide is planned, or the greater treachery or cruelty with which it is executed (e.g., assassination, death by starvation). Some circumstances, however, may be morally indifferent, such as the fact that the victim is killed by one kind of poison rather than another.

The Killing of Animals (or Vegetation).—(a) In itself, the killing of animals is not sinful; for animals are made for the use of man. Hence, it is lawful to kill, not only harmful animals, such as those that prey on human beings or breed pestilence or destroy property, etc., but also other animals, when their death is necessary for some good purpose, such as the provision of food, clothing or medicine for man.

(b) In its circumstances, the killing of animals may be sinful, and even gravely sinful, as when one kills the animals of one’s neighbor (Exod, xxii. 10, 11), or hunts against the law, or injures society by prodigal destruction of animal or plant life, or kills animals in cruel ways. The skinning of animals alive, in order to secure finer-looking furs to satisfy the vanity of women, is an inhuman barbarism of the worst type that should be reprobated by everybody.

When Homicide Is Lawful.—Killing of human beings is lawful in two cases. (a) It is lawful when the common safety requires that the State inflict death for a crime (capital punishment); for just as it is lawful to amputate a gangrenous member which threatens to destroy the body, so is it lawful to remove from human society by death an individual who menaces the safety of the community. (b) It is lawful when the safety of an individual demands that he kill an unjust aggressor (self-defense); for a man owes his first duty to his own life in such a case, and the aggressor in making a deadly attack voluntarily assumes the risk of being killed. It is more correct, however, to say here that it is lawful to defend one’s life with resultant death to the offender (as will be explained below, in 1826, 1828, 1834).

Arguments for the Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.—(a) Scripture.—In the Old Testament the death sentence was prescribed for certain more serious crimes, such as murder (“whosoever shall shed man’s blood, his blood shall be shed,” Gen., ix. 6); in the New Testament Our Lord recognizes that the power of a judge to sentence to death comes from above (John, xix. 10), and St. Paul declares that princes do not wield the sword without reason, but act as ministers of God when they punish evil-doers (Rom., xiii. 4).

(b) Tradition.—The Church has always taught the lawfulness of capital punishment and rejected contrary errors, as in the case of the Waldensians condemned by Innocent III.

(c) Reason.—The State has both the duty and the right to promote the common good and to defend it against its enemies, whether by war against external foes or by coercive measures against internal disturbers of the peace. Now, the experience of all the centuries and of all countries has shown that, generally speaking, the lives of law-abiding persons and the general peace are not sufficiently protected unless the supreme penalty be appointed for certain crimes.

Though lawful, capital punishment is not always necessary; for it is a means to an end, and it may be omitted, therefore, when the end can be obtained by the use of other and less severe means.

(a) Thus, a general suspension of the capital punishment is lawful in a community whose members are peaceful and not inclined to violence or other crimes subversive of law and order. Whether such ideal conditions exist today may be doubted, and indeed some countries that abolished the death penalty have found that this proved an incentive to crime and they were forced to restore the former laws.

(b) A particular exemption from capital punishment is lawful, when there are good reasons recognized by law for commutation or clemency. This has been the practice of governments throughout history, and is justified when it furthers the common welfare, or at least shows mercy to a deserving individual without harm to society. But a judge has to condemn when the law and the facts call for condemnation, and the authority in whom the pardoning power is vested has to use his power prudently, lest he encourage lawlessness.

It is not morally lawful to put criminals to death unless the following conditions are present:

(a) the crime must be external and of such a character that the public welfare requires the supreme punishment, either on account of the enormity of the act (e.g., murder), or on account of its danger (e.g., sleeping at one’s post in time of war). Further, the crime must be certain and sufficiently established, for, since the punishment should fit the offense and the law presumes innocence until guilt is proved, no one should be sentenced to death except for a serious and certain crime. The Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law;

(b) the sentence of death and its execution should be performed by those who have public authority for these acts and in the manner required by law. For capital punishment is a means of self-defense used by society, and its use pertains there fore to the representatives of society. Moreover, if private individuals exercised this function, accused persons would not receive the consideration of their rights or the opportunity of defense due them, and the public peace would be overthrown by murders of revenge committed in the name of justice.

(c) the penalty should be carried out in a humane and Christian manner, as is manifest. The convicted man should be allowed time and opportunity to make his peace with God and, if possible, to say farewell to relatives. Slow and agonizing forms of killing are of course entirely wrong, no matter how wicked the criminal who is being executed. The American law and other laws do not permit a pregnant woman to be executed until she has delivered her child.

Unlawful Killing of Offenders.—The killing of offenders is, therefore, unlawful in the following cases:

(a) when the offense is not serious or fully deliberate (e.g., involuntary manslaughter), or when it has not been sufficiently established (e.g., if it is not certain that the supposed victim of murder is dead or that he died from a homicidal act). In civilized countries today the law inflicts capital punishment only for the most serious crimes, and the State has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the punishment can be decreed. But in the past death was often the penalty for horse- or sheep-stealing, or even smaller offenses, and in times of excitement men have sometimes been sentenced to death without a fair trial;

(b) when the sentence of death is not pronounced or executed legally. Those who lynch the perpetrators of heinous crimes are often in good faith, especially if the processes of the law are too slow or uncertain, but since they act without authority, their deed is really murder. The same is true of a husband who kills his wife taken in adultery, of the relative of a seduced girl who kills the seducer, of an officer of the law who unnecessarily or without authorization kills a man sentenced to death when the latter is trying to escape. The State has the right, though, to declare a notorious malefactor outlawed, and thus to give to private citizens the right to take him dead or alive, or to kill him on sight; but it is clear that the exercise of this right is a dangerous remedy and one to be used sparingly;

(c) when the mode of killing or the circumstances are repugnant to Christian feeling. Today capital punishment is generally inflicted in a humane manner, but history records many cruel forms of execution, as when men were hanged, drawn and quartered, or burned at the stake, or put to death amid the jeers and curses of the populace.

Is Tyrannicide Lawful?—(a) If the ruler is a tyrant in act (that is, one who has a lawful title to rule but who abuses his authority), it is not lawful to kill him on account of his misdeeds or crimes, since the subject has not the authority to act in the name of the nation (Rom., xiii. 1 sqq.; I Peter, ii. 18). In case of self-defense, however, as when the tyrant unjustly makes a personal attempt on the life of a citizen, the latter has the right to kill. The Council of Constance condemned the doctrine of Wycliff that every subject has the right to assassinate a tyrannical prince, a doctrine that would make the position of every ruler unsafe, since there are always persons who think they are victims of persecution. The nation, however, has the right to depose or even to execute a wicked ruler, for government is given to rulers for the benefit, not for the destruction, of the common good.

(b) If the ruler is a tyrant in title (that is, a usurper), it is not lawful to kill him, when he has already obtained peaceful possession; for here again it cannot be said that the killer would have the authorization of the nation. If, however, the tyrant has not obtained possession but is struggling for it, his status will not be that of ruler but of public enemy, and it will be lawful to kill him as an act of war, provided the conditions of a just war are present (see 1384).

Judges and Executioners in Canon Law.—According to the law of the Church (Canon 984, nn. 6, 7), those who pass the death sentence as judges and the executioners and their immediate and voluntary helpers become irregular (i.e., incapable of lawfully receiving Orders or of exercising their powers). The reasons for this ancient discipline are chiefly two:

(a) clerics are the ministers of Christ, and therefore they should be like their High Priest, whose sacrifice they offer at the altar. Now Christ “when He was reviled, did not revile, when He suffered, He threatened not, but delivered Himself to him that judged Him unjustly” (I Peter, ii. 23). Hence, it is unbecoming that clerics should condemn to death or kill their fellow-men, even criminals;

(b) clerics are the ministers of the New Testament, and therefore they should conform themselves to its spirit of mildness. The divine law itself declares that a bishop should not have private quarrels or inflict blows (I Tim., iii. 3), but the church law goes further and declares that a cleric should not even act as public judge or executioner in capital cases. The Old Testament inflicted corporal punishments and death, and hence we read that its priests and levites put sinners to death with their own hands (Exod., xxxii. 28; Num., xxv. 7, 8; I Kings, xv. 33; III Kings, xviii. 40; I Mach., ii. 24), but the law of Christ contains no sentences of death or of bodily chastisement.

The Right of Self-Defense.—The second case of lawful homicide mentioned above (1819) is the killing of an unjust aggressor, not intended by the slayer, but consequent on his defense of his life against the aggressor. This right of self-defense is granted by natural law itself, and has been denied by but few moralists.

(a) Thus, nature inclines man to prefer his own life to that of another, other things being equal, and therefore it authorizes him to defend his life even at the cost of an aggressor’s life. Even the brute animals are armed by nature to defend themselves against attack.

(b) The natural law also permits one to perform an act from which two effects will follow, one good and the other bad, provided the good effect alone is intended and there is a sufficient reason for permitting the evil effect (see 104). In the present case the killing of the aggressor is an evil, while the protection of the innocent party is a good; but it is only the protection that is intended, and the killing is not an extreme measure in view of the greatness of the good that is at stake.

The right of self-defense is also sanctioned by human laws. (a) Thus, church law recognizes this right in the words of Innocent III: “All laws permit one to repel force by force, but the defense must not be immoderate, nor exercised from desire of revenge.” According to the Code (Canon 985, n. 4) irregularity arises from voluntary homicide, but this does not include the case of lawful self-defense, although a provisional dispensation must be asked for. A cleric has the right of self-defense, as well as a layman. (b) Civil law also has always admitted the right of a person assailed by another to defend himself, even by killing the assailant, if there is no other alternative.

Conditions for the Exercise of This Right.—(a) The assault must be a true aggression (i.e., an act of violence threatening the life of the person assaulted) and unjust (i.e., an attack made without public authority); (b) the resistance must be true self-defense (i.e., an act used to ward off attack or to make the assailant powerless) and moderate (i.e., the person attacked must not use more force than necessary and he must not intend to kill the assailant).

The person who is killed must be a true aggressor, for otherwise the slayer is himself the aggressor and guilty of unjustifiable homicide. Killing is therefore unjust in the following cases:

(a) when the opponent is not using true violence, as when he merely prays and hopes that you may die or be killed;

(b) when he is not using actual violence, as when he is disarmed or helpless, or when he has only threatened to kill you in the future, or to bring you to the gallows by his testimony or vote.

Must one wait, then, until the aggressor has actually attacked, before using self-defense? (a) One need not wait until physical aggression has started (e.g., until the adversary has fired a shot or struck a blow); otherwise self-defense would very often be futile. (b) One should wait until moral aggression has been shown before proceeding to defense; that is, the other party must perform some external act which according to the judgment of a prudent person at the time and place is one with the act of physical aggression, as when an angry man reaches for a gun or knife, or a desperado advances in a threatening manner.

The aggression must also be unjust or contrary to the right of the person attacked. (a) Thus, if the aggression is just, it is not lawful to kill the aggressor. Hence, it is not lawful to kill an officer of the law who is making an arrest, or guarding a prisoner, or leading him to execution. (b) If the aggression is not just, self-defense is lawful. It makes no difference whether the aggression is formally unjust (e.g., when the aggressor attacks you because he wishes to wreak revenge, or because he fears you), or only materially unjust (e.g., when you are a stranger to the aggressor, but he is drunk, or a dope fiend, or a maniac). Similarly, a son may defend himself against his parent, a subject against his superior, a layman against a cleric, an adulterer against the injured husband, a calumniator against the person calumniated; for authority or personal injury suffered does not give these persons the right to inflict by private authority the punishment of death.

Self-defense must be merely a protection of self against future evil and not a punishment of the aggressor for past attacks, for capital punishment belongs to society, not to private persons. Hence, if an aggressor has taken to flight, or has been disarmed, or knocked senseless, or has begged for mercy, it is not permissible to kill him.

Self-defense must be moderate, for injury or the death of a human being is a thing that should be avoided when possible. (a) Thus, the person attacked must not reply with force at all, if this is possible. He should escape, or call a policeman, or throw the weapon out of the window, etc., if these means will suffice. Some authors excuse from flight those who would suffer disgrace if they ran away from danger, such as those who are pugilists or professional fighting men. (b) The person attacked should use only such force as is necessary, if force must be employed. Thus, if the aggressor can be made helpless by the use of gas, permanent bodily harm should not be done him; if he can be subdued with the fists, knife or pistol wounds should not be resorted to; if wounds will suffice to hold him at bay (e.g., by blackjacking), killing should not be resorted to. In the heat of a fight, however, the person assailed sometimes unintentionally goes beyond what moderation requires.

The intention of the person who uses force to repel an unjust aggressor must be good. (a) Thus, as his end he must intend only the preservation of his own life and look upon the death of his neighbor as a misfortune. (b) As the means to this end he must intend only to stop the attack that is being made, not to bring on the death of the aggrcssor. Those who are commissioned by public authority to put a human being to death (e.g., the public executioner or soldiers in time of war) may intend these homicides, since they are means to the common good; but the death of one private person is not a means to the good of another private person, and hence it should not be directly aimed at.

The mind of the person who defends himself against the unjust aggressor must also be free from sinful dispositions, such as hatred and revenge; otherwise he sins against charity. Our Lord reprobated the teaching of the Scribes that it is lawful to return injury for injury in a revengeful spirit, and declared that one should prefer to receive a second blow rather than return a blow for the sake of revenge (Matt., v. 38 sqq.; cfr. also Rom., xii. 19).

When Self-Defense Is Obligatory.—Self-defense is sometimes an obligation. (a) Thus, it is an obligation, if the only factors considered are the life of the guilty aggressor and the life of the innocent person who is assailed; for the life of the innocent should not be sacrificed for the guilty, and charity indicates that the first duty of the person attacked is to himself. (b) It is an obligation, if, on account of circumstances, the person attacked owes it to others to preserve his life—for example, if he is the father of a dependent family, or a public official whose life is very necessary for the welfare of the community, or whose office it is to resist those who menace public security. This is true from the viewpoint of society also, for the world needs the good men it has, while there are too many wicked men already.

Sometimes self-defense is not obligatory. (a) Thus, it is merely optional, when no duty to others commands self-defense and a divine counsel invites one to omit it (see 1169). Hence, if the assailant is certainly in mortal sin, while the person assailed is certainly in the state of grace, it would be very commendable to die rather than kill the assailant, in order to grant him time for repentance. But a case of this kind is rather theoretical than practical, for how could one be sure that the assailant would profit by the opportunity allowed him of doing penance? At any rate, the sacrifice is optional, for the aggressor is either formally unjust, and hence not in extreme spiritual need, or only materially unjust, and it will be uncertain whether he is in spiritual need or whether, if he is in such need, the respite will be used by him (see 1165 sqq.). (b) Self-defense is unlawful according to some, if the life of the assailant is necessary for the common good, and the life of the person assailed is not necessary. But this would be a very rare case.

Defense of Neighbor’s Life.—The principles on defense of one’s own life against an unjust aggressor, even at cost of the latter’s life, may be applied to the life of an innocent third party.

(a) Thus, it is necessary to defend the innocent person, even if the aggressor has to be killed, when one is bound to give this protection by natural duty (e.g., because the innocent person is one’s child or father and the aggressor is not a relative), or by contract (e.g., because one is a hired bodyguard or policeman).

(b) It is lawful to defend the innocent person, even if the aggressor has to be killed, and even though there is no duty of nature or contract to give this protection (Exod., ii, 12). But it is disputed whether it is also necessary to do this. The affirmative opinion calls attention to the extreme bodily need of the innocent party, the negative to the extreme spiritual need of the aggressor. It is not necessary to risk one’s life in order to protect the life of the innocent party, unless the public safety is in peril, or one has undertaken this obligation (see 1169).

A private individual may defend life at the cost of the life of an unjust aggressor, because he is obliged or permitted to protect the life that has more of a claim on him. He may also defend certain other most important goods that belong to him or to his neighbor, even if need be at the cost of the unjust aggressor’s life, because the common good is more valuable than the life of the aggressor, and the defense of those goods is bound up with the common good. Thus, if it were not permissible to defend valuable property even to the extent of killing a burglar, criminals would be encouraged, peaceful citizens would be at a disadvantage, and the public security would greatly suffer. Among the goods now spoken of are goods of fortune and goods of body. It is not always obligatory, however, to exercise the right of extreme self-defense (e.g., in case of violation, provided no consent is given the deed).

Defense of Goods of Fortune Against an Unjust Aggressor.—(a) If the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., the aggressor wishes to take the last loaf from a starving man or the plank from a drowning man), or if it seems to be an attack on life (e.g., the burglar enters a room as if he meant to kill), the killing of the unjust aggressor is not unlawful, as is clear from the previous paragraphs.

(b) If the attack is made on goods of fortune only, but they are of great value and actually possessed, the question is disputed. According to some, killing in this case is unlawful, because life is more valuable than property; but the common opinion is that killing is lawful, both because Scripture excuses the person who kills the nocturnal robber (Exod., xxii. 2), and because the public safety is at stake and therefore justifies extreme measures.

(c) If the attack is made only on goods of fortune, and they are not yet possessed (e.g., a legacy one hopes to obtain) or have only a small value (e.g., one gold piece), killing is unlawful; for there is no proportion between external goods that are only hoped for or that are of minor importance and the life of a human being. Pope Innocent XI condemned the teaching that one may use homicidal defense to protect a coin or the prospect of receiving an office.

Defense of Bodily Purity Against an Unjust Aggressor.—(a) If the attack is equivalent to an attack on life, or seems to be an attack on life, self-defense even by killing is lawful, and hence it may be permissible to kill one who is attempting rape.

(b) If the attack is on bodily purity only, but per actum consummatum luxuriae, the question is controverted. One opinion is that killing may not be resorted to, for the aggressor cannot take away purity of soul, and the purity of body that he violates is less good than life. The opposite opinion holds that killing may be employed in self-defense, since bodily purity has a higher value than even notable goods of fortune, especially as violation is usually accompanied by spiritual damage or disgrace of family, etc.; and the public interest demands that such outrages be sternly suppressed on account of the strong inclination of many persons to commit them.

(c) If the attack is on bodily purity only, and per actum non-consummatum luxuriae (e.g., per osculum vel amplexum), killing is not justified, but other means of defense, such as blows or wounds, may be used.

Defense of Bodily Integrity Against an Unjust Aggressor.—(a) If the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., if the aggressor intends to mutilate or wound, but there is danger that he will kill), defense even with resultant killing is lawful.

(b) If the attack is not equivalent to an attack on life, but is very notable (as when a principal member will be lost or the person horribly disfigured), some authorities claim that defense which would cause the aggressor’s death is unlawful, because death is too heavy a price to pay for wounds. But against this it may be argued that the loss of limbs or organs is more serious than the loss of money, and, in some respects, is more damaging than violation. The civil law gives a person the right to protect himself in body and limbs, even by killing the assailant when absolutely necessary.

(c) If the attack menaces only a minor detriment (e.g., a black eye or bloody nose), certainly killing is unjustified. But the person attacked may hit harder and oftener than the assailant, if he is able, so that the latter may beware of him another time.

As the Symbol is the epitome of things to be believed, so the Decalogue is the epitome of things to be done. For it comprises the ten precepts handed down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai, in which all the duties of man, which the natural law prescribes, are contained more or less openly. The first three immediately regard God; the rest are referred to the neighbor.

Do importunate prayers constitute grave fear? - "Pontius, etc., affirms. But more truly it must be denied, unless the prayers are added to fear of reverence toward a superior; thus Sanchez, etc. And Sanchez well notes that not all assiduous prayers are called importunate, but only those which are most urgent and very often inculcated." L. 1. 2. n. 717.

Is it necessary for the moral goodness of human acts to direct all actions to the glory of God; and do human acts, insofar as they are good or evil, have the notion of merit or demerit before God? - R. To the 1st: The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said; since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary for them to be morally good. "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. "The whole that man is, and what he can and has, must be ordered to God." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. - 1 Cor. 10:31.

Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting for the end of some virtue, or for what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act tends to the glory of God from its intrinsic nature. To the point S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely." And q. 21. a. 4: "He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God which is due to the ultimate end." Cajetan on the same q. 8. a. 3: "one who always seeks what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself to virtually. For virtually to use something is within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports to operate actually."

Much more, moreover, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. Cajetan says this on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: "Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the middle movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does not do evilly, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only an act of such virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually toward God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially." S. Th. 2. D. 10. q. 1, a. 5; E. M.

R. To the 2nd: A human act has the notion of laudable or blameworthy, or of fault, from the fact that it is from the power of free will: "For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. It has the notion of good or evil from the fact that it is suitable or unsuitable to right reason. It has the notion of rectitude from the fact that it has order to the end. It has the notion of honorable or of sin from the fact that it is conformable or deformable to law. Finally it has the notion of merit or demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another, from the fact that it is performed in service of another. Retribution is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the advancement or harm of another. By giving something from those things which are in our dominion, we acquire for ourselves a certain right to receive something from another's. S. Th. De Verit. q. 29. a. 6. Therefore from the fact that a human act is referred to God as to the ultimate end, and consequently promotes his honor and glory, and God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, to whom it belongs to make retribution for those things which are done well or badly in it, human acts have before God the notion of natural merit or demerit. For a human act considered precisely according to its moral goodness, in the present order of divine providence, is not formally meritorious of grace and eternal life; for grace is necessary for supernatural merit, by which it is elevated to a supernatural condition. Materially, however, such an act is capable of becoming meritorious of supernatural reward, presupposing divine ordination and grace being added. For if these are removed, there is had only natural merit toward a merely natural reward, from the fact that good works yield to God's service. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, q. 21. a. 2. 3. 4, q. 114. a. 1. 2; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 3; E. M. 75. 89.

How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? - They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they accidentally affect it. Otherwise they would no longer have the notion of circumstances. - Therefore:

1. Who does not signify the substance of the one acting, but his quality or condition, for example, that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. To this circumstance Lugo, De Poenit. d. 16. n. 200, brings back the habit of sin; for through it is explained how someone is disposed to sin more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a union, office bringing a special obligation, vow, or state; as if a priest fornicates, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty only of blasphemy, just as another blaspheming. Malach. 2:1. 8; C. Trid. sess. 22. C. 1 de R.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 45. a. 4, q. 110. a. 4 ad 5; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. s. 4.

2. What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity, for example in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing belongs to another, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with damage thereby to a poor person, to wards, to girls to be married, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be species-changing. But what, that is, the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species. To this circumstance can be brought back how often, or the multiplication of acts. Nevertheless S. Th. did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are around the same act. But the number of operations does not stand around one and the same operation. For a second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely; nor the third of the second, and so on. From this it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole many times, but he must explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he must express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. Lugo l. c. s. 4. § 7. s. 5. 6. 9.

3. Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that every act of man happens somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example, that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of a sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only those into the species of grave sacrilege which are directly opposed to the sanctity of the place, or to the immunity annexed to it, such as effusions of blood or of human seed, which impede the divine worship to be exhibited there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals, which are contrary to immunity. Lugo l. c. s. 10.

4. By what aids signifies accidental instruments, or means, which the one acting used, for example, if someone used sacred vessels for poisoning, employed the aid of the devil, induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to relate to sin merely materially, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. Lugo l. c. n. 475. 476.

5. Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end, and that of the one acting, as if someone steals in order to get himself drunk. Why can manifestly give another species to an act. Lugo l. c. n. 477 seq.

6. How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example, intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, for example, that you killed by poison, by the sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although ordinarily aggravating or diminishing sin, can sometimes also give species. - Lugo l. c. n. 497 seq.; Laym. l. 3. de Iust. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 4. n. 1; Tambur. Meth. Confess. l. 2. c. 6. n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 3 ad 1, a. 4.

7. When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example, on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time aggravates sin, but does not add the grave species of sacrilege, unless it is done in contempt of the sacred time. Lugo l. c. n. 515 seq.; Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; L. 1. 6. n. 923; S. Th. 4. D. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4. Sol. 2.

Note: He does not satisfy who performs the work of a vow or oath while expressly intending not to satisfy; because it depends upon the will of the promiser that such an obligation remain. But the obligation of obeying law proceeds from the will of the legislator, and therefore is not extended beyond his intention, i.e., beyond the substance of the commanded work. While expressly intending; for even in those things which proceed from one's own will, the one acting would satisfy if he merely negatively did not have the intention of satisfying, for example because, forgetful of the obligation undertaken, provided nevertheless that he does not apply what he does to another thing. For each person, from a general prior intention, intends to satisfy a debt before satisfying those things which he has imposed upon himself by free will. And this holds also concerning sacramental satisfaction, namely if he does the work imposed by the confessor, yet not intending to fulfill the penance. L. 30, 163; l. 3, n. 700.

As regards vows and oaths. - Bishops can dispense: 1. In all simple private vows, except the five reserved to the Pope, namely of perpetual chastity, of Religion, and of pilgrimages to Jerusalem, to the thresholds of the Apostles, and to St. James of Compostella. - 2. In all oaths, if you except oaths accepted by a third party, which were not extorted by fear or fraud. - Hence Bishops cannot dispense in vows, whether perpetual or temporary, of Institutes of simple vows, after the Holy See has commended them at least by Decree of Praise. C. cited Conditae a Christo.

269 bis. Are there also privileges of other Prelates? - The privileges of Protonotaries are many. Four orders of these are had: Apostolic Protonotaries of the Number of Participants, seven, who exclusively constitute the College; supernumerary Apostolic Protonotaries; Apostolic Protonotaries after the likeness of Participants; titular, or honorary, Apostolic Protonotaries outside the City. The privileges of all these are contained in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 21 Feb. 1905, concerning Apostolic Protonotaries, concerning Urban Prelates, concerning dignities, canons, and others who enjoy some privileges proper to Prelates. Cf. Declar. S. R. C., 14 Mar. 1906, n. 4182. There are also privileges of the Common Chaplains of the Pontifical Chapel, S. R. C., 16 Mar. 1907, Acta S. Sed., vol. 40, p. 311; of the Loreto Chaplains, S. R. C., 11 Dec. 1912; of Apostolic Missionaries, Decr. S. O., 21 Apr. 1909.

269 ter. Note: 1. A canon duly enrolled in a Chapter which collegially enjoys privileges or insignia and rights pertaining to Apostolic Protonotaries, either supernumerary or after the likeness of participants, acquires no right by which he is numbered by the Supreme Pontiff among Domestic Prelates with the expedition of a Brief. S. R. C., 24 May 1911. - 2. To perform sacred rites in pontifical rite belongs to Bishops. From privilege this is also conceded to Protonotaries after the likeness of Participants, and to other inferior Prelates, but with more moderate adornment. The Constitution of Benedict XIV, In throno iustitiae, 28 Feb. 1752, establishes the manner of using the Indult of Pontificals. - 3. Since precedence is a sign of honor, it is to be deduced from the grade of dignity and from the power of jurisdiction and dominion. A collegiate church has precedence over pastors and a college of pastors. S. R. E., 23 Mar. 1619, n. 372; 5 Feb. 1639, n. 664; 6 Apr. 1647, n. 908. Collectan. S. R. C., Ind. v. Praecedentia.

As regards oaths, vows, impediments of marriage, ecclesiastical precepts. Cf. 246. Here it must be noted that it is not improbable to St. Alphonsus what very many affirm, namely, that regulars can in a case of necessity dispense with spouses, as Bishops can, in a vow of chastity for contracting marriage, l. 3, n. 258; l. 6, n. 1128. It must also be noted that there is no privilege of reciting the office only mentally. No regular order has ever used such a privilege, nor do the Friars Minor themselves, to whom such a privilege is said to have been granted, acknowledge it. Custom is the best interpreter and proof of laws. Cf. Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 3, d. 18; Melata, de Recit. mentali div. off. Nevertheless there are many other privileges, especially as regards missionaries, as may be seen in the Compendium of the Privileges of the Society of Jesus.

Note: If someone married sins with a married woman, or one having a vow of chastity sins with one also having a vow of chastity, he admits a double sin, by reason of marriage and vow. "For the prior malice is against the fidelity which he owes to his wife.... But the latter is insofar as he is the cause, by his cooperation, that his accomplice violates the laws of marriage." Likewise "one species of malice is contracted from the violation of one's own vow; but another from cooperation in the violation of the vow of someone to whose observance I am not held by vow, as is established." Lugo, l. c., n. 140, 141; L. l. 2, n. 46; l. 3, n. 456.

What is lust? - Lust, which is opposed to chastity, is the inordinate appetite of a venereal thing. Inordinate; venereal things are ordered to the generation of offspring, and they are had licitly only in marriage. Therefore those things are inordinate which are not ordered either to generation or to this in marriage. Lust is grave by its whole genus if it is deliberate and directly willed. Hence it does not admit smallness of matter. For the use of venereal things by its nature has been instituted for the conservation of the human race, which is a great good of men, and an external good of God; consequently he who abuses it gravely offends God, and injures human society. If it is deliberate and directly willed; for if deliberation and willing are concerned only with its cause, then smallness of matter can be given in this matter. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 153; L. 71. Cf. here 37 seqq.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

As to the Lord's Prayer. - All must know under grave sin that God is to be prayed to with hope and confidence, and that all goods both of soul and of body, and graces for fleeing the evils of the soul, must be sought from him. In it God is believed as provident, helper, forgiving, rewarding. Likewise there is an obligation, at least under light sin, of reciting it sometime, according to the common opinion. - Lugo, d. 13, n. 133; Suarez, d. 13, s. 4, n. 12; L. 3.

Is there also given a precept of the external act of faith? As to the external act of faith, there is given a negative precept, prohibiting the denial of the true faith or the profession of a false one. Likewise there is given an affirmative precept, obliging sometimes to confess the faith even with danger to life. Proof of the first part. To deny the true faith, or to profess a false one, is to deny God and Christ. But Christ says: He who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. Matt. 10:33. Proof of the second part. For ordered charity, which we owe to God and neighbor, requires that, when God's honor and the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be withdrawn privatively or contrarily, for professing the faith we should sometimes spurn temporal goods and even life. - Privatively, as if therefore great honor to God and great utility to neighbor would cease. Contrarily, as if otherwise God would be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave evil, e.g., if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, depended on it. Suarez, d. 4, s. 2; L. 10; Laymann, c. 11, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, aa. 1, 2; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1647, 1648, 1653, 1657, 1683, 1827.

By positive law all to be baptized are bound to profession of faith, either by themselves or through sponsors; converted heretics; Bishops before consecration, and before the dispatch of letters of their own provision, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; Sixtus V, C. Romanus; Gregory XIV, C. Onus Apostolicae; all regular Prelates, Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis, id. Nov. 1564; nevertheless this Constitution has not been received in use as to those regular Prelates who are not immediately set over government by the Holy See, but either by chapter or by a higher superior, Thesaurus, de Poenis, c. 1, v. Fides, cf. 550; those about to have ecclesiastical benefices, and those who must assemble in a diocesan synod, Trid. l. c.; likewise those provided with a benefice with care of souls, within two months from possession obtained, before the Bishop himself, or if he is impeded, his vicar general, otherwise they do not make the fruits their own; canons and dignities of a cathedral church, who likewise within two months from begun possession are bound to do this also in chapter; otherwise neither do they make the fruits their own, although they can gain distributions for their choir assistance, S. C. C. 1726; Trid. s. 24, C. 12, de R.; Primates, Archbishops, Bishops in the first provincial synod which they attend, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; those to be chosen for the government and chairs of Universities and public gymnasia; and also those to be promoted to scholastic degrees of doctor, master, etc., Pius IV, C. In Sacrosancta, 13 Nov. 1654, § V. But Doctors and Masters of Universities at the beginning of any year must issue a solemn oath by which they are bound to hand down orthodox doctrine, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R. It belongs to the Rector or Prefect to see that this is observed. - Profession of faith can be emitted immediately after institution or collation of a benefice, and before possession, S. C. C. 11 May 1782; but cf. here below, paragraph Non manet, and it must altogether be made in the form proposed by Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis. But a few things are to be added, so that account may also be taken of the Decrees of the Vatican Council, S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. Made otherwise, it will not profit toward avoiding the canonical penalties laid against those who omit this profession. Conc. Rom. Bened. XIII, tit. 1, c. 1; Bened. XIV, Inst. 60; Ferrar., v. Fidei professio; L. 41; Collectan. cit., n. 1670; E. M. 364.

Those who are announced as doctors in Sacred Scripture are bound to furnish an oath according to the prescribed formula approved by the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 29 June 1910. Likewise an oath, according to the prescribed formula, must be furnished by all those who are listed in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910, a profession of faith having been premised; - and also, by reason of office, synodal examiners and parish-priest consultors and those who are listed in C. Sapienti consilio, Order of Service in the Roman Curia, and others, concerning all of whom cf. below n. 550. This obligation of profession of faith seems grave, unless it has been derogated by legitimate custom. The penalty of restoring the fruits probably needs a declaratory sentence of the delict. Sanchez, l. 2, c. 5; Tamburini, l. 2, c. 1, D. 12, n. 4. The faculty made by the Council of Trent no longer remains, by which those provided with any benefices whatever can emit profession of faith within two months from the day of possession obtained; and consequently in the future profession of faith must be emitted before possession of the benefice. S. C. Cons. 1 Mar. 1911.

In external confession of faith and divine worship, the rite of one's own church, Latin or Oriental, is to be observed. Cf. for the Ruthenian rite constituted in the United States of North America, Apostolic Letter of Pius X, 18 Kal. 1907, and for the same rite constituted in the Canadian region, Decr. S. C. de Pr. I., 18 Aug. 1913. E. M. 365.

Blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. For by it man in heart or mouth, according to intellect or affection, attributes to God things which do not befit him, or denies things which befit him. The vice of blasphemy thus pertains to unbelief. Speech concerning it will occur in the second precept of the Decalogue. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 13.

Resolves: Therefore it is not licit to ask, for example, from a notary something opposed to his office. But it is licit to ask the sacraments from an unworthy minister, or an oath from one who is going to commit perjury, provided a just cause is present, namely for the first case, if there is necessity or notable spiritual utility; for the second, if a judge asks for an oath by reason of office, or it matters greatly to you, as by perjury for manifesting the frauds of another, so that you may obtain your right. A girl sins by accepting gifts from a lover if they proceed from shameful love, for they foster that shameful love; but otherwise, as is clear, if they proceed only from honorable benevolence and friendship, or if they are offered before others and cannot be refused without the scandal of others and her own infamy. In no way is it licit for an innkeeper, in order to allure more guests, ordinarily to admit gravely shameful dances in his house, or to propose to them for reading public papers which are evidently and ordinarily adverse to religion or good morals. In cities in which it is permitted for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is licit to rent a house to a usurer and to a prostitute, especially if other tenants are lacking, or it is easy for them to rent another house, unless nevertheless the prostitute would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the location would give greater occasion to sins. It is not licit to call a non-Catholic minister so that he may furnish his helps of false religion to the sick or dying person. S. O. 15 Mar. 1848.

L. 47, 60, 61, 70, 76, 77, 79; l. 3, nn. 434, 734; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 11; q. 98, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 26.

It is licit to sell indifferent things, or things which can easily have a good use, if the seller knows nothing about the evil intention of the buyer, because evil is not to be presumed. Hence it is licit to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, wine, etc., although very many abuse these things, because these are not ordered per se to sin, indeed often they serve good use. - But it is not licit to sell these same indifferent things when it is certainly known that the buyer will use them badly, unless they could not be denied without grave inconvenience, or also unless they would equally be bought from others; for in this last case, if the seller sinned, this would be only because he does not impede the sin of neighbor. But although he did not sell, he would not thereby impede the sin; for there would be another who would sell. Hence it is not licit to sell honorable ornaments to a girl, if it were established to the seller concerning future abuse, unless he would suffer notable damage, or unless she would equally buy them from others. Thus La-Croix, l. 2, n. 263, and others. But St. Alphonsus, 71, does not admit this last case. Cf. here 442. It is not licit to sell wine without grave and proportionate cause to those who resell it mixed with water. Likewise it is not licit for an innkeeper to sell wine to those who are foreseen to be about to become drunk, or to offer flesh-meat to those who are going to eat it on a forbidden day, unless a grave reason excuses, for instance if otherwise he would be notably harmed from diminution of buyers. Hence it is also commonly licit for an innkeeper to give flesh-meat when it is asked, unless the request is made in contempt of religion, because it would be a most grave inconvenience to inquire about the reasons of each one asking. L. 68, 69, 78. Indeed it is generally licit for an innkeeper, at whose place public coaches stop, to set a table with licit or illicit foods, because since it is established that several are going to ask for flesh-meat, it does not seem necessary to ask from individuals what they wish. A fortiori it is licit to sell flesh-meat on days of abstinence and in the time of Lent, because the seller cannot judge concerning the reasons of those buying, nor does it pertain to him to inquire about them. L. l. 3, n. 1030.

But it is not licit to sell things which by their institution or use are destined for evil, unless in a particular case it is established that the danger of abuse is absent, or unless a grave and proportionate reason excuses. Hence it is not licit to sell poison, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it well, e.g., for the making of colors, medicine, etc. Nor is it licit indiscriminately to sell depraved books, namely to any buyer. Nevertheless sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men who can read books of this sort usefully, e.g., for refuting them, etc. Except, however, books altogether obscene, which must be extirpated from the root. Tambur., in Decal., l. 1, § 4, n. 37; L. 66, 72, 76.

It is licit for workers to build and adorn theaters, if the ornaments are honorable in themselves, although another grave reason is lacking, because it is licit for Princes to permit spectacles. It is lawful, with the legitimate magistrate permitting, to restore and build synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, yet scandal and any contempt of religion being excluded, especially if it would equally be done without them. It is also licit to make statues of idols if these are not to be used for false worship, but for the adornment of streets, buildings, etc. On the contrary, it is not licit to build temples of idols, or to cooperate in their building; likewise it is not licit, so that danger of death or exile may be avoided, to build altars or idols, or to cooperate in their building, when this is had as a deed protestative of false religion. It is licit for Christian captives, from grave fear, to row in the galleys of infidels against Catholics. For they do nothing intrinsically evil, nor proximately pernicious to Christians. Besides, there is a most grave and proportionate cause for doing this. It is not licit to compose or represent gravely shameful comedies, whatever the profit may be. This also holds concerning shameful representations in Cinematographs. "Likewise those sin gravely who paint or publicly expose obscene images, namely with the shameful parts uncovered or covered with a thin veil; otherwise if, other parts being uncovered, the shameful parts are covered." L. 56. Yet except if something of this sort must be painted, e.g., for teaching or learning anatomical or obstetrical science. L. 73; l. 3, nn. 427-429; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1733, 1748, 1845; E. M. 365, 366, 367, 368.

What is the first precept of the Decalogue? - The first precept of the Decalogue is: I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods. Exod. 20:2, 3. - This precept, as affirmative, prescribes first of all acts of the virtue of religion; as negative, it prohibits vices opposed to religion. But religion is the moral virtue which exhibits due worship to God as the first principle of all things. Hence after the theological virtues it obtains the first place, and accordingly the sins opposed to it are most grave and mortal from their genus. Worship imports honor and reverence. Worship generally, besides honor, or the external signification of excellence, imports submission to the person who is worshiped. Therefore honor comprehends worship, yet honor conversely does not involve worship, "because reverence and worship add above honoring a testification of internal submission." Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 14, s. 1, n. 3. Therefore worship owed to God includes service. "But by the same act man serves God and worships him; for worship regards the excellence of God, to whom reverence is owed; but service regards the subjection of man, who from his condition is obliged to exhibit reverence to God. And to these two things pertain all acts which are attributed to religion, because through all of them man professes the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by exhibiting something to him, or also by assuming something divine." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 81, a. 3 ad 2.

Some acts of religion are internal, others external. St. Thomas posits two internal acts: devotion and prayer. He makes the remaining external acts: adoration, sacrifice, offering of first-fruits and gifts, offering of tithes, vow, oath, adjuration, praise; to these below he joins the sanctification of feasts and the use of the sacraments, insofar as through this we profess God to be the author of grace, by which he affects our mind and soul so that he may subject them more and more to himself. Besides, absolutely all sacred observances and ceremonies ordained by the Church to the worship of God can be added, such as the erection of churches and altars, the use of things blessed by the Church, etc., which from the motive of religion are determined and prescribed by the Church.

But the acts opposed to religion are some such by excess, as superstition with its species, others by defect, as irreligiosity with its species. To superstition pertain idolatry, divination, vain observance; to irreligiosity, temptation of God, perjury, infidelity in promises, blasphemy, sacrilege, simony. In the present treatise we will speak only of those acts of religion and opposed sins which regard this first precept of the Decalogue; concerning the remaining things there will be speech in the two following precepts and in other proper places. For the first three precepts concern acts of religion; and in this first precept of the law the worship of God, the one true God, is commanded, and the worship of false gods is excluded; and besides idolatry, all other superstitions are excluded; consequently also dishonoring God is excluded. Cf. 465. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 81 seqq.; q. 122, aa. 1, 2; 1. 2. q. 100, aa. 4-8; L. init.; Struggl 8, 9; tr. 5, q. 1, nn. 4, 5, 6; Lessius, de Virt. relig., c. 1, dd. 1, 2.

What is devotion, and is it necessary? - Devotion is a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God. Therefore devotion imports a certain special act of the will, namely of handing oneself over to God's service, and a certain special quality of this act, namely the aforesaid promptness. But there is a distinction between the handing over of self which is had through charity, and the handing over of self which is had through devotion. For through charity man hands himself over immediately to God, adhering to him through a certain union of spirit. But through religion man hands himself over immediately to works of divine worship. The object of charity and love is good; but the object of honor or reverence is something excellent. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 81, a. 4 ad 3; q. 82; q. 83, a. 15 c.

But devotion is altogether necessary, for it is impossible to execute those things which pertain to divine worship or service, which properly pertains to religion, without a prompt will of doing them. Whence, since it pertains to the same virtue to will to do something and to have a prompt will for doing it, devotion pertains to religion, and its first act is necessary for all following acts. Therefore devotion is a certain special act of religion by which someone promptly offers and hands himself over to divine worship; and at the same time it is a universal act insofar as it moves toward all acts of the service of God. But devotion can also be taken for habitual addiction to divine worship, in which sense a man is said to be truly devout. Likewise devotion can be taken not for the act, but for the quality of the act, namely for the very promptness and fervor by which devotion is manifested. And in this sense prayer is called devout. The aforesaid promptness consists in a determined and absolute affection which conquers every difficulty, so that the will is not delayed in the execution of divine worship when the occasion offers itself; but fervor is the intensity and vehemence of pious affection in divine worship. Devotion also signifies the whole pious manner of acting, and thus a life is called devout. And peculiar pious exercises are called devout exercises, in which sense there is often speech about this or that devotion, about these or those devout exercises, which are the matter of devotion, namely about which devotion is concerned. The extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is God; the intrinsic cause disposing us to it is meditation on divine goodness and divine benefits and at the same time consideration of our infirmity and need. Spiritual joy, gladness, sweetness, facility follow devotion per se. Whence devotion is also taken for this spiritual sweetness. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 82, aa. 3, 4; Lessius, de virt. relig., c. 2, d. 1.

What is prayer, and how many kinds are there? Prayer is taken here insofar as it signifies a certain deprecation or petition, according as Augustine says that prayer is a certain petition, and Damascene says that prayer is the petition of fitting things from God. Therefore prayer can be defined: a certain, as it were, conversation of our mind with God, in which we make known to him the desire of obtaining some thing. - Prayer is mental or vocal, according as it is carried out by mind alone, or the concepts of the mind are also expressed by the mouth. It is private or public, according as it is done by a private person and in a private name, or by the community, or by a minister of the Church in the name of the Church, in the mode prescribed by her. To this public prayer chiefly pertain the Mass and the canonical hours, concerning which we will speak specifically where there will be speech about the sacraments and about particular precepts. "Common prayer is that which is offered to God through the ministers of the Church in the person of the whole faithful people; and therefore it is necessary that such prayer become known to the whole people for whom it is uttered, which could not happen unless it were vocal. And therefore it has reasonably been instituted that ministers of the Church also pronounce prayers of this sort in a loud voice, so that they can come to the knowledge of all. But singular prayer is that which is offered by a singular person, of anyone praying either for himself or for others; and concerning the necessity of prayer of this sort, it is not necessary that it be vocal." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 83, a. 12.

Concerning public prayers, two things generally are to be attended to from Benedict XIV: 1. that these prayers and their formulas are not to be indicated and designated by private persons, but by Ecclesiastical authority, C. Quemadmodum, 23 Mar. 1743. 2. that in sacred rites no others are to be used except those which have been received by the Church, C. Inter omnigenas, 2 Feb. 1774, § 8. - Struggl 21; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 83; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 4, l. 1, c. 3 seqq.; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 1; E. M. Therefore public prayers have their chief value from the dignity and sanctity of the Church, which principally prays, but not from the sanctity and dignity of the persons through whom the Church prays. Lugo, de Euch., d. 19, nn. 124, 125. And in this prayer a threefold fruit can be distinguished: general, which by the intention of the Church is applied to all the faithful; particular, which is applied to the one praying himself; and special or middle, which is applied to him for whom the one praying specially intends to pray. Private and public prayer can be taken in another way, according as it is not exhibited before others, or only before a few; or, on the contrary, as it is exhibited openly and manifestly before fairly many others. And in both senses worship generally can also be taken as private and public.

Is there a precept of prayer? - R. Affirmative. It is proved: 1. because very frequently in Sacred Scripture, both by Christ and by the Apostles, prayer is commanded as necessary for salvation. 2. Because, on God's part, God ordinarily is accustomed to bestow his graces upon us, if you except a few, for example, the beginning of faith, only under this condition, that we ask for them by prayer; therefore it is read: You have not, because you ask not.

Jas. 4:2. And Augustine on Ps. 39: "God wishes to give, but he does not give except to one asking." Ordinarily, since again and again God from his infinite mercy also confers his graces upon those who do not ask. And in this sense more probably and commonly they teach that prayer is necessary for adults also by necessity of means for salvation. For that can truly be said to be of necessity of means without which, considering the ordinary divine order of providence, salvation ordinarily cannot be obtained. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11. But on man's part, his need is supreme, so that each one by full right ought to cry out with the Prophet: Deliver me, because I am needy and poor. Ps. 108:21, 22. Therefore the Angelic Doctor says: "Every man is bound to prayer for procuring spiritual goods, which are not given except divinely; whence they cannot be procured in another way, unless they are asked from him." In 4, D. 15, q. 4, a. 1^†; 3 p., q. 39, a. 5; L. init.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 2; Struggl 22-24; E. M.

When does the aforesaid precept bind? - The precept of prayer binds frequently. It is proved. For it is the precept of Christ and of the Apostles that we always, at every time, without intermission pray; these words do not prove that one must pray at each physical moment, which would be impossible, but that one must pray frequently, at a suitable time. Luke 18:1; 1 Thess. 5:17. Moreover this precept obliges per se: 1. when a man obtains the use of reason; for then he is bound to turn himself to God, and to acknowledge him as the fountain of all goods and to subject himself to the supreme Lord of all things, for which prayer serves wondrously. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 89, a. 9. 2. at the time of death; for then final perseverance is especially necessary, and prayer is necessary for obtaining it. "Since it is established," Augustine says, "that God has prepared some things to be given even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith; others not except to those praying, as perseverance unto the end; surely he who thinks that he has this from himself does not pray that he may have it." Lib. de Don. Persev., c. 16, n. 39. 3. "At certain intervals of hours and times," as the same Augustine says, Ep. 130. Moreover some teach that one must pray under grave obligation at least once a year; others every six months; others nearly every month; others absolutely every month, in nearly the same manner as the precept of faith, hope, and charity is to be observed. But it obliges per accidens: 1. whenever some precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without prayer; for he who is bound to the end is also bound to the means. 2. When a grave temptation presses which cannot be repelled in another way. 3. Generally, whenever some special divine assistance seems necessary to us, as in some grave calamity, whether private or public.

For laymen and for simple clerics no precept is given for performing certain prayers. But for clerics constituted in sacred orders, for beneficiaries, and for religious destined for choir, there is present the precept of the Church of reciting the canonical hours. He who omits morning or evening prayers, per se, does not sin, if he omits them only sometimes. The reason is that there is no law which commands determined prayers on single days and at fixed hours. Yet the doctors warn that some fault of negligence and sloth is rarely absent. Moreover, in practice those cannot be excused altogether from some fault who omit them rather often, both because perhaps they scarcely pray at another time or in another way, and thus at some point they will fail in the precept of prayer, and because on account of the dangers which occur daily, prayer being neglected, they will fall into many sins. Roman Catechism, p. 4, c. 1; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 2; L. init.; Lessius, de Virt. rel., c. 2, d. 2, 3; E. M.

What are the conditions of prayer? - In order that prayer be made legitimately, it ought to be made with attention, humility, confidence, and perseverance. The first part is proved. Prayer is an act of the worship of God, and exterior worship cannot exist without interior worship. Therefore attention at least concomitant with the first intention is required on the part of the very nature of prayer. But he who is voluntarily distracted in mind, in the act by which he prays, incurs that rebuke of God: This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. Matt. 15:8. How indeed does he demand to be heard who does not hear himself? But per se he sins venially who without a just reason is voluntarily distracted; and this holds even if prayer is made without obligation, because he inflicts some irreverence upon God. The second part is proved. Humility is necessary on the part of the very petitioner, because he recognizes his need. It is written: He has regarded the prayer of the humble, and has not despised their petition... The prayer of him who humbles himself will pierce the clouds. Ps. 101:18; Ecclus. 35:21. The third part is proved. Faith is necessary on the part of God, whom we pray; namely, that we believe that we can obtain from him what we ask, by reason of the divine omnipotence and mercy, from which prayer obtains what it asks. All things whatsoever you ask when praying, believe that you shall receive them. Mark 11:24; Jas. 1:6. The fourth part is proved. Perseverance is required on the part of the effect of obtaining; for as need is shown more by it, so one is moved more to mercy. Yet prayer has the efficacy of obtaining from the grace of God, whom we pray, who also induces us to pray. But it ought to be persevering, as to the desire of praying, continuously; and as to prayer itself, by not interrupting it at appointed times. "Some things are not denied, but are delayed so that they may be given at a fitting time. Yet this can be impeded if they do not persevere in asking." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15. Be instant in prayer, watching in it. Col. 4:2; Luke 11:8.

Does one pray who pronounces the words correctly and outwardly devoutly, if he voluntarily wanders in mind? Certainly; otherwise neither would he pray who wanders unwillingly, concerning which no one doubts; then, because prayer is petition, and only words and intention are necessary for petition. Therefore attention in the first intention suffices. As to outward devotion, external attention is had if one attends to pronouncing the words correctly, and is not occupied with a thing which cannot coexist with prayer, as if someone were listening to the conversation of others; not likewise if he clothes himself. Attention to God or to the sense of the words is internal attention. In vocal prayer the words are to be pronounced duly and correctly, not by syncopating or mutilating them, nor by corrupting their meaning, and they are to be pronounced so that, unless something obstructs, noise, deafness, one can hear himself. One can use a companion, and then it is necessary to hear him, namely, so that he communicates to him and makes his own what he hears from the companion, and thus the whole will be his, because hearing is in place of pronouncing. In order that prayer be profitable, the state of grace is not absolutely necessary. Therefore prayer also profits a sinner asking for things necessary to salvation. Struggl 27 seqq.; Elbel 419; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, aa. 13-16; Quodl. 3, aa. 8, 9; L. 1. 4, n. 176; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 4, l. 3, c. 4; E. M.

Whom besides God can we pray? - The Blessed Virgin Mary, as our mediatrix; the Angels, as guardians of men; all the Saints and friends of God, as our intercessors before God. Baptized infants, who died before the use of reason, can also be invoked privately, since they are saints and reign with Christ; and according to many the same is more probably to be said of the Souls detained in Purgatory. And indeed they are friends of God. Nor is it repugnant that those who need our prayers can usefully pray for us, just as the living usefully pray for one another, although they too need prayer to be made for them. More probably; for others deny it, chiefly because our necessities and prayers are hidden from them. But invocation of the Saints is of counsel, not of precept, since Trent, sess. 25, says only that it is good and useful to invoke them. Yet they commonly say that he is not to be excused from venial sin who would never invoke the Blessed Virgin, mediatrix of graces for us before God. Trent, sess. 25, de Invocatione, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, aa. 4, 11; Gur., Comp. 262, Cas. 247; Struggl 31; Del Vecchio, v. 1, n. 663; E. M.

For whom can we pray? - We must pray neither for the Saints nor for the damned. For the former possess beatitude in heaven which will never be lacking; but the latter have already been immutably handed over to eternal punishments in hell. But it is honorable to pray for the just who are detained in the fire of purgatory. It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins. 2 Mach. 12:46. Likewise it is permitted and we ought to pray for ourselves and, if the discussion is about private prayer, for all who dwell on earth, whether faithful, whether just or sinners, whether excommunicated or not, whether friends or enemies; namely, we must pray for all those whom we are commanded to love according to that saying of Christ: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Matt. 22:39. Hence the Apostle says: I urge first of all that supplications, prayers, petitions, thanksgivings be made for all men... for this is good and acceptable before God our Savior, who wills all men to be saved. 1 Tim. 2:1 seqq. If the matter is of private prayer, etc.; for as to public prayer, see the exception in the treatise on Censures, n. 1111.

But this duty of praying for all is satisfied if someone, although he makes no special mention of others, nevertheless excludes no one in those prayers which are not poured forth for himself alone, such as the Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation. For one must pray for all others to the extent that charity requires this, namely, in common. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 37, aa. 7, 8; Struggl 32; E. M.

What ought and can we ask when praying; what are the fruits of prayer, and are they certain? - R. To the first. First we ought to ask for spiritual goods, and these absolutely, because it is certain that we cannot abuse them: Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice. Matt. 6:33. But we can also ask for temporal goods, and for evils of temporal punishment, such as humiliation, poverty, etc., but conditionally; for they can sometimes help us toward salvation. Struggl 25; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, aa. 5, 6, 9.

R. To the second and third. Prayer, insofar as it is a free, good, supernatural work, is meritorious, and profits the one praying, and him alone, by condignity, namely if he is in the state of grace. Insofar as it is a laborious work, at least not lacking inconvenience, it is satisfactory, and can profit the one praying and others living by way of payment, and therefore more probably infallibly, by force of the communion of Saints; and the dead by way of suffrage, if and insofar as it has pleased divine Mercy. Prayer which is made for the dead, more truly from S. Thomas, Suppl., q. 71, a. 12, "as to the remission of punishment, avails him for whom it is made," although the measure of assistance furnished through our suffrages is unknown to us; but it depends on divine acceptance. For prayer profits them insofar as God, merciful and kind, accepts the satisfaction offered by us through it for the dead. But precisely insofar as prayer is prayer, it is impetratory, and profits oneself and other living persons and the dead. For prayer in obtaining does not rest upon the merit of the one praying, but upon divine mercy, which extends even to the evil, either on account of the salvation of him who prays, or also on account of the salvation of others and the glory of God. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 178, a. 2 ad 1. One undoubtedly receives what he duly asks. "And therefore four conditions are set down, with which concurring someone always obtains what he asks: namely, that he ask for himself, things necessary to salvation, piously and perseveringly," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15. "Pray for one another, that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man avails much." Jas. 5:16 seqq. The prayers of many are more easily heard. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 7 ad 3.

That he ask for himself; "because man cannot merit eternal life for another by condignity, therefore consequently neither can someone sometimes merit by condignity for another the things which pertain to eternal life. And on account of this he who prays for another is not always heard." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15 ad 2. "For it happens sometimes that prayer made for another does not obtain, even if it is made piously and perseveringly, and concerning things pertaining to salvation, on account of an impediment which is on the part of him for whom prayer is made." S. Th. l. c., a. 7 ad 2.

Things necessary to salvation; for the merit of prayer is principally ordered to beatitude. Therefore, if that which is asked is not necessary to salvation, nor manifestly contrary to salvation, then although the one praying can by praying merit eternal life, nevertheless he does not merit to obtain that which he asks. For what is more useful to the sick man, the physician knows better than the sick man. But if that which is asked is useful to salvation, he merits it not only by praying, but also by doing other good works; and therefore he undoubtedly receives what he asks, but at a fitting time, when he ought to receive it. S. Th. l. c., a. 15 ad 2.

Piously, that is, from the habit of virtue and grace, from charity, from religion, with humility, with faith. "Prayer, besides the effect of spiritual consolation which it presently has, has a twofold power with respect to a future effect, namely the power of meriting and the power of obtaining. But prayer, as also any other act of virtue, has efficacy for meriting insofar as it proceeds from the root of charity, whose proper object is the eternal good, the fruition of which we merit. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through religion as mediator, of which prayer is an act, with certain other virtues also accompanying, which are required for the goodness of prayer, namely humility and faith. For it pertains to religion to offer prayer itself to God; but it pertains to charity to desire the thing whose completion prayer asks. Faith, however, is necessary on the part of God, whom we pray, namely that we believe that we can obtain from him what we ask. Humility, however, is necessary on the part of the petitioner himself, because he recognizes his need. Devotion also is necessary, but this pertains to religion, of which it is the first act necessary for all consequent acts. But it has the efficacy of obtaining from the grace of God, whom we pray, who also induces us to pray. Whence Augustine says: He would not exhort us to ask, unless he wished to give. And Chrysostom says: He never denies benefits to the one praying, who by his goodness stirs them so that they do not fail to pray." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15.

Perseveringly: for since the force of prayer in impetration is from divine grace and mercy, it would be irrational always to be heard immediately, namely so that that grace and mercy may appear well. Nor indeed is it expedient for our salvation that we always be heard immediately, and therefore one must pray perseveringly, lest we impede grace if we do not persevere in prayer.

But God hears not only the prayer of the just man, but also that of the sinner "proceeding from a good desire of nature, not as though from justice, because the sinner does not merit this, but from pure mercy, the four conditions premised nevertheless being observed, namely that he ask for himself, things necessary to salvation, piously and perseveringly." S. Th. l. c., a. 16. The prayer of a sinner, although it does not proceed from sanctifying grace, nevertheless is made from actual grace, and is pious insofar as it asks something pertaining to piety. S. Th. l. c., a. 15 ad 1, a. 16 ad 2. Indeed prayer made with due conditions, that is, if it asks fitting things from God, with faith, with humility, with perseverance, is infallible by reason of Christ's promise, which pertains not only to the just, but also to sinners, and whether one prays for himself or for others, as is clear from the text of Jas. 5:16 seqq. "It is certain that prayer has a peculiar promise of God, by reason of which this obtaining is in its own way certain and infallible... Further, it is certain that this promise is not altogether absolute, but under certain conditions; these being posited, obtaining will be infallible, but not without them... It is certain that the state of grace is not simply necessary for obtaining... There is no reason why we should deny that the prayer of a sinner, which is apt to be heard, has an infallible promise... Everyone who asks receives... Everyone who asks, whether just or sinner... Whatever you shall ask in my name, this I will do... On account of this, the opinion which asserts that the promise is universal, whether one prays for himself or for others, seems sufficiently pious and probable... This infallible obtaining is not from justice, but principally from mercy, and also from simple fidelity." Suarez, de Relig., tom. 2, lib. 1, c. 23, nn. 2, 3; c. 25, nn. 2, 3; c. 27, nn. 1, 2, 4. Roman Catechism, de Poenit., p. 2, nn. 74, 76, p. 4, c. 2; S. Th., Quodl. 8, aa. 8, 9; C. G. l. 3, c. 158; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 26, s. 1; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 48, s. 3; Bellarmine, de Indulg., c. 13; E. M. 452.

How are the external acts of religion divided? - These acts are distributed into three classes. To the first pertain those acts through which someone exhibits his body for venerating God; such is adoration. To the second pertain those acts by which something from external things is offered to God. Concerning these a twofold consideration occurs. The first indeed is concerning those things which are given to God by the faithful, where one must consider sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes, and the sanctification of feasts, which is treated in the third precept of the Decalogue. The other is concerning vows, by which certain things are promised to God, and this must be remitted to the second precept of the Decalogue. Finally, to the third class pertain those acts by which something divine is assumed by men, which is either some sacrament, or the divine name itself. But there will be place to speak concerning the assumption of a sacrament in the treatise on the Sacraments. The assumption of the divine name, however, is made in three ways: in one way by way of an oath for confirming one's own words; in another way by way of adjuration for inducing others; in a third way by way of invocation for praying or praising. Concerning prayer it has already been said; concerning the others it will have to be said in the second precept of the Decalogue. Therefore here there will be discussion only of adoration, sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes. S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 84, 85, 86, 89; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 1.

What is adoration and of how many kinds is it? - Adoration is honor exhibited to another by an external gesture of the body, by which we testify our submission and the excellence of another; or insofar as it is a sign of internal estimation, reverence, and submission toward another, and consequently also of his excellence. Therefore adoration requires two internal acts: one of the intellect, the other of the will. The former is a speculative judgment concerning the excellence of another, and a practical judgment that it is honorable for us to be submitted to him on account of his excellence and our inferiority with respect to him. But the latter is the command of the will to lower oneself on account of that superior excellence in another. Whence at last the execution itself exists in the exterior gesture of the body.

Adoration is one thing political, another religious, according as it exhibits worship to another on account of a merely civil dignity or excellence, or on account of a supernatural excellence which is found in God and in his Saints. The latter comprehends under itself three species or quasi-species. The first is latria, which, with the genus taken for the species, is also simply accustomed to be called adoration; it is supreme and singular, which we owe to God alone, on account of the divine excellence proper to him, and which therefore is communicable to no other, according to Matt. 4:10. The second is dulia, which belongs to the Angels and other Saints, on account of the supernatural and created excellence which is in them. The third is hyperdulia, which is exhibited to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her supernatural and created excellence, but one altogether singular and greater and more eminent than all other created excellences. Species or quasi-species, because there is not sufficient agreement whether they are one species from one relation to God or threefold from a threefold diverse proper excellence.

Moreover any species of adoration is divided into absolute and respective. It is absolute when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence intrinsic to itself; and thus God, the Most Holy Trinity, Christ also as man, and the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist are adored with absolute worship of latria; but the Saints with absolute worship of dulia, and the Most Holy Virgin with absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is respective when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence and sanctity extrinsic to itself, but intrinsic to him to whom it is referred in moral estimation; and thus the Most Holy Name of Jesus Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and the Cross are adored with respective worship of latria; relics and images of the Saints, etc., with respective worship of dulia; images of the Most Holy Virgin, etc., with respective worship of hyperdulia. The title "The Penitent Heart of Jesus" is altogether condemned. Holy Office, 15 July 1892. The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, representing the Heart alone, is permitted only for private devotion, but is by no means to be exposed on an altar for public veneration. Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891. Because there is one excellence of the Three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is owed to them, and consequently one adoration. Trent, sess. 25, Decree on Invocation, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2 ad 3; q. 84; q. 103, aa. 3, 4; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 2, l. 1, c. 2; Struggl 11 seqq.

A determinate place is not required for adoration as though by necessity of the thing itself, but only according to fittingness, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed by place, but on account of the adorers themselves: first indeed on account of the consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be heard more; secondly on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity which are contained there; thirdly on account of the gathering of many adorers, from which prayer becomes more fit to be heard. The obligation of adoration is abundantly satisfied by otherwise fulfilling obligations toward God, in which adoration of God is contained implicitly and often also explicitly, as, for example, when prayers are poured forth to God, when one assists at the sacrifice of Mass, etc. E. M.

Can men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity be adored? - They can be honored with private worship. But they cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been numbered by the Supreme Pontiff in the Catalogue of Saints or Blessed. Public worship, however, is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church, or as instituted by her; private worship is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not licit to erect churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified, cf. 463; nor is it licit to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their relics or images for public veneration, or to carry them around in processions. Yet it is permitted to keep these images or relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private, which is not prohibited. Struggl 18; E. M.

Those are called Saints who solemnly, a definitive sentence having been issued, are enrolled by the Roman Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints, and their worship is permitted to all the faithful. Those are called Blessed who, from a special concession of the Roman Pontiff, can be honored with some public worship only in some place or in some Religious Institute. Those are Venerable concerning whom the cause of introduction of their beatification has been signed by the Roman Pontiff. Servants of God are those who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom. But "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X... forbade Servants of God, whose causes are henceforth introduced, to be called Venerable; likewise he decreed that solemnities are not permitted to be carried out on the occasion of the decree issued concerning the introduction of the cause... nor panegyric orations. But he permitted that Servants of God be adorned with the title Venerable only after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or concerning martyrdom, yet in such a way that from this permission no argument of granted veneration can be inferred or claimed... Solemnities for giving thanks to God even after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or martyrdom he likewise prohibited; yet by this prohibition he did not intend to prevent the addition in Masses, as is fitting, of a collect for thanksgiving." S. R. C., 26 Aug. 1913. This Decree also contains several other prescriptions to be observed in the beginning of causes of Servants of God, namely so that the cause may be duly instituted. There are special Instructions concerning the processes of causes of Martyrs in regions of unbelievers. Cf. Consulente Ecclesiastico, 1905, p. 313 seqq. Likewise there is a Decree to be observed concerning judicial order in causes of Servants of God proceeding by way of an excepted case. S. R. C., 11 Nov. 1912. "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, for treating causes of lesser moment of Servants of God, namely concerning reputation for sanctity in general, concerning non-cult, concerning the validity and relevance of processes, and other similar things, constituted a particular Congregation." Decree S. R. C., 9 Dec. 1908.

You will resolve: It is by no means illicit to place an effigy or statue of some deceased person not canonized, whether in an oratory even public, or in a church, provided this is not done for honoring him with public worship, but from another manifest motive, for example, if he is the founder or benefactor of the church, or his statue is placed at his tomb in the church. Thus also images of emperors, kings, and other distinguished men could be hung; and the Basilica dedicated to Saint Peter at Rome is adorned with images or statues of Pontiffs not enrolled in the Catalogue of Saints. S. R. C., 14 Aug. 1894, Decr.

A priest can indeed accept a stipend and celebrate Mass in honor of a man deceased with a reputation for sanctity, or in thanksgiving for a benefit obtained, etc., provided that he takes the Mass from the feast or from the feria occurring on that day, but not from the common of non-Pontiffs, nor recites a special prayer concerning him or with his name. The reason is that to perform the sacred rite for the aforesaid intention is not to honor someone with public worship, since the intention of the celebrant is something altogether private. Elbel 443; E. M.

Note: For the public worship of relics, it must be certainly established that the relics to be venerated pertain to a Saint or Blessed one solemnly recognized as such by the Church. In addition, the seal of some Bishop or Prelate ought to be affixed; but the seal of the Bishop of the place suffices for relics to be honored with public worship, nor is an authentic written document necessary. In order that new relics, although authentic, be exposed for the public veneration of the faithful in a church or in a public oratory, it is required that they be recognized and approved by the Bishop of the place, even if they were sealed at Rome by the Apostolic Prefect. Trent, sess. 25, de Invocat., etc.; Sixtus V, Const. Dominus omnipotens, 13 Nov. 1588. For ancient relics, their immemorial exposition and public veneration suffice; this rightly supplies any other document and bears before itself a valid presumption of authenticity. For private worship only private moral certitude is required, such as, for example, is had from a man worthy of faith.

A relic of the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ for public veneration is to be separated from other Relics of Saints in a special case. S. C. Indulg., 22 Feb. 1847; S. R. C., 25 May 1906; A. A. S., v. 1, p. 507. One sins gravely by stealing notable relics, or even the smallest part of a very precious relic, for example of the Most Holy Cross, because, although they are not estimable by price, nevertheless this taking away can gravely sadden the possessor. But in the Roman district it is prohibited under penalty of excommunication to steal relics, even the smallest, pertaining to churches, from the Constitution of Clement VIII and Paul V. Therefore not in every case is the theft mortal sin, and it is a grave real sacrilege.

As to images, halos, or rays, cannot be placed on images of the deceased, although they are commonly held as Saints, unless they have been beatified by the Church; likewise neither tablets and images, nor lamps or any other lights, namely in veneration and worship, may be hung at their sepulchers. But with the license of the Ordinary or Bishop, it is permitted to keep similar relics of a Saint in a place separated from the church and secret, to receive offerings and tablets, and to recount in little books the benefits received, yet not without the recognition and approval of the Bishop, and with a declaration first made by the author that he does not intend to win for his statements any faith other than that of human history, as Urban VIII established in the Decree Sanctissimus, 13 March 1625, and another special Constitution Caelestis Hierusalem, 5 July 1634; S. R. C., 31 July 1821; General Decree, 14 Aug. 1894; Leo XIII, Const. Officiorum ac munerum, General Decree, sec. 13; Pius X, Encyclical Letter Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907, paragraph De sacris Reliquiis.

Images of the Blessed are to be painted with rays only; of the Canonized, with a diadem around the head. Ferraris, v. Veneratio SS., n. 46. Likewise images of Our Lord and the Blessed Virgin, of Angels and Saints, ought to be painted or sculpted in that form and habit which from ancient time has been in use in the Church. Urban VIII, Const. Sacrosancta Tridentina, 15 March 1642; Benedict XIV, Const. Sollicitudini, 1 Oct. 1745.

As to the Blessed, it is not permitted to name churches or altars after them, and their images and relics can be retained and exposed only in those churches in which it is permitted to celebrate their office. Urban VIII, cited Decree Sanctissimus; Clement XI, Const. 82, n. 11. Images of Saints are laudably blessed, and privately any priest can bless them. S. R. C., 12 July 1704. S. R. C., 27 Sept. 1659; 17 Apr. 1660; 12 June 1660, Boianen.; Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; L. 1. 3, nn. 45, 532; Epist. Resp. at the end of c. 1; Benedict XIV, de Canon. SS., l. 2, c. 11; Struggl 18; Scav., ed. 12, Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 168 seqq. There is an Instruction of the S. R. C., 22 May 1912, on the privileges which, in the triduum or octave to be celebrated within the year from beatification or canonization, are usually granted by Rescript of that Sacred Congregation from the Supreme Pontiff. E. M.

463.a What is the nature and obligation of sacrifices? - The offering of sacrifices, considered in common, is from the natural law itself. For it proceeds from natural reason that, just as some things are offered to temporal lords in recognition of dominion, so also we should offer to God, as the supreme lord of all, certain sensible things as a sign of due subjection and honor. But the determination of sacrifices is from human or divine institution. The sacrifice which is offered exteriorly signifies the interior spiritual sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God, because exterior acts of religion are ordered to interior acts. But the soul offers itself to God in sacrifice, as to the principle of its creation and as to the end of its beatitude. Therefore the honor of sacrifices is to be exhibited to God alone. This also we see observed in every republic, that its supreme ruler is honored by some singular sign which, if it were offered to anyone else, would be the crime of lese majesty. Trent, sess. 22, c. 3.

Moreover there is a threefold good of man. The first indeed is the good of the soul, which is offered to God by a certain interior sacrifice through devotion and prayer and other interior acts of this sort, which are ordered to divine reverence. The second is the good of the body, which is offered to God in a certain way through martyrdom and abstinence or continence, or when someone subjects his own body to some affliction on account of divine reverence, and it is offered by exterior sacrifice. The third is the good of exterior things, from which an exterior sacrifice also is offered to God, if it again is ordered to divine reverence: directly indeed, when we immediately offer our things to God; mediately, when we communicate them to neighbors on account of God.

But sacrifices are properly so called when something is done concerning things offered to God, as that animals were killed and burned, that bread is broken and eaten and blessed. And the name itself sounds this: for sacrifice is so called from this, that man makes something sacred.

Hence sacrifice is commonly defined: the offering of a sensible thing, made to God by a legitimate minister, through real change, for acknowledging his supreme dominion and our subjection. Wherefore only priests offer sacrifices which are specially ordered to divine worship not only for themselves, but also for others. But other sacrifices anyone can offer to God for himself. All are bound to offer interior sacrifice to God, for all are bound to offer a mind devoted to God. Likewise all are bound to offer exterior sacrifice to God when exterior acts of other virtues are assumed into divine reverence, which fall under precept. But as to the exterior sacrifice by which something is exteriorly offered to God in protestation of divine subjection, under the New Law the faithful are bound to that one sacrifice which Jesus Christ instituted at the Last Supper, concerning which there will be discussion in the treatise on the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and on the Eucharist. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 85; Lessius, de Virt. Rel., c. 2, d. 4.

463.b What is the nature and obligation of oblations? - By the name of oblation here is understood the presentation of some thing for the worship of God, not so that some sacred thing is as it were consumed, as in sacrifice, but so that it remains whole to be deputed to divine worship, or to be expended for the uses of ministers. In the New Law, oblations of this sort are free, unless they are to be made from the necessity of the Church or from introduced custom. Since the priest is mediator between God and the people, oblations are to be presented to him by the people, not only that he may assume them for his own use, but that he may faithfully dispense them in those things which pertain to divine worship and for the uses of the poor, who, as far as possible, are to be sustained from the goods of the Church, because the Lord too had purses for the use of the poor.

Likewise in the New Law there is no special obligation to offer first fruits from the fruits of the earth received, unless according to the custom of the country and the need of the ministers of the Church. For first fruits are given by way of oblation, of whose nature it is that it be voluntary. But first fruits are offered because we ought to exhibit to God that which is chief, and in recognition of the benefit of God, who grants the earth and the fruits of the earth. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 86.

463.c Is there, and of what sort, an obligation of paying tithes? - The precept of tithes is partly of natural law, partly of positive law. "For natural reason dictates that the people should furnish the necessities of life to those who ministered in divine worship for the salvation of the whole people, just as stipends for livelihood are owed by the people also to those who watch over the common utility, namely Princes and soldiers and others of this sort.... The determination that a tenth part be paid was instituted by the authority of the Church in the time of the New Law.... Thus therefore it is clear that men are bound to the payment of tithes, partly indeed from natural law, but partly also from the institution of the Church, which nevertheless, the circumstances of times and persons being considered, could determine another part to be paid.... Ministers of the Church ought to have a greater care for promoting spiritual goods among the people than for collecting temporal goods; and therefore... they laudably do not demand tithes of the Church where they could not be demanded without scandal, because of desuetude or because of some other cause. Nor, however, are those in a state of damnation who do not pay in those places in which the Church does not ask, unless perhaps, on account of obstinacy of mind, they have the will not to pay even if they were asked. "But the root of the payment of tithes is a debt, by which carnal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 9:11: If we have sown spiritual things among you, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things?... For upon this debt the Church founded the determination of the payment of tithes. But all things whatsoever a man possesses are contained under carnal things, and therefore tithes are to be paid from all things possessed.... And therefore in the New Law men are bound to personal tithes, according to the custom of the country and the need of ministers. But the right of receiving tithes is spiritual, for it follows that debt by which expenses are owed to ministers of the altar from the ministry, and by which temporal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things; this pertains only to clerics having the right of souls. Tithes are owed by the faithful to clerics insofar as they are ministers of the altar sowing spiritual things among the people. Whence such clerics, insofar as they have ecclesiastical possessions, are not bound to pay tithes; but from another cause, namely because they possess by their own right, or by succession from parents, or in any other way of this sort, they are obliged to pay tithes. Clerics are bound to give a tithe to the Supreme Pontiff if he should require it. For natural reason dictates that provision be made from all goods for him who has care for the common state of the multitude, whence he can execute those things which pertain to the common salvation." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 87.

What are the acts opposed to religion? - "Something is opposed to true religion in two ways: in one way by excess, when, namely, that which belongs to religion is exhibited unduly to another; this pertains to superstition. In another way, as it were by defect of reverence, when, namely, God is contemned; this pertains to the vice of irreligiosity.... But superstition impedes religion as to this, that God not be taken up for worshiping.... But through irreligiosity religion is impeded as to this, that God, after he has been taken up, not be honored." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3.

What is superstition? - "Superstition," says S. Thomas, "is a vice opposed to religion according to excess, not because it exhibits more in divine worship than true religion, but because it exhibits divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in the manner in which it ought not." 2. 2, q. 92, a. 1. "But the principal impediment of religion is that man adhere to a false god.... And therefore in the first precept of the law the worship of false gods is excluded.... But all other superstitions proceed from some pact entered into with demons, tacit or express; and therefore all are understood to be prohibited in this which is said: You shall not have strange gods." 2. 2, q. 122, a. 2 ad 1, 2, 3; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1702.

Of how many kinds is superstition? - On the part of the thing which is given worship, the species of superstition are three: idolatry, divination, vain observance. For either a creature is worshiped as God, and this is idolatry; or from it, as from God, knowledge of hidden things is asked, and this is divination; or finally some help is implored, and this is vain observance. All these are mortal by their nature, since they inflict grave irreverence upon God, by attributing to a creature what is owed to God.

By reason of the mode in which worship is exercised, one superstition is that of false worship, if it signifies something false, for example if someone now offers worship to God through ceremonies of the Old Law; if a layman worships God as a public minister of the Church; if someone on the part of the Church exhibits worship to God contrary to the manner constituted by divine authority through the Church and customary in the Church. Another is the superstition of shameful worship, if it contains certain things injurious to God, for example if someone should introduce dishonorable and insulting words in his prayers. Another is the superstition of superfluous worship, if it contributes nothing to the true worship of God, for example the ceremony of hearing Mass before sunrise, with a fixed number, position, order of candles, etc.

This last species, scandal being excluded, ordinarily is judged only venial, because the matter is slight, and it ought rather to be called mere simplicity than positive irreverence. But the other two are regularly mortal, because they are gravely repugnant to divine honor and worship, which rests upon truth and sanctity. Regularly; for it does not seem grave if something slightly false is mixed into true worship from lightness, from lack of consideration. Lugo, de fide, d. 14, s. 3; d. 20, n. 23 seqq.; Struggl 2 seqq.; L. 3, 4; S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 92, 93; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1702, 1707.

What is idolatry, of how many kinds is it, and what kind of sin is it? - Idolatry is defined: an action by which worship owed to God alone is exhibited to a creature. It is threefold: perfect, imperfect, and simulated. The first renders divine honor to a creature, falsely judging it really to be God. The second indeed renders divine honor to a creature, but either from hatred of the true God, or from desire of obtaining something from a demon or another creature, not being ignorant that the same lacks divinity. Finally the third exhibits that honor to a creature, from fear of death alone, without internal affection, as happened to certain Christians in times of persecutions. Each of these kinds of idolatry is a grave sin. It is proved: "Just as in an earthly republic it seems most grave that someone should bestow royal honor upon another than the true king... so among sins which are committed against God, which nevertheless are the greatest, it seems most grave that someone should bestow divine honor upon a creature; because, as far as in him lies, he makes another God in the world." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 94, aa. 3, 1; L. 12, 13.

What is divination? - Divination is defined as the tacit or express invocation of a demon for knowing hidden things. Tacit or express, because it can be done in a twofold way: either by expressly invoking that help of a demon, and it is called express, or by employing certain means, useless and ineffective of themselves, for imploring the aid of a demon, and it is called tacit. Here it must be noted that it is not required that the demon at some time have made a pact that he would concur with the use of some vain means. For by the very fact that someone knowingly uses means lacking all proportion to the end, he invokes in act the aid of the demon, who is accustomed to mingle himself in these things. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, aa. 1, 2; L. 5, 6, 8.

Of how many kinds is divination? - Divination is distinguished into several species, but only materially, by reason of the diverse means. The principal species of divination through express invocation of a demon are: 1. Pythonism, when namely a demon, occupying the body of some man or woman and emitting voices from there, discloses hidden things. 2. Vaticination, when a demon uses the work of pseudo-prophets to signify hidden things. 3. Necromancy, when a demon answers through the dead or through those called back to life. 4. Oracle, when a consulted demon, hiding in images, answers. 5. Prestige, when the demon himself strikes the eyes by apparitions. 6. Oneiromancy, when a demon discloses hidden things through dreams. 7. When he foretells hidden things through certain figures or signs which appear in inanimate things, "and indeed if these appear in some terrestrial body, say in wood or iron or polished stone, it is called geomancy; if in water, hydromancy; if in air, aeromancy; if in fire, pyromancy; if in the entrails of animals immolated on the altars of demons, haruspicy." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 3.

Divination which is made without express invocation of a demon is twofold: one uses the dispositions of certain things; the other uses certain things which are seriously done by men for inquiring into something hidden. To the first pertain: 1. Chiromancy, as it were divination from inspection of the hand. 2. Physiognomy from the lineaments of the face. 3. Haruspicy from the entrails of animals. 4. Augury from the chattering of birds. 5. Auspice from their flight, position, feeding. 6. Astrology from the stars. 7. Geomancy, hydromancy, pyromancy, aeromancy from signs in earth, in water, in fire, in air. 8. Omen from words said without intention. But to the other pertains sortilege, as it were divination from lots, for example by considering what occurs to one opening a book, what one receives from slips secretly deposited, who throws more points of dice, what figure arises from melted lead thrown into water. "Thus therefore it is clear that there is a threefold genus of divination, of which the first is through manifest invocation of demons... the second is through the mere consideration of the disposition or motion of another thing... the third is when we do something so that something hidden may be manifested to us... but under each of these many things are contained." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 3; L. 6; Struggl 20, 21.

Note: Natural effects must be carefully distinguished from free effects. For the former can often be conjectured, as, for example, from the song and flight of birds or from the aspect of the stars, weather, rain, or serenity of the sky, etc., is conjectured. For experience establishes that a natural connection exists among these things. But one must speak otherwise concerning the latter. A disposition or state of mind sometimes can in some way be conjectured from color of face, or other external signs, although in practice one should generally abstain from such conjectures, on account of the danger of rash judgment. But free acts, whether past or future, can never be known with certainty.

To divination is to be attributed whatever hidden thing is known in another way than through revelation or through natural means; for no other means is given for investigating hidden things. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, aa. 1, 7; q. 96, a. 2; L. 9, 10.

What kind of sin is divination? - Divination from its genus is mortal, both because it attributes divine honor to a creature, by wishing to know from it things known to God alone, and because society with a demon is a great contempt of God, a betrayal and apostasy from God, since the demon is his perpetual enemy. Hence the Apostle warns: I do not want you to become associates of demons. 1 Cor. 10:20; Deut. 18:10-12. Yet tacit divination can sometimes be excused from mortal sin on account of simplicity and ignorance, or on account of defect of certain faith. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, aa. 2, 4; L. 7; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 2, c. 8, n. 15; Laym. l. 4, tr. 10, c. 3, n. 4; Struggl 19.

You will resolve: He is not free from grave fault who, using means disproportionate for some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with the demon; for he acts against his own protestation, and implicitly invokes the demon, since neither God nor an Angel mingles himself with such things.

Those sin gravely who ask soothsayers concerning their fortune or their future life, unless they act from simplicity, jest, or for the sake of curiosity, without giving faith to the sayings. Yet if the soothsayer acts seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation. Reuter 43; L. 8, 10; S. Th., Quodl. 3, a. 22.

Is it ever permitted to conjecture future things from dreams? - There are four kinds of dreams: 1. Natural, which have their origin from natural causes, for example, occupations or temperament of body. 2. Casual, which arise from the varied concurrence of phantasmal representations. 3. Those which are from God as author. Judg. 7:13; Dan. 2:19; Matt. 1:20; 2:12, 13, 19. 4. Those which have the demon as author. Deut. 18:10. Moreover, from natural dreams it is not superstitious to conjecture the present health of the body, or its future state, or even the manner and discipline of living, because among these there is a true and natural connection. Yet it would be superstitious to conjecture from them future freely contingent things, since these proceed only from the free and changeable will of man. From casual dreams it is superstitious to derive future things, because by the very fact that they are casual they cannot be accommodated for signifying any matter. Ecclus. 34:7. But he would not seem to sin mortally who, on account of a preceding dream, omits or performs an indifferent action; because this seems to proceed rather from a certain simplicity of mind, or excessive timidity, for example if someone should omit a walk because he dreamed that on it he would be treacherously killed on this or that day. Dreams which are certainly or more probably from God we can, indeed we are bound, says S. Alphonsus, n. 9, to believe, since God at times promised that he would speak in this way. Acts 2:17; Num. 12:6.

To believe diabolical dreams is mortal, unless ignorance or simplicity excuses, since it is to found truth upon a lie, and to enter into society with a demon. In this sense Scripture says: You shall not practice augury, nor observe dreams. Lev. 19:26. But whether a dream is from God or from a demon is difficult and dangerous to define. Struggl 24; L. 9; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 6.

Note: The general rule for discerning whether dreams come from a demon is: if they impel to evil, or if one experiences himself disturbed and less prompt for good. But otherwise, if the dream impels to good, or one feels himself readier for it; nevertheless one must always proceed with humility and fear, since the devil often transforms himself into an angel of light. Struggl 25; L. 9.

Is astrology ever permitted? - Astrology is of two kinds, natural and judiciary. By the first, natural effects are predicted, some certain, others probable; by the second, freely contingent effects are foretold from consideration of the position and motion of the stars. Now natural astrology is licit, as is clear. But judiciary astrology is altogether illicit and superstitious, because heavenly bodies can do absolutely nothing upon man's free will. L. 10; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 5. Those who, by judiciary astrology either by themselves or through others, have inquired concerning the state of the Christian republic are to be understood, from the Warnings for the Jubilee, as those who have inquired by the said Astrology concerning the life or death of the Roman Pontiff; their censures the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis preserved intact. Leo XIII, Const. Singulares, Kal. Nov. 1899; S. Penit., 20 Feb. 1900; E. M.

Is the use of lots ever licit? - Some lots are divisory, others consultory, others divinatory. Divisory lots, which are employed for settling disputes, etc., with both parties consenting, are licit, since they contain nothing superstitious, but are as it were a certain species of contract; and they are also approved in Scripture by these words: The lot suppresses contradictions. Prov. 18:18; 16:33. Except, by positive law, all elections to ecclesiastical prelacies and benefices, which ought to be made by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; this also holds concerning disputes about the same benefices. C. Ecclesia 3, de Sortil. Yet the doctors more probably judge that only this is forbidden, so that if the lot is used, the elections are illicit but valid. The reason is that nowhere are they declared invalid, if one election of a Prelate having jurisdiction is excepted. C. Quia propter, de Elect. Cf. Schmalz., l. 5, p. 2, t. 21, n. 38 seqq. Secular offices also are to be distributed not by lot, but according to the aptitude of persons; although among several equally apt and worthy persons, one can act by lot. Thus also, if several have deserved death, and it is not expedient that all be punished, it can be determined by lot who among them is to be killed. C. A. 835, 841; C. B. 659, 752; John 10:24.

Consultory lots, by which inquiry is made what should be done in this or that matter, are generally illicit, because they contain temptation of God and danger of diabolical fraud. Generally, for sometimes they are licit: when they are done by divine instinct or command, as happened in the election of Matthias, Acts 1:26; when necessity and honorableness of the cause require it, for example an urgent necessity of salvation, and no more apt mode of overcoming the doubt appears, provided they are done with prayer having first been made, with due reverence, and judgment is expected from God alone, and divine things are not turned to earthly affairs, etc. Divinatory lots, by which through the throwing of dice the knowledge of a hidden or future thing is inquired into, and this is sortilege, are in no way permitted, since neither from their own nature, nor from that of other things, nor from the institution of God or of the Church, does that casting of lots have any force for the aforesaid effects. Yet if God himself should impel one to cast a lot, which should scarcely ever be thought, then it will be licit, just as it was licit for Joshua when he used it to investigate the hidden crime committed by Achan. Josh. 7:14. "Moreover, if someone were to ask from God through lots the manifestation of hidden truth, such sortilege would not be superstitious, but a temptation of God, or another sin of irreligiosity, as Laymann teaches with Sanchez, n. 9." Struggl 26; L. 10, 11; S. Th., Quodl. 12, a. 35; 2. 2, q. 95, a. 8.

Honor thy father and thy mother.

Exod. xx, 12.

1. "The precepts of the Decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor. But among neighbors we are most bound to parents. And therefore immediately after the precepts ordering us to God there is placed the precept ordering us to parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle. And thus there is a certain affinity of this precept to the precepts of the first table." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5.

2. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, but secondarily and implicitly looks to the obligations of parents toward children, and also to the mutual obligations of other blood-relations, and of other Superiors and inferiors. "The use of this Precept extends most widely, for besides those who begot us, there are many others whom we ought to reverence in the place of parents, under the title of power, or dignity, or usefulness, or of some eminent duty and office." Roman Catechism, P. 3, C. 5, nn. 2, 8. "Something is owed first to parents rather than to country and blood-relations, because through the fact that we were born of parents, both blood-relations and country pertain to us. And therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue are precepts of law, through them man is ordered more to parents than to country or to other blood-relations. Nevertheless, in this precept, which concerns the honoring of parents, there is understood to be commanded whatever pertains to rendering what is due to any person whatever, just as the secondary is included in the principal." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 2.

3. This fourth precept, as regards acts per se, belongs to the virtue of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, and besides, gratitude.

4. Piety is taken 1. in a broader sense for religion, and thus to be pious is the same as to be religious; and the pious are called worshipers of God, but the impious idolaters and sinners. "God is the principle of being and governance in a far more excellent way than father or country. And therefore religion, which offers worship to God, is a virtue other than piety, which offers worship to parents and country. But the things which belong to creatures are transferred to God through a certain superexcellence and causality... Hence by excellence piety is named the worship of God; just as God is excellently called Our Father." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 2. - It is taken 2. likewise in a broader sense for mercy or a benign affection toward those needing our help. "As Augustine says: ... according to common usage the name of piety is also frequently used in works of Mercy. I think this has happened for this reason, because God principally commands these things to be done, which He testifies please Him before sacrifices; from this custom it has happened that even God Himself is called pious." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 2. - Piety is taken 3. properly; and it is a special virtue, to which it belongs to offer worship to parents and country. "It must be said that some virtue is special from the fact that it regards some object according to some special reason. But since it pertains to the notion of justice that it render to another what is due, wherever there is found a special reason of debt to some person, there is a special virtue there. Now something is owed to someone specially because he is the connatural principle producing into being and governing. But piety regards this principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and country, and upon those who are ordered to these." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3.

5. As in every virtue pertaining to justice, which is a virtue toward another, so also in piety a threefold object is distinguished, namely the object to whom, the object which, or material object, and the objective formal reason.

6. The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

7. Therefore piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "since between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as cohelpers for the conservation of the blood-relationship of each, which each spouse has from his own parents: for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is conserved. And we say the same about children, because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as conservers of the blood-relationship received from the parents." Cajetan on 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

8. The object which, or material object, of piety is worship, service, and duty; worship indeed and service per se, duty per accidens. "Something is owed to parents and fellow citizens in two ways: in one way per se, in another way per accidens. Per se there is owed to them that which befits a father insofar as he is a father, who, since he is superior, existing as a kind of principle of the son, is owed reverence and service by the son. But per accidens something is owed to a father which it befits him to receive according to something that happens to him; for instance, if he is sick, that he be visited and that attention be given to his cure; if he is poor, that he be sustained, and so with other things of this kind; all of which are contained under the debt of service. And therefore Tully says... piety exhibits both duty and worship, so that duty is referred to service, but worship to reverence or honor; because, as Augustine says... we are said to cultivate men whom we honor with either remembrance or presence." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 2.

9. Therefore the worship due to parents consists in reverence and honor to be shown to them; service, in this, that the son "obey their command, and while living repay their benefits according to his manner," St. Thomas, l. c., q. 102, a. 2; duty, in supplying to them any necessary assistance of life, if they need it. As duty is contained in service, so duty and service are comprehended in worship. For "in worship not only honor is understood, but also whatever other things pertain to fitting acts by which man is ordered to another." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 1. Likewise "in the honoring of parents there is understood every assistance which ought to be shown to parents, as the Lord interprets in Matthew 15. And this is because assistance is given to a father from debt as to one greater." St. Thomas, l. c., q. 101, a. 2, ad 1. "To parents as such there is owed the honor of reverence. But sustenance and other things of this kind are owed to them by reason of some accident, for instance insofar as they are needy, or servants, or something of this kind, as was said above, q. 101, a. 2. And because what is per se is prior to that which is per accidens, therefore among the first precepts of the law also, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, the honoring of parents is specially prescribed, in which, as in a certain principal thing, sustenance is understood to be commanded, and whatever else is owed to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 3. "With this honor," says the Roman Catechism, P. 3, c. 5, n. 7, "all these things are conjoined: love, observance, obedience, and worship. But wisely in the Law the word of honor was placed, not of love or fear, although parents are greatly to be loved and feared. For he who loves does not always observe and venerate; he who fears does not always love; but whom someone honors from the soul, he also loves and reveres."

10. The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.

11. Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. Hence the object to whom, the object which, and the objective formal reason of observance are clear.

12. The object to whom of observance is all persons constituted in dignity, namely superiors who actually govern us, and all others endowed with some excellence, since they are fit to govern us. "It is necessary that virtues be distinguished in an ordered descent in the same way as the excellence of the persons to whom something is to be rendered. But just as the carnal father particularly participates in the account of principle, which is universally found in God, so also a person who in some respect exercises providence over us particularly participates in the account of father; because the father is the principle both of generation and education and discipline and all things which pertain to the perfection of human life; but a person constituted in dignity is as a principle of governance with respect to certain matters: as the prince of the city in civil matters, the leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines, and there is the like in other matters. And thence it is that all such persons are called fathers because of the likeness of care; just as in 4 Kings 5 the servants of Naaman said to him: Father, and if the Prophet had told thee some great thing, etc. And therefore, just as under religion, through which worship is given to God, there is found piety, through which parents are worshiped, so under piety there is found observance, through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. And hence it is clear that persons constituted in dignity, as has already been said, are properly here those who not only have excellence, but also power of governing: kings, masters, teachers, the Supreme Pontiff, Bishops, and all others who have fitness to govern us by reason of their excellence. And thus the same Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 2, says: "It must be said that someone, from the fact that he is constituted in some dignity, not only has a certain excellence of status, but also a certain power of governing subjects, whence the account of principle belongs to him, insofar as he is governor of others. But from the fact that someone has perfection of knowledge or virtue, he does not obtain the account of principle as regards others, but only a certain excellence in himself. And therefore a certain special virtue is determined to showing honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity. But because through knowledge and virtue, and all other things of this kind, someone is rendered fit for the state of dignity, the reverence which is shown to some persons because of any excellence whatsoever pertains to the same virtue." But because of the various dignity there is various observance: civil, religious; natural, supernatural, which, offered to the saints, is called dulia.

13. The object which, or material object, of observance is honor, and worship or service; the former is owed by reason of the excellence of the person constituted in dignity, the latter by reason of power over subjects. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, "that to those who are constituted in dignity it belongs to govern subjects. But to govern is to move some persons to a due end, as a sailor governs a ship by leading it to port. Now everything moving has a certain excellence and power above that which is moved. Hence it is necessary that in him who is constituted in dignity there be considered first the excellence of status with a certain power over subjects, and second the office itself of governance. Therefore by reason of excellence honor is owed to him, which is a certain recognition of someone's excellence. But by reason of the office of governance worship is owed to him, which consists in a certain service, namely while someone obeys their command and repays in turn their benefits according to his manner... To the excellence of those who are constituted in dignity there is owed honor by reason of the higher grade, but fear by reason of the power which they have for coercing; but to the office of their governance there is owed obedience, by which subjects are moved to the command of those presiding, and tributes, which are certain stipends of their labor."

14. Honor certainly imports a certain testification concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, as by inclinations, or even by exterior things, for instance by the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 1.

15. The objective formal reason of observance is that special honesty which shines forth in worship and honor shown to persons constituted in dignity, which arises proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from that dignity. Now there is a twofold debt. "One indeed is legal, to the rendering of which man is compelled by law, and thus man owes honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity and have prelation over him. But the other is a moral debt, which is owed from a certain honesty; and in this way we owe worship and honor to those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to them." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2. Now persons constituted in dignity can be considered in two ways: according to their personal dignity, and according as they are ordered to the common good. Worship shown to them insofar as it is ordered to the common good pertains not to observance, but to piety. But worship shown to them which pertains specially to their personal usefulness and glory properly pertains to observance, according as it is distinguished from piety. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3. But since piety shows worship and honor, as observance also shows worship and honor, piety, although properly distinguished from observance, can by a certain excellence be called observance; just as, although piety properly so called is distinguished from religion, religion by a certain supereminence is called piety. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 1.

16. As regards dulia, "dulia can be taken in two ways. In one way commonly, according as it shows reverence to any man whatsoever by reason of any excellence whatsoever. And thus it contains under itself piety and observance, and any virtue of this kind which shows reverence to man. And according to this it will have parts diverse in species. In another way it can be taken strictly, insofar as, according to it, a servant shows reverence to a master: for dulia is called servitude... And according to this it is not divided into diverse species, but is one species of observance... because by one account a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher, and so concerning other things of this kind." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 4. Dulia "is a certain species of observance; because through observance we honor any persons whatsoever excelling in dignity; but through dulia properly taken servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3. And hence it is clear that observance is not a special virtue in the most specific species, but a special virtue in a subalternate species. And the Angelic Doctor insinuates this by saying, q. 102, a. 1, that it pertains to observance to cultivate and honor prince, commander, teacher, master, etc., whom he asserts, q. 103, a. 4, to be cultivated and honored by a diverse account.

17. Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.

18. Finally, as regards gratitude, "it must be said that according to the diverse causes from which something is owed, it is necessary that the account of rendering what is due be diversified; yet so that always in the greater that which is lesser is contained. But in God first and principally is found the cause of debt, because He Himself is the first principle of all our goods. But secondarily in a father, because he is the proximate principle of our generation and discipline. Thirdly, in a person who excels in dignity, from whom common benefits proceed. Fourthly, in some benefactor, from whom we have received certain particular and private benefits, for which we are particularly obligated to him. Therefore, because not whatever we owe to God, or to a father, or to a person excelling in dignity, do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit, thence it is that after religion, by which we pay due worship to God; and piety, by which we worship persons excelling in dignity; there is grace, or gratitude, which recompenses favor to benefactors; and it is distinguished from the foregoing virtues, as each of the later is distinguished from the prior, as it were falling short of it." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 106, a. 1. Therefore to a benefactor there is owed also per se honor and reverence, because he has the account of principle, and per accidens assistance or sustenance, if he is in need. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107, a. 3. But grace or gratitude recompenses a benefit by thanksgiving and by bestowing something gratuitously. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 6. To it is opposed ingratitude, which, according to the diversity of circumstances, is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude has been great. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107.

19. Some children are legitimate and natural, others natural, others legitimate. - Legitimate and natural children are those who are born from a man and his wife. - Those are presumed in law to be legitimate and natural who are born from a mother joined in a just marriage, unless it is juridically certain that their origin is from someone other than the mother's husband. For he is held to be the father whom the nuptials demonstrate. The mother indeed is certain; but the father is presumed. And this presumption also has force in the forum of conscience. C. B. (Cod. Germ.) 1591, 1717, 1720.

20. The fetus is usually brought forth in the ninth month from the time when it was conceived, sometimes at the beginning of the seventh, sometimes at the completion of the tenth, namely not before 180 days, nor after 300 days, C. I. (Cod. Ital.) 161 seqq.; C. G. (Cod. Gall.) 315; C. H. (Cod. Hisp.) 108; C. A. (Cod. Austr.) 138, 163; C. B. 1592, 1717; C. L. (Cod. Lusit.) 101. - Hence of him who is born either after the seventh month from the marriage entered, or before the tenth month from the marriage dissolved, that one is the father whom the nuptials demonstrate, unless something else is most evident; C. L. 103. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mother was adulterous, C. I. 165; C. G. 313; C. H. 109; C. A. 158, or that she herself professed the son to be adulterine, C. A. 158, unless she brings forward such indications as would be sufficient in the external forum, Lugo de Iust. d. 12, n. 26, although she be most worthy of faith, and under oath, and dying, asserts it; for no one merits belief when alleging his own turpitude, C. Inter 8, sect. ult. de Donat.; L. 654, 924. - A fetus brought forth before the seventh month from the marriage entered is held legitimate only if the husband either knowingly and willingly married the pregnant woman, or, when he was present, did not wholly repudiate the born child, C. I. 161; C. G. 314; C. H. 110; C. L. 102. A fetus brought forth later, after the tenth month from the dissolution of the marriage, is held as illegitimate, unless the health and morals of the mother and the circumstances of things persuade otherwise, C. I. 169; C. G. 315; C. H. 111; C. L. 102 seqq.

21. Natural or illegitimate children are those who are born outside marriage. These by canon law are irregular; by civil law they are distinguished from legitimate chiefly as regards succession to the paternal inheritance. C. A. 155, 165; C. H. 114, 127, 134, 139. - Natural children, if they are born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, whether by natural law or by divine and canon law, by the same canon law are called spurious, or born from a condemned intercourse, C. 3, 10 Qui fil. sint legit.; and they are adulterine, sacrilegious, incestuous, and nefarious; these latter are those who are born from ascendants and descendants. But by civil law all are called illegitimate and cannot be recognized, in various cases nevertheless determined by the various laws, C. I. 180; C. H. 119; C. G. 335; C. B. 1732; C. L. 122, 134. But in other cases not excepted by the laws they can be acknowledged and legitimated. C. I. 179, 195; C. G. 331, 334; C. L. 119. - They are acknowledged by the confession of the parents, by civil law authentic, C. I. 181; C. G. 334; C. H. 131; C. B. 1718; by canon law simple and bare, C. 10 de Probat.; and after they have been acknowledged, they follow the condition of the one acknowledging, whether mother, or father, or both, C. I. 185. - But those acknowledged are legitimated by subsequent marriage, by the law itself, C. 1, 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 331; C. H. 120, 121; C. A. 161; C. B. 1719; C. L. 119; and they can also be acknowledged after the marriage has already been contracted, C. I. 197; C. H. 121. Cf. C. G. 331. - But from the time they have been legitimated they are held just as if they had been brought forth from a just marriage, C. 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 333; C. H. 122; C. A. 161; C. L. 121. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 24, n. 16. But one merely acknowledged is understood to be the child only of him who acknowledged him. C. I. 182; C. G. 336; C. H. 129, 134. - From C. B. 1589, 1705, it is established altogether against natural law that a natural son and father are not reputed blood-relations! and, on the contrary, in his relations with his mother he has the juridical condition of a legitimate son! - In doubt whether someone was born from a legitimate marriage, he must be presumed legitimate. C. I. 120. - L. l. 3, n. 951.

22. Legitimate children are legitimated natural children, and adopted children, C. I. 737. Adoption is an act by which someone who is not such by nature is admitted into the place of a child. From more recent laws, the adopted person is held just as the legitimate and natural son only of him who adopted him, and he acquires the right of succession to him, C. I. 202, 204, 210, 737; C. G. 343, 344, 350; C. B. 1741, 1757; C. L. 124, 129. But he is not exempted from the power of his natural father, nor does he pass into the power and family of the adopting father; C. I. 210, 212; C. G. 348, 349. It is otherwise from C. A. 183; C. H. 177; C. B. 1765. This adoption is perpetual and is not dissolved even by mutual consent, C. I. 217. And so also the French Jurisconsults. It is otherwise from C. A. 185; C. B. 1768.

23. Legitimate and natural children, as regards receiving donations and as regards the right of succession, are held such from the time when they were really conceived, provided that afterwards they are born viable, C. I. 724; C. G. 725; C. A. 138. One is born viable who is born after the 180th day from conception, C. I. 160, 162; C. G. 312, 314; C. A. 138, and has been perfectly born. In doubt, one who was brought forth alive is presumed to have been born viable, C. I. 724. Abortive children, if they do not survive, are held as born dead. - Merely natural children, whether legitimated or acknowledged, acquire the right of succession from the marriage of the parents entered, or from that time at which they afterwards were acknowledged, C. I. 197; C. H. 124. - Merely legitimate children acquire the right of succession from that time at which they were adopted, as if then first they had been conceived. C. I. 210, 217; C. B. 1754, 1757. From C. H. 177, an adopted person acquires no right of succession except from a testament or from a prior agreement. From C. B. 1767, the right of succession can be excluded in the contract of adoption. - Therefore a donation can be made to one scarcely conceived, and, when a pregnant widow has been left, the inheritance in the meantime pertains to the son to be born. But, when he is born dead, it devolves to the nearer cognates of the father.

24. Those younger than seven are called infants, as if non-speaking, unable to speak. If they have already attained the use of reason, although they are not held by human laws, nevertheless they are held by natural law. - From the seventh year to the fourteenth, if male; to the twelfth, if female, they are called impubes; but beyond the aforesaid age they are called pubes, namely from the proximate power of generation attained at that age. - Impubes, if they cease to be under the power of the father, by the father's death or by the emancipation of the children, are called pupilli, L. 239 de Verb. sign.; having become pubes, they are called minors up to the twenty-fifth year of age by Roman Law, L. 1 de Minoribus. - By more recent Law, every other distinction having been removed, whoever, male or female, has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is called a minor; with such age completed, he is called of age, C. I. 323, 240; C. G. 388, 488; C. B. 2; C. L. 97, 311. From C. H. 320, majority is established when the twenty-third year has been completed; C. A. 21, 174, the twenty-fourth year. - A cleric is of age in beneficial and other spiritual causes when he has completed the fourteenth year of age. C. Si annum 3 de Iudic. in 6. - At a minor age the son, unless he is emancipated, is constituted under paternal power. C. I. 220; C. B. 1626. But one of age regularly manages his own affairs. From C. L. 311, he can freely dispose of his person and goods.

25. Since children have existence from parents, therefore, besides love, they owe them piety. For as the love of parents is for doing good, so the love of children is for honoring parents, St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3; q. 26, a. 9, ad 1, ad 3. But although love does not import honor, honor includes love, since whom we honor from the soul we also love. Therefore when by a sin of children only charity toward parents is injured, the only malice contained in it is that alone which is against filial piety. But if that sin has another malice against another virtue, then this new species is superadded to the former. - Piety per se requires two things, reverence and service, but per accidens help to be furnished, if they are in need. Hence it is that a sin against piety can injure both love and reverence and service toward parents; as, for example, if a son conceives internal hatred against parents, or externally by words or another action saddens them, he sins against love; if he curses his parents he sins against love and against reverence; if he contemns parents and the precept of parents, he sins against reverence and obedience. Another species can also accede to the species against piety, for example, if a son defames or strikes his father, he sins against piety and against justice. - Even at a greater age children owe parents love, honor, and reverence, because they are always children, those always parents. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 26, a. 9, 10; q. 101, a. 7; L. 333; C. I. 220; C. G. 371; C. H. 154; C. A. 144, 154.

26. From Sacred Scripture, in several places under grave penalties, love, honor, and obedience toward parents are prescribed. Eccli. 3:8, 9, 18; 7:29, 30; Prov. 19:26; Deut. 27:16; Exod. 21:15; Eph. 6:1; Col. 3:20. - And this precept is also clear by reason; because parents have a threefold respect to children, namely by reason of cause, by reason of preeminence, and by reason of governance. Consequently children ought to love them as authors of their existence, honor them as Superiors, and obey them as rulers delegated by God. But this precept is grave per se. - "For among neighbors we are most bound to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5. The reason is that, as the same St. Thomas teaches, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3, the persons of parents are more substantially joined to us than any other persons constituted in dignity. For generation and governance, of which parents are the principle, pertain more to substance than exterior governance, of which other persons constituted in dignity are the principle. Besides, "the showing of honor or worship must be proportioned not only to the person to whom it is shown, considered according to himself, but also according as he is compared to those showing it. Therefore although the virtuous considered according to themselves are more worthy of honor than the persons of parents; nevertheless children are more obligated, because of benefits received from the parents themselves and natural conjunction, to show worship and honor to parents than to virtuous strangers." St. Thomas, l. c.

27. Therefore although love, honor, and obedience, as they are shown to other men, pertain precisely to the virtue of charity, observance, and obedience, nevertheless as they are shown to parents they pertain to the virtue of piety, according as it is a certain special virtue which furnishes worship and duty to parents as the chief authors of life after God, and to other blood-relations, in whom, because of communion of blood, parents are in some way represented. But only those sins bear before themselves a special malice against piety which immediately injure their person, or intrinsic personal goods, such as hatred, detraction, striking; not theft. Nevertheless, since a father with respect to a son, and the same is true of a son with respect to a father, retains his own right as regards life, reputation, honor, a son sinning against his father in these things sins at once against piety and justice. But secretly taking away the goods of the father, against the father's will, a son sins per se only against commutative justice, and per se is bound to restitution.

28. For piety, which is between children and their parents, does not exclude strict justice between them. Those duties which are had between children and parents, as also between husband and wife, between brothers and sisters, and between other blood-relations, if they regard only these conditions of these persons, contain a certain deficient just, and pertain only to piety, as, for example, the education of children does. But those duties which regard the same persons among themselves insofar as they are men contain a just strictly such, and look to commutative justice. Therefore theft committed by a son against a father is theft injuring commutative justice, as any other theft. Likewise if a son kills his father, he sins against justice, as any other homicide, but besides there is also added a graver malice against piety. Similarly, if a spouse does not keep conjugal fidelity, he sins against justice, as any other person violating faith given in a bilateral and onerous contract; but besides there is added a graver malice against piety. The reason is that those duties which pertain to piety recede from the perfect distinction and otherness of persons which is properly required by commutative justice.

29. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 57, a. 4: "Right, or the just, is said by commensuration to another. But another can be said in two ways: in one way, that which is simply another, as that which is altogether distinct, as appears in two men, one of whom is not under the other, but both are under one prince of the city, and between such persons there is the simply just. In another way something is called another not simply, but as existing as something of him; and in this way in human affairs a son is something of the father, because he is in some way part of him, and a servant is something of the master, because he is his instrument. And therefore there is not a comparison of father to son as to one simply other; and on account of this there is not there the simply just, but a certain just, namely paternal; and by the same reason neither between master and servant, but there is between them dominative just. But a wife, although she is something of the husband, because she is compared to him as to his own body, nevertheless is more distinguished from the husband than a son from a father, or a servant from a master; for she is assumed into a certain social life of marriage; and therefore between husband and wife there is more of the account of the just than between father and son, or master and servant: because, since husband and wife have an immediate relation to domestic life, therefore between them there is not even the simply political just, but rather the economic just." But, as the same Angelic Doctor has ibid. ad 2: "A son, insofar as he is a son, is something of the father; and similarly a servant, insofar as he is a servant, is something of the master; nevertheless each, insofar as he is considered as a certain man, is something subsisting according to himself, distinct from others. And therefore, insofar as each is a man, justice is toward them in some way; and on account of this also some laws are given concerning those things which are of father to son, or of master to servant."

Hence it is clear that children under paternal power can well have dominion of things. But this dominion regards things given to them by any translative title of dominion, or acquired by their own industry. For as regards paternal goods, no strict right to paternal goods belongs to children while the father is living. Hence, if children under paternal power steal anything from these goods, they are bound to restitution per se. Per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of lesser moment, and it is prudently presumed that the father remits that obligation.

30. Now as regards love, one does not sin against it if parents are saddened by the manner of acting of children, when a just and grave cause urges that something be done, and it is clear that the offense of the parents arises from their mere moroseness.

But children, whether they are legitimate, that is, born in legitimate marriage from husband and wife, or illegitimate, that is, born outside legitimate marriage; likewise whether they are natural, generated from father and mother, or adopted, not from generation but from adoption, all owe parents love, honor, and obedience. But all owe love both by internal affection and by exterior work, also by furnishing them assistance if they are found in necessity, whether corporal or spiritual. For as love is contained under honor, so also the assistance of necessities is contained under the same honor. St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, a. 16.

31. As regards reverence, every irreverence and contempt toward parents, other things being equal, is graver than toward other neighbors, even relatives, even those constituted in dignity, because of the greater conjunction with them, which obtains the first grade after God, because of their greater dignity. But although, if children have injured the honor of parents, they ought to repair the injured honor to them by asking pardon from them, even before others in whose sight they sinned, nevertheless it can certainly be presumed, at least for the most part, where children refused to do this, that parents remit this obligation to the children, lest the children again incur offense of God and undergo eternal danger to the soul. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 334.

32. Reverence can be injured by words, gestures, and deeds, namely gravely, even in those things which as regards others are light, provided that they are not altogether light. Therefore children sin gravely: by Words, by everywhere addressing parents harshly; or even by showing them no sign of benevolence; by calling them, when present, by contumelious words; or by cursing them from the soul; by Gestures, by looking at them with fierce eyes, by mocking and deriding them when present; by Deeds, by lifting hands against them with deliberation, as a sign of striking them, by accusing them of crimes, unless there is question of crimes pernicious to the republic, such as heresy, treason, etc. - L. 333, 334.

33. Service likewise is gravely injured by not obeying parents in those things which look to domestic governance and economy, or pertain to good morals, if nevertheless parents command seriously and in a grave matter; except the election of a state, the entering of marriage, the entering of religion, unless nevertheless parents for a just cause contradict children in this matter. Likewise a grave sin is committed by not acknowledging them as parents, unless this is done from a just cause and only by outwardly concealing that one is their son. But they by no means sin by fulfilling the duties of religion against the prohibition of parents. For as regards all those things which pertain to salvation, they "are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5, ad 2. - L. 334, 335; St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 9, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2, 5; C. A. 148; C. L. 142.

34. The obedience to be furnished by children to parents is not unlimited, but has its own boundaries by which it is circumscribed. - The reason is that obedience is to be furnished according to the power of the Superior; namely, in those things to which the right of prelation extends. But paternal power does not exceed the rule and governance of the family, and the right education of the children. Aptly St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, q. 5, a. 9: "It must be said that, since obedience is owed to a prelate, the debt of obedience extends to those things to which the right of prelation extends. But a carnal father has the right of prelation over a son, first indeed as regards domestic conversation. For the father of a family is in the house as the king is in the kingdom; hence, just as subjects of the king are bound to obey the king in those things which pertain to the governance of the kingdom, so also children and others are bound to obey the father of the family in those things which pertain to the dispensation of the house. Secondly as regards discipline of morals, whence the Apostle says at Heb. 12:9: We had fathers of our flesh as instructors and we obeyed them. For the father owes the son not only education, but also discipline, as the Philosopher says. Therefore in these things the son is bound to obey the carnal father, and not in others."

35. And this doctrine is general: any subject whatever ought not obey his superior in all things, but only in those which pertain to his own subjection and to the superior's prelation. Man owes obedience in all things to God alone, because he is subject to God as regards all things; to any other human superior he is subject only according to a certain limited and determinate account. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5: "In those things which pertain to the disposition of human acts and things, a subject is bound to obey his superior according to the account of superiority; as a soldier obeys the commander of the army in those things which pertain to war, a servant his master in those things which pertain to carrying out servile works, a son his father in those things which pertain to discipline of life and domestic care, and so concerning others... Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both interior and exterior, and therefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. But subjects are not subject to their superiors as regards all things, but as regards some things determinately, and as regards those things they are intermediaries between God and subjects. But as regards other things they are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law."

36. Ought a son, concerning the election of a state, to consult parents and obey them? - R. 1. If there is question of the conjugal state, theologians more commonly teach that a son per se is bound to consult parents. The reason is that this is required by the service to be furnished by children to parents, that in a matter so grave, and in which they have greater experience, they should hear their counsel. But this obligation per se is light. For first, a grave obligation is not clear, since it is much disputed among the Doctors. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 849. Besides, this obligation cannot be grave, since children are not bound also to follow the counsel of parents, but are free. And they can sufficiently, either by themselves or through other prudent men, know what things occur in such an affair, lest they err in it. - But if there is question of the religious state, it is certain that per se they are not bound, nor is it expedient, commonly speaking, that children await the counsel of parents; because parents in this matter have no knowledge and experience, indeed often in this affair they are not friends, but enemies. St. Thomas, Opusc. 17, Against Those Withdrawing Men from Entrance into Religion, c. 9.

1. Renatus, a parish priest, from devotion toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, and to promote it more and more, often speaks to his parishioners about the Heart of Jesus doing penance for us, and counsels them this special devotion, namely toward the Penitent Heart of Jesus, and this frequent invocation: Penitent Heart of Jesus for us, have mercy on us.

2. Nicolinus, a parish priest, likewise to promote devotion to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, propagates among his parishioners certain new emblems of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist. For he asserts that worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist is more perfect than simple worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, since it embraces the Sacrament of the Eucharist itself, which is the Sacrament of love.

3. Nicolaus, a parish priest, propagates a special cult toward the adorable Face of the Divine Redeemer, and one diverse from that usual one, up to now attributed to the image of the Holy Face.

4. Lucianus, a parish priest, from devotion toward St. Joseph, propagates a special cult of this Saint under the title: of St. Joseph, friend of the Sacred Heart. But from devotion toward the Most Holy Virgin he preaches that she is to be worshipped under the title of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and distributes among his parishioners images of that Virgin which represent her standing with hands spread out, and the child Jesus standing likewise before her knees.

5. Lucas, with every effort, from devotion and love of Our Lord Jesus Christ, propagates devotion toward the Most Holy Soul of Jesus Christ, makes an image representing it, and institutes Confraternities in its honor. He likewise propagates devotion toward the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary; he also makes an image, and institutes a Congregation of nuns. Finally, among the faithful he propagates a certain formula of prayer "for obtaining that all men may recognize the supreme dominion of Christ and of Mary Immaculate over all creatures."

Q. What is to be held concerning these various cults?

R. Renatus does not act rightly, nor can he persevere in that practice. For the Holy Office, 15 July 1893, prohibited and condemned the titles: Penitent Heart of Jesus, Penitent Heart of Jesus for us, Penitent Jesus, Penitent Jesus for us. M. E., v. 8, p. 1, p. 175.

Nicolinus likewise does not act rightly, nor can he persevere in his practice. For by the Holy Office, 3 June 1891, it was decided: "The new emblems of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist are not to be approved by the Apostolic See. For fostering the piety of the faithful, the images of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus already used and approved in the Church are sufficient; because the cult toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist is not more perfect than the cult toward the Eucharist itself, nor another from the cult toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus." Monit. Eccles., v. 7, p. 1, p. 101. But when doubts had been proposed: "1. Whether the images of the Sacred Heart representing the Heart alone without the rest of the body can safely be distributed? 2. Whether they are approved at Rome? 3. Whether they must be withdrawn from the houses of the faithful, where they are an object of veneration?" The Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891, responded: "To the first, second, and third: The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Our Lord Jesus Christ, concerning which there is question, is permitted from private devotion, provided it is not exposed on altars to be worshipped with public veneration." M. E., v. 9, p. 1, p. 32.

Nicolaus likewise must abstain from the propagation of the aforesaid special cult, and one diverse from the usual one, toward the adorable Face of the Divine Redeemer. For, when the doubt had been proposed concerning approving or at least permitting a cult of this sort, the Holy Office declared: It is not expedient. Therefore Nicolaus may indeed propagate the cult toward the image of the Face of the Divine Redeemer, or copies of that image, but as it was already usual from ancient times, namely so that in the minds of the faithful, from veneration and contemplation of the aforesaid image, the memory of the sufferings of Christ may grow more day by day, and in their hearts sorrow for faults and an ardent desire of repairing the injuries inflicted on the divine Majesty may be increased. M. E., v. 7, p. 2, p. 221.

As regards Lucianus, concerning the cult of St. Joseph under the title Friend of the Sacred Heart, the Fathers of the S. I. C. "decreed, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII, that there is not to be an interlocution concerning the matter proposed. Besides, they ordered that the Sacred Congregation of Rites be warned lest in the future decrees, rescripts, etc., be issued in which the new title mentioned above is approved in any way, or even in which mention simply is made of it." M. E., v. 7, p. 2, p. 220. But as regards that title and image of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the same S. I. C., 3 Apr. 1895, decreed "that the title indeed can be admitted, but the images are not approved and are to be removed from public veneration."

As regards Lucas, although that prior cult contains nothing false, nor even anything incongruous, nevertheless it is a new cult, as it is proposed, and is not to be propagated publicly without the approval of the Church. "The Most Holy One.... commanded... that the writers are to be warned who sharpen their talents over.... arguments which savor of novelty, and, under the appearance of piety, strive to promote unaccustomed titles of cult even through journals, that they desist from their plan, and weigh the danger which lies beneath of drawing the faithful into error even concerning dogmas of faith, and of giving an occasion to haters of Religion for disparaging the purity of faith, Catholic doctrine, and true piety." Holy Office, 15 July 1893, M. E., v. 8, p. 1, p. 175. And this especially, in this cult of the Soul of Christ, is to be noted: that in it the whole Humanity of Christ and Christ the Redeemer appear less clearly than in the cult of the Most Sacred Heart, the Most Precious Blood, the Five Wounds, and the other mysteries of the life and Passion of Jesus Christ; whence surely the cult seems less suitable to be spread among the people.

But concerning the other cult toward the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the following doubts were proposed: "1. Whether and how it is fitting to approve the title of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which the new Institute of the Sisters A. of M. of the diocese of P. assumes? 2. Whether, the aforesaid title being admitted, it is fitting also to admit among the other feasts of the aforesaid Institute that of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary?" The Holy Office, 13 Dec. 1893, responded: "To both, negatively." But as regards that prayer, the Holy Office, 12 June 1895, decreed: "the prayer concerning which there is question is not to be approved, nor propagated among the faithful, nor enriched with indulgences."

Andreas, a priest, often heard speak about notable Relics; but he does not know what they are. He also heard speak about the exposition of Relics, and blessing with Relics, and also about their procession, but he does not know how all these things ought to be done. Wherefore he desires to be instructed briefly in all these things, as regards those things which more belong to practice.

R. Notable Relics are the Body, Head, Arm, Leg, or that part of the body in which a Martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small, and legitimately approved by the Ordinaries. S. R. C., 8 April 1628, to 3, Urbis. Bones of the femur would not be. Nor likewise the tibia. S. R. C., 3 June 1662, Dubium. - Thorns from the Crown of Our Lord Jesus Christ are counted among notable Relics, and are worthy of special cult. - Notable relics are to be kept not in monasteries, but in the exterior Church of nuns.

As regards the exposition of Relics, in all Churches it is licit to expose Relics, provided they are recognized by the bishop. S. R. C., 2 Sept. 1690, Fundana. - The abuse is to be eliminated of placing the Relics of Saints and pious images upon the tabernacle in which the most august sacrament is reserved; nor before the little door of the tabernacle, even if it is a Relic of the Most Holy Cross. S. R. C., 31 March 1821, to 6, General Decree; 12 March 1836, to 1, Triden. - But a Relic of the Most Holy Cross is to be separated from the Relics of Saints. - Under the Relic of some Saint, exposed to public veneration among candlesticks, a pall ought not to be used. S. R. C., 7 Apr. 1832, to 3, Ariminen. - When Relics of Saints are exposed, beyond the lamp, at least two lights must continuously burn upon the altar, though not at night; otherwise they are not to be exposed. S. R. C., 22 Jan. 1701, to 9, Congr. Mont. Coron. - Relics of the Blessed can be exposed, as images and statues, in churches in which the office and Mass of the Blessed can be recited and respectively celebrated.

As regards blessing with Relics, a priest in a private Mass, the Mass having been finished, vested in the sacred vestments, can distribute ashes and present relics to be kissed, if there is such a custom, after Mass is completed. S. R. C., 16 March 1833, to 5, n. 2704. - Before the wood of the Holy Cross openly exposed, one must genuflect on one knee in passing. S. R. C., 23 May 1835, to 2, n. 2722. In blessing with a relic of the Most Holy Cross, it is not licit to sing: Benedicat vos omnipotens Deus, Pater, etc. S. R. C., 23 May 1835, to 3. - Blessing and the kiss of the Relic are to be omitted as long as the Most Holy Sacrament remains exposed. S. R. C., 17 July 1900.

As regards the procession of Relics, it is not licit, for any cause or custom whatever, to carry Relics of Saints processionally under a baldachin; nevertheless it can be tolerated and permitted that the wood of the Most Holy Cross and the other Instruments of the Lord's Passion, with attention to the peculiar veneration of these, and to the almost universal custom, be carried under a baldachin, provided it is done separately and apart from the Relics of Saints, to whom this distinctive honor is by no means fitting. S. R. C., 27 May 1826, n. 2647, General Decree. The decree seems to have to be understood of ordinary processions, which are customarily celebrated every year, but not of solemn ones for the translation of some sacred Image or Relics. - Relics of the Blessed are not to be carried about in processions. S. R. C., 27 Sept. 1659.

Beatrix, a nun, had a spiritual friendship with another nun, Sanctina. When she was now near death, Beatrix asked of her that, if it pleased God, she would reveal to her the state of her soul after her death. With her hand stretched out toward the Crucifix, Sanctina nodded with her head. But, when Sanctina had piously died in the Lord, Beatrix immediately began to be disturbed by scruples; whence, approaching the confessor, she manifests the matter to him. You have acted very badly, the confessor responds; for, in these matters, the devil is accustomed to mingle himself. For it is not licit to inquire into things which God wills to be hidden, according to that saying of Eccl. 3:22, Do not seek things higher than you. But God wills the state of the soul after death to be hidden; which is clear from this, that when the rich man asked that Lazarus be sent to his living brothers, this was denied, as is said in Luke 16:29. Beatrix, more disturbed by this response, asks her Superior that before night she call Fr. Thomas, her extraordinary confessor; otherwise she certainly will not be able to sleep quietly and in peace.

Q. What will the extraordinary confessor be able to respond to Beatrix?

R. Fr. Thomas will be able to respond with that which St. Thomas would respond, Quodl. 3, a. 22. "I respond that it must be said that, since sin is against nature... to seek the fulfillment of a natural desire is not a sin, unless some disorder is added, as is clear in the taking of food and drink. But man naturally desires to know. Hence, if he seeks knowledge of some thing, it is not a sin, unless perhaps by accident, that is, through some disorder added; for example, if through the study and inquiry of some science someone is impeded from those things to which he is held to attend; for example, if a preacher is impeded from the office of due preaching on account of the study of geometry; or also, if someone seeks to know something, trusting proudly and presumptuously in his own ability; or if some other disorder of this sort should happen concerning this. But no disorder seems to be in this inquiry, if someone should seek from one dying to know his state after death, nevertheless submitting this to divine judgment. Hence no reason appears why this ought to be said to be a sin, unless perhaps he inquires from a doubting of faith concerning the future state, as though tempting.

But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that God wills many things to be thus hidden from us, knowledge of which we cannot acquire by our own powers or merit; which nevertheless he wills to be revealed to those asking humbly and piously, according to that saying, Matt. 2:25, You have hidden these things from the wise and prudent; and have revealed them to little ones. Hence it is not marvelous if God was unwilling that some things be revealed to the proud brothers of the proud rich man, which nevertheless he wills to be revealed to the faithful asking piously and humbly."

"He does not sin gravely," says La-Croix, l. 3, p. 1, n. 18, "who enters into an agreement with another, that the one dying first appear to the survivor, God permitting this, being about to warn the other concerning things pertaining to salvation; for in this he intends to know nothing by the aid of the devil. Nevertheless there could be venial sin present on account of curiosity or danger of deception."

Gerafinia, perfectly restored to health from a grave illness of influenza, makes a vow of abstinence and fasting for her whole life, on all Sundays and the days of the Nativity and of Easter. For she has heard that it is an efficacious and infallible remedy for preventing a relapse. And she holds this as altogether certain, since in fact she has now persevered in perfect bodily health for three years.

Q. 1. What is vain observance? - 2. Is Gerafinia guilty of superstition; and is she bound by the vow?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 478 seqq. To the second: Gerafinia is guilty of superstition. The reason is that fasting, observed on the aforesaid days, is not of itself an infallible means for preventing a relapse into influenza. But she resolved to observe it with certain faith in the effect that would follow.

Besides, she is not bound by the vow. For the cult is superfluous, foreign to the custom of the Church, and bearing singularity before itself. Hence a vow of fasting ordinarily on Sundays and on the more solemn feasts of the Church is null, especially when the one vowing by no means observes fasting on other days. Nevertheless, superstition being excluded, of itself it would not exceed venial sin. Indeed it would not even be venial if someone fasted from mortification. But it is better to abstain from such a fast, and therefore the doctors commonly teach that a fast promised on Sunday can be fulfilled on Saturday; and, if someone has vowed to fast for a month, that he is not bound on Sunday. But if someone accustomed to fast on other days sometimes fasts, from some good end, on Sunday, he does not sin. - Reuter, p. 2, n. 427; Lig. 4; G. 258-260; I. M. 466.

Hedvigis, laboring under a grave illness, consults several physicians, but in vain. Hence she first approaches Pancratius, who prescribes to her that she wear an artfully fashioned necklace for exciting the electric, biotic fluid. When she had done this for some time and had experienced some relief, she consults Nicetas, another physician, indeed an honest man, who counsels her to be subjected to hypnotism for exciting magnetic sleep in her, in which a benign crisis of the infirmity will be had. And he asserts that he will do this with every superstition and every other illicit circumstance entirely removed. But Hedvigis, since she is a timorous woman, before she furnishes her consent, seeks the counsel of the confessor.

Q. Has Hedvigis, in the first case, sinned; and what ought the confessor to respond to her in the other?

R. Hedvigis, in the first case, sinned in no way. The reason is that in applying that remedy there was no superstition, and no other illicit circumstance. As regards superstition, there is no doubt that electric fluid exists in inanimate bodies, of altogether marvelous power and efficacy. Therefore nothing prevents that the same fluid exists in animate bodies, in plants, in animals, in man, and that in these it obtains a still special efficacy from the soul, which is the intrinsic principle of life; whence a fluid of this sort is also called biotic. And certainly, as electricity excited from without in man can be gravely harmful to man, like other elements, why also can it not, when excited in due manner, produce salutary effects, which also happens in other elements applied extrinsically to the organism? And thus in fact there are several who are well or badly disposed according to the various state of the electricity of the air. But there is nothing illicit and immoral in this, that someone should wear a necklace made from a determined metal, or from sealing wax, or from another similar material apt for exciting or extinguishing electricity.

As regards the other case, since there is question only of merely exciting sleep, which can be excited by several natural means, it does not seem that superstition must necessarily therefore be asserted. And every superstitious cause being removed, as, for example, if this were done by the mere command of the will, and likewise every immoral circumstance being removed, as, for example, if a dishonest touch were used, nothing is then had which appears illicit. Wherefore it does not seem that the confessor, in the case, can burden Hedvigis' conscience with grave sin. Indeed, the oracles themselves of the Holy See condemn not magnetism, but the abuse of magnetism. And it is well established among the doctors that those things are to be judged natural which are not established to exceed the powers of nature, whether from the effects themselves which followed, or from the causes applied, or from the manner of applying these. But, since this matter generally is not without grave danger, the confessor will indeed act prudently by exhorting Hedvigis that she apply another remedy and omit this one. D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 2, n. 53. Cf. G. 271 seqq.

It will not be beside the matter here to note that, just as in this matter of magnetism and hypnotism there are several who hold all things as natural and licit, so on the contrary there are not lacking those who hold all things as superstitious and illicit. The former and the latter err together. - Speaking of fascination, St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 117, a. 3, ad 2, says: "It must be said that from the strong imagination of the soul the spirits of the conjoined body are changed, which change of the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the subtler spirits come.... Thus therefore, when some soul has been vehemently moved to malice, as happens especially in old women, her look is made poisonous and harmful according to the aforesaid mode, especially to children, who have a tender body and one easily receptive of impression. It is also possible that, by the permission of God, or even from some hidden pact, the malice of demons cooperates in this, with whom sorceress old women have some covenant."

When the aforesaid change has been produced in the body, as St. Thomas says in the same place, "the continuous air is infected up to a determined space." And this indeed is verified in contagious diseases, which are not always communicated by bodily touch, but also without touch, and therefore through infected air. And thus through this change of one's own body an exterior body can be changed. St. Thomas, ibid., ad 3. What, then, prevents some impression from being produced naturally by a look, for example, imagination also assisting? - And thus Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 247, commemorating this doctrine of St. Thomas concerning fascination, says: "One is natural, of which we have an example in magnetism, when from the fixed gaze of another someone easily receives impressions.... Another is superstitious and is called common fascination, which is believed by the common people, namely that those looking with an envious mind harm.... Here also we note that not all things which are believed to be deceits are such; for the sagacity and imagination of man can have many parts; for how very powerful it is, and of how many evils it is a cause, philosophers everywhere prove by inescapable arguments and facts." Besides, St. Thomas wisely warns, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4: "Where manifest indications of someone's malice do not appear, we ought to hold him as good, interpreting for the better insofar as it is doubtful." - Yet it is rightly counseled then to premise a protestation of not willing the effect, if some superstition lies beneath. Cf. D'Annib., l. c.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 12, a. 13.

Macrina, a nun most observant of regular discipline, frequently fasts, rises at night to pray, and exercises other austerities of the body. When Petronia the superior had learned these things, she prohibits all things to Macrina. For she says that sanctity does not consist in these things; and, with attention to Macrina's physical constitution, that this is to tempt God, assuredly a grave sin. Although Macrina is not of robust health, nevertheless she is altogether well. But preferring obedience to her superior, she submits herself altogether to her.

Q. 1. What is temptation of God, and what kind of sin? - 2. What is to be thought concerning Macrina? - 3. What is to be thought concerning Petronia?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 487 seqq. To the second: Macrina indeed is to be praised on account of her virtue of penitence and obedience. That Macrina was led by the good spirit of God in the exercise of that exterior penitence is clear from this, that although she was not of very strong health, nevertheless she was well; whence it can also be gathered that in fact she had not been indiscreet by exercising penances beyond her strength. It is especially clear from the promptitude of her obedience; whence it is also gathered that she was moved not by a certain pursuit of singularity, but by a true desire of virtue.

To the third. Petronia indeed errs when she says that sanctity does not consist in exterior penitence, in order to contemn it. For although sanctity essentially and formally is not in this exterior penitence and mortification, nevertheless it consists in it instrumentally; since several other virtues themselves also do not essentially constitute sanctity; nevertheless they are most valid means and instruments for acquiring sanctity. St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, a. 24. She likewise errs when she affirms that Macrina tempts God. For then Macrina would have tempted God, when Macrina, seeing, for example, that she was being weakened in her powers by those exterior austerities, had still persevered in that manner of acting, for the sake of making trial of the goodness and power of God, expecting from him that she be preserved unharmed. And in such a case she would have sinned not only against the first precept of the Decalogue, but also against the fifth precept, if by acting thus she had exposed herself to grave danger of life, without any necessity or proportionate utility, but only from the rash inclination of her own will. Wherefore Petronia gravely errs when she affirms a grave sin.

Besides, Petronia, in this matter, interferes with the office proper to the confessor, contrary to the Decree of the S. C. EE. and RR., 17 Dec. 1890. For spiritual direction properly pertains to the confessor, which by its nature also embraces the exercise of these penances. Hence, according to the present practice of the Sacred Congregation, for private penances of this sort, which are in no way public, nothing is required except the approval and permission of the confessor; but for those which would in some way be public, the approval also of the superior is required, for preserving the right order of the whole Community.

But in granting or denying exterior penances of this sort, due discretion and prudence must be preserved. "For there are some directors so imprudent that they seem to place every progress of the soul in burdening it with fasts, hairshirts, bloody disciplines, burnings, and similar things. But others seem altogether to reprove external mortifications, as useless for spiritual progress, placing all perfection in interior mortification. But these also err, as the first do, because bodily mortifications aid internal ones, and are in some way necessary, when they can be exercised, for restraining the senses; and therefore we read that they were practiced more or less by all the Saints.... To assert absolutely: External mortifications profit nothing, or little, is the greatest error." St. Alph., H. A., last treatise, App. 1, n. 23. Cf. this whole number and the following ones.

1. Theofridus, on feast days, is accustomed to go to Church, yet not with the mind of honoring God, but of seeing his betrothed, and inviting her to come together into another place. Hence during the whole time of the sacred functions he morosely feeds his eyes by looking at his betrothed, and in her, in his own mind, he takes complacence to himself, and with shameful touches upon himself he is venereally delighted.

2. Livonia and Vibiana stubbornly contend and quarrel with each other over the ownership of a certain prayer book, in church. Hearing the shouts, Andronicus, the church custodian, immediately runs up, who at once, with his staff, beats the women and casts them out of the church. But behold, while Livonia hastens to go out, she is driven against the door of the church and pours forth blood from her nostrils.

“26. The prayer of one foreknown [as damned] avails no one.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned at the Council of Constance.

“50. In vain do we cry to God: My Father, if it is not the spirit of charity that cries. — 59. The prayer of the impious is a new sin; and what God grants them is a new judgment upon them.” Propositions of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

“7. He who, in praying, asks for something singular and determinate asks for evil and asks evilly, because he asks for a negation of good and a negation of God, and prays that God be denied to him.” Proposition of Eckhart condemned by John XXII in 1329.

“14. It is not fitting for one who is resigned to the divine will to ask anything from God, because asking is an imperfection, since it is an act of one’s own will and choice, and is to will that the divine will be conformed to ours, and not that ours be conformed to the divine; and that saying of the Gospel, Ask and you shall receive, was not spoken by Christ for interior souls, which do not wish to have a will; indeed, souls of this kind arrive at such a point that they cannot ask anything from God. — 15. Just as they ought not to ask anything from God, so neither ought they to give Him thanks for anything, because each is an act of one’s own will. — 22. To assert that in prayer it is necessary to help oneself through discourse and through thoughts when God does not speak to the soul is ignorance. God never speaks; His speech is operation, and He always operates in the soul when it does not impede Him by its discourses, thoughts, and operations. — 23. In prayer it is necessary to remain in obscure and universal faith, with quiet and forgetfulness of every particular and distinct thought concerning the attributes of God and the Trinity, and thus to remain in the presence of God to adore, love, and serve Him, but without producing acts, because God is not pleased with these. — 24. Whatever thoughts occur in prayer, even impure ones, even against God, the Saints, the faith, and the sacraments, if they are not voluntarily nourished nor voluntarily expelled, but are tolerated with indifference and resignation, do not impede the prayer of faith; indeed, they render it more perfect, because the soul then remains more resigned to the divine will. — 25. Even if sleep supervenes and one sleeps, nevertheless actual prayer and contemplation take place, because prayer and resignation are the same, and while resignation endures, prayer also endures. — 26. Those three ways, the purgative, illuminative, and unitive, are the greatest absurdity that has been spoken in mystical theology, since there is only one way, namely, the interior way. — 27. He who desires and embraces sensible devotion neither desires nor seeks God, but himself; and he who walks by the interior way acts evilly when he desires it and endeavors to have it, both in sacred places and on solemn days. — 30. Everything sensible which is expressed in the spiritual life is abominable, filthy, and unclean. — 32. Neither before nor after Communion is any preparation or thanksgiving required—for these interior souls—other than continuance in solid passive resignation, because in a more perfect manner it supplies for all the acts of the virtues which can and do take place in the ordinary way. And if, on this occasion of Communion, movements of humiliation, petition, or thanksgiving arise, they are to be repressed whenever it is not discerned that they are from a special impulse of God; otherwise they are impulses of nature not yet dead. — 33. A soul which proceeds by this interior way acts evilly if on solemn days it wishes by some particular effort to stir up in itself some devout feeling, since for interior souls all days are equal, all are festive. And the same is said concerning sacred places, because for souls of this kind all places are equal. — 34. To give thanks to God with words and tongue is not for interior souls, which ought to remain in silence, placing no impediment to God’s operating in them; and the more they resign themselves to God, the more they experience that they cannot recite the Lord’s Prayer, or Our Father. — 35. It is not fitting for souls of this interior way to perform operations, even virtuous ones, from their own choice and activity; otherwise they would not be dead. Nor ought they to elicit acts of love toward the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, or the Humanity of Christ, because, since these objects are sensible, such also is the love toward them. — 36. No creature, neither the Blessed Virgin nor the Saints, ought to sit in our heart, because God alone wills to occupy and possess it. — 55. By this interior way, although with much suffering, one arrives at purging and extinguishing all the passions, so that nothing further is felt, nothing, nothing; nor is any disquiet felt, as in a dead body, nor does the soul allow itself to be moved any further. — 56. The two laws and the two cupidities—one of the soul and the other of self-love—endure as long as self-love endures; hence, when this has been purged and killed, as takes place by the interior way, those two laws and two cupidities are no longer present, nor is any fall thereafter incurred, nor is anything further felt, not even venial sin. — 57. Through acquired contemplation one arrives at the state of no longer committing sins, either mortal or venial. — 58. One arrives at a state of this kind by no longer reflecting upon one’s own operations, because defects arise from reflection. — 61. When the soul has arrived at mystical death, it can no longer will anything other than what God wills, because it no longer has a will, and God has taken it away from it. — 62. By the interior way one arrives at a continuous and immovable state in imperturbable peace. — 63. By the interior way one arrives even at the death of the senses; indeed, the sign that someone remains in the state of nothingness, that is, of mystical death, is that the external senses no longer represent sensible things, so that they are as if they did not exist, because they do not succeed in causing the intellect to apply itself to them. — 64. A theologian has less disposition for the contemplative state than an uneducated man: first, because he does not have so pure a faith; second, because he is not so humble; third, because he does not so greatly care for his own salvation; fourth, because he has his head filled with phantasms, species, opinions, and speculations, and cannot enter into that true light.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

“9. I recently considered whether I should wish to receive or desire anything from God; I wish to free myself very well from this, because if I were one receiving from God, I would be under Him or beneath Him, as a servant or a slave, and He would be as a Lord in giving; but it will not be thus in eternal life.” Error of Eckhart condemned by John XXII in 1329. Cf. nn. 452, 455.

“18. He who in prayer uses images, figures, species, and his own concepts does not adore God in spirit and truth.” Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

“Is a certain formula to be approved for obtaining that all men acknowledge the supreme dominion of Christ and Mary Immaculate over all creatures? — Resp. The prayer in question is not to be approved, nor propagated among the faithful, nor enriched with indulgences.” Holy Office, 12 June 1895.

“26. Praise which is offered to Mary, as Mary, is vain.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1698.

“The Saints reigning together with Christ are to be venerated and invoked, and they offer prayers to God for us, and their relics are to be venerated. I most firmly assert that images of Christ and of the Mother of God ever Virgin, as well as of the other Saints, are to be had and retained, and that due honor and veneration are to be imparted to them.” Tridentine Profession of Faith.

“I constantly hold that there is a Purgatory and that the souls detained there are aided by the suffrages of the faithful.” Tridentine Profession of Faith. [The source prints the section number “437”; corrected here to “457” from the numerical sequence and the subject indicated in the book’s contents.]

“The suffrages of the faithful living, namely, the sacrifices of Masses, prayers, and alms, and other offices of piety which, according to the institutions of the Church, are customarily performed by the faithful for other faithful, profit them—the souls of Purgatory.” Greek Profession of Faith prescribed by Gregory XIII. The same is contained in the same words in the Oriental Profession of Faith prescribed by Urban VIII and by Benedict XIV.

“1. Whether it is expedient to approve, or at least to permit, a special worship of the adorable Countenance of the Divine Redeemer, distinct from that customarily rendered until now to the image of the Holy Face, which is being most greatly propagated through the annals of the relevant archconfraternity by the priests called Priests of the Holy Face (Sainte Face), established at Tours. — 2. Whether, in order to propagate or establish the worship concerning which there is question in the other query, it is expedient to dedicate a church or public oratory, to establish confraternities, and even to found some religious congregation or institute under the title of the Holy Face. — Resp. To the 1st: It is not expedient. — To the 2nd: In the negative; and according to the intention.

“The intention is: in adopting the title of the Holy Face, both in the Brief dated 16 Dec. 1884 granting special indulgences to the confraternity erected at Tours under such a title, and in the Brief dated 30 March 1885 elevating the confraternity to the rank of an archconfraternity, the Holy See did not in the least intend to favor, much less either directly or indirectly to give approval to, a special and distinct worship to be rendered to the adorable countenance of the Redeemer in that manner which is especially proposed and propagated by those called Priests of the Holy Face.

“The Holy See intended to favor solely the veneration already shown from ancient times toward the image of the Countenance of the Divine Redeemer, or toward copies of that image, so that, from the veneration and contemplation of the aforesaid image, the memory of the Passion of Christ may increase more from day to day in the minds of the faithful, and in their hearts sorrow for sins and an ardent desire of making reparation for injuries inflicted upon the Divine Majesty may be augmented.” Holy Office, 4 May 1892.

“The Supreme Sacred Roman Universal Inquisition wholly prohibits and condemns the title: The Penitent Heart of Jesus — The Heart of Jesus doing penance for us — Jesus doing penance — Jesus doing penance for us.” Holy Office, 15 July 1893.

“1. When certain matters concerning devotion toward the Most Holy Soul of Our Lord Jesus Christ had been referred by the Sacred Congregation of Rites to the Holy Office, on Wednesday, 10 March 1875, it was decreed: Care is to be taken lest, under the pretext of devotion toward the Most Holy Soul of Christ, novelties deserving reprobation creep into the public worship of the Church in images, formulas of prayer, and other sacred things, or anything new be introduced without consultation of the Holy See, especially if they are derived from devotions or visions neither examined nor approved. Moreover, in the writings sent to the Sacred Congregation of Rites certain things are found which are by no means to be approved, without the amendment of which it is not to be permitted that those writings be published among the people.

“2. In the year 1883, petitions having been presented for the foundation of an Institute for the adoration of the Most Holy Soul of Our Lord Jesus Christ, on Wednesday, 10 May of the same year, the same Most Eminent Fathers issued the decree: The Sacred Congregation responds to the petitions: In the negative. And this is to be written to the Bishop, who is to withdraw the indulgences attached to the prayers and to each word of them, and is to place no faith in the revelations concerning which there is question; and the decree issued in the year 1875 is to be communicated to the Bishop.

“3. Finally, in the same year and on the same Wednesday, when a certain formula of prayer to the Soul of Jesus Christ was called up for examination, the Most Eminent Fathers ordered it to be amended and ordered the decree reported above to be communicated to the Bishop who had approved it.” Holy Office, May 1901.

“1. Whether and how it is expedient to approve the title of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which the new Institute of the Sisters A. of M., of the diocese of P., assumes. “2. Whether, if the aforesaid title is admitted, it is also expedient to admit among the other feasts of the aforesaid Institute that of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary. — Resp. To each: In the negative.” Holy Office, 13 Dec. 1893.

“The worship of St. Joseph under the title Friend of the Sacred Heart (ami du S. Cœur) was made the object of a special examination; and the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Cardinals, General Inquisitors in matters of faith and morals, all the circumstances, especially those occurring in the case, having been maturely weighed, decreed, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, that no pronouncement was to be made concerning the matter proposed. — Furthermore, the aforesaid Most Eminent Fathers ordered that the Sacred Congregation of Rites be admonished not thereafter to issue decrees, rescripts, etc., in which in any manner the new title concerning which there is question above is approved, or even in which it is simply mentioned.” Holy Office.

“The worship of the Heart of St. Joseph had already been reproved by Gregory XVI, and for this reason medals which displayed it together with the Most Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary were prohibited.” Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, 19 Feb. 1879; Sacred Congregation of Rites, 14 June 1873. [The source prints “Gregory XIV”; corrected here to “Gregory XVI” as required by the historical chronology of the cited devotion.]

“Whether the temporal nativity of any Saint or Blessed, except that of the Virgin Mother of God and also that of St. John the Baptist, can be celebrated by a liturgical rite or by another manner of sacred solemnity. — Resp. In the negative, even if the celebration should take place on the day of death or on any other day assigned to the commemoration of the same Saint or Blessed.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 19 Dec. 1893, General Decree.

With regard to the worship to be rendered to the Holy Thorn, “the Decrees are to be observed, especially the Decree in Tridentina, 12 March 1836, and the others concerning the worship to be exhibited and prescribed for Relics of the life-giving Cross and of the other instruments of the Lord’s Passion.” Holy Office, 17 Sept. 1897. — The Decree in Tridentina, to the 1st, declares that a Relic of the Most Holy Cross is not to be exposed above the Tabernacle containing the Eucharist. The other, in Varsavien., to the 12th, declares that one knee is to be bent before a Relic of the Most Holy Cross exposed in the principal place upon the altar. These things are also confirmed by other Decrees.

“Whether the practice of separating Relics of the Most Holy Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ from relics of the Saints is correct and to be retained. — Resp. In the affirmative, and to the Most Eminent Prefect according to the intention. And the intention was that it be written both to the Most Eminent Vicar of the City and to the Most Reverend Sacristan of the chapel of the Apostolic Palace, to whom the custody of sacred relics pertains, that the decrees previously issued for the separation of Relics of the Most Holy Cross from relics of the Saints be restored to force.” Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, 22 Feb. 1847.

“Whether in a solemn procession of the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, both on the day of Corpus Christi and in Holy Week, it is lawful to carry instruments of the Most Holy Passion of Our Savior Jesus Christ, namely, a fragment of the Most Holy Cross or of the Thorn. — Resp. In the negative.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 17 June 1684, n. 1731.

“Whether outside the feast of Corpus Christi and its octave it is lawful, in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary or of the Saints, to carry the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist in evening processions, and also images or relics of the Blessed Virgin herself and of the Saints. — Resp. In the affirmative, with the consent of the Ordinary, as regards the first part; in the negative as regards the second.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 31 Jan. 1896, nn. 3878, 3997.

“Can ancient reliquaries with Relics, which lack an authentic document and formerly belonged to suppressed monasteries, be exposed upon the altar, as has been done from time immemorial? — Resp. In the negative.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 23 June 1892, Lauden., to the 5th.

“There are many relics enclosed in precious silver reliquaries in nearly all the churches of the diocese, even the poorest, for which authentic documents are not held, nor is there knowledge that such documents formerly existed, nor is the time known from which those relics have been possessed. Their number is considerable; and although the reliquaries savor of antiquity, nevertheless there exists in the archives of the parishes or in their histories no certain document proving their authenticity. Yet they are venerated by the peoples with great piety, so that this worship cannot be prohibited without scandal. Therefore, since they are very ancient, so that antiquity itself can constitute an argument sufficient to produce moral certainty, and since among all they have always been and are in the greatest veneration, the Bishop petitioner thinks that worship of this kind can be permitted; nevertheless, to remove every anxiety, he implores the judgment of Your Holiness concerning this. — Resp. Ancient relics are to be preserved in that veneration in which they have hitherto been held, unless in a particular case there are certain arguments that they are false or spurious.” Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, 20 Jan. 1896.

“1. Whether the anterior part of the arm, which is called the forearm, separated from the other, upper part of the same arm, can be held as a notable relic. — 2. Whether the same is to be said of that upper part of the arm, namely, insofar as it too can be held as a notable relic. — 3. Whether the heart, tongue, and hands, if they are miraculously preserved intact, ought to be held as notable relics. — Resp. In the affirmative.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 27 June 1899.

“I profess that which was defined against the Iconoclasts: that images of Christ and of the Virgin Mother of God, as well as of the other Saints, are to be had and retained, and that due honor and veneration are to be imparted to them.” Oriental Profession of Faith prescribed by Urban VIII and by Benedict XIV.

“29. Likewise, whether he believes and asserts that it is lawful for the relics and images of the Saints to be venerated by the faithful of Christ.” Articles from the Bull Inter cunctas of Martin V concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Hus are to be questioned.

“69. The prescription which, generally and without distinction, notes images of the incomprehensible Trinity among images to be removed from the Church, as furnishing to the uneducated an occasion of error: on account of its generality, rash and contrary to the pious practice observed in the Church, as though there existed no images of the Most Holy Trinity commonly approved and safely to be permitted. From the Brief Sollicitudini nostrae of Benedict XIV, of the year 1745. — 70. Likewise, the doctrine and prescription generally reproving every special worship which the faithful are accustomed to render to some image in particular, and their having recourse to it rather than to another: rash, pernicious, injurious both to the pious practice observed in the Church and to that order of providence by which God willed that these things not take place in all memorials of the Saints, He who distributes to each his own as He wills. From St. Augustine, Letter 78, to the clergy, elders, and entire people of the Church of Hippo. — 71. Likewise, that which forbids images, especially those of the Blessed Virgin, to be distinguished by any titles other than denominations analogous to mysteries of which express mention is made in Sacred Scripture, as though other pious denominations, which the Church approves and commends even in her public prayers, could not be ascribed to images: rash, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the veneration due especially to the Blessed Virgin. — 72. Likewise, that which wishes to extirpate as an abuse the custom by which certain images are kept veiled: rash, contrary to the practice observed in the Church and introduced for fostering the piety of the faithful.” Propositions of the Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI.

“25. It is unlawful for a Christian to place an image of God the Father seated in a church.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

From the Brief of Urban VIII, 15 March 1642: “Sacred images are not to be exposed under new forms of dress, but only in that form in which from ancient times they have customarily been exhibited in the Roman Church.” Decree n. 810.

“1. Whether images of the Sacred Heart of Jesus representing the Heart alone, without the rest of the body, may safely be distributed. — 2. Whether they are approved at Rome. — 3. Whether they must be withdrawn from the homes of the faithful where they are objects of veneration. — Resp. To the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd: The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Our Lord Jesus Christ concerning which there is question may be permitted for private devotion, provided that it is not exposed upon altars to be honored with public veneration.” Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891.

“New emblems of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist are not to be approved by the Apostolic See. For fostering the piety of the faithful, the images of the Most Sacred Heart already used and approved in the Church are sufficient, because worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist is neither more perfect than worship toward the Eucharist itself nor different from worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus. Furthermore, the same Most Eminent Fathers ordered that the intention made known by this Sacred Congregation at the command of Pope Pius IX of holy memory, on Wednesday, 13 Jan. 1875, be communicated, namely, that other writers also, who sharpen their talents upon these and other arguments of this kind which savor of novelty, and who under the appearance of piety endeavor to promote unaccustomed forms of worship and titles even through periodicals, are to be admonished to desist from their purpose and to weigh the danger there is of drawing the faithful into error even concerning dogmas of faith, and of furnishing to those who hate religion an occasion for detracting from the purity of Catholic doctrine and of true piety.” Holy Office, 3 June 1891.

Nevertheless, by the Brief Admotae nobis of Leo XIII, 16 Feb. 1903, the title and worship of the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus is approved. “Petitions have been presented to Us … that through Us a pious Archconfraternity under the title of the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus be instituted by Apostolic authority. But We, to whom nothing is more ancient or more pleasant than that a confraternity of the faithful, which, by a worship not wholly dissimilar to that which is professed toward the Sacred Heart, recalls through peculiar exercises of veneration, love, and a grateful and reverent disposition that act of supreme love by which Our Redeemer, pouring forth all the riches of His Heart, instituted the adorable Sacrament of the Eucharist so that He might abide with us until the end of the ages, should obtain a fitting seat in this fostering City, the center of the Catholic world, have judged that assent should be given to these pious desires. These things being so, etc.”

“The Bishop of the diocese of L. asks whether a certain devotion called the Mighty Hand may be considered lawful. It consists in images and medals which represent an open hand having a wound within it and, upon the tips of its fingers, the images of the Child Jesus, of Mary Most Holy, of St. Joachim, and of St. Anne. — Resp. The aforesaid image was previously condemned by the Council of Trent, and let the Bishop take care that the images, medals, and every writing or formula of prayer pertaining to the said devotion be destroyed.” Holy Office, 13 March 1891.

“The Archbishop of N. humbly sets forth that a new article of devotion has been placed on sale there under the name New Cross of the Immaculate Conception. It is a medal in the form of a cross, bearing the image not of Our Lord Jesus Christ, but of the Immaculate on one side, and of the Sacred Hearts with the monogram of the Blessed Virgin on the other. He therefore asks the oracle of Your Holiness whether such a devotion may or may not be approved. — Resp. 14. The aforesaid devotion, as it stands, is not to be approved.” Holy Office, 13 March 1901.

“More than once there has been consideration of a norm to be prescribed for venerating the Blessed Virgin, Mary the Mother of God, under the title Our Lady of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and of images of the Blessed Virgin herself which represent her standing with hands extended and the Child Jesus likewise standing before her knees. And it was decreed that the title indeed could be admitted, but that the images were not to be approved and were to be removed from public veneration, and that they were to be tolerated only in the church of the Sodality of Issoudun; but that, insofar as it could be done, images of the Blessed Virgin Mary carrying the Child Jesus in her arms were to be introduced. Hence the Sacred Order, being greatly solicitous for the law of supplication, which corresponds to the law of belief, after the matter had been maturely weighed, confirming the former decrees and, insofar as need be, renewing them, again disapproves the images concerning which there is question above and forbids them to be proposed to the veneration and piety of the faithful; and where they have been tolerated, it commands that they be cautiously and prudently removed and approved images substituted in their place. — It will not be beside the point here to recall to mind the general admonition appended to the decree of Wednesday, 13 Jan. 1875. (Cf. the preceding paragraph.)” Holy Office, 3 April 1895.

"Our Most Holy Lord... declared, established, and decreed that images and the other things aforesaid, and anything else carrying before itself and indicating veneration and cult, of any persons whatever who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom, whenever that reputation may exist, are not to be placed in oratories or public or private places, or in churches, whether Secular or Regular, of any Religion, Order, Institute, Congregation, or Society whatsoever, before they are canonized or declared Blessed by the Apostolic See; and, if any have been placed, they are to be removed, just as he commanded them immediately to be removed.

2. And likewise he prohibited that henceforth books of the same persons be printed, containing deeds, miracles, or revelations, or any benefits whatsoever as received from God through their intercessions, of those who have departed from life celebrated by reputation or opinion of sanctity or martyrdom, as stated, without the recognition and approval of the Ordinary, who in recognizing them is to employ Theologians and other pious and learned men for counsel; and, lest henceforth fraud, or error, or anything new and disordered be committed in a matter so grave, he is to transmit the instructed matter to the Apostolic See and await its response. But the revelations and miracles and other aforesaid benefits which hitherto have been printed in books containing the life and deeds of these persons without recognition and approval of this kind, His Holiness wills and commands to be judged in no way approved.

3. He also forbade and prohibited that at the sepulchers of these persons tablets and images of wax or silver, or of any other material whatever, whether painted or fashioned and sculpted, be hung or affixed, and lamps or any other lights be lit, without recognition by the Ordinary to be made wholly as above, and to be referred to and approved by the Apostolic See.

4. Declaring that through the above-written things he does not will nor intend to prejudice in any way those who are venerated either by the common consent of the Church, or by immemorial course of time, or by the writings of Fathers and holy men, or by the knowledge and tolerance of the Apostolic See or of the Ordinary through a very long time.

5. But so that the foregoing may be more diligently observed, he strictly commands all and singular, both Ordinaries and Inquisitors of heretical depravity, that each in his own Diocese or Province carefully keep watch lest, without the aforesaid approvals, images with the aforementioned signs be exposed, or the aforesaid miracles, revelations, and benefits be published, or other things be done against what has been disposed above.

6. But transgressors, if they are Regulars, are to be punished with deprivation of their offices and of active and passive voice, and also suspension from Divine things; but if they are secular Clerics, likewise with deprivation of their offices, suspension from Divine things, and from the administration of Sacraments and the execution of their Orders respectively, and with other penalties to be inflicted at the judgment of the aforesaid Ordinaries or Inquisitors, according to the manner of the fault.

7. But those who shall have printed books or painted, sculpted, or in any way fashioned or formed images, and the rest of the craftsmen in any way offending concerning the foregoing, let them lose all the aforesaid things, and besides be affected with monetary and other, even corporal, penalties, according to the gravity of the crime, at the judgment of the same Ordinaries or Inquisitors.

8. Anything whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding." Urban VIII, 13 March 1625.

"Whether the practice of separating Relics of the Most Holy Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ from Relics of the Saints is accurate and to be observed? - Resp. In the affirmative." S. C. Indulg. 22 Feb. 1847.

"Whether nuns, or pious women living a common life under a rule, can, with the license of the Ordinary, first wash Corporals, Palls, and Purificators? - Resp. In the negative." S. R. C. 12 Sept. 1857.

"Having received responsive letters of the Bishop of Corneto concerning the petition of nuns who were prohibited by the Bishop from bleaching Purificators for the service of their Church, the Sacred Congregation granted the requested bleaching, not only for the service of their Church, but also of the whole city, provided that the Purificators are first washed by some Priest and the ablution is placed in the sacrarium." S. R. C. 12 Jan. 1636.

"Whether the custom of exacting an annual canon is sustained in the case? An annual canon of 35 centesimi to be exacted from any parish whatever for obtaining the material of the Most Holy Oils and remunerating the ministers distributing the same. - Resp. The custom can be tolerated." S. C. C. 20 Dec. 1879. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 13, p. 180 ff.

"Whether one who buys crosses, medals, etc., in order to distribute them after they have been blessed with the application of indulgences, can ask their price from the recipients without fault, or without danger of losing the indulgences? Whether they are lost only when someone has made those things his own and has used them with the intention of gaining Indulgences? - Resp. In the negative to the first part; to the second, it does not need a response." S. C. Ind. 22 Feb.; 12 July 1847; 2 Oct. 1840; 15 May 1886.

"... His Holiness... strictly commanded that the Christian faithful, under any pretext whatever, even of redeeming Sacred Relics and remains of the Saints, although enclosed in a little case and furnished with a seal, presume neither to buy nor trade for them, both in the City and outside it. Furthermore he commanded that whoever finds sacred relics standing for sale is to notify the Ordinaries of the places, whose concern it will be to provide opportunely. Therefore the same Most Holy Lord ordered this Decree to be made and published..." S. C. Ind. 21 Dec. 1878. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 11, p. 365. Likewise Letters of the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, by command of Our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII, were given to the Bishops concerning the sacrilegious commerce of false relics, on the 16th day before the Kalends of February 1881. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 14, p. 59.

"1. Whether it is lawful for the Bishops and Clergy to swear the Spanish civil Constitution of the year 1869 according to the formula prescribed by the Government? 2. Whether the Spanish Bishops and the other Ordinaries of places ought, through Pastoral letters, to teach the faithful people concerning the true sense of taking the oath? - As regards the first question, it is easily evident to anyone that the prescribed oath is illicit both for clerics and laymen, the formula of the same oath being considered, circumscribed by no limits. For it cannot be permitted to a Catholic man that he swear that he will observe those laws which are opposed both to divine and to ecclesiastical sanctions. Moreover, the Bishops of Spain do not fail to know, and Your Eminence knows well, that in that Constitution laws are contained by which Catholic unity is gravely wounded, the widest liberty of worships and doctrine is introduced and constituted, and other things opposed to divine and ecclesiastical right are established, which were reproved by the unanimous voice of the Bishops and by the wishes of almost all Spaniards. Hence it happened that there were not lacking those who, with a praiseworthy plan indeed, preferred to resign public offices rather than, with conscience resisting, bind themselves by an oath of this kind. Nevertheless, if the Government perseveres in what it has begun, which may God avert, and the Clergy is driven to issuing this oath, then, in order to avoid greater evils and only in the case of coercion, the Sacred Penitentiary judged that it can be tolerated that the taking of the oath be made according to the prescribed formula, provided that to the text of the formula itself the limitation be added: excepting those things which are opposed to the laws of God and of His Holy Catholic Church. - But as regards the second question, since from the taking of this kind of oath, especially when done by ecclesiastics, occasion of scandal would easily be provided because of the peculiar condition of the Spanish people, unless they are rightly taught about the aforesaid appended limitation, hence this Sacred Penitentiary judged it supremely expedient that Bishops and Ordinaries of places admonish and instruct the flock committed to them concerning the appended limitation by pastoral letters. Indeed, it would be desirable that these pastoral admonitions become known to the people before the mentioned oath is issued. But since similar questions have also been proposed by other sacred Prelates of Spain, I most readily persuade myself that Your Eminence will courteously and willingly deliver a copy of these letters to them, so that in so great a matter all may be able and willing to walk with equal step." Cf. Fr. Villada, Cas. Consc. his present. tempor. accommod., Part 1, De liberalismo, Brussels, 1884, p. 266 f.; Acta S. Sed. Vol. 2, p. 675.

"Whether the oath proposed by the intruding Government is lawful in these or similar words, in which unlimited obedience is contained: I swear fidelity and obedience to Victor Emmanuel, king of Italy, and to his successors. I swear that I will observe the Statute, and every other law of the state, as for the inseparable good both of the king and of the fatherland of Italy. Resp. The oath, as it is set forth, is not lawful; but the oath of merely passive obedience can be tolerated in all those things which are not opposed to Divine and Ecclesiastical Laws, according to the form approved by Pius VII of holy memory, and expressed in these words, namely: I promise and swear that I will never give assistance to conspiracy of any kind, whether assembly or sedition, against the actual Government; and likewise that I will be subject to and obey the same in all those things which are opposed neither to the laws of God nor of the Church." S. Poenit. 10 Dec. 1860. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 561.

"Can a Bishop, when asked, pronounce an oath, or at least what observance can he promise to the new order of things? - Resp. In the negative; both because it is prohibited by the Sacred Canons for Ecclesiastics to issue an oath before lay authorities, and because the oath as proposed is illicit, as is clear from the Response in the Letters of 10 Dec. 1860." S. Poenit. 14 Dec. 1866. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 2, p. 675.

"But it has been reported that in several regions of the Indies, Catholics have been accustomed, if the issuing of an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and exhibited by the Government; but from another side, it is by no means difficult to obtain from the civil Government itself that Catholics be granted the power of issuing the oath upon their own Bibles. Therefore all Apostolic Vicars in whose Missions a use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed should diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian Government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church.

But until they have obtained this from the civil authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful furnishing oaths upon Bibles of Heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath. Meanwhile let them teach the Sacred Congregation whether the Bibles of heretics, exhibited for the oath, are substantially corrupted, whether they are exhibited so as to be approved by Catholics, whether our Latin Vulgate is customarily excluded. Finally, by whom, and in what circumstances, and for what object, oaths of this kind are exacted." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 8 Dec. 1869.

The vow of Communities to celebrate certain Feasts of precept with vigil and procession, insofar as it is by the force of a vow, although confirmed by the Bishop, obliges no one except those making the vow. S. R. C., in the decrees apud Gardellini, nn. 1444, 1624, 1874, 1963, 2019, 4152.

"Is it necessary to obligate under sin the faithful of the Vicariate of Chausy, who cannot hear Mass because of the lack of priests, to assist on feast days, in place of Mass, at pious assemblies of the faithful? - Resp. The faithful who, in the proposed case, cannot hear Mass on feast days are not on that account released from the obligation of sanctifying the Feast through prayers or other pious works; and therefore they are greatly to be exhorted, but nevertheless not obligated under guilt of sin, as though disobedient to a precept of the Church, to strive to be present at those pious assemblies, in which they can be instructed and nourished with the food of the word of God and other exercises of religion, and, joined in prayers in the spirit of charity, can more efficaciously implore Divine aid." S. C. de P. F. 4 Jan. 1798.

On the schools of heretics. - "... Fathers and mothers become guilty of a most enormous sin all the more who, truly cruel toward the souls of their children, send them to the schools of Protestants; and even worse, if they compel them to go. The matter is evident: parents of this kind are to be reproved and detested in their crime, and their amendment is to be sought by all possible means; and at times they are to be kept far from the Sacraments, as being incapable and unworthy, until they have recalled their children from schools of this kind. - The children also, the matter considered in itself, certainly become guilty of grave fault by going to such schools. But in the case of true coercion, the confessor, having weighed the circumstances of the person and of the fact, should act toward them according to the rules proposed by approved authors for cases of this kind." Instr. of the Cardinal Vicar for the Parish Priests of Rome, 12 July 1878.

"Moreover, what had to fall under deliberation first of all was the very manner of instructing youth, proper and peculiar to schools of this kind, non-Catholic schools. This seemed to the Sacred Congregation, even of itself, full of danger and very adverse to the Catholic cause. For the students of such schools, since their own plan excludes every doctrine of religion, will learn neither the rudiments of faith nor be instructed in the precepts of the Church, and therefore will lack knowledge most necessary for man, without which one does not live as a Christian... In the aforesaid schools... teachers are used indiscriminately from every sect, so that it is free to pour errors and seeds of vices into tender minds. A certain corruption also threatens further from this, that in the same schools, or at least in many of them, adolescents of both sexes are gathered into the same room for hearing lessons, and males are ordered to sit on the same bench next to females. All these things bring it about that youth is miserably exposed to harm concerning faith, and morals are placed in danger. - But unless this danger of perversion is made remote from nearby, such schools cannot be frequented with a safe conscience. The natural and divine law itself cries this out... And these things indeed, as founded on natural and divine right, state a certain general principle and have universal force, and pertain to all those regions where this most pernicious method of instructing youth has unhappily been introduced... - Moreover, the Sacred Congregation is not ignorant that the circumstances of things are sometimes such that Catholic parents can, in conscience, entrust their offspring to public schools. But they will not be able to do this unless they have sufficient cause for so acting; and whether such a sufficient cause is or is not present in some particular case will have to be left to the conscience and judgment of Bishops. According to the things reported, it will then generally be present when either no Catholic school is at hand, or the one which is at hand is little suited for instructing adolescents suitably and congruently to their condition. But in order that public schools can be approached in conscience, the danger of perversion, which is more or less always connected with their own plan, must be made remote from nearby by opportune remedies and precautions. Therefore it must first of all be seen whether, in the school about whose attendance there is question, the danger of perversion is of such a kind that it plainly cannot be made remote, as often as there are either taught or done there certain things contrary to Catholic doctrine or good morals, which cannot be heard or done without loss to the soul. Truly such a danger, as is evident of itself, must be wholly avoided with any temporal harm whatever, even of life. - Moreover, in order that youth can in conscience be entrusted to public schools, they must duly and diligently receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, at least outside school time. Wherefore let parish priests and missionaries... diligently apply themselves to catecheses... But let the parents themselves, or those who are in their place, carefully watch over their children... It is manifest from Catholic moral doctrine that those parents who neglect to impart this necessary Christian instruction and education to their children; or who allow them to frequent such schools in which ruin of souls cannot be avoided; or finally who, although a suitable Catholic school is present in the same place and aptly instructed and prepared, or although they have the faculty of educating their offspring as Catholics in another region, nevertheless entrust them to public schools without sufficient cause and without the necessary precautions by which the danger of perversion is made remote from nearby, cannot, if they are contumacious, be absolved in the Sacrament of Penance." Instr. S. C. de P. F. on public schools to the Most Reverend Bishops in the United States of North America, 30 June 1875, approved by the Supreme Pontiff 24 Nov. of the same year.

On non-Catholic Universities. - "By letters given on 3 Feb. 1865 to the Right Reverend Fathers and Lords, the sacred Prelates of England, the Sacred Council called Propaganda signified that it had most willingly confirmed the opinion unanimously proposed by the praised Bishops in the recent London meeting, concerning colleges not to be erected near the English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and concerning Catholic parents to be opportunely persuaded not to send their sons to those Universities; namely, because the same Sacred Council had seen the judgment of the Bishops to be especially consonant with the principles handed down by itself according to the mind of the Supreme Pontiff, as often as it had been consulted concerning the dangers of mixed schools... But since not all have carried the same judgment concerning non-Catholic Universities to be avoided, and since there were even some who judged that it could be tolerated that Catholic youth frequent the aforesaid institutes, either because of the temporal advantages which are obtained in them, or because in their opinion no certain law appears by which access to them is absolutely prohibited, I think it worthwhile that Your Excellency explain clearly in the Pastoral Letter the doctrine concerning proximate occasions of sinning gravely which are to be avoided, to which no one can expose himself without lethal sin, unless grave and proportionate necessity urges, and unless such precautions are employed by which the proximate danger of sinning is removed. Now truly in the matter of which there is question, to which, from the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff, there belongs an intrinsic and most grave danger, not only for honesty of morals, but especially for faith, which is altogether necessary for salvation, who does not see that there scarcely can, or indeed scarcely even can, be given those circumstances in which non-Catholic Universities may be frequented without sin? The lightness of mind and instability of adolescents, the errors which are drunk in, as it were with the air, in the said Institutes without the antidote of sounder doctrine, the very great force which human respect and mockeries of companions exercise upon youths, bring upon adolescents so present and so proximate a danger of falling that generally no sufficient reason can be conceived on account of which adolescents may be entrusted to non-Catholic Universities..." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 6 Aug. 1867.

On mixed schools of heretics. - "1. Whether it is lawful for parents to entrust their children to be instructed in schools of this kind, mixed schools? - Resp. Generally speaking, it is not lawful, but in particular cases this must be left to the judgment and conscience of the Ordinary; nevertheless it will be his office to take diligent care that not only by himself and by parish priests, but also by individual parents, opportune remedies be applied by which the danger of perversion is removed from the students, and at the same time to strive with magistrates and presidents that violence not be done to the conscience of Catholics by using books which are hostile to the Catholic religion; and finally assiduously and earnestly to admonish and exhort all, and especially those who have the means, that they send their children to other regions where they may be educated as Catholics."

2. "Whether it is lawful for a priest in the aforesaid schools to hand down the teachings of the Christian faith, or to discharge the office of Chaplain? - Resp. In the affirmative and according to the mind; the mind is that care is to be taken that priests, or upright laymen of well-known religion, be placed in charge, as far as can be done, not only of handing down the Christian faith, but also of schools of other disciplines. But so that every fear of scandal may cease, the people are to be admonished that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this kind may be averted as far as can be done; and that this therefore ought to serve no one as an excuse not to send his children to merely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no way endangered."

3. "Even if those mixed schools can somehow be tolerated, is it lawful for the Catholics of the Jura to send notice that they renounce their right founded on public agreements, by force of which it is unlawful for anyone to take up the office of teaching in their public schools who does not profess the Catholic religion?" - "Resp. In the negative, whether there is question of an express cession, or even of a tacit cession from silence and culpable tolerance. Therefore, although care must be taken that nothing be done imprudently by which the ferocity of adversaries is stirred up to inflicting graver evils, nevertheless nothing is to be remitted of industry and constancy, so that legitimate means which are in the power of Catholics may be employed to recover the aforesaid right together with the sanctity of the compact and the indemnity of the Catholic Religion." Instr. S. I. C. to the Bishops of Switzerland, 17 Jan. 1866.

On Catholic schools without religious instruction. - "By a very recent decree the catechism is cast out of the municipal Catholic schools; a decree worthy of censure, it removes the barrier against rampant heresy and unbelief... But while, in the name of Religion, we lift up our voices to defend its sacred rights, we also will that it become known to anyone how much a mad plan of this kind is opposed to the good of society... For it is not lawful to renew upon the child the judgment of Solomon and irrationally and inhumanely to divide the same in the middle as regards his intelligence and will; because while the first is cultivated, the second must be directed to acquiring virtuous habits and pursuing the ultimate end... And the matter shines with such splendor that it would be held as true, even at the price of contradiction, by those same persons who desire that the document of Religion be cast out of schools; while they direct their efforts not only to the intellect, but to the will also, striving that ethics, which they call civil and natural, be taught in schools, and taking care that youth be directed to the acquisition of civil and social virtues. But moral philosophy of this kind not only is unable to lead man to the higher end, constituted by the Divine Goodness in the beatific vision of God, but also becomes unequal to this, that the mind of the child be instructed toward true virtue and be able to remain constant on the right path. And rightly have we used the word cast out: because the method devised of offering religious instruction only to those children whose parents expressly request it becomes altogether a mockery. For it is not easy to grasp how the authors of an impious plan did not weigh with what bad feeling a child would be affected who would see himself undertaking religious instruction by a manner wholly different from others... But if there should be parents, as is not difficult, driven either by depravity of mind or by ignorance and sluggishness, who would not ask the benefit of religious instruction for their children, a great part of the young would lack most salutary teachings, with the greatest risk not only to the innocent souls of those children, but also to civil Society itself.

When benefits of lesser moment also were expected, elementary instruction was made obligatory by law, with parents being driven by fines to send their children to schools. Who now will dare to snatch away from Catholic youth religious instruction, which presents itself as a wiser protection for living life uprightly? Is it not cruel to require that children of this kind grow up without any notion of religion...?" Letter of Leo XIII to the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, Tot inter, 26 June 1878.

"The Church, guardian and vindicator of the integrity of faith, which, by the authority handed to it by God its founder, must call all nations to Christian wisdom, and likewise carefully see by what precepts and institutions youth, which is within its power, is cultivated, has always openly condemned schools which are called mixed or neutral, having admonished fathers of families again and again that, in a matter of such importance, they should turn their mind to caution." Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII, Nobilissima Galliarum, to the Bishops of France, 8 Feb. 1884.

On mixed schools of Catholics. - "... It can be tolerated that Schismatic girls be admitted into a college which sisters direct, provided that they show a good disposition, that they be instructed according to the things set forth, and yet that they not be obligated to assist at the Sacrifice of the Mass and other ecclesiastical functions, but that this be left to their judgment; with it forbidden indeed that they ever have disputations with Catholic girls about matters pertaining to religion, or go to a Schismatic temple to receive sacraments from Schismatic ministers. But if in some case this can in no way be prevented, let the sisters behave passively. And likewise with it forbidden that the girls be visited by friends and relatives, except parents and tutors, without the license of the Ordinary. Concerning all these things, the parents or tutors of the same girls are to be clearly and explicitly instructed and to consent to them before the girls themselves are admitted to the College. And let this be written to the Right Reverend Archbishop, the Ordinary, with the warning that he take care of the execution of all these things and of the spiritual good of the girls, as far as can be done, even after departure from the college; and let the sisters be instructed that if any girl asks to be converted to the Catholic faith, the matter is to be referred to the Archbishop himself, who will prudently provide according to the circumstances of the case, and should carefully take care that from the admission of Schismatic girls there be no danger, not even the least, of perversion or indifferentism for the Catholic girls. Feria VI, place IV, 1 June 1866." From this decision it can be concluded what is the mind of the S. C. S. O., and what precautions were prescribed by it in this matter. Nevertheless the decree reported cannot be held as a general rule to be applied to any other mixed boarding school, because of the diverse circumstances of each particular case. Instr. S. C. de P. F. 25 April 1880, n. 66. Cf. Collectan. Constit., etc., for the use of Apostolic Workers, Paris, 1868.

1094. In explaining the moral doctrine concerning the theological and moral virtues, by that very fact we have declared the precepts of the Decalogue connected with them, and also the principal ecclesiastical laws; for these cannot be separated from one another. But since, as St. Augustine testifies, the Decalogue is the sum and epitome of all laws⁵ which must be observed by man, and especially by the Christian, so that he may tend suitably to the last end and happily attain it, it is of no small importance to meditate upon the precepts of the Decalogue and to understand them distinctly, so that by frequent preaching they may be clearly proposed to the faithful, and consciences may be composed, judged, and reformed according to them. In order that pastors and other priests may be as equal as possible to this duty, although we treat the virtues at length in the whole course of the moral Synopsis, it is useful to present a compendious exposition of the individual precepts.

⁵ Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, q. 140, P. L., XXXIV, 644. - Here the Decalogue is treated as it has been completed and perfected by Christ. During the first four centuries, the Fathers scarcely speak of the Decalogue. But St. Augustine, pouring the Christian spirit into the interpretation of the Decalogue, presents it as the sum of the Christian law; for "the ten precepts (depend) upon those two, namely the love of God and of the neighbor, on which the whole Law and the prophets depend." The interpretation which we briefly contract, with the cooperation of E. M. Quevastre, is that which the Catechism of the Council of Trent digested more fully from Christian Tradition. - We have already described the origin and character of the Decalogue in the Treatise on Laws, n. 235-245. Cf. Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. IV, 171-176.

"Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me."⁶

⁶ Exod. 20:3.

1095. This precept, first and greatest of all not only in order, but in reason, dignity, and excellence, consists of a double part, as do the other precepts, namely an affirmative and a negative part; these we shall touch on successively.

1. As affirmative, it commands the eliciting of acts of faith, hope, and charity, by which we worship God as faithful, whose oracles we rightly and deservedly assent to; as omnipotent and merciful, in whom we place all our hopes; as full and overflowing with goodness and perfection, whom we embrace with the whole heart. Against this precept sin those who fall into heresy, who put faith in dreams, auguries, and other most vain things, who cast away hope of their salvation, who rely on riches and on bodily health and strength, who conceive hatred and weariness of God, etc.

1096. 2. By the other part of the precept, which is negative, idolatry, or the worship of false divinities, is prohibited.

(a) But the veneration and invocation of the holy angels and blessed souls are not prohibited, nor even the cult of sacred relics. For we honor the saints as the household members, friends, and ministers of God: this manner of acting is commended by manifold theological reason, apostolic and ecclesiastical custom, the benefits and patronage of the saints themselves, and many and great miracles.⁷

⁷ On these things cf. St. Ambrose, Epist. XXII, P. L., XVI, 1019 sq.; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XXII, 8, P. L., XLI, 700; Confessions, IX, 7, P. L., XXXII, 770.

(b) Nor is the art of fashioning or sculpting prohibited, unless the majesty of God be injured. This could happen for a double reason: one, if idols and images were worshiped as God, or it were believed that some divinity or power was in them, or that something was to be asked from them, or that confidence was to be fixed in images; the other, if someone tried to fashion the form of the divinity by some art, as if it could be seen by bodily eyes or expressed by colors or figures.

(c) Hence it is lawful to represent by images the persons of the Most Holy Trinity, especially after the manner of the apparitions which are related in Sacred Scripture; it is lawful to fashion or paint images of Angels, Saints, the Blessed Virgin Mary, and Christ Himself. For representations of this kind teach us the attributes and benefits of God, the virtues and intercession of the Saints, and consequently excite us to worship, invocation, and imitation. Besides, pastors should take care to restrain abuses and superstitions which can creep into the use of images, according to the decree of Trent.

All these things indeed we have explained above, namely: (A) as to the virtues: (a) the necessity of faith for salvation, n. 628-630; the truths which must be explicitly believed by necessity of means, n. 631-637; the truths by necessity of precept, n. 639-647; and also the obligation of externally professing the faith, n. 648-654; - sins against faith, namely heresy and doubt in faith, 656-662; apostasy and adhesion to Masonic sects, 663-666; infidelity, 667-668; and the chief causes which induce loss of faith, 669-688; nor did we pass over the means by which we are able to progress in faith, 689-694.

(b) The nature and properties of hope, 696-713; its necessity, 714-718; sins against hope, namely despair and presumption, 720-725; adding a few things concerning the means of progressing in hope, 726-729.

(c) The nature of charity toward God, 745-748; the necessity of loving God above all things, 749-754; sins against this virtue, especially hatred of God, 755-757; the means of progressing in the love of God, 758-763.

(d) The precept of charity toward the neighbor, 769-779; insofar as it includes the love of enemies, 780-789; alms to be given to the poor, 790-795; fraternal correction, 796-804; and also the order to be observed in charity, 805-816; the works of social charity so necessary today, 817-835; sins opposed to fraternal charity, namely discord and contention, 836-839; scandal, 840-850.

(e) The necessity of the virtue of religion, especially of adoration and prayer, 855-873, and also of devotion, 886-893. - Concerning the cult of Blessed Mary and the saints, concerning sacred images and relics, we have written elsewhere, in De Verbo Incarnato, near the end.

(B) As to vices: (a) idolatry, 895-896; (b) vain observances and various superstitions in which the devil intervenes, 899-905; (c) tempting God, by which an unusual effect is expected from God without cause, 925-928; (d) sacrilege and simony, or the unworthy handling of a thing or person sacred to God, 929-942.

"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."⁸

⁸ Exod. 20:7.

1097. Although, in the first precept of the divine law, this which follows in the second place is necessarily contained, nevertheless God, because of the greatness of the matter, willed to give separately this law concerning the honoring of His own divine and most holy name.

1. As affirmative, the second precept commands us to honor the name of God, and by it to swear holily.

But we are commanded to honor not the name itself taken literally, according to the vain superstition of certain Jews, but the omnipotent and eternal majesty of the one and triune Deity which the name of God signifies.

The name of God, thus understood, is honored: (a) by confession, by which we acknowledge God and His Christ to be our Lord and the author of our salvation; (b) by meditation on the word of God, by which His will is declared; (c) by praise, by which, following the example of David and Job, we celebrate the magnificent attributes and works of God, and give singular thanks to Him for all things, both prosperous and adverse; (d) by prayer, by which we confidently implore His help; (e) by vow, by which we irrevocably refer certain works to the worship of God; (f) we pursue the name of God with honor when, for the sake of making faith, we call God as witness, whatever the form and conception of words by which this is done; for both "God is my witness" and "By God" are the same. We can also swear by created things, as by the sacred Gospels of God, by the Cross, by the relics of the Saints, and other things of that kind, insofar as the splendor of the divine majesty shines forth in those things.

There are two kinds of swearing: one assertory, when we religiously affirm something concerning a present or past matter, as the Apostle does in the Epistle to the Galatians;⁹ the other promissory, to which also threats are referred, looking to future time, when we promise and confirm as certain that something will be so; of this kind is that oath of David directed to Bersabee.¹⁰

⁹ Gal. 1:20.

¹⁰ 3 Kings 1:29.

For a legitimate oath three things are required: (a) truth, insofar as what is asserted is itself true, and he who swears judges that it is so, or insofar as he who promises something is so disposed that, when the time comes, he will actually perform it; (b) judgment, by which the oath is employed not rashly and inconsiderately, but advisedly and thoughtfully; whence it has been established that an oath not be exacted from children before the fourteenth year;¹¹ (c) justice, which is especially required in promises; therefore if someone promises something unjust and dishonorable, he both sins by swearing, and by making promises heaps crime upon crime, as Herod¹² and the Jews did, who wickedly pledged that they would taste nothing until they had killed Paul.¹³

¹¹ Gratian, Decretum, p. II, C. 22, q. 5, c. 16.

¹² Mark 6:23.

¹³ Acts 23:12.

Under these conditions it is plainly lawful to swear, as is established by the authority of Scripture¹⁴ and by manifold reason.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ps. 18:8; Deut. 6:10, 13; Ps. 62:12; Apoc. 10:3.

¹⁵ Cf. Catech. Rom., here, 7.

2. As negative, the second precept forbids: (a) to swear without counsel, without truth, without justice, or with some contempt, as if someone were to swear that he would not obey the evangelical counsels, or were to swear by false gods; (b) to injure the word of God, either by bending Sacred Scripture from its right and genuine meaning to the dogmas and heresies of the impious, or by twisting it to scurrilous and fabulous things; (c) to blaspheme, which is a far more detestable crime.

Concerning this we have treated in the Treatise on the Virtue of Religion, explaining namely: (a) how there are prohibited: blasphemy, n. 919-924; the vain taking of the name of God, 961-963; rash oath and the violation of a legitimate oath, 947-957; and also violation of a vow, 984-989; - (b) how reverence for the name of God is prescribed, which is shown by frequent invocation and praise, n. 963; by the religious observance of an oath, 947-952; and by the faithful fulfillment of a vow, 979-989.

"Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day."¹

¹ Exod. 20:8.

1098. By this precept of the law exterior and social worship is prescribed, which is, as it were, a certain fruit of the preceding precept. This duty of religion was once assigned to the sabbath, yet by positive ordinance; hence the cult of the sabbath, instituted as a sign of creation and of liberation from Egyptian servitude, could be transferred to Sunday in memory of the Resurrection of Christ and of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

Although this precept differs from the rest in this, that with respect to time, rite, and ceremonies it is positive, nevertheless it agrees with them because it has something which is prescribed by natural right. For to render worship and religion to God is an inclination and law of nature; whence among all nations we see that there have been certain fixed and public feasts, which were consecrated to sacred things and to divine duties.

1. By the third precept we are commanded to assist at the most holy sacrifice of the Mass; but besides this, there are commended frequency of the sacraments, especially confession of sins and Communion, the hearing of the word of God, prayer and divine praises, and works of mercy.

2. Works which impede divine worship are prohibited, namely every kind of servile work, and besides and especially sin; but by no means those things which pertain to worship itself, such as preparing the altar, adorning churches, or other things that are necessary.

Concerning these things the treatment was given at n. 1006-1047.

"Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth..."²

² Exod. 20:12.

1099. 1. This precept agrees with the first three: for if we do not venerate and honor parents, whom we ought to love next after God, since they are almost always before our eyes, what honor, what worship shall we give to God, the supreme and best parent, who falls under no sight?³

³ 1 John 4:20.

(A) Besides those who begot us, there are many whom we ought to honor in the place of parents, either by reason of power, or dignity, or utility, or some excellent function and office. Thus there are to be honored: (a) prelates of the Church and priests, who have begotten us in Christ Jesus through the Gospel,⁴ and as it were travail again with their little children until Christ be formed in us;⁵ (b) magistrates who govern the republic; (c) guardians and teachers, to whose care, fidelity, probity, and wisdom we are entrusted; (d) the aged and those worn out by age.

⁴ 1 Cor. 4:14.

⁵ Gal. 4:19.

(B) But especially are father and mother to be honored by us, who are certain images, as it were, of the immortal God, from whom life has been given to us, whom God used in order to impart to us an immortal soul, by whom we were led to the sacraments, instructed in religion and in human and civil culture, and educated to integrity of morals and holiness.

2. The honor of parents includes: (a) love, since they are so disposed toward us that they flee no labor, no striving, no dangers for our sake; (b) prayer, that they may be most commended to God and to the saints; (c) obedience, by which we conform our manner of acting to their judgment and will; (d) imitation, since we seem to attribute very much to those to whom we wish to be as similar as possible; (e) help as to the necessities of body and soul, especially in sickness, taking care lest they omit anything that pertains either to confession of sins or to the other sacraments; (f) care for burial and funeral rites, and also suffrages for hastening the repose of the soul.

In this same manner Bishops and Pastors are to be honored, assisted, and heard; Princes are to be observed and helped by prayers. The same is true of others who rightly and deservedly are called fathers, such as magistrates and the aged: for they are worthy to receive honor and benefit from our charity, obedience, and help.

3. Parents also have their own proper duties and functions: (a) that they imbue their children with most holy disciplines and morals; (b) that by their examples they inculcate equity, continence, modesty, and religion; (c) moreover that they especially avoid three things: 1) lest they speak or determine anything too harsh against their children, so that they do not become fainthearted;⁶ 2) lest by dissolute indulgence they corrupt their children; 3) lest in the education and instruction of their children they enter into preposterous counsels, being occupied in this one thought and care, that they may leave a rich and ample patrimony, while not solicitous about eternal salvation.

⁶ Col. 3:21.

Concerning these things it has been said in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 969-1002 (30-63).

"Thou shalt not kill."⁷

⁷ Exod. 20:13.

1100. 1. It is not prohibited: (a) to kill animals, "because they are not associated with us by any reason,"⁸ and to eat them has been granted by God to men; (b) to inflict capital punishment upon wicked and criminal men, by which the life of men may be kept safe; (c) to take life from enemies, with only the aim of public utility; (d) to kill another for the sake of defending one's safety; (e) nor is he guilty of this precept who by chance kills a man; in this, however, one can sin for two reasons: 1) if someone, occupied in an unjust matter, kills a man; 2) if, not having examined all things, he negligently and incautiously kills someone.

⁸ St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, I, 20, P. L., XLI, 35.

2. What is forbidden. (a) But other killings are prohibited, whatever be the difference either of the killer, or of the one killed, or of the killing. All, namely even the rich, even the powerful, even parents, ought to abstain from killing; all, even those of humble and abject condition, are defended by the force of this law; nor is it lawful for anyone to kill himself; every manner also of accomplishing killing is interdicted, namely physical perpetration and moral cooperation. (b) It is also prohibited to indulge anger without just cause, by which a way can be prepared for killing.

3. But we are commanded to have peace and charity with all, even enemies and those causing troubles;⁹ and consequently to cultivate patience,¹⁰ beneficence, meekness, and forgiveness of injuries.

⁹ Matt. 5:23.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 13:4.

4. Indeed, for the perfect observance of the precept we receive from the Lord the counsel of not resisting evil, of offering the other cheek to one striking the right, and of letting go cloak and coat to one seeking them.¹¹

¹¹ Matt. 5:39.

Concerning these things we discuss in the Treatise on Justice, namely: concerning suicide and self-mutilation, n. 289-308; concerning the killing of the innocent, of malefactors, and of an unjust aggressor, 311-333; concerning duel, 334-344; concerning war, 345-363.

"Thou shalt not commit adultery."¹²

¹² Exod. 20:14.

1101. 1. As to the negative part, by this precept there are prohibited: (a) adultery, which, besides the baseness which is common to it with other kinds of intemperance, also has joined to it a sin of injustice not only against the neighbor, but also against civil society; (b) every kind of impurity and immodesty, indeed every intimate lust of the soul, insofar as these dispose to adultery and disturb the order of generation divinely instituted.

2. As to the affirmative part, chastity is prescribed to each one, to be observed according to his state. For procuring this, these will be of the greatest help: (a) consideration of the baseness inhering in carnal sins, and of the injustice by which adultery is compounded, together with the infamy and manifold ruin which follow sins of this kind; (b) avoidance of idleness, excess in food and drink, immodest looking with the eyes, more elegant adornment, lascivious speech, and obscene books; (c) for suppressing the force of lust, confession and Communion should be employed, assiduous prayers joined with alms and fasting, vigils, pious pilgrimages, and other afflictions of this kind.

Concerning these things we have treated in the Treatise on Chastity and in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony.

"Thou shalt not steal."¹³

¹³ Exod. 20:15.

1102. 1. By this precept there is prohibited any taking away or possession of another's thing, which in the broad sense is called theft. But if we speak more strictly, there is distinguished: theft, by which something private is taken from a private person; peculation, by which something public is taken; plagium, by which a free man is carried off into servitude; sacrilege, by which a sacred thing is seized.

(A) How grave these sins are appears: (a) from their nature, by which they are contrary to justice and sometimes to religion; and from their consequences, which are hatred, enmities, and condemnations of innocent men.

(B) Guilty of theft are: (a) those who occupy the things of others; (b) those who employ frauds in the quality of merchandise, in weight and measure; (c) those who do not furnish owed work or who plunder the resources of masters; (d) those who extort money by deceitful begging; (e) those who do not fulfill an office undertaken; (f) nor are sons of families and wives alien from the same fault, when they steal money from fathers and husbands. All these injustices are committed secretly and furtively; whence they are called thefts in the stricter sense.

(C) But guilty of rapine, which is the taking of another's thing openly and sometimes by force and violence, are: (a) those who do not pay wages to workers; (b) those who practice usury; (c) those who have judgments for sale; (d) those who, after taking a period of time for paying, buy goods on their own or another's credit and do not free the pledge; (e) those who exact debts owed to themselves too harshly; (f) those who withhold grain in time of necessity.

(D) Bound to restitution are not only those who have committed theft, but also all those cooperating in theft, such as those commanding, advising, consenting, participating in the thing taken, not prohibiting, not disclosing, and receiving. Nor do these excuse: care of preserving status and of having the convenience of life, the abundance of those from whom a thing is taken, the custom or occasion of stealing, the desire of taking revenge, the necessity of paying debts.

2. They observe the seventh precept more abundantly who exercise various works of mercy, devote themselves to labor, and cultivate frugality and thrift, so that they may do good to others.

Concerning this we treat in the Treatise on Justice, 431-610, 613-938.

"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor."¹⁴

¹⁴ Exod. 20:16.

1103. 1. There are prohibited: (a) false testimony against any man whatever, even for favoring him, not only in judgment, but also outside judgment; (b) detraction through calumny and backbiting; (c) the stirring up of discords; (d) flattery; (e) lying; (f) simulation; (g) contumely; (h) rash judgment.

2. But there is commanded: (a) that judges exercise forensic judgments justly and according to the laws; (b) that the accused and the guilty confess the truth when they are legitimately interrogated; (c) that witnesses bring true and certain testimony when they are questioned by a judge according to the norm of law; (d) that advocates defend just causes justly and measure their fee according to right and equity by their work; (e) that accusers and petitioners exactly observe truth and justice toward all, even adversaries.

Concerning these things the treatment was given in the Treatise on Justice: (a) concerning rash judgment, n. 365-373; (b) concerning detraction, or defamation, through evil-speaking and calumny, 374-395; (c) concerning contumely, or injury to honor, 397-400; (d) concerning false testimony and lying, 401-417; and in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, where the duties of judges, accused persons, witnesses, advocates, etc., are treated, n. 992-1020.

"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house: neither shalt thou desire his wife, nor his servant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his."¹⁵

¹⁵ Exod. 20:17.

1104. By these precepts we are admonished that the law of God is of such a kind that it must be observed not only in external acts, but also in the intimate sense of the soul.

1. Here there is prohibited, not the very power of desiring, which may be used both for good and for evil, but only that lust of desiring which the Apostle calls the concupiscence of the flesh.¹⁶ Now this cupidity is condemned either because it seeks evil, as adulteries, or because the things sought are another's, such as house, field, wife, ox, ass, and many other things, which, by the very fact that they are another's, the divine law forbids one to covet.

¹⁶ Gal. 5:16, 24.

Above others, however, those labor under this vice of cupidity: (a) those who delight in dishonorable games, or who abuse games immoderately; (b) merchants who desire a shortage of goods and high prices of grain, and who take it ill that others besides themselves sell or buy, so that they themselves may sell more dearly or buy more cheaply; (c) those who desire others to be in need so that they themselves may gain by selling or buying; (d) physicians who desire diseases; (e) legal consultants who covet the force and abundance of causes and lawsuits, etc.

2. The affirmative part of the precept, especially of the tenth, consists in this, that if riches abound, we not set the heart on them, and be prepared to cast them away through zeal for piety and divine things, and gladly spend money in relieving the miseries of the poor; if means are lacking, that we bear poverty with an equal and cheerful soul. By this law likewise it is prescribed that with ardent zeal and the highest desire we choose that to be done, not which we covet, but which God wills, as is explained in the Lord's Prayer.

Concerning internal sins and desires we have treated above, n. 499-506.

These are, summarily set forth, the holy precepts of God, of which a richer explanation can be found both in the course of our moral Synopsis and in the reading and meditation of the third part of the Roman Catechism. Moreover, the Roman Catechism teaches us both the manner of proposing doctrine persuasively and clearly, and the considerations by which souls may be moved to observing the law of God, whether considered in general or in the individual precepts.

1105. That authority belongs to the Church for making laws binding in conscience, we have already proved in the Treatise on the Church, n. 843. In truth she has promulgated many laws, concerning which we spoke above, n. 257-331. But among manifold laws of this kind, some are by antonomasia called the precepts of the Church, because they are of greater moment and touch all the faithful: five, six, or seven are numbered according to diverse times and various provinces of the Church.

The collection of these precepts under a common name does not seem ancient: for it is not found in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, published in the year 1566; but Peter Binsfeld (Enchiridion theol. pastoralis, 1591) already enumerated five precepts of the Church; Bellarmine, in his Catechism, 1598, set forth six; and P. Fagundez (+ 1645) published an entire treatise on the five precepts of the Church.¹

¹ A. Villien, Histoire des Command. de l'Eglise, in Revue du Cl. francais, t. XLI (1905), p. 562.

Formerly five were numbered as contained in these little verses:

"Keep the feasts, be present at the sacred rite; observe the fasts;
Let confession be annual; let Communion be at Easter."

Therefore the first precept is the sanctification of feasts which the Church has instituted, according to what was said above, n. 1010. - The second commands the hearing of Mass on Sundays and feast days, above, n. 1020-1037. - The third embraces fasting and abstinence from flesh: these two precepts formerly formed one, but today they are commonly distinguished, since often, according to today's discipline, abstinence is imposed without fasting. - The two latter, annual confession and paschal Communion, you will find declared in the Treatises on Penance and on the Eucharist. - In certain regions, however, a seventh precept is added concerning the contribution of support for the sustenance of pastors.

Therefore it remains to speak of three things: 1. concerning fasting; 2. concerning abstinence from flesh; 3. concerning the sustenance of pastors.

1106. Fasting is threefold: (a) natural, which consists in complete abstinence from food and drink: such is the Eucharistic fast, which is required from the midnight preceding Communion; (b) ecclesiastical, which consists in abstinence from food, not total, but according to limits predefined by the Church; (c) moral, which is moderation in taking food and drink, and, by extension, in other pleasures either of the soul or of the body.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147; Billuart, De Jejunio; St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 1005 sq.; Ball. P., n. 1103-1153; Marc, n. 1218-1243; Lehmkuhl, n. 1210-1222; Noldin, n. 662-680.

Here ecclesiastical fasting is treated; we shall explain: 1. its origin and utility; 2. the manner of observing the law of fasting; 3. the causes which excuse from it.

1107. 1. Historical evolution of the law of fasting.³ (A) Under the Old Law, fasting is commended many times, and sometimes also prescribed.

³ Thomassin hands down fully and learnedly the brief history which we outline, Traite des Jeunes de l'Eglise, Paris, 1680.

(a) Thus it is presented as conferring greater force on prayer: "Prayer is good with fasting";⁴ hence David fasted that he might obtain from the Lord the health of his child;⁵ Judith is praised because she fasted all the days of her life, except the sabbaths and new moons and the feasts of the house of Israel;⁶ Esther fled to the Lord in prayer and fasting;⁷ Judas Machabeus, with his companions, prepared himself for battle by prayer and fasting.⁸ - Fasting, moreover, is preached as a means of doing penance and obtaining mercy from God: "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping";⁹ and so the Ninivites obtained their conversion and salvation by prayer, lamentation, and fasting.¹⁰

⁴ Tob. 12:8.

⁵ 2 Kings 12:16.

⁶ Judith 8:6.

⁷ Esth. 14:2.

⁸ 2 Mach. 13:12; cf. 1 Esdr. 8:23.

⁹ Joel 2:12.

¹⁰ Jonah 3:5, 10.

(b) Moreover the Jews had been commanded to fast on the tenth day of the seventh month;¹¹ and in the time of captivity the fasts of the fourth, fifth, and tenth month had been instituted.¹² - The Pharisees fasted more frequently.¹³ - But God was not placated by external fasting unless they at the same time cultivated true penance, justice, and charity.¹⁴

¹¹ Exod. 16:29.

¹² Zach. 8:19.

¹³ Luke 18:12.

¹⁴ Isa. 58:3-7.

1108. (B) Under the New Law, (a) Christ commended fasting by His own example, fasting forty days and nights before He preached the Gospel.¹⁵ He did not impose a law of fasting on His disciples, but at the same time announced that they would afterward be occupied with fasting;¹⁶ and He commands those who fast to avoid hypocrisy and ostentation, lest they be seen by men as fasting, but by the Father who sees in secret.¹⁷ - Nowhere, however, is it read that Christ Himself established certain fasts.

¹⁵ Matt. 4:2.

¹⁶ Matt. 9:14-15.

¹⁷ Matt. 6:16-18.

(b) The Apostles and first disciples are said to have fasted sometimes, especially when there was question of the election and consecration of ministers of God.¹⁸ Paul relates that he and other ministers of Christ often fasted.¹⁹ Yet it is not read in the sacred Scriptures that they established the law of fasting; but some Fathers say that the Lenten fast is observed in the Church according to the tradition of the Apostles; nevertheless Augustine confesses that it was not defined by Christ and the Apostles on which days one ought to fast.²⁰

¹⁸ Acts 13:2-3; 14:22.

¹⁹ 2 Cor. 6:5; 11:27.

²⁰ St. Augustine, Epist. 36, c. 14, P. L., XXXIII, 151.

1109. (c) Whatever the case, in the Church the custom soon prevailed of fasting in the time of Lent, for imitating Christ and doing penance before paschal Communion. Thus St. Jerome wrote to Marcella:²¹ "We, according to the tradition of the Apostles, with the whole world agreeing with us, fast one Lent; they (the Montanists) make three Lents in a year, as if three Saviors had suffered." - In truth, already in the fourth century, the Lenten fast was observed in both Churches, with this difference, however, that in the Eastern Church the fast lasted through seven weeks, because it was interrupted on every sabbath and Sunday, while in the Western Church it lasted only six weeks, because it was interrupted only on Sunday.²² - A few days were added to this fast by private persons, for the sake of devotion, namely the days of the weeks of Sexagesima and Quinquagesima; and, from the ninth century, the obligatory custom of fasting on the four days preceding Lent was introduced, so that, Sundays being deducted, the fast of forty days might be completed.²³ - But the devotion of the faithful did not stop here: certain persons began to fast outside Lent on two or three days each week, though this was not commanded by law. But gradually the custom prevailed, around the fifth century, of fasting for a few days at the four seasons of the year, to imitate the practice of the Jews and to dedicate the whole year to God; afterward the ordinations of priests and deacons could be celebrated only on these days.²⁴ - Later, in the sixth century, in certain churches there was instituted a fast of three days in each week of Advent.²⁵ At almost the same time, it was established that fasting be done during the triduum of the Rogations, first in particular Churches, soon in the universal Church. - Finally, from the sixth century, the custom also began of fasting on the vigils of the principal feasts, for example, of the Nativity of the Lord, Epiphany, Assumption, and the feasts of the Apostles.²⁶

²¹ St. Jerome, Epist. 41, P. L., XXII, 475.

²² See the authorities in Thomassin, op. cit., I, ch. 7, p. 33-44.

²³ Thomassin, op. cit., II, ch. 1, p. 224 sq.

²⁴ Thomassin, op. cit., I, ch. 21.

²⁵ Thomassin, I, ch. 23.

²⁶ Thomassin, II, ch. 14.

1110. (d) But the manner of fasting was much stricter in the first times than in ours: namely, one meal was taken in the Latin Church after Vespers, that is, toward the end of the day; in the Greek Church a meal was taken more often, but a very small one.²⁷ In those times, the faithful abstained not only from food, but also from wine, and they took only a little water at certain hours to extinguish thirst.²⁸ - But gradually and imperceptibly, from the tenth century, the custom prevailed of taking the meal at the ninth hour (that is, three o'clock after midday), and, a little later, at the noon hour.²⁹ In the thirteenth century, only one eating was permitted, as St. Thomas witnesses.³⁰ But a little later the use prevailed, borrowed from monks, of taking a small collation in the evening hour.³¹ - Finally, in the nineteenth century, the custom began of taking a small quantity of coffee in the morning with a little piece of bread.

²⁷ Thomassin, op. cit., II, ch. 9.

²⁸ Thomassin, II, ch. 7.

²⁹ Thomassin, II, ch. 12.

³⁰ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147, a. 6.

³¹ Thomassin, II, ch. 11.

From this it is clear that the law of fasting is ecclesiastical, introduced by custom, and is to be understood and applied by the custom of various places.

1111. 2. Utility of fasting. The Church, in the Lenten Preface, thus describes the spiritual utility of fasting: "O God, who by bodily fasting dost restrain vices, elevate the mind, bestow virtue and rewards." - In truth fasting, moderately and wisely employed: (a) restrains vices, insofar as it moderates the concupiscence of the flesh; for experience has found that concupiscence is inflamed not a little, not only by sumptuous meals, but by any excess in food and drink, while lust is cooled by abstinence. Now men are prone, on account of the pleasure annexed to food, to indulge in some excesses; but by fasting established at fixed times, they learn moderation, and repair excesses, if any have been committed.

(b) It elevates the mind; for just as man, by taking food immoderately, becomes animal, unfit for intellectual operations, and prone to earthly things; so, on the other hand, he who at fixed times moderately deprives himself of food and drink becomes spiritual, thinks more frequently of spiritual things, and tends more easily to heavenly things.

(c) It bestows virtue, first of all sobriety and temperance: for he who sometimes abstains from lawful things, by that very fact moderates intemperance more easily; and also penance, because fasting, from what was said above, contributes to true amendment of heart: for since we are allured to sin by pursuing pleasure, we are turned away from sin by mortification.

(d) It bestows rewards, namely the eternal crown of glory: for he who, on account of God, abstains from many things will receive a hundredfold in the other life. Wherefore the Apostle said:³² "And every one that striveth for the mastery refraineth himself from all things; and they indeed that they may receive a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible one."

³² 1 Cor. 9:25. Cf. St. Basil, homilies 1 and 2 on fasting.

1112. 1. Extension of the law. The law of ecclesiastical fasting obliges all baptized persons having the use of reason, from the completed twenty-first year of age to the begun sixtieth year (Code, c. 1254). - That this obligation is grave is established from the condemnation of this proposition 23 by Alexander VII, September 24, 1665: "He who breaks the fast of the Church, to which he is bound, does not sin mortally, unless he does this from contempt or disobedience, for example, because he does not wish to subject himself to the precept."¹

¹ In Denzinger, n. 994; cf. Viva on this proposition.

The days on which, from common law, fasting is prescribed are: (a) the Lenten season, from Ash Wednesday² up to Holy Saturday inclusive, except Sundays and feasts of precept, where these are observed, except, however, during Lent; the fast ceases on Holy Saturday after midday (Code, c. 1252).

² In the Milanese church the use is retained of beginning the fast from the first Sunday of Lent, as formerly was commonly done.

(b) The Wednesday and Friday and also the Saturday of the Ember Days; this is done so that at each season of the year the faithful may expiate their sins, obtain new graces, and obtain good ministers from God (for then sacred orders are conferred).

(c) The vigils of certain feasts, namely of the Nativity of the Lord, Pentecost, Assumption, and All Saints: namely for this end, that these feasts may be celebrated devoutly. - But previgils, with respect to fasting and abstinence, are not anticipated. Thus if the feast of the Nativity of the Lord occurs on Monday, the fast and abstinence which are impeded on Sunday are not now to be observed on the preceding Saturday.

1113. 2. Concerning lawful meals. On days of fasting, according to today's discipline, one full meal is permitted, to which can be added a moderate collation and a morning morsel.

(A) Concerning the one meal. From midnight to midnight, only one full meal is permitted, the quantity of which, moreover, has not been determined. Therefore he satisfies the precept who dines more sumptuously so that he may bear the burden of the fast more easily. If he indulges in some excess, he sins indeed against temperance, but not against the law of fasting.

1114. (a) The time at which, from almost universal custom, this meal must be taken is around noon. It is lawful, however, notably to anticipate it when a just cause is present, for example, the necessity of beginning a journey, transacting business, or weakness of constitution. Indeed a notable anticipation (for example, of one hour), even without cause, is not a mortal sin, because it does not remove the substance of the fast, which consists in one full eating.

It is likewise lawful to invert the time of dinner and collation, for a reasonable cause, for example, to take the collation around the eleventh morning hour, and dinner around the sixth evening hour:³ this is very practical today in cities, where people are accustomed to dine in the evening. Indeed, according to some,⁴ when a just cause is present, it is lawful to take the collation in the morning, dinner at midday, and the morsel in the evening, because in this way the substance of the fast is preserved.

³ To the question: "Whether on days of fasting the time of eating can be inverted, by taking the little evening refreshment between the tenth and eleventh morning hour, but deferring dinner to the fourth or fifth evening hour," the Sacred Penitentiary, January 19, 1834, answered: "If there is some cause for the aforesaid inversion, penitents who use this custom are not to be disturbed." (Acta S. Sedis, I, p. 424).

⁴ D'Annibale, III, n. 134; Noldin, n. 674.

(b) Dinner must be morally continuous and not immoderately prolonged. For if it is notably interrupted, it is no longer one meal, but several. What interruption is notable must be judged from the estimation of prudent persons, with attention especially to two things, the intention of the one fasting and the length of the interruption. Generally an interruption is considered slight which does not exceed half an hour; but if someone has begun to dine, and afterward has been legitimately interrupted for an hour, he can complete the dinner, because he had the intention of returning. Moreover, if the interruption is had for a grave cause, for example, for administering the sacraments or helping those dangerously sick, even after two hours it is lawful to return to the dinner; for the Church does not require that someone be forced to pass the day without sufficient refreshment when some duty to be fulfilled presses.

It is not lawful to prolong dinner immoderately, for example, beyond two hours, unless a special cause is present, for example, the custom of prolonging dinner when friends are invited, as happens in certain regions.

1115. (B) Concerning the collation, or little supper. Besides dinner, a collation is permitted, which is commonly taken in the evening; here one must attend to what is lawful to take by custom as to the quantity and quality of foods.

(a) As to the quantity of food, about a fourth part of a full dinner can be taken; and, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 1025), eight ounces (about 240 gr.) can be permitted to all indiscriminately, even if they would be fully refreshed by this quantity. - Besides, attention must be paid to the constitution, duties, and functions of each one, the duration of the fast, etc.; thus in colder regions more is customarily conceded than in warmer ones, more to one laboring through the whole day than to one spending time in leisure, more to one weak and voracious than to one robust and lacking hunger. The general principle is that whatever is necessary can be taken so that one may be able fittingly to obey his duties.

By universal custom it is lawful on the vigil of the Nativity of the Lord to take a quantity twice as great.

(b) As to the quality of foods, the custom of each region is to be followed, since the collation was introduced by custom. In certain regions, fish, eggs, milk products, butter, and cheese are not permitted, but only cakes, bread, fruits, vegetables, and legumes. In others, either by custom or by indult, eggs and milk products are permitted, little fish, or even two or three ounces of larger fish. Hence, in practice, the mandates which Bishops promulgate concerning this matter at the beginning of Lent must be diligently read.

1116. (c) Concerning the morning morsel, or breakfast. From the Code, c. 1251, it is lawful in the morning to take something of food, that is, a small quantity of coffee, chocolate, tea, or something of this kind, with a little piece of bread;⁵ the quantity of nutritive food generally ought not to exceed two ounces (about 60 gr.), unless more is required on account of constitution or duties to be fulfilled.

⁵ Thus from the declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, November 21, 1843. The doubt being proposed: "Whether it can be permitted that in the morning on days of fasting a small quantity of coffee or chocolate be taken with a morsel of bread, as is done in the Canadian region"; it was answered that "those who follow such a use are not to be disturbed."

1117. 3. Concerning those things which can be taken outside these meals. According to today's discipline, outside the aforesaid meals, it is lawful to take something by way of drink or medicine, according to the saying: liquid does not break the fast. By way of drink, it is lawful to drink water, even sugared water, wine, beer, and various liquors, even if in some way they nourish; by way of medicine, coffee, tea, very diluted chocolate, electuaries (in a small quantity) which are made from sugar, juniper, lemon, etc., can be taken, if they are taken for digesting food, preserving the voice, removing stench of the mouth, etc.; indeed, a very small piece of bread before drink, lest the drink harm, provided this is not done frequently, but once or twice in the day. - But what properly has the character of food cannot be taken, for example, broth, honey, milk,⁶ sugar, oil.

⁶ In certain regions purified milk is lawfully taken as a drink.

The quantity of food which is required for grave sin cannot be determined mathematically; it is rather commonly admitted that grave matter is what exceeds four ounces (120 gr.), whether it be taken at one time or in parts through the day. For small eatings taken on the same day coalesce and can constitute grave matter, from proposition 29 condemned by Alexander VII:⁷ "On a day of fasting, he who more often eats some small thing, even if at the end he has eaten a notable quantity, does not break the fast."

⁷ Denzinger, n. 1000; cf. Viva on this proposition.

1118. 4. Concerning abstinence to be observed on days of fasting. (A) From the Code, c. 1252, "the law of abstinence and fasting is to be observed on Ash Wednesday, the Fridays and Saturdays of Lent, and the Ember Days," and the four previgils mentioned above (1112). By the name of flesh understand not only flesh properly so called, but also all parts of animals, such as blood, marrow of bones, brain, fat, lard, and broth expressed from flesh. By no means, however, are fish prohibited. But what is flesh and fish in the ecclesiastical sense must be determined not from the theories of natural philosophers, but from common estimation and the custom of places; for this distinction was especially introduced by custom.

Ancient authors generally held as prohibited the flesh of animals "resting on the earth and breathing,"⁸ and as lawful the flesh of aquatic animals, which live and breathe in water, or at least are nourished by fish. Today, however, with attention to custom, by the name of fish are understood not only fish properly so called, but also: crustaceans, such as crabs, crayfish, sea-urchins (crabes, ecrevisses, homards, langoustes, oursins de mer); mollusks, such as shells, oysters, snails (coquillages, huitres, limacons); reptiles and amphibians, as frogs, turtles (grenouilles, tortues). But the flesh of mammals and birds is prohibited, with a few exceptions from custom; thus otters, beavers or castors, seals (loutres, castors, phoques) are permitted, and in certain regions ducks of a certain species (canards sauvages).⁹

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147, a. 8.

⁹ According to some (Noldin, n. 664), the same is to be said of coots, because their use was conceded to the Minims; but, since this was conceded as a grace, it cannot be inferred from this that it is lawful for all without indult; in truth this faculty was denied to the Carthusians.

1119. (B) In the time of Lent, formerly even on Sundays, besides flesh, eggs and milk products were prohibited by common law, that is, milk and all those things which are made from milk, such as butter, cheese, etc.; but, from can. 1250, the law of abstinence "forbids eating flesh and broth from flesh, but not eggs, milk products, and any condiments even from the fat of animals."

1120. (C) As to gravity of matter, authors do not agree; nevertheless most concede that, as to flesh, matter which exceeds two ounces (60 gr.) is grave. But a greater quantity is required if there is question of a condiment which comes from flesh, or of eggs and milk products.

Since the law of abstinence today differs from the law of fasting, he who knowingly violates both, without reason, commits a double sin in itself. Indeed, according to the common opinion, one sins against abstinence as many times as flesh is eaten by morally distinct acts. Otherwise one must speak of the law of fasting, which can be violated only once in a day. - In practice, however, attention must be paid to the psychological dispositions of violators of the law: often they apprehend all these things only confusedly, by way of one thing, and commit only one sin.

1121. 5. Concerning the forbidden mixing of flesh and fish. By a law handed down by Benedict XIV,¹⁰ one who by force of dispensation had received license to eat flesh could not, on days of fasting, eat flesh and fish together in the same meal. This prohibition has been abrogated by the Code, can. 1251: "It is not forbidden to mix flesh and fish in the same meal."

¹⁰ Benedict XIV, Const. Non ambigimus, May 31, 1741; In suprema, August 22, 1741; Libentissime, June 10, 1745. You will find these prescriptions fully explained in Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 104-108.

1122. Three can be distinguished: 1. impotence; 2. duties of state incompatible with fasting; 3. dispensation.

1. By reason of impotence, all those are excused who, on account of weakness of body, poverty, or other grave inconveniences, cannot morally fulfill the law; for a law, especially a positive one, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

(A) Thus, by reason of weakness, there are excused: the sick, the convalescent, or those of ill health, pregnant or nursing women, who cannot fast without notable harm; likewise sexagenarians, even if they seem rather robust, because their strength decreases and they need more frequent restoration; but not quinquagenarian women, unless another reason concurs, for, according to physicians, they do not need food more than men of the same age.¹

¹ Cf. Ami du Clerge, 1903, p. 13.

(B) By reason of poverty, all those are excused "who cannot at the same time have what suffices them for sustenance,"² that is, for a full eating, or who have nothing else than bread and legumes or other foods that are little nutritive.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 4.

(C) By reason of grave inconvenience, there are excused those who from fasting suffer grave headache or notable deprivation of sleep; wives and sons of families, who by fasting would incur grave indignation of husbands or parents; those who perform works of charity or piety which they would have to abandon while fasting; in one word, those who cannot fulfill the law without grave inconvenience.

1123. 2. By reason of duties of state, all those are excused who by fasting would not be able rightly to fulfill their duties without great fatigue or weakening of powers. Therefore not every labor exempts from fasting,³ but only labor that is arduous and continuous for many hours, such as today is the labor of many in fields, workshops, industrial or liberal arts. Here there is question not only of works of the hands, but also of intellectual labor, which weakens the brain and nerves more than servile work.⁴ Now today, because of the law of competition prevailing almost everywhere, many men, otherwise rich, have the duty of working intensely and for a long time. Therefore many under this title are exempted from the law.

³ This is established from the condemnation of proposition 30 by Alexander VII, March 18, 1666: "All officials who labor bodily in the republic are excused from the obligation of fasting, nor ought they to make certain whether the labor is compatible with fasting." (Denzinger, n. 1001.)

⁴ Under this title, therefore, professors and students who labor arduously are excused, but not those who indulge sloth.

Here theologians are accustomed to enumerate workers who, according to the nature of their labor, are excused or not; but many things which they formerly wrote cannot be applied today, circumstances having changed. Thus they say that printers turning the press are excused, but by no means those who compose type; now today this work, because of the application of mind which it requires, is often more arduous than turning the press. Therefore the only general rule is that every labor, whether manual or intellectual, exempts from fasting when it is both arduous and continuous for many hours; this must be judged with attention to all the circumstances of persons, health, inclemency of the air, etc.

1124. Hence a journey undertaken for a just cause suffices to exempt from fasting if, with all things considered, it is long and arduous; this indeed depends upon the traveler's health and the manner of traveling. Thus a journey on foot of 12 or 15 miles is sufficiently arduous, especially if the road is rough, while a journey of 150 miles on railways scarcely induces any fatigue. Now a journey does not excuse from the law unless it causes notable fatigue.⁵

⁵ This is established from proposition 31 condemned by Alexander VII: "All those who travel on horseback are absolutely excused from the precept of fasting, however they travel, even if the journey is not necessary, and even if they complete the journey of one day." (Denzinger, n. 1002.)

Those who are excused by reason of labor are not bound to fast on the few days on which they interrupt labor, at least generally, because they must repair the powers necessary for proximate labors. - Nor are even the rich bound to interrupt labors incompatible with fasting; for the public good demands that they be occupied with ordinary occupations. - Yet it is not lawful to undertake labor incompatible with fasting for the sake of mere recreation, for example hunting, unless rarely and on account of some utility.

What duel is? Which things are touched here

81. 1. Duel, namely undertaken on private authority; since it is established that other combats can be justified. Moreover, a duel is a dangerous combat of two persons (or of a few, equal in number), which is undertaken from agreement, or from a certain pact previously made concerning place, time, and also, at least as usage bears, concerning weapons, and these lethal. It is called dangerous insofar as it brings danger of life, of mutilation, or at least of grave wound.

What suicide is

2. Suicide, or the direct killing of oneself, done by one's own authority.

Divorce?

3. Divorce, namely in the modern acceptance, or perfect, by which is designated the sacrilegious attempt of breaking the bond of marriage, even consummated marriage, so that the faculty is given of entering a new marriage while the partner is living.

What if they are said to be lawful by accident?

4. Lawful: whether in themselves, or even in any case whatsoever or by accident. For the mind of the Legislator is clear, by which he wished to protect Catholic doctrine.

When they are established as lawful

5. They establish, that is, they do not merely assert, but contend that it is so, or attempt to demonstrate it;¹ and this with that breadth which satisfies the inscription of chapter 5. Cf. n. 74, 2.

¹ Cf. Gennari, cited place, p. 40.

1. THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF THE BODY.—The Catholic Church in her ethical teaching avoids two false extremes: she neither undervalues the body, nor does she overestimate it. a) Against what we may term false Spiritualism the Church upholds the value and importance of the material element in man. She teaches that the human body is superior to the bodies of all other creatures because it was directly created by God and is (not so much the prison as) the organ of an immortal soul.¹ Through the body the soul exerts its activity and comes into contact with the material universe. In and through the body man exercises control over the lower creatures² and communicates with his fellowmen. There could be no social intercourse if men had no material bodies.

¹ Cfr. Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV, c. 23 (Migne, P. G., XXXIII, 484). —Saint Bernard, De Diligendo Deo, XI, n. 30 sq. "The flesh is plainly a good and faithful companion to a good spirit: if it burdens him, it helps him; if it does not help him, it relieves him of his burden; or surely it helps him and does not burden him at all. The first state is laborious but fruitful; the second is at rest but by no means wearisome; the third is also glorious." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXVII, 993).

² Gen. I, 25.

The human body was raised to its true dignity when the Son of God was made flesh and suffered and died to redeem men from sin and its consequences. With the same body that endured the death agony on the cross, Christ rose from the grave, ascended into Heaven, and now sits at the right hand of God the Father, whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead.

Through the instrumentality of the Sacraments the body, having been redeemed by Christ, participates in the graces of the atonement and thereby becomes a temple of the Holy Ghost,³ destined to rise again after death and to be forever transfigured in Heaven. Hence every Christian is in duty bound not to "yield his members as instruments of iniquity unto sin," but to present them "as instruments of justice unto God."⁴ b) The Catholic view of the body differs also from that of the Materialists, who unduly exalt, nay fairly worship, the flesh. The Church values the body only in connection with, and as ennobled by, the spirit, and commands it to be mortified. "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscence."⁵ "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is the service of idols."⁶

³ 1 Cor. III, 16.

⁴ Rom. VI, 13; cfr. 19; 1 Cor. VI, 13, 20.

⁵ Rom. XIII, 14.

⁶ Col. III, 5 sqq.

To mortify the body does not, of course, mean to kill or maim it, but merely to subdue its sensual inclinations, so that it may become a fit companion for the spiritual and immortal soul —"bonus plane fidusque comes spiritui bono" as St. Bernard calls it,⁷ —and that it may be gradually prepared for its final transfiguration in Heaven.

⁷ See note 1, supra, p. 9.

2. LIFE. —Of even greater value than the body is life. a) Life ranks first among the blessings of the natural order because it is the foundation and an indispensable condition of all the rest. According to revelation, man's life on earth is intended as a preparation for the life eternal in Heaven. It is the period of sowing for the great harvest;⁸ the day assigned for laboring in the vineyard of the Master;⁹ the time appointed for trading with the God-given talents,¹⁰ for running the race and competing for the grand prize.¹¹ Again and again Holy Scripture tells us, "What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap,”¹² and, "We have not here a lasting city," but should "seek one that is to come."¹³ If this terrestrial journey forms but a moment, as it were, of our total existence, which is for the most part to be spent in the world beyond, then that moment is extremely precious, and every fraction thereof possesses incalculable value for the welfare of the soul. What Christ said of Himself applies in a measure to every man: "I must work the works of Him that sent me, whilst it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work."¹⁴ b) Life being a gift of such immense value, we are in duty bound to cherish it; or, as St. Paul says, we must "redeem the time."¹⁵

⁸ Luke XII, 23.—Cfr. V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911, 5th ed., pp. 119 sqq.

⁹ Matt. XX, 1-16.

¹⁰ Matt. XXV, 14-30.

¹¹ 1 Cor. IX, 24 sq.

¹² 2 Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8 sq.

¹³ Heb. XIII, 14.

¹⁴ John IX, 4. —Cfr. St. Jerome, Comment, in Evang. S. Matth., l. IV, c. 25: "After the day of judgment no opportunity for good works and justice remains." (P. L., XXVI, 185).—St. Augustine, Serm., 93 (al. De Verbis Domini, 23), c. 10, n. 16: "It has been said, it is true, it has not been said deceitfully: ‘Knock, and it shall be opened to you’ (Matt. VII, 7), but now, when it is the time of mercy, not when it is the time of judgment. For those times cannot be confused, since the Church sings mercy and judgment to her Lord (Ps. C, 1). It is the time of mercy: do penance. Do you wish to do it at the time of judgment? You will be among those virgins against whom the door was shut." (P. L., XXXVIII, 579).

¹⁵ Eph. V, 16; Rom. XIII, 13 sq.; Col. IV, 5. —Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 16 (al. I inter Homil., 50), n. 2; Serm., 17 (al. 28 inter Horn., 50), n. 7; Serm., 167 (al. 24 De Verbis Apost.), n. 3 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 122, 138, 910).

a) Hence no man is allowed to destroy or curtail his life, even though it may have become a burden and is seemingly of no further value. By the aid of divine grace all temporal adversities and sufferings can be borne, nay made productive of supernatural glory. A life of suffering is not necessarily useless, but may be rendered highly meritorious by prayer, patience, and a good example, and thus become beneficial to the afflicted individual as well as to the entire human race. He who has to suffer much should frequently recommend himself to God, practice the virtue of resignation, cultivate good cheer, and never lose hope.¹⁶ Like St. Paul, he should offer the tribulations which he suffers "in the flesh" for the purpose of "filling up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ."¹⁷ Illness and suffering are by no means always a punishment for personal sins.¹⁸ Oftentimes they are graces in disguise, given by a merciful God to enable man to train his soul for Heaven. "Sufferings are lessons," runs an old saw,¹⁹ but they are also, in the words of a modern poet, favors from on high.²⁰ When borne for the love of God, "tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us."²¹

¹⁶ Matth. XVI, 24; XXVI, 39; St. Augustine, Confess., l. II, c. 42; 1 Pet. IV, 22 sqq. —Cfr. Horace, Carmina, II, 3, 1: "Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem." —Seneca, Ep., 78, 20: "What then? Do you think that you are doing nothing if you are temperate while ill? You will show that sickness can be overcome, or at least endured. Believe me, there is room for virtue even on a sickbed."

¹⁷ Col. I, 24.

¹⁸ Matt. IX, 2; Mark II, 5; Luke XIII, 1-5; John IX, 1-3.

¹⁹ Παθήματα μαθήματα.

²⁰ Luise Hensel: "Leiden sind Gnaden."—Cfr. Ecclus. II, 3 sqq.; Phil. I, 29; 1 Pet. I, 17; Heb. XII, 7-11. —St. Ambrose, Expositio in Evang. sec. Lucam, l. IV, c. 41 (v. Koch-Preuss, A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. II, p. 38, n. 11).—Cfr. St. Augustine, Confess., l. II, c. 2, n. 4: “Lord, who formest suffering into a precept (Ps. XCIII, 20), and strikest in order to heal, and puttest us to death lest we die apart from Thee.” (P. L., XXXII, 677). —IDEM, Enarrat. in Psalmos, LXVIII, s. 2, n. 1: "And when the Lord permits or causes us to be in some tribulation, even then He is merciful." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 854).—Seneca, De Provid., II, 2: "Omnia adversa [bonus vir] exercitationes putat."—IDEM, ibid., V, 9: "Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes viros." —Ovid, Trist., V, 3, 75: “Hectora quis nosset, si felix Troia fuisset?"—P. W. v. Keppler, Das Problem des Leidens, 2nd ed., pp. 12 sqq.

²¹ Rom. V, 3 sqq.

"We suffer with Christ, that we may be also glorified with him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us."²²

²² Rom. VIII, 17.

Thus, suffering may be made a source of joy. "In much experience of tribulation," says the Apostle, "they have abundance of joy."²³

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 2; cfr. Jas. I, 2-4; 1 Pet. I, 6-9; IV, 12 sq.

"The cross with its stern lines," writes Bishop Keppler, "a cold, bare, branchless tree with rough-hewn stumps for arms, is indeed at first sight a sad and joyless thing to look at, so true an image is it of harsh contradiction, so good a symbol of bitter pain. Yet men find that the cross possesses a certain beauty. In its sturdy, clear-cut, well-proportioned form they see a picture of steadfastness, of aspiring effort, of opposition conquered and contradictories reconciled. The sight of a man hanging in agony upon the cross arouses, at first, no sense of joy, it is true. Yet there is a wellspring of joy in the sure faith that the Divine Hero bleeding on the cross is dying in the battle against the fiercest foe of joy and of salvation, and conquering as He dies. The cross becomes the symbol of victory and thereby the symbol of joy. Darkness and gloom are dispelled and everywhere is shed the glory of the Resurrection. In its light, the tree of the cross becomes the tree of life, of resistless power; the dried trunk is clothed with blossoms and fruit; and out of the crown of thorns spring forth roses. Thus also is it with the cross and the crucifixion in the life of each individual Christian. That a man should take up his cross daily; that he should not only bear his cross, but crucify the flesh, the old man —these are not forced figures of speech, but stern demands which certainly do seem likely to lead far away from joy. Yet the battle to which they summon is waged not against joy, but against joy's worst enemies. The cross obliges us to renounce the apples of Sodom, the wild cherries of sin, which are really no joys at all, but it does not demand a total renunciation of legitimate natural joys; it only insists that they be used in moderation and with a good intention. Excessive enjoyment always begets disgust. Unrestricted activity and gratification of the sensual instincts does not add to the sum of joy, but ruins both joy and the man; it sins not only against morality but against hygiene, which is to-day sometimes regarded as the supreme standard. A life 'beyond good and evil,' —to use Nietzsche's phrase —unscrupulous poaching, complete loosing of the wild, natural instincts, whose advocate, protector, and prophet Nietzsche was unwillingly degraded into becoming by his less worthy disciples, the feeling of 'the beast of prey within man, the fair, ravenous, blond beast, lusting for prey and conquest,' —all this does not enrich, gladden, deepen, nor sweeten life. It delivers life over to the most wretched languor, to the hospital, the madhouse, to suicide, —'those graves of lust,'²⁴ so numerous in the world to-day.²⁵

²⁴ Numb. XI, 34.

²⁵ P. W. von Keppler, More Joy, (tr. by Jos. McSorley, C.S.P.), pp. 76 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

Even Goethe realized that the spirit of austerity and self-sacrifice alone can provide the proper basis for a healthy, happy, cheerful life:

If thou hast not part In death as well as birth, A sorry guest thou art Upon the gloomy earth.

"Man must die in order to grow. He must renounce selfishness, for it makes him poorer, not richer, and especially poorer in joy."²⁶

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 79–84.

"Nothing," says a contemporary Protestant writer, "shuts in a life and shuts out satisfaction and joy like the self-considering temper and the self-centered aim. Such a life, though it may seem to itself self-developing, is in fact self-deceived. Instead of growing richer in its resources, it finds itself growing poorer. The more it cultivates itself, the more sterile it grows; the more it accumulates, the less it has; the more it saves, the more it is lost."²⁷

²⁷ Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Christian Character, p. 206.

b) To long inordinately for death is contrary to the Christian concept of life, its value and purpose. The "desire to be dissolved and be with Christ," which St. Paul extols as "by far the better thing,"²⁸ must spring from an absolutely pure motive and be accompanied by complete resignation to the will of God. To wish for death in order to escape the dangers, vicissitudes, and tribulations of this earthly "vale of tears," is opposed to the teaching of Christ.²⁹ Life is a precious gift which should be conscientiously employed.³⁰ Though time is short, it is of sufficient duration to enable us to gain eternity by making good use of the fleeting moments given to us.

²⁸ Phil. I, 23.

²⁹ Cfr. F. W. Faber, Growth in Holiness, Ch. IV.

³⁰ Phil. I, 24 sqq.; cfr. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd

"Nothing," says the Ven. Don Bosco, "torments the reprobates in hell more than the thought that they have idled away the time which they received for working out their eternal salvation; nothing so consoles the elect in Heaven as the reflection that they have employed their days for the honor and glory of God." c) By commanding us to sanctify our bodies and to employ time for the purpose of gaining eternity, the Church does not, as some assert, "preach gloom and sorrow and demand of her followers that they forego all joy, thus making hypocrites of them." Both the Old and the New Testament bid man to be joyous. "Be glad in the Lord and rejoice, ye just, and glory, all ye right of heart."³¹ "Let the just feast and rejoice before the Lord, and be delighted with gladness."³² Christ Himself says: " Ask, and you shall receive, that your joy may be full."³³ And again: "These things I speak in the world, that they may have my joy filled in themselves."³⁴ Even the "Preacher," who so frequently insists on the vanity of earthly things, counsels the "young man" to enjoy life,³⁵ though always, of course, in the fear of God and with due regard to His commandments.³⁶ Thomas a Kempis says: "There is no true liberty nor perfect joy but in the fear of God with a good conscience.”³⁷ The religion of Christ is by no means gloomy.

³¹ Ps. XXXI, 11.

³² Ps. LXVII, 4; cfr. Luke X, 20.

³³ John XVI, 24.

³⁴ John XVII, 13.

³⁵ Eccles. XI, 9.

³⁶ Eccles. XII, 13; cfr. Ps. XCVI, 12; Rom. XIV, 17.

³⁷ De Imit. Christi, I, 21 (ed. Pohl., Vol. II, p. 39): "There is no true liberty and no good joy except in the fear of God with a good conscience." —Cfr. Seneca, Ep., XXIII, 3: "Do this before all else, my Lucilius: learn to rejoice." —IDEM, ibid., 4: "True joy is a serious thing."

"Gloom is an alien and an enemy in Christian hearts," writes Charles Stanton Devas. "If Christianity is the religion of sorrow, it is also, and pre-eminently, the religion of joy; the solution of this antinomy being that Christianity is the religion of love, and that in this world love and sorrow are linked by a mysterious partnership. Now Christian asceticism is no superstitious pain-worship, no offering to some pain-loving deity, some evil principle opposed to the good, as though life and health were not God's good gifts; nor again has it ought in common, except sometimes the outward show, with the proud self-righteousness of the Hindu ascetic or Moslem dervish. Much rather Christian asceticism is a form of love; and love being the root of joy, it follows that Christian joyfulness is not in spite of asceticism, but its consequence. We are taught as an elementary truth that man is on earth for the one end of perfecting himself in the love of God. This is his purpose and probation. But only through labor, pain and suffering is love perfected. Christianity, then, has no mission to eliminate labor, pain, and suffering from this world (pati et perpeti humanum est, wrote Leo XIII), but to transmute them. They can be the means whereby we can obtain the subjection of the lower selfish life and of greedy individualism; the suppression of false self-assertion and of blind nature before the law of reason and of God. Christianity is frankly 'the religion of suffering, of mortification, of self-sacrifice, of consuming love, of self-forgetting zeal, of self-crucifying union,... the religion of the cross and the Crucified.' ³⁸ Joyous abandonment, generous self-sacrifice, these are the watchwords, and to become living images of the Divine Model of whom it is written that He pleased not himself."³⁹

³⁸ Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., l. III, c. 8, n. 24: "These are the clouds [of the Pelagians] concerning praise of creation, praise of marriage, praise of free choice, and praise of the saints—as though any one of us disparaged these things and did not rather proclaim them all with the praises due to the honor of the Creator and Savior. But creation does not wish to be praised in such a way that it does not wish to be healed. And the more marriage is to be praised, the less the shameful concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world (1 John II, 16), is to be imputed to it. Marriage certainly found this concupiscence in human beings; it did not cause it, since concupiscence exists in very many without marriage, and marriage, if no one had sinned, could have existed without concupiscence." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 606). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 1-4; Contra Gent., l. III, c. 112, n. 6. —J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History, (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), New York, 1914, pp. 131 sqq.

³⁹ C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, pp. 121 sq., London, 1906.

"It is not true," says the Ven. Don Bosco, "that men are made sad by serving God. Who was more genial than St. Aloysius, or more joyful than St. Philip Neri or St. Vincent de Paul? And yet these holy men devoted their entire lives to the practice of virtue."

"The Catholic attitude towards modern intellectual life," says Father Joseph Laurentius, S. J., "requires no other weapon for its defence than an unbiased knowledge of Catholic principles. The Syllabus [of Pius IX] does not condemn progress, liberality, or culture as such; it merely rejects that which the enemies of the Christian religion have falsely decked out under these terms. A progress without God, without faith, without religion, —these are essential requisites of all true advance, —is no progress at all, but retrogression. A Liberalism detached from the principles of Christian freedom and justice, based upon State omnipotence and the tenets of an atheistic pseudo-philosophy, is a false Liberalism. A culture that excludes the true religion from education and science, and pursues materialistic aims, is a misnomer. Such tendencies are not only unacceptable to the papacy, but must be rejected by every believing Christian, be he Catholic or Protestant. True Liberalism and progress, —the kind that ennobles man, emancipates him from the slavery of passion and sin, and elevates him to the ideal atmosphere of faith, knowledge and virtue, and strengthens and fosters the family, community, State, both in a material and in a spiritual way, —such the Church is ever ready, nay eager, to enlist in her service."⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Jos. Laurentius, S.J., in the Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, Vol. LXXI (1906), pp. 241 sqq., especially 250 sq.—Cfr. Hettinger-Stepka, Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian, St. Louis, 1902, pp. 343 sqq.; G. Grupp, Kulturgeschichte der romischen Kaiserzeit, Vol. II, Munich, 1904, pp. 477 sqq.; Philip Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 133 sqq.; the Syllabus Errorum of Pius IX, n. 57, with the commentary of F. Heiner, Der Syllabus, Mayence, 1905, pp. 267 sqq.

READINGS. —P. W. von Keppler, More Joy (tr. by Jos. McSorley, C.S.P.), St. Louis 1914.—C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, London 1906. —Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), pp. 215 sqq., New York 1914. —W. Schneider-H. Thurston, S. J., The Other Life, pp. 74 sqq., New York 1920. —H. T. Henry, Catholic Customs and Symbols, N. Y. 1925, pp. 3 sqq.

1. THE CARE OF THE BODY IN GENERAL.—If the corporeal life of man is of such great importance for his eternal destiny, it follows that he must take good care of his body.

The desire to live (instinct of self-preservation) and to enjoy perfect health of mind and body is implanted by nature in every human being. "No man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it," says St. Paul.¹ Hence it is a natural duty to preserve life and health and to acquire and employ the means by which they may be prolonged and fostered.

¹ Eph. V, 29.

Since, however, in consequence of the fall of our first parents, the sensual delight which men take in life and its pleasures easily degenerates into sinful enjoyment, the care of the body must be regulated by the precepts of Christian morality.

"By eating and drinking," says St. Augustine, addressing God, "we repair the daily ruins of the body until Thou destroy both the food and the belly (I Cor. VI, 13).... This Thou hast taught me, that I should come to take nourishment as I take medicine. But while I am passing from the uneasiness of hunger to the satisfaction of satiety, the snare of concupiscence lieth in wait for me; for the very passage itself is a pleasure, and there is no other way to pass but this, to which necessity obliges me. And thus, whereas health is the cause of eating and drinking, a dangerous delight comes in as an attendant, and for the most part endeavors to go before, that for its sake I should do what I pretend and desire to do only for the sake of health. Nor are both of these content with the same allowance: for what is sufficient for health is too little for delight, and many times it becomes uncertain whether it be the necessary care of the body that requires a further supply, or the voluptuous deceit of concupiscence that calls for this allowance. And the unhappy soul grows glad of this uncertainty, and prepares therein the protection of an excuse, being pleased that it does not appear what is exactly proportioned for the maintenance of health, that under the cloak of health she may indulge her pleasure. These temptations I daily strive to resist, and I invoke Thy right hand to my assistance, and refer my anxieties to Thee, for I have yet to seek for counsel in this matter."²

² Cfr. St. Augustine, Confess., l. X, c. 31, n. 34–44: "We repair the daily decay of the body by eating and drinking, until Thou destroyest both food and the belly (1 Cor. VI, 13).... This Thou hast taught me: that I should approach the taking of food as I do the taking of medicine. But while I pass from the discomfort of want to the repose of satiety, in the very passage the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for me. For that passage itself is pleasure, and there is no other way through which necessity compels me to pass. And although health is the cause of eating and drinking, a dangerous delight joins itself as a handmaid and generally tries to go before, so that what I say or will that I do for the sake of health may be done for its sake. Nor is the measure of each the same, for what is enough for health is too little for pleasure. And it is often uncertain whether the necessary care of the body is still asking support or the deceit of pleasure is supplying its service. The unhappy soul rejoices in this uncertainty and in it prepares the defense of an excuse, glad that what is enough for the moderation of health is not apparent, so that under the pretext of health it may obscure the business of pleasure. I strive daily to resist these temptations, and I invoke Thy right hand for my salvation, and refer my agitations to Thee, because my counsel on this matter is not yet settled." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 797).

Whatever God has created is good, and, broadly speaking, there are no material objects which man is per se obliged to renounce. St. Paul's assurance, "All things are yours," ³ is addressed to the faithful. Nevertheless the proposition is true only in a general way. The right of the individual to enjoy the good things of nature is limited in various ways.

³ 1 Cor. III, 22; cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 3–5.

1. It is limited, above all, by the particular needs of each. These needs are manifold and far exceed the essential requirements of life and health. They are measured by the personal necessities, bodily and spiritual, of each individual, by the degree of culture he has attained, by his position in society, the nature of his vocational duties, the climate, social environment, and many other factors.

2. The right of the individual to enjoy the good things of life is limited further by the social demands of the community in which he lives. Every member of society has a right to enjoy the things God has provided for the race as a whole. To waste or destroy them is against the law of nature, and to do so wantonly, without a just and sufficient cause, would betray a brutal disposition and be a crime against nature. To waste the means of subsistence, on the proper distribution of which the welfare of entire classes depends, involves an injustice against God and men.⁴

⁴ Is. LXV, 8; Luke XVI, 19 sqq.; John VI, 13.

3. A third limitation arises from the purpose for which the good things of nature were created. The body must be nourished and fostered, not for its own sake, but that it may efficiently serve as the organ and companion of the soul. "We live not to eat, but we eat to live," says the wise Socrates. Only in so far as the good things of nature serve this higher purpose, is their use permitted. "I say to you, be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on. Is not the life more than the meat, and the body more than the raiment?"⁵ "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences."⁶ "Let not then our good be evil spoken of, for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."⁷

⁵ Matt. VI, 25; cfr. Matt. X, 39.

⁶ Rom. XIII, 14.

⁷ Rom. XIV, 16 sqq. —Cfr. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV, c. 26 (Migne, P. G., XXXIII, 490); Juvenal, Sat., X, 356: "One must pray that there be a sound mind in a sound body; ask for a courageous spirit."

Good health is a necessary condition for the development of talent. Those who are sickly depend on others, whereas robust men have courage to dare and do. Therefore suitable provision for the preservation of health is an essential part of character training.⁸

⁸ W. L. Pyle, Personal Hygiene, Philadelphia, 1917.

2. VARIOUS MEANS OF CARING FOR THE BODY.—The ordinary means of keeping the body efficient may be grouped together in two classes: those by which health is preserved and fostered, and those by which harmful and disturbing influences are warded off.

1. FOOD AND DRINK. —The chief means of preserving health are food and drink. a) Mankind as such has unlimited control of the resources of nature. The Old Testament distinction between clean and unclean foods was purely disciplinary and ceremonial, and is no longer enforced under the New Law.⁹ "I know, and am confident in the Lord Jesus," says St. Paul, "that nothing is unclean of itself."¹⁰ This includes animal as well as vegetable foods, for Christ Himself teaches that not what enters into the mouth, i. e., food and drink as such, but the inordinate use thereof defiles man.¹¹

⁹ Gen. VII, 8; Lev. XI, 8; Matt. XV, 11; Mark VII, 15; Acts X, 15.

¹⁰ Rom. XIV, 14; cfr. Col. II, 16.

¹¹ Cfr. Matt. XV, 17-20; Mark VII, 15–23; Tit. I, 15.

There is no moral objection to the common practice of making food more palatable by artificial means, because to enjoy one's meals is not to indulge in sensuality or sybaritism. Man is in duty bound to take wholesome food and to be moderate in its use, i. e., to eat neither too little nor too much for his physical well-being. b) The use of food is limited by the needs of each individual, which differ according to age, climate, constitution, occupation, etc. Every man is allowed to take as much food as he requires to maintain himself mentally and physically efficient, and all are in duty bound to avoid excess because it disturbs the equilibrium of soul and body and makes the former the servant of the latter, whereas it ought to be its master.¹² Following the example of Christ and the Apostles, therefore, we should take our daily nourishment temperately and with gratitude to God, begin each meal with a blessing (benedictio mensae) and never forget to give thanks after eating.¹³

¹² Cfr. Rom. XIII, 14; XIV, 17; cfr. Eccles. X, 17.

¹³ Matt. XIV, 19; XV, 36; XXVI, 27; Mark XIV, 23; Luke XXII, 17; John VI, 11; Acts XXVII, 35; Rom. XIV, 6; 1 Cor. X, 31; 1 Tim. IV, 3–5.

To eat or drink to satiety for mere pleasure (ob solam voluptatem) is morally illicit, even though it may not result in direct injury to the health.¹⁴ In the long run intemperance invariably revenges itself upon its victims.

¹⁴ Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI, prop. 8: "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because (some) natural appetite may lawfully enjoy its own acts." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1158).

On the sin of drunkenness in particular see Vol. II of this Handbook, pp. 79 sq. On the duty of self-denial, infra, pp. 72 sq.

Some believe that men were originally vegetarians and received permission to eat flesh meat only after the Flood. This opinion may be true or false, but we believe it has no basis in Holy Writ.

2. CLOTHING. —Another important means of preserving the health and warding off disease and other harmful influences is clothing. a) Clothes are worn for a fivefold purpose: to protect the body against the inclemencies of the weather or climate, to adorn it, to cover nakedness and preserve modesty, to distinguish the sexes, and to mark differences in office, occupation, or social rank.¹⁵ b) In the choice of his garments the individual is to a considerable extent limited by season, climate, temperature, custom, fashion, and other factors.

¹⁵ Gen. III, 7–11, 21; 1 Cor. VII, 34; XII, 23 sq. —Chas. S. Devas, Political Economy, pp. 153 sqq.

Custom should not be disregarded entirely, and even erratic Dame Fashion may be followed to a certain reasonable extent.¹⁶ A person may dress well without being on that account guilty of vanity. For a man to dress like a woman, or vice versa, may be sinful or not, according to motives and circumstances. If done as a matter of necessity, or for any other good and sufficient cause, it is permissible; if the intention be venially sinful, it is a venial, if grievously sinful, a mortal sin.¹⁷

¹⁶ W. T. Kane, S.J., "The Psychology of Fashion", in America, N. Y., 7 July, 1923, Vol. XXIX, No. 12, pp. 269 sq.

¹⁷ C. 6, D. 30 (Concil. Gangr. a. 355, can. 18): “If any woman, judging it useful by deliberate choice that she use male clothing, for this reason imitates the dress of a man, let her be anathema.” (Decretum Gratiani, ed. Friedberg, Leipsic, 1879, p. 107). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 169, art. 2, ad 3; 1a 2ae, qu. 102, art. 6, ad 6. —H. Busembaum, S. J., Medulla Theol. Mor., Tournai, 1876, l. II, tr. 3, c. 2, dub. 5, a. 2: "If a woman uses male clothing, or conversely, merely from levity without a depraved intention or danger of scandal and lust, it will be venial only; otherwise mortal; but no sin if from necessity."

The Church condemns vanity, wastefulness, carelessness, uncleanness as well as indecency in regard to clothing.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cfr. St. Jerome, Epist., LII, n. 9: "Adornment and squalor are to be avoided in equal measure, because the one savors of luxury and the other of vainglory." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 535).—St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, l. II, c. 12, n. 41: "It must especially be observed that ostentation can exist not only in the splendor and display of material things, but even in mournful squalor itself, and is the more dangerous insofar as it deceives under the name of service to God. Therefore, one who shines forth in immoderate care of body and clothing or in the splendor of other things is easily convicted by those very things of being a follower of the pomps of the world and deceives no one by a false appearance of holiness; but one who, in the profession of Christianity, directs men’s attentive eyes upon himself by unusual squalor and filth, when he does this voluntarily and does not suffer it from necessity, can be judged from his other works whether he does this from contempt of superfluous refinement or from some ambition." (P. L., XXXIV, 1287).— On wastefulness in the matter of dress and adornments, which is so conspicuous a fault of western nations, especially since the Industrial Revolution, Charles S. Devas (Political Economy, p. 154) says from the standpoint of the economist, that it is a source of "frequent ruin." The following remark of the author deserves reproduction also in a handbook of Moral Theology: "In many modern countries, by the disorganization of family life, notably by the absence of the housewife from home and by the want of training in household work, the proper care or repair of clothes has been neglected (as well as of the house-linen and household utensils): such neglect being no trifle; for since clothing will last twice as long if properly mended and cared for, the neglect of such care will compel a man, if he is to be clad as well as before, to spend on clothing nearly twice as much." The scarcity and high price of clothing consequent upon the Great War have checked this "depraved consumption" of clothing and household utensils, and it is to be hoped that the lesson will not soon be forgotten.

For women to employ the arts of the toilet (cultus muliebris) out of vanity is not a mortal sin, but to do so in order to tempt men is grievously sinful.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cfr. Prov. VII, 10; 1 Cor. VII, 34; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 169, art. 2; Ovid, Remed. Amor., 342 sq.

It should never be forgotten that the highest purpose for which clothes are worn is the preservation of modesty.^* The moralist has no right to inveigh against the vagaries of fashion unless they endanger modesty or health or unless people spend more money on clothes than they can reasonably afford.

^* Cfr. A. Vermeersch, S.J., De Castitate, Bruges, 1919, pp. 19 sq.

In some countries custom prescribes a definite attire for people according to profession, occupation, or social rank. Where such a custom exists, it should be respected. The clergy, in particular, have a prescribed dress (habitus clericalis), which is regulated partly by the general laws of the Church and partly by diocesan ordinances, which should be conscientiously observed.²⁰

²⁰ Conc. Trid., Sess. XIV, c. 6, de Ref.; Sess. XXIII, c. 6, de Ref.; Codex Iuris Can., can. 136; Chas. Augustine [Bachofen], O. S. B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. II, pp. 84 sq.; Irish Eccles. Record, 5th Series, Vol. XI (1918), No. 606, pp. 475 sqq.

Why in this place concerning religion. - Adhering to the logical distribution, St. Thomas, when he has completed the articles concerning prudence, at once takes up justice, the cardinal virtue of which religion is a potential part. Most theologians of today, however, with whom we agree, prefer the order of dignity, so that they treat first of religion rather than of justice.

Utility. - It greatly concerns the moral theologian to acquire for himself an accurate notion of a virtue whose very mention, in the present manner of treating honesty, is too often passed over, so that he himself may esteem it more and preach it more efficaciously.

Taken not as a form of worship commonly imposed on several persons (the Catholic religion), but as a virtue, religion is the moral virtue by which the interior and exterior worship which is owed to God is truly exhibited. Most noble after the theological virtues, religion is joined to justice, but as a potential part, because we can never render to equality what we owe to God the Creator, Lord, and universal Benefactor, and because God is also worshiped by free acts. - The material object of this virtue is the various acts of worship, to the doing of which it inclines on account of the special honesty of observing that divine excellence which infinitely transcends every other.

It is immediately clear how religion differs formally from charity. While charity loves, religion adores; the former observes unity, the latter distance and dependence: the former is of an equal friend, the latter of a creature and an inferior. Yet there is no opposition between the two; for is not the miracle of goodness which overcomes the distance between God and us most apt for kindling and nourishing love and at the same time the will of every submission?

Religion, a virtue of the will, has in the will its internal or strictly elicited act. And it is that very affection by which the soul submits itself to that infinite excellence, and intends or seeks the honor of God.

This same affection inspires Christian humility, which, not content with a moderated pursuit of one's own excellence, reveres God's excellence by contempt itself for earthly sublimity. Cf. below, the treatise on Humility.

Whatever acts break forth from that affection of subjection, strictly speaking, are commanded acts of religion. Among them, however, some, by their own nature, signify our affection toward God in such a way that, whether they are interior or even exterior, they contain divine worship per se and are referred among the proper acts of the virtue of religion. These, by a certain broader usage, are also called elicited acts of religion. They are: devotion, adoration with sacrifice, prayer, praise, vow, oath, sanctification of feasts, pious offerings of things or persons. But because all good acts glorify God, we can also perform all from the intention of religion: such acts are then said to be commanded by the virtue of religion. Thus the whole life of religious, morally considered, is made honorable by a general intention of religion.

N.B. - The logical division of the present treatise would be that in a former section we should treat of the individual or singular exercise of the virtue of religion, in another of its collective or social exercise. This latter is performed both by the profession of common religious life and by the sanctification of feasts. - But both arguments must be postponed. Therefore we shall treat only of the individual exercise of religion. Hence first we must treat of the positive acts of the worship of God, which we shall set forth according to the order of the divine precepts to which they correspond, and then of sins against the virtue of religion.

— Religion is here understood as the moral virtue by which the interior and exterior worship owed to God is exhibited. Worship denotes the reverent execution of the offices which we have toward God as He is our Lord. The honesty of rendering the things which are owed to the Lord under this title is the formal object of religion; the material object is the various acts of worshiping. The very interior affection toward worshiping God is the strictly elicited act of religion; more broadly elicited are acts, whether interior or exterior, which contain divine worship per se; commanded are other good acts which have been performed from the intention of divine service.

Utility. - In its positive part the treatise on religion embraces several things whose importance is immediately manifest. For the general exposition of acts of worship offers occasion to instruct the candidate of theology concerning the genuine notion of liturgy and its right estimation, and to preserve him from several practical errors. Concerning the efficacy of prayer one must speak prudently, and it is fitting, by a few notions, to prepare the way for mystical theology itself. The things then proposed concerning prayer, concerning oath and vow, pertain to daily use. It is of particular importance to know what must be thought concerning a fictitious oath, lest that holy thing become an instrument of tyrannical oppression, and in what way the power of invalidating vows must be understood.

The order of speaking will be this: first we shall treat of varied worship in general and of liturgy, then of prayer, then of oath and adjuration, finally of vow. The Decalogue itself is the author of this order for us, since prayer has customarily been referred to the first precept, but oath and vow to the second precept.

What worship is. Every care concerning some thing is marked by the name of worship or cultivation: care of the body, of knowledge. More specially, however, it signifies the recognition and practical observance of the excellence of a Superior. Thus all acts by which man subjects himself to God so that he may render to Him what is owed to Him are acts of divine worship. And such are all acts of the virtue of religion.

When we say this, we by no means affirm that those acts are wholly acts either of worship or of religion: for not insofar as they are directed to our good, but insofar as they express an order toward God, are they acts of worship. But that they may be acts of religion or worship, it is enough that they manifest an affection of subjection toward God and of trusting reverence.

Finally, more strictly, acts of worship are acts protestative of divine excellence and of man's subjection under God; or the acts which we have called elicited acts of religion.

Of how many kinds worship is. I. Worship is interior, in devotion of the mind, and exterior, which is subdivided into private and public. Public ritual worship is called liturgical, of which below. Sacraments also pertain to public worship: for they are at the same time for the remedy of sin and for divine worship: whether by consecration they depute a man to divine worship, as Baptism, Confirmation, and Order; or purify the consecrated worshiper, as Penance and Extreme Unction; or prepare worshipers and represent a holy thing, i.e. the union of Christ and the Church, as Matrimony does; or are themselves acts of worship, as is the confection of the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is done by sacrificing.

From c. 1256, public worship is that which is rendered "in the name of the Church by persons legitimately deputed for this and by acts which from the institution of the Church are to be exhibited to God, the Saints, and the Blessed alone." In this canon, as is clear from the Constitution Quamvis iusto, 30 April 1749, § 12, of Benedict XIV, to which we are referred in a note, the particle and adds not a second required condition, but another form of public worship, so that it has only the force of or.

Acts which are permitted to be exhibited only to God, the Saints, and the Blessed are: to place images on an altar, to depict them with halos, rays, or another sign which manifests and excites worship, to hang votive tablets or votive gifts at their tombs, to light a lamp before relics or to propose them for public veneration. On the contrary, that persons not beatified be depicted on the walls or in the colored windows of a church, without a sign of sanctity; that, with the Ordinary consenting, to whom the matter must be referred, things obtained "from a vow" with testimony of a grace received be kept secretly: these do not pertain to public worship.

Although not a few pious writers are still accustomed, in describing the lives of Saints, to insert protestations which have their name from Urban VIII, nevertheless those decrees have now been abrogated by the Constitution Officiorum of Leo XIII, 25 January 1897. Cf. our De prohibitione et censura librorum, n. 19 note and 79.

Today only these can be honored with public worship who by decree of the Holy See have been numbered among the Saints or Blessed. This discipline was introduced by Alexander III (1159-1181), and perfected by Urban VIII. Therefore, concerning the formal canonization of Servants of God who are prior to Alexander III and are named in the martyrology, the Church is not solicitous. Immemorial worship rendered to Servants of God who lived after Alexander III and before the time fixed by the Constitution of Urban VIII¹ can remain in the state in which it is. Indeed, concerning their beatification a process can be instructed "by way of worship or of an excepted case," so that that worship may be formally approved. Once this approval has been obtained, the Servant of God is equivalently beatified. Cf. canons 2125-2135. More recent Servants of God, on the contrary, cannot be beatified or canonized unless it has first been established that no public worship had been given to them. Therefore the process is called "by way of non-worship." - From the decree of S.R.C., 26 August 1913, Servants of God can no longer be called Venerable from the time their cause has been introduced, but only from the time the heroicity of virtues or martyrdom has been proved.

Canonization, but not Beatification, contains an infallible and irreformable judgment. Therefore "Saints can be honored everywhere and by any act of worship of that genus (dulia); but the Blessed cannot be honored except in the place and manner which the Roman Pontiff has granted" (c. 1277, § 2). These modes are shown, some from immemorial custom, others from a special indult. Cf. Wernz, Ius Decret. t. 3, n. 367.

Private worship is honorably bestowed on him whose sanctity is morally certain to you. Thus baptized infants, although, because they have exercised no heroic virtues, they are not subjects of canonization (Wernz, t. 3, n. 365), can be invoked by parents and brothers as true intercessors before God.

¹ I.e. the year 1534. On account of a particular cause, however, that time is taken with a certain greater latitude. Cf. Epitome iur. can. II, 602.

— II. Worship is distinguished as latria, which is proper to the infinite divine Majesty; dulia, which honors the singular likeness with God which the Saints participate. The special name hyperdulia is today reserved to acts by which the singular dignity and sanctity of the Virgin Mother of God is honored, on account of the peculiar proximity to God which divine maternity conferred upon her. Cf. 2, 2, q. 103, art. 4, ad 2. Hence indeed she is akin to the Word, because she is consanguineous with the human nature which the person of the Word espoused to Himself.

Except sacrifice, which is proper to the worship of latria and pertains to public worship, other external acts, according to the intention of the one honoring and the circumstances, can manifest latria or dulia: thus genuflection, the lighting of lamps, and also fumigation (the offering of incense).

— III. Worship is distinguished besides as absolute and relative. Absolute worship is terminated at persons; relative at things which are connected with a person and thus participate a certain sanctity, which is the cause why they cannot be treated unworthily and can be positively affected with honors: relative honors indeed, because they are mediately referred to a person. Among these things, relics themselves are placed. Cf. c. 1255 § 2. Persons themselves who represent others more worthy, e.g. Legates who represent a Prince or the Supreme Pontiff, are honored with relative worship. But we can, almost as we honor God in His Saints, merely use an image for representing to ourselves a person, and thus directly, through the image, honor the person represented: then the image itself is not honored. The declared reason for relative worship shows why the worship of an image is not the same as the worship of the person; why the image of a less worthy person can be honored more than the image of a more worthy one; and why the various images of the same person are honored in various degrees.

— Concerning the worship of relics, cf. canons 1283-1287.

That we may gather these things into a few points: a) Only those relics can be honored with public worship in churches which have legitimately been "authenticated." b) Holy relics whose documents of authenticity have perished cannot be exposed for public veneration without the judgment of the Ordinary of the place. In these matters the Vicar General needs a special mandate. c) Ancient relics are confirmed in the possession of their veneration, unless it is certain that they are false. d) Ordinaries of places must prudently remove from worship a relic which they know certainly not to be authentic; and at the same time restrain imprudent attacks.

Notable relics, or those which in some church are honored with great veneration of the people, cannot validly be alienated or transferred perpetually into another church without permission of the Apostolic See. Notable relics are the body, head, arm, forearm, hand, leg, or that part of the body in which the martyr suffered, provided that it is entire and not small (c. 1281, § 2). The same cannot be kept in private houses or oratories without the express license of the Ordinary of the place (c. 1282, § 1). Relics of the Most Holy Cross are never to be exhibited for public veneration in the same case with relics of the Saints, but are to have their own separate case (c. 1287, § 2). Finally, "to sell sacred relics is wrong" (c. 1289, § 1).

— Concerning the worship of sacred images. Cf. cc. 1279-1281, 1385 and 1399.

The blessing of images is not prescribed by any canon as to be done; but "if images exposed to public veneration are solemnly blessed, this blessing is reserved to the Ordinary, who nevertheless can commit it to any priest" (c. 1279, § 4). - No unusual image can be placed in churches, even exempt ones, or in sacred places unless it has been approved by the Ordinary of the place: to this certain cautions are prescribed by c. 1279, §§ 1-3. - "Precious images, i.e. those outstanding by age, art, or worship, exposed to the veneration of the faithful in churches or public oratories, ... are never to be repaired without consent given in writing by the Ordinary; who, before he grants license, is to consult prudent and expert men" (c. 1280). - Precious images, or those which in some church are honored with great veneration of the people, cannot validly be alienated or transferred perpetually into another church without permission of the Apostolic See (c. 1281, § 1). - Sacred images to be printed must be submitted to ecclesiastical censorship; moreover printed images are prohibited which are alien to the sense and decrees of the Church (c. 1385, §§ 1, 3°; and 1399, 12°).

(1) This paragraph concerning liturgical worship we must credit to Rev. Fr. I. Hanssens, S.J., professor of sacred liturgy in the Pontifical Gregorian University and in the Pontifical Oriental Institute.

I. Conditions of a Good Definition. Liturgy is called the whole order of liturgical acts. But these acts, in order that liturgy may constitute some species and be the object of its own science, must: 1) have some proper nature, i.e. refer one and the same quality by which they both agree among themselves and differ from other acts of the same genus; and furthermore this quality must in some way be natural or essential, i.e. be joined by an intimate connection with those acts and constitute their intrinsic reason; 2) by reason of that nature, have neither too slight a place nor too light an importance among the acts of Catholic life.

That this order of acts exists and must be called by the name of liturgy will soon appear.

II. Insufficient Definitions. Such, on the contrary, would not be a liturgy which would be only the decorative part of worship, ceremonial, aesthetic; - or its ecclesiastical and human part, opposed to the other part, i.e. the essential and divine part instituted by Christ Himself. For, although perhaps such a sense can also be attributed to the word liturgy itself (let the grammarians see to it), liturgy conceived in this way would not have a sufficient place among the acts of ecclesiastical life; besides, the quality by which liturgical acts would be constituted would not be natural or essential, but wholly exterior and accidental. Nor is it enough to say that liturgy is that part of worship which comprises the sacrifice of the Mass, the sacraments and sacramentals, and canonical prayer; or that it consists of those acts whose norms the liturgical books legitimately define: for again in such definitions any intrinsic and essential note is lacking.

For this reason we cannot make our own the definition defended by the distinguished Callewaert, a man so well deserving of liturgy, according to which "liturgy is public worship insofar as this is ordered by ecclesiastical authority"¹, and which the author himself equates with the definition proposed in the notable manual of Thalhofer-Eisenhofer². It has rightly been objected to this definition that it establishes a specific reason too exterior, i.e. the ordering impressed on worship by the Church, and thus excludes from liturgy the rites themselves, at least insofar as they are already defined and instituted by Christ Himself, such as, for example, the Eucharistic sacrifice itself in the Mass, and the substantial rites of the sacraments³.

III. The True Definition. This is reached partly by deduction and partly by induction. For several centuries, however, all experts have connected liturgy with the public worship of the Church (concerning worship and specifically concerning public worship, cf. above n. 165, 166). Yet liturgy cannot yet be defined by public worship itself; for there are some acts of public worship in the Church which are not counted among liturgical acts: for example, sermons. Therefore proceeding further, we shall say that liturgy is public worship in the Church insofar as it consists of rites, or that it is the public and ritual worship of the Church; but by this note, that it is ritual, the specific reason of liturgical worship is constituted. A rite, moreover, can be defined as an exterior action to be done according to a definite form, by which some effect is signified and, ex opere operato, taken properly or more broadly, is produced, either in the sanctification of souls or, as in our case the matter stands, for the honoring of God. Every rite, although it is simple and stripped of all pomp, nevertheless necessarily possesses some stability and gravity. Liturgy is composed not only of rites instituted by the Church, but besides, indeed chiefly, of rites instituted by Christ, even before and apart from every ordering impressed upon them by the Church. As to the rites of the sacraments, although principally they tend to the sanctification of souls, nevertheless at the same time and equally immediately they are directed to the honor of God, and this by the very fact that they express and signify themselves as effecting the sanctification of the faithful, which is a most excellent work of divine power and goodness. Ceremonies are secondary rites, completing the principal rites and adding beauty and majesty to them, so that indeed they beget similar effects, but through rites properly so called.

Liturgical worship, although of itself it suffices that it be exercised in the name of the universal Church but apart from the community, nevertheless has been so instituted that it ought per se to be performed by the very legitimate and public (officielle) communities of the Church, i.e. collectively and hierarchically; and in fact it is usually performed in that way. This is true of Mass, of the canonical hours, which are the common office of some group, even if, by way of habit or exception, they are permitted to be recited apart from choir: this is true of the administration of all the sacraments and of the sacrament of Penance itself, as is clear from its history.

¹ Liturgicae Institutiones: Tractatus primus, Bruges 1910, p. 6, n. 6.

² Handbuch der katholischen Liturgik, 2nd ed., t. 1, 1912, p. 4.

³ D. Franco de Wyvls, Tydschrift voor Liturgie, 1920, p. 140.

— You ask, what are rubrics?

Rubrics are those rules which prescribe only the exterior manner of ritual actions, with no distinction made between rites and mere ceremonies, between necessary rites and adventitious rites, and with no explanation added of their sense or efficacy. For example, in exactly the same way they describe the rites occurring in the incensation of the altar and the rites proper to the consecration itself. The rubric therefore is the "letter" of ritual worship; but the "spirit" of this worship is the native signification of the rites and their proper efficacy.

The rubric must be animated and ruled by the spirit. In turn the spirit itself is subject to other necessities, which it pertains to the rubrics legitimately to define and to confer on them the force of law. Thus it happens that, while the spirit of the prayer Domine non sum dignus to be said in distributing Communion requires that it be recited by the faithful person himself, nevertheless on account of decency or for some other reason, the rubric fittingly establishes that it be pronounced by the priest himself in the name of the faithful person. By the same reason the dialogue Mass is consonant with the spirit of the liturgy, but it can be ignored by the rubric, indeed on account of extrinsic reasons it could be condemned by it.

The Spiritual Value of the Liturgy. It is scarcely necessary to say how great these parts are in the life of the universal Church. Is not public worship to be rendered to God to be placed among her more principal duties? But now, who does not see that in reality public worship is almost wholly contained in liturgical worship? Therefore, the faithful who become partners of liturgical worship, how fitting it is that they perform so great a duty worthily and intelligently!

Nor is fruit for souls lacking from such participation. For:

1. Liturgical worship, because it is ritual, pours into the soul the sense of some mystery and superhuman power, which greatly helps men to approach God with greater reverence.

2. For the same reason, i.e. because it is ritual, liturgical worship appears endowed with an efficacy which transcends ordinary human powers, and thus begets greater confidence.

3. Because it is adorned with pomp, it brings much beauty and majesty to the whole Catholic religion.

4. Because it is public, it excellently illustrates before all eyes the nature of the Church as she is a society.

5. Because it is stable and one, it awakens the sense of unity in time and unity in space, that is, of continuous tradition and catholicity. Therefore it is a most powerful remedy against excessive individualism and a document accommodated to all souls of a truly Catholic life, that is, collective and hierarchical.

6. Finally, by reason of the very means which it uses for signifying the honoring of God, it at the same time contributes most efficaciously to the Christian instruction of the faithful, namely by reason of the mysteries which are commemorated in it, by reason of the readings and chants which it contains, and especially by reason of the sacramental rites by which grace is poured in.

Certainly several of those salutary effects are not proper to liturgy as such: nevertheless even these usually in fact, at least with such great efficacy, are begotten by liturgy alone, either because, so far as most of the faithful are concerned, the collective and social exercise of religion is contained in liturgical worship, or because, as has been said, the principal means of sanctification which the Church uses, under another aspect, are also acts of liturgical worship.

Excesses to Be Avoided. 1. Nevertheless every excess must be abstained from in exalting the merits of liturgy; nor must its ambit be so extended that it seems to comprehend the whole spiritual life both of the universal Church and of individual faithful. For liturgy is public and ritual worship and nothing besides. Therefore whatever does not have the character of a worshipful act and does not consist in rites must wholly be denied to liturgy. But who will seriously deny that very many such works exist both in the spiritual life of the Church and in that of the faithful? Think of the whole office of public teaching or the use of jurisdiction in establishing laws and ruling the faithful: very many works of charity, etc.; but among the faithful, worship of private devotion, and especially the custom of pious contemplation and of examination of conscience; fasts, vigils, and the other exercises of penance, not to speak of many other things which are too manifestly distant from liturgy by the whole heaven.

2. Nor is the name of Catholic piety rightly reserved to liturgy, while outside it a place is conceded only to devotion that is wholly private. For a false supposition underlies this distinction; because not only those things which are exercised publicly in the Church, but all other good works also which are done at the will of or with the approval of the Church within her limits, although they are in some way private, nevertheless, on account of the communion of saints, are truly works of the whole Church and acquire their proper dignity from this. For the publicity of the acts of the Church, in relation to spiritual effects and especially to the communication of merits, is nothing other than a certain sacramental. Therefore the Church is badly defined as a "society of liturgy."

3. But must not at least the whole remaining spiritual life be subject to liturgical worship? Must not this be its center, as they say, so that all other spiritual actions are either preparation for or continuation of liturgical worship? There is someone who affirms this. But this necessity could be defended in some way if liturgy were not only materially (which it truly is) but also formally penance, thanksgiving, ascetical life, etc. For then liturgy would be the same as the public and legitimate exercise of the whole Christian and spiritual life. Nevertheless even then it would have to be demonstrated that the Church proposes that public exercise as one and excellent, so that the private exercise would be excluded or at least the public would always have to be preferred to it. This does not seem able to be said rightly. For in this assertion there lies hidden always the same error by which it is affirmed that only that which is public (officiel) is done with the Church and through her.

But moreover, liturgy is not formally penance, thanksgiving, ascetical life, etc., but only worship, and indeed public and ritual worship. But can worship, especially public and ritual worship, be the center of the whole spiritual life? There is no reason for asserting such a thing. For although to serve God is the one end of our whole life and of the Church's life, nevertheless God is not served principally by worship.

Yet again it is not denied that liturgy is of such great importance that its exercise is worthy to be carefully prepared and continued by apt readings and meditations; and this seems to us to be liturgical life. Nevertheless it must be noted that such preparation and continuation is no longer formally the exercise of liturgy.

But at least, even if some coordination only without subordination is admitted between liturgy and the remaining acts of spiritual life, is not liturgy nevertheless, as it were, the exemplar and teacher of the whole spiritual life? Certainly liturgy, since it is an ecclesiastical institution, enjoys immense authority; and on the other hand some unity in our spiritual life is greatly to be desired. But the authority which liturgy enjoys from the institution of the Church has force only insofar as liturgy is worship, not insofar as it is an exercise of penance, prayer, ascesis, etc., since all these things it is only materially. Moreover, the Church never hints that she wishes to propose, by her public worship, an exemplar of the whole spiritual life.

— You ask concerning "liturgical spirit."

And first, what is it? It consists in those dispositions of intellect and will, indeed also of sensibility, which are necessary or useful for performing a liturgical act well, i.e. integrally and worthily. But that it should be done fruitfully pertains at least to the spirit of the liturgy, because liturgy does not formally intend this end. Many things are often attributed to liturgical spirit as if they were proper to it, which pertain to it only materially. Thus that liberty of soul and mind in liturgical meditation, i.e. in that meditation which is exercised in the very performing of a liturgical act, for example in singing the Office. For why could someone not use the same liberty in meditating on the psalms or other passages of sacred Scripture apart from every action of liturgical worship? And so, while the liturgical spirit is altogether necessary, and too often is greatly lacking, in the exercise of liturgical worship itself, outside that worship it must be said not to be required; but individual acts of spiritual life must be done in that manner and with those dispositions of soul which their nature demands for greater spiritual usefulness, always with the authority of the Church preserved.

These acts are devotion, adoration, praise, and prayer.

I. Actual devotion is a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God. It is acquired by prayers and by consideration or contemplation of the divine perfections and of one's own defect. Per se and principally, it brings spiritual joy, as the fruit of the considered divine goodness and of the promise of aid; accidentally, however, and consequently, it brings sorrow according to God, from consideration of one's own misery and of the absence of the vision of God. Cf. 2, 2, q. 82.

II. Adoration, taken strictly, is the formal exhibition of supreme reverence and the protestation of subjection, in recognition of the infinite excellence and supreme dominion of God. By a broader usage, it is extended to the very veneration which belongs to creatures.

Taken adequately, it comprises, besides interior veneration (through internal adoration), exterior humiliation of the body (through external adoration); the latter aids the interior; from man's composite nature, as it were spontaneously, it accompanies the former, and from the necessity of social worship it is sometimes prescribed.

III. Praise is prayer making clear the greatness of virtue insofar as it shines forth in effects, and especially in benefits.

Hence it is said to differ from honor, because we honor all the good, but we praise benefactors. Therefore it pertains to the office of gratitude which must be rendered to God. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I and 3; St. Thomas on Ps. 17.

The power of God shines forth in all visible nature; but in no creature more than in the heroic life of the saints.

Praise of the mouth is a part of external worship. For stirring up affections, chant agrees with it especially well, and is therefore most suitably instituted, "that the souls of the weak might be more provoked to devotion" (2, 2, q. 91, art. 2).

I. Notion. 1. A twofold description of prayer is proposed: the ascent of the mind to God; the petition of fitting things from God. The former is drawn from the praying subject and from the term of the motion, the latter from the object; the former sets forth more the dignity and sublimity of the action, the latter more its utility and the divine goodness; the former is more eternal, the latter more practical now and accommodated to our present state.

Each notion is well joined by Damascene ¹, since there is no ascent to God without petition, no petition made to God without an ascent of the mind to God. For, our present condition considered, our perpetual need of goods which we cannot receive except from God brings this about, that every formal approach of ours to God contains a formal or virtual petition. Indeed, in the perpetual thanksgiving of the heavenly citizens there is had a virtual supplication for perpetual divine possession; nor is conversation with God conceived where the creature (not a being in itself) does not receive, and God (infinite being, incapable of reception) does not give.

2. Prayer is distinguished as formal and virtual or vital. The former, from a suppliant intention, approaches God; the latter consists in good works, since good works have impetratory force.

It is also distinguished as mental and vocal: not because the former excludes words or exterior signs, but because it is not, as the latter is, bound to words. Vocal prayer is rendered in exterior words by intention; whether the one praying here and now finds words which he utters with a loud or low voice, or whether he follows a formula written at another time by himself or by another. Concerning the essence of vocal prayer cf. III, 39. - Mental prayer is so completed in the mind that there is no professed use of voices or exterior signs. Mental prayer in turn is divided into meditation and contemplation. Meditation strictly is discursive prayer; contemplation, as the fruit of meditation, is a simpler and affective intuition of truth. Contemplation itself can be either ordinary or extraordinary, or mystical. The latter has as its proper note that it takes place with a certain sense of the divine presence: it is the fruit of a new divine grace, distinct from the grace which makes an act supernatural and salutary. From this we pronounce nothing concerning the frequency or rarity of that grace. Cf. our work Quaestiones de Virtute religionis, etc., q. 1, c. 2.

3. Their own parts in prayer belong to the intellect and to the will. Yet because prayer pertains to the genus of a certain speech, and by persuasion orders God toward doing something in favor of the one praying, prayer is formally an act of the intellect.

¹ De fide orthodoxa III, 24, P.G. 94, 1090.

The Parts of Complete Prayer. From the occasion of the words of St. Paul, "I beseech therefore first of all that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings be made for all men" (1 Tim. 2:1), St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 83, art. 17, finds in every perfect prayer four parts: approach to God through a certain dutiful salutation, which he calls prayer strictly so called; formal petition, which is designated by the name of postulation; exposition of reasons and sacred contestation, which is called obsecration; and thanksgiving for benefits already received, which disposes toward new ones to be granted. These parts are easily distinguished in several prayers of the Church, for example in the prayer of the Most Holy Sacrament: "O God (prayer), who under a wonderful sacrament hast left us a memorial of Thy Passion (thanksgiving), grant graciously, etc. (postulation), graciously, who livest and reignest (obsecration)."

II. The Praying Subject. Christ never prayed servilely, as creatures do who cannot provide for themselves the things which they seek; but dispensatively, by voluntary lowering of Himself, which, by no means repugnant to His human nature, was at the same time an example to us. In heaven, however, He is presented to us by the Apostle as "always living to make intercession for us" (Heb. 7:25). But since He is now in the glory of the Father, and all things have been handed over into His hands, even as man, this is better understood, rather than of formal prayer, of the title of every grace to be obtained, which we perpetually have in His wounds and in His humanity.

That the Blessed Virgin Mary is, for us, by her prayer, the universal Mediatrix of grace, is a persuasion which is more and more rooted in the souls of the faithful, confirmed by several pontifical documents, expressed almost authentically by the proper Mass itself granted, nourished by the studies of theologians, so that the sweet hope grows day by day that at some time this truth will be proposed to the faithful as a dogma of faith to be believed. The peculiar force which, as Mother of God and our Mother, Mary has for interceding for us is so well known that therefore she has been called suppliant Omnipotence.

The Saints themselves can seek for themselves both the glory of the body and the accidental glory of honors or worship. For us they can obtain every genus of goods, according to the order of divine Providence.

The souls of purgatory, even if they do not know our petitions (which St. Thomas thinks, but it is not certain), seem at least able to pray for the living in common, and especially for those joined to them. Indeed, although they cannot satisfy, they can usefully pray to God that they may as quickly as possible obtain beatitude, by asking some remission of punishment or a certain divine motion by which God may move wayfarers to pray and satisfy for them. Cf. Suarez, De Religione, Tract. IV, Lib. I, c. 10, n. 25-28.

Every wayfarer can pray not only for himself, but also for his neighbor, of whom, on account of the bond of charity, he is in some way said to be one.

III. Object. All things are to be sought by us in order to salvation. Therefore an indifferent thing, as such, cannot be the object of an honorable petition. Yet those alone seem objectively to sin who, while asking temporal things, formally exclude the right use of the temporal good. For a thing indifferent from its object can be referred to divine glory. But whoever acts with an honorable intention tacitly does not seek a thing that is indifferent except insofar as it is lawful for him to seek the same. Therefore, rather than that we stir up scruples concerning the thing sought as indifferent, it will be much better that we inculcate the Lord's counsel: "Seek first the kingdom of God and all these things shall be added to you" (St. Luke 12:31); lest, from scant success of prayers, Christians begin to scrape away in their souls concerning prayer and to lead a languid spiritual life. Therefore they should also be admonished that temporal goods are not granted by God except in order to aiding salvation; and that by an excessive affection by which temporal things are sought before other goods, prayer itself is partly vitiated.

Things, however, can be sought determinately, which aids our fervor, or indeterminately, as when we confidently say: "He whom Thou lovest is sick" (Gospel of St. John 11:3).

IV. Terms. 1. Prayer is properly made to God, from whom we expect all goods. In a secondary way, the worship of suppliant prayer is directed to the Saints, that they may pray for us, and on account of their merits God may hear us. Because formal invocation of them is less essential, there is nothing wonderful in the fact that it must be referred to an age of developed Christian religion. But in the present state entirely to neglect it would savor of a certain pride and irreligiosity. Therefore c. 1276 opportunely commands these things: "Before the rest, let all the faithful pursue the Blessed Virgin Mary with filial devotion."

2. The pious work of aiding souls detained in purgatory is not doubted to contribute greatly to obtaining graces: pious alms are thus joined with prayer.

St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 83, art. 11 ad 3, denies that the souls of purgatory are to be invoked, because they do not know our petitions and are rather in need than themselves helping (cf. n. 181). Yet these are not certain arguments. Nor does it appear why they cannot pray for the living in common and for those specially joined to them. Cf. Suarez, Relig. tr. IV, L. 1, c. 10, 25-28. And without doubt, once received into the eternal tabernacles, they will be grateful to their benefactors.

V. Efficacy. 1. From the divine promise, which is contained in manifest places of Sacred Scripture, prayer, made in the due manner, possesses an infallible efficacy of obtaining. "Ask and it shall be given you" (St. Matt. 7:7; St. Luke 11:9). "All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive" (St. Matt. 21:22). That it may be made in the due manner, there is required humility, by which, subject to God the Supreme Lord, we desire goods for ourselves according to the order pre-established for us by divine Wisdom; faith, by which we believe God's omnipotence and promises; confidence, by which we do not doubt concerning divine fidelity; perseverance, by which our virtue, especially humility, is exercised, and the defect of individual prayers is supplied; at least initial conversion to God, so that our petition may be sincere. Therefore, since God destines no goods for us as indifferent to salvation, and wills us to be subject to the laws of His supreme and universal Providence, all and only those things can be infallibly obtained by us which are necessary or useful for attaining the degree of heavenly glory predestined for us.

2. It is less established that prayer poured forth for others is of infallible efficacy. Yet the universal force of the words of Sacred Scripture seems to prove this, especially since they expressly commend prayer for others, for example Eph. 6:18, 19; 1 Tim. 2:1-4. But the necessary disposition can be lacking in him for whom we pray. And because the application of prayer to the souls of purgatory seems to be subject to other things than their present disposition, for example to the mercy by which they themselves were commendable while they lived on earth, therefore suffrages for the souls of purgatory do not always free them.

3. Aids of efficacy. Since divine Providence has brought us to our state and has prepared for us various conjunctions with others, the more we seek those things which are according to our condition, and the more the persons for whom we pray are joined to us, the more easily we shall be heard. Moreover, that the sanctity of the one praying contributes to the efficacy of prayer is not to be doubted.

4. Utility of imperfect prayer. Although a prayer in which some required condition is lacking cannot rest upon the divine promises, nevertheless it is not made useless, since the benignity of God preserves for it some impetratory force ¹, and repeated prayers can supply the defect of individual prayers.

¹ Cf. Aertnijs, I, 414, V; Tanquerey, II, 872.

— You ask concerning the necessity of attention and concerning distractions. A certain attention or application of mind is necessarily had, from the fact that someone, from a formal or virtual intention, pronounces prayerful words. Therefore distraction usually signifies not so much alienation of the mind from God as a division of the mind among several things. But the reverence owed to God demands that at least when we pray by profession, the mind be morally wholly turned to Him. But a just proportionate cause, whether of labor through which at the same time we desire to pour forth some prayer, or of the importance of the business itself whose thought comes upon the mind, or of the very utility of the distraction, can take away that irreverence, and therefore the venial sin. Cf. the things said, III, 39, where the threefold attention is also explained, or Tanquerey, II, n. 872.

VI. Necessity. 1. That prayer is necessary to us at least by necessity of precept is certain by faith. For this is demonstrated to us by very clear places of Sacred Scripture, by the word and example of the Lord, and by the exhortation of the Apostles. And the Scriptures so join prayer with necessary goods that they already inculcate a necessity of means, which is more clearly preached in Tradition and admitted by the more common opinion. Yet it is a diminished necessity of means, insofar as it presses, not strictly upon all, but upon most by ordinary law; i.e., according to the doctrine received in the schools, grace immediately sufficient for fully believing or for overcoming grave temptations is available to many by no other way than that of prayer. But who, without great temerity, could presume that he will be immune from great difficulties or temptations?

2. That one must pray frequently in life is effected from the same places of Scripture. For the sacred texts will that in every necessity, concerning every matter, we confidently have recourse to God. How often, however, cannot be defined. The theologians who demand monthly prayer do not demonstrate their intention. Therefore it must be said that this precept is more determined by the laws of the Church concerning hearing Mass, concerning receiving the sacraments, and is abundantly fulfilled by the various offices of Christian life.

3. The same precept obliges accidentally: a) when grave temptations are foreseen or must be overcome: the omission will be one sin, in number and species, with the sin which ought to have been avoided through prayer. For prayer was not prescribed except for avoiding that, so that one precept of not committing such a sin has been violated; b) when, in danger of death, pardon from mortal sin must be obtained; c) when, in a grave calamity of the public or of those joined to us, prayer is shown to be an efficacious remedy which others will neglect (when will these things be established?); d) from an imposed office: the pastor of souls is obliged to prayer by the office itself; those ordained in sacred orders, beneficed persons, together with the office imposed on them by the Church, have the obligation of reciting the divine hours.

For the most part, from a less right cause, the omission of every morning prayer, evening prayer, and prayer before and after bodily refreshment will be venial, although these are not prescribed. Catholic families are very opportunely admonished that these prayers, commended by the pious custom of the Church, not gradually be neglected and passed over. When refreshment is taken in a public place, our regions being considered, it is becoming that a priest or religious not omit prayer. And per se it is also to be recommended to lay persons that, in a manner which is free at the same time from timidity and from arrogance, they preserve the custom. What Mohammedans and many Protestants dare, will Catholics no longer dare?

— You ask, what prayer is to be preferred, whether mental or vocal. Mental prayer does not differ from vocal precisely in this, that the former excludes the parts of voice and body, while the latter excludes interior discourses and affections. For one who prays in the mind is accustomed to show himself praying by the whole habit of the body, and not rarely to break forth into words. Again, without some attention of the mind there would not be vocal prayer. But both prayers are separated by this distinction, that vocal prayer is bound to a definite form of words, while mental prayer is released from this bond.

These things presupposed, vocal prayer alone is adapted to public prayer; and the loftiest thoughts can be revolved in vocal prayer. Therefore, in the first place, each one ought to place before others that prayer by which he himself is more aided. Yet that prayer which is directed by the mind is preferable and per se more useful: it permits to the nobler faculties an unimpeded abundance of explaining themselves; it is prayer in which the voices serve the affections of the mind, and have only that use which agrees with the present desire or need of the soul, rather than a manner of praying which follows an exterior norm, fixes the acies of the intellect at least in part upon words, so that the superior faculties can give themselves less fully to their acts, and in some way join themselves to the words as attendants; or are easily impeded by the pronunciation of the words. Add that mental prayer is accustomed to be more laborious, so that the merit of greater bodily affliction is added.

Concerning Mystical Prayer. 1. Notion. Mystical prayer denotes contemplation of God or of heavenly things, full of affection, extraordinary and ineffable, with a certain sense of the divine presence, and indeed an intimate one. Although not all require this sense as essential, nevertheless in that sense by which mystics are said to experience divine things, we think there is a specific note by which mystical contemplation is proved to differ from common contemplation.

It is commonly known that mystical contemplation itself is distinguished by various degrees, of which the supreme is spiritual marriage. Moreover, mystical facts or phenomena which accompany that contemplation are called, some exdeic, insofar as they have as term something created, such as visions themselves, revelations, ecstasies; others are endeic, which attain God Himself or a closer conjunction with Him. The former pertain to graces gratuitously given, which are neither the object of merit nor contribute to sanctity; while the latter, in some degree, are offered as a sufficiently common reward of peculiar fidelity and are very useful for sanctity. Therefore the former are neither to be sought nor desired, but rather humbly to be fled. Nor must one strive indiscreetly for perfect contemplation ¹; yet for this a man can laudably dispose himself by great purity of heart, profound humility, and ardent charity.

Every mystical state indeed is the fruit of its own grace, distinct from the grace which effects a supernatural and salutary act; but a remote general aptitude, not to say universal, for obtaining that state in some degree seems rather to be admitted.

Let it be enough to have intimated these things concerning prayer; for more, cf., for example, in Quaestiones De virtute religionis et pietatis.

¹ Alvarez de Paz, De inquisitione pacis, b. 5, p. 2, c. 13.

I. Concerning worship. By the general name of worship all acts of the virtue of religion are designated, since by them the service of God is integrated. The worship of latria is distinguished, which is proper to the divine Majesty; of hyperdulia, which is rendered to the Blessed Virgin Mary; and of dulia, by which the Saints are commonly honored. Except sacrifice, which pertains to public latreutic worship alone, other external acts, according to the intention and circumstances of the one honoring, can manifest latria or dulia.

Worship is interior and exterior. Exterior worship can be private and public: public worship is rendered in the name of the Church, by persons legitimately deputed for this, or by acts which from the institution of the Church can be exhibited only to God, the Saints, and the Blessed (c. 1256). Public worship is called liturgical when it is rendered by a rite or ordered mode prescribed by legitimate power (by Christ or by the Church). The norms of the material execution of sacred rites are called rubrics. The liturgical spirit, or the study of accommodating personal devotion to the properly social devotion which belongs to liturgy, is greatly to be commended, yet so that it not be preached as exclusive, and not depress private devotion. Finally, he leads a liturgical life who is assiduous in celebrating liturgical acts and girds himself for them by private spiritual exercises.

With public worship today only these can be honored who, being prior to Alexander III, have been described in the martyrology, or who by decree of the Holy See have been numbered among the Saints or Blessed. Yet the immemorial worship rendered to Servants of God who died before 1534 can remain in its state. (That time is not taken mathematically or rigorously, but morally.)

Only those Servants of God can be called Venerable whose martyrdom or heroicity of virtues has been proved. Private worship is honorably attributed by someone to him whose sanctity is morally certain to that person. Canonization, but not beatification, contains an infallible decree. Therefore the worship of the Blessed is circumscribed by place and mode. Absolute worship is terminated at persons; relative worship at things which, on account of connection with persons, participate their sanctity. Such are relics and images: these we can immediately honor on account of the person; just as we can, without any honor rendered to the image itself, merely use the image for honoring the person.

To the Ordinary belongs the delegable power of solemnly blessing an image which is honored with public worship; nor can an unusual one be placed in sacred places without the license of the Ordinary of the place. Per se, without an authentic document, relics cannot be honored with public worship in churches, unless they have been endowed with ancient veneration and it is not established that they are false.

Worship is distinguished as latria, which is exhibited to the divine majesty alone, and dulia, which is exhibited to the Saints. The singular dignity and sanctity which divine maternity conferred upon the Virgin Mother of God gives place to the worship of hyperdulia. Except sacrifice, which is proper to the worship of latria, the other external acts, according to the intention and circumstances of the one honoring, can manifest latria or dulia.

II. Concerning the acts in species. 1. Devotion is defined as a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God.

2. Adoration, taken strictly, is the formal exhibition of supreme reverence; by a broader use of the word, creatures also are adored. Taken adequately, it is interior and exterior: this agrees with our nature and is sometimes prescribed by the necessity of social worship.

3. Praise, by which we profess, internally or externally, the beneficent perfection or goodness of God, is a part of gratitude owed to God. Expressed by chant, it aids the devotion of the weak. By a broader use of the word, the greatest praise accrues to God from the promoted perfection of the rational creature.

4. Prayer. a) From the subject and term it is called: the ascent of the mind to God; from the object: the petition of fitting things from God. It is distinguished as formal, by which, from a suppliant intention, God is approached, and virtual or vital, which the good works of him who does not refuse to pray contain; mental, which is not bound to words, and vocal, which is rendered in exterior words by intention.

Mental prayer is divided into discursive meditation and intuitive contemplation, which can be ordinary or extraordinary, or mystical: mystical is with some sense of the divine presence. Vocal prayer is divided into private and public. - Although intellect and will intervene in prayer, prayer is nevertheless formally an act of the intellect. - Distraction, insofar as it merely denotes division of the mind among several things, does not take away the substance of prayer, at least of vocal prayer; yet if it is voluntary, it derogates venially from the reverence owed to God, unless a proportionate cause excuses it. - Because in moral estimation attention is judged to persevere, he who is involuntarily distracted is sometimes, rather improperly, said to be virtually attentive. Nor for vocal prayer is it necessary that the one praying be able to hear himself.

b) Since prayer contains confession of one's own subjection and recognition and praise of divine excellence, it is of itself a meritorious act of religion.

c) Complete prayer contains approach to God (prayer more strictly so called), postulation, obsecration or contestation of motives, and thanksgiving for benefits already accepted (1 Tim. 2:1).

d) Not only wayfarers pray, but also Saints, the souls of purgatory, and, less properly, as it seems, Christ glorious and reigning.

e) The object of prayer. Whatever can pertain to salvation can be sought for us or for others, but not indifferent or temporal things as such. For as such God has by no means ordered them to us.

f) The term from whom it is obtained is God alone; the term through whom is Christ; and, on account of the merits of Christ, also the Blessed Virgin and the Saints.

g) Efficacy. Already honorable per se and of some efficacy, prayer made in the due manner has, from divine promise, a certain infallible efficacy of obtaining for us the things which, according to the ordering of divine Providence, conduce to our salvation. This efficacy seems also to be extended to prayer offered for others who are disposed. Prayer made in the due manner requires humility, faith, confidence, perseverance, and at least initial conversion to God. According to the dignity of the one praying, according to the quality of the prayer, and according to the conjunction of the one praying with him for whom he prays, the efficacy itself of prayer varies in degree.

h) Necessity. By very clear places of Scripture the precept of prayer is so demonstrated that it is certain by faith. And the Scriptures so join prayer with necessary goods that they inculcate at least a diminished necessity of means, which the more common opinion reads in Tradition. That is, grace immediately sufficient for fully believing or for overcoming grave temptations will be able to be at hand for many by the way of prayer alone. Most, however, have great difficulties to overcome, so that prayer becomes for most a means necessary for salvation. How often one must pray cannot be defined; but the precept of frequently praying is abundantly fulfilled by the various offices of Christian life. The precept obliges accidentally when grave temptations are foreseen or must be overcome; when, in danger of death, pardon from mortal sin must be obtained; or, if that is ever established, when a grave necessity of the public or of those joined to us could be averted by the prayer of someone alone; finally, insofar as it enters into the office of one's state. Although morning prayer, evening prayer, and prayer before and after bodily refreshment are not properly prescribed, for the most part, in the concrete, complete omission, on account of a less right motive, will not lack venial fault.

i) For each one the better prayer is that by which he is more aided; yet per se mental prayer is more excellent, insofar as, bound by no words, it permits a freer direction to the superior faculties.

k) The mystical state, which can be called a certain affective suffering or experience of divine things, although it demands a special grace of God, seems, in some degree, less prodigious, remotely offered to most, not to say all; and, because it is very useful for sanctity, it can be piously and humbly sought, and prepared for dispositively by the exercise of virtues. But the added rare graces gratuitously given, which tend not to a closer conjunction with God but to some created thing, as a vision or revelation is, are not to be desired but humbly fled. Moreover, in ecstasy itself, man continues freely to love God and to merit, and implicitly seeks all fitting things from God.

Utility. In setting forth the negative offices of the virtue of religion, by which we are ordered to ward off all vices contrary to religion, questions occur which we can deservedly call at once very useful, delicate, and modern. How useful it is to separate superstition properly so called from vain but human arts will be confirmed by the missionary who knows by experience itself how great a ruin of souls an imprudent reprobation of usages can bring among less cultivated peoples. No one will deny that the question of spiritism is modern and very grave. In the chapter on blasphemies, it will be helpful to separate true blasphemous formulas from vulgar sayings; at the same time, however, the question concerning the subjective guilt of those who use those formulas will have to be examined a little more accurately than is sometimes done. Nor can the mind of the theologian be so occupied by trivial blasphemers that he can scarcely attend to worse blasphemers, who by their writings affect God and divine things with insults. Then the intimate ratio of sacrilege will have to be penetrated, by which those things which are sacred by divine right and those which are sacred by human right may be well distinguished. Finally, in the chapter on simony, the legitimate use of stipends and taxes must be clearly demonstrated, and all confusion must be removed, which, because of the obscurity itself which it begets, is accustomed to pave the way for illicit modes of gain.

Ratio of order. Although the things which we offer to God necessarily remain always below the dignity and merit of Infinite Goodness, and under this respect our religion cannot become excessive, nevertheless our mode of worshiping God can be vicious, or even the term which we pursue with religious affection. In this respect man is said to sin by excess against religion; and that vice is called by the common name superstition. This, therefore, must be divided into superstition by which the true God is badly worshiped, and superstition by which a creature is unduly honored or obtains services; whence two articles compose this chapter on superstition. In the latter article there will be discussion of modern spiritism.

By defect, however, one sins against religion by irreligiosity, which contrarily denies the worship owed to God, to His Name, and to a sacred thing. Its fuller ratio, by which every office of religion is deserted, is not customarily treated here, because if it remains from contempt, it is to be reduced to the genus of blasphemy and is easily joined with apostasy, concerning which above; but if it has been mere negligence, it demands no other explanation besides those things which have been said concerning sloth. Less complete irreligiosity derogates either from the reverence owed to God, by tempting God, by blasphemy, and by perjury; or from the reverence which is owed to sacred persons or things, by sacrilege and simony. We shall treat each successively, passing over the question of perjury, which was treated in the chapter on oath.

What it is to tempt God. 1. The reverence owed to God requires that we have recourse to the special help of God and to His attributes modestly, discreetly, and humbly. To will that He should exhibit Himself as if on a stage is gravely injurious to God. Whoever, therefore, without cause, asks for the intervention of God commits this malice. Therefore the proper ratio of tempting God is in the rash demand for divine intervention. To this malice there can be added a sin against faith and hope, if someone, as if doubting, formally wishes to explore the divine truth or attribute, and thus thinks of tempting God more strictly, or of proving Him by experience.

Various concepts. Theologians do not all conceive tempting God in the same way. For some it is rash exploration of the divine perfection; for others, however, rash exploration of the divine good pleasure. They distinguish express temptation, which intends exploration, and interpretative temptation, which lies hidden in the manner of acting. Each is formal when, whether doubting or not, someone with conscious rashness asks that God come to his aid or manifest Himself.

Who are guilty of tempting God. He tempts God who, without a special divine instinct, absolutely wills or promises a miracle; or who, without sufficient cause, wills a miracle conditionally, if it please God, as if someone offers a miracle to prove the truth of faith; if someone, in a slight matter, or when other means are at hand, asks for a miraculous sign. The former will of itself be a mortal sin; the latter in practice will generally be excused from grave sin by some simplicity and slight insistence.

Common use. In common speech he is said to tempt God who rashly exposes his health, who preaches or teaches without preparation, insofar as he seems to demand an undue divine help. But this is rather presumption, which is opposed to another precept, for example the fifth. For where expectation of divine help is lacking, temptation of God is necessarily absent. - The gravity of the guilt must be judged from the importance of the foreseen harm.

I. Notion and division. 1. Notion. Directly opposed to the will of worshiping God is a will insulting toward God, which blasphemy betrays. For blasphemy is an insult brought against God.

2. Division. a) Since God can read an insulting affection in the heart, a man can be blasphemous without any exterior sign; and he can manifest or exercise that mind exteriorly, either by signs of words, formal or equivalent, or by an insulting action. Hence blasphemy of heart, of mouth, and of deed.

Yet that division is not formal. When blasphemy is reserved, only that is understood which is done through speech, oral or written.

b) Direct blasphemy proceeds from a formal intention of dishonoring God; indirect blasphemy contains a virtual intention in the will of saying or doing things which are insulting toward God ¹. The former differs from the latter in degree, not in species.

c) Blasphemy can be either simply insulting, or heretical, which at the same time, at least exteriorly, denies a revealed truth; or imprecatory, by which evil is wished to God. And in its own genus it is completed by an affection of detestation or hatred, which at the same time is a most grave violation of charity.

d) God can be blasphemed in Himself, or in His saints and in sacred things. The former is graver, although, as blasphemy, it does not differ in species from the latter. But, according to the intention of the blasphemer, it can at the same time touch the Saints themselves or the Blessed Virgin in their own excellence, for example in the Immaculate Conception: then at the same time it will be against dulia or hyperdulia. St. Alphonsus judged that this regularly, in his time, did not happen. St. Alph., l. 3, n. 132.

e) Finally blasphemy is distinguished as vulgar, which is uttered in very customary formulas, often after the manner of an interjection, so that the blasphemer himself did not compose the words or arrange them into the form of a sentence; and deliberate, whose formula was invented or composed by the blasphemer himself.

¹ Under another respect, formal is called culpable; material, excusable.

II. Gravity. Of the sins which are opposed to religion, blasphemy is of its genus the most grave, so that true blasphemy does not admit slightness of matter.

An insulting word pronounced against the Saints in jest, not from contempt or hatred or indignation, is thought to be venial. But this is not done in jest except when the things treated are of lesser importance and give occasion to pleasantries, as if you call Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers.

The root of direct blasphemy, i.e., the impulsive cause which is accustomed to induce a man to formal blasphemy, is of itself the appetite of vengeance against God. Namely, bearing indignantly his lot, which he knows to be subject to God's judgment, an angry man seeks that vengeance of which alone he has the supply; and he attacks the honor of Him whom he cannot harm or touch. This root appears also in the selection by which, in various adversities, he blasphemes the saints who are invoked as protectors against definite calamities: as if, because cattle have been lost or are sick, you blaspheme St. Paschal, and because of pestilence, St. Roch.

The root of indirect blasphemy is too swift anger or impatience, together with a defect of reverence toward God or the Saints. The same defect of reverence also gives place to jocose blasphemies.

III. Examples. 1. As many as deny that God exists or are unwilling to worship Him are in reality, objectively, guilty of most grave blasphemy. Atheists hold the highest degree among infidels; then those who break off every positive relation between God and man, so that they put God as if outside intercourse. Those succeed who admit only natural religion; finally, those who wish to render to God only the diminished worship of Mohammedans, Jews, or heretics. This blasphemy becomes graver if there is added, through formal temptation of God, a certain provocation, as: "If He exists, or if He can, let Him punish the denier of the faith, of the Eucharist," etc.

2. Very grave, formal, and scandalous blasphemies are committed through impious books and newspapers.

3. He blasphemes not only who, raging against God, curses Him, or denies His wisdom and goodness in words, or has doubts; but also he who, without anger against God, seriously and knowingly utters things which, from their signification or from the manner of speaking and the circumstances, bring diminution upon the divine honor or rule. And other signs against God, such as spitting toward heaven, are blasphemous just as words are.

1. In the present introduction we intend nothing other than to prepare a surer and clearer attainment of the end which we keep before our eyes throughout the whole work on chastity and the contrary vices. For accurately knowing the material object of any virtue wonderfully assists a man in penetrating into the duties of that virtue. But in a matter which, like chastity and lust, is full of scruples, distinct notions can of themselves either remove or forestall many doubts and anxieties of mind.

It is not expedient, however, that all, or even most, priests should be compelled to draw anthropological notions concerning chastity and lust for themselves and from scientific books; for most could not accomplish this without loss of time, danger of deception, and some detriment to modesty. Accordingly, we have proposed to lighten the burden for them. Therefore, omitting superfluous erudition, we shall endeavor, as far as we are able, to explain clearly those few teachings of anthropological science which illuminate our moral treatment.

We do not propose anthropological notions as though investigated by our own study; rather, just as we have received them from the books and counsels of experts, so we refer them in this introduction to a more perfect knowledge and cultivation of purity.

41. By the various teachings which, prudently collected chiefly but not exclusively with respect to health, we report in this place, we intend in the first place to cut away or refute several errors harmful to morals, and to provide for the moral order by observing it. We hope besides that we shall furnish more than one priest with an abundance of useful counsel.

The conjugal act, when not too frequent and practiced by healthy persons, benefits health more than it harms it. Those, however, whose nerves are badly affected either by illness or by intemperance can suffer harm from it, sometimes grave harm ¹. For love, that is, sexual ardor, has been called a brief epilepsy.

¹ Ellis, in Moll, p. 181. Compare especially Féré, p. 319.

Anthropologists say that it matters greatly for the happiness of life together that the husband begin to approach his wife not fiercely but rather gently, as befits a man, and thereafter use his right discreetly ².

² Moll, pp. 446-447.

The wife, in turn, so that she may please her husband, should be rather yielding and ready in rendering the debt.

But how often, after the fervor of the first weeks, is it expedient for spouses to exercise the conjugal act? Luther established the celebrated rule for men of more vigorous age that intercourse should regularly be had twice or three times in a week. Vigorous age, moreover, is said to flourish between 25 and 40 years. Many physicians still approve Luther's norm.

Others, however, more prudently deny that a general rule can be handed down, and say that one's own experience and one's varying strength must be consulted. Artificial excitations are to be avoided; rather, spontaneous desire is to be obeyed ("to drink according to one's thirst"). But he who from the use of marriage has for a sufficiently long time felt himself weaker and of disturbed health is by that very fact invited to greater moderation ³.

³ Compare Féré, chapter 10.

Physicians and anthropologists are to be read cautiously on these matters. Often ignorant of and unconcerned with principles, deceived by incomplete experience or induction, they sometimes give enormously depraved precepts or counsels with serene countenance, which more accurate observation is later compelled to refute even under a merely scientific aspect. But let us trust more in provident God, so that we may be persuaded that infinite wisdom lies hidden in the natural order, in such a manner that the holy observance of this order must be held of itself most salutary not only for the souls of individuals but also for their bodies, and besides for the family and society.

Thus, while there are some who say it is desirable that a man abstain from his wife when she is pregnant and even when she is nursing ⁴, others think that a moderate use of marriage during the same time is in no way harmful, and indeed is commendable, for healthy persons. "A gentle embrace, from time to time (during pregnancy), will restore calm and gaiety to her (the wife), by proving to her that she is not disdained. It is good to add that gestation, because of the state of irritation in which the genital apparatus finds itself, is not without sometimes provoking erotic desires which it is very legitimate to satisfy.... A man has no greater reason to distance himself from his wife during lactation. Nature so little commands it that she gives a new radiance, a fullness of form, and an increase of freshness to the woman intelligent enough to have the coquetry to nurse.... It is wrongly believed that the excitement produced by sexual union is sufficient to give milk qualities harmful to the child. On the contrary, it is the complete prohibition of venereal pleasure which often has the effect of diminishing the quantity of milk ⁵."

⁴ Indeed, Gemelli, Non moechaberis, p. 65, appears to demand this. Yet that position affords little support to the right use of marriage and to monogamy itself.

⁵ Dr. Bourgas, Le droit à l'amour pour la femme, Paris, n.d.

Finally, this is to be observed: just as the affection of love itself impels one toward the intimate union of copulation, so in turn the use of marriage strengthens and increases the affection of love. Copulation therefore fulfills a threefold office: multiplying human beings, remedying incontinence, and fostering the mutual love of the spouses.

42. That a chaste and continent life of itself harms health in no way is attested by so many who have the greatest name among physicians and physiologists that the few who think otherwise can be disregarded; those, however, who condemn continence in the name of bodily health or give immoral counsel, as happens far too often, must be reproved from true science itself.

It is enough for us to cite two most expert writers whom no religious scruple could have led to less sincerity. They not only state what they think but also report the opinions of learned men: Féré, L'Instinct sexuel, p. 25 ff. and especially p. 315 ff.; and Moll, Handbuch der Sexualwissenschaften, p. 887 ff.

The latter, even in the rarer cases in which, because of the nervous condition of persons, he judges continence to be accidentally harmful, cannot approve a physician who therefore advises an illicit use of venery. For besides the moral consideration, which he admits cannot be neglected in this matter, he affirms that greater harms are to be feared from illicit intercourse. "It can indeed happen that a physician does not too hastily dissuade one from seeking forbidden pleasure and refrains from an untimely admonition; yet such cases are so rare that they cannot establish a rule."

The former, moreover, writes: "In the discussion which took place at the Medical Society of Lyon concerning the book of Dufieux, which made the defense of religious celibacy, his opponents found nothing to object to the denial of the maladies attributed to continence.

"Mantegazza, who is not distinguished among the apostles of continence, nevertheless recognizes no inconvenience in it. Physiologists, on the contrary, have found advantages in it.... Continence realizes a reserve of forces.... It is generally favorable to psychic activity as well as to physical activity.

"Somatic continence can be harmful only if it coincides with psychic excitation. Impotence is not the product of abstinence, but very often of abuse.... It is not necessary to rely upon religions in order to bring to light the moral merits of chastity in general, and, in particular, of chastity outside marriage. It is enough for us to take utilitarian morality exclusively into consideration.... From this point of view one can affirm without hesitation that the lack of chastity is immoral" (p. 116 ff.).

Forel himself (p. 251) has this: "The man who, for one reason or another, cannot procure normal coitus for himself ought to content himself with nocturnal pollutions, and the woman with voluptuous dreams, both abstaining from active and voluntary excitations." Dr. Löwenfeld ⁶ concludes the argument thus: "A normal man who has not diminished his power of resisting libido by sexual abuse, and who leads a sufficiently active and hygienic life, can persevere in abstinence without notable distress; moreover, the more consistently he cultivates it in all circumstances, the more easily he will preserve continence of itself." Finally, he altogether rebukes physicians who, when the opportunity for a useful marriage is lacking, advise fornication with a prostitute in order to prevent or avert the harms of continence. "This cannot suffice for a young man: it will excite libido, far from being able to calm it."

⁶ Sexualleben und Nervenleiden, p. 54.

At another International Conference for the Prophylaxis of Syphilis and Venereal Diseases, Brussels, 1902, physicians of great name approved this conclusion by unanimous vote: "Above all, the male youth must be taught that not only are chastity and continence not harmful, but also that these virtues are among the most commendable from a medical point of view."

Nor is the reason obscure. Spontaneous emissions during sleep sufficiently prevent a chaste man from having organs excessively filled with semen; and experience in turn testifies that it is, as it were, proper to the sexual organs that they preserve their power without use. "From puberty to old age, the testicles continue to secrete sperm without stimulation and no more lose their function than does the ovary, from puberty to menopause, or the uterus, or the breasts, which can remain at rest for long years without losing the faculty of responding to the call. Those who are capable of psychic chastity can preserve continence without having anything to fear for their testicles and their fecundity; and neither do they have anything to fear for their health, which does not depend upon the satisfaction of the sexual instinct. And feeling runs no more risk than do the organs; love never dies of need, it often dies of indigestion.... Beale, professor at the Royal College of London, says that it cannot be repeated too often that abstinence and the most absolute purity are perfectly compatible with physiological and moral laws ⁷."

⁷ Féré, p. 25 ff.

In the female sex alone, concerning which this question is much less accustomed to be raised, a prolonged rest of the uterus can bring this inconvenience, that internal tumors, fibromyomas, are produced more frequently.

Although an honorable life is to be commended to all, the counsel of perfect continence nevertheless is not positively to be given to all. In this matter it must be well noted that, in order to advise marriage to some, psychological or moral powers and tendencies must be considered more than strictly physical ones. Nor is marriage itself to be rashly counseled to the vicious.

43. - 1. In marriages of blood relatives there is this force, that peculiar traits (les caractères propres, "proper characteristics") are confirmed more and more in the offspring. Accordingly, insofar as an entirely healthy family or a family infected with certain defects is in question, such marriages, under this aspect, will have to be held harmless or harmful.

Certainly, if for several generations marriages were celebrated only among blood relatives, the danger of degenerate offspring could not be denied; but foreign elements are assumed sufficiently and more than sufficiently that this inconvenience need not be feared (Bushan, in Moll, pp. 908-915; Forel, pp. 179-180).

2. They say it is desirable that spouses not be separated by an excessive difference. Hence marriages between persons of the same skin and color are physiologically preferable to mixed marriages.

3. By marriages between persons of the same race, the national type will be strengthened; by marriages between various races, defects or faults proper to a certain race can be corrected.

44. Masturbation, or solitary onanism, which is a very frequent defect common to both sexes, can be procured by exterior touch or contact, friction, compression of the legs, suspect flagellations, for example upon excitable parts by means of nettles, and finally by obscene phantasms themselves. Manual masturbation, therefore, which is obtained by an exterior action, can be distinguished from spiritual or mental masturbation, which is obtained by the power of the imagination.

Not so rarely, those who indulge in this vice, especially women, introduce into the body various things suited to assisting their intention; likewise, some masturbators injure the penis with a needle or knife.

This vice is often practiced to supply the pleasure of the normal act; sometimes it also discloses or induces an inverted sexual appetite; and not so rarely it can be of doubtful signification. In estimating the intimate character of the vice, we can be assisted by the fantastic image which is accustomed to accompany the act.

Although far lesser harms are customarily imputed to that vice today than formerly, it can nevertheless never be despised as a thing of small importance.

For since the moral satisfaction of mutual love is lacking, the solitary use of venery, taken in itself, exhausts the powers of the body more than normal copulation ⁸. Furthermore, from acts which are very easily repeated there arises a habit and an ever-growing propensity, which prepares excesses harmful to the nerves. These harms can be immense in a subject whose nerves are badly affected; and they sometimes so disturb the sexual appetite that physical arousal is separated from the affection of love, and one has a man who is easily aroused and at the same time impotent for normal copulation.

⁸ Forel himself admits this, p. 250. On the harms of incontinence compare also Gemelli, Non moechaberis, pp. 85-91.

In some habitual practitioners, mental debilitation is also observed, especially in memory.

Mental or psychological masturbation is especially harmful as being exhaustive.

Moreover, these psychological effects more frequently accompany or follow this vice: arrogance, melancholy, affectation of solitude, and finally and especially neurasthenia.

To the production of these effects there contribute not a little: consciousness of the injury inflicted upon the will; the mark of turpitude with which the habitual practitioner is branded in the common estimation ⁹; remorse of conscience; religious anxieties; and the subjective persuasion or fear of a life diminished and exhausted before its time.

⁹ Gemelli, Non moechaberis, p. 93, thus beautifully describes the moral diminution of an adolescent after his first sin: "He thinks his guilt known to everyone; he imagines that his father and mother, while kissing and embracing him in their accustomed manner, perceive something new and read the truth, as it were, upon his forehead."

In sum, the pathological harms are more of the psychic than of the strictly bodily order.

Moreover, the causes of the harms are: native infirmity of body, excessive frequency of the excess, humiliation of the will after a fruitless struggle, human respect, religious consciousness of sin, and subjective fear of injuries.

45. The Neo-Malthusian arts ¹⁰ are the various manners by which spouses endeavor to procure for themselves a sterile conjugal act.

¹⁰ The theory is treated below, in the treatise itself.

The principal arts are:

418. In this second part, in which we enter upon SPECIAL THEOLOGY, there comes to be treated the exercise of virtues, or the acts by which due order is preserved and man attains his end, that is, eternal life. But those things which must be done or avoided for this end are contained in the DECALOGUE, according to that saying of the Lord (Matt. 19:17): But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.

Now some things are had explicitly in the Decalogue, namely those which are enunciated in the several precepts; others implicitly, and indeed in two ways: for they are either preambles to the Decalogue, namely the theological virtues: FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY; or they are as it were consequences of the same, such as the positive laws of the Church, more strictly defining certain offices of men and establishing diverse penalties.

Therefore there will be three sections of this second part:

SECTION I. ON THE PREAMBLES TO THE DECALOGUE, or on the theological virtues.

SECTION II. ON THE SEVERAL PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE.

SECTION III. ON ECCLESIASTICAL PRECEPTS AND PENALTIES.

419. "Preambles to law," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 22, a. 1), "are those things without whose existence law cannot have place. But of this kind are the precepts concerning the act of faith and the act of hope: because through the act of faith, the mind of man is inclined so that it recognizes the author of the law as such, to whom it ought to subject itself; but through hope of reward, man is induced to the observance of the precepts." But charity is the very end of the law, according to that saying (1 Tim. 1:5): The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith not feigned. For it moves to observing the whole law, according to that saying (1 John 5:3): For this is the charity of God, that we keep his commandments; and finally all the precepts tend together toward love of God and neighbor, according to that saying of St. Augustine: "Whatever we are prohibited by God's law, and whatever we are commanded to do, we are prohibited and commanded for this, that we may fulfill these two" (tr. 87, toward the end).

Those three preamble virtues are called theological, because they have God himself for their object; the Apostle commemorates them, writing to the Corinthians (13:13): And now there remain faith, hope, charity. Through FAITH we know God, who has revealed and proposed himself to us as the end to be attained; through HOPE we are raised up into him, so that with confidence we expect beatific possession of him; finally through CHARITY we adhere to him, loving him for his own sake, and our neighbors on account of him.

Therefore there will be three treatises:

TREATISE I. On Faith.

TREATISE II. On Hope.

TREATISE III. On Charity.

We shall treat of three things in this treatise: 1. the nature of faith; 2. the necessity of faith; 3. the vices and sins opposed to faith.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 1 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, tr. 1; ed. G., I, p. 295; H. Ap., IV, 1; Lugo, de Virt. Fid., disp. XV; Suarez, disp. I and VII; Wilmers, de Fide divina; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., p. 70; Scheeben, Dogmat., I, § 38, etc.

420. Things to be noted beforehand. The name faith signifies assent which is given to another's sayings on account of his authority. If this assent is given on account of the authority of man, it is human faith; if on account of the authority of God, it is divine faith. This, if it is considered in act, is called actual; if in habit, it is called habitual.

DEFINITION. Faith is a theological virtue infused by God, inclining us to assent firmly, on account of divine veracity, to all things which God has revealed, and has proposed to us through the Church as to be believed.

In the definition are expressed: 1. the material object of faith; 2. the formal object of faith; 3. the subject of faith. - A few things concerning each.

421. The primary MATERIAL object of faith is God himself, the highest Truth in being; the secondary object is other truths revealed by God to us. To the point, thus the Vatican Council (Const. Dei Filius, III): "All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed."

The Holy Council says 1. Which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down; both to indicate the twofold font of the whole of revelation, that is, Sacred Scripture and tradition; and to exclude any other revelations whatsoever made to certain Saints, which of themselves cannot become the object of Catholic faith.

2. Proposed by the Church as divinely revealed, to indicate the divinely instituted organ by which alone men can be taught what things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith.¹

3. Which are proposed whether by solemn judgment..., to indicate the extraordinary mode which the Church is accustomed from time to time to use in proposing truths to be believed with divine and Catholic faith; when namely, through the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, or through the episcopate gathered in an ecumenical council, it singularly and determinately defines certain points and enjoins them to be believed. Truths thus solemnly proposed are called defined dogmas of faith, and the contrary and pertinacious error is held as heresy. By the same appellation those truths also are to be denoted which appear immediately contained in Sacred Scripture, for example, Christ's birth in Bethlehem, his agony, scourging, etc.; for these truths also become known through the solemn proposition of the Church, namely through that general proposition by which it defined the whole of Scripture to be divinely inspired.

4. Or by ordinary and universal magisterium, to indicate the ordinary mode which the Church uses in proposing truths of faith: when namely, through its pastors and doctors, it universally affirms that certain truths are revealed by God; although they may have been defined by no decrees of councils or of Roman Pontiffs. And points of faith of this kind must be believed with divine-Catholic faith.

Truths which have been revealed by God in a particular mode are to be believed with faith simply divine; but explicitly by those alone to whom they become known in a certain mode, for example, by that theologian alone who evidently finds the truth in Sacred Scripture, by that person alone who has received the divine revelation (VII, 262).

422. The FORMAL object of faith is the authority of God revealing, who, since he is the highest Truth, can neither be deceived nor deceive. Whence the most holy Vatican Council (l. c.) defined: "faith ... to be a supernatural virtue, by which ... we believe the things revealed by him to be true; not on account of the truth of the things seen through by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive."

From these things you will gather: 1. The assent of faith is formally resolved into the first truth revealing, or the very authority of God revealing (Becanus, de Virt. theol., c. 8, q. 8; Tanquerey, II, 618).

We said: resolved formally; for dispositively, it is resolved into the motives of credibility; directively, into the authority of the Church proposing and deciding what is to be believed; effectively, into God and the infused habit of faith. Cf. n. 423.

2. The knowledge of faith is more certain than any natural knowledge. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 5, a. 8, ad 2).

3. Divine and Catholic faith is necessarily universal, that is, comprising all truths divinely revealed and proposed as such by the Church. The reason is that the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing. Therefore he who knowingly rejects one article of faith, for example the eternity of the punishments of hell, cannot have theological faith as regards the others.

423. The SUBJECT of faith is the intellect, which is moved by the will so that it assents to things to be believed. This is expressed in the definition by these words: inclining us to assent.

Faith is in the intellect as in its subject; but because faith pertains to the intellect according as it is moved by the will, there ought also to be a habit in the will, namely charity, so that the act of faith may be perfect, that is, so that it may proceed connaturally from both powers and be meritorious; not, however, so that it may be perfect in the notion of assent: for to this a firm adhesion of the intellect from the pious motion of the will, without the habit, suffices (Billuart, de Fide, Diss. 3, a. 1).

From the things said, the ACT OF FAITH can be defined: An act by which the intellect, illuminated by God through grace, from the command of the will likewise excited and aided by divine grace, assents to things to be believed.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 3-8; St. Alphonsus, II, 2; VI, 505; H. Ap., IV, n. 3; Billuart, de Fid., disp. 3; Pesch, n. 426-465; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., disp. II, c. V, a. 4; Viva, Thes. damn., P. I, prop. I.

424. Things to be noted beforehand. 1. A twofold necessity as regards salvation is distinguished, one of means, the other of precept: a) That is necessary by necessity of precept which, if omitted inculpably, does not harm salvation, as the real reception of the Eucharist. b) That is necessary by necessity of means without which, even if it is omitted inculpably, in the present order of Providence salvation cannot be obtained.

This necessity of means again is twofold: strict, if it can be supplied by no other means; thus sanctifying grace in the last moment of life is strictly necessary for salvation; broad, however, if another means of supplying is present. Thus, for example, charity can succeed into the place of baptism. Cf. n. 1451.

2. It is certain that HABITUAL FAITH is strictly necessary, by necessity of means, for eternal life. For no one can be saved without infused habitual justice. But the habit of faith is either a part or the foundation of this justice. Therefore. But this faith, in baptized infants and the perpetually insane, suffices for salvation, since it is equally certain that all dying with the grace of baptism become partakers of eternal life (Suarez, disp. 12, s. 1, n. 4).

Therefore the whole question concerns ACTUAL FAITH, and indeed the act of faith both internal and external, with respect to adults who enjoy the use of reason.

The internal act of faith can be either explicit or implicit. It is called explicit when one adheres to a revealed Truth apprehended in its own terms: for example, I believe that Christ is the Incarnate Word. It is called implicit when one adheres to a revealed Truth contained in another Truth apprehended in its proper terms: for example, I believe all things which are proposed by the Church as revealed.

425. PRINCIPLES. I. The internal act of faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. It is established from Scripture (Epistle to the Hebrews 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. And from Trent (Sess. 6, c. 6): "Without faith justification never happens to anyone." God does not justify adults unless through their own acts they tend into him.

Nor does faith in desire, or faith improperly or broadly so called, suffice;¹ for faith properly so called (according to Trent, Sess. 6, c. 8) "is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification," and consequently it presupposes nothing in which its desire would be included. Suarez judges this conclusion so certain (disp. 12, s. 2, n. 101) that he denies it can be rejected without error in faith. Yet from this it cannot be inferred that there are men who are in an impossibility, properly so called, of obtaining salvation. For "to him doing what is in him, God does not deny grace."

Whence St. Thomas (de Verit., XIV, a. 11, ad 1): "If someone," he says, "nurtured in forests or among brute animals..., should follow the guidance of natural reason in desiring good and fleeing evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration the things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius." Cf. St. Alph., Gran mezzo della pregh., P. II, c. 4.

426. II. The act of faith is necessary for all by necessity of precept. It is established from Scripture (Mark 16:16): He that believes not shall be condemned. Likewise from the twofold proposition condemned by Innocent XI, namely the 16th: "Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept, and according to itself"; and the 17th: "It is enough to elicit the act of faith once in life."

This obligation of eliciting the act of faith can be either on account of faith itself or on account of another obligation. Concerning the former St. Alphonsus speaks thus: "It is certain," he says, "that man is bound by the natural law to turn himself to God through faith, hope, and charity, and therefore to elicit acts of those virtues, since each virtue lives by its acts" (II, 6).

Hence the PRECEPT OF FAITH urges: 1. Per se, that is, independently from every other circumstance: a) at the beginning of spiritual life, that is, when someone, for example a boy or a non-Catholic, shall have known both those things which must be believed and the obligation of believing (cf. n. 436); likewise when some truth to be believed is proposed by the Church; b) more often in life, at least once in the year, as Doctors admit with sufficient probability (II, 7); c) in the article or danger of death, as is more commonly taught, because then we are especially bound to tend into God as our ultimate end (II, 5; H. Ap., IV, 13; Conf. dir., IV, 6).

2. Per accidens, that is, from a peculiar circumstance: a) when a grave temptation against faith is pressing, which cannot otherwise be conquered; b) when a precept must be fulfilled which requires faith, for example of penance, of profession of faith, of communion, etc.; c) after a lapse into heresy or faith denied; because the injury inflicted upon the First Truth must be repaired. Thus all (II, 5).

Take note: 1. We are never strictly bound to recite the customary formulas of the act of faith. A man who lives Christianly (at least by fulfilling the paschal precept) sufficiently satisfies the precept of faith (and of hope), because in him who has already learned and believed generally the truths to be held by faith, implicit or exercised acts suffice, such as to pray, to adore the crucifix, to sign oneself with the sign of the cross (II, 7). Cf. Ferreres, I, 188.

2. A heretic, so long as he judges his own sect to be more credible, or equally credible, and Catholics to reject and persecute the word of God, is not bound to believe, because the faith is not yet sufficiently proposed to him, and he would act imprudently. Cf. n. 441.

3. "If a doubt about his sect should arise for someone, he is bound to inquire further and to ask light from God: but if he neglects this, he sins against faith. But if afterwards our faith is sufficiently proposed to him, he is bound to embrace it" (II, 9).

427. Questions. QUAER. 1. What things are to be known and explicitly believed BY NECESSITY OF MEANS?

Resp. 1. They are two: a) that God is; b) that he is the rewarder of good, and avenger of evil. For the Apostle (Heb. 11:6) says: He that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. It is established also from the 22nd proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which said: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in him as rewarder" (II, 2; Exam. Ord., n. 131).

2. As regards the mysteries of the Most Holy TRINITY and of the INCARNATION and DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST, there is controversy. The first opinion, sufficiently probable, denies that these must be explicitly believed, supported by this reason: that, after the promulgation of the Gospel had been made, the condition of those who have heard nothing of Christ was not changed for the worse; whence now, as formerly, those can be saved who believe with explicit faith in God as rewarder, and with implicit faith in the Redeemer. Thus very many more recent authors with Lugo, Sylvius, etc. - But the second opinion, which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus, affirms; because many texts of Sacred Scripture and of the Holy Fathers seem to require faith in Christ, so that man may be united to his Redeemer and be justified through this union. Thus more commonly the ancient theologians.

This opinion is favored (especially for practice) by the response of the Congregation of the Holy Office, which, having been asked whether an adult who was in the article of death and who promised that, after health was recovered, he would learn the truths of faith, could be baptized, wrote back, on January 25, 1703: "the promise does not suffice; but the missionary is bound to explain to the adult, even dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are chiefly the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." This decree was renewed on March 30, 1898 (Mon. eccl., X, P. II, p. 30).

Finally, for practice, the 64th proposition condemned by Innocent XI urges: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he may labor under ignorance of the mysteries of faith; and even if, through negligence even culpable, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

From these things conclude: 1. The CONFESSARIUS sins by absolving (outside the case of necessity) one who is ignorant of the aforesaid mysteries, since he exposes the sacrament to danger of nullity. Therefore he ought either first to instruct a penitent of this kind, or to dismiss him until he shall have been instructed. But it is better briefly to teach him, and to elicit with him acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition (Prax., n. 22). 2. A PENITENT who notices that his confession, on account of such ignorance, was probably valid, but also probably null, is bound, after having been taught those mysteries, to repeat the confession. The reason is that "with respect to him who has certainly gravely sinned, the obligation of fulfilling confession not only probably, but certainly valid, always urges and possesses antecedently" (cf. n. 83). Thus St. Alphonsus (II, n. 2, at the end), reforming his former opinion. See ed. G., I, p. 298.

Note. Invincible ignorance concerning the aforesaid mysteries can scarcely be found among us. If someone exists so dull that he cannot grasp them, he is rather to be assimilated to an infant (Aertnys, II, tr. 1, n. 4; Tanquerey, II, n. 438).

QUAER. 2. What things are to be believed or known BY NECESSITY OF PRECEPT?

Resp. "Explicitly, by necessity of precept, there ought to be known and believed, at least in substance, as St. Charles Borromeo teaches (Instr. ad Conf.): the Apostles' Creed; the Lord's prayer and the angelic salutation; the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church; the sacraments which are necessary to anyone, such as baptism, Eucharist, and penance; for concerning the others it suffices to have implicit faith, since explicit faith is necessary only for those who receive them" (H. Ap., IV, 3; Conf. dir., IV, 2).

Hence: 1. They sin (mortally or venially, according to the gravity of the matter) who neglect to learn the aforesaid things;² likewise pastors who do not teach these things to their sheep, as also parents and other Superiors who do not teach them to their children or subjects, either by themselves or through others. 2. He who is ignorant of the aforesaid things even inculpably can indeed be absolved the first time, provided that, after being admonished, he firmly proposes to learn them. But if afterwards he has altogether neglected to fulfill the obligation, he must be treated as a recidivist (cf. n. 1829). 3. He who neglects to learn the same by memory sins venially. But this light obligation chiefly urges the uneducated, because otherwise they can scarcely have sufficient knowledge of them (II, 3; Prax., n. 22).

We ought also to profess faith externally, according to the words of Christ the Lord (Luke 9:26): He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty; and of Paul (Rom. 10:10): With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. There is added the reason that the Church ought to know its faithful.

This precept is at once affirmative and negative.

428. PRINCIPLES. I. The precept of professing faith, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges, in certain circumstances, either by divine right or by ecclesiastical right.

1. By divine (or natural) right there is given an obligation of professing faith externally in a twofold case, "namely, when, through omission of profession, either the honor owed to God or usefulness to be bestowed upon neighbor would be taken away privatively or contrariwise."

We said: a) privatively, as if a great honor toward God or usefulness redounding to one's neighbor would therefore cease; b) contrariwise, as if otherwise God would be affected with injury, or one's neighbor with a grave evil, for example, if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, etc., depended upon it. For then the act of virtue seems prescribed when it is necessary for the end of the precept; and this occurs here, because the end of the precept is charity (II, 10).

Hence, "if heretics trample images and afflict the faith with other injuries, a Catholic is bound to protect it by his confession, if indeed he prudently hopes for profit from this." But otherwise, if the honor of God and the usefulness of neighbor counsel prudent dissimulation (II, 11).

2. By ecclesiastical right some are bound to emit the profession of faith alone, others the profession of faith together with the oath against modernism.

To THE PROFESSION OF FAITH ALONE are bound, besides those to be baptized (who namely are bound through sponsors, if they are infants), and more probably personally, not through a proxy: a) Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops, in the first provincial synod at which they are present (Trent, Sess. 25, de Ref.);³ b) all beneficed clerics who by right are present at the diocesan synod, the first time (ibid.); c) all prelates of religious institutes; likewise all to be promoted as doctors, masters, regents, and professors, where the decree of Pius IV on this matter is in force;⁴ d) heretics returning to the Church, who are bound both to abjure heresy and to emit an express profession of faith before witnesses, as is commonly done, and reason counsels, and right confirms. Cf. n. 1833.

To THE PROFESSION OF FAITH TOGETHER WITH THE OATH AGAINST MODERNISM are bound: a) those to be ordained to major orders, at least before the Subdiaconate; b) priests, before they are given the faculty of hearing confessions or preaching (especially solemnly during Lent), but not as often as the faculty is prolonged; c) pastors (also succursalists), canons, beneficed clerics, without delay before entering into possession of the benefice (the profession of faith is to be renewed when they are transferred to another benefice); d) all officials of episcopal Curias, tribunals, Roman Congregations; e) readers of theology and philosophy in Seminaries of secular clerics and in Colleges of religious, annually before beginning lectures; f) moderators of religious before they enter upon office. Cf. the Motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910; declaration of the S. C. Consist., September 25, October 25, December 17, 1910; February 10, 1911; Vermeersch, Period., V, p. 197, 229, 252, 271; Hilling, die Reform. des Papst. Pius X, I, p. 184.

Note. 1. The obligation of itself is grave. Yet it primarily affects Superiors, who ought to call subjects to professing. 2. The internal assent is diverse for diverse points: it is the assent of faith in the profession of faith; it is assent of a diverse grade of certitude, according to the points assigned in the oath, as is established from the various expressions accompanying the several parts, for example I admit, I acknowledge, I hold, with firm faith I believe, I altogether reject, I hold as certain, etc. 3. The mode of emitting it is that the oath, in writings indeed to be preserved, be given to the respective Superior, namely according to the various title by which one ought to profess. Thus, for example, moderators and readers of religious, as such, ought to profess before the moderator either immediate or major; those to be ordained, even exempt religious, before the Bishop or Vicar general, who previously has himself made the profession of faith. In particular cases, for a just cause, some priest, whether secular or regular, constituted in some dignity or office, can be delegated to receive the profession. 4. An exception has been made in Germany only for those who are Doctors in public Universities of the State, so that, from the benign interpretation of the Pontiff, they use their right by not emitting the oath. 5. There must be denounced to the Holy Office not only those who have violated the oath, but also those who have refused to subscribe to it.

429. II. The precept of professing faith, insofar as it is negative, prohibits: denying the true faith, professing a false faith, or simulating it. It prohibits these three things even if they were done externally (II, 12).

1. Denying the true faith. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:12): If we shall deny him, he also will deny us. - Whence the Church always punished with most grave penalties those who had denied the faith in persecutions. For exterior denial of faith is a lie harmful to one's neighbor and most injurious to the truth of God.

2. Professing a false faith. For this is manifestly to renounce the true faith.

Hence, he sins gravely against faith who, even when questioned by a private person about his religion, replies that he is a Turk, or a Jew, or a Gentile; for this is just as if he denied himself to be Christian. But it would not be mortal nor against faith if someone denied that he was a priest, a religious, or that he had been present at the sacrifice of the Mass (Piscetta, II, p. 22).

3. Simulating a false faith; for it matters very little whether someone lies by word or by deed. Hence Benedict XIV, in the year 1742, declared that it was not licit for Chinese Christians to exhibit external signs of adoration to an idol, although the intention were directed to a cross hidden under the garment (Scavini, l. 2, n. 820, 4; Zitelli, App. Jur. eccl., l. II, App.).

430. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is licit to HIDE faith, or to dissimulate it?

Resp. 1. When the precept of confessing it externally urges, it is not licit, as we said above (n. 428, 1).

Hence deservedly, as being too general, the 18th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is interrogated by public power, I counsel ingenuously confessing faith as glorious to God and to faith; I do not condemn keeping silent as sinful per se." Cf. Viva, P. II, on this proposition.

2. When the precept does not urge, it is licit, for a just cause, to hide faith, or to cover the truth by words or other signs ambiguous and indifferent.

Hence, one interrogated about faith outside the order of law can keep silence, or respond obscurely. "For generally it is not true that one interrogated (even by public authority) is bound positively to profess faith, except when this is necessary lest he seem to those present to have denied faith" (II, 13, 2). Much more will someone be able to refuse a response to those who ask from curiosity, unless, having been asked about the faith in hatred of religion, he would seem to those present to deny the true religion.

Note. He who flees in time of persecution is not considered to hide his faith. Cf. Matt. 10:23. Yet pastors of souls are bound not to abandon their sheep (II, 14).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is licit to use the SIGNS or GARMENTS of unbelievers?

Resp. 1. If the garments or signs are proper to that region, even if the whole region is unbelieving, it is licit; for these, of themselves, are not referred to religion. - 2. If they are religious garments or signs, one must distinguish: either they are common, and then it is licit to use them, provided a grave cause underlies it; or they are ceremonial and indicate profession of religion, and then it is not licit except from a most grave cause (Piscetta, II, p. 23). - 3. But if these garments or signs, from their own nature or from use, are solely protestative of a false religion (as would be the equipment and garments whose use is in sacrifices, or certain signs of the Masonic sect), it is in no way licit, unless necessity makes every religious signification absent, for example in a fire.

QUAER. 3. Whether Catholics, in the intercourse of COMMON and PUBLIC LIFE, are bound positively to profess faith?

Resp. Affirmatively; because also in the order of earthly things, all things must be directed to the highest good as to the ultimate end. Besides, all human actions, at least in the concrete, either agree or disagree with natural and divine right, and therefore are subject to the judgment and jurisdiction of the Church. Yet it suffices if, through an exercised act, in civil life Catholics profess faith and exercise external acts when they ought to be exercised (Mausbach, Kath. Mor., s. 365).

Hence: 1. Catholics, individually or associated, ought to acknowledge the rights of the Church's authority in controversies and social causes, for example concerning hours of work, the manner of wages, voluntary cessation of labor, etc. 2. Societies which primarily and principally pursue the temporal good of one or another order of civil life (such as associations for cultivating letters and arts, for promoting the temporal lot of workers, for sustaining political parties), on account of mixed questions which cannot fail to occur for Catholics, ought of themselves to be confessional. Yet societies of this kind that are interconfessional are tolerated where a just cause counsels it, as would be a great inconvenience to be avoided, provided that suitable cautions are applied for avoiding the dangers to faith and religion to which Catholic men are necessarily exposed in such groups. - 3. The mode by which confessional Catholic and non-Catholic societies can labor together for the common good is to be preferred here: with distinction remaining and special caution being applied, they should rather be joined to one another by an exterior league. Cf. Letter of Leo XIII, May 1892; Letters Graves de Communi (A. S. S., 33, p. 385); Letter of Pius X to the Sillonists, November 22, 1909 and August 25, 1910; Encyclical Letter Singulari quadam caritate, September 24, 1912. Cf. also Mausbach, die Kath. Moral., p. 2, c. 9 and 10; Ami du Clerge, 1913, Les cath. et les oeuvres non confessionnelles; Hiptmair, in the periodical Linz. Quart. Schr., 1914, article Kirchl. Zeitlaufe.

431. From the things said, you will resolve:

A. CONCERNING THE HIDING OF FAITH:

1. "When you are not asked about faith, often it is better, for the honor of God and the usefulness of neighbor, to cover faith than to confess it: as if, hidden among heretics, you do more good; or if from confession more evil would follow, for example the exasperation of a tyrant, danger of defection if you were tortured."

2. "To redeem with money, lest an inquiry be made concerning your faith, is licit; and often it is a great virtue of discretion to preserve life for the glory of God, and to cover faith by licit modes."

3. "Likewise a licit mode is, when a Catholic passes through heretical places, and grave danger threatens him (of life, for example, or of goods), for dissimulating faith, to eat meats on a prohibited day, because the precept of the Church does not oblige under such danger" (II, 14, 15). Cf. nevertheless n. 154, 3.

432. B. CONCERNING COMMUNICATION WITH NON-CATHOLICS.

Things to be noted beforehand: a) The discussion concerns communication in the exercise of divine worship or in those acts of civil life which are consecrated by religion, as, for example, in the celebration of marriage, in funeral rites.

b) This communication can be active, namely when a Catholic is present at the sacred rites of non-Catholics; or passive, namely when non-Catholics, with Catholics consenting, are present at their sacred rites.

c) Again, it can be public or private. It is public if a Catholic is present at sacred rites which a group of non-Catholics celebrates as a group: for example, at sacred rites which take place in a non-Catholics' temple. It is private if he is participant in a sacred thing which is done by a non-Catholic as a private man, not as a minister of a sect; as if, for example, you recite the Lord's prayer with a non-Catholic.

433. Therefore in particular:

I. CONCERNING ACTIVE COMMUNICATION.

1. To hear sermons of heretics generally is not held as a sign of profession of faith; although from these, if there is scandal, danger, or special prohibition, one must certainly abstain. Thus Paul V (Brief, September 16, 1606) forbade the English to obey a law prescribing this (II, 16, 13).

2. To conduct a funeral as far as the doors of the temple or cemetery is considered a civil courtesy. But regularly it is not licit to be present at the religious ceremonies, because ordinarily it has the character of communication in sacred rites, or presents the appearance of it. Except if, from the circumstances of place, time, etc., something else is signified (II, 16; Gury-Cretoni, I, p. 555).

3. To stand by at the celebration of nuptials, for example as a maid of honor, is for the most part assessed as a testimony of respect toward the spouses, without the heretical rites therefore being approved. Moreover, a Catholic who, with contempt of the laws of the Church, contracts nuptials before a minister of a non-Catholic religion incurs excommunication, and no Catholic can approve this by his presence. Indeed parents and those more closely joined by blood are generally bound positively to disapprove this (Kon., 254, 2). Cf. n. 1314.

4. A servant can, after the example of Naaman the Syrian (4 Kings 19), carry his master by carriage to heretical temples, or accompany this man's daughter or wife to them for the sake of guardianship, yet so that he does not participate in the heretical rites; likewise he can carry infants to be baptized and support them on his arm while they are baptized by a heretical preacher. For all these things pertain to service, and attest no partnership of worship (II, 16, 12).

5. He who receives supper or sacred communion from heretical ministers, or from schismatic priests, even in paschal time or in danger of death; or absolution, except in the article or danger of death; or baptism, unless any other Catholic baptizer whatsoever is lacking; or contracts marriage religiously before them, is guilty of mortal sin against faith (II, 16, 14).

6. Those who, for the sake of a religious rite, sing hymns in the temples of heretics, play organs, respond to the minister, plainly become participants of worship, and therefore in some way betray the faith. - Those who build, restore, or sweep temples do not always seem to enter into partnership of religion; but they provide a certain work, from which one must abstain, especially in a Catholic region, unless a most grave cause urges (Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 37; A. S. S., vol. 11, p. 174). Cf. n. 523, 2.

7. It is not licit for schoolmasters to teach boys Protestant hymns, or a heretical catechism, or to use a Protestant version of Sacred Scripture, although parents or rectors of schools demand it (Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 38).

8. It is not licit to go to musical concerts of heretics, if by occasion of the place the concerts put on the notion of worship, or if the profits from these redound to the usefulness of heresy, or otherwise favor heresy (ibid., n. 39).

9. To bend the knees with heretics praying (whether publicly or privately, but not formally) does not seem to be denial of faith; for it is understood to be done for the sake of civility, provided that it be done only occasionally. - But a custom in these matters is altogether to be disapproved, as favoring heresy and full of danger. Therefore it is in no way to be permitted to servants whom masters are accustomed to urge to this. Resolve the same concerning a servant who would be ordered to read Protestant bibles to a master becoming blind, or ill (Kon., n. 254, 5).

II. CONCERNING PASSIVE COMMUNICATION.

This can take place in a twofold mode: merely passively or negatively, or actively or positively, when non-Catholics positively do or contribute something.

1. Negative communication is permitted; for example, a non-Catholic can be admitted to hearing Catholic sermons, to assisting at the sacrifice of the Holy Mass, to participating by his presence alone in ecclesiastical ceremonies.

2. But positive communication is interdicted according to the things said above, because it easily falls back into illicit communication, and, where it is formal, becomes a sign of the unity of two religious confessions.

3. Thus are understood several decisions of the Sacred Roman Congregations concerning the invitation of non-Catholics into choir, the bestowal of the peace, of ashes, of candles, admission to carrying torches and lights, kissing the instrument of peace, carrying the body at funerals or holding the cloth, and even singing separately and not without scandal in the musical choir.

4. It is licit to invite non-Catholics to play the organ.

5. As regards admitting Protestant or schismatic girls into Catholic houses of education, several decrees exist, especially for houses situated in Italy, and prescriptions are given for the Superioresses of the same Institutes. Cf. Ami du Clerge, 1908, p. 445; Monit. eccl., X, 86; XI, 434.

CERTAIN RESPONSES OF THE SACRED CONGREGATIONS.

1. To the doubt: Whether it is licit for Catholics to go to the temples of heretics, the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, on January 14, 1718, responded: "It is licit, if they go for the sake of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred rites, in which such going is commonly held for an act protestative of a false religion; since, just as to go to profane buildings, so also to the temples of heretics, is an act indifferent per se, which becomes evil only from a depraved end or from circumstances."

2. The same Sacred CONGREGATION, on May 10, 1770, decreed: "It is regularly not licit for Catholics to be present at sermons, baptisms, and marriages of heretics or schismatics." To undertake also the office of sponsor in the baptism of heretics is strictly prohibited by the same decree (cf. Intr. Card. Vicar, July 7, 1878, apud Gury-Cretoni, I, p. 554; Lehmkuhl, I, 816).

3. The Sacred Congregation DE PROPAGANDA FIDE, having been asked in the year 1674: Whether Catholic missionaries, asked by schismatics, can preach in their churches, responded: "Either they are invited to the effect that Catholic truth be preached there indefinitely, and even against the errors of the same schismatics, and affirmatively; or only that a discourse be made concerning virtues and vices which commonly ought to be exercised and avoided both by Catholics and by schismatics, and negatively." Scavini, II, n. 911, 14).

4. The Congregation of the HOLY OFFICE, having been asked: "Whether it is licit for nuns having care of the sick in a hospice to call a heretical minister, who for the sake of religion would be sought by a sick heretic; likewise, whether this would be licit for a Catholic in whose house a heretic was sick?" responded on March 15, 1848: According to the things set forth, it is not licit; let them have themselves passively.¹ This response was renewed by the same Sacred Congregation on February 5, 1872, and on December 14, 1898 (N. R. Th., 31, p. 402). - Yet otherwise, as is clear, if, when the sick person asks, greater evils would threaten from the denial, for example, desperation, outcries against the Church, blasphemies, scandal of others, etc. Then the little minister could licitly be called, so that he may visit the sick person (Scavini, l. c., 8; Kon., 313, 3; Monit. eccl., IX and X).

N. B. See other things at n. 447 seqq., where concerning dangers of faith, and n. 523, where concerning cooperation, and apud Lehmkuhl, I, n. 809; Villada, Cas. consc., II, 52.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 10-12; St. Alphonsus, II, 17; ed. G., I, p. 309; Lugo, disp. XVIII seqq.; Aertnys, l. II, n. 9; Lehmkuhl, 1, 410; Tanquerey, II, n. 655; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 205 seq.; Gopfert, 1, § 47.

434. To the virtue of faith is opposed, by EXCESS, rash credulity, by which, from levity of heart, things are believed as belonging to the Christian faith and religion, when they are not such; as, for example, if someone lightly believed and handed on to others private revelations very suspect and doubtful. - Hence St. John warns (1 Ep. 4:1): Dearly beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits whether they are of God. But, the danger of losing true faith being excluded, the aforesaid credulity will be a venial sin, or none.

By DEFECT, to the virtue of faith are opposed: 1. Sins of omission, namely negligence in learning truths of faith necessary to know; and omission of acts which the affirmative precept of faith prescribes (cf. n. 428). Yet by these sins the infused habit of faith is not lost. 2. Sins of commission, namely denial of faith, whether external or internal, which the negative precept forbids (cf. n. 429). But since internal denial of faith is made especially through infidelity, heresy, and apostasy, and since the dangers of these sins also are prescribed to be avoided, we shall treat here: a) of infidelity; b) of heresy and apostasy from faith; c) of avoiding dangers of losing faith.

435. DEFINITION. Infidelity properly so called is lack of faith in a man not baptized. For those are called infidels who have not yet received the infused habit of faith.

DIVISION. A threefold infidelity is distinguished: negative, of those who have heard nothing about the faith; privative, of those who from vincible ignorance do not know the truths of faith; positive or contrary, of those who resist faith sufficiently proposed, or contemn it (Instr., IV, 4).

436. PRINCIPLES. I. Negative infidelity is not a sin. The reason is that it is not voluntary; and therefore this 68th proposition of Baius was deservedly condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin." Cf. n. 425.

II. Privative infidelity is a grave sin. For it proceeds from ignorance which is vincible, and therefore gravely culpable.

III. Positive infidelity is a most grave sin; because it contains grave injury and contempt of divine authority. Whence, he who has not believed shall be condemned (Mark 16:16).

The principal SPECIES of positive infidelity are: paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and other sects of unbelievers. To these are numbered atheism, pantheism, deism; finally rationalism, from which is born either incredulity, which rejects all religions as fictions, or indifferentism, which estimates all religions as equal. Yet these, in a baptized man, are rather referred to apostasy and heresy (cf. n. 438).

437. IT IS ASKED. Whether unbelievers can be compelled to receiving faith?

Resp. They cannot be compelled directly, both because the Church has no power over the non-baptized, and because the reception of faith, so that it may be true, ought to be voluntary. This is confirmed by canonical right and by the practice of the Church itself, which has never used coercion, but persuasion (l. V Decr., tit. 6 and c. 3).

We said directly: "for the Church, and any supreme prince, can indeed compel Jews and pagan subjects to hearing our faith" (II, 19). The prince can also prohibit idolatry, since this is repugnant to the natural law; and thus, the Church applauding, Constantine and Theodosius proscribed such impiety. Likewise, he can prohibit, even by arms, that faith be impeded. "And for this reason," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 10, a. 8), "the Christian faithful have frequently waged wars by right against unbelievers."

Three things come to be considered here: the sins of heresy and apostasy, the ecclesiastical sanction against these sins, the reconciliation of heretics.

438. NOTIONS. I. Heresy is a pertinacious error against faith, in one who has received the faith.

For heresy which is punished by canonical penalties there is required: 1. on the part of the person, profession of the Christian religion, and baptism validly received (for a catechumen cannot yet be punished by the Church); 2. on the part of the intellect, error, that is, assent, or a formed judgment; 3. on the part of the will, pertinacity, by which someone knowingly and willingly does not wish to submit his judgment to the Church teaching infallibly (which is characteristic of this sin); yet it is not required that someone adhere tooth and nail and with a delay of time to such error; 4. on the part of the matter, error against Catholic faith, that is, against some point of faith explicitly defined or proposed by the Church; 5. on the part of the act, that the error be externalized, whether by a deed or by a word indicating internal heresy (VII, 300 seqq.).

Before God, anyone is a heretic who rejects some truth which he knows to be revealed, even by voluntarily doubting (cf. 421, 4).

II. Apostasy is total departure from the Christian faith received through baptism.

Note. For the crime of apostasy the profession of some false religion is not required. Therefore, under the name of apostates come also Masons, nihilists, anarchists, more probably socialists properly so called, free-thinkers, rationalists, deists, pantheists, spiritists, and generally all those who, after baptism received, have completely withdrawn from Christian faith, although they have not passed over to Judaism or to another infidelity. Cf. L. Jaugey, de Fide, n. 161; Tanquerey, II, p. 387, note 2; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, vol. 16, die Quellen des Ungl.; vol. 48, Atheismus u. s. Folgen.

Note. There will be discussion of apostasy from Religion or from Sacred Order in Part IV.

DIVISION. Heresy is distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of the sin, it is formal, if someone adheres to error with pertinacity, that is, knowingly and willingly; or material, if there is error in the intellect without pertinacity in the will.

2. By reason of the act, it is internal, if it lies hidden in the mind; or merely external, if someone by mouth, for example by uttering a heretical blasphemy, or by deed, for example by prostrating himself before an idol, denies the faith which he retains in the heart; or externalized or manifested, if it is in the mind and is produced exteriorly.

3. By reason of manifestation, it is occult, if it becomes known to no one or to only a few; and public, if it is known to very many and cannot be concealed (Perrone, de Virt. fid., n. 481-490). Cf. n. 1199.

439. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal heresy, and apostasy from faith, are most grave sins. The reason is: 1. because they contemn the authority of God revealing, and therefore attack God himself; 2. because they directly impede the remission of other sins, since faith is "the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the fellowship of his sons." Trent, Sess. VI, c. 8, and Vatican, Sess. III, c. 3.

440. II. Material heresy, of itself, is free from fault. For it proceeds from ignorance. Yet except if it proceeds from culpable ignorance; because then it will be culpable in the same degree as the ignorance itself, although it does not yet reach formal heresy (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. I, n. 1-6; VII, 301).

The signs of heresy, whether material or formal, are the following:

1. He is considered only materially a heretic, and therefore, from the faith received in baptism, belonging to the Church of God: a) Who is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church when he has recognized the error, although meanwhile he may defend his own opinion tooth and nail. b) Who has known nothing concerning the Catholic faith, and has never doubted concerning his own. c) Who, while doubting, has studied to recognize the truth as much as he could. - But he who culpably procrastinates his conversion to the faith is not for this reason a heretic; nevertheless he sins against the affirmative precept of faith if he puts it off for a long time.

2. He must be considered a formal heretic: a) Who doubts, and from pertinacity or from contempt of the Church refuses to inquire further. b) Who deliberately turns the intellect away from truth sufficiently proposed, so that he may adhere to his own sect or opinion. c) Who, after the truth has been recognized, perseveres in contradicting the Church, as heresiarchs are accustomed to do from hatred of the Pope or of the Church. These are the three principal GRADES of pertinacity, of which the first is founded upon truth studiously neglected; the second upon truth sufficiently proposed but contemned; the third upon recognized truth maliciously opposed (Voit, I, 378-379).

441. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he is a formal heretic who DOUBTS concerning matters of faith?

Resp. 1. If he positively doubts concerning some dogma already defined or proposed by the Church, judging it to be uncertain on account of opposed reasons, beyond doubt he is a formal heretic. In this case, that saying of right strictly holds: "One doubtful in faith is an unbeliever" (c. 1, de Haeret.; cf. H. Ap., XIX, 53).

2. If he doubts negatively, namely by suspending judgment concerning some article of faith, one must distinguish thus: either a) deliberately and pertinaciously he suspends his assent, because he thinks the judgment of the Church is not a sufficient foundation for believing; and then he likewise is a formal heretic; or b) deliberately indeed, but not pertinaciously, he suspends assent; and in this case, although he sins gravely against faith, he is not nevertheless strictly a heretic, because there is not present a pertinacious choice; or c) neither deliberately nor pertinaciously, but from temptation, he remains so suspended that he neither dissents nor assents: in this case he does not sin, or at most only venially, because perhaps he resists the temptation tepidly (II, 19; VII, 302).

QUAER. 2. What is to be thought about those who adhere to opinions which are marked not only by the Sacred Congregations, but by the Church, indeed with a dogmatic censure, yet lighter than heresy?

Beforehand note. DOGMATIC censure, proceeding from the supreme and universal magisterium of the Church, condemns some thesis as heretical, or erroneous, or proximate to heresy or error, or rash. DISCIPLINARY censure, which corresponds rather to the prerogative of government than of magisterium, is not condemnatory of doctrine, as dogmatic censure is, but prohibitory of the same. This is also called ECONOMIC or PRUDENTIAL, when the enunciation of some doctrine is prohibited not on account of an intrinsic cause, but on account of causes or reasons of prudence, namely that dissensions may be removed, peace consulted, scandal guarded against (Konings, n. 268, q. 3).

Resp. Of themselves, they are not guilty of heresy, but certainly they sin mortally. We say of themselves; for those adhering to opinions of this kind as true and licit virtually deny the infallibility of the Church: and if they are conscious to themselves of this denial, they are guilty of heresy (I, 104). Cf. n. 1328.

From these things are to be judged followers of liberalism who embrace various errors concerning liberty, condemned by the Church in the Syllabus, or demand excessive tolerance for favorers of errors. Concerning these below (n. 445). Concerning liberalism cf. Aertnys, Theol. past., P. III, a. 5; Godts, Les droits en matiere d'education: la liberte, Ch. II; Berardi, Exam. Conf., n. 2455 and Casus Consc., a. 1894.

442. PRINCIPLES. I. Heretics and apostates are punished with spiritual and temporal penalties. Cf. n. 438, 1314, 1351.

1. The SPIRITUAL penalties are: a) Excommunication latae sententiae, reserved in a special way to the Supreme Pontiff, which is incurred also by those believing heretics ... and generally all their defenders. b) Irregularity, likewise reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, which is extended also to the sons of those who persist in heresy or have died in it, to the first and second degree through the paternal line, but through the maternal line to the first only (N. R. Th., 22, p. 601; 24, p. 276), even in Germany and in other places where heresies rage with impunity (S. Off., Dec. 14, 1890). c) Incapacity for any ecclesiastical office and benefice whatsoever. d) Privation by the right itself (but after a declaratory sentence) of every dignity, benefice, and office. e) Privation of ecclesiastical burial.

2. The TEMPORAL penalties are: perpetual prison, confiscation of goods, etc.; but these no longer have force (Soglia, Inst. Jur. priv., § 232).

II. There is given an obligation of denouncing heretics and those suspected of heresy.

1. By force of the edicts of the HOLY INQUISITION, the following must be denounced to Ordinaries or to the inquisitors themselves, under penalty of excommunication ferendae sententiae (if someone has neglected to denounce for a month): a) formal heretics, and their favorers; b) all suspected of heresy, such as sorcerers, heretical blasphemers, those abusing the sacraments (for example, those who celebrate or absolve without priesthood), confessors soliciting to base things, those contracting nuptials while a spouse is living or with a solemn vow (III, 123; IV, 251-54; VII, 249).

These decrees indeed are not observed in many places, because on account of the liberty of worship asserted for all, the errors of heretics rage with impunity, and therefore the denouncing of them imposed by the law of the Church by no means obliges. Yet clerics seem to have to be denounced in every case, so that the Bishop may meet the harm both of the people and of the clergy specially committed to himself (Scavini, II, 845, 3).

2. By force of the natural law, one must denounce either heretics or those suspected of heresy, as often as it is a question of avoiding grave harm of souls, to which the Superior can bring a remedy.

Let it be noted: 1. This obligation from the natural law will be able to urge even in places where heretics are everywhere mixed with Catholics, for example, if it is a question of an unusual danger which threatens the Catholic religion through them, the Superior being unaware, and to which the Superior can provide in at least some way. 2. Formal heretics, even if they are not dogmatizing, anyone is bound to denounce, even with danger of grave harm; even a blood-relative, brother, indeed wife, son, or father. The reason is that heresy is so harmful a plague that it has a remedy with difficulty and easily turns to common harm. 3. Those suspected of heresy generally are not bound to be denounced by blood-relatives or others fearing grave harm from it. The reason is that since in those suspected there is only doubtful heresy, only a doubtful evil can be feared from it, and the danger of common harm is considered remote (IV, 249-50).

443. I. ANY CONFESSOR can absolve both those guilty of merely internal heresy and also heretics who have incurred no censure.

II. The BISHOP, or INQUISITOR, can in the external forum, by himself or through another, absolve notorious heretics. It matters little whether they were denounced or appeared spontaneously. Yet abjuration must be premised before a notary or someone delegated by the Bishop for this (S. O., March 28, 1900) and witnesses. Thus from the Bull Cum sicut of Clement VII, January 15, 1530 (Anal. eccl., VIII, p. 191); cf. Coll. de Prop. Fide, n. 1682.

Note. 1. Nevertheless it is granted by the aforesaid Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide that sometimes abjuration be made before a few witnesses, without a notary (Coll., n. 1686 and 1681).

2. In places of mixed religion, Bishops are accustomed commonly to have and communicate a delegated faculty of absolving. - The formula of abjuration is that which the Holy Office composed on July 20, 1859.

3. Any confessor can absolve from the sin of heresy those guilty persons thus absolved from censure (VII, 83; H. Ap., XX, de Privil., 39).

III. ONLY THE ROMAN PONTIFF can absolve (by himself or through another) heretics whether notorious or occult. It is supposed that they have not yet presented themselves to the judicial forum of the Ordinary, either from delation or spontaneously (Bened. XIV, Const. Pastor bonus, 1744).

Hence: 1. Protestants, or other notorious heretics, who wish to abjure their heresy, can be absolved by the Bishop or by his delegate. For their heresy, in every case, must be brought to the external forum.

2. The contrary must be said of a Catholic who privately fell into heresy, or lived in some sect so occultly that his heresy became known to only a few. For he would be in a case of occult heresy, nor could he be absolved by the Bishop,

so long as his delict had not been brought to the judicial forum. Whence, if he refuses to manifest his heresy in the external forum, he will need an indult of the Holy See (that is, of the Major Penitentiary) to obtain absolution (Bouix, de Episc., II, p. 222). See nevertheless the things to be said at n. 1314.

Note. The MODE of reconciling heretics will be treated at n. 1832 seqq.

There are especially three things which bring danger to faith, namely: 1. liberty of worships conceded by a prince; 2. communication with heretics or unbelievers; 3. reading of depraved books.

In voluntarily incurring these dangers there is given a fault of imprudence, which nevertheless is not always mortal, nor opposed to faith; and therefore it does not necessarily expel the habit of faith (Tanquerey, I, 655-659). If the imprudence is against faith, from the fact that someone proximately exposes himself to danger, there will be present a grave sin of infidelity.

444. Note beforehand. That liberty or equality of worships lies greatly in ambush against the Catholic faith, nothing is more evident than this. For through it there is brought into Catholic kingdoms that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, "of the indifference of any religion whatsoever, which, after every distinction of truth and error has been taken away, boldly asserts that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever," and thus it casts peoples down into the abyss of incredulity (Pius IX, Enc., November 9, 1846).

445. PRINCIPLES. I. Liberty of worships, considered as doctrine, is a false principle of liberalism, which a Catholic legislator ought to impede by all the ways in which he can. Reason: he who cannot favor lesser vices, how much more ought he to resist those things which tear out the foundations of the commonwealth (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. 1, n. 4; opusc. Fedelta dei vassalli).

Liberalism is a politico-religious system which professes an independence of the State from the Church so complete that the State rules itself, no respect being had to Religion, as if this did not exist, and all religions were in reality equal in themselves.

Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have always reprobated this liberty and equality of worships: "What more insane can be devised?" exclaims Pius VI in the Letter to Cardinal La Rochefoucauld (on March 10, 1791). Gregory XVI, in the Encyclical Mirari vos; Pius IX, in the Encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864) and in the Syllabus (propositions 77, 78, and 79); Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Libertas (June 20, 1888), condemned this system by their supreme authority. The same Pontiff spoke thus concerning this doctrine in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: "If it differs from Atheism in name, in reality it differs not at all."

Note. But what kind of sin against faith he commits who professes liberalism was said above at n. 441.

II. Liberty of worships and of conscience can sometimes be tolerated where the prince cannot impede it without graver detriment to the true religion and commonwealth. Thus the Angelic Doctor teaches (2.2, q. 10, a. 11): Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits some evils to be done in the universe which he could prohibit, lest, by their being removed, greater goods be taken away, or even worse evils follow. St. Alphonsus is plainly consonant with the Angelic Doctor (II, 18). Cf. Zigliara, Summa Phil., p. 247.

III. Liberty of worships, existing in fact, creates a twofold danger for the faithful, both of embracing the theoretical error concerning the equal value of religions, and of confusing political tolerance with dogmatic tolerance (Villada, Casus Consc., I, p. 59).

The matter is clear. From this twofold danger it must always be discerned whether someone in reality has fallen into a sin opposed to faith, or has only undergone the danger of falling into it, and whether the matter is one of doctrinal liberalism, or only of political parties.

446. From these things you will resolve: A. As regards liberalism, as it is doctrine:

In order to determine what sin against faith he commits who professes this liberalism, one must carefully inspect (as Genicot says) what he understands by the sentence to which he gives assent, since among those who have not completely turned aside to atheism or rationalism and who wish to remain Catholics, this word liberalism is taken with manifold variety; then one must see how far, by reason of ignorance and good faith, each one is excused from formal sin.

Hence: 1. He is a heretic who: a) fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, that is, the full independence of the State from the Church, or (what is worse) the subjection of the Church to the authority of the State. For some subordination of the State to the Church is manifestly contained in the full power with which Christ furnished Peter and his successors; b) the same must be said of those liberals who pertinaciously hold certain particular doctrines which are also adverse to divine faith, for example, that by force of a merely civil contract there is given among Christians a true marriage. Cf. Sarda y Salvani, Le liberalisme est un peche.

2. They are excused from heresy, but expose themselves to danger, who defend these errors on account of ignorance for the most part culpable, and yet do not bear the mind of retaining them when they shall have known them to be reprobated by the Church. Likewise, by defect of religious assent, they sin gravely against prudence or reverence owed to the Church who hold only some secondary error, but one by no means contrary to divine faith, for example the 76th proposition of the Syllabus, concerning progress going to follow for the Church from the abrogation of the civil empire. But here some good faith can easily be admitted.

B. As regards liberalism, as it denotes political parties.

Before all things one must examine whether those who adhere to such parties nevertheless otherwise seem to fulfill the offices of good Catholics. Then it must prudently be explored whether they themselves admit something evil in doctrine or manner of acting, or without sufficient reason cooperate in the evil counsels of others; and according to these things let them be judged.

Concerning cooperation of this kind a question often occurs when there is question of schools, assemblies, and other social works.

In the opening lecture of this course, I remarked to you, gentlemen, that the scope of Medical Jurisprudence is much wider than that of Medical Law. It embraces many subjects of which human laws take no cognizance, and in particular such vicious actions as do not violate the rights of others, but are injurious to those only who practise them. They undermine the health and shorten the lives of the guilty parties, and bring in their train diseases the most destructive and often the most incurable. It is the physician’s beneficent task to lessen the weaknesses and sufferings of the body, and to prolong human life in well-preserved vigor to a green old age. It is not the least important part of his valuable services to provide for the sound and vigorous propagation of the human race to future generations. Of this propagation of our race, of the laws which govern it, and of the criminal abuses by which these laws are violated, I am to treat in this present lecture. My subject is “Venereal Excesses.”

I. If a physician’s purpose were only to make money, his task would then be to multiply diseases and infirmities; he would then be as great a curse to mankind as he is really intended to be a blessing; and an immense blessing he will be to his fellow-men if he studies to remove even the remote causes of diseases and untimely deaths. He can do so in a variety of ways and not the least by providing against sexual excesses and abuses. These are a copious fountain of ill to humanity. A host of diseases, such as tuberculosis, diabetes, cardial and nervous affections, epilepsy, hysteria, general debility, weaknesses of sight, languor and general worthlessness, hypochondria, weakness and total loss of reason, and, in married life, impotence and sterility are some of the effects of venereal excesses. Any excitement of the sexual passion before the body has received its full development is more or less injurious to its welfare; and all excesses or unnatural indulgence of it at any period of life is pregnant with deplorable consequences. Now, such evil practices are too much overlooked by many physicians; yet it is certain that thousands of patients might, by timely warning on these matters, be saved from unspeakable mental and physical sufferings. To give sensible and intelligible directions on a subject as delicate as it is important in medical practice, it will be necessary to enter into some scientific details.

The passion which prompts to sexual intercourse is altogether natural in itself, and, as such, intended by the Creator to be indulged in at the right time and in the proper manner. It is the stimulus which He has provided for the propagation of the human race. If the stimulus is strong at times, this too is a special effect of His wisdom; because without a powerful prompting of this kind, most men would shirk the burden of married life, just as very many would not care to toil if they had no hunger and thirst and other bodily wants to satisfy.

But though all these cravings are useful and even indispensable to mankind, all of them need the regulation of reason. When they are indulged immoderately or in unnatural ways, they become most copious sources of bodily diseases, of mental disorders, and moral degradation. Every one knows how the passion of drink, when abused, proves the ruination of millions; excessive eating, too, injures the systems of countless people. But no animal passion is more liable to become disorderly, none needs more firm control and habitual watchfulness, than the passion of lust. Reason dictates that it should be indulged for no other purpose than that for which the Creator has made it, namely, marital intercourse. I say marital and not merely sexual intercourse; for outside of married life all nations have always condemned its indulgence.

Besides, it is only in the married state that the children, which are the fruit of such intercourse, can be properly educated. To generate a race of young barbarians is certainly not the purpose of the sexual relations. Children must not be begotten unless they can be properly raised, in a manner worthy of their noble destiny. Now, it is only in the married state, in the family or domestic society, that they can be thus educated. They need the tender hand of a mother to supply their material wants; they need the manly care of a devoted father to provide the necessaries of life, his firm hand to break their wanton wills, and his wise direction to set them well on the road to temporal and eternal happiness. Therefore, no one has the right to beget or to bear children except in marital life. Now, the sexual passion is to be exercised only in connection with its proper object, the procreation of children and the fostering of such mutual love between husband and wife as is conducive to domestic happiness. Therefore this passion is to be kept under careful and rational constraint. This the law of morality requires; all nations have ever exacted that this passion shall be subject to established rules; no free-love has ever been tolerated where there was the least pretence to civilization, and I do not know that it was ever permitted even among barbarians.

Even the distant approach that Mormonism made towards free-love has been absolutely condemned and repressed by the common-sense of the American people, as incompatible with civilization. In fact, all history testifies that the true civilization of any race or country rises or falls with the restraints imposed on the passion of lust; no polygamous nation has ever been more than half-civilized. The greatness of Rome and Greece decayed when the laws of social purity declined; and in our own day the immorality of what is called “the social evil” is the darkest stain on modern civilization.

And what we say of civilization or social soundness, the soundness of the body politic, applies in a great measure to individual soundness, the health of every person’s mind and body. Personal purity promotes health and vigor, it lends beauty to form, gives a keen edge to the intellect, adds energy and brings success to manhood, and prepares for enduring and honored old age. Venereal excesses, on the contrary, undermine the vigor of the constitution, bring on a host of bodily infirmities, exhaust the system before the proper time, debauch and degrade the mind and will, and prepare their victims for an early grave or a decrepit old age.

II. But how can a passion so ardent be properly restrained? In particular, what can a physician do to prevent the manifold injuries which, if not properly controlled, it will bring to his patients? These are practical questions directly to our purpose.

The first requisite for all effective action is to have correct knowledge and strong convictions on a subject. No one will check a passion with firmness if he have a lingering doubt as to whether, after all, he is strictly bound to restrain it. As a man’s mind matures, at least if his mind be upright and not distorted by the strain of a ruling passion, he understands more and more thoroughly that his perfection consists and his highest interests lie in obeying at all times the law of reason, in maintaining his specific dignity of a rational being, and not allowing himself to be controlled by passion, the ruling power of brute animals. Besides, he becomes aware in various ways of the evil results of immoral practices, and he sees many reasons to keep his passions in check. But young people have neither such experience nor such information, and they are not always wise enough to understand the imperative dictates of self-restraint. And yet it is often in early years, while body and mind are in the period of development, that the most serious injury is done to the constitution and to the character by the indulgence of carnal pleasures. Habits are then engendered which become a real slavery; so that later in life when there arises a sincere desire to stop such disgraceful practices, there is a feeling of impotence to resist temptations which by one’s own fault have become a second nature.

What then can be done with the young? They must early and authoritatively be told of the wrong, the sin of base self-indulgence, and of every practice that leads to it. If a beginning of immorality is discovered in a child, it must be plainly told and emphatically warned of the serious consequences involved. The child’s mother is, as a rule, the best guide and director in infancy. Later on, the Doctor has frequent chances to do so; it comes from him with better grace than from others; and his warning is likely to be minded, because it is clear that he knows and ought to know what he is talking about with regard to bodily consequences. Yet it is always a matter of delicacy; and great care should be taken lest, while pointing out the evil, there be also a stimulus added to a prurient curiosity.

Much good sense is required in any given case to decide whether more good or more evil is likely to result from the warning; in doubt of success, it is better to leave the matter alone.

“Where ignorance is bliss

’Tis folly to be wise.”

The safest way of repressing the passion of lust is the provision that an all-wise Providence supplies in Religion, in which God authoritatively forbids all immoral action and even all immoral coveting or desire. Positive dogmatic teaching on this subject is required, especially with the young. You cannot argue with them on this matter as you can with grown people. That is one reason why religious teaching should permeate early education. The Decalogue should be the back-bone of a child’s training: and it should be proposed on the authority of God, and explained so as to check not only sinful acts, but also covetings, prurient curiosity, improper reading, immodest looks and thoughts, in a word, whatever paves the way to the walks of sin. The greatest of teachers has Himself laid down the law in this matter: it must be proposed as coming from His divine lips, as it did: “I say to you that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart” (St. Matt. v. 28). The lesson is enforced by these words of the^† great Apostle: “Neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate ... shall possess the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10).

True, the child will not realize the full import of such lessons; but he will understand it in due time; and already in early years he will be warned against indulging his nascent passions. It is well that the conscience should be early awakened in this matter; for the more this passion is indulged, the more it craves for further indulgence till it becomes almost uncontrollable.

III. No possible evil to any individual man or woman can result from the firm control that one may acquire over the passion of lust. On the contrary, if it should be controlled all through life, this would only add to a man’s strength of mind, firmness of will, soundness of body, and length of life. For in the school of morality, in which every Physician should be educated, the leading principle is: “Contraries are cured by contraries,” “Contraria contrariis curantur.” On this principle, lust is most efficiently controlled by aiming, at least in youth, at total abstinence from its indulgence. You know that, in the Catholic Church, priests and religious lead a single life, and pledge themselves for life to practise the most perfect control of the sexual passion. What do you think is the result of their total abstinence on this point with regard to their length of days? As a rule their life is much longer, in normal circumstances, than that of the other learned professions. Here are a few proofs. In France, during the twenty years from 1823 to 1843, 750 priests died in the diocese of Paris. Of these only 200 were under sixty years old; there were 554 between sixty and seventy years old, 448 over seventy, and 177 over eighty. Again, of 202 Carmelite nuns who died in a large convent of Paris, Dr. Descuret, the attending physician, states that 82 had lived over seventy years, 23 over eighty years. Most Trappists and Carthusians die of scarcely any other sickness than old age. All young people who aspire to the clerical or religious profession learn from their early years the holiness and the loveliness of purity. Our Church effects this result by placing before their youthful imaginations the most perfect of patterns of virtue, the infant Saviour, the virgin Mother, the boy saints Aloysius and Stanislaus, the maidens Agatha and Cecilia, and a whole phalanx of Christian heroes and heroines.

I dwell the more willingly on this subject, gentlemen, because, besides protecting modesty in your young patients generally, it may fall to the lot of some of you, in the course of your professional careers, to be attending physicians to religious houses; and you will then appreciate the delicacy of the flowers of virtue that bloom beneath the shadow of the sanctuary. Certainly even there you may happen to find isolated cases of infidelity to duty; for human nature is not angelic nature; but in such abodes it comes near to it, at least for the vast majority.

IV. On the other hand, what sad havoc does not the sexual passion play where it is precociously developed and wantonly indulged. Dr. H. Fournier, one of the most eminent physicians of Paris, says: “There is not a vice more fatal to the conservation of man than masturbation.” This unfortunate habit is sometimes acquired by very little boys and girls. Foolish or vicious nurses may bring it on by handling young children most indelicately. This is one of the many reasons why none but virtuous servants and nurses should be employed by wise parents and physicians. In later years, children often learn this degrading and most injurious vice from their depraved companions, some of whom seem even to regard the practice of it as a manly accomplishment. When habitually indulged in, it produces on the health and the strength of the constitution effects the most deplorable. Even the intellect is liable to become thereby enfeebled, a want of virility is exhibited both in the body and in the mind of its victims; then follows a loss of ambition and self-control. “When this morbid passion gets control of a person,” writes an experienced practitioner in medicine, “it is as though an unclean spirit had entered, subdued the will, weakened the moral forces, enfeebled the intellectual faculties, lessened the power to resist temptation, and overcome every obstacle opposed to its gratification. Even while the intellect is still clear, and the sense of wrong keen, the individual is a slave to this morbid impulse.” Though the baneful effects may not always affect the physical health of the victim, the unfortunate practice very often engenders in boys and girls tendencies which in later years lead to all the miseries conspicuous in houses of debauch and infamy. But I need not dwell on consequences that belong to pathology rather than to Jurisprudence.

V. Confining myself to my sphere of what is morally right or wrong, I must be permitted to point out some gross violations of duty in some members of your honored profession. There are physicians so reckless of consequences and of principles alike as to advise at times the practice of illicit sexual intercourse. Let them beware; they are doing a very unwise and guilty act. Even if an immoral practice should save a human life, it may not be indulged, on the principle which must be by this time very familiar to your ears, that the end does not justify the means. And besides no good result can be expected from what is contrary to the law of nature and of nature’s God. It was to punish sins of the flesh that the Deluge was sent, which destroyed nearly the whole human race. “All flesh had corrupted its way,” says the sacred historian. It was to punish unlawful indulgence of lust that Sodom and Gomorrha were destroyed by fire from heaven; and the memory of these guilty cities is preserved in the very name of Sodomy. Onan, as the same sacred volume relates (Gen. xxxviii), performed the marriage act in a manner to frustrate it of its legitimate purpose, the generation of children, and the Lord slew him; and his sin is to this very day branded with his name and called Onanism. And yet in Christian lands physicians are found who will at times dare to recommend such practices to their patients.

On the occasions mentioned, God punished the guilty miraculously; but that is not His usual way. He has so contrived our natures that sins committed against His laws in our bodies ordinarily bring a part of their punishment in their train, not the less certain because slower in its operation than a miracle would be. All the venereal diseases are there to act as earthy ministers of Heaven’s justice, anticipating, and often mercifully averting, the punishments of the future world.

VI. Besides private and secret tortures of body and mind, a public and most deplorable calamity has descended of late on our own vigorous young nation, as well as on some older lands, threatening in the not distant future the extinction of many of its most esteemed families and of what was, not long ago, a vigorous stock. The following article by Dr. Walter Lindley, Professor of Gynecology in the University of Southern California, will explain the matter better than my words could do. It was read in Los Angeles at a meeting of the Southern Californian Medical Society in June, 1895, and is printed in the “N. Y. Medical Journal” of August 17 of the same year (pp. 211 and following). It is headed “American Sterility;” I will quote freely from it:

“The obstetrician finds his vocation disappearing among the American women from the face of the earth.

“It is a fact that the American family with more than one or two children is the exception. From the records of six generations of families in some New England towns, it was found that the families comprising the first generation had on an average between eight and ten children; the next three generations averaged about seven to each family; the fifth generation less than three to each family. The generation now on the stage is not doing so well as that. In Massachusetts the average family numbers less than three persons. In 1885 the census of Massachusetts disclosed that 71.28 per cent of the women of that State were childless. The census of 1885 in the State of New York shows that twenty-five per cent of the women of that State are childless, fifty per cent average less than one child, and seventy-five per cent average only a trifle over one child.

“Southern California has fully as dark a record as New England—that is, in the family where the man and wife are American-born. It goes without saying that the medical profession in this country is composed to a great extent of typical progressive Americans, and I ask you to make mental statistics of the children in the families of the physicians in Southern California, and you will find very few of them containing more than two.

“Had the Rev. T. R. Malthus lived in the United States to-day, he would never have argued about the danger of over-population, as he did in his interesting volume on ‘The Principles of Population.’”

After quoting the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Lycurgus, Dr. Lindley continues: “In Southern California there are, it is true, many children, but the average American family is very small.

“As I sat writing this an evening or two ago, I jotted down the names of twenty-five families of my acquaintance in Los Angeles, taking them as fast as I thought of them. The list was composed entirely of professional and business men ranging in age from thirty-five to fifty. All had been married quite a number of years. The result of my memorandum was that in these twenty-five families there were but eighteen children. These families were wholly unselected, and are about the average Protestant American families outside the rank of laborers.

“What are the causes of this small proportion of children? Disease, preventives of conception, and abortion form the trinity of responsibility in this grave condition. It is true that the first cause (disease) results in many women being barren, but I believe that you will agree with me that the last two causes, preventives of conception and abortion, are the two chief causes.

“The A. P. A. might find food for thought by investigating the infrequency of criminal abortion in Catholic families in the United States. It is the Protestant or agnostic American who too often uses one of the preventives of conception.” (Here the Doctor refers to a foot-note in which he says: “I write this opinion as a Protestant, and should be glad to learn that it is not well founded.”) He continues: “If, through inadvertence, pregnancy should occur, then an abortion is in order. Disease and poverty and war and accident all work together to keep down the population, but we are overcoming these. Plagues and pestilences are rare. The number who die of starvation in California is very small, while war has played but a small part. Through the diffusion of the laws of sanitation, improved dietary, and advanced therapeutics, the longevity of man is increasing, but the American woman’s aversion to child-bearing is blighting our civilization, and can be well named the twentieth-century curse. In this aversion the woman frequently echoes the wish of the husband.

“A large proportion of the American young women who marry do so with the determination that they will have no children. They are abetted in this notion by many elderly women. The cure for this terrible sentiment is education. The home, the press, the schoolroom, and the pulpit should be centres for reviving the ancient idea of the nobility of motherhood. The physician should not underestimate his influence.

“By constantly bearing in mind the danger of the present tendencies, he can do much to change the current. Let us hope that we shall again see the day when thoughtful motherhood shall be considered the highest function of womanhood, and to shirk this natural duty will be deemed a disgrace.”

Gentlemen, it would be easy to prove that this testimony of Dr. Lindley is not that of an exceptional witness, or a piece of special pleading; but it is the acknowledged conviction of the medical profession generally, confirmed by the last United States Census, and in fact not questioned, to my knowledge, by any weighty authority. As early as 1857, Dr. H. B. Storer, an eminent physician of Boston, startled the community by publishing two books on this subject, entitled: “Criminal Abortion. Why not?—A Book for Every Woman”; “Is it I?—A Book for Every Man.” Soon after, Rev. John Todd, a Protestant minister of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, published a work styled “Serpents in the Dove’s Nest,” all which works and a multitude of others tell the same tale of woe regarding the increase of child-destroying crimes in New England, chiefly among the old stock peculiarly called Americans. Dr. Nathan Allen, of Lowell, Massachusetts, in his treatises, “Changes in the New England Population” and “The New England Family,” gives overwhelming testimony. “Harper’s Magazine” (quoted by the “Catholic World” for April, 1869) remarks: “We are shocked at the destruction of human life on the banks of the Ganges, but here in the heart of Christendom fœticide and infanticide are extensively practised under the most aggravating circumstances.” We Catholics are not personally interested in this matter; but the good of our fellow-men and chiefly our fellow-countrymen calls for the earnest exertion of us all to stop this dreadful evil. All the works I have referred to exempt Catholics from the blame pronounced; the “Harper’s Magazine” article referred to expressly says: “It should be stated that believers in the Roman Catholic faith never resort to any such practices; the strictly Americans are almost alone guilty of such crimes.” This matter is fully explained in a recent work called “Catholic and Protestant Countries Compared,” by Rev. Alfred Young, C.P., ch. xxxii.

VII. Now, gentlemen, I am very much afraid that while physicians as a body abhor all such murders and openly condemn them, many do not show much repugnance to allow, and even sometimes to suggest, such onanistic intercourse among married people as shall prevent the possibility of conception. For instance, if it happens that a young mother suffers much in her first confinement, at once the suggestion is made that a second parturition may prove fatal. From that moment regular intercourse is dreaded. Either onanism is habitually practised, or the husband becomes a frequent visitor to dens of infamy, where to where to save his wife’s health, he encourages a traffic that leads multitudes of wretched girls to a premature and miserable death. Every one despises those outcasts of society; but are not the men who patronize them just as guilty? Probably enough, if the imprudent suggestion about dangers of a second child-bearing had not been made by the Doctor, the young wife might have become the happy mother of a numerous family of healthy children. For we must trust in Divine Providence. If a husband and wife do their conscientious duty, there is a God that provides for them and their family more liberally than for the birds of the air and the lilies of the field. And if He should so dispose that the worst should befall, well, such temporal clangers and sufferings as attend child-bearing are the lot of woman-kind, just as the dangers and hardships of the battlefield, the mine, the factory, the forest, and the prairie are the lot of the men.

The man who shirks his duty to family or country is a coward; women, as a rule, are brave enough in their own line of duty, and patiently submit to God’s sentence pronounced in Paradise, “I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conceptions, in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children” (Gen. iii. 16), just as they have to submit to the words immediately following: “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power, and he shall have dominion over thee.”

Certainly, the husband of a delicate woman ought to spare her strength and restrain his passion, but not at the sacrifice of morality; and Doctors ought to be very careful not to cause false or exaggerated alarms, and thus make themselves to some extent responsible for untold moral evils. They should remember that, as a rule, the raising of a family is the principal purpose of a married life. The happiness and virtue of the parties concerned depend chiefly on the faithful performance of this duty. How sad is the lot of those—and they are many—who undertook in early years of married life to prescribe a narrow limit to the number of their children; they had one or two, and they would have no more, and for this purpose criminally thwarted the purposes of nature. Then comes death and snatches away their solitary consolation: and they spend their old age childless and loveless, in mutual upbraidings and unavailing regrets.

How different is the lot of those aged couples—and they were many of yore, and are yet in various nations—who are like patriarchs amid their crowds of children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren, dwelling in mutual love and as if in a moral paradise where all domestic virtues bloom!

VIII. True, such families are usually the outcome of moderately early marriages; and many Doctors nowadays disapprove of such unions as an evil. A moral evil they certainly are not; and the physical evils sometimes attending them must, I think, be traceable to a variety of causes; for such evils are certainly not inseparable from early marriages. As to their moral advantages, Mr. Wm. E. H. Lecky, in his “History of European Morals,” writes of the Irish people in particular: “The nearly universal custom of early marriages among the Irish peasantry has alone rendered possible that high standard of female chastity, that intense and jealous sensitiveness respecting female honor, for which, among many failings and some vices, the Irish race have long been pre-eminent in Europe” (v. i. p. 146). And that he does not confine his statement to female chastity is evident from what he adds farther on: “There is no fact in Irish history more singular than the complete and, I believe, unparalleled absence among the Irish priesthood of those moral scandals which in every Continental country occasionally prove the danger of vows of celibacy. The unsuspected purity of the Irish priesthood in this respect is the more remarkable, because, the government of the country being Protestant, there is no special inquisitorial legislation to insure it, because of the almost unbounded influence of the clergy over their parishioners, and also because, if any just cause of suspicion existed, in the fierce sectarianism of Irish public opinion it would assuredly be magnified. Considerations of climate are quite inadequate to explain this fact; but the chief cause is, I think, sufficiently obvious. The habit of marrying at the first development of the passions has produced among the Irish peasantry, from whom the priests for the most part spring, an extremely strong feeling of the iniquity of irregular sexual indulgence, which retains its power even over those who are bound to perpetual celibacy” (p. 147). No one will say, I believe, that the custom of early marriages in Ireland has any injurious effects on the health of either parents or children. Nor need it necessarily have such effects on those of our American young men and women who lead regular lives and are not enfeebled by unnatural vices or demoralized by dainty food and luxurious manners.

A wise physician has many proper ways of providing for the health and strength of both parents and children without advocating practices which are a snare for innocence. Let him insist with all his patients on the cultivation of healthful habits for the family and the individual; wholesome and not over-delicate food; moderation in eating and drinking; regular and manly exercise, especially in the open air; early hours for retiring and rising. But, above all—and this is directly to our present purpose—let him show the greatest regard for the laws of morality, the main support of individual and social happiness. His views upon such matters, manifested alike in his conduct and his conversation, but especially in his management of cases involving the application of moral principles, will go far to influence the community in which he moves. His task is to be a blessing to his fellow-men, a source of happiness and security to individuals and to society.

In this last lecture of our course I propose to make a brief excursion with you into the border-land of science, a region chiefly occupied by imposture and superstition. To show there is such a territory, we have only to name a few of its inhabitants, such as mesmerism, animal magnetism, odylism, hypnotism, mind-reading, faith-cures, clairvoyance, spiritism, including table-rapping, spirit-rapping, most of which have been used in connection with medicine. I do not maintain that all of these are mere vagaries, empty shadows, without the least reality, mere ghosts and hobgoblins, mere phantoms of the heat-oppressed brain, or cunning devices of impostors to deceive a gullible crowd of the ignorant public. Yet most of these are such beyond a doubt, and as such are totally unworthy of our attention.

Medicine is a science; it deals with undoubted facts and certain principles, and with theories in so far as they are supported by well-ascertained realities. The border-land of which I speak presents to our investigation few certain facts. It is chiefly the domain of imposture. Charlatans and showmen and medical quacks call things facts that are not facts. Among all the inhabitants of the shadowy region that I have enumerated, there is only one considered to-day by the science of medicine as worthy of its attention. It is hypnotism. As its first origin is connected with the history of mesmerism, and the latter, though itself a phantom, has been used as the chief patron of all other phantoms, I will premise a few words about mesmerism itself.

I. Mesmer was born about 1733, studied in Vienna and there became a doctor of medicine in 1766. Soon after, he began to speculate upon the curative powers of the magnet, and claimed to have discovered the existence of a force in man similar to magnetism and the source of strong influence on the human body.

In 1775 he published an account of the medical powers of this animal magnetism, which from his name was afterward called mesmerism. Paris was then the centre of attraction for scientific discoverers and pretenders. Thither Mesmer betook himself and there he soon created a lively sensation by the exhibition of mesmeric trances, some of which were accompanied by clairvoyance—that is, the power of seeing objects concealed from the eyes. He was also supposed to work some inexplicable cures.

"Superstition," says St. Thomas,² "is a vice opposed to religion according to excess; not because it shows more in divine worship than true religion, but because it shows divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in the manner in which it ought not."

334. • Idolatry is an action by which worship owed to God alone is rendered to a creature; and this happens not only by sacrifice, but by any sign of honor by which someone intends to submit himself to a creature as to God, for example by genuflection.

Idolatry is distinguished as twofold, namely: 1° Material or simulated, when someone without internal affection, from grave fear, shows worship to an idol. It would also be called material if it proceeded from invincible error, for example if someone, falsely thinking a host to be consecrated, were to adore it. - In the first case it would be a mortal sin; in the second, none, as is clear.

2° Formal and proper, which is done 1° by adoring a creature as God; 2° by showing worship to a demon or another creature as if to God, or at least from the mind of obtaining something from such a creature which can be asked from God alone.³

335. • Vain observance is superstition which employs means neither proportioned nor instituted by God for obtaining a certain effect.

It is of three kinds, namely: 1° Notory art, or the art of acquiring knowledge without labor. 2° Art of healings, or the art of healing by various signs or sacred things. 3° Observance of events, by which from consideration of some fortuitous event it is conjectured that something favorable or unfavorable will be in the future.¹

Principles. - I. Vain observance is a grave sin, because it attributes divine honor to a creature, while it expects from it what must be expected from God alone; and because it rests upon an implicit pact with a demon. Yet it can often be venial from imperfection of the act, from simplicity, from some ignorance, or from timidity, as happens especially among the uneducated in the observance of events.²

II. Vain observance is discerned especially: 1° from the insufficiency of the cause for naturally producing the effect; 2° from the joining of a vain or false circumstance as if necessarily required; 3° from the infallibility which is attributed to means in no way infallible.³

III. In doubt whether effects proceed from a natural cause or from a demon, they can be attributed to the powers of nature; and therefore it is licit to procure them, because it is not established that the thing is evil. Yet Doctors counsel a previous protestation against any intervention of a demon. - But in doubt whether effects are produced by a demon or by God, if there is present a certain probability that they cannot proceed from a natural cause, they are to be attributed to the demon, unless the sanctity of the one working or other clear signs persuade the contrary, because it is rash to think that miracles are always occurring. Hence it is not then licit to try whether the effect is going to follow or not. - St. Alph.,¹ St. Thom.,² and others commonly.

336. You will resolve. - 1° Those are guilty of superstition who wear ligatures marked with certain characters; who invoke certain unknown names, or employ a certain number of crosses or prayers for healing wounds, for rendering themselves invulnerable, ... etc.²

2° Likewise those who wear certain prayers, expecting an effect altogether infallible from them. - Yet those are not to be blamed, indeed are very much to be praised, who wear pious medals, sacred images, or Relics of Saints, hoping that they will specially obtain divine help for themselves.³

3° Likewise those are guilty of superstition who regard certain days as favorable and others as unfavorable, so that they direct their actions from this; or who for expelling diseases require herbs gathered on such a feast, ... etc.⁴

4° But it is not superstitious to observe the moon or times more suitable for gathering herbs, cutting trees, etc.; ... nor to wear sacred things or words of Sacred Scripture for the honor of God or the Saints and for imploring their help. Likewise neither to recite a certain number of prayers, nor to do all those things which can increase devotion, provided that an infallible power is not attributed to them.⁵

5° Nor is it in any way superstitious, indeed it is very religious and pious, to recite novena prayers, or to repeat prayers so many times in worship of Our Lord, or of the Blessed Virgin, or of some Saint, provided that an infallible power is not attached to such a number, to a certain day, or to a fixed time.⁷

337. Definition. - Divination is the inquiry of hidden things by the help of a demon.

Division. It is 1° express, if it is done through the express invocation of a demon; 2° tacit, if that invocation is only in disproportionate means.

Various kinds of divination are distinguished, of which sort are especially: 1° Judicial Astrology from the stars; 2° Augury from the song or flight of birds; - 3° Auspice from the song of birds; - 4° Haruspicy from the entrails of animals; - 5° Chiromancy from the lines of the hand; - 6° Geomancy from signs in the earth; - 7° Omen from a fortuitous event; - 8° Necromancy from invocation of a dead person; - 9° Oneiromancy from dreams; - 10° Sortilege from lots; - 11° Oracle from idols; - 12° Vaticination from prophets or cards.¹

338. Principles. - I. Whatever of hidden things is known in another way than by revelation or by natural means must be attributed to divination; for no other means is given for investigating hidden things. - But in doubt whether knowledge arises from natural means or not, whether from a good or from a bad spirit, the rules set forth above concerning vain observance must be applied (n. 335, II).

II. Express divination can never be excused from mortal sin, not even through ignorance; for it is clear that a pact with a demon, or to invoke him, even without a pact, is something most gravely illicit.

This is clearly established from Sacred Scripture, Deut. 18. 10; Lev. 20. 6.

III. But tacit divination can sometimes be excused from mortal sin because of simplicity or ignorance, or because of defect of certain faith.²

339. You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from grave fault who, using disproportionate means for some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with a demon; for he acts against his protestation, and implicitly invokes the demon, since neither God nor the Angels mix themselves with such things. - Yet otherwise in doubt whether the effect is had from a natural cause, as was said concerning vain observance³ (n. 335, II).

2° Natural effects must be carefully distinguished from free effects; for the former can often be conjectured, as, for example, from the song and flight of birds, or from the aspect of the stars, one conjectures storm, rain, or serenity of the sky, etc.; for by experience it is established that there is a natural connection among these things. But one must speak otherwise of the latter.

3° Character or state of soul can sometimes in some way be conjectured from the color of the face or other external signs, although in practice for the most part one must abstain from such conjectures because of the danger of rash judgment. But free acts, whether past or future, can never be known with certainty.

4° Those sin gravely who inquire from diviners about their future fortune or life (in English: to consult fortune-tellers; card-cutting); unless they act from simplicity, jest, or from cause of curiosity, without giving faith to the things said.¹ - Yet if the diviner does this seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation.

340. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is the use of lots ever licit?

Resp. 1° Dividing lots, by which it is discerned what is to be assigned to each in settling lawsuits or in distributing things, are certainly licit, since they are entirely free from all superstition.

Resp. 2° Consultory lots, by which the divine will is investigated so that it may be known what is to be done, are not licit unless they are made by a special impulse of God, or there is question of a grave affair in which another counsel is lacking. The reason is that, according to ordinary providence, God does not will that inquiry be made in this way about His will, but recourse must be had to prudent men or ecclesiastical Superiors.

Resp. 3° Divinatory lots, by which the manifestation of a hidden thing is sought, for example from the casting of dice, etc., ... are always gravely illicit, as containing at least tacit invocation of a demon. Superstition of this sort is properly called sortilege, by which name also other kinds of superstitions commonly come.²

341. • Quaer. 2° Is it licit to conjecture future things from dreams?

Resp. Negatively, ordinarily, because dreams almost always proceed from natural causes, for example from the stirring of humors, etc. ... Besides, dreams sent by God are very rare, and are joined with signs through which they can be certainly discerned from natural or diabolical dreams.³

Quaer. 3° Is the use of a divining rod licit?

Resp. 1° Certainly it is to be condemned as often as the rod is moved or not moved according to the mere intention of him who holds it in his hand, and is not moved in the presence of another thing not sought, although of the same nature. For there is no proportion between a natural thing and the intention of man. Hence those sin gravely who use a rod for seeking a thief, or for detecting the stone marking the boundary of a field.¹

Resp. 2° To some the use of the rod for detecting waters or metals does not seem certainly to be condemned, if the rod is moved over these things in every case equally, whether they are sought or not. Yet a protestation against diabolical operation, which perhaps can be present, will prudently be made, and every superstitious spirit must be excluded.³

342. • Quaer. 4° Is Magnetism licit?

Preliminary note. A threefold principal effect or degree is attributed to Magnetism: a) the state of sleep, by which the senses are lulled, as in natural sleep, but often so that "neither the greatest crash reaches the ears of the one lulled, nor can any violence of iron or fire excite him." Thus the Postulate of the Bishop of Lausanne, 19 May 1841; b) the state of somnambulism, in which someone, although he is altogether destitute of the use of the senses, nevertheless sees, hears, speaks, and responds to all things about which he is interrogated; c) the state of clear intuition, or wonderful knowledge of one's own or another's state, and of remedies suitable to illnesses, as well as vision of the actions of other men, even far distant, and of all things which are done both near and far.

Resp. Theologians formerly went off into three opinions, of which the first ascribes all, the second none, the third some of its effects to the devil. This third opinion can no longer be approved practically, and the first seems altogether to have to be admitted. For the simple will, or intention of the magnetizer, or even the consent of the magnetized person joined to this will, is declared to be either the sole or certainly the primary cause of all and individual of these three effects; but this cause is altogether disproportionate to individual effects. For that cause cannot be called proportionate: 1) the will with its immanent acts, because the whole power of an immanent act is consumed in the will itself, and does not pass over to an effect extrinsic to itself; nor 2) the will using the ministry of another power, because thus it is circumscribed by the faculty of that other power, so that the effect cannot exceed the faculty itself of this other power. (In what way, for example, will a Magnetizer who endeavors to know some matter which he is ignorant of be able to transmit knowledge of this thing into the magnetized person?) - nor 3) a fluid, because between a spiritual and a material substance there is no medium. Therefore these words of the Encyclical of the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition, dated 4 Aug. 1856 (see p. XLIX), can be applied to each degree: "In all these things, whatever art or illusion" (namely the magnetizers) "may use, since physical means are ordered to non-natural effects" (of which sort is also sleep, as described above), "there is found deception altogether illicit and heretical, and" (which ordinarily is present in the manner of magnetizing) "scandal against uprightness of morals." Wherefore we think that one must altogether subscribe to these words of the illustrious Perrone:¹ "Although not a few Catholics have judged and still judge that in general the use itself of magnetism was proscribed and eliminated by the Church, yet there are not lacking those, and learned and pious ones, who deny this. Nevertheless we are persuaded that, if not theoretically, yet practically, magnetism of this sort was and is disapproved by the same Apostolic See."

Nor does the declaration of the same Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, 28 July 1847, stand in the way: "With every error, sortilege, explicit or implicit invocation of a demon removed, the use of Magnetism, namely the mere act of employing physical means otherwise licit, is not morally forbidden." For the Sacred Congregation, as consultants of the same Holy Congregation have often holily testified, never instituted any examination about the physical question of this magnetism.

Hence precisely it will not be licit to consult magnetizers even about the nature of illnesses, so that it may be discerned what cure is to be applied to them. For unless, as we saw in n. 335. III, there is present a certain probability that certain effects proceed from a natural cause, it is not licit, not even with protestation against any intervention of a demon, to employ means even only doubtfully superstitious; but the effects of magnetism, far from being certainly or probably to be said to proceed from a natural cause, rather are to be attributed to a demon according to things commonly happening. Therefore practically, etc. - It is added that, as will soon be said, it cannot be asked from a magician that he remove a spell unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. Therefore likewise remedies for illness must not be sought from magnetism unless it can reasonably be presumed that they are to be known in a natural way; but certainly the contrary must be presumed. Therefore. Cf. Capellm. p. 37 sqq.

Quaer. 5° What about Spiritism?

Resp. It is certain today that turning or knocking tables and the other means which Spiritism uses are partly deceitful tricks, partly diabolical superstitions,¹ and therefore that it is illicit either to try the operations of Spiritism, or to approve them, or to favor them in any way, for example by being present.

343. I. - Magic, taken broadly, or natural or artificial magic, which is called white magic, is the art of doing wonderful things, at least apparently, through natural causes or the industry of man, without any ministry of a demon.

Magic, strictly said, is the art of doing wonderful things which, although they are not supernatural, nevertheless surpass the powers of man, and therefore can happen by the help of a demon alone, explicitly or implicitly invoked.

II. Malefice is the art of harming with the intervention of a demon. It is distinguished as twofold, namely amatory and venomous. Amatory malefice, or a love potion, is a diabolical art by which lubricous love or hatred in some person toward another is vehemently excited, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by showing more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors. Venomous malefice is precisely the art of harming the neighbor by the help of a demon, and this in various ways, for example by illnesses, stupidity, etc.²

Malefice is commonly called sortilege, because through it an evil lot is cast upon those against whom vengeance is exercised through diabolical operation. Hence in Canon Law and in ecclesiastical history magicians and witches are called male and female sorcerers.

344. You will resolve. - 1° Magic does not differ from vain observance except in that its effects are more wonderful, for example the changing of bodies, etc. But in moral species it differs neither from vain observance nor from divination; because it matters little whether knowledge of hidden things or wonderful effects are sought from a demon.

2° But malefice differs in species from other superstitions, because beyond the sin opposed to Religion it adds damage to the neighbor.

3° Amatory malefice does not induce one necessarily to perpetrating a sin of luxury, because it does not remove liberty, but only vehemently excites to lust toward some determined person, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by presenting more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors.¹

Quaer. Can it be asked from a magician that he remove a malefice?

Resp. Negatively, unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. - Thus commonly Theologians.² Cf. n. 319.

345. • Temptation of God is a word or deed for taking an experiment about God through an extraordinary effect rashly expected from Him. - Thus the common doctrine with St. Thom.³

But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone doubting about some perfection of God says or does something with the mind of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection, and this is called formal or express; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing about the perfections of God, without necessity wills to obtain either the manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through wonders, and this is called implicit or interpretative.

It is certain that formal or express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against Religion. - But if it is only implicit, often because of ignorance or inadvertence it can be venial, although of itself it is more probably mortal.¹

You will resolve. - 1° Those formerly sinned gravely against Religion who demanded that their innocence be proved by duel, by burning iron, etc., or who without a just cause freely offered themselves to martyrdom, unless they were excused by good faith or divine inspiration. - Nevertheless it is licit to ask from God a miracle under the condition, if it has pleased Him, as often as there is a grave cause for our own or others' salvation, or for fulfilling the divine will, or, as St. Thom.² says, when there underlies a just necessity or pious utility and the other things which ought to concur for this. For then it is not to tempt God, but to request the help of God at an opportune time.

2° Likewise he sins gravely who, without a just cause, exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without certainly trusting in divine Providence, he does not sin against Religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3° He sins only lightly who in a light illness, with remedies rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from all fault if he hopes that he will be freed naturally from such an illness with God's help.³

4° Likewise he sins of himself venially who from negligence approaches unprepared to preaching the word of God, hoping for special help from God.

346. • Sacrilege is the violation or unworthy treatment of sacred things. It is distinguished as threefold: 1° personal; 2° local; 3° real.

Principles. - I. Sacred here is called whatever is deputed to divine worship from divine or ecclesiastical institution, and therefore deserves special reverence. - St. Thomas.¹

Hence 1° Sacred persons are those who are deputed to divine worship through Sacred Tonsure, or through religious vows, or more probably also through any vow of chastity.

2° Sacred places are those which by the authority of the Church are dedicated to worship, as temples and public chapels (not private ones), yet consecrated or blessed; likewise blessed cemeteries. L. IV. 460.

3° Sacred things are those which pertain to divine worship or are proximately referred to it, as Sacraments, consecrated vessels, Relics or images of Saints; likewise those things which pertain to the adornment of the Church or of ministers; finally ecclesiastical goods, even movable ones. - St. Thom.²

II. Sacrilege is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to the most excellent moral virtue, namely Religion, and for the most part regards grave matter. - Yet it can become light by reason of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.³

III. Sacrilege differs in species according as it affects a person, place, or sacred thing; hence in confession those circumstances must be explained. - St. Alph.⁴ St. Thom.⁵

347. You will resolve. - 1° Personal sacrilege is committed: 1) by inflicting violent hands on a Cleric or Religious; 2) by any sin of luxury perpetrated by or with a person bound by a vow of chastity; 3) by violation of personal immunity. - But it will not be sacrilege to detract from a priest, because his person alone is sacred, but not his reputation.⁶

2° Local sacrilege is committed: 1) by all sins by which a Church is polluted by Law, namely by illicit shedding of human blood or seed, homicide, or burial of an excommunicated person or infidel in the Church; 2) by all sins which are done against the immunity and sanctity of a sacred place, as breaking in, despoiling, theft, quarrels, and similar things; 3) by actions unbecoming the sanctity of the place, as are markets, assemblies, and the din of judgments, unless a grave cause excuses.¹

3° Real sacrilege is committed: 1) by unworthy administration or reception of the Sacraments; 2) by unworthy treatment of sacred Relics, images, etc.; 3) by profanation of sacred vessels, instruments, or ornaments; 4) by theft of a thing pertaining to divine worship or to the Church; 5) by abuse of Scripture, for example by twisting its words to vain things, etc.; 6) by neglect of sacred vessels, corporals, etc., in those who ought to care for these things religiously.²

348. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is violation of a person bound by a simple vow of chastity outside Religion sacrilege?

Resp. It is controverted. The more probable opinion of St. Alph.³ affirms, because through any vow of chastity man is truly consecrated to God. For one's own will suffices for consecrating one's own acts to God, while for public consecration public authority is required.⁴ See p. LXXXIX. 7.

Besides, whoever is bound by a vow of chastity, as often as he violates this, certainly commits a twofold sin: namely one against chastity, and the other against Religion. - Lacroix.⁵

Quaer. 2° Are all sins of luxury committed in a Church or cemetery sacrileges?

Resp. 1° Merely internal sins are not to be held as sacrileges, because they do not seem specially to affect the sacred place, unless there is a desire of sinning externally in the sacred place itself. - Thus commonly.⁶

Resp. 2° As to external sins, it is certain that sacrilege is committed through consummated acts, namely through voluntary pollution, fornication, etc. This is openly clear from Canon Law. But whether it is also committed through other grave external sins, for example gravely impure touches, is controverted. St. Alph.,⁷ Collet, etc., more probably affirm.

Quaer. 3° Is every theft in a Church sacrilege?

Resp. 1° It is established that every theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, and also theft of a non-sacred thing nevertheless committed to the custody of a sacred place, as is clear from Canon Law.¹

Resp. 2° As to things which by chance or by accident are found in the Church, as purses, a watch, etc., it is probably controverted on both sides.

349. • Quaer. 4° Does the injury of any goods whatever belonging to Clerics constitute sacrilege?

Resp. Negatively, but only injury of goods which Clerics possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, and of which they cannot dispose, and of those which pertain to the adornment of the church, because these alone are sacred.² (II) p. 479.

Quaer. 5° To whom is it licit to touch sacred vessels?

Resp. If they actually contain the Blessed Sacrament, outside a case of necessity or danger of profanation, it is licit for no one, without grave sin, to touch them, even mediately, except for a priest or deacon; otherwise, for all Clerics without special permission. The same is licit for sacristans, whether regular laymen, or oblates of secular congregations, or nuns; likewise for those who in clerical dress serve churches. For other laymen it is prohibited under venial sin to touch them immediately, unless a reasonable cause excuses.³

But it is licit for all to touch other sacred things, of which sort are, for example, Agnus Dei, at least from modern custom, Relics of Saints, sacred ornaments, except those which immediately touch the holy Eucharist, as, for example, corporals, palls, purificators after use and before washing. But the first washing of these must be performed by a cleric in sacred orders, yet probably it can also be performed by a tonsured cleric; but it cannot be done without venial sin by a layman, or even by a nun or pious women living a common life under rule;⁴ but the second and third washing, although more suitably done by a cleric, can nevertheless be done without sin even by a layman. It would also be venial not to throw the water of the washing into the sacrarium.⁵

350. Definition. - Simony, so called from Simon Magus, is the studied will of selling or buying for a temporal price something spiritual, or something annexed to the spiritual. It is said studied will, not only because, no differently from other sins, it demands deliberation, but also because for its essential malice it is not required that the pact be completed by mutual consent or in reality; but the interior affection even of one suffices, namely the simoniacal will of making a pact or of obligating.

A temporal price is distinguished in Canon Law¹ as of three kinds: 1° a gift from the hand, or recompense of any temporal thing estimable by price; 2° a gift from the tongue, or patronage, under which name come praises, commendations, prayers, etc., to be interposed from pact in favor of the one conferring the spiritual thing; 3° a gift from service, or any servitude, or offices furnished to another, for example servitude or any similar office.

351. • Likewise, the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual is threefold: 1° antecedently, to which the spiritual thing accedes, as the right of patronage inhering in land; 2° consequently, which depends on the spiritual, as the fruits of a benefice or office; 3° concomitantly, as labor in sacred functions. But labor of this sort is annexed to the spiritual thing either intrinsically or extrinsically. It is called intrinsically annexed if it is not easily separable from the thing itself; otherwise it is called extrinsically annexed. Thus celebration of Mass is labor intrinsically annexed to a spiritual thing; but extraordinary fatigue, as singing, delay until midday, a long or difficult journey to be undertaken for celebrating, and other similar things pertain to labor extrinsically annexed.

Division. Simony is distinguished as:

1° Mental, if it is done merely internally or without pact, as if someone recommends a son to the collator of a vacant parish, and meanwhile under the appearance of a liberal gift sends silver vessels to him with this internal intention, that he move and oblige him to nominate his son.

2° Conventional, if a pact indeed intervenes, but is in no way carried into execution, at least by both parties.

3° Real, if the pact is fulfilled by each party, at least inchoatively.

To this is added confidential Simony, which is done by any pact, or confidence, in election or presentation to benefices, or in resigning them, etc.¹

Simony is also distinguished as of divine or natural law, and of ecclesiastical law. The former is had if the thing simoniacally exchanged is spiritual from its nature, as are indulgences, Sacraments, etc.; but the latter, if something is done against some law which has been made by the Church because of either the danger or the appearance of simony.

352. Principles. - I. For Simony it is required that the temporal thing be given or accepted, either formally or virtually, for the spiritual thing itself and in exchange for it, so that an equating of the spiritual thing with the temporal thing is made, or a commutation, from the primary motive of having one thing for the other as a price or just compensation. The reason is clear from the very definition of Simony. Hence if some honest motive intervenes, by force of which the temporal thing is given, and in turn the spiritual, one would no longer be the motive of the other, but only its impelling cause, and therefore it would not be Simony.

I said: 1° formally, that is, that someone directly intends to receive the spiritual in place of the temporal thing and because of its estimation.

I said: 2° virtually, namely that someone wills to obtain the spiritual thing proximately and immediately through the temporal thing, and no other true and honest motive intervenes. For in this will there is virtually included the intention of commuting one thing with the other.

II. It is licit to give for a price the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual antecedently and concomitantly extrinsically, provided the price is not increased because of the spiritual thing annexed. But in no way is it licit to give for a price what is annexed to the spiritual concomitantly intrinsically, or inseparably, nor what is annexed consequently.

The first reason is because the thing and the labor of the action are truly estimable in themselves by price. Yet by Canon Law the sale of balsam which is contained in Chrism is prohibited, although it preexists the consecration; because since it is of small price, the Bishop would seem to sell Sacraments.²

Nevertheless, as to blessed Oil or Sacred Chrism, Scavini observes that in some cathedral Churches the use has prevailed that something is accepted from particular Churches for compensating the expenses made in obtaining the matter.

The second reason is because what is intrinsically annexed to the spiritual is inseparable from it; hence the thing itself or the action would be judged to be sold. Yet, even apart from extrinsic labor, something can licitly be accepted for sacred ministry by reason of a stipend or support, as is established from the practice of the Church. For natural equity demands that honest support be granted to those who are vacant for the utility of others. Hence Christ:¹ The laborer is worthy of his hire. And the Apostle:² Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they who serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.

The third reason is because that which is consequent is judged spiritual, or bound to the spiritual. It is also derived from a special disposition of Canon Law.

III. Simony is a most grave sin; and if it is of divine and natural law, it does not admit smallness of matter. But if the Simony is of ecclesiastical law, there can be smallness of matter in it according to St. Alph.³ - The reason is that any spiritual thing, from comparison with a temporal thing, is treated as vile with great injury against God Himself. This is established also from the words of St. Peter to Simon Magus:⁴ Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be possessed with money.

353. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it Simony to give principally indeed a temporal thing for a spiritual, but not uniquely?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that even thus there is present a comparison of the temporal thing with the spiritual. For the motive which is added, however honest it may be, does not destroy the malice and impiety of the prior motive because of which the temporal thing is principally given. This is established also from propositions 45 and 46 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XVI).

Quaer. 2° Is it Simony to give or procure for a Superior a temporal thing for conciliating him to oneself with a view to obtaining a benefice or office?

Resp. Negatively, if the primary intention is of giving the temporal thing gratuitously; because then the immediate comparison is made of a temporal thing with a temporal thing, namely the benevolence of the Superior. But otherwise if the spiritual thing is intended as a due recompense, not, however, as the effect of gratitude of soul. This intention, unless the opposite either is established or can be gathered from adjuncts, for example from the smallness of the gift, etc., is to be presumed to exist virtually, if another title is lacking, for example of removing an unjust vexation, etc.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it Simony to perform sacred functions principally because of a stipend, or to receive something for sacred doctrine?

Resp. to the first. Negatively, at least more probably, because the stipend is not received as the price of the sacred thing, but as something owed to the person who is occupied for the sake of the neighbor. - Lacroix and others commonly,² against some. Therefore if some inordinate affection intervenes (for there will be no fault if need or another honest cause impels one to seeking stipends of this sort), it will not be the vice of Simony, but of avarice.

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, if the instruction tends to the spiritual good of others, because it is a spiritual thing, unless nevertheless it is accepted by title of stipend or support. But otherwise if the instruction is merely temporal, for example in handing on an explanation of Sacred Letters or Theology.³

354. • Quaer. 4° Is it Simony to redeem oneself with money from unjust vexation concerning benefices, or another spiritual good, for example Sacraments, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least more probably, because liberation from vexation, which alone is directly intended, is something temporal. - Hence you can give money to your enemy if he tries through fraud to impede the collator from favoring you. - St. Alph.⁴ and others commonly. Indeed Doctors agree in the same, even if he wishes to impede by prayers alone. But you cannot give money to those who can harm or benefit by electing or presenting to a benefice or by conferring it; for to offer money to them lest they harm would be the same as to offer it so that they benefit, that is, so that they not deny consent.⁵

Quaer. 5° Is it Simony to give or accept something for entrance into Religion?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not licit to give or accept something for entrance alone; because this would be a commutation of a sacred thing, of which sort Religion is, with a temporal thing.

2° It is certain also that it is licit for a poor monastery to exact something for the support of the one entering, because then the spiritual thing is not commuted with the temporal; and otherwise equity demands that something be received, lest the monastery fall burdened by expenses.

3° It is likewise certain that it is licit for a monastery to exact something for the support of Novices, because since they do not yet pertain to Religion, and can depart at will, and often in reality do depart, it is not equitable for the monastery to undergo so grave a burden for them. Yet the Religion of Friars Minor can receive nothing from a special decree.

4° But if there is question of a wealthy monastery, it is controverted. St. Alph.¹ denies, unless the one to be received is old or infirm. Besides, now all doubt vanishes because of the difficulty of the times. For no monasteries are found so wealthily founded that they need no alien help at all for the present and the future. Besides, as is established from several decrees, Nuns always can exact the established dowry, and for choir nuns they ought to [n. 1188. II. 3)].

355. • Quaer. 6° Does a priest commit Simony who promises a Mass to a layman for the outcome of a game, while the companion puts up a temporal price?

Resp. Negatively of itself, because by this reason a spiritual thing is not properly equated with a temporal thing, just as it is not equated when Mass is said for a stipend; but only the execution of a spiritual thing is offered in place of a temporal thing which would otherwise have to be handed over. For he does not sin who offers to a creditor 100 Masses to be celebrated for him, so that he remit a debt of $100; therefore by parity neither does he sin who promises a Mass for the outcome of a game, while the other puts up $1. - Thus Voit² against others. - Besides, a game of this sort rarely lacks some scandal, and therefore must always be dissuaded from.

Quaer. 7° Does a priest commit Simony who for Mass exacts a stipend above the usual tax or one established by the Bishop?

Resp. Negatively, unless he acts with a simoniacal mind; because, since he has another title of exacting remuneration, comparison between the spiritual and the temporal is lacking. He would indeed sin against obedience or justice by exacting more than is equitable, but not at all against Religion. - Yet Voit¹ contradicts, with others, because (he says) then every just title of exacting the temporal thing is lacking.

356. • Quaer. 8° What about so-called stole fees?

Resp. 1° By common law it has been established: a) that their payment not be a condition without which sacred functions are not performed, and therefore that it not be exacted before those functions; b) that after the sacred functions to which they are annexed by diocesan law or laudable custom, they can be exacted, and indeed from justice,² except from the poor; c) that those who maliciously strive to alter laudable custom are restrained by the Bishop, not by the priest.³ - But a custom cannot be called laudable when it is forbidden by the Holy See or by the Ordinary (cf. Conc. Pl. Balt. II, p. 290, Doc. VI), or has proceeded from the exaction of priests.

Resp. 2° According to the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, it belongs to Bishops "in ... diocesan synod, or otherwise, as it shall have seemed to them in the Lord, with the counsel of priests also employed, to establish a just" manner "by which among priests dwelling together ... the alms which the faithful spontaneously confer on occasion of the administration of the Sacraments of Baptism or Matrimony are distributed, with consideration not neglected of the stronger right and the graver burdens of the pastor."¹

Moreover, in various dioceses it has been established that stole fees which proceed from functions exercised in another's parish or for the sake of another's parishioner are remitted to the proper pastor. Yet this must not be understood of offerings altogether voluntary, or of those to which the faithful are obliged neither by diocesan law nor by custom; nor even of that part of the owed offering which exceeds the tax established by law or custom; for as to that part it is altogether voluntary.

Resp. 3° As regards specifically the administration of Sacraments, on the occasion of:

a) Confirmation, if it is joined with a pastoral visitation, as is customary, "let it be ... in the choice of those who are visited whether they prefer to pay that which was previously customarily paid by them, a certain sum of money having been fixed, or rather ... to furnish provisions" to the Bishop.¹

b) Eucharist, nothing is customarily accepted.

c) Penance, confessors "should not apply pecuniary penances to themselves ... nor should they ask or accept anything from penitents as a reward of their ministry."² "Even things offered spontaneously," the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore³ warns, "under whatever name, let them refuse; nor let them allow even the Mass alms itself to be offered in this sacred tribunal."

d) Extreme Unction, nothing is accepted. "But if a priest has made a long journey for visiting them, nothing forbids that the necessary expenses of the journey be given to him; but let it be absent that they be exacted from the poor."⁴

e) Orders, "let Bishops and other collators of orders, or their ministers, accept nothing ... even spontaneously offered, under whatever pretext."⁵ Yet a Bishop conferring Orders in place of another or outside the cathedral in favor of some convent or college will be able to accept expenses of the journey.

f) Baptism and Matrimony. It is certain: 1) that nothing can be exacted where there is not diocesan law or laudable custom. But this cannot be called laudable if it had proceeded not from the piety of the faithful, but from the exaction of priests, as Canonists explain.

2. "Those things which, from the zeal of piety after baptism or matrimony has been conferred, are spontaneously offered by the faithful under the name of alms" a priest, if he wishes, can accept.⁶

Resp. 4° Around burial it has been established:

I. By common law: 1° a) For ground to be deputed to burial (for the word burial comes also in this sense), not yet blessed, something can be exacted or accepted; b) but not for ground already blessed, c) unless either custom is present, or something is offered liberally, or something is sought by reason of the location or more honorable place.

The first part of the response is clear from the fact that ground of this sort is something profane, and therefore can be sold and bought without any stain of simony; the second from L. III, Decr. T. XXVIII, c. 13; the third from the fact that the custom is not called depraved in the cited law, except in the case in which "the digging of a grave is not first permitted for the deceased before a certain price is paid to the Church for the ground in which they are to be buried"; - that a free offering is prohibited by no law; - and that location or a more honorable place is something profane, estimable by price.

2° For the act and office of burial, things spontaneously offered, as is clear of itself, can be accepted, and, where custom is in force, something can also be exacted by title of support.

3° For the burial of the poor, whether as to place or act, nothing can be exacted by pastors.¹

II. By our law, or by the statutes of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore,² the price paid for a place of burial is to be employed for preserving, restoring, and adorning cemeteries, and, if anything remains, for promoting works of charity or religion by the judgment of the Ordinary. "But we strictly forbid," say the Fathers, "that ever, under whatever pretext, without permission of the Ordinary, ecclesiastical men dare to make their own the monies which are derived from cemeteries; but if they shall have attempted this, let them be punished with most severe penalties."

"Where there is custom," says De Angelis,³ "it is admitted ... that for a common place in a cemetery a tax be paid, which is called of burial; and the reason for paying this tax is a partial reintegration of the sum expended for the building of the cemetery, and of the expenses which are made for the preservation and custody of the same place; just as here at Rome there is also such a tax, and it is noted in the said Statutes of the Clergy, chap. 6" (the Statutes of the Roman Clergy are denoted). "But for the poor, burial ought to be gratuitous; and what is rightly reprehended in these exactions is the vexatious mode by which they are made, so that permission for burial is not given unless the sum of money has been paid; ... concerning which last case, as Doctors observe, the disposition of Chap. 13, h. t."⁴ is to be understood. See this above under 1°.

357. You will resolve. - 1° He does not commit Simony who exchanges Relics with Relics;¹ because thus the spiritual is not given for the temporal. The same must be said of other sacred things, if you except benefices, whose exchange, lest it be done by proper authority, is prohibited by the Church.

2° He does not commit Simony who sells blessed wax, rosaries, crosses, or medals to which indulgences are annexed, or sacred Relics enclosed in precious cases, or other similar things; because these are not sold by reason of the sacred thing, but by reason of the price of the temporal thing annexed; but otherwise if, because of the sacred thing itself, these were sold for a greater price. It must be observed besides that by several decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences it has been forbidden that blessed rosaries, crosses, or medals be exposed for sale.¹

3° He does not commit Simony who pays money to a heretical prince, lest he be impeded from entrance to the Church or from frequenting religious assemblies of Catholics; or to a malevolent man, lest he be unjustly defamed by him and barred from a benefice to which he has or can have a right. The reason is that in this way the temporal thing is not given for a spiritual right, but for removing or impeding injury, which is something temporal.

4° Those are not to be accused of Simony who serve gratuitously or for an inadequate wage, so that by this occasion they may demonstrate their probity or dexterity with hope of sometimes obtaining some benefice; because they do not expect that spiritual thing as the price of their labors. - Elbel.²

5° Nor are those culpable of Simony who from gratitude furnish a temporal thing for a spiritual thing received, and vice versa. Thus a Chaplain would not sin who more gladly furnished services to a Bishop from whom he obtained a benefice, nor a Bishop who conferred a benefice on a Cleric in recognition of services; because these are not furnished as a price. Besides, it is honorable and laudable to show oneself grateful for an accepted service. Yet one must carefully beware lest disguised Simony lie hidden under the title of gratitude; but this would happen where there intervened an implicit pact of giving a benefice for temporal service, or vice versa.³

6° But it would be Simony to perform sacred ministries precisely because of the price to be received as such, for example to accept money for absolution from sins, from censures, or for dispensation in a vow, oath, irregularity, and matrimonial impediments. The reason is that it is a spiritual act both by reason of the principle or spiritual power and by reason of the end or salvation of souls. Yet money is licitly accepted on occasion of dispensations, especially when another just cause is not present, by title namely of commutation or alms, or of support of the burdens of the Pontificate, for coming to the aid of the necessities of the Church, for example of Temples, Missions, etc., or for other pious uses, for example for relieving the poor, for endowing hospitals, for the expenses of tribunals by which dispensations are granted, etc. For a suitable stipend must be assigned to the various officials or ministers employed for expediting causes.

358. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Must the spiritual thing acquired simoniacally be restored?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, as to benefices; thus the common and certain opinion of Doctors. The reason is that laws, as a punishment for the delict, stand in the way, so that the one receiving can acquire dominion of neither the price nor the benefice. And since the acquisition of the benefice is invalid, by that very fact dominion of the fruits cannot be acquired; and therefore these also must be restored.

Resp. 2° Negatively, as to the rest, although the judge can enjoin restitution as a penalty of the crime. Thus the common opinion with Schmalzgrueber.¹ The reason is not only because certain things cannot be restored, for example Sacred Order, but also because for the transfer of a spiritual thing to be valid by divine law, for example of most holy Relics, nothing more is required than the power of transferring in the one and of receiving dominion of the thing in the other; but, unless there is some defect from elsewhere in either, this power is present in both as to a spiritual thing. Therefore. But if the transfer is valid by divine law, it will also be valid by human law, since by this law simoniacal provisions alone of benefices, almost only, are decreed invalid.

Quaer. 2° Must the price accepted simoniacally for a spiritual thing be restored?

Resp. 1° If only the crime of simony intervened, but no injury of justice, there is no obligation of restoring the simoniacal price before a condemnatory sentence of a judge, unless the price itself exceeds the estimation of the temporal advantage which is transferred with the spiritual thing to another. Thus Suarez, Lessius, Laymann, Reiffenstuel apud Schmalzgr.¹

Resp. 2° But where the simoniacal pact is also opposed to commutative justice, the price must be restored before every sentence of a judge. Thus the common opinion. The reason is that, from the injury of commutative justice, the obligation of restoring arises by the very law of nature.

Quaer. 3° To whom must the simoniacal price be restored?

Resp. 1° If the price has been given, but the spiritual thing has not yet been handed over, the common opinion teaches that the price must be restored to him who gave it, unless the judge shall have decreed otherwise. The reason is that laws establish vindicatory penalties only against real simony.

Resp. 2° But if the handing over has followed on both sides, before sentence it can probably be restored either to the giver, or to the church, or to the poor.²

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.¹

By this precept there is prohibited any irreverence toward God, whether by the vain usurpation of His Most Holy Name, or by blasphemy, or by an oath or vow either illicit or violated.

359. • The Most Holy Name of God is said to be usurped in vain when it is taken without a reasonable cause, or without due reverence. But this is wont to be done especially in a threefold manner, namely:

1° From impatience, or indignation, against creatures even inanimate, or against oneself, for example: My God! Good God! how badly this matter proceeds! My God! how foolish I am!...

2° From admiration, by way of exclamation. Thus it is said: Jesus, Mary! O God! My God!

3° Superfluously, generally from a mere formula, or from levity, or from a certain custom. Thus it is said: My God, indeed,... it is so, or it is not so.

360. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is the vain usurpation of the name of God always a sin, and how great?

Resp. 1° Of itself it is a sin, because it injures the reverence due to the divine name. It is established moreover from Ecclesiasticus:² Let not the naming of God be continual in thy mouth.

Resp. 2° Of itself it is only a venial sin, because that reverence is not gravely injured. But it can become mortal because of formal contempt of God or grave anger against Him, because then it is judged to participate in the nature of blasphemy.

Resp. 3° Although fault is often absent because of inadvertence, yet they are not to be excused who, without any sense of reverence, from custom always have the Most Holy Name of God in their mouth. - On the other hand, if the Most Holy Name of God is usurped with due reverence, even in indifferent matters, not only will sin be absent, but, where it is thus usurped by way of invocation, it will be a good and meritorious work. For the rest, they will more easily be excused from sin who usurp the Most Holy Name of God by way of admiration or interjection, because then irreverence is more easily absent.

Quaer. 2° Is it a sin to usurp uselessly the names of the Saints?

Resp. Affirmatively. For what is said concerning the Most Holy Name of God must, proportion observed, also be said concerning the names of the Saints, as is established from the cited place of Ecclesiasticus, where it is added: And meddle not with the names of Saints. The same also must be said concerning the vain usurpation of the words of Sacred Scripture, when they are taken irreverently. Council of Trent, session 4.

Quaer. 3° Is the assiduous and useless usurpation of the name of the demon a sin?

Resp. Negatively, of itself. Yet it is to be reproved as less becoming in the mouth of Christians, especially of priests, who by reason of scandal sometimes are not free from mortal fault. - Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus,¹ Bouvier, etc.

361. Definition. - Blasphemy is speech injurious to God. Speech, however, can be done not only by explicit word, but in some sense also by mind and by deed. Yet if there is question of reservation or of other penalties inflicted on blasphemy, only oral blasphemy is properly understood.

Division. Blasphemy is distinguished first:

1° Direct, or indirect, according as dishonor of God is either directly and formally intended by the blasphemer, or, although not intended, yet in his sayings or gestures some contumely against God is contained. Direct blasphemy, since ordinarily it has hatred of God joined with it, differs in species from indirect blasphemy, which is uttered from anger against men or creatures.¹

2° Immediate, or mediate, according as it affects God Himself immediately, or only mediately, namely by dishonoring the Saints or sacred things in words. They do not differ in species.

3° Heretical, imprecatory, and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere contumely; these differ in species, since the heretical is also opposed to faith, and the imprecatory also to charity.

Principles. - I. Any formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether direct or indirect, whether immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason is that any contumely against God is a grave injury inflicted on the divine Majesty. - Yet it can become venial from imperfection of the act, namely from defect of advertence or of perfect consent.

II. For perfect blasphemy, by reason of the act, an express and explicit intention of dishonoring God is not necessary, but an implicit one suffices, namely when someone with advertence utters those things which contain true contumely against God, even from jest or from anger against creatures. The reason is that from these there follows grave dishonor of God, although indirect; for grave irreverence is committed against God when words contumelious to Him are employed for jest, or for expressing anger. - Reuter.² Except, unless the jest takes away every manner of irreverence toward God.

III. Words are to be held blasphemous of themselves which, from common apprehension, which has already attributed a determined sense to the words,³ or from a derisive or angry manner of speaking, or other circumstances, contain dishonor of God.

362. You will resolve. - 1° It is blasphemy to say: May the death, or blood of God destroy you; may the Sacraments destroy you. Likewise to spit toward heaven, to gnash the teeth against it, to say that one wishes to do something against God's will, and similar things.

2° It is blasphemy to say: God has wholly forgotten me. Why did God create me? - Yet except if these things are uttered in a human manner of speaking, from levity, or to show the gravity of pain or weariness, as is often wont to happen. But they are never to be excused from grave sin who advertently and seriously say: God is unjust. - God unjustly burdens me with tribulations. - He unjustly permits the wicked to be happy in the world. - Voit.

3° Ordinarily they are to be judged to have sinned gravely who, carried away by anger or some passion, uttered words of blasphemy; nor is their excuse to be admitted that they did not attend to the signification of the words, because ordinarily there was not lacking some advertence, at least confused, concerning the malice of blasphemy. The same is to be resolved concerning the habituated, excepting nevertheless those who, from an inveterate custom of blaspheming already retracted, break out indeliberately into words of this sort.²

4° He does not sin gravely who pronounces words indeed blasphemous in themselves, but halved or corrupted, so that he does not attend to the true sense; for these no longer have the nature of blasphemy. - St. Alphonsus,³ Bouvier.⁴

363. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it blasphemy to curse creatures?

Resp. Distinguish: it is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example rain, winds, as commanded by God, or with the word God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example our soul, the Catholic Faith, heaven, and the like. But otherwise, as almost happens, if the indignation is borne against creatures without relation to God. - Thus commonly.⁵ Hence:

Quaer. 2° Are the imprecations in English to be judged blasphemous: 1° "GOD DAMN ME or YOU"; 2° "GOD DAMN MY or YOUR SOUL"; 3° "GOD DAMN MY or YOUR SOUL TO HELL"?

The first formula seems scarcely, or hardly at all, able to be proved blasphemous; for the pronoun me or you, as is plain of itself, denotes the soul neither etymologically nor from common apprehension, at least among our people. Kenrick⁶ excuses it in practice from mortal sin, as for the most part containing nothing other than a merely material imprecation.

The second, considering the principles applied by St. Alphonsus to cursing the dead, seems blasphemous, and therefore of itself mortal, although in the genus of cursing or material imprecation it would be. For the Holy Doctor denies that cursing the dead is blasphemous also for this reason, that it is not referred to the soul; but in the second and third formula the soul is named in express words.

Quaer. 3° Is it blasphemy to curse the whole world?

Resp. Affirmatively, because just as to swear by creatures in which the divine attributes shine forth more is a true oath, so to curse those same things is true blasphemy, because in them God is indirectly contemned.²

364. • Quaer. 4° Is it blasphemy to curse the dead?

Resp. Negatively, unless the mind is specifically borne toward the souls of purgatory, because the dead in general do not have a special relation with God.²

365. • Definition. An oath is an invocation of the divine Name in testimony of truth.

Division. An oath is distinguished:

1° Assertory, by which present or past things are affirmed or denied, or promissory, which extends itself only to future things. Although not every oath concerning the future is promissory. For a twofold oath concerning the future is distinguished by Doctors: one bare and simple, which contains no promise toward another, for example if you swear that you will not enter this house or tavern, etc.; but another is promissory, which is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion.

2° Solemn, or simple, according as it is done in the form required by law, or with solemn ceremonies, or with these excluded.

3° Explicit, or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed as testimony in which the divine attributes especially shine forth.

4° Contestatory, or execratory or imprecatory, according as God is invoked as witness alone, or as witness and at the same time avenger of perjury.

Yet according to the common opinion all oaths are of the same species.¹

An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and licit, and, if it is promissory, obligates in conscience, unless a just cause stands in the way, or its obligation has legitimately ceased. - Thus all;² and it is established both from the definition of the Council of Constance, session 8, against Wycliffe (p. IX), and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, and also from various places of Sacred Scripture. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God... and shalt swear by His name.³

The obligation of swearing presses as often as an oath is either necessary for helping one's neighbor, or is legitimately exacted by a Superior.

I. On the requisites for the essence of an oath. - 366. - Two things are required for an oath, namely: 1° The intention of swearing, at least virtual; because without such intention there cannot exist a formal oath. 2° An oath-formula, either by God explicitly, or implicitly by creatures, or an oath-sign; because, since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath.⁴

367. You will resolve. - 1° A fictitious promissory oath, or one merely external, is not valid, because of defect of will or intention. Yet he who thus swears sins; but more probably, speaking of itself, only venially, because it is nothing but a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God.⁵ - Nevertheless it is mortal in contracts, or before a judge (because of grave deception against justice), or if the one swearing fictitiously does not have the mind of fulfilling the promises.⁶

2° An oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from religion, more probably is not valid, because this is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid.

3° It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness.... Let God be witness to me.... I invoke God as witness. Otherwise, if someone swore by creatures in which the divine goodness or power does not shine forth, for example by a beard, etc.¹

4° It is not an oath to say: God knows.... I speak before God, etc.... if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists,... as I exist,... as I am in this place,... on the faith of an honest man (upon my word and honor), by my faith,... by my conscience,... by priestly faith,... may I die, or may the devil destroy me, unless it be so.... Except when these last two are uttered by way of execration, and not rather, as is customary, by way of pledge. Indeed it is not even an oath to say: I swear or I swear that it is so, unless a question about giving an oath has preceded. - St. Alphonsus,² and many others.

II. On the requisites for the liceity of an oath.

368. • A threefold condition is required for the liceity of an oath according to that saying of Jeremiah:¹ Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.

I. Therefore Truth is required, that is: conformity of the assertion with intention and not with the fact. For an oath excludes only lying, not every error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath the existence of the intention.

II. Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a just cause.

III. Justice, that is, that the oath be about a just, licit, and honorable thing. Thus he would swear against justice who by oath would obligate himself to inflict damage unjustly on his neighbor, or to furnish something else prohibited.

369. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What is a sufficient cause for swearing?

Resp. Any honorable cause of some weight, for example peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc.¹

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to swear with probability of truth?

Resp. Negatively, because God cannot be invoked except in testimony of a certain thing; nevertheless a certain moral certainty, or sole probability, suffices.²

Quaer. 3° Is it licit to swear with mental restriction?

Resp. Negatively, if it is purely mental; but otherwise, if it is broadly mental, and a just cause is present, which nevertheless ought to be greater than that which is required for an unsworn restriction, and greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring.⁴ See what is to be said n. 513-515.

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to swear, touching and kissing Protestant Bibles, when they have been presented to us by magistrates?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, as is plain; hence one about to swear is accustomed to bring Catholic Bibles or a prayerbook in which some part of Sacred Scripture is contained. For the rest, solemn affirmation among us suffices. I said: Negatively, of itself, because ignorance often excuses. Collect. p. 630 n. 1180.

Quaer. 5° Is it licit to give an oath in public disturbances of the commonwealth?

Resp. This generally depends on the circumstances. Weigh what justice or the common good postulates, and what the obligations required by the oath are, whether positive or negative. - But especially it is expedient to consult ecclesiastical Superiors, to whom it belongs to define what, according to the various circumstances, is to be done.

370. • Quaer. 6° What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, judgment, and justice?

Resp. to the first. It is mortal, because to bring God forward in testimony of falsity is to will to destroy His veracity. It is established also from Proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI (see p. XV). L. IV. 147.

Resp. to the second. It is venial of itself, that is, with the danger of perjury excluded;⁵ because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. - Thus almost all, even the stricter authors.

Resp. to the third. An assertory oath must be distinguished from a promissory one. In the former, for instance if someone boasts with an oath about some sin, more probably there is only a venial sin against religion, because it is not done to confirm complacency in sin, but only to make others more certain about it, which is only a certain venial levity of soul. Except, however, an oath for confirming detraction; for it is employed as a means for making another's infamy more certain. In the latter oath it is certainly mortal, if there is question of a grave matter, as is plain; if of a light matter, St. Alphonsus¹ is more pleased by the opinion which affirms that even in this case one sins mortally, because it seems to be a grave irreverence to invoke God as witness and surety of sin, even light sin.

You will resolve. - 1° Among prohibited oaths are listed those which are customarily emitted in secret societies, and by which members obligate themselves to obey those things which perhaps will be ordered by certain superiors, or to keep secrecy even against legitimate power.² See n. 1721. 1°. d).

Yet there are certain societies of workers in which an oath is emitted, or is judged to be emitted, with a restriction, that it is licit to reveal its object to the Ordinary or to a priest; and these, indeed, if the oath contains nothing else which is opposed to justice, and the society is not illicit from elsewhere, are not to be disturbed. See n. 1721. 1).

2° The oath of preserving the Constitution of the United States is to be understood in the popular sense, which, namely, is received among all; for each person is not judged to embrace with judgment of mind whatever is contained in it, nor does the Constitution obligate to this.³ Nor is a law to be called evil, but good, which permits a lesser evil that it may prevent a greater one. Moulart, L'Eglise et L'Etat.

3° The oath of foreigners seeking the right of citizenship here is licit, even for him who shall have given an oath of fidelity to the prince from whom he departed. For that oath of fidelity was exacted for confirming the natural obligation of citizens, rather than for inducing a new one, and therefore it must be explained according to the nature of that obligation, by which no one, unless a public and grave cause presses, is bound to remain in his fatherland, and which he satisfies who obeys the prince while he dwells in his domain. But as regards the oath which is given here by foreigners seeking the right of citizenship, and by which every foreign prince is abjured, and consequently also that one from whom someone departed, it is understood of that natural obligation being abjured which, by departing from his domain, has already ceased; and therefore it cannot be called illicit.

4° He who, while war is raging among some nations, brings goods under a neutral flag and documents either fictitious or purposely made into a neutral port, so that thence they may be carried to one or the other of the nations which wage war between themselves, is sometimes compelled to swear that the documents are true. Such an oath cannot be given in the case. (o) p. 473.

371. Principles. - I. Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of justice or fidelity which arises from a simple promise, also induces an obligation of Religion. The reason is that the promise already obligates of itself, and it is confirmed and strengthened by divine testimony invoked. - But an oath concerning an illicit or wholly useless thing does not obligate at all, because an oath, as an act of Religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing.

II. The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly, and follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, and all its conditions. The reason for the first is that the one swearing is judged to have willed to obligate himself as little as he could; but the reason for the other is that the oath does not change the nature of the act, but adds to it only the obligation of Religion, and hence ought to have the same conditions and limitations.

III. The obligation of an oath is moreover to be interpreted according to the tacit conditions included or understood in it, which are: 1° if I shall be able without grave damage; 2° if the matter shall not have been notably changed; 3° if the rights or will of the Superior do not stand in the way; 4° if the other shall have preserved reciprocal faith; 5° unless the other cedes from his right.¹

S. Th. II-II, q. 13.

781. Blasphemy (blapto, I injure; pheme, fame), etymologically signifies malediction and insult against someone (I Cor. IV, 13), and therefore is used to signify derogation from some excellent goodness; but in the sense of the holy Fathers and Theologians, only speech insulting to God is so called. It is said:

1. Speech or signification, and thus it is distinguished from infidelity, which is a judgment, and from sacrilege (and simony), which is an unworthy treatment of a sacred thing. Moreover, utterance happens in various modes, and therefore on the part of the act, blasphemy is internal, of the heart (by a nod, as among demons), and external, which is either of the mouth, when it is done by spoken or written words, or of work, when it is done by sign, deed, or gesture, as if someone gnashes his teeth against God, spits toward heaven, tramples Christ, sacred images, crucifixes, casts blood toward heaven, etc. Hence sacrilege is also blasphemy, if in the deed of violation of the sacred thing there is at the same time signification, or a certain real speech against God.

2. Against God, and thus it is distinguished from insult and malediction against one's neighbor and against other creatures. Blasphemy, namely, is an act against faith, religion, and God, either in himself, or through creatures, insofar as they express an order to God: "for just as God is praised in his saints insofar as the works which God effects in the saints are praised, so also blasphemy which is done against the saints consequently redounds against God" (a. 1, ad 2). Hence on the part of the object or term, blasphemy is immediate or mediate.

3. Insulting, by which, namely, something is detracted from the excellence or honor of the divine majesty, and thus it is distinguished from perjury, which is speech invocative of divine testimony. But since God is present everywhere, every speech against him is an insult; hence blasphemy can also be diverse according to the diverse mode by which insult is inflicted, as we are now to explain.

782. Diverse modes of blaspheming. - Therefore, on the part of the mode by which insult is inflicted, blasphemy can be enunciative, dishonoring, or imprecative.

1. Enunciative blasphemy happens:

a) by affirming of God what does not belong to him, for example, that he is unjust, the author of evils, cruel, that he punishes unjustly, has forgotten me, is a tyrant, etc.;

b) by denying to God what belongs to him, such as omnipotence, providence, justice, knowledge, for example, by saying that not all things are well ordered but could have been done better in creation, that God does not will or cannot help us, does not care for our affairs, that one will do something against God's will ("whether God wills or does not will, I will do this"), by denying God or the sacraments, etc.;

c) by ascribing to creatures what is proper to God alone: for since everything proper to God is God, by this very fact God is said to be a creature and that which is proper to him is denied, for example, by saying: I can do this as well as God; by seriously calling a mistress a goddess, one's whole and only good, one's beatitude; by swearing by false gods; by calling the devil holy, omnipotent, more faithful, more powerful (a. 1, ad 3).

But if something contrary to faith is affirmed, or something pertaining to faith is denied, the blasphemy is heretical.

2. Dishonoring blasphemy happens:

a) by affirming or denying something of God with truth, but in an insulting mode through contempt or mockery, for example, by reproaching Christ because he suffered and died, by naming his shameful members, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean," "Hail, king of the Jews," "Vah, thou who destroyest the temple of God"; or by cursing through all these things, for example, "may the blood, wounds, death, head, passion, sacraments, chrism of Christ destroy thee"; or by bringing Scripture to foul things: for all those things were instituted not for destroying but for saving;

b) not by affirming, but by naming holy things shamefully and contemptuously, that is, from anger, not indeed against creatures, but against God or religion, after the mode of one being indignant at them or contemning them, for example, "God!"; the name of God, the members, blood of Christ; the sacraments, the saints; "vah! the power of God"; to swear mockingly by the members of Christ; "I despise God with my whole heart," etc.

3. Imprecative blasphemy is when evil is wished or cursed upon God, or even commanded, for example, that he perish, not exist, die, be damned, not punish sins, not be omnipotent; "to the contempt of God!"; "may it displease God!" If such a thing is done from the soul, it proceeds from hatred of God and is the blasphemy of the damned and of the worst men.

All the aforesaid modes are reduced to the two former: falsely to affirm or deny concerning God. For dishonoring blasphemy implicitly says that there is in God something blameworthy which is not blameworthy, or denies that something is worthy which is worthy. Imprecative blasphemy implicitly affirms of God that something is possible which cannot be, or that something is fitting which is not fitting.

783. The diverse intention of the blasphemer. - On the part of intention, blasphemy is direct or perfect, which is done with affective detestation or the express intention of dishonoring God, and proceeds from hatred of God, from anger and indignation against God (and religion), from contempt, etc.; and indirect, which is done without an express but with an implicit intention of dishonoring God, when someone voluntarily utters words which, according to the judgment of his intellect, he knows, either from their proper signification, or from the mode of uttering them or other circumstances, to imply dishonor of God (a. 1). Hence if someone from custom, from anger against creatures, from jest, after the manner of an interjection, pronounces blasphemous words, he commits the sin of blasphemy; except if it happens from jest that the words are not held by others as blasphemous, or if they are uttered merely narratively.

784. Blasphemy is a sin at the same time against faith and religion. - For:

a) It is opposed to the confession of faith: for either it is heretical and explicitly says something against faith; or at least it says implicitly that God or a sacred thing is blameworthy, or that in God there is something worthy of insult. Namely, someone can sin against confession of faith even by stating nothing against faith, namely, by signifying by his mode of speaking that he does not believe, or by speaking as if he did not believe.¹

¹ Cf. Lumbreras, in Angelicum, 1937.

b) It is also directly opposed to the honor and praise which are owed to God, and thus contains dishonor and irreverence against the virtue of religion.

Hence all blasphemies, even heretical ones, do not differ in species under the aspect of blasphemy; but sometimes other species are added, such as heresy, hatred of God, despair, which then must be declared in confession.

But if the speech is insulting against creatures, if they are considered formally with relation to God, insofar as they are his creatures, as easily happens for wind, rain, thunder, heaven, the whole world (for example, "cursed be the rain of God"...), and almost always for those things which per se express relation to God, such as Christian faith, the sacraments, the saints, our soul, etc., the insult necessarily redounds against God, their author. Indeed, since blasphemers generally do not intend to affect those things with injury on account of their own excellence, but only mediately insofar as they are referred to God, there is not a sin against dulia, but against religion and faith alone. - But if the saints were considered not as saints, but in themselves, formally abstracting from relation to God, insofar as they are men, it would be a sin against dulia alone owed to the saints, light if it is done from jest (for example, by calling St. Crispin a vile shoemaker, St. Peter bald, Saints John and Paul eunuchs), grave if it proceeded from anger, indignation, contempt, or hatred against them.

To curse other creatures considered in themselves, if they are rational, is injurious to them; if irrational, it is vain and idle. To curse the devil is not evil, except sometimes per accidens by reason of scandal.

785. Blasphemy is a mortal sin from its whole genus: for no insult against God can be small (Lev. XXIV, 15-16; Is. XXXVI; IV Kings XVIII, XIX; Tob. I, 21; II Mach. XV; I Tim. I, 20; Col. III, 8).

Indeed it is called most grave, in an absolute sense, that is, very grave; taken abstractly insofar as it is opposed to religion alone and implies only the dishonor of God, it is less grave than hatred of God, infidelity, despair, and idolatry; but graver than perjury (which affirms nothing false against God, but only makes him a witness of falsity) and than homicide (which is only against one's neighbor). But if it is considered in the concrete, it supposes and includes the malice of infidelity or hatred of God and adds something to them, and thus it is graver than they, so that the greatest blasphemy is graver than the greatest infidelity or the greatest hatred of God.

Therefore, on the part of the object, only idolatry surpasses it, which otherwise contains great blasphemy.

On the part of the sinner, however, it is often graver than idolatry.

On the part of the effect, it is less than homicide: for homicide harms man more than blasphemy harms God.

786. A voluntary custom or habit of blaspheming is evil because it proximately inclines to sin; hence there is an obligation of removing it, and he sins gravely who voluntarily acquires such a habit or neglects to eliminate it. He sins internally and as to affection as often as, noticing the obligation of retracting the habit, he does not retract it; externally and as to effect as often as, from habit, he utters sufficiently foreseen blasphemies by morally distinct acts.

He who blasphemes from custom:

a) either utters blasphemous words advertently, and then the blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in itself;

b) or he does not attend to the words uttered, and then the speech which externally sounds like blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in its cause, namely, the custom, as was said;

c) but if he has efficaciously retracted the custom, it is neither voluntary in the cause, nor a sin.

The custom is retracted by a will by which someone grieves over it and proposes to himself to employ means for removing it (which, on account of usefulness, should be renewed several times); but if after the resolution he has not employed the means, the custom again becomes indirectly voluntary for him, because he shows that he does not will to remove it.

787. Practical rules. - 1. Formulas are not blasphemous which by their proper signification can be insulting against God, but are either greatly changed or corrupted, or halved or defective, or at least are not held by men as blasphemous. Such are the expressions: merdie, mordie, lardie, jarnidie, sernidie, ventredie, sacredjen, non de domme, verdomd, podverdomme, sacre non, sakristi, sapristi, sangbleu, morbleu, non di hu, non de djouw, godvernondedomme, godvernondedju, saterment.

2. On the contrary, formulas are blasphemous which of themselves, by proper signification, do not contain insult against God, but either from the mode of uttering the name of God ironically or with contempt or in anger against God; or even from common acceptance are held as such. Such formerly was the Flemish expression G. v. D., which signifies according to some: "God damn," according to others: "God damn me" (which is a mortal imprecation if said seriously, venial if said with levity, as ordinarily happens), whose true signification it is necessary to teach the non-blaspheming people by mandate of the Bishops of Belgium (October 1903).

3. Equivocal formulas which can have a blasphemous and a non-blasphemous sense are blasphemous or not according to the intention of the speaker or at least of the hearers, for example, mort-Dieu, ventre-Dieu, hoc est a fato destinatum, c'est fatalite, het is alzoo dat het moest zijn. Hence they are not blasphemous if they are generally not held as such by men, for example, in Belgium: tausend sakrament, tausend Herr Gott, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, milliard de nom de Dieu, sacre mille Dieu.

4. In doubt whether a formula is blasphemous, one must attend to the intention and conscience of the one uttering it, and to the circumstances.

5. The French formula S. N. de D. (S. D.) of itself is equivocal, because the word sacre has a double sense: in its primary and obvious sense it indeed signifies "blessed"; but in a secondary signification by antiphrasis it can signify "cursed" or "execrable," as happens in interjections and formulas: sacree bete, sacre coquin, menteur, bougre, matin, sacre cure, sacre fils, sacree pluie. Hence the formula S. N. de D. can have a pious sense, and a blasphemous sense, which sense it in fact has if it is pronounced from anger or indignation, not indeed against creatures, but against God. Originally it seems to have been promissory: "I swear by the sacred name of God." But that sense is no longer perceived by all; indeed by some the formula is taken in a blasphemous sense, whether they hold it as signifying: "execrable be the name of God," or themselves attribute to it no determined sense but in a confused way conceive it as a great blasphemy; which also often happens concerning the formula S. D., although for this one the persuasion is less firm. Yet this estimation does not exist by right and is not correct, since these formulas can have a good sense.

Wherefore in practice preachers and confessors should teach: a) that the blasphemous sense is not the only and sole necessary sense, and especially that it is not: "God is cursed"; b) that the formula is not blasphemous if it is not uttered from an evil intention, or from anger and indignation against God, but only after the manner of a simple interjection or from anger against creatures; c) that nevertheless one must abstain from it, both because it includes venial irreverence toward God, and lest there be scandal to others.

I. At the threshold of this treatment, let it be pleasing to write out the words which Saint Alphonsus there brings forward, n. 415: "Now with difficulty we undertake to treat that matter whose very name alone infects the minds of men. Let the chaste reader, I ask, pardon me if he finds here several questions and circumstances, omitted by others, discussed and explained: would that I had been able to explain myself more briefly or more obscurely. But since this is the more frequent and more abundant matter of confessions, and that because of which the greater number of souls slip down into hell, hence it was necessary for me, for the instruction of those who desire to learn moral science, to explain myself clearly, although as chastely as could be done, and to discuss very many particulars. Yet I beg students who are preparing themselves for the office of hearing confessions to read this treatise for this end alone, casting away every curiosity altogether; and at that time often to lift their mind to God and commend themselves to the Immaculate Virgin, lest, while they strive to gain the souls of others for God, they themselves suffer the loss of their own."

II. But since the aforesaid matter cannot be sufficiently understood unless entirely accurate physiological notions are present concerning the organs and actions that serve generation, from the natural sciences we here briefly add a general description of them, without, however, descending into the minutiae of things: avoiding a useless abundance which is apt to beget confusion together with dangerous curiosity, so that we may say neither more nor less than is necessary for knowing the whole matter perfectly.

Accordingly, the special questions to be treated are:

1. Physiological notions concerning the genital organs and generation;
2. Concerning chastity and lust in general;
3. Concerning consummated lust according to nature;
4. Concerning consummated lust against nature;
5. Concerning immodesty, or imperfect lust;
6. Concerning internal lust;
7. Concerning the causes and remedies of lust;
8. Concerning spouses in the use of marriage.

III. Concerning the present matter the following may usefully be consulted:

1. All scientific works of anatomy or physiology, among which the following may be regarded as more widely known among the clergy: Vivat, Woordenboek (under the words: Geslachtsorganen, Ei, Eierstokken, Embryo, Bevruchting, Zaad); and Dr. Vigouroux, Traite de Medecine pratique, vol. IV.

2. Among theological works: Saint Thomas, II-II, q. 151-154 and Supplement, q. 42, art. 3; q. 49, art. 4-6; q. 64; with the commentaries of Cajetan, Sylvius, and Billuart (On Temperance; On Marriage); Lessius, On Justice and Right and the Other Cardinal Virtues; P. Ledesma, On the Great Sacrament of Marriage; Th. Sanchez, On the Holy Sacrament of Marriage; Saint Alphonsus, Moral Theology; Bouvier, Moral Theology; On the Sixth and Ninth Precepts; Berardi, Practice of Confessors; Aertnijs, Fascicle of Moral Theology: On the Use of Marriage; Noldin, On the Sixth Precept and the Use of Marriage; Tanquerey, Moral Theology (appendix On Chastity, supplement On Marriage); Ill. Waffelaert, On the Cardinal Virtues; De Smet, On Betrothals and Marriage; and Collationes Brugenses, vol. V, VI, and VII; Em. Van Roey, Special Question concerning the Sixth Precept of the Decalogue; Wouters, On the Virtue of Chastity and the Opposed Vices.

3. Among works at once anatomical and theological: De Breyne, Moechialogie; Moral Theology in Its Relations with Physiology and Medicine; Van Olfers, Pastoral Medicine; Capellmann, Pastoral Medicine; Latin translation, Pastoral Medicine, of which a new edition was made through the care of Drs. Bergmann; Eschbach, Physiological-Theological Disputations; Antonelli, Pastoral Medicine; Surbled, Morality in Its Relations with Medicine and Hygiene; The Hygiene of Marriage; Gemelli, Thou Shalt Not Commit Adultery; On the Definition of the Concept "Impotence of Coeundi" under the Aspect of Pastoral Medicine; Salsmans, Medical Deontology; Vermeersch, On Chastity; Schim van der Loeff, The Reproductive Life of Man, together with W. J. Duynstee, The Doctrine of Chastity.

I. The principal genital organs of the man are:

A. External: 1. The two testicles (teelballen, zaadklieren, seminal glands): they are two glands, or "two ovoid little bodies which, hidden within their covering or scrotum (balzak, bourse), protrude beneath the lower body and hang outside the trunk. They have obtained their name testes because they bear witness to virility."¹ In the testicles the zoosperms (spermatozoides, levenskiemen, zaaddraden) are elaborated, which seem to consist, as it were, of a head and a tail and to move after the manner of animals; nevertheless they are not regarded as animals, but merely as cells, because no sensitive life has thus far been discerned in them.² These are the masculine element essential to generation. They are mixed in a fluid which is produced from the same testicles and which can be ejaculated together with the zoosperms. But in order that it may be ejaculated and flow more easily, in its passage there is mixed with it a fluid which is secreted from various interior glands: thus a mixed liquid of white color and oily odor is obtained, perfectly suited for ejaculation. Such ejaculation is called pollution. The fluid elaborated by the testicles is called semen or sperm. When the semen is mixed with zoosperms, it is perfect semen, apt for generation: the zoosperms are the essential element of the semen.³

¹ Eschbach, cited work, diss. I, ch. 2, art. 2.

² They are about 50/1000 millimeters in length: the head has 5/1000 millimeters; the segment or body 6/1000, and the tail 40/1000 millimeters.

³ Not only spermata are produced by these testicles, but they are at the same time sources of internal secretion, which is mixed with the blood, and to which are attributed the signs of virility (beard, hair in the pubic region, masculine voice) and the power of nourishing sensual appetite. Vermeersch, De Castitate, n. 7.

2. The virile member, or rod (roede, verge: ordinarily about 9 cm. long in repose, about 15 cm. in erection): it is the organ destined for intromission into the genital organ of the woman and for depositing the semen there; beneath it is the urethra, or canal, which emits both sperm and urine.⁴ When it is filled with blood, the virile member is erected; and then, before the expulsion of semen, there is customarily produced and slightly emitted, from the glands which flow into the virile member, a thinner fluid. This effusion is called distillation by theologians.⁵ The extreme part of the member is occupied by the glans (eikel, gland), very excitable, which is covered by the prepuce (voorhuid), the extreme little skin of which the Jews used to cut away: this glans is the principal seat of venereal pleasure.

⁴ "Yet not in such a way that they are mixed. For, while the erection of the rod and the ardor of ejaculation continue, the urinary bladder, on account of the contraction of the smooth muscle of the urethra, is so closed that urine cannot go forth from the urinary bladder and be mixed with the sperm." Piscetta and Gennaro, Elementa Theologiae moralis, VII, p. 5.

⁵ In men, therefore, theologians distinguish pollution and distillation, because there is a twofold emission of diverse nature. The first is of the fluid mixed with zoosperms, thicker and denser. "In pollution the effusion of humor is more copious and joined with a great commotion and pleasure of the genitals; in distillation, on the contrary, the effusion of humor is often slight and occurs almost drop by drop, and ordinarily with only a slight commotion and pleasure, or scarcely any that is perceived." Noldin, cited work, n. 40. This humor, moreover, is of a thinner nature and without special color or odor.

B. Internal: 1. The two deferent canals (vasa deferentia, zaadleiders, 40-50 cm. long), which have their beginning from the testicles and, by a long circuit, flow into the urethra as ejaculatory canals.

2. The two seminal vesicles (zaadblaasjes), which are one among the various organs of a certain secretion. The deferent canals pass by them; hence zoosperms are often found in them, and these remain there for some time. From this they received their name, seminal vesicles, as if they were receptacles of the zoosperms.

II. The principal genital organs of the woman are:

A. External: 1. The external pudendum (schaamspleet), by which name is meant the complex of exterior parts, of which the principal are: the large lips (schaamlippen), or the two folds of the exterior skin; the small lips, or two smaller folds situated between the large lips; the clitoral organ (kittelaar), or a very small organ analogous to the virile member, without a urethra, 1-2 cm.,⁶ which is situated at the summit between the small lips, is pleasurably erected, and is an instrument of pleasure; the urinary meatus, or opening placed beneath the clitoral organ, through which urine is emitted; and so forth.

⁶ Sometimes it appears greatly developed, 6-7 cm., and then certain women abuse it, approaching others after the manner of a man. This is one of the forms of the sin of sodomy.

2. The female genital canal (scheede: ordinarily about 7-9 cm. long in front, 8-10 behind), which is found beneath the clitoral organ and urinary meatus, in the middle between the small lips. It is a canal of cylindrical form leading from the exterior part to the interior, and is the receptive organ destined for receiving the virile member, the due vessel; through it also the monthly blood is emitted and the fetus comes forth; hence it is flaccid and very extensible. Its mouth in virgins is regularly covered by a membrane, the hymen, the seal of virginity (maagdenvlies), which usually imitates the figure of a half moon, so that it does not close the whole mouth. In the heat of concupiscence the female genital canal emits, rarely outwardly, rather into the cavity of the uterus, a fluid similar to that which men emit in distillation; this is rightly called distillation, or also feminine pollution, while the ancients called it the seed of the woman. Erroneously, however: for although it renders copulation more suitable and the intromission of the man easier, nevertheless it in no way directly serves generation.

3. To these may be added the breasts or paps, which are destined not for generation itself but for producing and giving milk.

B. Internal: 1. The uterus or womb⁷ (baarmoeder), which communicates with the female genital canal and is destined to contain the fetus.

⁷ The ordinary dimensions in the normal state differ from virgins to multiparas, namely from about 60 mm. to 68 mm. in length, and from 38 to 43 mm. in breadth.

2. The ovaries (eierstokken, eiklieren): these are two glands to the right and to the left of the uterus, by which the ova, 200/1000 mm., are produced. The ova are the feminine element essential to generation.

3. The oviducts, or tubes (eileiders, 10-12 cm. long), which are two canals which communicate with the uterus and through which the eggs descend into it.

In the woman there are three principal seats of pleasure: first and chiefly the clitoral organ; secondly, the female genital canal as far as the uterus; thirdly, the mammary papillae of the breasts, the excitation of which carries with it an excitation, even a vehement one, of the genital organs. Hence, although by nature modesty is greater in the woman, by which she is drawn back from lust, nevertheless venereal satisfaction is greater; and therefore, after a woman has become lustful, she is often more prone to libido than the man.

III. The evolution of the genital organs.

In the fetus before the end of the third month the sex cannot be sufficiently distinguished, but the external genitals appear the same. Hence it is already understood that the opinion of Aristotle, whom many scholastics followed, is false, according to which the male fetus is animated after 40 days, the female after 80 days; for at this time the distinction of the sexes does not yet sufficiently appear. From the middle of the third month a certain point or genital tubercle is seen, which indicates the external organ, between two folds of skin which are divided below by a middle furrow. Already a little earlier there are two small internal glands, which in the course of the third month begin slowly to evolve and become ovaries in the female, testicles in the male. For these, before birth, are hidden in the abdomen in the lumbar region beneath the kidneys, and from birth they descend into the scrotum; yet it sometimes happens that one or both do not descend, and then one remains rudimentary: ectopia, displacement. But as the fourth month begins, the distinction of the sexes begins to appear in the external organ: in the male, the upper part or point increases greatly and evolves into the virile member, while in the female it remains small and becomes the clitoral organ; the lower part, or folds, in the male increase and are joined so that the scrotum may be formed; in the female they are more absorbed, and thus become the lips of the external pudendum.

From the time of puberty the organs begin to become apt for generation. The testicles begin to produce semen, and also internal secretion and zoosperms, although the semen is not immediately accustomed to be prolific. In our regions this time generally runs from the thirteenth or fourteenth to the sixteenth year; the elaboration of semen, once begun, of itself perseveres through the whole of life, even in old age, although then it does not always remain prolific.

Puberty in the female exists from the time of ovulation, which is customarily revealed by the menstrual flow, following the separation of a mature ovum, the lunar month being 28 days. This is a flow of blood which women suffer each month from the time of puberty, among us from the twelfth or thirteenth to the fifteenth year, up to about the fiftieth year: for each month in the ovaries an egg matures, at least one, which, having been separated from the ovaries, is carried into the uterus of the woman. At the same time the interior parts of the uterus are filled with blood, so that, if conception occurs, blood may be supplied for the evolution of the fetus. But if the egg has not been fertilized, the blood, and with the blood the egg, flows out through the female genital canal at a later time. This flow is called menstruation (regles, lunes, menstrues, stonden, maandstonden) and ordinarily lasts for two or three days, sometimes for more. Sometimes the health of the woman requires that the menstrual flow be provoked or checked by art, that is, by means of medicines. But from the age of about 45-50 years, ovulation and the flow of blood cease, and a little afterward the woman is no longer apt for generation but becomes sterile; this is called the age of return, or menopause (retour d'age, age critique, kritische tijd, de jaren, de keerjaren, de slechte jaren).⁸

⁸ Similarly, removal of the ovaries suppresses the flow of blood; likewise fertilization, and sometimes lactation.

At the time of puberty the breasts also develop in the female, so that they are able to produce milk; in the man they remain in a rudimentary state.

IV. Carnal copulation and fertilization. The essential elements of fertilization are the virile sperm, in which the zoosperms are contained, and the feminine ovum. Fertilization requires that some zoosperm enter the ovum before, having been separated from the ovary, it arrives through the oviduct into the uterus. To obtain this there is required the physical conjunction of man and woman, or carnal copulation (copula, coitus, paring), by which the man introduces the erect virile member into the woman's genital canal, so that in the very heat of the flesh he may emit and pour out the semen there. This copulation, in order that of itself it may be apt for generation, comprises:

1. the erection of the virile member, by which it is enlarged and made rigid;
2. its introduction into, and intromission within, the woman's genital canal, whence the man must injure and tear the seal of virginity in a virgin, which, once torn, does not return: the defloration of the virgin;
3. in the same place, in the heat of the flesh, the agitation and contraction of the virile member and the effusion of semen. To this in the woman, from the heat of concupiscence, there corresponds abundant distillation and contraction of the female genital canal; but these two are not necessary for generation.

The zoosperms, introduced into the female genital canal, swim in the semen and move themselves by vital motion so as to tend toward the interior parts of the female genital canal and uterus; and the uterus, as if by sucking, draws the spermatic fluid, thus seconding the motion of the zoosperms. Opposite this, the ovum separated from the ovaries descends through the oviduct. The progress of the ovum is slow, 7-8 days or more; on the other hand the motion of the zoosperms is relatively rapid, so that within the space of a few hours they enter the oviduct, where they can live for several days, 7-8 or more, and await the ovum.⁹ But if one zoosperm reaches the mature ovum, it will enter it, and from the conjunction of both fertilization and generation will occur. From the head of the zoosperm and the nucleus, or germinal vesicle, of the egg, there will be made one new cell, surrounded by the radiated protoplasm of the egg, which is the origin of the whole new living being.¹⁰

⁹ Therefore fertilization does not occur immediately after copulation, since the zoosperms can live for several days in the living body of the woman. Even after death they still move for one and a half to two days. At a temperature of 38-40 degrees they show themselves more lively; at a temperature of 20 degrees they appear without motion. They are killed by cold water; they are slain by electric lightning. Alkaline fluids favor their motion; acids harm them.

¹⁰ Hence the doctrine of many Scholastics, among whom is Saint Thomas, can no longer be sustained, who asserted that the feminine element in generation is merely passive. For although the masculine element actively provokes and determines the transformation of the ovum and conception, and the feminine element passively undergoes that transformation, though it seems to concur actively to some extent by attracting the head of the zoosperm, nevertheless each concurs actively in the same way toward the formation of the new being, namely by its own vital powers.

And so, by carnal conjunction, the man and woman have truly been made one from two: they have brought about one action by two similar parts, just as, so to speak, one organ is composed from each body. Namely, they constitute one principle of generation and one flesh.¹¹ By reason of the carnal commingling, not only does the member of one become the member of the other, but they are truly one flesh: the man has deposited something of himself in the woman, and the woman has made that semen her own; and the semen, which is something of the man, has now come into the possession of the woman's uterus. Thus marriage is truly and absolutely consummated.

¹¹ "They shall be two in one flesh, that is, through carnal mingling they are made one flesh; and thus the members of one become the members of the other ... from two there is made one principle in the act of generation." Saint Thomas, In I ad Cor. VI, 16. Likewise Cajetan: "in one perfect and just, that is, legitimate, principle of carnal generation." Cf. Vermeersch, cited work, p. 13. Some have erroneously understood carnal commingling as mingling with menstrual blood: for even if there is no menstruation, nevertheless by copulation marriage is consummated.

But if, after copulation, the zoosperms enter the ovum, they will be one flesh not only in the act of marriage, but also in its effect, in the new flesh composed from them. And thus a perfectly consummated marriage becomes still more fully consummated.¹²

¹² For then there will be the strictest commingling of flesh or of the elements serving generation, namely of semen and ovum.

But it should be noted that generation can strictly occur without intromission into the female genital canal, and that it suffices that the man deposit the semen at the mouth of the female genital canal, which then, by vital motion and by the attraction of the female genital canal, can enter. But in this way fertilization can occur only very rarely and accidentally; hence it does not suffice for copulation as nature instituted it, and men who are able to accomplish only this, and cannot effect intromission into the female genital canal, are impotent for completing copulation and for contracting marriage. A fortiori, artificial fertilization does not suffice for copulation, by which semen previously emitted is introduced by some art into the female genital canal or uterus; this, moreover, is gravely illicit.¹³

¹³ In the decree of the Holy Office, 24 March 1897, the matter concerns artificial fertilization properly so called. It would be otherwise if, after copulation had been duly performed and the semen deposited not indeed at the mouth but in the entrance of the female genital canal, it were gathered there, without being drawn out of the female genital canal, and by means of a little syringe carried more deeply toward the uterus. For in this way at no moment would the semen be deprived of its ordination toward the end of generation; hence this would not seem to be anything but assisting nature.

V. Impotence and sterility. The impotence of coeundi, or of copulating, is one thing; the impotence of generating is another. The former dirimently impedes marriage, which consists in the mutual handing over of bodies in order to carnal copulation, and therefore has as its immediate end copulation itself: this is impotence with respect to marriage itself. The latter, the impotence of generating, does not impede marriage itself, but only the further principal end for which marriage was instituted: this is not impotence of marriage, but only its sterility.

In other words: the primary end of the institution of marriage is one thing, and is generation; and the end of the thing instituted, or of marriage itself, is another, and is copulation of itself apt for generation. If this immediate end is attained, the thing itself is valid, even if by accident it is impossible that the further end, or primary end of the institution, be attained. But carnal copulation of itself apt for generation is essentially the act by which, through intromission of the virile member into the female genital canal, virile semen is emitted and deposited there. Hence whatever renders that copulation impossible, absolutely or relatively, constitutes the impediment of impotence; whatever does not impede copulation, but only generation, is not impotence, but only sterility. Hence:

A. Impotence (onvermogen) is present whenever there are not organs ready for carnal copulation, or when, though the organ remains, copulation is nevertheless impossible. It is absolute or relative according as it is toward every person or toward only some person. Hence:

1. In the man impotence is: a) absence of the virile member; b) defect of both testicles, or their perfect contusion or atrophy;¹⁴ c) double vasectomy, or resection of both deferent canals; d) disproportion of the virile member; e) hypospadia¹⁵ and epispadia, by which the meatus opens not at the extremity but in the middle of the virile member, whether on the lower part or on the upper part, so that the semen cannot be poured into the female genital canal; f) aphrodisia, or excessive heat, by which, from exaggerated excitation, the semen is lost before copulation; and anaphrodisia, or excessive frigidity, by which erection of the virile member and expulsion of semen are impeded.

¹⁴ Those who lack both testicles are called eunuchs; cf. Mt. XIX, 10 sq. Some are spadones, who are born thus; others are castrated, who by human art have been deprived of the testicles or even of the virile member itself. "A spado, or one who is born a eunuch, and one who was castrated as an infant, is incapable of true copulation; those deprived of both testes in adult age remain capable of copulation for some time, but generally through a more or less ample interval afterward they can no longer exercise copulation itself. Those deprived of the testes are deprived of the internal secretion by which the energy of copulating with effusion is nourished, so that they are destitute of satiative copulation with effusion, and then of the faculty of copulation." Thus Vermeersch, cited work, n. 60 and 84.

¹⁵ De Smet, De Matrimonio, n. 551, note 4, notes that that defect is sometimes cured by a mere change of position in copulating.

The first three make impotence absolute; the fifth and sixth make it relative; the fourth makes either one. The sixth ordinarily does not render one perpetually impotent; concerning the third it is disputed whether potency can be restored.

2. In the woman impotence is: a) defect of the female genital canal or of an opening in it, so that it cannot be perforated at all; b) excessive narrowness; c) vaginismus, by which, from excessive excitation, the external pudendum is closed, cannot endure intromission, and impedes copulation.

In the first case there is absolute impotence; in the second, relative; in the third, either one, and not always perpetual.

B. Sterility (onvruchtbaarheid) 1. in the man is the absence of prolific semen because, on account of an accidental and transient cause or an obstruction, the semen here and now is destitute of zoosperms, or because, on account of disease of the testicles, the seminal vesicle, the urethra, and so forth, the zoosperms are not sufficiently lively, or perish too quickly, or lack a necessary element, or are not apt to enter the ovum.

St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57 sqq.; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. lib. 3, n. 486-961. Dom. Soto, Lugo, Molina, Lessius, Billuart, etc., also published excellent treatises on right and justice. Among modern authors worthy of mention are Waffelaert, Tract. de iust. (Bruges 1885); Marres, De iust. (Roermond 1889, 2nd ed.); Vermeersch, De iust. (Bruges 1901), and very many others, whom it would be long to enumerate.

Order Of Things To Be Said. After the treatise on the virtue of prudence, it is necessary to treat of the virtue of justice, which among the moral virtues stands out under a twofold respect, namely of subject and of object. For justice is subjectated in the nobler part of the soul, namely in the will; but the other moral virtues reside in the lower appetite, as fortitude in the irascible appetite, temperance in the concupiscible appetite. Prudence, however, which resides in the practical intellect, is not a merely moral virtue, but also an intellectual one, as was said above, I, n. 457. By reason of object, justice stands out among the other moral virtues, since they are praised only according to the good of the virtuous man himself; but justice is praised, moreover, according as the virtuous man is well-disposed toward another,¹ and therefore justice is especially necessary for human society. The most noble virtue of justice has several potential parts, whose office is to render what is due to persons joined to us in a special way, for example, to God, parents, etc. From this it follows that the virtue of justice, with its potential parts, comprises almost all things which are commanded in the whole Decalogue, except the sixth and ninth precepts. But since clarity would be little served if almost the whole Decalogue were explained under one single treatise, we divide this Treatise XI into two sections, namely:

1. On right and on the virtue of justice itself.
2. On the potential parts of the virtue of justice.

¹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 12.

111. Preliminary Note. Since we have spoken of damaging in general, now one must deal in particular with some damagings in which a special difficulty is found. Following the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor,⁷⁴ we shall first treat of injuries committed by deeds, and then of injuries committed by words. By deeds injury can occur in three ways: 1. by directly injuring the very person of the neighbor; 2. by indirectly injuring the neighbor, namely in another person intimately joined to him; 3. by injuring the proper things of the neighbor. Enough has already been said above concerning this third injury, under damaging in general. Injury of the very person of the neighbor is prohibited by the fifth precept of the Decalogue: "You shall not kill"; by these words there is forbidden primarily every unjust homicide, that is, suicide and the unjust killing of the neighbor, and secondarily whatever injures one's own or another's body in an undue mode. But the neighbor is injured indirectly in a person intimately joined with him through adultery and deflowering. Therefore the order of things to be said is the following: 1. on injury against one's own body; 2. on injuries against the body of the neighbor; 3. on injury arisen from deflowering and adultery.

⁷⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64 sqq.

Above, n. 6, when there was discussion concerning the object of ownership, it was proved that useful ownership of his body indeed belongs to man, but not absolute ownership. For man is, as it were, the steward of God, and therefore he commits injury toward God if he abuses his body or destroys it. But strictly speaking the suicide does not commit injury against his own body, since injury is always toward another and not toward oneself. Suicide (and the same holds of every homicide) is either direct or indirect. It is called direct when it is directly both intended and follows from an action freely placed. But it is called indirect when it is not intended, but is foreseen as going to follow from an action placed, which nevertheless does not directly cause death but only induces a most grave danger of death. Therefore in direct suicide (say the same of homicide and the procuring of abortion) the end both of the work and of the worker is death to be inflicted; but in indirect suicide neither the end of the work nor the end of the worker is death.

112. Principle 1. Direct suicide, done by private authority, is always a most grave sin.

Thus all Catholics teach against the Stoics, Epicureans, and several modern non-Catholics.

Proof. The sin of suicide is most strictly prohibited by law a) divine, b) natural, c) ecclesiastical.

a) In the fifth precept of the Decalogue divine law inculcates: "You shall not kill."

b) By a threefold reason direct suicide injures natural right itself;⁷⁵ for it is against charity toward oneself, violates the rights of the human community, and violates the rights of God himself. Therefore suicide first injures charity toward oneself. For each person ought to love himself, and from this love there arises the most vehement inclination of preserving oneself and resisting death. Hence suicide is something unnatural and injuring charity toward oneself. Moreover, it does injury to human society. For every man ought to be a useful member of human society. But by departing from life by his own motion, a man can now bring no utility to society. Therefore he commits injury. Finally, suicide is very injurious to God, who gave life to man and continually conserves it, and therefore is the perfect owner of every human life. Wherefore St. Paul says very well: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."⁷⁶ But he who destroys his own life by suicide destroys the property of God and therefore inflicts grave injury upon God;⁷⁷ to him alone belongs the authoritative judgment of life and death, according to that saying: "You are, O Lord, he who has power of life and death."⁷⁸

c) Suicide is gravely prohibited by ecclesiastical law, which, as a penalty for so great a crime, forbids the body of a suicide to be buried in a sacred place or Mass or other liturgical suffrages to be celebrated for him.⁷⁹ But these ecclesiastical penalties are not incurred a) if the suicide was committed from madness or another cause impeding the use of reason; b) if the suicide gave signs of repentance before he expired; c) if the crime was wholly occult, lest the reputation of the survivors be violated; d) if there was doubt whether death arose from suicide, or whether the suicide was committed from madness. He who attempted suicide is irregular,⁸⁰ is barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and incurs other penalties if he is a cleric.⁸¹

But it is said that suicide done by private authority is a most grave sin. For either from divine authority or sometimes from public authority suicide would be lawful. It is plain that God can command suicide to some man; for he himself is the supreme owner of life and death. But whether in reality God ever gave such a precept is not certainly established. For the deeds which are read in the lives of the saints (e.g., St. Apollonia, St. Pelagia, St. Sophronia) do not certainly prove that a divine precept was present. Those saints most certainly had the best intention, but through invincible ignorance they could have done something which objectively was illicit.⁸²

But could someone kill himself by command of public authority? E.g., can someone justly condemned to death by poison or hanging himself take the poison or hang himself? This case occurred in the East, and Socrates, condemned to death, is said to have obeyed the law of the republic and himself taken poison.⁸³ Billuart⁸⁴ and St. Alphonsus⁸⁵ deny (and call their opinion the more common), but it is not certainly established that this is intrinsically evil; wherefore it would be lawful for one justly condemned to death to employ this mode of dying when the supreme judge commands it. "For if the accused can open his mouth so that poison may be poured into it, so also he can draw it up with his hands, and so also he can transfix himself with a sword. For then the judge constitutes the accused as executioner of himself." Yet this is cruel and not very becoming.

Scholion. On The Principal Causes Of Suicide. In our times suicides become more frequent from day to day. The fundamental cause of this mournful experience seems to be the defect of faith creeping in more and more. For it is impossible that a man well conscious of the punishments of Gehenna (which he will certainly suffer through all eternity if with full advertence and deliberation he commits suicide) would not prefer to tolerate all the pains of this world rather than commit suicide. Hence suicides also happen much more frequently among unbelievers than among Catholics.⁸⁶ Another cause of suicides is books and theaters, in which suicide is very often glorified and therefore commended. Priests should not omit to deter the people from the enormous crime of suicide.

⁷⁵ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5.

⁷⁶ Rom. 14, 7 sq.

⁷⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5, where also the excuses which are sometimes brought forward for suicide are refuted.

⁷⁸ Wis. 16, 13.

⁷⁹ Rit. Rom. tit. 6, c. 2, n. 3. Code of Canon Law c. 1240, 3.

⁸⁰ Code of Canon Law c. 985, 4.

⁸¹ L. c. 2350, § 2.

⁸² Cf. Lessius l. 2, c. 9, n. 23, cited by Noldin, De praeceptis n. 327.

⁸³ Cf. Plato, Phaedo (LVII): τι χρή ποιεῖν.

⁸⁴ De iust. diss. 14, a. 4, dico 4.

⁸⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 369.

⁸⁶ Paulsen rightly says: "Suicide is, as a rule, the unbeautiful end of an unbeautiful life" (System der Ethik II, 120).

113. Principle 2. Indirect suicide is not licit unless a proportionately grave cause is present.

It is explained. An action indirectly causing death is not intrinsically evil, and therefore, when a proportionately grave cause comes in, it is licit in the same way in which an indirectly voluntary evil is permitted. But what is a proportionately grave cause must be prudently estimated in individual cases. The nearer and more certainly the action is going to induce death, the greater the cause required. Among causes permitting indirect suicide are enumerated the public good and the spiritual good. For it is certain that a man can and ought to expose his life to the greatest danger if the public good demands this. Thus soldiers with evident danger of life ought to fight in battle; pastors ought to administer the sacraments, even if on account of a raging epidemic they expose themselves to mortal contagion. The spiritual good also, and notably the good of virtue, is an excusing cause. Hence missionaries laudably set out into foreign and unhealthy regions with manifest danger of death; religious sisters can serve the sick laboring under plague. If the danger of death is not so proximate, even a lighter cause can excuse. Hence it is lawful, e.g., for workers to blow glass, to gild metals, to work in sulfur mines, etc., with danger of notably shortening life. Nevertheless he always sins who from a futile reason exposes or abbreviates his life, e.g., men who from vainglory fight in a duel, some tightrope walkers, those prolonging a fast for a very long time (for the sake of mere experiment or wager). Likewise those who hasten death for themselves by gluttony, by immoderate passions, by morphinism; those who undertake altogether unusual labors without sufficient reason; those who refuse to take even ordinary remedies for preserving or recovering health.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 10, a. 3.

114. Authors raise two questions here: 1. Is it lawful to kill oneself in order to avoid a certain and harsher death? St. Alphonsus responds:⁸⁸ "Directly to kill oneself is never lawful ... it is lawful to kill oneself indirectly: for instance, if someone throws himself out through a window in order to escape a fire; especially if there is some hope of escaping death. Thus teach Busenbaum, Lugo with Lessius, Continuator Tournely, and Sporer. And Elbel permits this even to accused persons detained in prison, for escaping a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual prison." Whatever may be the case concerning this indirect killing, which seems to be licit, since there it is not a question of death itself to be inflicted upon oneself, but rather of exposing oneself to the greatest danger of death, nevertheless the opinion defended by Elbel does not seem able to be sustained, unless it is a question only of undergoing the danger of death, but not of certain death itself. Otherwise those suicides which happen rather often, which evildoers condemned to perpetual labor in prisons commit, would also be licit. And indeed no one will sanely say this. For the rest, from the very words of Elbel it appears that he speaks only of danger of death. For he says: "Even in these circumstances they [soldiers] do not intend to kill themselves, but only by flight to seek liberation from the squalor of perpetual prison, which to many seems, not without merit, more intolerable than death itself; therefore if death follows from such flight besides their intention, they must by no means be judged to have intended it, but rather to have held themselves permissively in order to it."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 367.

⁸⁹ De homicid. n. 16, ed. Bierbaum.

115. 2. Can a virgin choose death rather than her own violation? a) It is certain that a virgin cannot directly kill herself in order to avoid violation, e.g., by transfixing her heart with a sword. It is also the express opinion of St. Thomas,⁹⁰ saying: "Similarly, it is also not lawful for a woman to kill herself, lest she be corrupted by another; because she ought not to commit in herself the greatest crime, which is the killing of herself, in order to avoid the lesser crime of another; for it is not the crime of a woman violated by force, if consent is absent, because the body is not stained except from consent of the mind, as Lucia said." Hence the things which are had in the Decree of Gratian⁹¹ from St. Jerome,⁹² "In persecutions it is not lawful to perish by one's own hand, apart from where chastity is endangered, but to submit the neck to the one striking," are either to be piously explained or to be abandoned. Then b) it is also certain that a virgin in that case can flee with evident danger of death, e.g., by throwing herself from a high window; but c) it is not certain whether a virgin ought rather to allow herself to be killed than violated, e.g., when the aggressor threatens her with death unless she permits intercourse. Several authors affirm,⁹³ because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if she rests induced by fear, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary. Other theologians⁹⁴ deny, provided that the virgin bears herself merely passively and the danger of consent is absent. The reason is that in that case the violation is something merely physical; and just as a virgin can, for recovering health, permit physical violation through a surgical operation, so at least on account of the most eminent danger of death she can permit that violation through extorted intercourse. Certainly in the second case the virgin provides material and proximate cooperation in the sin of the aggressor, and therefore a much greater cause is required than in the case of a surgical operation; but nevertheless that aggressor is already in heart guilty of deflowering before the external work perpetrated, and besides he would become guilty of both internal and external homicide if the virgin did not bear herself permissively. Therefore the merely passive permission of the virgin helps rather than harms the soul of the aggressor. St. Augustine⁹⁵ also seems to favor this opinion.

⁹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 3.

⁹¹ c. 11, C 23, Q. 5.

⁹² Comm. in Jonah l. 1, n. 402 (Migne, Patr. lat. 25, 1129).

⁹³ Lugo, Salmanticenses, Azor, Bonacina, etc., cited by St. Alphonsus, l. c. n. 368.

⁹⁴ Navarrus, Toletus, Soto, Schindler.

⁹⁵ De civ. Dei l. 1, c. 18.

116. On Self-Mutilation. By almost the same right by which suicide is prohibited, mutilation of oneself is also prohibited. For just as man does not have full ownership of his life, so neither can he dispose concerning his members except for the uses determined by God. But because the parts are for the sake of the whole, it is lawful to cut off a member if this is necessary for saving the whole bodily life. Thus all theologians teach with St. Thomas.⁹⁶ Therefore it is lawful to submit oneself to surgical operations when they are truly useful or necessary for preserving health. Moreover, it is lawful to cut off a bound hand, if this is necessary for taking flight and thus for escaping death.⁹⁷ But for other ends mutilation cannot be done licitly, because God never, either explicitly or implicitly, conceded such a right to men. Hence it is not lawful for an adolescent to mutilate himself in order to escape military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms, nor to do emasculation or castration for preserving chastity, as Origen is narrated to have done.⁹⁸ Hence deservedly the Church has established the penalty of irregularity against those who have castrated themselves or have otherwise mutilated themselves or others.⁹⁹

On Artificial Sterilization. In former times castration of boys came into use for preserving a boyish voice. This castration indeed was held licit by some authors, if danger of life was absent and it was not done to boys unwilling.¹⁰⁰ There is no leisure to refute this opinion and practice, today deservedly obsolete. In our times the so-called artificial sterilization rages more and more from day to day; it can very easily be obtained not only by vasectomy but also by Roentgen rays (X-rays); but it is usually employed for recovering health, for avoiding generation, and for other ends. But since this sterilization is true bodily mutilation (of the ovaries or testicles), it is not morally licit unless for curing diseased organs and for obtaining the health of the whole body. Therefore it is not lawful to employ it, e.g., for preventing the generation of numerous offspring, for preventing a man altogether depraved from transmitting his very bad habits into offspring by generating.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 65, a. 1.

⁹⁷ Several authors (Lugo, Lessius, Molina, Salmanticenses, Billuart, Lehmkuhl, Marc, Aertnys) more probably think that someone can mutilate himself in order to avoid death unjustly threatened by a tyrant. Wherefore if, e.g., a husband says to an adulterer caught in the act: either castrate yourself or I shall kill you, the adulterer could castrate himself in order to avoid the death threatened by the husband. I am unable to grasp how that opinion is probable, since such mutilation is manifest and proximate cooperation in the sin of another.

⁹⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.

⁹⁹ Code of Canon Law c. 985, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 374.

¹⁰¹ Pius XI, encyclical Casti connubii, Dec. 31, 1930 (Act. Ap. Sed. XXII, 230), and S. C. S. Off., Mar. 21, 1931 (Act. Ap. Sed. XXIII, 118).

117. Scholion. The desire of death can be something 1. licit; 2. illicit; 3. imperfect. This desire is licit if it arises from a good motive, namely because someone desires to be joined with God, to be no longer able to sin, etc. In this sense St. Paul teaches that it is much better to have the desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ than to remain in the flesh.¹⁰² But it is illicit if it arises from a wicked motive, e.g., if someone with rebellion against the divine will wishes death for himself, if someone from impatience now no longer wishes to tolerate this life. Rarely, however, is this desire of death gravely illicit, because often it is not so voluntary and serious. Finally, the desire of death is something morally imperfect if someone so abhors some earthly evil, for example grave illness, incarceration, a very hard state of life, etc., that he prefers bodily death rather than to sustain that evil. Although such a desire is not gravely sinful, because already in Sacred Scripture it is said: "Death is better than a bitter life,"¹⁰³ nevertheless it is something imperfect and a venial sin, because by patiently tolerating such very grave evils of earthly life a man will have a precious reward in heaven, which he loses by desiring death.

There are some men who, even in the ordinary distresses of this life, often exclaim: Would that I were dead! Would that I were in the tomb! etc. Exclamations of this kind certainly are to be avoided and are objectively illicit, but often they are semi-deliberate acts and not seriously willed; hence they are either no sin or a venial sin.

¹⁰² Cf. Phil. 1, 23-24.

¹⁰³ Eccli. 30, 17.

Preliminary Note. Injury against the body of the neighbor can be committed in many ways, e.g., by injuring his health; but especially this is done by killing him, or homicide. Homicide is the same as the killing of a neighboring man. But the neighbor can either injure the common good, and then he is an evildoer to be punished, or cause great bodily injury to a private person, and then he is an aggressor to be repelled, or finally be altogether innocent. Therefore we shall treat 1. of the killing of an evildoer, 2. of the killing of an aggressor, where there will also be discussion 3. of dueling and 4. of war, and finally 5. of the killing of an innocent person, where there will also be treatment 6. of craniotomy and 7. of abortion.

118. Principle. Public authority, and it alone, has the right of killing those who have committed most grave crimes.

Proof. The reason is that the death penalty is a necessary means for preserving the common good. For unless great evildoers could be killed by public authority, they would always become more arrogant and would greatly diminish public peace and security. Therefore in Sacred Scripture also we read that this power was conferred upon public authority,¹⁰⁴ and we find its use among all peoples. Thus, e.g., among the Israelites it was established: "He who strikes a man, wishing to kill, let him die by death." "He who has cursed his father or his mother, let him die by death."¹⁰⁵ But no one except public authority can inflict the death penalty, because evildoers can be licitly killed only on account of the common good. Therefore he alone who by office ought to procure the common good, i.e., the superior of the community, can punish someone by death. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "To kill an evildoer is lawful insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community, and therefore it belongs only to him to whom the care of preserving the community is committed; just as it belongs to a physician to cut off a putrid member when the care of the whole body has been committed to him. But the care of the common good is committed to princes having public authority; and therefore it is lawful for them alone to kill evildoers, not for private persons."¹⁰⁶

Those private men act illicitly who kill certain evildoers immediately after the crime committed by their own authority, which practice is commonly called Lynch justice, lynching. Thus at least objectively speaking, because perhaps several so acting are in good faith.

Soldiers and guards appointed for capturing or guarding an accused man cannot indeed kill him when he is taking flight, but they can fire a gun at the legs of the one fleeing, so that he can be captured. But if in this way the fleeing man is accidentally killed, the guards have not sinned. For the rest, guards, watchmen, and soldiers are accustomed to have special instructions how in individual cases they ought to act. They are not to be disturbed in conscience if they act according to these instructions.

Things To Be Provided Before A Sentence Of Death. No one can licitly be condemned to death by supreme authority unless, after judgment, moral certitude has been had concerning the most grave crime committed.

Therefore in order that the death penalty can be licitly inflicted, there is required a) a most grave crime; b) moral certitude that this crime has been perpetrated. The crimes which are punished by the death penalty by modern criminal codes are few, e.g., voluntary homicide, treason, certain crimes during war. It is not indeed required for the liceity of the death sentence that the accused have confessed his crime in court, but it is altogether necessary that moral certitude concerning the crime perpetrated be had, because otherwise an injury could be done which afterward would be irreparable.

Before execution of the sentence of death, time must be conceded to the accused for reconciling himself with God according to the prescriptions of religion.

Several criminal codes rightly establish that no pregnant woman can be punished by death, but that birth must first be awaited.

In ancient times civil law permitted that a husband could kill an adulterer caught in the very act. But since certain theologians extended this permission of civil law even to the killing of the wife, proposition 19 was condemned by Alexander VII: "A husband does not sin when he kills by his own authority a wife detected in adultery."¹⁰⁷ St. Thomas had already solved this question: "Civil law reckons as licit, as it were, that he kills her [namely, the wife] in the act itself [of adultery], not as commanding, but as not inflicting the penalty of homicide, on account of the greatest incitement which a man has in such a deed to the killing of his wife. But the Church in this is not bound by human laws.... And therefore in no case is it lawful for a man to kill his wife by his own authority."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Ex. 22, 18 and Rom. 13, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Ex. 21, 12 sqq.

¹⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 3. Similar things are had there a. 2 and 7; q. 65, a. 1 and ad 2; q. 108, a. 3 ad 1; De malo q. 1, a. 5 ad 12; Contra gent. 3, 146. But always the same reason is brought forward by the Angelic Doctor for the liceity of the death penalty, namely, the necessity of the common good.

¹⁰⁷ Denz. n. 1119.

¹⁰⁸ 4 dist. 37, Q. 2, a. 1.

119. Punitive Beating. The things just said concerning the death penalty to be inflicted upon evildoers hold also, with due proportion observed, concerning mutilation and beating. In ancient times, and also in the Old Testament, certain crimes were punished by mutilation of members, e.g., by cutting off the hand, gouging out the eyes, etc.¹⁰⁹ Although these penalties were very harsh and today are no longer in use, nevertheless they could be licit and just. For he who has the power of killing has, a fortiori, the power of mutilating. It is never lawful for a private man to mutilate another without his legitimate consent. Hence not even physicians can perform a surgical operation without the explicit and licit consent of the sick person; this consent, in persons lacking the use of reason and in persons bound by a religious vow, can be supplied by legitimate superiors.

Not only supreme power, but also another legitimate superior can moderately beat delinquent subjects. For to whomever the right of punishing belongs, to him is also conceded the power of moderately beating the delinquent. Hence nothing prevents parents and teachers from punishing disobedient children moderately and discreetly with blows. Nevertheless, that in these things action must be taken with great justice, prudence, and moderation is plain of itself. But it is lawful for no private man to beat another private man not subject to him, unless nevertheless it is a question of just defense. The reason is that it does not belong to a private man to punish another equal to himself. Yet often it is lawful for a private man moderately to beat unruly and damaging children, both because the permission of the parents can deservedly be supposed, and because otherwise there is almost no other remedy at hand for restraining them from damaging.

Scholion. On Adversaries Of The Death Penalty. The Waldenses, Anabaptists, Jeremy Bentham, Cesare Beccaria, Chr. Lucas, Spedalieri, and others denied the power of punishing evildoers by death, and in fact in certain regions the death penalty was abolished, but after a few years often was restored (e.g., in several districts of Switzerland and of the United States of North America). For sad experience has proved that evildoers cannot be sufficiently restrained by fear of prison. Hence the death penalty must be held as a salutary and efficacious remedy for preventing enormous crimes and for preserving peace in the republic. There is no leisure to solve the objections which are usually brought forward by adversaries of the death penalty.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Ex. 21, 24; Lev. 24, 20; Deut. 19, 21.

¹¹⁰ See Cathrein, Moralphil. II, 677 sqq.

328. Notion. Three things are ordinarily signified by the name devotion:

1. Certain exercises of piety; in this sense we speak of devotion toward the Eucharist, toward the Five Wounds, etc.

2. Attention and a certain spiritual consolation in prayer.¹ It is ordinarily called accidental or affective devotion. In this sense we say: I made meditation with great devotion, or without devotion.

3. The first act of the virtue of religion, in which sense it can be defined: Devotion is a certain will [i.e., an act of the will] to give oneself promptly to those things which pertain to the service of God. Thus St. Thomas.²

The word devotion itself, considered in itself, signifies a habit rather than an act, and indeed devotion is not rarely taken as a habit;³ but then it does not really differ from the virtue of religion itself. Following the Angelic Doctor, however, we take devotion insofar as it is an internal act of religion and insofar as it is elicited by a firm, constant, and generous will. St. Thomas rightly proves in this manner that devotion is to be considered as an act:⁴ "By acts, and not by habits, we merit, as was established above.⁵ But devotion has a special notion of meriting. Therefore devotion is a special act." Not everyone who sometimes proposes to give himself to the service and worship of God is called devout, but he who does this from a stable and constant virtue. Christ had devotion most perfectly, who could say of himself: "In the head of the book it is written of me that I should do thy will: O my God, I have desired it, and thy law in the midst of my heart";⁶ and: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me."⁷ It is to be noted that the will to give oneself promptly to those things which pertain to the service of God can arise not only from the virtue of religion, but also from the virtue of charity; but in different ways. For if such a will intends a union of friendship with God, it is an act of charity; but if it intends the worship and service of God, and indeed as something due because of God's excellence and our subjection, it is an act of religion. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:⁸ "It belongs immediately to charity that man give himself to God by adhering to him through a certain union of spirit; but that man give himself to God for certain works of divine worship belongs immediately to religion, but mediately to charity, which is the principle of religion." Just as charity commands all the virtues, and consequently also the virtue of religion, so likewise the virtue of religion, through the act of devotion, commands the other acts which pertain to the worship of God. Hence devotion has a most general influence upon all the other acts.⁹ For why do we worship God by prayer, sacrifice, and ceremonies? Because we wish to give ourselves and all our things to the divine service. Hence it appears how necessary devotion is in the spiritual life, so that, when it is lacking, human acts of divine worship become remiss and imperfect; indeed, the vice of acedia arises. Just as the virtue of religion is intimately connected with the virtue of charity, so the act of the virtue of religion, which is devotion, is closely joined with the act of charity which is ordinarily called a good intention in all our works.¹⁰

¹ In the German language, Andacht.

² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 82, a. 1. In the German language this devotion could perhaps be called self-consecration and zealous surrender to God, devotedness (Selbstweihe und eifrige Hingabe an Gott, Ergebenheit).

³ Piety (Frömmigkeit).

⁴ S. theol., l.c., in arg. Sed contra.

⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 21, a. 3 and 4.

⁶ Ps. 39:8ff.

⁷ John 4:34.

⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 82, a. 2 ad 1.

⁹ Ibid., a. 1 ad 2.

¹⁰ Good intention (Gute Meinung, bonne intention).

329. The causes of devotion are partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic. The principal extrinsic cause is God through his grace. This grace, both sanctifying and actual, is altogether necessary for a supernatural and meritorious act of devotion. For with sanctifying grace all the theological and moral virtues are infused, as was said above, I, n. 472. Now the infused virtue of religion does not elicit a supernatural act of devotion unless actual grace excites and assists it. The acquired virtue of religion, however, can elicit some act of devotion even without grace. The secondary extrinsic cause of devotion is often the example and moral influence of other devout men, as is evident from daily experience.

The intrinsic cause of devotion is meditation and contemplation both of God's beneficence and excellence and of the humanity of Christ, and of human dependence upon God the Creator, Governor, and Mover. For from contemplation of God and Christ charity is excited, which is the proximate cause of devotion, according to the words: "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God."¹¹ But from consideration of human dependence and defects arises the desire for divine assistance, according to the words: "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, who made heaven and earth."¹² From these things it appears clearly how necessary good and frequent meditation is for the religious life.¹³

¹¹ Ps. 72:28.

¹² Ps. 120:1.

¹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 82, a. 3.

330. The effects of devotion are several:

1. Spiritual joy.

For devotion, as was just said, is caused principally by meditation on the divine excellence and beneficence. But this meditation produces spiritual delight, according to the words: "I remembered God, and was delighted."¹⁴ Accidentally, however, this consideration causes a certain sadness in man the wayfarer,¹⁵ according to the words: "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God: when shall I come and appear before the face of God? My tears have been my bread day and night."¹⁶

2. Accidental or affective devotion.

For the spiritual joy arising from devotion does not remain in the mind alone, but overflows into all the human faculties, causing sweet consolations, even sensible ones. God is accustomed to grant this affective devotion to beginners in the spiritual life, lest they be deterred by the difficulties which arise. As time advances, however, this devotion gradually ceases; indeed, it not rarely gives place to spiritual aridity, God thus disposing it for our testing. Accidental devotion, although it is much less than substantial devotion, nevertheless is not to be despised as useless or evil in itself. Therefore Innocent XI condemned the proposition of Michael Molinos:¹⁷ "He who desires and embraces sensible devotion does not desire or seek God, but himself; and he acts badly who, walking by the interior way, desires it and strives to have it, both in sacred places and on solemn days." On the other hand, affective devotion is not to be esteemed excessively, nor ought a man to grieve from the lack of it, since substantial devotion alone suffices.

3. Facility and promptness in performing the other acts of religion, such as praying, adoring, sacrificing, etc., and even the acts of the other virtues.

The reason is that a devout mind is prompt to please God through all virtuous acts.

4. An excellent influence also upon bodily gestures and one's manner of acting.

For because of the intimate union of body and soul, a mind truly and constantly devoted to God shines forth even in the body, so that the countenance, bodily gestures, voice, and ecclesiastical ceremonies to be performed appear under the influence of devotion.¹⁸

From all these things we are convinced of the great value of devotion and are admonished to pray with the Church "that we may be instructed by an affection of pious devotion," and that "God may increase devotion in us unto salvation."

¹⁴ Ps. 76:4. Hence the most devout St. Paul said of himself: "I exceedingly abound with joy in every tribulation" (2 Cor. 7:4).

¹⁵ Cf. S. theol., l.c., a. 4.

¹⁶ Ps. 41:3ff.

¹⁷ Proposition 27 (Denz. n. 1247).

¹⁸ Cf. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion § 9.

We must treat individually: 1. the notion and division of prayer; 2. its object; 3. its necessity; 4. its efficacy, where its properties also will be discussed; 5. certain particular prayers, and notably the canonical hours.

338. The general rule in this question is a proposition taken, not indeed according to the very words but according to the sense, from St. Augustine: It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to desire.⁶⁵

Applications of the rule. a) It is lawful to ask in prayer not only for goods in general, but also in particular. The contrary doctrine proposed by Socrates,⁶⁶ Wycliffe, the Illuminati, and the Quietists is false and contradicts Sacred Scripture, in which we are commanded to ask also for particular goods. The most manifest example is the Lord's Prayer itself, in which seven particular and determinate petitions are contained.

b) It is lawful to ask determinately and absolutely for goods necessary to eternal salvation, such as the required grace and all other means necessary to salvation. The reason is that no one can abuse these goods and that God truly wishes us to ask for them, admonishing us: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God."⁶⁷ Indeed, it is not only lawful but also better to ask for goods of this kind in an absolute manner, because in this manner we pray more attentively and because we are accustomed to pray for and desire goods the more fervently the more particularly they are regarded.⁶⁸ Hence the doctrine of the Quietists is false which teaches that even spiritual goods necessary to salvation are to be asked for only conditionally, namely, under the condition that God has predestined us to eternal salvation, and that man ought to renounce even eternal life if God has thus decreed. The falsity of this doctrine is evident from the fact that God sincerely wishes all men to be saved,⁶⁹ and that no one is reprobated to hell before foreseen demerits. Graces gratuitously given and charisms, e.g., the gift of tongues, miracles, etc., may not be asked for absolutely in prayer, but only conditionally, because these graces are not means directly useful to the eternal salvation of the one possessing them, but rather benefit other men.

c) It is lawful in prayer to ask also for temporal goods, not indeed so that we establish our end in them, but as certain aids by which we may be assisted in attaining eternal beatitude.⁷⁰ This is also confirmed by the practice of the Church, which asks in prayers, e.g., for rain, fair weather, health, etc. But when we ask temporal goods from God, we ought always to add at least the implicit condition that we do not expect our prayers to be heard if the temporal goods are obstacles to our eternal salvation. Since temporal goods in fact are often obstacles to salvation, they are to be sought through prayer cautiously and not too avidly.

d) It is also lawful in prayer to ask for physical evils both for oneself and for another, provided, however, that they are asked for as means of obtaining spiritual goods of great value. Thus St. Paul desired to be dissolved and to be with Christ; thus the saints not rarely asked for poverty, infirmity, persecutions, etc. Nevertheless, prayer of this kind is to be made with great caution, especially if there is question of asking for the physical evil of one's neighbor, because deceptions will very easily be present and because the intention of the one praying is not rarely not so pure.⁷¹

e) It is not lawful in prayer to ask for a morally evil thing, e.g., assistance in perpetrating theft or fornication. For such a prayer would be a grave sin, at least speaking objectively, because he who wished to have the most holy God as a cooperator in a sin, even one light in itself, would commit grave irreverence toward him.⁷²

⁶⁵ This proposition is found according to its sense in Ep. 130 (otherwise 121), c. 12, ad Probam (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 503).

⁶⁶ In St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 5.

⁶⁷ Matt. 6:33.

⁶⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, IV, dist. 15, q. 4, a. 4, quaestiunc. 3.

⁶⁹ Cf. 1 Tim. 2:4.

⁷⁰ S. theol., l.c., a. 6.

⁷¹ Cf. Billuart, De orat. a. 5.

⁷² Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 142.

339. Scholion. On the Lord's Prayer. St. Thomas⁷³ demonstrates excellently that in the Lord's Prayer all things whatsoever which we can lawfully ask from God by praying are contained in perfect order. Since the Lord's Prayer is the best and most frequent among all prayers, it is very expedient that pastors of souls diligently instruct the faithful concerning the beauty and suitability of this prayer. Therefore the Roman Catechism,⁷⁴ intended for parish priests, has an ample commentary on the Lord's Prayer.

⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 9. The source prints q. 82, an evident typographical error.

⁷⁴ Part IV, c. 9.

We divide this article into eight paragraphs: 1. on the nature and division of a vow; 2. on the subject of a vow; 3. on the object of a vow; 4. on the obligation of a vow; 5. on the intrinsic cessation of a vow; 6. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through invalidation; 7. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through dispensation; 8. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through commutation.

436. Preliminary. Among the ways of worshiping God there is also the invocation of the divine name. The divine name is invoked in three ways: 1. by way of an oath, for confirming the speaker's own words; 2. by way of adjuration, for inducing others to do or omit something; 3. by way of invocation, for praying and especially for praising God. In this article we treat of the invocation of the divine name through an oath; in the following article, however, adjuration and the invocation of the divine name will be treated. But concerning prayer enough has already been said above.

This article is divided into four paragraphs: 1. on the notion and division of an oath; 2. on the lawfulness of an oath and its requisite conditions; 3. on the obligation of an oath; 4. on the violation of an oath, or perjury.

Preliminary Note. Since this article is rather long, it is divided into four sections: 1. on the nature and origin of this worship; 2. on the utility of this worship; 3. on hearing Mass, which is the first part of this worship; 4. on cessation from servile works, which is the other part of this worship.

This article treats of all those things which are prescribed both in the third precept of the Decalogue: "Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day,"⁶²⁶ and in the first precept of the Church concerning the observance of feast days.

⁶²⁶ Ex. 20:8.

465. The observance of Sunday and feast days is deservedly numbered among the principal external acts of the virtue of religion. Now the precept of sanctifying Sundays and feast days is partly of natural law, partly of positive divine law, and partly of ecclesiastical law.

a) The precept is indeed of natural law insofar as it commands that some time be allotted to divine worship, and not only to private worship, but also to public and social worship. For there is in man a natural inclination to allot some time to every necessary thing, just as a determined time is allotted, for example, to bodily refreshment and sleep.⁶²⁷ Internal and external, private and public divine worship is altogether necessary for man, as was said above in n. 327. Therefore natural law itself demands that a determined time be allotted to divine worship. Hence there has never been any nation so uncultivated or so barbarous that it did not consecrate feast days to its gods.⁶²⁸

b) The precept of observing Sunday is of positive divine law insofar as it commands that on one day of each week there be cessation from every servile work in praise of the Creator.⁶²⁹

c) Finally, this precept is of ecclesiastical law insofar as it has been determined by the Church alone on which fixed days and in what ways God is to be worshiped. Hence St. Thomas⁶³⁰ says: "The observance of Sunday in the New Law succeeds the observance of the sabbath, not by force of a precept of the law, but from the constitution of the Church and the custom of the Christian people."

It cannot be proved that Sunday was instituted by divine law (Sporer-Bierbaum⁶³¹ almost alone teaches this). In the earliest times the apostles seem to have assembled in the temple to praise God not on Sunday but on the sabbath;⁶³² this indeed is a most manifest sign that the sanctification of Sunday was not instituted by Christ Himself; for otherwise the apostles would certainly have obeyed the command of their Lord. But when Sunday first began to be sanctified in place of the sabbath is not so certainly established. Several authors teach that the apostles themselves introduced this practice. Thus St. John says: "I was in the spirit on the Lord's day."⁶³³ St. Luke relates:⁶³⁴ "And on the first day of the week, when we were assembled to break bread," that is, according to the meaning of this phrase: on the first day after the sabbath, or our Sunday. Hence St. Augustine already says of this text:⁶³⁵ "The first day of the week is called the day which is now called the Lord's day." By the second century the sanctification of Sunday seems already to have been universal.⁶³⁶ The reasons why Sunday was sanctified in place of the sabbath are indicated in this manner by St. Leo I:⁶³⁷ "On this day the world took its beginning. On this day, through the Resurrection of Christ, death received its destruction and life its beginning. On this day the apostles receive from the Lord the trumpet of the Gospel to be preached to all nations, and receive the sacrament of regeneration to be brought into the whole world.... On this day, finally, the Holy Spirit promised by the Lord came."

⁶²⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 122, a. 4 ad 1.

⁶²⁸ Cf. Catech. Rom. P. 3, c. 4, q. 6.

⁶²⁹ Thus rightly Fr. Schmid in Linzer Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift 1900, 12-26; Noldin, De praeceptis n. 260; Tanquerey, De virt. relig. n. 1011; Göpfert, Moraltheol. I, 338. For God Himself selected every seventh day as assigned to divine worship: "Six days shalt thou work, and shalt do all thy works. But on the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: thou shalt do no work on it, thou and thy son and thy daughter, thy manservant and thy maidservant, thy beast and the stranger who is within thy gates" (Ex. 20:9ff.). If it had not been established by divine law that on every seventh day there be cessation from servile work in honor of God, then, absolutely speaking, the Church could define that throughout the world Sunday rest be had every tenth or twentieth day; this, however, is not commonly admitted.

⁶³⁰ L.c., ad 4.

⁶³¹ Theol. mor. tract. 3, n. 484.

⁶³² Cf. Acts 3:1; 5:12.

⁶³³ Apoc. 1:10.

⁶³⁴ Acts 20:7.

⁶³⁵ Ep. 55 (al. 119), in Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 212.

⁶³⁶ St. Ignatius admonishes: "Let us no longer sabbatize in the Jewish manner.... But after the sabbath let every lover of Christ celebrate the Lord's day" (Ep. ad Magnes., in Migne, Patr. graec. 5, 768ff.). Cf. also Didache c. 14.

⁶³⁷ Ep. ad Diosc. (Migne, Patr. lat. 54, 626).

466. Corollary. From what has been said it follows in what sense the sanctification of Sunday and feast days pertains to the third precept of the Decalogue, and in what sense it pertains to the first precept of the Church. For the precept of worshiping God on fixed days by cessation from servile work is prescribed by divine-natural law, and consequently by the Decalogue. Probably it is also contained in the precept of the Decalogue that on every week some day of rest be observed in honor of God. But the selection of Sunday in place of the sabbath, as well as the special manner of sanctifying Sunday by hearing Mass, the sanctification of other feast days, and the determined manner of ceasing from servile work: all these things pertain to the first precept of the Church. For the sake of brevity and also of clarity, the observance of Sunday and feast days according to both natural-divine law and ecclesiastical law is treated together here, as we have already said above.

467. The scope of the precept of sanctifying Sundays and feast days is discerned by considering 1. the persons obligated, 2. the days to be sanctified, and 3. the works to be performed.

1. What persons are obligated by this precept?

This precept binds under grave sin all baptized persons possessing the use of reason after the first seven years of age. Hence the proposition (52) was condemned by Innocent XI: "The precept of observing feast days does not bind under mortal sin, scandal being set aside, provided contempt is absent."⁶³⁸ But since this precept binds all baptized Christians possessing the use of reason after the first seven years of age, it also binds Protestants and other heretics, since they are subjects of the precepts of the Church. Nevertheless, it may rightly be supposed that our pious Mother the Church does not wish to urge this obligation for them with exact rigor; and consequently, when heretics return to the bosom of the Church, they are not to be accused of as many mortal sins as the times they applied themselves to servile labors on Sundays and feast days, provided, however, that they satisfied the precept of natural law to worship God externally at some time.

2. What days are to be sanctified?

⁶³⁸ Denz. n. 1202.

468. Besides Sunday, the Church commanded several other days to be celebrated during the course of the year; the list of these presented by Urban VIII was afterward increased by one feast by Clement XI.⁶³⁹

According to the discipline now in force, however, feast days under precept in the universal Church are only: each and every Sunday, and in addition ten feasts, namely, the Nativity, Circumcision, Epiphany, Ascension, and the Most Holy Body of Christ; the Immaculate Conception and Assumption of the Blessed Mary, Mother of God; St. Joseph, her Spouse; the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul; and, finally, All Saints. "Wherever any feast among those enumerated has been legitimately abolished or transferred, let nothing be changed without consultation with the Holy Apostolic See."⁶⁴⁰ "But if in any nation or region the bishops judge that any one of the abrogated feasts ought to be retained, let them refer the matter to the Holy See."⁶⁴¹ Therefore those statutes concerning the celebration of feasts which were made for certain regions remain in use, for example, for France, where the feasts (apart from Sundays) have been reduced to four, namely, the Nativity and Ascension of the Lord, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the feast of All Saints. Particular statutes are also had for England, Ireland, and North America. Pius X expressly declared that the suppression of feasts concerns the faithful only as regards the obligation of hearing Mass and abstaining from servile works; on the contrary, the obligation of applying Mass for the people and solemnly celebrating the Offices in church according to the former discipline remains.⁶⁴²

3. What is to be performed on feast days?

⁶³⁹ Const. Universa, 13 Sept. 1642.

⁶⁴⁰ Code of Canon Law, c. 1247, §§ 1 and 3.

⁶⁴¹ Motu proprio of Pius X Supremi, 2 July 1911 (cf. Acta Ap. Sedis III, 305ff.).

⁶⁴² Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Council, 3 May 1912 (Acta Ap. Sedis IV, 340).

469. On all Sundays and non-suppressed feast days the faithful are bound to two things: a) to hear Mass, because the Sacrifice of the Mass is the most excellent of all acts of worshiping God; b) to abstain from servile and forensic works, because these works are accustomed to hinder a man from applying his mind perfectly to divine worship.

The precept of hearing Mass seems to have been in force from the beginning of the Church, as is indicated not obscurely by the celebrated text in Didache c. 14: "But on the Lord's day, having assembled, break bread and give thanks, after you have confessed your sins, that your sacrifice may be clean." The so-called Canons of the Apostles and the Council of Agde presuppose the existence of this precept. In canon 10 it is had: "Let all the faithful who assemble in church for the sacred solemnities hear both the Scriptures of the apostles and the Gospel. But those who do not persevere in prayer until Mass is completed, nor receive Holy Communion, ought to be deprived of communion as persons causing disturbances in the Church."⁶⁴³ The Council of Agde (a. 506) speaks still more clearly:⁶⁴⁴ "By a special ordinance we command secular persons to hear the whole Mass on Sunday, so that the people do not presume to depart before the priest's blessing." The precept of abstaining from servile works on Sunday likewise seems always to have been in force in the Church. The Emperor Constantine sanctioned Sunday rest also by civil penalties.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴³ Thus c. 61, D. 1 de consecr.

⁶⁴⁴ Thus c. 64, D. 1 de consecr.

⁶⁴⁵ Cf., for a historical exposition, Tanquerey, De virt. relig. n. 1006ff., and Theod. Zahn, Geschichte des Sonntags vornehmlich in der alten Kirche (1894), 196-240.

470. Besides hearing Mass and abstaining from servile and forensic works, the faithful are bound to nothing else by strict ecclesiastical law. Therefore there is no obligation of ecclesiastical law to hear a sermon or catechetical instruction, to assist at Vespers and other devotions, and much less to assist at the sermon and other Offices in the parish church. Nevertheless, an obligation of natural law to assist at a sermon, catechetical instruction, and other religious exercises can easily be present, for example, for the sake of fostering the interior spirit of devotion, acquiring and preserving sufficient knowledge of matters of faith and morals, and avoiding scandal. Wherefore the faithful are to be earnestly exhorted not to be content with hearing a private Mass, but also to assist on Sundays and feast days at a sermon or catechetical instruction and other religious exercises. Certain authors wished to prove the existence of an ecclesiastical precept of hearing a sermon in the parish church from the fact that the Council of Trent⁶⁴⁶ ordered pastors to exercise the office of preaching on Sundays and feast days. For if pastors are bound to preach, parishioners must hear their preaching. Other authors, however, most commonly teach that the Tridentine precept contains nothing other than that pastors are bound to provide parishioners an opportunity to hear the word of God in the parish church. But the parishioners are not strictly bound to assist at this preaching.

⁶⁴⁶ Sess. 24, c. 4 de reform.

471. Alas, sad experience demonstrates more than sufficiently that, in those regions and families in which the sanctification of Sunday and feast days is little esteemed, faith soon vanishes, morals become corrupt, family life perishes, and even industrial progress is impeded. On the contrary, the due sanctification of Sunday and feast days produces the greatest benefits. For through it there is produced:

472. 1. The preservation of man's natural powers.

The physical powers of man, since they are limited, are quickly consumed unless they are restored by at least weekly rest. This rest is obtained much more certainly and efficaciously if determined days are appointed at fixed intervals, on which not only ordinary labors are interrupted, but spiritual refreshment also is furnished through religious worship. Certainly a man could also choose a day of rest of his own accord and worship God in a private manner, but this end is attained much more efficaciously if a determined day is established for all men by ecclesiastical and civil law. For by the force of the unavoidable competition existing everywhere, many men (especially laborers and artisans) would be compelled to labor more than is just, so that no time of rest would remain, if the law itself did not command Sunday and feast-day rest.

473. 2. A precious aid for the whole spiritual life.⁶⁴⁷

For man, oppressed by continual labors to sustain himself and his own, often distracted by various cares and anxieties, and enticed by many pleasures, gradually becomes totally immersed in material things; as the sad experience of all ages and peoples, among whom the faithful practice of religion was neglected, demonstrates. Witnesses are the ancient pagans, whose detestable vices and altogether irrational life St. Paul describes so graphically.⁶⁴⁸ "Bread and Circuses" cried those pagans, thus manifesting that they desired nothing other than sustenance and pleasure. But if on Sundays and feast days all are bound by force of law to cease from servile works and apply themselves to religious exercises, hearts are raised above matter to spiritual and heavenly things. After Sunday rest has been duly completed, men return eagerly, equipped with new powers of mind and body, to their daily labors, which they perform with greater energy. Hence it has happened that those peoples who faithfully observe Sunday rest are accustomed to surpass, even in commerce and industrial affairs, other nations which are accustomed to make little of the observance of Sunday. Therefore Sunday rest in no way impedes even the industrial progress of peoples. To this is added that, through religious exercises performed on Sundays and feast days, the moral and religious life of man is efficaciously promoted. Through sermons heard concerning matters of religion and morals, and through graces received in religious exercises, man is greatly assisted to detest vices and to lead a well-ordered life.

⁶⁴⁷ Cf. Tanquerey, l.c., n. 1014, and Gilfillan, The Sabbath Viewed in the Light of Reason, Revelation, and History. Edinburgh, 1867.

⁶⁴⁸ Rom. 1:21ff.

474. 3. The integrity of family life is fostered.

For the various members of a family are often compelled to occupy themselves with different labors throughout the entire week. Spouses are separated from one another, and parents from their children; but when they are reunited in the evening hours after their labors have been completed, they generally cannot, being tired in their powers, sufficiently enjoy the consolations of domestic life. But if Sunday rest is well observed, then all the members of the family can converse pleasantly together at least once in the week and foster mutual love. Especially, the good education of children is almost impossible without Sunday rest. For unless children are incited by the example of their parents to religious worship, they scarcely, if indeed at all, guard against irreligion and bad morals.

475. 4. The propagation of social worship, and even of the true Church herself, is obtained.

Christ founded a visible Church and consequently also requires visible worship performed by His Church. Such worship is social, that is, it must be performed by ecclesiastical society. Further, it is impossible for social worship to be completed in the due manner unless all the faithful are bound to assemble in churches at determined times. Moreover, it is very fitting and efficacious that such assemblies take place on Sundays and feast days, as perpetual experience demonstrates. It is likewise evident how good an influence religious services performed in our churches on Sundays and feast days exercise even upon non-Catholics who may be present. Therefore very many conversions have taken their beginning from attendance rendered at religious services. Thus the true Church is propagated through the social worship of Sunday and feast days.

From these things it is apparent that every effort must be made so that the observance of Sunday and feast days may take root more and more in the Christian people. Hence those associations founded for the protection of Sunday rest are to be fostered; hence civil laws already in force in several kingdoms concerning the observance of Sunday are to be commended; hence violators of Sunday rest are to be prudently admonished, and indeed, if they cause public scandal, they are to be denounced to the competent superior; hence, finally, let each person, by most religiously observing the Sunday precept, furnish a good example to others and procure spiritual profit for himself.

The requisites for satisfying this grave precept and the excusing causes will be treated. Four things are required for satisfying the precept of hearing Mass, namely: 1. bodily presence; 2. an entire Mass; 3. religious assistance; 4. a due place.

476. The gravity and scope of this precept. Since the precept of hearing Mass is an essential part of the precept of observing Sunday and feast days, without any doubt it binds under grave sin, so that its violation is a mortal sin from its genus. This is also evident from proposition 52 condemned by Innocent XI and already cited above in n. 467. All the faithful of either sex, when after the first seven years of age they possess the use of reason, are obligated to hear Mass on Sundays and feast days. Therefore infants and the insane who lack the use of reason are exempt. Hence a child who after the age of seven has not yet attained the use of reason is not bound to hear Sunday Mass; but if he has certainly acquired the use of reason before the age of seven, he is not in himself bound to assist at Mass, since it has been established generally that those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed their seventh year of age are not bound by merely ecclesiastical laws, unless the law expressly provides otherwise.⁶⁴⁹ In practice, however, parents are to be admonished to bring their children to Mass as soon as possible. The precept of hearing Mass also binds clerics, as is evident of itself; but a priest celebrating Mass (even in a private oratory) by that very fact satisfies this precept. The same seems to hold for the server of the Mass.

⁶⁴⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 12.

477. 1. Bodily presence is the first requisite of the Sunday precept. This presence is judged to be sufficiently present when the person hearing Mass is morally united with the celebrant, so that it can truly be said that the one assisting has morally heard Mass and offered the Sacrifice with the celebrant. Therefore the following satisfy the precept as regards bodily presence:

a) all who are within the church, even if they stand in a side chapel or behind a column, where they can neither see nor hear the priest celebrating, provided, however, that from the sound of the bell or from the signs of others who stand nearer to the Mass they perceive in some manner what is being done by the celebrant;⁶⁵⁰

b) also those who stand outside the church near the door (even a closed door), and indeed even in a neighboring house, provided they can still perceive the ceremonies in some manner. Lugo⁶⁵¹ and, after him, several others limit this by saying: provided that house is not more than thirty paces distant from the church; but in reality this cannot be determined mathematically. For if someone truly can attend religiously to the ceremonies of Mass, and there is a true moral union with the celebrant, sufficient moral presence seems to be present. Besides, this manner of assisting from a neighboring house and generally from a place outside the church cannot be permitted without a reasonable cause, for example, sickness. Sufficient bodily presence certainly does not seem to be present if someone hears Mass by means of the new invention which is called "Radio."

⁶⁵⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 312.

⁶⁵¹ De euchar. disp. 22, n. 21.

478. 2. Presence must continue during the entire Mass, that is, from the beginning of Mass through the priest's blessing inclusively. The Last Gospel does not seem to pertain to the integrity of the Mass. Hence it is said in the text of the Council of Agde cited above:⁶⁵² "By a special ordinance we command secular persons to hear the whole Mass on Sunday, so that the people do not presume to depart before the priest's blessing. But if they should do so, let them be publicly confounded by the bishop." The reason is that in the ancient liturgies of the East and West no Gospel was read after the priest's blessing.⁶⁵³ But since, according to the universal liturgy now in force, the Gospel of St. John (or another Gospel) is always read at the end of Mass, it is irreverent if the faithful depart immediately after the priest's blessing without a sufficient reason. On the Nativity of the Lord and on other days⁶⁵⁴ on which priests can celebrate three Masses by common or particular law, the faithful are strictly bound to hear only one Mass. One who cannot assist at an entire Mass is bound at least to be present at an essential part, for example, the consecration or Communion, if this is possible. But one who is able to assist only at an accidental part, for example, through the Gospel, is bound to nothing. Therefore one who arrives before the consecration and cannot assist at another Mass is bound at least to remain until the end of Mass. But one who arrives after the consecration, according to several casuists, is no longer bound to assist at the remaining part. St. Alphonsus,⁶⁵⁵ however, asserts: "We say that he is indeed obligated to hear the remaining part of the Mass; for one who certainly cannot fulfill the precept imposed is bound at least, if he can, to fulfill it probably." Besides, all those things which follow after the consecration until the end are certainly a notable and essential part of the Mass, and consequently one who can hear that part is also bound to do so.

All teach that one who culpably does not hear a notable part of Mass sins gravely. But the casuists disagree greatly about what part is truly notable, although they agree on two things: 1. The notability of a part is to be judged not only from its duration, but especially from its dignity. Hence, if someone culpably omits the consecration and Communion, although he hears all the other parts, he certainly sins gravely, because he did not hear a notable part of Mass according to dignity. 2. Generally, one third of the Mass is judged a notable part and grave matter.⁶⁵⁶ Among the many diverse opinions reviewed by St. Alphonsus,⁶⁵⁷ the following are rather commonly admitted today:

The omission is judged light: everything from the beginning of Mass up to, but not including, the Offertory; likewise, everything after Communion; likewise, everything from the beginning through the Epistle together with everything which follows Communion.⁶⁵⁸

The omission is judged grave: everything from the beginning through the Offertory inclusively; likewise, everything from the beginning through the Gospel together with those things which follow Communion;⁶⁵⁹ likewise, from the Preface until after the consecration; likewise, from the consecration through the Agnus Dei, etc.

⁶⁵² c. 64, D. 1, de consecratione.

⁶⁵³ Cf. concerning this matter Thalhofer, Handbuch der kathol. Liturgie II (1912), § 40.

⁶⁵⁴ The Day of the Commemoration of All the Faithful Departed. Code of Canon Law, c. 806.

⁶⁵⁵ Homo apost. tr. 6, n. 33; cf. also Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 310.

⁶⁵⁶ Thus St. Antoninus, S. theol. P. 2, tit. 9, c. 10, § 1.

⁶⁵⁷ L.c.

⁶⁵⁸ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 718; Tanquerey, De virt. relig. n. 1023; Noldin, De praeceptis n. 265; Göpfert, Moraltheol. I, 344.

⁶⁵⁹ Al. Piscetta, Theol. mor. II, n. 237, thinks this omission is light.

479. Casuists are accustomed to ask here whether one satisfies the precept who, from two Masses, hears those parts which, joined together, constitute a whole Mass. For example, Peter arrives at church when Mass has already proceeded as far as the Canon; he assists at this Mass until the end; then from another Mass he hears everything through the Canon. Authors commonly teach: If the consecration and Communion are had in the same Mass, the precept is satisfied in this way; but not if the consecration and Communion do not pertain to the same Mass. The reason is that the consecration and Communion constitute the essence of the Mass.⁶⁶⁰ Therefore, if someone heard these parts in the same Mass, he had the essence of the Sacrifice; but if he heard the consecration and Communion from different Masses, he had the essence from neither Mass. Certainly, however, one does not satisfy the precept of hearing Mass who hears two or more parts of Masses celebrated simultaneously by different priests. This is established from proposition 53 condemned by Innocent XI: "He satisfies the precept of the Church concerning hearing Mass who hears two of its parts, or indeed four, simultaneously from different celebrants."⁶⁶¹

From what has been said, certain practical resolutions follow:

You will resolve: a) Peter arrives after the Gospel has already been said. He is bound under light sin afterward to supply from another Mass the part of the Mass already said. Even a light inconvenience excuses from this supplementation.

b) Peter arrives at church after the Offertory has already been completed. He is bound either to remain until the end of this Mass and then hear from another Mass everything through the Offertory inclusively, or, having left the first Mass, to hear another whole Mass. This obligation is grave, and only a grave inconvenience excuses from it.

c) Peter arrives after the consecration. He is bound to hear another entire Mass; if he cannot do this, he is bound at least to remain at this Mass until the end, as was said above from St. Alphonsus.

Things to be noted for practice. In order to render a correct judgment concerning the gravity of the sin of those who approach the church after Mass has already begun, or who depart before Mass has been finished, attention is to be given not only to the material part omitted, but especially to their negligence and perverse will, namely, whether this was done without any sufficient reason, whether with great or slight negligence, and whether they could have heard another entire Mass. When there was grave negligence and a notable part was omitted, there is also a grave sin. If either of these is absent, grave sin also is absent.

⁶⁶⁰ Thus also St. Alphonsus (l.c., n. 311), who adduces and refutes several other opinions on this matter. There are several authors who reject the proposed opinion, especially Concina (De praec. Eccl. l. 1, diss. 3, c. 2, n. 6), citing Suárez and Azor for his opinion.

⁶⁶¹ Denz. n. 1203. Diana, Bonacina, Busembaum, etc., held this proposition at least as probable; cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c. 3, n. 311.

480. 3. Religious assistance is commanded. Merely physical presence during Mass does not suffice; otherwise one who slept deeply throughout the whole Mass would also satisfy the precept, which certainly no one will say. For a truly religious act is prescribed, which cannot be had without at least some religious intention and attention.

a) First of all, a due intention is required, namely, of worshiping God or hearing Mass.⁶⁶² Wherefore one does not satisfy the precept who, for example, approaches the church solely to hear the music or to accompany another. But I say: solely for that or another profane end; for if, besides the end, although principal, the true worship of God is still intended, the precept is satisfied. Hence a young man who approaches Mass principally from fear of his parents or from the motive of seeing a girl, but at the same time wishes to satisfy the precept, truly satisfies it, although he sins because of the perverse principal motive. Thus the common opinion.⁶⁶³

b) Next, due attention is required. Those things which were said above in n. 354 concerning the diverse modes of attention are to be recalled. To satisfy the precept of hearing Mass, external attention is certainly required, that is, the omission of an external work incompatible with internal attention. Thus all teach. Wherefore one does not satisfy the precept who during a notable part of Mass attentively reads profane books for the sake of study or recreation, who writes, who converses during almost the whole Mass, who sleeps during a notable part of Mass, etc. But one who merely dozes sleepily satisfies the precept, because he has at least imperfect attention. According to several followers of Lugo,⁶⁶⁴ no internal attention is required by the precept of the Church, but external attention suffices, so that even one who is voluntarily distracted during the whole Mass and thinks about very sinful things nevertheless satisfies the precept.⁶⁶⁵ Their reason is that nothing other than the worship of God is commanded by the Church. But the worship of God can subsist even with voluntary distraction. Therefore someone can satisfy the ecclesiastical precept even if he is voluntarily distracted. Moreover, they say, prayer itself does not necessarily require anything other than external attention. Therefore, a fortiori, external attention suffices for hearing Mass. According to St. Alphonsus,⁶⁶⁶ however, and many other authors, it is more probable that, in addition to external attention, at least some imperfect internal attention to the essential parts of Mass is required. And in truth, both arguments of the opposite opinion seem to be futile. For above in n. 355 we already proved that true moral prayer is impossible with voluntary distraction. Indeed, to will to elevate the mind to God through prayer, and at the same time directly to will to direct the mind to something altogether disparate, seems to be impossible and to imply a contradiction. Next, the true worship of God does not seem able to coexist with wholly voluntary distraction during Mass. For every rightly instructed Christian knows that wholly voluntary distractions during Mass are sinful, especially if the thoughts concern unlawful objects. How, then, can one and the same man will to worship God and at the same time explicitly will to be distracted and consequently to offend God? Therefore I think that voluntary distraction destroys the very intention of worshiping God. Nevertheless, in practice so great a difference does not exist between the two opinions; for it is scarcely possible that someone should will to hear Mass and nevertheless also will to be distracted throughout the whole Mass. Therefore, by force of the initial intention, some internal attention already seems to be present. Now the second opinion teaches that any, even the least, internal attention suffices for satisfying the precept.

Since prayer properly so called is not required for satisfying the precept of hearing Mass, but the worship of God and religious assistance suffice, those sufficiently satisfy the precept who during Mass read a pious book, perform an examination of conscience, sing, play the organ, collect alms, etc., provided that from intention they attend in some manner to the rite of the Mass.

⁶⁶² Cf. I, n. 223.

⁶⁶³ Concina teaches the contrary (De praec. Eccl. l. 1, c. 4, n. 2), who does not seem rightly to allege St. Antoninus for his opinion, since the latter speaks of those who assist at Mass solely for a perverse end, "who otherwise would not hear it." Cf. what was said above in I, n. 122 concerning the influence of the end upon the morality of an act.

⁶⁶⁴ De euchar. disp. 22, nn. 27-31.

⁶⁶⁵ Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 263.

⁶⁶⁶ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 313.

481. It is asked especially: whether one who confesses his sins during the whole time of Mass or during a notable part of it satisfies the precept? Several authors, such as Ballerini,⁶⁶⁷ Génicot,⁶⁶⁸ Noldin,⁶⁶⁹ Göpfert,⁶⁷⁰ and Tanquerey,⁶⁷¹ think that confession probably does not impede external attention and consequently that the one confessing satisfies the precept. This opinion can be admitted only with difficulty in theory.⁶⁷² For if conversation, as the cited authors themselves agree, impedes external attention and consequently the satisfaction of the precept, the same must be said of confession, which is speech requiring very serious and intense attention on the part of the penitent. In practice, however, confessions during Mass can be permitted for the following reasons: a) because almost always penitents of this kind cannot conveniently receive the Sacrament of Penance at another time, either because of the multitude of their own labors or because of the scarcity of confessors, and therefore Holy Mother Church is presumed in these cases to interpret the precept of hearing Mass benignly; b) because such confessions often last only through a small part of Mass, and then they certainly do not impede the satisfaction of the Sunday precept. But if they last for a longer time, let the confessor command the penitent to remain silent for a short time and attend to the Mass, at least during the consecration and Communion, so that he may thus satisfy the precept at least according to its substance. Thus also runs the practice of confessors.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁷ In the notes to Gury, Comp. theol. mor. I, n. 346.

⁶⁶⁸ Cas. consc. I, 341.

⁶⁶⁹ L.c.

⁶⁷⁰ Moraltheol. I, n. 345.

⁶⁷¹ De virt. relig. n. 1027.

⁶⁷² St. Alphonsus says of it (l.c., n. 314): "It does not seem altogether destitute of probability; and I myself formerly judged it probable. But because I later observed that it was rejected by several grave doctors, I now do not dare to call it probable."

⁶⁷³ Cf. Göpfert, l.c.

482. 4. A due place is required for satisfying the precept.

The ancient law by which the faithful on Sundays and feast days were bound to hear Mass in the parish church has long since been abrogated, both by privileges granted to the Mendicant Orders by the Supreme Pontiffs⁶⁷⁴ and by contrary custom. Hence no bishop or pastor can now strictly command that the faithful must hear Mass in the parish church. The people can, however, be admonished to approach their parishes frequently, at least on Sundays and the greater feasts.⁶⁷⁵ According to the discipline now in force, all the faithful can satisfy the precept of hearing Mass a) in any church, b) in a public or semipublic oratory, c) under the open sky, and d) in private chapels of cemeteries.⁶⁷⁶ In private oratories, however, only those who enjoy a special indult can satisfy this precept. When by special permission Mass is said in another profane place, those for whom the permission was given satisfy the precept. The local Ordinary can give such permission to say and hear Mass, but only by way of an act,⁶⁷⁷ that is, in an extraordinary case, and only when a just and reasonable cause exists.⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁴ Cf. Leo X, Const. Intelleximus, a. 1517; Paul III, Const. Christifideles, a. 1549; St. Pius V, Const. Etsi Mendicantium, 16 May 1567.