209. Nature of vow. 1. A vow is defined: a promise made to God concerning a better good. Two things are required for a valid vow: the will of vowing and suitable matter.

a. A promise is the will of obligating oneself to doing or omitting something, and accordingly it introduces a true obligation. Wherefore a vow differs from a resolution conceived before God, which is the will of doing or omitting something, and therefore introduces no obligation. Hence omission of a resolution is not of itself a sin; but because of the motive of negligence or weariness on account of which it is omitted, it can accidentally be a venial sin.

b. It is of the essence of a vow that it be a promise made to God Himself; if some vow is made to saints, it is ordinarily to be understood that it is made to God in honor of the saints. But if someone vows only to a saint and in no way intends to promise anything to God, he does not make a vow properly so called, which by its nature is an act of latria, but elicits an act of dulia or hyperdulia (n. 136).

c. The faithful not rarely doubt whether they conceived a resolution or made a vow. In order that their doubt may be solved, it is not enough to attend to the word which they used: for even the word I promise often expresses only a resolution; but, according to St. Alphonsus, they are to be asked "whether then, when they made the vow, they thought that they would have sinned gravely or not, if afterward they had not satisfied it."² If the matter remains doubtful, it must be resolved that they made a resolution, because the obligation is not established.

d. For the value of a vow its acceptance on the part of God is required, for it is of the nature of a promise that it be accepted by him to whom the promise is made. But God at once accepts all promises made to Him which do not lack the due conditions: for unless God accepted promises made to Him, sacred Scripture would not urge the obligation of fulfilling the things which have been promised to God.³

2. A vow is an act of the virtue of religion, and indeed of latria: for by vow man offers a good work to God in order to honor and worship Him; but an act which is ordered to worship to be exhibited to God is an act of latria. And just as a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, so also the fulfillment of a vow pertains to the same virtue. Therefore a work furnished from vow has a twofold moral goodness.

The moral value of a vow is clear not only from this, that sacred Scripture exhorts to fulfillment of a vow (the places cited) and reports the example of St. Paul, who had made a vow,⁴ but also from the very nature of the thing: for a. works done from vow, beyond the goodness which they have from the object, put on the value of an oblation made to God and the merit of the virtue of religion; b. the one vowing offers a greater subjection toward God and a more perfect oblation; for by vow he obligates himself toward God and offers to God not only the thing promised in act, but through the obligation his very will; c. the tendency of the will into the good becomes more serious and firm through a vow; d. but if the execution of the vow is entangled with difficulties, not only is the fickle will strengthened, but in addition there is offered to the one vowing an occasion of showing fidelity and love toward God.⁵

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 1-12. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 194-262. Suarez, De religione, tr. 6, l. 1-6. Thom. Sanchez, In praecepta decalogi, l. 4, c. 1-56. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 40. Th. Bouquillon, De virtute religionis (Bruges: Beyaert, 1880), pars II. I. Wirthmuller, Die mor. Tugend der Religion (Freiburg: Herder, 1881), p. 538 ff. Io. Reuter, Theologia moralis, pr. II, tr. 4. C. Kirchberg, De voti natura, obligatione, honestate etc. (Monasterii: Aschendorff, 1897).

² Praxis confess., c. 2, n. 25.

³ Cf. Eccl. 5:3, 4; Num. 30:3 ff.; Deut. 23:21.

⁴ Cf. Acts 18:18; 21:23 ff.

⁵ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 6.

210. Division of vow. A vow is divided in many ways:

1. Into a private vow, which is made by the one vowing alone without the intervention of the Church, and a public vow, which is made by the authority and intervention of the Church.¹

2. A public vow is either solemn or simple, according as the Church by her authority accepts and confirms it as such, or accepts it not as solemn but only as simple; but before God each vow obligates essentially in the same way.

a. Solemn vows are: the vow of chastity made in the ordination of the subdiaconate, and the substantial vows which are made in religious orders, to which in some orders other solemn vows (accidental vows) are added; all remaining vows are always simple.

b. There is a celebrated controversy about what that is by which a solemn vow is constituted and differs from a simple one. It is certain that the solemnity of a vow has been constituted by the Church; therefore solemnity belongs to a vow not from its own nature but from ecclesiastical law. Moreover it seems certain that in the solemn vow itself, from the will of the Church, there is something which is not found in a simple vow. Each vow, solemn and simple, consists essentially in the handing over of the one vowing made to God and the Church, and in acceptance on the part of the Church. Now the specific note added by the Church to a solemn vow consists in such a handing over and acceptance as is of itself perpetual and irrevocable on each side, and which renders the one vowing incapable of certain acts contrary to the vows (of marriage, of possession, of contracting), unless the Church dispenses. Nor nevertheless is this note external to the vow, since the one vowing himself, from the will of the Church, consents that from his vow there follow both the aforesaid incapacities and a bond between himself and the Church or religious order which is indissoluble by the ordinary way.²

3. Into a personal vow, if some action of the one vowing himself, or omission of an action, is promised, as a vow of making a pilgrimage or of fasting; and a real vow, if directly some thing external to the one vowing is promised, but an action only so far as it is required for furnishing the thing, as a vow of giving alms; and a mixed vow, if each is promised at the same time, as a vow of making a pilgrimage and offering a candle.

4. Into a determinate vow, if the thing promised is accurately designated: I vow abstinence; and a disjunctive vow, if from several things proposed one thing to be furnished is promised, which can be determined at will: I vow fasting or alms.

5. Into a reserved and non-reserved vow, according as the power of dispensing or commuting belongs to the supreme pontiff alone, or also to other superiors.

6. Into a temporal and perpetual vow, according as it is promised to be observed only for a certain time or through the whole of life.

7. Into an express vow, if the internal promise is declared outwardly by words or other signs, as commonly happens; and a tacit vow, if the internal promise itself is not expressed outwardly, but nevertheless an action is knowingly posited to which a vow is annexed: thus the vow of chastity is made in reception of the subdiaconate.

An implicit vow must be distinguished from a tacit vow; thus he who vows religion implicitly vows chastity. An implicit vow differs from a tacit one in this, that an implicit vow is contained in that which is explicitly promised; a tacit vow is not contained in the action to which it is annexed, but the external action shows that a vow has been made interiorly.

8. Into a singular vow, which is made by a physical person, and a common vow, which is made by a moral person or by a community.

This division is taken from the subject making the vow, which in a common vow is the community as such, not the individual persons of the community.

9. Into an absolute and conditioned vow, according as something is promised simply or under a condition. A conditioned vow is divided into penal, if under the condition of fault a penalty to be inflicted is promised: if I blaspheme again, kneeling I shall recite the rosary; and non-penal, if something is promised merely under a condition: if I recover health, I shall undertake a pious pilgrimage.

Article Second. On the Conditions Required for a Vow

For vowing validly, some conditions are required on the part of the one vowing, others on the part of the matter.

¹ A public vow is sometimes defined in such a way that it is a manifest vow and is opposed not to private but to hidden. From this it is clear that a simple vow, which is opposed to solemn, according to the diverse definition of public, can be public and not public. Thus simple vows which are made in regular orders before profession are public (not private), because they are accepted by the Church; they are not public, because they are not manifest.

² Cf. Sanchez, In praecepta decal., l. 5, c. 1; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 603; Lehmkuhl, I^11, n. 647.

211. On the part of the one vowing, for the essence and value of a vow there is required intention, deliberation, and perfect liberty.

Once these conditions have been declared, it will be clear that anyone who has reason and is not prohibited by positive law can vow. Therefore vows made after the completion of the seventh year are of themselves judged valid. Religious vows cannot validly be made before the sixteenth year of age, because before that time they are declared invalid by positive law.

1. Intention, or the will of promising and obligating oneself, is required, because each will pertains to a true promise.

a. A fictitious vow, or one made without the will of promising or of obligating oneself, is null; but a vow made with the mind of obligating oneself, but not of fulfilling it, is valid, but gravely or lightly illicit according to the nature of the matter.

b. The will of vowing or promising can indeed be distinguished by reason from the will of obligating oneself: for obligation is the essential and necessary effect of a promise; nevertheless, for this very reason, it is impossible that someone will to promise and not will to obligate himself.

212. 2. Perfect deliberation, namely that consideration of the thing and of the obligation which is required for a truly and perfectly human act: for no one is judged to obligate himself without sufficient deliberation. And this deliberation indeed is required for every vow, whether its matter is grave or light: for in every vow an obligation is undertaken; but for an obligation to be undertaken voluntarily there is required an act of mind and will that is perfectly human.

a. Therefore the vow of a child not yet perfectly in possession of reason is not valid even under light obligation, nor that of a man half-asleep or half-drunk. Nor is a vow made with complete ignorance or with only half-full knowledge of the obligation which it introduces valid; nor a vow made with only confused or general knowledge of some burden which is assumed. Nevertheless, in order that a vow be valid, consideration of the thing promised as to all its circumstances is not required, but knowledge of it as to its substance is sufficient.

b. In order that a vow be valid, prolonged and mature deliberation is not required. From defect of mature deliberation it not rarely happens that a vow is made imprudently; an inconsideration of this kind in making a vow furnishes a cause of dispensation or commutation, but it does not render the vow invalid.

c. If it is doubtful whether a vow was made with full deliberation, the vow does not obligate, since a doubtful obligation is none. But where the fact of the vow made is established, defect of full deliberation is not easily to be admitted.

213. On a vow made from error. a. It is not valid if the error is substantial, that is, either concerning the substance of the thing promised or concerning a substantial circumstance which, if it had been known, would have impeded the vow: for error of this kind removes the will of vowing, since there is no will where there is no knowledge. But it is valid if the error is accidental, that is, concerning an accidental circumstance which, if it had been known, nevertheless would not have impeded the vow: for error of this kind does not remove the will of vowing.

Therefore invalid is the vow by which someone promises to offer a chalice which he thinks is of copper, when it is of gold; by which someone promises a pilgrimage to a sanctuary which he thought was two hours distant, but is eight. But valid is the vow by which someone promises a pilgrimage to a place which he thought was three hours distant, but is four.

b. It is not valid if the error concerns the final or motive cause, because when the final cause is lacking, consent is lacking; but it is valid if the error concerns only an impulsive cause, namely one without which the vow would nevertheless be made, because full consent is present.

If someone promised a pilgrimage on account of health restored to his father, whom he later knows never to have been ill, he is bound to nothing. - If someone promised to go to a sanctuary primarily for honoring the Blessed Virgin, secondarily for visiting a friend there, he is bound to go, even if, at the time at which he promised this, the friend had already left that place.

c. Religious vows, however, are always valid, unless error bears upon the substance of the vows: for in making religious vows each person ought to have that intention which the religious state demands; but this demands that the one vowing will his vow to be valid, even if he is ignorant of some circumstance; for otherwise the religious state would not have that firmness which by its nature it ought to have.

214. 3. Perfect liberty, or free consent of the will, by which the one vowing wills himself to be obligated toward God to doing or omitting something.

On a vow made from fear. A vow made from fear which disturbs the use of reason, and therefore impedes the necessary deliberation, is not valid; but supposing the necessary deliberation, which even grave fear ordinarily does not impede,¹ these things are to be stated:

a. A vow made is valid: alpha. from grave fear which has arisen from an internal cause or from an external necessary cause; therefore a vow made in danger of life, whether from illness or from shipwreck, is valid, because the vow is freely chosen for escaping the imminent danger; beta. from grave fear which has arisen from an external free and just cause, as if one guilty of a crime must be subjected to a penalty unless he makes a determinate vow; gamma. from grave fear which has been impressed by an external free and unjust cause, but not for extorting a vow; therefore he is held by the vow who, in fear of death which robbers threaten, vows a pilgrimage if he should escape.

b. A vow made from grave fear which has been impressed by a free and unjust cause for extorting a vow is not valid, not only by ecclesiastical law, which in this case declares vows (at least solemn ones) void,² but also by the law of nature, not indeed because of defect of consent, but because God does not accept a coerced vow of this kind: for God cannot accept a promise which is extorted by unjust force, lest He seem to approve the injury inflicted upon the one vowing.³

There are those who probably extend this same thing even to light fear; and indeed the reason in each case is the same, provided it is established that fear was the true and sole cause of vowing. Therefore the vow of entering religion made by a girl is not valid, on the ground that her parents induced her to such a vow by importunate admonitions.

¹ For the same reason, a vow made in the heat of passion or devotion is ordinarily valid, even if the one vowing afterward repents of his vow, because an affection of this kind rarely impedes the necessary deliberation and liberty. Nevertheless, in these circumstances there is a sufficient reason for recurring to dispensation.

² C. Perlatum 1, De his, quae vi metusve causa fiunt (I. 40). Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, De reg. et mon.

³ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 609.

215. On the part of the matter, for the value of a vow it is required that it be possible, honorable, and concerning a better good.

1. Possible to the one vowing not only physically, but also morally: for no one can obligate himself to the impossible. But that is judged morally impossible which cannot be accomplished without great difficulty.

Therefore a. a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even semi-deliberate ones, is not valid, since this is impossible without a special privilege of God; b. a vow of avoiding all deliberate venial sins, whether in general or in a determinate species, is valid if it is made by a person who seriously strives for perfection; but in others, because of moral impossibility, this vow is null, unless it is a vow of avoiding deliberate venials of a certain species; c. a vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid, because this is possible to all with the ordinary help of God: nevertheless it is not expedient that it be made by a frail person.

Whether a vow concerning a thing partly possible and partly impossible is valid depends upon the intention of the one vowing. If he intends to promise each part after the manner of one thing, he is held to nothing where he cannot fulfill the whole; but if he does not intend to vow after the manner of one thing, or if the intention of the one vowing is not established and the matter must be resolved from presumed intention, these things can be established:

a. If the matter is indivisible, or if in the possible part the reason of the vow is not preserved, he is held to nothing. Thus he who promised a Roman pilgrimage and cannot complete the whole way is held to nothing.

b. But if the matter is divisible, it is valid for that part which is possible, unless that part is accessory; hence he who vowed fasting and cannot abstain from meats is held to fasting as to the single meal.

You have another example in a vow of pilgrimage to be undertaken with bare feet, or of pilgrimage with reception of the sacraments. He who in the former vow cannot furnish the accessory is held to the principal thing, namely to the pilgrimage itself. In the other vow he who cannot make the pilgrimage is not bound to receive the sacraments; but if reception of the sacraments were the principal thing, he would be held to receive the sacraments at home.

216. 2. Honorable: for God is worshiped only by an action which is pleasing and acceptable to Him; but nothing is of this kind except what is morally good.

a. A vow concerning a vain or useless thing, for example of not going out of the house first with the right foot, is invalid. Likewise a vow concerning an indifferent thing, for example of not passing through a determinate street, is invalid, because it contributes nothing to divine worship. But if an indifferent thing from circumstances or from the end becomes morally good, it can be matter of vow.

b. To vow a vain or indifferent thing is a venial sin. To vow a lightly evil thing, according to some, is a venial sin; according to others, a mortal sin. To vow a gravely sinful thing, according to all, is a grave sin, because a grave injury is inflicted upon God.

The argument of those who say that a vow concerning a lightly evil thing is a grave sin seems to be convincing: for a vow of this kind supposes that an evil thing pleases God and is accepted by Him; but in these things there is contained irreverence toward God, which does not admit smallness of matter, because this is directly and immediately repugnant to His supreme holiness.

Whether a vow concerning a good thing, but evil from the end of the one vowing, is valid.

a. It is not valid if the evil end is the motive and total cause of the vow, which happens in two ways: when the vow is made for obtaining from God an illicit thing, and when it is made in thanksgiving for an illicit thing, as if someone vows alms for obtaining a favorable outcome of an unjust case, or if someone makes a vow because he has happily killed an enemy; for that end infects the whole vow and renders it evil and blasphemous.

b. A vow is valid if the evil end is an impulsive and partial cause of the vow, as if someone vows large alms before others indeed in honor of God, but also in order to be praised by men on that account. A vow of this kind is valid, because the evil end accompanies the vow, good in itself, only accidentally.¹

c. In like manner a vow made under an evil condition, which is not posited as the end of the vow, is valid; and this indeed not only if the condition in itself is a good thing which supposes an evil action, as if someone vows a pious work if he has escaped unharmed from a duel (to preserve life is a good thing, which he intends to obtain through the vow), but even if the condition is an evil thing, as if someone vows a pious work if he actually kills an enemy: for once the condition has been posited, it is honorable to fulfill the vow.²

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 621.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 206.

217. 3. Concerning a better good, that is, such that it does not impede a greater good; therefore the matter of a vow must be not only good in itself, but also better, not than any other good whatsoever, but than its opposite: for if the thing promised is a lesser good, the one vowing obligates himself to omitting a greater good in order to do a lesser; but this cannot be pleasing to God, who desires that man always do that which is better.¹ But it is not required that the thing promised absolutely be a better good, but it is sufficient that relative to the person vowing it be better than its opposite.

a. Hence a vow of marrying is not of itself valid, even if the vow is of taking a pious and poor woman, or one exposed to danger of incontinence, because for the one vowing celibacy is the greater good; nevertheless if marriage is necessary for someone, whether for removing scandal or because of danger of incontinence, for him it would be a better good and suitable matter of vow. Likewise, if someone has already proposed to take a wife, a vow of taking a poor woman in order to relieve her need is valid.

b. A vow of not vowing made absolutely is invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow; but a vow of not vowing except with the license of the confessor is valid, because it is better to vow without danger of imprudence than with danger of imprudence. Yet if someone afterward should vow without consulting the confessor, the act of vowing would indeed be a sin, but the vow itself would be valid, unless he had also established this, that the future vow be invalid.²

Whether an action commanded can be matter of vow. - Nothing prevents a thing commanded from being able to be matter of vow; for on the part of the matter nothing else is required for a true vow except that it be a good thing, not impeding a better good; but a thing commanded is good and is better than its opposite, namely its omission, and the one vowing can add another obligation from religion to the obligation arising from the precept.

¹ Suarez, l. 2, c. 7, n. 2.

² Laymann, l. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 5.

The Second Commandment of the Decalogue is, “‘ Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.”¹ It prohibits all irreverent use of the name of God, blasphemy, unlawful oaths, and violation of vows. Inasmuch as it is virtually positive, it commands us always to speak of God with reverence and respect,

¹ Exod. xx 7.

WE take God’s name in vain and break the Second Commandment when we use the word “ God” as an exclamation of wonder or impatience, or merely as an interjection in such phrases as “ good God,” ‘‘ my God,” “by God.” If these phrases are used at fitting times and with due reverence they are, of course, not sinful but meritorious; the sin consists in using them without due reverence, too frequently, and merely as expletives, for such an abuse of the holy name of God shows a want of reverence to him and is displeasing to him.

This irreverence, however, is not grave, and so the sin of taking God’s name in vain is of itself only venial; indeed, want of advertence will often prevent it from being even venially sinful. Still, care should be taken to correct any bad habit that may have been contracted in this matter.

What has been said of the name of God may be applied with due proportion to those of our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, and the saints.

BLASPHEMY is an imprecatory or a contumelious speech against God. Not only words, but actions also, which express contempt, insult, derision, or imprecation against God are blasphemies.

Blasphemy is direct when the dishonour of God is intended; if the dishonour of God is not intended in itself but it is foreseen that it will be the consequence of one’s word or actions, it is indirect.

Blasphemy which is against God in his own person is immediate; if it immediately affects some creature which has a special relation toward God it is mediate.

Blasphemy is a grave insult to almighty God, and is always a serious mortal sin if it is committed with full advertence and consent. To deny the existence of God, to complain against his Providence and assert that he is unjust, to deny the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mother of God, are so many heretical blasphemies and grievous sins.

It is a disputed question among theologians whether blasphemy against the saints which is only mediately against God is of the same species of sin as blasphemy which is immediately against him. Many assert that the species is different inasmuch as the honour due to the saints is outraged as well as that which is due to God. Ordinarily, however, it is God who is chiefly dishonoured by insults offered to his saints, and so practically we may follow the opinion of other theologians and hold that there is no specific difference between the two sins.

To utter imprecations or to speak injuriously against creatures which have a special relation to God is blasphemy. Thus it is grievously sinful to call down maledictions on one’s fellow-men, wishing that they may perish eternally. Such acts are seriously against charity as well as religion. To utter imprecations against brute beasts or other creatures which have no special relation to almighty God is not blasphemy, and will not ordinarily exceed a venial sin. Profane words and vulgar expressions like “‘ damn,” “ bloody,” and so forth, are commonly used without definite meaning, and at most are venial sins, because they are unbecoming, shock others, or are manifestations of anger and impatience. It is sometimes said that blasphemy is most common where faith is strong, and this may be a reason why real blasphemy is not so common perhaps with us in ordinary conversation as with some nations.

AN oath is the calling on God to witness to the truth of what we say. This calling on God may be express or tacit; it is express when God is mentioned, as, ‘‘ I swear by God ”’; it is tacit when we swear by some creature which in a special way shows forth the Divinity or has some special relation to him, as, ‘‘ I swear by the Christian Faith,” “‘ by the Gospel,” “by Heaven.”

In an assertory oath we call God to witness to the truth of a present or past event; in a promissory oath we call him to witness to some future event.

A solemn oath is clothed with the ceremonies prescribed by law, such as holding up the right hand or kissing the Bible; a simple oath is devoid of such ceremonies.

An imprecation is sometimes added to an oath by such words as, ‘‘ so help me God ”’; in this case we have an imprecatory oath; otherwise it is an invocatory oath.

There cannot be an oath strictly so called unless there be the intention of swearing and a suitable form of words be used which express that intention. One who uses the colloquialism, “‘ I swear it is so,’ usually has no intention of taking an oath, nor do the words signify an intention of calling on God to witness to the truth of what is said. The same must be said of phrases like ‘‘ on my honour,” “ by my faith,” * God knows ”’; and a fortiori the mention of fabulous gods, as, “‘ by Jupiter,’ etc. However, if there be an intention to take an oath, this will be sufficient to make it binding in conscience whatever the form of words may be, so that perjury will be committed if what is asserted is not true. If the form of words is suitable for an oath, the intention to swear is presumed.

If the requisite conditions be fulfilled, oaths are lawful, and indeed they are an act of divine worship, for they are an acknowledgement of the omniscience and veracity of God, as well as a public profession of belief in him. This has been the constant teaching of the Church, teaching which has ample warrant in both the Old and New Testament, The prophet 1$7 Jeremias lays down the conditions which justify an oath, and many instances of oaths are found in the epistles of the Apostle of the Gentiles. The words of our Lord¹ do not prohibit the taking of oaths if the requisite conditions be present. They give expression to his desire that all Christians should be so truthful and sincere that it will not be necessary for them to use oaths to confirm the truth of what they assert. The conditions which make an oath lawful are given in the words of Jeremias:² ‘‘ And thou shalt swear, As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgement, and in justice.”

We swear in truth when we are morally certain that what we assert under oath is according to fact. We are not justified in asserting that to be true which we do not know to be true and we commit the grave sin of perjury if we swear to what we know to be false.

We swear with judgement when there is a just cause for invoking the testimony of God and it is done with proper consideration and reverence. A just cause will be any matter of some importance for the welfare of either soul or body, whether it be public or private. We are not, therefore, justified in swearing to every assertion which we believe to be true; there must be some special reason for employing the name and authority of God to confirm what we say. However, provided that the other conditions are not wanting, the defect of judgement in swearing will not be more than a venial sin, for it is no more than the idle use of the name of God.

It is an insult to God to invoke his testimony to a sinful act or in furtherance of what is sinful. If this is done, the oath is unlawful on account of the want of justice. Justice, then, in this connection requires that the assertion in an assertory oath should not be sinful, such as a sin of detraction or boasting about past sins. In a promissory oath, that which is promised must be honest and lawful.

There is some difficulty and dispute among theologians about the gravity of the sin which is committed when an oath wants justice. If in an assertory oath the testimony of God is unjustifiably invoked to promote a seriously sinful object, the want of justice in the oath will be gravely sinful. If, on the contrary, the testimony of God does not further the end in view, the want of justice will probably be only venially sinful, because the assertion is true, as is here presumed, and the irreverence committed against God by invoking his testimony even to a gravely sinful act does not seem to many to be more than a venial sin.

An oath, therefore, taken to confirm detraction in a grave matter is mortally sinful; an oath confirming a boast about grave sins committed in the past is probably only venial.

Somewhat similarly in a promissory oath, if the act promised be gravely sinful, the defect of justice makes the oath gravely sinful; for it is a great insult to God to use his testimony to further what is mortally sinful. If the act promised is only a venial sin, a probable opinion holds that the oath is only venially sinful, against a more probable contrary view.

¹ Matt. v 34.

² Jer. iv 2.

The effect of a promissory oath is to bind the person swearing to do what he promises by an additional obligation derived from the virtue of religion, which requires that out of reverence for God we should religiously perform what we promised under oath. If we fail to do this in a matter of moment, grave sin will be committed, as all acknowledge. Moreover, as is obvious, if when the oath is taken there is no intention of keeping it, a grave sin of perjury is committed, for perjury is never venial on account of triviality of matter. If, however, when the oath was taken there was a serious intention of keeping it, but afterwards there was a failure to do so in a matter of small moment, a probable opinion holds that such a want of fidelity in a small matter cannot be more than a venial sin.

The obligation imposed by a promissory oath is of strict interpretation, and follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is annexed, so that it is dependent on all the conditions and limitations with which law, or custom, or the circumstances invest the act or contract. For a promissory oath is accessory and follows the nature of the principal act to which it is annexed. And so an oath to observe the rules or statutes of a corporation is understood to refer only to those that are in force.¹

¹ Can. 1318, 1321.

An oath should conduce to the service and honour of God; it cannot be a bond of iniquity; and so an oath to do what is wrong is sinful and of no effect. Similarly, an oath to do what is useless, or which hinders greater good, is null and void. In case, however, another party has acquired rights under an oath, justice requires that this should be kept, and so the mission oath, by which a sworn promise is given to serve a particular church or mission, binds a missionary priest even though he is persuaded that he has a vocation to the religious state.

In accordance with rules of canon law, an oath extorted by violence or grave fear is valid, but it can be dispensed by an ecclesiastical superior. Moreover, an oath taken without violence or fraud by which one renounces a private advantage or favour granted him by law must be kept as long as it can be kept without sin (Can. 1317, sec. 2, 3).

An oath may cease to bind from intrinsic or from extrinsic causes. If circumstances produce a change in the matter of the oath so that it has become unlawful, or useless, or an obstacle to greater good, or if some condition is not fulfilled, the oath no longer binds. The same must be said when the motive of a promissory oath no longer exists, as if I swore to help a poor person with money who subsequently becomes rich (Can. 1319).

An oath may be annulled, dispensed, commuted, or relaxed, in much the same way as a vow, and it will be more convenient to treat of these extrinsic causes for being released from the obligation of an oath in the next chapter, where the doctrine is applicable to vows and oaths alike (Can. 1320).

A vow is a promise made to God about something which is good, possible, and better than its omission.

It is, then, a promise, a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of a new obligation which binds the conscience; and in this it differs from a mere purpose to do better, which imposes no new and special obligation. Such an act must be perfectly human, performed with full knowledge and with complete use of reason, so that a vow taken by a man who was half drunk, or who had not the full use of reason, would not be valid. A vow, however, does not require actual and explicit consent when the obligation is assumed; it will be sufficient if there is virtual and implicit consent. A person who receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows that the Church has annexed a solemn vow of chastity, takes the vow by the very fact of being ordained, though at the time he is not thinking of it.

A vow in the strict sense is an act of divine worship offered to God alone, and so we cannot take a vow to the Blessed Virgin Mary or to the saints.

The matter of a vow must, of course, be something which is lawful and good; it would be an insult to God to promise him to do something wrong. It must be something which is possible, both physically and morally, for there can be no obligation to do what is impossible. A vow, then, to avoid all sin, even the slightest, would be invalid, for without a special privilege of God it is impossible. The matter of a vow must not only be good, but better than its omission or its opposite. For what is promised to God in a special manner and under a fresh obligation must be something that will be pleasing to him, but a promise to do something which had better not be done cannot be pleasing to God, who desires our perfection.

A vow is absolute when it has no condition attached to it, otherwise it is conditional.

A personal vow makes a promise of some action to be performed; a real vow dedicates a thing to God.

Vows are perpetual if the obligation is undertaken for life; otherwise they are temporary.

A solemn vow is one which is invested by the Church with special force and stability, together with certain legal effects; others are simple. The vows taken by religious in regular orders specially approved by the Pope, and by those who receive sacred orders, are solemn.

Substantial mistake about the matter of a vow or about the circumstances which are regarded as entering into the substance of the matter invalidates a vow. For substantial mistake hinders consent of the will; consent was given to something which was not there, and so there was no contract. A vow, then, dedicating to God a chalice which is thought to be silver, while in reality it is gold, would be invalid, just as a sale of it would be under the same mistake. Merely accidental mistake about things of little moment which were not really the motive for taking a vow does not invalidate it. However, according to St Alphonsus,¹ it is a probable opinion that a mistake about something connected with a vow, which if it had been known before would have prevented its being taken, is sufficient to invalidate it. This doctrine may be applied to private vows, but it cannot be extended to the vows of religion, which place the religious in a permanent state of life. In order to invalidate these, mistake must be substantial. For just as the perpetuity of the state of marriage, the good of the parties concerned, and the public good, require that only substantial mistake should invalidate marriage, so for the same reasons only substantial mistake invalidates the vows of religion, by which the religious enters into mystical espousals with Christ.

Fear arising from natural causes, provided that it does not take away the use of reason, does not invalidate a vow. If, however, grave fear be unjustly caused with a view to compelling another to take a vow, the vow is null and void (Can. 1307). The same is probably true even if the fear be slight. For God cannot be supposed to accept a promise which has not been freely given, but on the contrary extorted by unjust violence,

¹ Theol. Mor., 3, n. 226.

A vow, as we have seen, imposes a special obligation on him who has taken it to perform what he has promised: “ If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him: but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it.¹ If a special time was fixed for the fulfilment of the vow, with the intention that it should be fulfilled then, and at no other time, it must be fulfilled at the time appointed under pain of sin, and it no longer binds after the time has elapsed. If, on the contrary, it was intended that it should continue to bind even after the time fixed had elapsed, then the obligation still remains, The obligation should be fulfilled at the proper and reasonable time, and unreasonable delay will be sinful: ‘‘ When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... . And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”² It is not clear, however, whether even notable delay in the execution of a vow is always mortally sinful. Notable delay without just cause would be a mortal sin if the obligation of the vow were grave, and if the delay endangered its execution altogether or made the matter of the vow notably less than was promised. On the other hand, if a rich man vowed to give a large sum of money to the poor, assigning no particular time for the execution of the vow, it is probable that he would not commit a grave sin, even if he deferred giving the money until his death, and then gave it by his will. For in these circumstances the matter of the vow is not seriously affected by the delay, which therefore cannot be a grave sin.

The measure of the obligation of a vow is the will of him who takes it, much in the same way as the obligation of a law depends on the will of the lawgiver. Ordinarily it will be presumed that in grave matter, such as the Church considers to be sufficient for a precept to bind under mortal sin, a vow also binds under pain of grave sin, for the intention of him who took the vow is presumed to accommodate itself to the matter. Nothing, however, prevents him from limiting the obligation of a vow even in grave matter, so that transgressions of it will be only venial sins, if he expressly intended it. This, however, must not be understood of the essential vows of religion, nor of the solemn vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders. These vows are regulated by the Church, and according to her intention they bind under pain of grave sin in grave matter. Another exception must be made to the general rule that the obligation of a vow depends on the will of him who takes it; for if the matter be light it cannot form the ground for a grave moral obligation, when this is imposed by a human will. As a contract binds only the parties who agree to it, so no one can be bound by a vow made by someone else. In former times it was not uncommon for parents to vow a child to religion. Such a vow put no obligation on the child, but the parents were bound by it to give the child the opportunity of entering religion if he desired to do so. There are also instances of communities who have jointly taken a vow to observe a certain day as a fast or a feast. Thus the Romans, in the year 1703, vowed to observe as a fast day the vigil of the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary in thanksgiving for being preserved from an earthquake. The successors of those who took such a vow are bound to fulfil it, much in the same way as they are bound to pay interest on the National Debt. Their predecessors had the power to bind themselves and their successors, for the community remains the same moral entity.

We saw above that the matter of a vow must be something which is physically and morally possible. It may happen that he who took the vow may be able to fulfil it in part only and not wholly. He will be bound to do at least this when the matter is capable of being divided and is usually so treated, for the obligation of the vow then falls on the whole and on its several parts. Otherwise he will not be bound, nor will he be bound to do something which was a mere accessory of the substance of the vow, even if it be possible. And so one who should vow to fast for a week, if he found this impossible, would not be excused from fasting on the days that he could do so. But if he had vowed to build and decorate a church and afterwards found this to be impossible, he would not be bound to build a portion of it, nor to decorate some other church.

¹ Eccles. v 3.

² Deut. xxiii 21.

A vow may cease to bind for intrinsic or for extrinsic reasons. It will cease to bind intrinsically if the matter cease to be a better good or become impossible. Thus if a young man had vowed to enter religion, but his parents afterward became dependent on him so that he could not leave them without a violation of duty, his vow would cease to bind as long as the same conditions lasted. Or if a wealthy man vowed to spend a considerable sum of money in charities every year, if he became poor his vow would no longer bind him. And generally a vow, like any other promise, will cease to bind if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken. A vow ceases to bind extrinsically if it is annulled or dispensed or commuted. We will treat of these extrinsic causes of the cessation of a vow in the following paragraphs.

The annulment of a vow may be direct or indirect, By direct annulment the obligation of a vow is altogether removed by one who has authority over the will of the person who took the vow. For those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground (Can. 1312).

By indirect annulment the obligation is suspended by one who has authority over the matter of the vow. For it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of someone else. And so if a servant took a vow to hear Mass every morning, her mistress, whose rights are infringed thereby, might suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the servant remains with her, for no service is rendered to God by injuring a fellow-creature. When the term of service expired, the obligation of the vow would revive.

The annulment of a vow will be valid even when it is done without just cause and against the will of the subject, for even then a condition is wanting on which the validity of the vow depended. It will be lawful as well, if there be a reasonable cause, which need not necessarily be a very serious one.

All religious superiors can directly annul the vows taken by their subjects after their religious profession, and indirectly the vows taken by them previously, as far as they prejudice religious discipline or the rights of superiors. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—the essential vows of religion by the taking of which a person becomes a religious—cannot be annulled; for it is only by them that religious superiors receive their authority over the wills of their subjects, and authority is powerless against its own source.

Parents can directly annul the vows of their children taken before the age of puberty, when children become independent of the authority of their parents in matters relating to the service of God. They can indirectly annul the vows of their adult children as long as they continue to live with them.

A husband can directly annul the vows of his wife taken after marriage, and indirectly those taken previously. A wife can annul the vows of her husband only indirectly, as far as they prejudice her rights.

A dispensation from a vow is a remission of the vow made in the name of God for a just cause by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. The Church has always understood that the power to dispense vows is contained in the authority granted by our Lord to his Church.¹ She exercises this power in the name of God, not arbitrarily, but for just cause, which is required not merely for the lawfulness, but also for the validity of the act. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken without sufficient deliberation or in immature age.

The power of dispensing vows belongs to the public authority granted by God to the Church in order that she may rule and legislate for her people. It does not belong to the power of remitting sins which is exercised in the sacrament of Penance. All ecclesiastical prelates, then, who exercise jurisdiction in the external forum in their own name can dispense from vows, except in so far as their authority has been limited by a superior. Other ecclesiastics can only dispense from vows by delegated authority and according to its terms and conditions, (a) The Pope can for just cause dispense any of the faithful from any vow.

(b) For a good reason and provided that the dispensation does not injure the rights of others, local Ordinaries can dispense their subjects and also strangers from private vows which are not reserved to the Holy See. The only private vows which are now reserved to the Holy See are a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and a vow of entering into a religion of solemn vows, if they were taken absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309, 1313).

(c) Prelates of Religious Orders have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over their own subjects, and as a general rule have the same power over these as a Bishop has over his subjects. Besides, they receive by their privileges ample delegated authority to dispense not only their own subjects, but seculars and lay people as well. The privileges granted to the respective Orders should be consulted concerning this special authority and the conditions of its exercise.

(d) Parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum, and can only dispense from vows by delegated authority. They should consult their faculties to know what powers they have received from their Bishop, When a vow has been made in favour of a third person and accepted by him, such a vow cannot lawfully be dispensed without his consent, otherwise justice would be violated. And so, although a Bishop has power to dispense members of diocesan congregations from the vows of religion, he cannot do this lawfully without the knowledge and consent of the superiors of the Order.² The religious vows of congregations which have in any way been approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Pope.

The vow of chastity imposes a serious and arduous obligation which should not be undertaken without mature deliberation and knowledge of one’s own strength. A confessor should be slow to approve of such a vow being taken, especially if it is to be perpetual. When there is just cause for a dispensation being granted, it is the practice of the Church to commute, rather than altogether to dispense, a perpetual vow of chastity. This practice, though not of obligation, should be adhered to by those who have authority to dispense from this vow. It may be commuted into the obligation of receiving the sacraments at least once a month, saying the rosary every day, or other works of piety.

¹ Matt. xvin 18.

² Constitution of Leo XIII, Conditae, December 8, 1900.

A vow is commuted when another good work to be performed under the same obligation is substituted for that which was promised.

All who can dispense from a vow can also commute it, for the less is contained in the greater. It is obvious, however, that it must not be done to the injury of a third person. person who is under vow may commute it into some The good work which is evidently better than what was promised, for, as the rule of canon law has it, he does not violate his promise who changes it into something better (Can. 1314). He may also commute his vow into something that is of equal merit; but to avoid the danger of self-deception, and because it is not easy to say when good works are of equal merit, it is better to have recourse to one’s confessor. Special authority is required to commute a vow into something which is less good, for such a commutation is a sort of dispensation from the vow. In order that commutation into something which is less good may be lawful, a just cause is required, though less than is required for dispensation; probably, however, if there be no just cause the commutation will be valid, but the obligation will remain of supplying the deficiency as in human transactions. No special cause is required for commuting a vow into something which is evidently better; greater readiness in fulfilling one’s obligation will be a sufficient cause for commuting a vow into something of equal merit.

One whose vow has been commuted is always at liberty to return if he pleases to the observance of his vow, for the commutation was made in his favour, and he may renounce it.

When a vow has been commuted by competent authority its obligation is extinguished or transferred to the new work, and it does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, in case the performance of the substituted work is impossible, the original obligation revives.

III. Acts of Religion. The acts of religion are distinguished into internal and external acts. The internal acts are devotion and prayer. External acts are those by which we worship God either through one's own body, and this is adoration; or by offering to God some external thing, and these are sacrifice, oblation, and vow; or by assuming something pertaining to God, namely either the Sacraments or the name of God, which can be assumed either by invocation, or by oath, or by adjuration (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 84, Preface). Concerning each of these, discussion will be had in Book II.

I. The external act, or profession of faith, is sometimes prescribed. This is clear: 1. From Sacred Scripture. "If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God has raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."¹ 2. From the fact that the Church was instituted by her Author as an external, visible society of believers. But such a society carries with it that believers also profess the faith externally. 3. The majesty of God revealing requires this, for external adherence also is owed to Him. How greatly the obligation of sometimes professing the faith presses is clear, for example, from the fact that the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, on May 28, 1635, responded that "a Mohammedan who wishes, on account of danger to life, to be a hidden Christian and to remain such cannot be admitted to baptism, but must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion."²

II. The external act, or profession of faith, generally obliges the faithful "whenever their silence, evasiveness, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor" (can. 1325, § 1). Specifically, it obliges:

1. By reason of the precept of faith itself:

a) When a baptized infant attains the use of reason, or an adult embraces the faith or returns to it after public departure.

b) Several times in life, as is gathered from the arguments adduced under I. Besides, a man who lives Christianly abundantly satisfies this obligation, since hundreds of times he places acts which contain a profession of faith at least in an act exercised.

c) When the honor of God as Author of faith must be defended (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2); this has place: 1. if someone is questioned by public authority. Hence proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel that he frankly confess the faith as glorious to God and the faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful per se."³ But "if a prince by a general law orders the faithful to disclose themselves, by wearing a sign, or presenting themselves, or otherwise, they are not bound, since no one is bound to speak the truth unless he has been specially asked" (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 50), that is, the obligation of professing the faith presses only when someone is summoned before the law. Make exception if civil authority questions someone about the faith contrary to the prescription of law. Nor is the case present if someone is questioned for a merely political end, for example on the occasion of a census of the people. 2. If the faith is treated contemptuously and someone can conveniently defend it, for example by refuting objections that have been brought forward (St. Alphonsus, II, 11). 3. If, considering the circumstances, omission of profession would be taken for denial of the faith, as if, when several persons have been questioned about the faith and others are professing it, you were silent (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 40); likewise if, when you were questioned about the faith, another, while you were silent, answered for you that you were not a Catholic. I said considering the circumstances, because per se there is no obligation of professing the faith if someone is questioned by a private person (St. Alphonsus, II, 13, 20).

d) When, unless someone professes the faith, there is grave danger that he will deny the faith.

e) When profession of faith has been prescribed by the Church. Now:

alpha) It must be made by an adult to be baptized⁴ and, if an infant is to be baptized, by the sponsors;⁵ likewise by priests in their ordination⁶ and bishops in their consecration;⁷ specifically, by a person past puberty who is to be baptized and who is converted from heresy or schism to the faith.⁸

beta) From can. 1406, those held to the obligation of making profession of faith, according to the formula⁹ approved by the Apostolic See, are:

1. Before the president or his delegate, those who are present at an Ecumenical or particular Council or at a diocesan Synod with either consultative or deliberative vote; but the president before the same Council or Synod.

2. Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the first Cardinals in the order of priests and of deacons, and the Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church, those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity.

3. Before a delegate from the Apostolic See, those promoted to an episcopal see, even a nonresidential one, or to the governance of an abbey or prelature nullius, an Apostolic Vicariate, or an Apostolic Prefecture.

4. Before the cathedral Chapter, the Capitular Vicar.

5. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the Chapter, those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry.

6. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other consultors, those taken into the office of diocesan consultors.

7. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate, the Vicar General, parish priests, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual benefices, having care of souls; the rector and professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in seminaries, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books, of whom in can. 1393; priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.

8. Before the Ordinary or his delegate, the Rector of a University or Faculty; but before the Rector of a University or Faculty, or his delegate, all professors in a canonically erected University or Faculty, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination has been made, are endowed with academic degrees.

9. Before the Chapter or Superior who appointed them, or their delegate, Superiors in clerical religions (can. 1406, § 1).

10. Those who, after having left the prior office, benefice, or dignity, obtain another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again make profession of faith according to the norm of this canon (can. 1406, § 2), that is, can. 1406, § 1.

gamma) From the decree of the Holy Office,¹⁰ the anti-modernist oath, prescribed by Pius X in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum,¹¹ must be made, until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter, and indeed according to the formula attached to the Motu Proprio, which, with their name signed, they shall give to their Ordinary:

1. Clerics to be initiated into major orders; to each of them beforehand let there be handed a copy both of the profession of faith and of the formula for taking the oath, so that they may know them accurately in advance, with the sanction, as below, for violation of the oath added.

2. Priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.¹² These, however, are not bound when their faculties are prolonged or when they transfer to another diocese.

3. Parish priests, Canons, and Beneficiaries before entering into possession of the benefice.

4. Officials in episcopal curias and ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges.

5. Those chosen to deliver sermons during the time of Lent.

6. All officials in Roman Congregations or tribunals before the Cardinal Prefect or Secretary of the same Congregation or tribunal.

7. Moderators of religious families and Congregations before they enter office.

8. Doctors both of seminaries and of religious families, before they enter office.¹³

It is disputed whether those designated under 8 are bound to make the oath yearly. Now it seems it must be answered affirmatively; for the Holy Office declared¹⁴ that the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath must remain in their full force until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter. But, considering the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath, the said oath was to be made yearly by the aforesaid Doctors.¹⁵

Objection 1. The oath is intended as a complement of the profession of faith; and therefore, once the yearly profession of faith has been removed, it should likewise be held as removed. But the profession of faith must be made only at the beginning of the office undertaken (can. 1406, § 1, 7).

Response. The argument adduced seems sufficiently to prove that the reason of complement in the case should not be urged so strongly; in other words, that the anti-modernist oath must be urged even independently of the profession of faith. Besides, there is a special reason for requiring the oath, namely the combating of modernism, and this reason persists and presses, even if the profession of faith is omitted.

Objection 2. The declaration of the Holy Office can regard only the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, which does not prescribe a yearly oath; but not the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, which extends the sense of the said Motu Proprio to each year.

Response. Apart from the fact that it is in no way clear that the Motu Proprio does not prescribe a yearly oath, the declaration of the Holy Office is considered to regard the Motu Proprio as it had in fact been in force. But in fact it had been in force according to the norm of the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, whether that declaration is extensive or comprehensive.

Note 1. One does not satisfy the obligation of making profession of faith, established by can. 1406, if he makes it through a procurator or before a layman (can. 1407).

Note 2. Any custom against the canons just cited is reprobated (can. 1408), that is, canons 1406 and 1407.

Note 3. One who, contrary to the prescription of can. 1406, neglects to make profession of faith without a just impediment is to be warned, with a suitable term also fixed beforehand; when this has elapsed, if he is contumacious, he is to be punished even by deprivation of office, benefice, dignity, or function; nor meanwhile does he make his own the fruits of the benefice, office, dignity, or function (can. 2403).

2. By reason of the precept of another virtue, profession of faith obliges:

a) When by professing the faith someone would have hope of converting others to the faith, or by not professing it would be a scandal to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, II, 11).

b) When by neglecting profession of faith someone would expose himself to grave danger of committing some sin other than one against faith itself; which will rarely have place.

¹ Rom. 10:9 sq.; cf. Matt. 10:32 sq.

² May 28, 1635 (Collectanea, n. 84); cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1790 (Collectanea, n. 602).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1168.

⁴ Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 32.

⁵ Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 17.

⁶ Roman Pontifical, On the Ordination of a Priest.

⁷ Roman Pontifical, On the Consecration of a Bishop.

⁸ Roman Pontifical, Order for Reconciling an Apostate, Schismatic, or Heretic; cf. Instruction of the Holy Office to the Bishop of Philadelphia, July 20, 1859.

⁹ This formula is found at the beginning of the Code.

¹⁰ March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).

¹¹ September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655).

¹² Thus the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).

¹³ Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655); Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).

¹⁴ March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).

¹⁵ Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910.

This precept regards the honor to be shown to God through words. But by words he is especially honored through praise, a vow, an oath, and adjuration. Hence we shall treat first of praise, then of the vow, then of the oath, and finally of adjuration.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 91; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, lib. III, nn. 121-132; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, nn. 1-11.)

Praise is an honorable utterance of the excellence of God. But concerning praise, what we said about adoration holds, namely that in order for it to be a true act of religion, there must be joined to it an internal act by which we honor the excellence of God with mind and heart, and which is customarily called praise of the mind or praise of the heart.

We shall speak first, very briefly, about the usefulness and modes of praising, then about the sin chiefly opposed to it, that is, blasphemy.

I. Praise is useful not only because through it we worship God with both soul and body, but also because through it we stir up ourselves and our neighbor to greater devotion.

"We use words," says St. Thomas, "in one way toward God, and in another way toward man. For toward man we use words in order to express to him the concept of our heart, which he cannot know except through our words; and therefore we use oral praise toward man so that it may become known either to him or to others that we have a good opinion of the one praised; so that through this we may both provoke the one praised to better things, and lead others, among whom he is praised, to a good opinion and reverence and imitation of him. But toward God we use words, not indeed so that we may manifest our concepts to him, who is the inspector of hearts, but so that we may lead ourselves and others hearing us to reverence for him. And therefore oral praise is necessary, not indeed on account of God, but on account of the one praising himself, whose affection is aroused toward God from his praise" (II-II, q. 91, a. 1).

II. Praise can be made both by speech and by song.

On the usefulness of song, St. Thomas says: "Vocal praise is necessary for this, that man's affection may be stirred toward God, and therefore whatever things can be useful for this are fittingly assumed into divine praises. But it is manifest that according to the diverse melodies of sounds, the souls of men are disposed in diverse ways, as is clear through the Philosopher in VIII Politics (chs. 5, 6, and 7), and through Boethius in the prologue of music (or book I, ch. 1); and therefore it was salutarily instituted that song be assumed into divine praises, so that the souls of the weak may be more stirred to devotion. Hence Augustine says in X Confessions (ch. 33): 'I am led to approve the custom of singing in the Church, so that through the pleasures of the ears the weaker soul may rise up into the affection of piety'" (II-II, q. 91, a. 2).

¹ Cf. Suarez, De virtute et statu religionis; Bouquillon, De virtute religionis; Dignant, De virtute religionis (Theologia Brugensis); Vermeersch, De virtute religionis et pietatis; Wirthmuller, Die Tugend der Religion.

I. Notion. Blasphemy is customarily defined: contumelious speech against God. It is said:

1. Speech, that is, the signification of contempt or disparagement of God; in this signification the malice of blasphemy is essentially situated. Under the name of speech come thoughts, internal or mental speech;¹ words and writing, verbal speech; actions or gestures and deeds, real speech, as if someone from anger against God should gnash his teeth. All these can be significative of contempt of God (St. Alphonsus, III, 125).

2. Contumelious; namely, speech signifying contempt or disparagement of God is required. Moreover, for subjective malice it is not required that someone proceed from a formal intention of inflicting contumely; it suffices that he know and sufficiently advert that the speech is contumelious, and nevertheless admit it (St. Alphonsus, III, 124).

3. Against God; namely, speech, in order to be blasphemous, must signify contempt of God or dishonor God, and this either immediately or mediately in creatures. When the latter occurs we shall soon explain. Moreover, God is dishonored both by denying what belongs to him; and by attributing to a creature something which is proper to God alone; and by treating God in the manner of one showing indignation, mocking, or provoking (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 13, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 121).

Blasphemy differs: 1. from the vain usurpation of the divine name, which indeed is opposed to the reverence due to God, but does not signify contempt of God; 2. from sacrilege, which indeed imports unworthy treatment of a sacred thing, person, or place, but does not necessarily signify contempt of the sacred and consequently of God, as if someone steals a sacred thing. In the case in which sacrilege also signified contempt of the sacred, the malice of blasphemy would accede, as if a sacred thing were treated contumeliously.

For discerning whether speech is contumelious against God, attention should be paid to: 1. the force of the words; 2. the manner of uttering them and the circumstances. Namely, it can happen that words or other signs which of themselves do not involve contumely become contumelious if they are uttered, for example, from anger against God or from the mind of provoking him; 3. common estimation, whether in some region or in a particular place. Namely, although common estimation, whether in some region or in a particular place, commonly corresponds to the sense which words have according to etymology and native signification, nevertheless it can happen that common estimation attributes to words a contumelious sense which of themselves they do not have, and conversely. Hence there can also be expressions which in one place have the sense of blasphemy, but not in another. Besides, note that blasphemous words do not lose their sense, and therefore constitute true blasphemy, even if they are uttered fictitiously. But words lose a blasphemous sense if they are spoken narratively or for the sake of instruction. The context can so change the sense of the expression that it ceases to be contumelious, and only some or even no irreverence toward God is left (St. Alphonsus, III, 124).

"In doubt whether some expression is or is not blasphemy, it is by no means to be taken as blasphemy" (St. Alphonsus, III, 129). Similarly, an expression which has a twofold sense, one blasphemous and the other not blasphemous, should of itself and in practice not be held for blasphemy.

¹ It is called by St. Thomas blasphemy of the heart (II-II, q. 13, a. 1).

II. Division. Blasphemy is distinguished:

1. Into direct or immediate, and indirect or mediate, according as God is dishonored immediately in himself or mediately in creatures. This latter occurs when contumely is done to creatures which have a special relation to God. Therefore it has place:

a) When contumely is done to creatures which of themselves express order toward God, and are considered of themselves in that way, as Angels, Saints, and sacred things. They can, however, be considered abstractively, not as Saints, but as certain men who were on earth; as "if you call Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers, John and Paul eunuchs" (St. Alphonsus, III, 125). In this case there is not blasphemy, but there is sin against dulia: lightly, if from jest; gravely, "if you say these things contemptuously or from hatred or indignation against the Saints" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). There is not blasphemy because in the case the contumely does not redound upon God; there is sin against dulia because one cannot effectively abstract from the dignity intrinsic to the Saints.

b) When contumely is done to creatures which are, as it were, spontaneously considered with relation to God, although one can more easily abstract from that relation. Such are the soul,¹ heaven, and the whole world.

c) When contumely is done to creatures with explicit consideration of their relation to God; as if things are cursed as commanded by God, or with the word of God added, for example, "Cursed be God's rain." In the cases set forth, contumely toward the creature necessarily redounds upon God himself (St. Alphonsus, III, 129).

2. Into simple, heretical, and imprecatory, according as it contains merely contumely against God, or also either denies a truth revealed by God, or wishes evil to God or to things which, either of themselves or from positive consideration, are related to God.

3. Into directly and indirectly intended, according as someone formally wishes to dishonor God, or blasphemes without that formal intention. But it is clear that this intention is not required for the sin; for the willing of the object whose malice is known suffices.

¹ But not the dead, unless by the intention of those cursing the contumely is directed toward holy souls detained in purgatory; which does not have place. I said not the dead, because the word dead does not of itself explicitly express souls, but deceased men; hence to curse the dead is not blasphemy (St. Alphonsus, III, 130).

III. Morality. 1. Blasphemy is a grave sin from its whole genus, so that it can become only venial because of imperfection of the act or defect of advertence. For it is clear that blasphemy always contains grave irreverence toward God. With respect to defect of advertence, observe:

a) A defect of this kind often excuses those who both are not accustomed to blaspheme, or at least have retracted the habit of blaspheming, and utter blasphemy from a sudden movement. The same must be said of those who, not adverting to a blasphemous sense, pronounce formulas of impatience such as: "God has forgotten me"; "God has undeservedly inflicted these things on me" (St. Alphonsus, III, 129).

b) The habit of blaspheming more often does not prevent someone from sufficiently adverting to the evil. There is added that a habitual blasphemer who does not try to amend himself is culpable in the cause.

2. Immediate and mediate blasphemy do not seem to differ in species. For the contumely which is immediately inflicted on God and that which redounds upon him, such as mediate blasphemy, seem to be of the same moral deformity.

3. Although all blasphemies as such are of the same species, nevertheless often a circumstance accedes which adds a new species; as if someone blasphemes from hatred toward God, or utters heresy. Indeed there are those who judge that every blasphemy, even non-heretical blasphemy, is opposed to the profession of faith; this, however, is not evident (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 13, a. 1).

4. Finally, it is disputed whether contumely against the Saints contains, besides blasphemy, also a sin against hyperdulia or dulia. Moreover, St. Alphonsus and other authors, against others, hold the negative opinion as sufficiently probable, because "those who blaspheme the Saints, speaking commonly, more truly intend to affect them with injury, not on account of their precise and proper excellence, but insofar as they are mediately referred to God" (St. Alphonsus, III, 132).¹

¹ If someone, however, were to inflict contumely on the Saints both as such and not as such, or insofar as they were men on earth, there would be both blasphemy and a sin against dulia (n. 635).

IV. Diverse expressions. 1. Corrupted expressions remain blasphemous as follows:

a) If the corruption is only grammatical, so that according to common estimation the sense is not changed, they remain blasphemous.

b) If the corruption is substantial, so that according to common estimation the sense is truly changed, they do not remain blasphemous.

Hence even if it were admitted that the Dutch expression God verdoem me, or God verdom me, is blasphemous, nevertheless, for example, pot verdom me, God doorie would not be blasphemies; nor, even if Sacre nom de Dieu, Mille noms de Dieu were held for blasphemy, would Sacre nom, Mille noms be blasphemies; nor is Mort-bleu blasphemy.

c) If the corruption is equivocal, for example Farni (je renie) Dieu, blasphemy is in practice judged to be absent, unless common estimation attributes a blasphemous sense to the corrupted expression.

2. It is blasphemy: 1. to say: "Whether God wills or does not will, I shall do this." "Cursed be God." "May God perish." "Would that God did not exist." 2. With contempt or indignation against God to name the divine attributes, for example: "Bah! the goodness of God! Bah! the justice of God!" To this belongs the blasphemy of the Jews: "Hail, King of the Jews," and that of Julian the Apostate: "You have conquered, Galilean!" 3. To say: "May the Sacraments destroy you," since they were given by God not for destroying, but solely for saving man. It is not blasphemy if someone from anger or indignation, not against God but against a man or beast of burden, merely utters sacred words: "Death of God!" "A thousand Gods!" "A thousand sacraments!" "Sacrament!"¹

3. There was dispute about the French expression Sacre nom de Dieu, to which this one is equated: Sacre Dieu. Moreover, the word sacre, when the native signification of the word is considered, signifies holy rather than execrable. But from usage and common estimation, when it was uttered in anger, it was accepted in a bad sense. But in the year 1912 the Belgian Bishops tried to restore the native signification; and it is permissible to suspect that this has succeeded or will gradually succeed. A fortiori, at least in practice, the equivocally corrupted expressions Sacre die, Sacre diu, or dic cannot be held for blasphemy.²

4. What about the expression Deus damnet me?³ This indeed involves a grave imprecation, and therefore, if it were done seriously, it would be a grave sin. Moreover, it certainly is blasphemous if it is uttered by provoking God. Otherwise it is disputed. Cornelisse,⁴ Derksen, and others affirm. Aertnys,⁵ Lehmkuhl,⁶ Brahm,⁷ Forstmann,⁸ and others deny, and the Belgian Bishops embraced this opinion in letters in the year 1903. Moreover, this more benign opinion is sufficiently probable to us, because the arguments hitherto brought forward by the adversaries seem devoid of force, or can be sufficiently weakened.

Argument 1. The expression Deus damnet me is referred to the soul. But a curse of the soul is mediate blasphemy, which namely redounds upon God.

Response. I deny that the said expression is referred to the soul explicitly or by express intention. But mediate blasphemy occurs only when the soul is expressed or expressly intended (St. Alphonsus, III, 129, 130; n. 635).

Argument 2. The expression of which we speak contains a petition for a thing which is not fitting to God.

Response. It belongs to God both to save and to damn. Nevertheless it would be blasphemy to say: "May God damn me while innocent."

Argument 3. To wish or to ask for one's own damnation by the force of the words expresses contempt or disparagement of eternal beatitude. And this disparagement redounds upon God himself as Author, Giver, indeed Object of our beatitude. Therefore there is mediate blasphemy.

Response. I deny the major, because the wish or petition of damnation can arise from another motive than from contempt, for example from anger against oneself. Hence from the fact that damnation is wished or asked for, contempt of beatitude is not signified; and yet this is required for blasphemy.

Argument 4. To wish or ask for one's own damnation by the force of the words expresses contempt or disparagement of God insofar as he is terrible; and this is blasphemy.

Response. I deny the major, because the wish or petition of damnation can proceed also from another motive than from disparagement of God insofar as he is terrible, for example, as we said, from anger against oneself. Hence from the fact that damnation is wished or asked for, disparagement of God insofar as he is terrible is not signified.

¹ In German: Tausend Sacrament.

² Cf. Collectanea Mechliniensia, 1912, p. 192.

³ In Dutch: God verdom me.

⁴ Theologia Moralis, I, 312.

⁵ Sententiae a R. Adm. P. Aertnys non ita pridem reiectae religiosa defensio.

⁶ Cited work.

⁷ Casus Conscientiae, I, 218 and 236 note.

⁸ Cited work; Theologia moralis specialis, n. 95.

V. Things to be noted. 1. The confessor should take pains to know what expressions in the place of confession are held as certainly blasphemous.¹

2. One accustomed to blasphemies should be counseled that after uttering a blasphemy he immediately be sorry and impose upon himself a light penance, for example by saying: Glory be to the Father, etc. Sometimes it can be advised that instead of blasphemy the penitent use corrupted words or other words sounding sharply, yet signifying nothing evil.

¹ The Dutch word vloeken is used to signify both blasphemies and curses and abusive words against men and beasts of burden. Hence the confessor should inquire what the penitent intends. The Dutch formulas God verdoeme or God verdomme are joined by the people in the greater part of Holland to the sense: "May God damn me," which, as we have proved, probably is not blasphemous. In some parts they do not understand what they are saying, or think that with these words they are cursing God; and this is certainly grave blasphemy. Therefore if the confessor fears that the penitent admits the false sense, he should teach him the true sense. Otherwise he should say that to ask one's own damnation from God, if done seriously, is a mortal sin; otherwise only light; nevertheless, an evil custom of this kind is to be rooted out.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, lib. III, nn. 194-262; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, nn. 21-50.)

We shall speak first about the notion, division, and morality of a vow, then about the requisites for a vow, then about the obligation, and finally about the cessation of a vow. Having set these things forth, in a scholion we shall speak of reserved vows in particular.

I. Notion. A vow strictly so called is a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good (can. 1307, § 1). It is said:

1. Promise, that is, the giving of faith, from which an obligation of faith arises. Therefore a vow differs from a mere proposal or will of doing something; indeed, a promise of doing something can be composed with the proposal of not doing it.

2. Deliberate and free; these will be explained more opportunely soon.

3. Made to God; a promise made to the Saints, if it rests in them, is not a vow strictly so called or an act of latria, but of dulia or hyperdulia. Nevertheless the promises which are said to be made to the Saints, as it seems, are commonly vows strictly so called, because for the most part they are made to God alone in honor of a Saint, or at least are primarily referred to God (St. Alphonsus, III, 194; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 3).

4. Concerning a possible and better good; these also will soon be clarified.

II. Division. A vow is divided:

1. Into public and private. A public vow is one which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private.

2. Into solemn and simple. A solemn vow is one which has been recognized by the Church as such; otherwise it is simple.

3. Into reserved and non-reserved. A reserved vow is one whose dispensation only the Apostolic See can grant; otherwise it is non-reserved.

4. Into personal, real, and mixed, according as an action of the one vowing, or some thing, or both together, for example alms to be distributed by the one vowing, is promised.

5. Into explicit and implicit, according as it is emitted in proper terms, or is contained in another act or vow, or is judged annexed to it.

6. Into perpetual and temporary.

7. Into absolute and conditional, according as someone obliges himself absolutely, or dependently on some condition: either a condition suspensive of the obligation, as if someone vows entrance into Religion if he recovers health; or resolutory, as if someone vows entrance into Religion unless his sister enters marriage (St. Alphonsus, III, 195).

III. Morality. A vow is an honorable act. This is established against Wyclif; likewise against Luther and Calvin, who hold as honorable only vows concerning things already otherwise prescribed; finally against those who at least disapprove religious vows.³ But the honorableness of a vow is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which commends the making of vows both expressly⁴ and by narrating the examples of holy persons;⁵ 2. from the fact that a vow, by inducing an obligation, confirms the will in good.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Confessarius rite institutus ad impugnandam blasphemiam; Aertnys, De imprecatione "Deus damnet"; Brahm, Dissertatio de formula: G. v. d., Deus damnet me.

² Cf. Kirchberg, De voti natura, obligatione, honestate.

³ Letter of Leo XIII, Testem benevolentiae, January 22, 1899.

⁴ Ps. 75:12.

⁵ Gen. 28:20; Acts 18:18.

I. Requisites on the part of the one vowing. There are required a will to bind oneself, sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow, and perfect liberty.

1. A will to bind oneself, at least implicit; for this belongs to the essence of a vow. When the aforesaid will is lacking, there is a mere proposal (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 201).

Corollary I. One who is ignorant of the obligation of a vow vows invalidly, because he lacks the will to bind himself; for the will is not borne toward what is unknown. Except one who wills to vow as others are accustomed to do, even if he merely is ignorant that an obligation arises; for he has an implicit will to bind himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Corollary II. One who wills to vow, but positively excludes the obligation, does not vow; for although the obligation itself is the effect of a vow, nevertheless he who positively excludes the obligation does not have the mind, not even implicitly, of binding himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. Sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow; namely, distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices; yet this, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se. I said:

a) Distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices. The reason is that vague knowledge suffices for the one vowing to consent to the object, that is, to those things by which the object is constituted. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity is valid when the one vowing knows that by this vow carnal pleasures are renounced, although he is ignorant of precisely what these pleasures consist in; likewise even if he is ignorant of the "mysteries of life," as they are called.

b) Vague knowledge, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se; for, when this too is lacking, the one vowing does not consent to the object, since it is in no way known. It is said per se, because even vague knowledge does not seem to be required if the one vowing expressly intends to vow what others vow; for then he implicitly consents to the object. Hence one who, for example, in vowing chastity, expressly intends to vow what is vowed by others seems to vow validly, even if he is ignorant, for example, that by a vow of chastity carnal pleasures are renounced. But a defect even of vague knowledge seems almost hypothetical.

Corollary I. Error obstructs validity if it concerns the substantial elements of the thing promised, that is, whether its substance,¹ or the final cause,² or a circumstance which notably changes the substance.³ The reason is that, while error concerning substantial elements remains, consent to the substance is lacking. That a circumstance which notably changes the thing also must be referred to the substantial elements follows from the fact that in this case, according to common estimation, there is a substance or thing morally diverse (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary II. Error does not obstruct validity if it concerns either circumstances of lesser moment,⁴ or the impulsive cause.⁵ The reason is that consent to the substance of the thing promised is not lacking. And this holds even if the error gave occasion to the vow;⁶ for the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did. But the fact that, once the error was removed, he would not have consented, does not prevent the fact that he consented (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary III. Religious vows, no less than other vows, are void because of error concerning substantial elements, because the reason given above, being drawn from the nature of the thing, must hold here too. Nevertheless, in practice, the said vows will scarcely be void except because of error concerning the very substance of the vows, because, when that error is lacking, error generally will not be such as to constitute a morally diverse object.

3. Perfect liberty, that is, such as is required for sinning gravely; for only an act fully human or fully deliberated suffices for undertaking an obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 196). Hence vows are invalid when made before the age of discretion, or by one semi-insane, semi-drunk, semi-asleep, or arising from fear which so disturbs the use of reason that full deliberation is impeded. But vows emitted in fervor of devotion are valid, and generally also those which are emitted from sudden passion or levity of mind, because sufficient deliberation generally is present.

Fear which does not impede full deliberation influences a vow in this way:

a) The following do not obstruct validity: 1. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) struck from within, that is, by a cause that is not free; hence a vow emitted in danger of shipwreck is valid; 2. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) justly struck. The reason is that in each case, on the one hand, full deliberation is supposed, and on the other hand no injury has been done to the one vowing, so that no reason exists why the vow would be invalid; 3. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) unjustly struck, but not for extorting a vow, does not obstruct validity; hence a vow emitted so that God may rescue you from the hands of robbers is valid. The reason is that, in relation to the vow, no injury is inflicted on you (St. Alphonsus, III, 197).

b) At least by canon law, grave fear struck from without, unjustly, and for extorting a vow, obstructs validity (can. 1307, § 2). It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow. Some affirm, and they extend this also to light fear, because God does not accept a vow of this kind, lest He give force to unjust compulsion. Others deny, because, in their opinion, a sufficiently solid reason cannot be alleged why God would not accept a fully deliberated act (cf. St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ For example, someone vows a thing of his own which he judges to be glass, when it is a gem.

² Someone vows a Mass for the health of his father, when he is dead.

³ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues, when it is six leagues.

⁴ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues; but it is three and a half leagues.

⁵ Someone vows alms to be given to poor Peter, whom he judges to be religious, when he is irreligious.

⁶ Suppose that in the cases set forth under 4 and 5, had the error been absent, he would not have vowed the pilgrimage or the alms.

II. Requisites on the part of the thing promised. The thing promised must be possible, morally good, and better than its contradictory.

1. Let it be possible, and indeed physically and morally. For there can be no obligation to physically impossible things; but an obligation of morally impossible things, since it would tend to detriment, is not accepted by God. If the thing promised is partly possible, partly impossible, the vow is valid for the possible part, if the matter both is divisible by its nature, and by the intention of the one vowing has been promised dividedly. If in the matter of a vow one thing is principal and another accessory, the vow is valid as to the possible principal thing, although the accessory is impossible; but not the converse (St. Alphonsus, III, 202).

2. Let it be morally good, because God is offended by an evil thing and is not worshiped by an indifferent thing; hence a promise of things of this kind is not accepted by God. An indifferent thing indeed can be done in an honorable manner; but the thing, not the manner, is supposed to be vowed. Otherwise one must speak if an act indifferent in itself becomes good because of a circumstance; in that case, as clothed with that circumstance, it can be vowed.

3. Let it be better than its contradictory; and this either in itself, or with the circumstances considered, because a promise of abstaining from a thing by which God is worshiped more is not accepted by Him.

Corollary I. A vow of not sinning at all, whether perpetually or for a notable time, is null. For that is impossible without a special privilege of God.¹ But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid; likewise a vow of employing special care to avoid all sins; likewise - but only in a person of solid virtue - a vow of avoiding either all fully deliberated venial sins, or a certain species of venial sins not so difficult to avoid, for example a vow of not stealing. Otherwise one must speak concerning a certain species of venial sins which scarcely can be avoided, as are, for example, idle thoughts (St. Alphonsus, III, 203). A vow of always doing what is held to be more perfect is valid in a person of very great virtue, insofar as it is understood of fully deliberated acts.

Corollary II. A vow of not marrying, or of chastity, is generally valid. I said generally, because it is disputed whether it is valid if it is pronounced in the world by one for whom, because of peculiar frailty, a peculiar danger of incontinence is imminent. Some deny, because marriage seems better, all things considered. More commonly it is affirmed, because, since other means of preserving continence are available, celibacy is better and remains so. A vow of a thing prescribed, since it is morally good, is valid, and effects that a transgression is also opposed to religion (St. Alphonsus, III, 213). A vow emitted against the precept of a superior is valid if the superior only forbade vowing; in that case the act of vowing is evil, but the object which is vowed is good, as is supposed. Otherwise one must speak if a thing forbidden by the superior is vowed.

A vow made concerning a good work, but for an evil end:

a) It is valid if only the act of vowing is elicited for an evil end, for example if someone publicly vows alms in order to gain vainglory (St. Alphonsus, III, n. 206).

b) It is not valid if a good work is vowed as to be directed to an evil end alone, or from a mere affection for an evil thing, for example alms to be given for vain glory alone, or only for seducing someone to sin. The reason is that the thing promised, as it is intended - that is, as a means of attaining an evil end - is evil. If a good work is vowed as also to be directed to a good end, the vow is valid, and the thing promised seems to have to be performed for the good end alone, because the thing promised, as it is intended, is also good (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

A vow made concerning a good work, but for an indifferent end (for example if someone vows fasting in order to save expenses): such a vow is not valid if a good work is vowed as to be directed to an indifferent end alone; if a good work is vowed as also to be directed to a good end, the vow seems to be valid, as was said concerning a good work to be directed to an evil end and to a good end.

A vow emitted from affection for a good thing, even if joined with an evil cause or condition, seems to be valid, because the thing promised, as it is intended - that is, as a means of obtaining a good or licit thing - is good; for example if you vow alms so that you may not be caught in a crime (St. Alphonsus, III, 206).

Corollary III. A vow of marrying is not valid per se, because the opposite is better; it is valid per accidens: 1. if someone is otherwise bound to marriage; 2. one who, because of a particular danger of incontinence, emitted the said vow, more probably is bound by the vow, but only conditionally, namely unless he wishes to use other means; 3. likewise, per se, a vow of marrying a poor girl is valid if one is going to marry someone (St. Alphonsus, III, 207, 209; VI, 75). Likewise, a vow of passing to a laxer Religion is invalid. Likewise, a vow not to vow is invalid, because to vow is better; nevertheless a vow of not vowing without the counsel of the confessor is valid. He who has emitted this vow and nevertheless, without consulting the confessor, vows, acts validly but illicitly; besides, in that case, more probably he would also vow invalidly if the one vowing had intended from the beginning that vows emitted without the counsel of the confessor would be null, and without attending to this intention emitted a vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 210).

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 23.

I. The existence of the obligation is clear from Sacred Scripture: "If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases Him; but whatever you have vowed, pay."¹ And indeed the reverence due to God requires that we fulfill the things which we have promised Him.

¹ Eccl. 5:3.

II. The subject of the obligation is only the one vowing, so that no one can be bound directly by force of a vow emitted by another (can. 1310, § 1). I said directly, because the obligation of a real vow, and of a mixed vow insofar as it is real, passes to heirs through inheritance, as we shall explain shortly. I said by force of a vow emitted by another, because if a community has emitted a vow, successors are not bound by force of the vow, but can be bound by reason of a pact, statute, or custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 213, 214, 216, 217).

III. The object of the obligation, or the matter to which the obligation extends, depends on the intention of the one vowing; this is especially to be deduced from the words pronounced or comprehended in the mind, with attention also to common estimation and the norm for interpreting ecclesiastical law in similar matter (St. Alphonsus, III, 222, 180).

Corollary. One who has vowed to recite the Rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, unless something else is clear from the mind of the one vowing. For so the word Rosary is commonly taken. One who has vowed to fast for a month is not bound on Sundays. One who has vowed to fast on each Friday or Saturday, if on such a day, for example, the Nativity of the Lord falls (cf. can. 1252, § 4), is not bound to fast. One who has vowed to hear Mass for a month is not bound on Sundays and feast days to two Masses. Except, as to individual cases, if a contrary mind is evident (St. Alphonsus, III, 224). One who has emitted an indeterminate vow: if it is indeterminate as to time - as if someone has vowed to recite the Rosary daily - is bound perpetually, unless another mind is clear; if it is indeterminate as to the quality or quantity of the thing, he can define it at will, provided the thing defined is not such that it should be judged rather to mock God than to satisfy the vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 221).

IV. The quality of the obligation. The obligation of a vow, that is, of a promise made to God, is an obligation of religion as to genus (can. 1307, § 1), and of fidelity toward God as to species. Namely, the reverence due to God, as we noted under I, requires that we perform the things promised to Him. But here note the difference between fidelity due to men and that by which we are bound toward God. Fidelity is owed to men lest they be deceived; but to God, lest there be derogation from the reverence due to Him. Moreover, all violations of vows are of the same species; hence if another malice is added, for example, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicated, he can confess separately the violation of the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

V. The quantity of the obligation. The obligation of a vow generally is grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns grave or light matter. I said generally, because the one vowing can emit a vow, which is like a law, under light obligation,¹ just as a legislator can impose a grave thing under light obligation (n. 149); nevertheless, the one vowing is presumed not to have done this. A matter light in every respect cannot be vowed under grave obligation (n. 149; St. Alphonsus, III, 211, 213). Moreover:

1. Matter is judged grave which, considering the thing and the circumstances, would be prescribed by the Church under grave obligation. If it is a question of a thing to be given, that matter is held grave which, if a reason of justice intervened, would have to be given under grave obligation. Yet the said norms should be understood so that greater matter is required if someone were to vow a series of objects or a great quantity to be bestowed. Hence, for example, one who promises to hear 20 Masses does not seem to sin gravely by neglecting one or another.

2. If someone has vowed something to be repeated often, which is not grave (as if someone vows that he will bestow a franc on the poor every week), there cannot be grave matter unless several matters coalesce. But several matters coalesce if the one vowing intended them after the manner of one thing, as in the example set forth; otherwise if he intended them separately. But if the intention of the one vowing is doubtful, several matters are presumed to have been intended after the manner of one thing if it is a question of a real vow; otherwise if it is a question of a personal vow.

¹ Except if it is a question of public vows, which, when emitted under light obligation, are rejected by the Church and therefore are not accepted by God.

VI. Fulfillment of the obligation; concerning this it must be seen when and how a vow ought to be fulfilled.

1. The time for fulfilling a vow. a) If the time is determined, this must be observed. If a vow has not been fulfilled at the determined time, the obligation ceases or does not cease according as the time was attached for ending the obligation, or for urging its execution. Moreover, the time is judged attached for ending the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the time itself, as if someone emits a vow of fasting on the Vigil of some Saint. Nor then, if an impediment is foreseen, is there an obligation of anticipating it (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). It is judged attached for urging the execution of the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the vow to be fulfilled, as if someone emits a vow of fasting next Thursday, without regard to any special character of that day. In that case the vow must afterward be fulfilled if it was not fulfilled at the appointed time; indeed, generally there is an obligation of anticipating it if it is foreseen that the vow can be fulfilled neither at the appointed time nor afterward.¹ In doubt whether the time has been determined for ending the obligation or for urging its execution, the former is presumed in personal vows, the latter in real vows (St. Alphonsus, III, cited place); nevertheless the circumstances should be attended to. One who emitted a vow of doing this or that within a determined time, for example of receiving Communion within this month, if after the time has begun he foresees an impediment, certainly is bound to fulfill the vow now.

b) If the time is not determined, the vow ordinarily must be fulfilled as soon as it can be fulfilled morally. This is clear from Sacred Scripture,² and from the fact that a vow has the character of a debt. I said ordinarily, because sometimes one might rightly say that the obligation of fulfilling the vow as soon as morally possible is not undertaken by the one vowing, but that the matter can be taken more broadly. Moreover, delay, unless there is a just cause, is a grave sin: 1. when it is done with grave danger of omission or of inability to fulfill the vow; 2. when the delay is notable, and it concerns a vow in which delay involves diminution of the proximate matter, as happens, for example, in a vow of entering Religion; in this vow a delay beyond half a year is held by St. Alphonsus (III, 221) to be mortal. It is disputed whether one sins gravely if the delay is notable, say for two or three years, and it concerns a vow in which the delay does not involve diminution of the matter promised, as happens, for example, in a vow of making a pilgrimage, etc. But with St. Alphonsus (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 33) it seems it must be affirmed, because so great a delay of execution against the will of the creditor, that is, God, seems to contain grave disorder. Deuteronomy seems to favor this.³

2. The manner of fulfilling a vow. a) A personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself. Hence it cannot be fulfilled through another; nor, if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, must another be substituted by him (St. Alphonsus, III, 217).

b) "Real vows are to be discharged from one's own property; hence one who cannot do so from his own property is not bound to beg from another. But if he can do so from his own property, and yet another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to discharge it for him, this is valid.... Indeed, he sufficiently satisfies a vow or oath of alms who, after learning of it, ratifies alms given by another for that purpose while he himself was unaware of it; because then the vow is already fulfilled with the consent of the one vowing" (St. Alphonsus, III, 217). The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, and likewise the obligation of a mixed vow for the part by which it is real (can. 1310, § 2). It is disputed, however, of what nature the obligation of the heir is. But the real obligations of the testator seem indirectly to affect his goods themselves, so that the said obligations, whether of justice, or of fidelity, or of religion, or of a manifold title, pass to the heirs by the same title by which the testator was bound by them.

c) A mixed vow, as to the personal and real part respectively, must be fulfilled as was said under a and b. But if the obligation of the vow ceases insofar as it is personal, for that reason its obligation does not cease insofar as it is real, unless the real part was promised only accessorily.

¹ Sometimes, however, from the circumstances the intention of the one vowing not to bind himself before the attached time can be gathered.

² Deut. 23:21.

³ Deut. 23:21.

VII. The obligation of certain vows in particular. 1. A vow under a suspensive condition - for example, "I vow entrance into Religion, if my father consents" - obliges in this way: the one vowing is bound:

a) Once the condition has been fulfilled, to execute the vow. Nevertheless he is not bound until the condition has been fulfilled specifically, not merely equivalently. For example, "you vowed Religion if your sister married; it does not suffice if she dies" (St. Alphonsus, III, 219); except if another intention of the one vowing is sufficiently clear.

b) Not to render himself unable to execute the vow.

c) Not maliciously to impede the condition from being fulfilled. But one who impedes that does not act maliciously if it is a question of a condition which depends on the will of the one vowing. Hence if someone vowed to enter religion if within a year he had not entered marriage, he can enter marriage, and thus impede the condition from being fulfilled. "Likewise, you vowed chastity; if you fall from frailty, you do not sin with respect to the vow; otherwise, if you sin deliberately in order to be freed from the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 218). One who impedes the condition from being fulfilled is bound to remove the malicious influence if the condition still can be fulfilled; if it can no longer be fulfilled, he is not bound to execute the vow, unless it is evident that the intention of the one vowing extended more broadly (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. A penal vow - for example, "I vow Religion if I shall have perpetrated such a sin again" - after the sin has been committed does not oblige if fully deliberated consent was lacking.

3. A vow concerning the deed of another is understood thus: that the one vowing ought prudently to take care that the other perform it (St. Alphonsus, III, 216).

Corollary I. In strict doubt whether someone has vowed, or has taken up a mere proposal, he is not bound by the obligation of a vow (n. 228). In doubt whether a prepubescent person, otherwise normal, could omit a vow with sufficient deliberation, the faculty is presumed if he has completed the seventh year; otherwise, if he has not completed the seventh year (cf. can. 88, § 3).

Corollary II. One who has performed the thing promised while unmindful of the vow more probably has satisfied the vow, because everyone is judged to have the habitual will of satisfying a debt before what is not a debt. Otherwise one must speak of him who, mindful of the vow, intends not to satisfy it (St. Alphonsus, III, 224, at the end).

Corollary III. In strict doubt whether the act by which the vow is fulfilled has been placed, there is an obligation of observing it; otherwise if it is doubted whether the act placed suffices for fulfilling the vow (n. 231).

A vow can cease both through intrinsic causes and through an extrinsic cause, that is, through an authority intervening. Cessation which occurs through intrinsic causes is customarily called simple cessation. But authority can intervene through irritation, suspension, dispensation, and commutation (can. 1311). We shall speak of each.

The causes of simple cessation are: 1. lapse of time attached for ending the obligation; 2. substantial change of the matter promised; 3. defect of the condition on which the vow depends; 4. defect of the final cause (can. 1311).

I. Lapse of time, namely time attached for ending the obligation. When time ought to be judged attached in this way, see n. 649.

II. Substantial change of the matter promised. This has place if the matter becomes evil, indifferent, or less good than its omission. Likewise if the matter is notably changed because of a supervening and unforeseen circumstance. The reason is that the intention of the one vowing is judged to be interpreted in this way; indeed, not without foundation is notable change said to constitute a morally diverse object (St. Alphonsus, III, 226). Hence one who has vowed, for example, to build a church, is not bound by the vow if and as long as, because of damage following in the state of his fortune, the execution of the vow is rendered difficult. Except from the rule stated: 1. if it is a question of public vows, which are: religious vows, solemn as well as simple, perpetual as well as temporary, substantial as well as those which are annexed to them; likewise a vow annexed to Sacred Order; 2. if the discussion concerns a supervening difficulty which the matter of the vow carries with it by its nature, or which follows from the changed disposition or will of the one vowing. The reason is that in the former case, since the common good demands it, every supervening circumstance is judged to have been comprehended in the vow; in the latter case, the circumstance of grave supervening difficulty, since the very nature of the thing carries it with it, is judged to be contained in the vow. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity, even one emitted in the world, does not cease because of a difficulty afterward arising, even if it was unforeseen (St. Alphonsus, IV, 50). Besides, note:

1. If the matter of the vow has become unsuitable or impossible in part, the obligation also ceases as to the other part if the matter of the vow is either indivisible by nature, or was intended undividedly by the one vowing; but it persists if the matter of the vow both is divisible by its nature and was intended dividedly by the one vowing. Hence one who vowed 100 Masses and can offer only 50 is bound to these. If in the matter of the vow principal and accessory can be distinguished, when the principal falls, the accessory falls, but not conversely.

2. One who has emitted a disjunctive vow - for example, "I vow that I will undertake a pilgrimage or cause 10 Masses to be celebrated" - in the case in which one part has become unsuitable or impossible, is bound in this way:

a) If before election one part becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing is per se immune from every obligation. For the circumstance that the one vowing now cannot choose is not judged to have been comprehended in the vow. Except: 1. if with sufficient certainty he intended one or the other part absolutely, that is, whatever might happen; 2. if the other part became unsuitable or impossible through the fault of the one vowing (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

b) If after election the part not elected becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing is bound to perform the part elected, because in that case the election seems to have to be regarded as validly determinative of the prior vow (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) If the part elected, not yet put into execution, becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing per se is bound to nothing, according to what was said under a).

Corollary. One who has chosen one part can sufficiently probably commute it with the other part, because the election is not judged to have been intended in such a way that the one vowing deprived himself of the faculty of choosing the other part (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

III. Defect of the condition, namely the condition on which the vow depends; for example, if someone vows a pilgrimage if this or that should succeed: when the thing does not succeed, the vow collapses.

IV. Defect or cessation of the final cause, that is, of the cause for which the vow was emitted uniquely or principally, and without which it would not have been emitted; as if someone vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining his father's health, and the father dies before the vow is fulfilled.

I. Notion. Irritation is the annulment of a vow, validly emitted, made by one who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing. Irritation is customarily distinguished as twofold, direct and indirect; but indirect irritation is rather called suspension, which is also more conformable to the Code of Canon Law (cf. can. 1312, § 2).

II. The existence of the power of irritating vows is clear both from the tradition and practice of the Church, and from can. 1312, § 1.

III. The source of the power. The power of irritating vows seems to be founded either in dominative power alone, or in dominative power completed or perfected by positive law.¹ According to the former opinion, dominative power of itself imports the power of irritating vows; according to the other, the power of irritating vows is indeed suggested, as to the power of parents, by the weakness of children; as to the power of religious superiors, by the fact that the subjection of the religious is most especially ordered to the direction of those things which can contribute to perfection, such as vows. From the things said, I say, the power of irritating is indeed suggested, but nevertheless it is not present in dominative power unless in some way it is completed or perfected by positive law (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 227). Whatever the case, in fact dominative power certainly has annexed to it the power of irritating, as will be clear from what must now be said.

¹ Some derive the power of irritating vows from positive law alone; others judge that, at least in some cases, it must be strengthened and more accurately circumscribed by positive law (cf. Damen, cited work, pp. 11-12).

IV. The subject of the power of irritating vows is all those who enjoy dominative power over the will of the one vowing (can. 1312, § 1). If the power of the superior, for example of the father with respect to a pubescent child, has not wholly ceased, the faculty of irritating vows emitted in the time of subjection persists, provided the one vowing, after the time of subjection, has not confirmed the vow with knowledge of the infirmity of the vow. Otherwise one must speak if the power of the superior, for example of a regular Prelate, has been wholly extinguished, or some religious is now no longer subject to him (St. Alphonsus, III, 238).

To whom specifically the power of irritating vows belongs, see in the corollary.

V. The extent of the power. The power of irritating extends to all vows of subjects emitted in the time of subjection, even to those which are reserved as to dispensation; likewise to those which are to be executed after the time of subjection has passed; likewise to those which the lord himself has approved. Indeed, he cannot even abdicate the faculty annexed to dominative power, namely that of irritating vows. It was disputed whether the power extended to vows concerning internal acts; but much more commonly it was affirmed, and can. 1312, § 1 does not except them (St. Alphonsus, III, 227).

VI. The use of the power. Irritation made without cause is valid; however, it is lightly illicit, insofar as the progress of the subject is irrationally impeded. Moreover, any just or reasonable cause suffices (can. 1312, § 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 228).

VII. The effect of irritation is that the vow is entirely extinguished, so that in no case does the obligation afterward revive (can. 1312, § 1).

Corollary. The following can irritate vows:

1. A father can irritate vows emitted by prepubescent children, provided that when they become pubescent they have not confirmed them while aware of the infirmity of the prior vow. If, unaware of the infirmity, they confirm them, strictly speaking they only renew the vow as it was; but it was infirm or irritatable. The aforesaid power also belongs to him who, either by law (as a tutor), or by the father's disposition, is substituted in his place. The reason is that, because of the weakness of prepubescents, power over their will, that is, dominative power, must be judged to belong to the father and to the others enumerated. But dominative power, by can. 1312, § 1, has annexed to it the power of irritating vows (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 238; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 9).

It is disputed whether a father can irritate vows emitted by pubescent minors. Now the matter seems wholly doubtful, because the father's dominative power over pubescent minors is not proved. Nor is can. 89, which declares: "A minor person remains subject to the power of parents or guardians in the exercise of his rights, except in those things in which the law holds minors exempt from power"; nor is the cited canon, I say, judged to settle the question or theoretical controversy whether or not the father enjoys dominative power over pubescent minors.

Corollary. In doubt whether a vow was emitted before or after puberty, the power of irritating is doubtful, because it is doubtful whether the vow was emitted at a time when it was certainly subject to irritation.

2. The mother seems able to do the same as the father, provided he does not contradict, or with dependence on the father. The reason is that dominative power seems to belong to the mother as much as to the father, because she is the principle of the child no less than the father. Once dominative power is admitted, the power of irritating vows also must be admitted (St. Thomas, opusc. 17, cap. 13, vers. Decimo; St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 36).

3. The husband seems to have the power of irritating the vows of the wife, because he seems to enjoy dominative power over her; for such power of itself is very expedient for the good of conjugal society, that is, for fostering dependence and intense love, for restraining the wife's impulses of mind, and for favoring the peace of the family. But dominative power carries with it the power of irritating vows (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 324).¹

4. Superiors of religious, both exempt and non-exempt, both solemnly and simply professed, and likewise Superioresses, can directly irritate vows emitted by subjects during the time in which they were subject to themselves or to other Superiors, for example to a predecessor (can. 501, § 1). The power does not extend: 1. to substantial religious vows, for since these are constitutive of subjection, they are emitted independently of this subjection, and therefore cannot be called infirm or irritatable; 2. to vows annexed to the substantial vows, because since they are emitted together with the substantial vows, they likewise are judged to have been made independently of subjection. They also except the vow of passing to a stricter Religion² (St. Alphonsus, III, 233; IV, 53, 54).

What has been said about Superiors of religious should also be applied: 1. to the Pope with respect to professed male and female religious (cf. can. 499, § 1); 2. to Chapters of religious according to the norm of the constitutions and common law (cf. can. 501, § 1); 3. to the Bishop, if it is a question of a religion of diocesan right.

A Superior cannot irritate the vows of novices unless, according to the things said under I, he truly supplies the place of a parent, and it is a question of a vow which a parent could irritate (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55). Nor does the faculty of irritating the vows of novices or other faithful belong to the Supreme Pontiff, because he lacks dominative power over them.

Question. Whether the Church supplies probable power of irritating vows.

Response. We judge that it must be denied. For the power of irritating vows supposes dominative power; if this is present, the Church certainly completes it; if it is not present, it cannot be completed.

Corollary. Those who enjoy the power of irritating vows can also in advance render subjects incapable of vowing, either in some matter or universally, so that vows from that time are null from the beginning (St. Alphonsus, III, 228).

¹ Cf. Num. 30:7-13; Eph. 5:24.

² Cap. 18, de Reg.

I. Notion. Suspension of a vow is relaxation of the obligation of a vow for a time, made by one who has power over the matter of the vow. By authors it is commonly called indirect irritation.

II. What the subject of the power is is clear from the notion, and is handed down in these words of can. 1312, § 2: "He who has power not indeed over the will of the one vowing, but over the matter of the vow, can suspend the obligation of the vow for so long as the fulfillment of the vow would bring prejudice to himself."

III. The extent of the power. The faculty of suspending vows extends to all vows which, and insofar as, prejudice the power or right of the one about to suspend; even to those which were emitted at a time when the aforesaid power or right did not yet have force, for example, if it is a question of novices, to vows emitted before the novitiate. Likewise the faculty extends to vows which the superior approved, unless by approving them he renounced the right to which the vow was prejudicial (St. Alphonsus, III, 242).

The Sin of Blasphemy.—So far we have spoken of the sins of unbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come to the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of faith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of ordinary denial of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article of faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will be treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more serious sin is blasphemy, that is, the denial to God of something that is His; or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of this sin we shall speak now.

Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for God. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy, which is contrary to the external profession of faith. External blasphemy is opposed to faith either directly (by denying what is of faith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and hence it is either heretical or non-heretical.

(a) Heretical blasphemy affirms about God something false, or denies about Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when some created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when some divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is heretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin, or that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to deny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true, etc.

(b) Non-heretical blasphemy affirms or denies something about God according to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is opposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be treated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol. II). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: “God is good!”

Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.—(a) Custom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in discovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain common expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to signification the phrase, “Sacred Name of God,” is harmless and might be a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken in French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification, the expression “Ye gods” in English, “Thousand names of God” in French, “Thousand Sacraments” in German, are blasphemous; but according to the sense in which they are used by the people they merely express surprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English language as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions, just as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from obscenity.

(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the presence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter are capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an ambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that no blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed trying to correct his children that he exclaims: “Why did the Lord ever send me such pests?” Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers him: “Who is to blame if they are pests?” Since Titus is habitually religious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former sounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy. Claudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series of calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: “I must be only a step-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever create me?” The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather than of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often addresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that she is the goddess at Whose shrine he worships, his supreme beatitude, etc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by Balbus they are harmless.

The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.—(a) From its very nature (i.e., from the importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures), blasphemy is a mortal sin, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and destroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith itself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15 sqq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished as the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and generally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a public nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society; when printed, it is a libel.

(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But blasphemy is the greatest of the sins against faith, since to inner unbelief it adds external denial and insult.

(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of the smallness of the matter involved, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great when its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say that our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show contempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.

(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of unpremeditation, if at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as murder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a sudden fit of anger. Example: Sempronius has the habit when driving his refractory mules of shouting at them: “You creatures of the devil!” A priest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is blasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules irritate him, making no effort to improve.

Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the duty of confession.

[a] There are three distinct species of blasphemy—non-heretical, which is opposed to the virtue of religion; heretical, which is opposed to religion and faith; diabolical, which is opposed to religion, faith and the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished in confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did not obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint’s picture to the wall, saying: “You have great influence with God!” (non-heretical blasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: “I have lost all faith in Saints” (heretical blasphemy). Sempronia, Whose child has just died, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical blasphemy).

(b) Circumstances may aggravate the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that is directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the Saints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy against other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is greater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy that excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more concealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver than blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require that aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others say this is not necessary (see Vol. II).

According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250), blasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy against the Father, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or weakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy; (b) blasphemy against the Son, which is contumely against God spoken out of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13); (c) blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is contumely against God spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who attributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt, xii. 31).

To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of God that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be reduced to six, there are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (i.e., six kinds of contemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner contempt is a blasphemy.

(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the thought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence, despair and presumption which remove these divine preventives of sin are blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the truth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence, resistance to the known truth and displeasure at the progress of God’s kingdom are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.

(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the nothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former inclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the latter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the resolve not to grieve over sin and obstinate adherence to such a resolve are also sins against the Holy Ghost.

There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to come (Matt., xii. 31)?

(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are unpardonable according to their nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their nature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they also remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus, if one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines not to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance, which is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or ignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.

(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are not unpardonable, if we consider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously a disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which, according to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope and repentance to those who were in despair, for example. Hence, we repeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life.

Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy suddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (i.e., the willing choice of evil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes due to a disorder in the will itself which has a strong inclination towards wrong, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It is clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly, Example: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This argues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong attachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to the fact that the will has lost certain protections against sin, and hence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the Holy Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God’s gifts contained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but follows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3); but, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that one should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been careful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however, that a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or malicious sinner.

Remedies Against Blasphemy.—(a) Those who blaspheme maliciously should be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the absurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and ejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b) Those who blaspheme through habit or out of sudden anger or passion should be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make themselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden outbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be performed each time blasphemy is uttered.

Absolution of Blasphemers.—(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no censure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every confessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy is heretical, excommunication is incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may be granted as explained there.

The Accidentals of a Contract.—(a) Bond is the agreement by the obligor of a contract to pay a certain forfeit to the obligee, if the former does not perform his contract or does not perform it before a certain date. This agreement obliges in conscience, if the promise was seriously made, if the penalty is not excessive, and if the breach of agreement is culpable.

(b) Oaths added to contracts have moral effects on the contracts themselves and also on acts contrary to them. As regards the contract, an oath adds the obligation of religion to that of justice, if the contract is valid and irrescindable; and the common opinion is that it strengthens a contract extrinsically, that is, it induces an obligation of religion to keep the promise, if the oath is invalid or rescindable by positive law only and in favor of a private privilege; but an oath in no way strengthens a contract that is naturally invalid or rescindable positively on account of the public good. As regards acts that are contrary to an invalid or rescindable contract that was confirmed by a valid oath, they are sinful, as being irreligious, but not invalid nor unjust (see 2260).

(c) Conditions are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract that the consent or dissent is made dependent upon their existence or fulfillment. An immoral condition, if unfulfilled, takes from the contract all obligation, exception being made for separable parts that are not affected by the immoral clause; but if it has been fulfilled, it seems that there is a moral obligation to pay the consideration promised (see 1878 d).

(d) Modes are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract as to qualify the rights or duties of the contractants, or the purpose, matter or time of the contract, but not so as to make the consent dependent on the fulfillment of the thing designated. Thus, if Titus leaves money to Balbus, chiefly because Balbus is his nephew, and secondarily because he imposes on Balbus the obligation of using the money for his education, Balbus in accepting the money accepts also the obligation, but the gift does not lapse if the obligation is not complied with. If a donor adds an immoral mode to his gift (e.g., that the donee use in immoral ways the money left him), this purpose is regarded as non-existent and the gift stands in spite of it. If an agent violates a mode (e.g., he pays $1001 when he was directed to pay $1000) but not a condition (e.g., that he purchase land and not a house), the contract stands.

Cursing.—Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some person or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him or it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the speaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which are the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different from prediction of evil, and some passages in the Imprecatory Psalms, though couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future, rather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate of the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:

(a) imperatively, when one pronounces with authority that punishment is to be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way God decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges sentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;

(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command punishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may overtake a person or thing. Examples are: “Bad luck to you,” “May you break your leg,” “The devil take you,” “God damn you.” A curse made in the form of a prayer is called an imprecation.

When Cursing Is Not Sinful.—Cursing a person is not sinful when the evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that is in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to good, not to evil.

(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is in it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its physical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice and therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible are of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of God, as when Elias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i), and Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they express the submission of the human will to the just decree of God: “And the Levites shall pronounce with a loud voice, ‘Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law,’ and all the people shall say, ‘Amen’” (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).

(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of public or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes a jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not the sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the community. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the enemies of religion, of the Church, or of one’s country; it is lawful to pray God to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be reformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one must remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may happen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil as a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).

Sinfulness of Cursing.—Cursing a person is sinful when the evil ordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of this person.

(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser from heaven (“Neither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to charity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other things being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation, for it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be defamed) than to inflict that evil on him.

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, cursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly deliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly intentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really wish that the evils pronounced should be fulfilled. The curses, “Go to hell,” “God damn you,” are usually not meant or understood to express a wish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment. Hence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should be remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by reason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to their children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason of irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of a curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree (e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).

Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.—Persons who have expressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt whether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin. For such doubts theologians give the following rules:

(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off and hoped that no evil would happen to one’s neighbor, mortal sin was committed during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly passed away;

(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state of mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind will be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if one is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the curse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is hostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the curse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person whom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to desire in one’s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to displeasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.

Circumstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.—There are certain circumstances of person and objects which change the moral species of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.

(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is changed, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is committed by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against God, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness is the curse against one’s parents, which is a sin of impiety.

(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species is also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the deed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from contumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not pleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he who wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who wishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a neighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one sins by hatred.

Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.—(a) By reason of the specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace, poverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for, though the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in the previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is committed if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions of the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see 217).

(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of several sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin that is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group, formally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs from a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual injuries (see 218).

The Cursing of Evil.—(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such, that is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful to pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of God and man. But it is sinful to curse any creature of God, even though he is among the lost, for the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from God.

(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a creature of God that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause (e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils), or location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and Jonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these creatures of God in themselves.

It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of its relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man himself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g., when God cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed the fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the good of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a drunkard may be lost).

Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.—(a) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of God, for in so doing one reflects on God Himself, and incurs the guilt of blasphemy.

(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man. Thus, if one wishes that a neighbor’s cattle may die, intending only the harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful cursing (see 2113).

(c) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who curse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the stubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool, etc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend only to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.

Vows.—A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is better.

(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4), Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of performing one’s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses (e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one who swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow of chastity (see 2234, 2262).

(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the vow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one vows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the Saint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow principally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of obliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to the virtue of veneration (dulia), but it would not be an act of religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn circumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.

(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since a vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence, it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one’s steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood, for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.

The Various Kinds of Vows.—(a) By reason of its object, a vow is either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine with an offering).

(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).

(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).

(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an unconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on pilgrimage, if one recovers one’s health; a vow to enter religion, if parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).

(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow, as when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e., manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and chastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).

(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious institutes.

Vows in Canon Law.—The canonical dispositions in reference to vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.

Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.—Is the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of ecclesiastical law?

(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place, age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these matters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change these conditions as she sees fit.

(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends, not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving over to God of one’s person itself and an internal spiritual consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied, however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense even in solemn vows.

Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.—In the intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he who takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of the gravity of the sin (see 177).

(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g., Titus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms; Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father’s recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental (e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance; Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion, according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good demands that the religious state, like the married state, have stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the obligations that go with it.

(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g., vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation (e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its pronouncement).

Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.—In the will of the person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.

(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to the vow.

(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow. The reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made under unjust pressure.

(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, Sec.3) invalidates a vow given under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.

Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.—(a) All admit that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause (e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g., vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).

(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his wish to evade punishment.

Vows of Doubtful Validity.—In the following cases it is disputed whether fear invalidates a vow.

(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes). Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable to think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light, fear.

(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates, when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the aggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only the occasion of the vow.

The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.—As was said in the explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.

(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded. On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).

(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to take a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep) does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius, foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation. On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit intention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make religious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).

The Matter of a Vow.—(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.

Vows that Promise Something Necessary.—(a) If the necessity is absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is impossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a vow that one’s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to which agreement is given, etc.

(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment (e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of precept, for example, to practise celibacy.

When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.—(a) If the vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there would be no obligation.

(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the matter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really severable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to go barefooted).

(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption (cfr. 465).

Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.—(a) Vows that promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe’s vow to immolate the first living being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to the part that is sinful.

What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that have an evil end or other evil circumstances?

(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done (e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is the author of sin.

(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil circumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the vow is substantially licit.

(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circumstance affects neither the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus, it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel but to protect one’s life.

Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.—(a) These vows are invalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to God (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one’s earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary, impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault per se, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and displeasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.

(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).

Meaning of a Better Good.—It is also necessary for validity of a vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of God, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.

(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not true.

(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.

Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.—(a) The vow to do what is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to embrace a counsel) is invalid per se. There may be cases, however, in which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g., when a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to make no other vows without advice).

(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more pleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.

Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.—(a) If the vows are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige, being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of caring for those in distress.

The Obligation of a Vow.—Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment, for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture declares that one must pay one’s vows, and that it is better not to vow than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).

(a) The Quality of the Obligation.—A vow is an act of religion, since it promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised (e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing dedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same species, namely, sins against religion.

(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.—A vow, as being a duty of religion (see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

What is the second precept of the Decalogue? - The second precept of the Decalogue is: You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain. Ex. 20:7. This precept directly prohibits every inordinate usurpation of the name of God, such as is done especially by blaspheming, by swearing rashly, by vowing and not keeping a vow. But indirectly it commands the reverent usurpation of the name of God and its praise. Struggl 11; L. 120; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 2. Therefore, as superstition is especially prohibited by the first precept, so irreligiosity is prohibited by this precept; these two are impediments of true religion. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, aa. 2, 3.

What is vain usurpation of the Most Holy Name of God? - The Most Holy Name of God is said to be usurped in vain when it is assumed without reasonable cause, or without due reverence. And this is usually done in three ways: 1. from impatience or indignation toward creatures; 2. from admiration, by way of exclamation; 3. merely superfluously, or from lightness, or from custom and a certain formula of speaking.

What kind of sin is vain usurpation of the name of God? - It is a venial sin per se. Per se; for 1. all fault can often be absent because of inadvertence. 2. It can also become mortal on account of formal contempt of God, or grave anger against God. The first part is proved: per se it is a sin, because it injures the reverence owed to the divine name. It is established besides from Ecclus. 23:10: Let not the naming of God be frequent in your mouth. The second part is proved: per se it is only venial sin, because that reverence is not gravely injured.

Is it a sin in the same way to usurp the names of the Saints uselessly? - R. Affirmative. For what is said concerning the most holy name of God must also, proportion being preserved, be said concerning the names of the Saints, as is established from the cited place of Ecclesiasticus, where it is added: And do not mingle yourself with the names of the Saints. The same also must be said concerning the vain usurpation of the words of Sacred Scripture, when they are taken irreverently. L. 123.

Is the frequent and useless usurpation of the name of the demon a sin? - R. Negative per se. Yet it is to be reproved as less becoming in the mouths of Christians, especially in priests, who by reason of scandal sometimes are not immune from some fault. But some assert that it is venial per se. L. 131; Voit 514.

What is blasphemy? - Blasphemy is defined: speech of malediction against God. By speech are comprehended not only words, but also thoughts and deeds which inflict insult upon God; as if someone tramples a Crucifix underfoot, or emits spittle toward heaven as toward the seat of God. Hence blasphemy is opposed to the virtue of religion, since it is directly contrary to God's honor and worship. Malediction here is not restricted to the imprecation of some evil, but is extended generally to speech of any evil whatever, so that there are comprehended insult, railing, reproach, opprobrium, mockery, derision, jeering, illusion, irony, imprecation, any derogation from the excellent divine goodness and divine honor, whether by denying something of God which belongs to him, or by asserting of him what does not belong to him. Against God, namely considered either in himself or in his Saints and creatures in order to God himself, insofar as in them some divine perfection shines forth, for example sanctity, goodness, wisdom. L. 121, 122, 125; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1; q. 14, a. 1.

Note: If the discussion is of reservation or of other penalties inflicted upon blasphemy, only oral blasphemy is properly understood. For the word blasphemy then is to be used strictly. Moreover, in the common usage of men, blasphemy signifies a vice of the tongue, and it is opposed to the praise of God, which is exhibited by words alone. Therefore blasphemy of deed, by which rather the honor of God is injured, is not properly blasphemy, but is reduced to blasphemy as to the character of the injury against God. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 2; q. 103, a. 3; Struggl 34; Ithur., Cas. 30; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, c. 4, n. 1.

You will resolve: If someone from anger against a man, or by exclaiming to exaggerate the truth, names the Saints, the Blessed Virgin, the death of God, the Body of Christ, the Blood of Christ, the Head of Christ, and other honorable members of Christ, per se he does not commit blasphemy, but only an unworthy usurpation of the divine name. Per se; for otherwise it is if these are uttered from anger or indignation against God by way of contempt, or if among the hearers God and his sacred things are judged to be dishonored. Nor is it blasphemy to say: I deny God, if I do not strike you; for he who speaks thus wishes only to signify that he certainly will strike. Nor to say: this is true as God; for created truth is not equated with uncreated truth, but only a certain hyperbolic likeness is implied. But it would be blasphemy if it were in fact intended to signify that the truth is as great according to equality as it is in the truth of faith.

On the contrary, it is blasphemy to say: may the death of Christ or the blood of God destroy you; may the sacraments destroy you; because injury is inflicted upon the death, blood, and sacraments of Christ, which are ordered not to the ruin but to the salvation of men. Consequently it is blasphemy to say: may God damn you. Likewise it is blasphemy to say that one wishes to act with God unwilling, and similar things. It is blasphemy to say: God has entirely forgotten me; why did God create me? Except, however, if these are uttered in a human manner of speaking, from lightness, or to show the gravity of grief or weariness, as is often accustomed to happen. But those are never to be excused from sin who advertently and seriously say: God is unjust; God unjustly burdens me with tribulations; he unjustly permits the evil to be happy in the world. Voit 519; L. 123-126, 128; Aertnys, ed. 2, n. 67, q. 6; Lehmkuhl, Cas., ed. 3, n. 218, 336, note.

Of how many kinds is blasphemy? - Blasphemy is first distinguished: 1. into direct or indirect, according as the dishonoring of God is intended directly and formally by the blasphemer, or, although it is not intended in itself, is nevertheless contained in deeds or sayings injurious to God, which are uttered by him with the intention, for example, of joking, of manifesting anger, with advertence to the sense which the words contain. 2. Into immediate or mediate, according as it immediately affects God himself, or only mediately, namely by dishonoring the Saints or sacred things by words. 3. Into heretical, which is also against faith; imprecative or execrative, which is also against the charity of God; and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere contempt of God, although it pronounces true things, but from anger and an evil mind against God. L. 122, 123, 126; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

What kind of sin is blasphemy? - Any formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether direct or indirect, whether immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason is that any derogation from divine goodness is a grave injury inflicted upon the divine Majesty. Hence Lev. 24:16: The man who has cursed his God shall bear his sin; and he who has blasphemed the name of the Lord shall die the death. Insofar as it derogates from divine goodness by denying something of God which belongs to him, or by asserting of him what does not belong to him, it is opposed to confession of faith, and pertains to infidelity, or to sin against faith. Insofar as it again derogates from divine goodness by wishing evil to God, it is against charity toward God. Insofar as it is opposed to divine praise and divine honor, it is against religion and is a sin of irreligiosity. St. Pius V, Const. Cum primum, 6 Kal. Apr. 1566, sec. 10; Struggl 36; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, aa. 2-4; E. M.

Note: Blasphemy, as any other sin, can become venial from imperfection of the act, namely from defect of advertence or of perfect consent. To the point is S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 3: "Blasphemy can proceed without deliberation from surreption in two ways: in one way because someone does not advert that what he says is blasphemy, which can happen when someone suddenly from some passion breaks out into imagined words, whose meaning he does not consider; and then it is a venial sin, and does not properly have the notion of blasphemy." Direct blasphemy brings a merely aggravating circumstance over indirect blasphemy, and therefore it is not necessarily to be expressed in confession. For that circumstance of direct voluntary, as merely subjective, indeed makes the act more voluntary with respect to the evil object, but does not tend toward a new objective malice.

You will resolve: He does not sin gravely who pronounces words which are indeed blasphemous in themselves, but so halved or corrupted that he does not attend to their true sense; for example, he who says: I deny Di! I deny Diana! For these no longer have the character of blasphemy. L. 123.

Is the intention of dishonoring God altogether necessary for blasphemy? - For perfect blasphemy, by reason of the act, an express and explicit intention of dishonoring God is not necessary, but an implicit intention suffices, which is present in indirect blasphemy. The reason is that the indirectly voluntary suffices for sin. Therefore he who advertently pronounces blasphemous words, whence in reality there is dishonoring of God, for whatever cause he does this, voluntarily admits the sin of blasphemy and becomes guilty of it. Therefore he who knowingly and willingly pronounces blasphemous words is not excused by the fact that he did not have the intention of contemning God, but did it moved by anger or despair, for the sake of frightening, or for the sake of empty solace. Reuter 442; L. 124, 127.

Do blasphemies uttered against God and against the Saints differ in species? - Busembaum with others probably affirms, because the persons are distinct to whom their own honor is owed. Bonacina, Sanchez, and others probably deny, because the Saints are intimately connected with God, whence injury inflicted upon them is referred to God himself. Finally the Salmanticenses and others hold that besides proper malice against latria, it contains another malice distinct in species against dulia.

But since those who blaspheme the Saints, more truly, commonly speaking, intend to affect them with injury not precisely on account of their own excellence, but insofar as they are referred to God; therefore they sin not against dulia but against latria, and therefore they are not bound to explain whether they blasphemed God or the Saints. But if something is uttered against the Saints, but only as men once dwelling on earth, it will be only against dulia. Indeed it will even be only venial if it is done from jest, for example, if someone calls Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers; but, on the contrary, it will be mortal if it is done from contempt, from hatred, or from indignation against the Saints. Struggl 37; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 277 seqq.; L. 124, 125, 132; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

Is blasphemy uttered in jest grave? - These words are from Reuter, n. 442: "Blasphemy is grave... if someone in jest says blasphemous words, where among the hearers dishonoring of God is joined to them." Therefore grave fault will be absent where among the hearers that dishonoring is absent. L. 124.

Is it blasphemy to curse creatures? - It is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example, rains or winds as commanded by God, or with the word of God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example, our soul, the Catholic faith, heaven, and similar things. But otherwise, as generally happens, if indignation is borne toward creatures without relation to God. "To curse irrational things insofar as they are creatures of God is the sin of blasphemy; but to curse them, considered according to themselves, is idle and vain," namely it is venial. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 2. But per se there is no sin if irrational creatures are cursed because of harm brought, for example, a storm, because it devastated vineyards. Thus David without sin cursed the mountains of Gilboa, namely on account of the slaughter of the people which had happened on them. To curse rational creatures, to whom from charity we ought to wish good, is against the same charity.

L. 128; S. Th. l. c., a. 4 ad 1.

You will resolve: It is not grave simply to curse an hour, day, or year, unless the word holy is added; or unless the day of itself bears before itself something special of sanctity, such as Easter day, etc. The reason is that whatever imports sanctity is per se referred to God, who is the author of all sanctity; and the utterance of words by which a certain special sanctity is explained, at least indirectly, speaking per se, is referred to God.

To curse beasts, winds, etc., is regularly a light fault; nor regularly, in anger, is the mind present that the curse be carried into execution; and it is an act of impatience. Likewise "in anger to imprecate upon others a demon, hail, thunderbolts, etc...., for the most part, at least when it is said against those who are loved by the angry person, on account of sudden commotion and inadvertence and defect of serious will, is only venial.... But it is grave if subjects thus curse superiors, children parents, even only materially, especially to their face; because it is grave against due reverence." L. 130. Cf. ibid., n. 126 seqq., Epist. Resp. and n. 134; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 3.

542.bis Note: To curse is the same as to speak evil. And this is done either by way of simple enunciation, by reporting the evil of another, which pertains to detraction; or by way of cause, either by effecting something or by moving others through command to do something; or by way of the expression of a certain desiring affection. "In those two modes in which evil is spoken by way of commanding or by way of wishing, by the same reason something is licit or illicit. For if someone commands or wishes the evil of another insofar as it is evil, as though intending the evil itself, thus to curse in either mode will be illicit; and this is to curse, speaking per se. But if someone commands or wishes the evil of another under the aspect of good, thus it is licit, nor will it be cursing, speaking per se, but per accidens, because the principal intention of the speaker is not borne toward evil, but toward good. But it happens that some evil is spoken by commanding or wishing under the aspect of a twofold good: sometimes indeed under the aspect of the just, and thus a judge licitly curses him upon whom he commands a just punishment to be inflicted; and thus also the Church curses by anathematizing, just as the Prophets in the Scriptures sometimes imprecate evils upon sinners, as though conforming their will to divine justice, although imprecations of this sort can also be understood by way of foretelling. But sometimes some evil is spoken under the aspect of the useful, as when someone wishes some sinner to suffer some sickness or some impediment, either that he himself may be made better, or at least that he may cease from harming others." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1. "Blessing or cursing properly pertains to that thing to which something good or evil can happen, namely to a rational creature. But good or evil is said to happen to irrational creatures in order to the rational creature, on account of whom they are. But they are ordered to him in many ways. In one way indeed by way of assistance, insofar as human necessity is assisted from irrational creatures. And in this way the Lord said to man, Gen. 3:17, Cursed is the earth in your work, namely so that man might be punished through its sterility. And thus also is understood what is had in Deut. 28:5, Blessed are your barns, and below, v. 17, Cursed is your barn... In another way an irrational creature is ordered to the rational by way of signification; and thus the Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. In a third way an irrational creature is ordered to the rational by way of containing, namely of time or place; and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of original guilt which he contracted by being born, and on account of the punishments following; and on account of this also David can be understood to have cursed the mountains of Gilboa, 2 Kings 1, namely on account of the slaughter of the people which had happened on them." S. Th. l. c., a. 2.

A licit curse, and one conformed to the divine will, as being just, does not lack its effect. Hence "the curse of a mother uproots the foundations." Ecclus. 3:11, namely, "it uproots houses down to the foundations, that is, it plainly destroys and extinguishes his offspring and family and its riches and honors... An example of a curse is in Ham... St. Augustine relates a similar example, lib. 22, de Civit., c. 8, and more fully in Serm. 34, concerning a mother who, cursing ten sons, made them all trembling, miserable, and wandering. Thus today we see sons and illustrious families, which seemed likely to endure for ages, fall and be extinguished." Cornelius a Lapide on the same place. Likewise, "the prayer of him who curses you in the bitterness of his soul will be heard," namely of the poor man. "But he who made him will hear him." Ecclus. 4:6; "that is to say, God the Creator will hear him as his afflicted creature, despised by you and abandoned to you. Therefore he himself, as advocate and father of the poor and orphans, will take up his just complaint and cause against you, and will condemn and punish you." Cornelius a Lapide on the same place. But anyone can pray away from himself the evils of a curse both by penance and by prayer, conciliating God's blessing to himself.

Is it blasphemy to curse the whole world? - St. Liguori, n. 129, affirms, because just as to swear by creatures in which the divine attributes shine forth more is a true oath, so to curse them is true blasphemy, because God is indirectly contemned in them. "Yet in reality such a sense is scarcely accustomed to occur to the mind of the one uttering these things." Thus Gury 304. But the same St. Alphonsus, l. c., thinks the opposite: "Ordinarily speaking, I judge that country people who curse the world for the most part sin gravely, while they accuse themselves of such a curse with grave horror." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 4 ad 1.

Is it blasphemy to curse the dead and the devil? - R. To the first. Negative, yet in that case in which the mind of those cursing is not borne to this, that he curse them insofar as they are creatures of God. Indeed for the most part this is not even mortal, because through this no grave injury is inflicted upon them, either in themselves or from the mind of those uttering it: not in itself, because the word dead is more to be referred to the body which dies than to the soul which always lives; or at most it signifies men who have finished life, who can be either saved or damned. Not from the mind of those uttering it, because those cursing the dead in no way intend to pray evils upon the souls of the dead, but rather to reproach the living, to whom they are accustomed to refer their curses as an injury. L. 130. R. To the second. Tamburini rightly thinks that to curse the devil is rarely mortal sin, because he is always accustomed to be cursed as the author of evils or as the enemy of God; in this manner, abstracting from the act of impatience, he says that it is not even venial. L. 120; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1 ad 4.

Are these French expressions blasphemous: "Nom de Dieu! Noms de Noms! Mille Noms! Sacré Nom!" without an addition, etc.? - R. Negative per se, even if they are uttered in anger, unless the anger is borne against God himself, or unless there is present a blasphemous intention, which is generally absent. For these words contain no blasphemy in themselves. Therefore they will be only venial on account of the vain usurpation of the name of God; but if the name of God is employed in these formulas neither explicitly nor implicitly, they will per se be free from all fault.

Is the French expression "S. Nom de D." blasphemy? - Some answer: affirmative per se, because those words, by reason of the common acceptance of the faithful, are insulting to God. Others answer: negative per se, unless a blasphemous intention explicitly, or at least implicitly, intervenes, because those words in their obvious sense contain no insult of God in themselves; for in reality they signify the blessed name of God. Therefore in practice all those who utter words of this sort are not easily to be accused of mortal sin. For it is certain, experience being witness, that not a few, especially the uneducated, do not apprehend grave malice in them. Therefore the confessor should attend first to the varied common usage of places, which could well have determined the meaning of the word sacred to signify cursed. Likewise he should attend to the various circumstances of penitents. "Sins of words are especially to be judged from the intention of the speaker." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2.

Note: In doubt whether some expression is or is not blasphemy, it is by no means to be taken as blasphemy. L. 129, 130. If the words according to themselves express no diminution of divine honor, it is not to be judged blasphemy, nor mortal sin. L. 130. If the meaning is doubtful, then attention must be given to the intention and affection of the one uttering the words. L. 130. The uneducated often confuse with blasphemy any less becoming words and curses against beasts and men. Therefore they are to be taught, "lest so many souls perish miserably from ignorance on account of an erroneous conscience of mortal sin." L. 131.

What is the nature of an oath? - An oath is: the tacit or express invocation of the Name of the Lord, as the first and infallible truth, as witness of some truth. Heb. 6:16; L. 133; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1. Hence it is clear that an oath is an act of the virtue of religion, or of latria; because "in this very thing, that man swears by God, he professes God to be more powerful, as one whose truth is indefectible and knowledge universal, and thus in some way exhibits reverence to God... But to exhibit reverence to God pertains to religion, or latria." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 4; Bouquillon, de Virt. Rel., l. 2, p. 3.

Of how many kinds is an oath? - An oath is distinguished: 1. as assertory, according as God is invoked as witness of a past or present truth; and promissory, according as "divine testimony is brought in for confirming something future." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1. The promissory oath is twofold, strictly or broadly such. The first is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion. The second contains no promise toward another, but a mere purpose, to which is added an obligation from the virtue of religion, insofar as by oath God is brought forward as witness and as it were guarantor of fulfilling the purpose. But it is comminatory if the one swearing, under the attestation of the divine Name, threatens another with punishment; for example, I swear by God that unless you do this, you will pay the penalties.

2. Solemn or simple, according as it is made in the form required by law and with solemn ceremonies, for example, with Mass, with preceding Communion, or with these excluded. Laypersons swear in court by touching the Gospels; ecclesiastics swear with the Gospels only placed before them and the hand brought to the breast. C. Cum in 7, de Iur. cal. In court; for outside court, when clerics swear and make profession of faith, the custom is that they do it with the Gospels touched. Holy Office, 6 Aug. 1897, VIII. Clerics, especially priests, cannot interpose a solemn oath except by license of the Bishop, which is granted only for a grave cause, before a judge not their own, even if ecclesiastical; but before a layman they ought not furnish an oath. But Bishops need the license of the Supreme Pontiff. C. Inhaerentes 1, de Iur. cal.; C. Quoties 31, c. 22. But outside court, ecclesiastics do not need the Bishop's permission. C. Ex rescripto 9, de Iurei.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 10. Likewise clerics, unless they are vassals, are prohibited from furnishing an oath of fidelity to Princes. C. Nimis 30, de Iurei. Yet by Concordats it is permitted.

3. Explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed for testimony, in which the divine attributes specially shine forth. 4. There is also added the invocatory oath, by which God is simply invoked as witness; and the imprecatory oath, by which God is invoked at once as witness and as avenger of perjury or of broken faith. To this is referred the formula: So may God help me, and these holy Gospels of God. For just as he who pronounces these words prays good for himself if he speaks the truth, so he imprecates evil upon himself if he lies. Whence he who voluntarily perjures himself in this way, seriously wishing evil for himself, sins not only against religion, but also against charity toward himself. Struggl 3; L. 139-142; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1 ad 3.

Doctrinal, political, and judicial oaths are also distinguished. Doctrinal oaths are assertory and promissory oaths concerning profession of some doctrine. Such are the oaths prescribed by the Supreme Pontiffs for heretics and schismatics returning to Catholic faith and unity, and most recently prescribed by Supreme Pontiff Pius X against the errors of the modernists. Political oaths are also assertory and promissory oaths concerning the observance of civil laws and the conservation of civil government. The licitness of this oath depends on its matter; if this is not licit, it is often permitted by the Holy See on account of grave causes, with restriction to passive subjection and obedience, and in those things which are not opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws. S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860; 1 Dec. 1866; A. S. S., v. 2, p. 676.

Judicial oaths are those which are emitted in a tribunal, so that truth may be known and justice rightly administered. And first there is the decisory oath, which is tendered by one of the litigants to the other, by authority of the judge, and carries with itself the decision of the suit. It is a certain species of transaction. Besides this there is the supplementary oath, which the judge tenders to one of the litigants because of defect of full proof, whence it is called supplementary. Third, there is the estimatory oath, or oath in the suit, when the harm inflicted is established, but because of defect of proofs its quantity cannot be determined; the oath is tendered by the judge, so that by it the value of the thing and the harm inflicted may be established. In addition, the oath of calumny is called the oath by which the litigating parties protest that they proceed not calumniously, but judge that they have a good cause and right. The oath of malice is called the oath by which protestation is made of not maliciously proposing exceptions, seeking delays, etc. Bouquillon, de Virt. Relig., l. 2, p. 3, c. 4; Sebastianelli, Prael. Iur. Can., p. 1, tit. 7, c. 2, a. 5; Schmalzgr., l. 2, tit. 24.

What are the requisites for the essence of an oath? - Two things are required for an oath: 1. the intention of swearing, at least virtual, because without such intention a formal oath cannot exist. 2. an oath-formula, either explicitly through God or implicitly through creatures, because God is given to another as witness, which cannot be done by the mind alone; and since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath. When there is doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, judgment is usually made according to the common acceptance of the words which he used. But this intention contributes so much to the value of the oath that if someone uses words in no way importing an oath, yet thinks that they are oaths, he truly swears as to the internal forum; and on the contrary, that intention being lacking, the oath is null as to the internal forum, even if words truly oath-making are employed. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 98, a. 1; L. 134; Struggl 1.

The profession of faith having first been made, the following are bound to furnish the oath according to the prescribed formula: doctors in seminaries, at the beginning of the year; before they enter office, doctors or lecturers, likewise in religious orders; preachers, pastors, beneficiaries before entering possession of the benefice, canons; officials in episcopal curias and tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges; officials in Roman congregations or tribunals; religious superiors; clerics to be initiated into major orders. To each of these an exemplar both of the profession of faith and of the formula of emitting the oath is to be handed over beforehand, so that they may know them accurately beforehand. But the formula of the oath is to be signed and preserved in the archive. Those are to be denounced to the Holy Office not only who violate the oath, but also who refuse to sign it. Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; S. C. Cons., 25 Sept., 25 Oct. 1910. Priests who profess sacred disciplines in civil universities are not bound by this oath. Pius X, Letter to Card. Fischer, 31 Dec. 1910. But the anti-Jansenistic oath was abrogated in Belgium and Holland. S. C. C., 22 Feb. 1912. A Bishop can grant the faculty of hearing Confessions for some more or less long space of time to an extra-diocesan Priest already approved by his own Ordinary, without being compelled to receive from him again the oath prescribed by the Motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum. And by way of a passing act he can grant the same faculty to a Priest who has never furnished the aforesaid oath. S. C. Cons., 20 June 1913. It suffices that the oath to be furnished before the reception of sacred orders be furnished before entering the sacred order of subdiaconate, preserving the right of the Ordinary to require it again before conferral of each of the sacred orders, if from any cause he judges it necessary or useful. S. C. Cons., 24 March 1911. Alumni of the Urban College of Propaganda Fide, of North America, of Ireland, of Scotland, and of other Colleges according to the decision of S. C. Cons., 12 Nov. 1908, 25 July 1909, are also bound to furnish the oath according to the prescribed formulas; officials of the Roman Curia and ministers of any order in the Roman Curia; Consultors and Cardinals of the S. C. of the Holy Office, of the Index, of Consistorial affairs; Pius X, Const. Sapienti consilio, Ord. serv. in R. C., p. 1, c. 3, p. 2, c. 7, art. 2, n. 4, art. 7; examiners of books and writings of Servants of God; those to be named doctors in Sacred Scripture, Pius X, Motu proprio, 29 June 1910; synodal examiners and parochial consultors, S. C. Cons., 15 Feb. 1912. Missionaries are bound to furnish the oath by force of the Bulls Ex quo and Omnium sollicitudinum of Benedict XIV, not only European priests, but also indigenous presbyters. S. C. de P. F., 21 June 1895; E. M. 550, 551.

You will resolve: A fictitious oath, or one merely external, is not valid on account of defect of will or intention of swearing. But one swearing thus sins, yet only venially, if he says what is true, or has the mind of fulfilling what he promises, because he utters nothing except a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God; but mortally, if he says what is false, or does not have the mind of fulfilling the promise, or there is a precept of a superior, for example in judgments. For grave abuse and irreverence of the name of God for the deception of others would be present. Proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI.

More probably a promissory oath made indeed with the mind of swearing, but not of obliging oneself from religion, is not valid, because it is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obliging oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid. L. 172; H. A. 17.

A promissory oath made without the mind of fulfilling, but with the mind of swearing and obliging oneself, is valid. But he who swears thus sins mortally, because he invokes God as witness of a fictitious purpose or fictitious promise, and therefore swears against truth. For in a promissory oath God is assumed as witness of a present purpose or promise, and in some way as guarantor of future execution, insofar as this at least depends upon human will.

It is an oath to say: I swear by God; I call God to witness, etc. Likewise it is an oath to say: I swear by the Saints, the Church, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith; because then the very Author of the Faith, of the Gospel, of the Church, and of the Saints is judged to be brought in as witness. Likewise an oath is judged to be made by nobler creatures, since through them their Creator is then taken, who singularly resides and shines forth in them. Thus, for example, when one swears by heaven, its Dweller and Lord is understood; when by earth, He whose footstool it is; when by the temple, He who is worshiped there. Thus likewise several more probably judge it to be an oath if you say, by my soul, because God singularly shines forth in the soul, who then is judged to be brought in as witness. Yet it must be confessed that there is scarcely anyone who, while using these words, thinks of God; and therefore this formula too rarely contains an oath. But otherwise it would be if someone swore by creatures in which divine goodness or power does not specially shine forth, for example, by a beard, etc.

It is not an oath to say: God is truth, God lives, God knows, I speak before God, if these are uttered merely narratively to signify the serious and grave attention of the one speaking; but otherwise if invocatively, for calling God as witness of truth, which is discerned from the circumstances or intention of the speaker. Likewise to say: I swear it is so, is not truly an oath, because then divine testimony is invoked neither explicitly nor implicitly; unless nevertheless an interrogation concerning an oath preceded, because then through the preceding interrogation that "I swear" is sufficiently determined to a true oath. C. I. Proc. Poen. 229. In addition, these words: may I be killed if this is not so, and similar ones, although they are true oaths if they are said by way of execration, because God is considered to intervene specially in that killing, nevertheless commonly they contain only a certain pledge or obligation of penalty, and signify: if it is not so, I pledge my life. The same must be said concerning the other formula: may the devil seize me. But otherwise, if God is expressly named there by saying: may God destroy me if I lie, because then God is invoked as avenger of a lie, if perhaps one is uttered.

It is not an oath to say: truly, certainly, in truth, by the faith of a good man, of a Christian, of a priest, of a soldier, of a Prince, of a King; nor to say: by my conscience, because God is not brought in as witness. He does not swear who says: it is as true as the sun shines, as I sit here, walk, etc.; whence even if the comparison is false, it is only a lie, since no one is invoked as witness. Although to say: it is as true as God is; as Christ is in the venerable Sacrament; as the Gospel is true, etc., commonly seems to contain an oath with blasphemy, nevertheless this does not sufficiently appear, because no one is invoked as witness, nor does it seem to be blasphemy if it is true and the mind of the one uttering it is only to signify a likeness of truth, not equality of certitude. L. 134-143; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 1, 6; Suarez, de Rel., tr. 5, l. 1, c. 13; E. M. 551, 554.

Is an oath licit? - An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and licit; and, if it is promissory, it obliges in conscience, unless a just cause stands in the way, or its obligation has legitimately ceased. This is established both from the definition of the Council of Constance, sess. 8, against Wyclif, and from proposition 101 condemned by Clement XI in the Bull Unigenitus, and from proposition 75 condemned by Pius VI in the Bull Auctorem fidei, and also from the universal practice of the Church and peoples, and from various places of Sacred Scripture. Deut. 6:13: You shall fear the Lord your God... and by his name you shall swear. And indeed God and his attributes are especially honored from this, that he is brought into the midst and invoked as the highest and infallible Truth in testimony of truth. C. Etsi 26, de Iurei.; L. 144 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 3, 4. From a grave cause, and with a protestation employed, an oath upon Protestant Bibles can be permitted, insofar namely as they contain the true word of God. E. M.

What are the requisites for the licitness of an oath? - A threefold condition is required, according to Jer. 4:2: You shall swear: The Lord lives, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice. The reason is that otherwise it cannot be furnished with due reverence to God.

Truth, that is, conformity of the assertion with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes every lie, but not every error. In an assertory oath, truth regards the existence of the fact according to the mind, not also according to the truth of the thing; in a promissory oath, it regards the existence of the intention of obliging oneself and of furnishing what is promised.

Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a grave cause. For since an oath is a most holy thing, it ought not be made without prudence, consideration, reverence, and rashly without any necessity and cause.

Justice, that is, that the oath be concerning a matter, whether promised or simply proposed, or concerning an assertion, just and honorable. Thus he would swear against justice who would oblige himself by oath to inflict harm unjustly upon a neighbor, or would affirm what he was prohibited from manifesting. Ecclus. 23:9, 12; L. 144; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 3, 5, 10; E. M.

What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, without judgment, without justice? - To swear without truth is always mortal, even in light matter, because to bring God into testimony of falsity is to will to destroy his infinitely perfect truthfulness. This is also established from proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI; S. Th., Quodl. 1, a. 18. To swear without judgment, from lightness, for example from custom, without grave cause, or if someone swears before he has sufficiently investigated the truth, is venial per se, scandal and danger of perjury nevertheless being excluded, because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. To swear without judgment from rashness, lest perhaps what is asserted is true, or what is promised can be fulfilled, is grave on account of the danger of perjury. To swear without justice is certainly mortal in a promissory oath if the matter concerns committing a grave sin, as is clear; indeed, according to St. Liguori, even if the matter concerns only a venial sin, at least more probably, because it seems grave irreverence to invoke God as witness or guarantor of any sin whatever to be committed. Yet Suarez with others says that the opposite opinion is common.

But in an assertory oath, more probably it is only venial per se, because the oath per se falls upon the assertion, not as evil but as true. Thus he who boasts by oath about fornication committed, although by this boasting he sins lethally, nevertheless by force of the oath per se he does not confirm the boasting, but only the truth of the fornication. Except unless the oath is assumed as an instrument or means of sinning, for example, for strengthening detraction. And this holds even if someone uses an oath as an instrument or means for consummating venial sin, because one swearing thus, as far as in him lies, makes God an accomplice of his sin. "If someone swears," says S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 2, "that he will not do some better good which nevertheless he is not bound to do, (for example, not entering religion), he indeed sins by swearing, insofar as he places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit, who is the inspirer of a good purpose; nevertheless he does not sin by keeping the oath, but he would do much better if he did not keep it." But a sin of this sort, since the matter concerns only a counsel not to be embraced, is venial per se. L. 145, 147; Suarez, l. 3, c. 12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7, a. 9 ad 3; q. 98, aa. 2, 3; Quodl. 1, a. 18; Struggl 5, 7, 9; E. M.; cf. here 582, 583. In public disturbances of civil society, the oath of passive obedience, as it is called, is permitted, namely that one will do nothing against the Government, and with the laws of God and the Church preserved. Pius VII, Instruction, year 1808; S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860. Cf. here 549.

What is a sufficient cause for swearing? - Any honorable cause of some weight, for example, peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc. L., H. A. 14.

Is it permitted to swear with probability of truth? - "For swearing rightly absolute and altogether infallible certitude is not required, but some moral certitude suffices, or a certain probability which reaches a certain moral certitude. Thus Tamburini. Indeed Sanchez, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, Lessius, Bonacina, Azor, with the common opinion, say more expressly that in an oath, whether assertory or promissory, probability of the truth asserted or of the fulfillment of the promised thing to be executed suffices, provided that there is not a probable reason to the opposite. Hence they say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of faith that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with oath. Yet this does not run in judgment," L. 148, where the oath which is required is to be emitted from one's own certitude. Struggl 6. Therefore he sins gravely who swears in mere doubt of truth, because God, infallible truth, cannot be invoked except in testimony of a thing which seems at least morally certain. Struggl 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 1.

Is it permitted to swear with mental restriction? - R. Negative, if it is purely mental; and here, according to St. Alphonsus, pertain propositions 26, 27, 28 condemned by Innocent XI. Affirmative, if it is broadly mental, from a just cause. "It is certain," says St. Alphonsus, n. 151, "and common among all, that from a just cause it is permitted to use equivocation... and to confirm it by oath...

But a just cause can be any honorable end for preserving goods useful to spirit or body." And again: "For swearing thus, except in judgments and contracts, an absolutely grave cause is not required, but any reasonable cause suffices, for example, to free oneself from the troublesome and unjust interrogation of another." And Busembaum, n. 170, adds: "When there is a just cause of necessity or utility, one can use amphibologies in an oath, even if he spontaneously offers himself to the oath." Finally St. Alphonsus, n. 151, adds that, according to the more probable opinion, it is venial if he furnishes this without cause. "The reason is that in an oath of this sort truth and justice are already present, and only judgment or discretion is lacking; and the deficiency of this is only venial... Yet one must except, with the Salmanticenses and others commonly, unless this is done in judgment or in contracts." The reason of this exception as to the first is that we are bound from obedience to answer a superior legitimately interrogating according to the sense of the one interrogating; but as to the second, because then from justice we are bound to utter words according to the mind of the contracting party, lest he be deceived and suffer harm. Struggl 16 seqq.; Lugo, de Fid., d. 4, n. 67; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 4; E. M.

What is the obligation of a promissory oath? - Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of justice or fidelity which arises from a simple promise, also induces an obligation of religion. The reason is that a promise per se already obliges, and with divine testimony invoked it is confirmed and strengthened. "For someone is bound to make true what he swore; otherwise truth is lacking in the oath." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7. But an oath concerning an illicit or plainly useless thing by no means obliges, because an oath, as an act of religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing. R. 58, de R. I. in 6. Oaths of this sort do not revive, even if the thing afterwards ceases to be idle or illicit according to R. I. 18 in 6: "That which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not strengthened by lapse of time."

Nor likewise does an oath impeding a greater good oblige, for example, of not entering religion or of marrying, unless someone swore in favor of another. For then, without injury to the other's right, he cannot embrace the evangelical counsels. Thus alumni of the College of the S. C. de P. F. cannot enter religion without permission of the Holy See, because of the oath by which they are bound. Struggl 24 seqq.; L. 172, 176; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 8; Quodl. 5, a. 27; Scavini, ed. 12, Milan, 1874, v. 2, n. 229; v. 4, nn. 243, 244, 245; cf. here 554. Alumni of the Urban College of Propaganda Fide promise by oath the observance of the laws of the College, that they will not enter a religious order without special permission of the Holy See, that they will ascend to sacred orders up to the priesthood, and that they will return to their own diocese and there give perpetual work to the sacred ministry. S. C. Cons., 29 July 1909.

You will resolve: He who swore to an evil thing is never obligated by the oath; indeed he sins in two ways if he fulfills the oath, namely against religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7. He who confirmed a prodigal promise by swearing is not obligated by the oath, because that promise is at least lightly evil. He does not sin against an oath who for the sake of courtesy swore that he would not sit, drink, enter the house, etc., before another, if, compelled by the other, he sits, drinks, or enters first; because for the most part an oath of this sort is null from defect of intention of swearing, or, if it is valid, it is relaxed by the other yielding his right.

Parents who do not fulfill an oath of punishing their children rarely sin, because for the most part the oath concerns a useless thing, or rather inordinate vengeance; add that often those delinquent either have already been corrected, or at least have promised amendment. Likewise merchants for the most part do not seem to be bound by an oath not to sell for less, or many persons not to buy; either because oaths of this sort generally concern a useless thing, or because these men do not have the mind of swearing, or certainly because there is present in the oath a tacit condition, unless things seem likely to turn out better otherwise. L. 176, 180, 185, 186; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7.

How is a promissory oath to be interpreted? - The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly and according to the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, so that it follows all its conditions. The reason is that the one swearing is judged to have wished to oblige himself as little as he could, and otherwise the oath does not change the nature of the act, but superadds to it only the obligation of religion; and therefore it ought to have the same conditions and limitations. Hence he is not bound by oath who under oath promised marriage to a girl rich, healthy, virgin, of good reputation, if she has fallen into poverty, illness, infamy, fornication, because the simple promise then does not oblige. C. Quemadmodum 25, de Iurei. Likewise, if you promised and swore to Titia that you would marry her, you can, leaving her, enter religion, because this tacit condition is present in the promise of marriage: unless I enter religion. And this also holds if betrothals were confirmed by oath, unless the marriage were necessary for legitimating offspring, repairing scandal, or providing for the honor of the betrothed woman, if it could not be met in another way. He who reveals a sworn secret does not sin when the very law of secrecy ceases to oblige, because an oath, as we have said, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined. L. 180, 183, 727; l. 6, n. 870.

What are the tacit conditions included or understood in a promissory oath? - They are: 1. If I shall be able without grave harm, because no one is judged to oblige himself to a thing impossible both physically and morally. 2. If the thing has not been notably changed. 3. If the rights or will of a superior do not stand in the way. 4. If the other has preserved reciprocal fidelity. 5. Unless the other yields concerning his right. L. 180; Struggl 31. Cf. here 566.

Is smallness of matter given in transgression of a promissory oath? - The first opinion denies, because not only a simple promise is violated, but a sworn promise. Therefore in any matter a grave injury is inflicted upon God, whose testimony has been invoked in vain by the one swearing. And indeed God would be called either as guarantor, namely by his authority, or certainly as witness of falsity, if truth were not conformed to the thing promised. For in this oath God is invoked as witness of the present intention, and either as quasi-sponsor or also as witness of future execution. But God can in no way either fail faith or lie in any matter, even the smallest. "Whoever swears that he will do something is obligated to do it, so that truth may be fulfilled," on account of reverence for divine testimony. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 8.

The second opinion affirms, because in a promissory oath God is not properly brought in as witness of the future execution of the thing promised, but only as witness of the actual promise, or of the true intention of executing the promise. Nor indeed is he brought in as guarantor of future execution, but merely as confirming, or furnishing authority to, the obligation which arises from the promise made before him, just as a Prince renders betrothals contracted before him firmer by his authority. Now as to the first, no irreverence is committed against God through transgression of a promissory oath, or God is not made witness of falsity, since we suppose that the promise and the intention of execution were sincere in the one swearing. But as to the other, by infidelity in the matter promised, to be fulfilled under divine authority, irreverence indeed is inflicted upon divine authority, but one which is neither direct and formal, since it is intended only indirectly in the very violation of the promise, nor greater; indeed, with S. Thomas as witness, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 8, per se it is less than the irreverence which is found in transgression of a vow. Since therefore in this, as also in any indirect irreverence against God, lightness of matter is admitted by all, it must also be admitted in that which transgression of a promissory oath inflicts. And indeed if the one swearing, in the act of the oath, had the will of fulfilling, and afterwards does not fulfill it, he does not commit a lie and perjury, but only infidelity, which, since the thing promised is not grave by hypothesis, will not be able to be extended to grave fault. Besides, in this oath God is brought in as witness of the contracted obligation, which consequently cannot be violated without irreverence toward God; but this indeed can be grave or light according to the nature of the matter. St. Liguori, n. 173, says that each opinion is probable; but he adheres more to the second opinion, and in H. A., n. 13, says: "If the thing promised is not grave, infidelity does not reach grave fault." Suarez, l. 3, c. 16, n. 9 seqq.; L. 172, 173, 178, 211.

Does a promissory oath emitted through error or deceit oblige? - R. Negative, if the error or deceit concerns the substance of the thing; but otherwise if it affects only its accidental adjuncts, because a simple contract would be invalid in the former case, but not in the latter. L. 175. Yet the same St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 187, warns that the opposite opinion is probable when the error or deceit concerns those circumstances which, although accidental, if they had been known from the beginning, would have deterred one from the oath and promise. Those things entering the quasi-substance of the contract are as a condition without which not. This warning of St. Alphonsus indeed ought to hold, as in vows, so in gratuitous contracts, but not in onerous contracts. Cf. 575.

Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear oblige? - The first probable opinion affirms. For the general rule is that any oath is to be kept when it can be done without sin, lest God be brought in as witness of the false. The second opinion, also sufficiently probable, denies, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. But that promise by natural law is void, or at least rescindable by the very one who suffered fear, according as the promise is gratuitous or onerous, on account of the grave injury which it contains, which is not to be confirmed and continued by oath. Whence even the patrons of the first opinion warn that he who suffered fear can ask relaxation of the oath, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can seek in judgment what he gave, or secretly compensate himself. L. 174; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 3; q. 98, a. 3 ad 1; Ithur., Cas. 15, nn. 11, 18; Struggl 23, 29.

Must a promissory oath in favor of a third party always be fulfilled, as long as it can be fulfilled without sin? - R. Affirmative, if that third party already has a right acquired through an accepted promise, even if it is against the evangelical counsels, and even if the promise made is void by law in hatred of the creditor, as a promise of paying usuries and a promise of money made to a prostitute, although such an oath was illicit. Understand this if the prostitute, for example, has already furnished her work; otherwise, if not. Yet it must be said otherwise if the promise is void by law because it would be against the common good and concerning a prohibited thing. The reason is that in this second case the fulfillment itself would be illicit. Therefore an oath extorted by fear concerning religious profession, marriage, betrothals, etc., does not oblige. On the contrary, as to the first case, on account of reverence for the divine Name, the oath is to be observed whenever it can be observed licitly. Cf. 554, 558, 560, 566, 970; L. l. 6, n. 870.

1. Caprasius, a shepherd, often signifies his anger against the goats fleeing to the mountain by exclaiming: Name, Great Name, A Thousand Names, Names of Names. Sometimes, however, also by exclaiming, he says angrily: Blessed Name, Sacred Name. And likewise sometimes he exclaims: Name of God, Name of Jesus, Name of Mary, Name of all the Saints.

Q. 1. What is the vain usurpation of the Name of God, and what kind of sin? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 527 seqq. To the second: Caprasius, by exclaiming, Name, Great Name, etc., is free from the sin of blasphemy. For these locutions are not locutions of malediction against God, neither of themselves nor from the circumstances of the case. Not of themselves, because in some the name of God does not intervene; but in others, in which it does intervene, no injurious word is had. Not from the circumstances, because Caprasius is angry neither against God nor against the Saints, but only against the fleeing goats. G. 293; I. M. 533.

2. Hypparchus accuses himself in sacramental confession that he is often accustomed to blaspheme, uttering true blasphemies. But to excuse himself he adds that he does this by no means from the intention of reproaching God, but only of spurring horses, or sometimes of scolding his wife or children.

Q. 1. What is blasphemy? - 2. What as to the case?

To the first, cf. I. M. 531 seqq. - To the second: Hypparchus is guilty of blasphemy. Nor indeed is he excused from the fact that he did not intend to reproach God. For from this very fact that someone knowingly pronounces blasphemous words, if not directly and explicitly, at least indirectly and implicitly he wills to reproach God. "Nevertheless it must be confessed that in practice those who use blasphemous words are often excused from mortal sin, whether on account of inadvertence, or on account of good faith, etc." G. 295; I. M. 535, 536, 538.

3. Aman, a debtor, after many and useless promises already made beforehand, that he would pay the money owed as soon as possible, was again promising his creditor John, and was invoking his own faith as an honest and noble man. John, moved by anger because of the debt often promised to be paid and never paid up to now, began to curse the faith of Aman, saying: cursed be your faith, which is always deceived and deceives; may accident seize you and your faith; may the devil himself seize you with your faith. But a little afterward John, thinking about what he had said, immediately approaches the confessor, accusing his sin. But after hearing the confession the confessor says to John: I cannot, my son, absolve you, or at least I cannot absolve you immediately; for the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, q. 13, a. 3, says: "blasphemy is the greatest sin." Go therefore in peace, and return after a month.

Q. 1. What is practically to be held concerning blasphemy from anger? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first: "Here it must be noted that some blasphemers of this sort say that they did not advert to the malice of blasphemy. And some doctors say that these, sometimes, on account of the impulse of anger or contracted habit, can blaspheme without advertence. But I think... that there is always present in blaspheming some advertence, at least confused, concerning the malice of that utterance; for anger, or habit, ordinarily does not so darken the intellect that it is utterly not adverted to the malice of blasphemy, although this itself is not known reflexively." Lig. l. 3, n. 127; I. M. 53, 57. Cf. I. M. 533, 536.

To the second. The confessor indeed erred first by judging that the aforesaid locutions contained blasphemies. For, as is evident, no word injurious to God is contained in them. The aforesaid locutions contain only malediction and contumely or reproach, and imprecation. But since John was moved by anger and, immediately thinking about what he had said, approached the confessor; and Aman had often broken faith; neither does that malediction of deceitful faith contain grave guilt, nor does that contumely or reproach contain a grave wounding of honor, nor was that imprecation uttered with a serious and malevolent mind. Wherefore John seems to be excused not only from the guilt of blasphemy, but also from the guilt of grave sin. And, since John otherwise does not lack due dispositions, since, fearing the sin committed, he immediately runs to expiate it in the sacrament of penance, the confessor indeed acts badly by denying or deferring absolution to him. And although Aman had been guilty of blasphemy, and blasphemy is the greatest sin according to its genus, it does not therefore follow that absolution is to be denied or deferred. - I. M. 342, 541, 542, 1514-1516.

1. Rusticus, a rude man, often swears from anger, saying: By my soul; may God punish me. At Easter time he confesses, and the confessor vehemently reproves him, saying: Do you not know that this is grave perjury and grave sin? Rusticus, terrified, on that day of confession indeed abstains from that perjury, but afterward goes on swearing as he did before.

Q. 1. What concerning the custom of swearing? - 2. What concerning an oath uttered in anger? - 3. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the custom of swearing in itself seems to wound only the judgment required in an oath, and therefore regularly and in itself must be called a light sin, insofar as it is voluntary. But by reason of the danger which it contains of perjuring, it is not without grave sin. Perrone § 253. Hence in Ecclus. 23:9 it is said: Let not your mouth become accustomed to swearing; for there are many falls in it.

To the second. An oath uttered in anger is often free from grave fault. Thus Busemb. and St. Alph., l. 3, n. 146: "Those uttering words from anger, namely, by God, by Christ, I will kill you, commonly do not sin gravely, because for the most part they are excused by ignorance or indeliberation."

To the third. The proposed case can easily be resolved by the very words of St. Alph., l. 3, n. 150: "Some simple persons seem sometimes able to be excused from mortal perjury by reason of inconsideration, when they use certain sworn formulas, such as by my soul; may God punish me. For although they know that this is called an oath, nevertheless they do not apprehend that to swear and to invoke God as witness is something grave; but only apprehend some confused notion of an evil not of so great moment. Indeed it must be noted that commonly rustics do not apprehend the gravity of perjury; while, confessing themselves about oaths, they little or not at all distinguish true oaths from false; and this I have long since understood from practice in Missions. Wherefore for those who have the custom thus of perjuring, I judge that confessors rather ought to abstain from instructing such persons about the grave sin which in fact is in perjury, lest material sins in them, on account of the bad habit which they have, become formal; from the general rule.... Nevertheless such habitual persons are to be strongly warned that thereafter they cease swearing falsely. For the rest, it is not always expedient to warn a rude penitent of this sort concerning the gravity of perjury, if the admonition is foreseen not easily to be profitable." G. 296; I. M. 549, 551.

2. Candidus, a priest, since, by applying himself to a game of cards, on a certain day he had inadvertently prolonged it beyond midnight, and consequently had omitted on that day to recite vespers and compline, noticing this on the following day, emitted an oath of no longer playing, lest he again be exposed to a similar danger. But it is very difficult for Candidus to keep his oath; since his two brothers and two other priest friends, who come together toward nightfall, are accustomed to play cards together for the sake of recreation, a moderate quantity of money having been exposed. And since Candidus no longer appears and remains alone in his own separate room, pretending that he must prepare Lenten sermons, both his brothers and the priest friends strongly urge him that at least sometimes, or for a shorter time, by his presence he be willing to make the conversation of brothers and friends more cheerful, and to be present at the game as before. So that he may do this more willingly, his brothers propose to him that they themselves will pay for him that moderate quantity of money, if he himself is defeated in the game, and that they themselves will give him all the money which as victors in the game they obtain.

Q. 1. What concerning an oath of not playing? - 2. What concerning the oath of Candidus?

R. To the first: "If an oath has been made of not playing in general, all agree that it does not oblige one to abstain from an honest and moderate game." For an oath of this sort is understood to have been made lest someone spend notable time, expose a grave sum of money in a game, squander goods, etc.; unless something else must be judged from particular circumstances, for example, "if the one swearing expressly intended a greater good in abstaining from play, as that he might be free for God, mortify himself, etc." For then he is held to abstain even from licit and small-quantity play. "But in this play there can well be smallness of matter, which is to be measured according to the end intended by the one swearing. Such a one swearing can also give money to another for playing, and watch him, and also assist him; because this properly is not to play." Lig. 178; I. M. 562.

To the second. If Candidus, asked by his brothers and friends, merely assists at the game without playing, he does not break the oath of not playing. If Candidus recites all the canonical hours in the morning and evening; nay indeed, if in the evening he also anticipates matins and lauds of the following day, neither, by playing late with friends and brothers for the sake of urbanity, does he violate the oath. For in cases of this sort, for defining sin and grave sin, attention must be paid both to the quantity of matter and especially to the end which someone proposed to himself in swearing. - I. M. 562, 566; G. 298.

3. Thomas, leader of an army, in a war altogether unjust on the opposite side, captured by enemies and cast into prison, is then sent as an envoy to his own people, so that he may negotiate concerning concluding peace, with an oath nevertheless that, whatever may be the outcome of the negotiation, he return to the city and prison of the enemies.

Q. Is Thomas held to return?

R. "He who promises with an oath to return to prison, according to others, is not held to return with probable danger of most grave unjust harm; for it would be to offer himself to it spontaneously. But much more probably he can, because, the promise having been placed, to return is an act of virtue." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 229.

4. Ambrosius, a servant, having known the fornication of the son of the household, swears to him that he will manifest it to no one.

Q. Does such an oath bind?

R. "The oath binds; unless silence gives occasion of another fornication; or unless there is present the necessity of correction, or the just interrogation of a superior intervenes." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 4, n. 229.

5. Minantius often swears, saying in a rather raised voice: I swear by this Cross, and showing with his hand whatever object first occurs to him. Nay indeed, he often swears, saying: By God, by Christ, I will kill you, I will cut off your head. At other times also he swears, saying: May as many Angels take my soul as the times I have done this; So may God favor me, as I....

Q. What is to be thought concerning formulas of this sort?

R. It is not a true oath, "regularly speaking, to say: May as many Angels take my soul as the times I have done this.... Nor is it an oath to say: I swear by this Cross, the Cross nevertheless not having been shown or signed." Lig. 143. But, speaking in itself, it is a comminatory oath to say: By God, by Christ, I will kill you, I will cut off your head; and it is a grave sin. For God is expressly named there, and invocation of him is added to confirm a grave and unjust threat. Lig. 143, 146; I. M. 554.

6. Sisinius in court affirmed by oath that the one hundred gold pieces which Caius owed to Sempronius had already been restored by the former to the latter. Yet Sisinius had known this only from the assertion of Caius himself, his friend, of whose truthfulness he was firmly persuaded, and could have no suspicion of falsity.

7. The same Sisinius in court affirmed a falsehood by oath. But he swore according to the form introduced into the courts on account of those who refuse to invoke the holy name of God, namely: I swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing other than the truth.

Q. Was Sisinius perjured in either case?

R. Affirmatively, in the first case. The reason is that for an oath in judgment, knowledge of the matter is required, which he does not have who hears the matter from others related to him, and all the more related by one having an interest in that cause himself. To the point, St. Alph., l. 3, n. 148: "They say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of trust that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with an oath. Yet this does not run in judgment." - I. M. 556.

Affirmatively also in the second case. The reason is that that formula contains a true oath. "To say," says St. Alph., l. 3, n. 136, "I swear it is so, is not truly an oath, because then divine testimony is invoked neither explicitly nor implicitly.... Unless an interrogation concerning an oath preceded, because then, through the preceding interrogation, that I swear is sufficiently determined to a true oath." Now that formula, from the very interrogation and admonition of the judge, is determined to a true oath. For in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, after in art. 297 that form has been established in art. 299 it is said: "The oath shall be furnished by witnesses or experts, standing on their feet, in the presence of the judges, after a serious admonition which will be made to them by the president or by the praetor concerning the moral importance of such an act, concerning the religious bond which believers contract by it before God, and concerning the penalties established against those guilty of false testimony or expert opinion," etc. - I. M. 550, 551.

8. When a ship had come to the port of Marseilles from the Canary Islands, the captain of the ship was asked by the harbor master whether he had touched at those islands, which were altogether falsely asserted in the public newspapers to be infected by plague. The captain of the ship immediately responded negatively, since those islands in fact were infected by no contagious disease.

Q. 1. Is it licit in an oath to use mental restriction? - Who regularly can use mental restriction? What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. n. 557. To the second: "Regularly public persons can use broadly mental restriction when asked about matters committed to their faith, such as secretaries, parish priests, captains, magistrates, advocates, physicians, midwives, etc. For if things committed to persons of this sort were violated, most grave inconveniences would certainly follow. For the rest, we do not deny that the present question is difficult, in which we can be deceived, both in assigning a legitimate cause and in using legitimate formulas of speaking; for easily a broadly mental restriction can be a purely mental one. Wherefore one must proceed cautiously, lest we harm human society, lest we introduce confusion, lest we derogate from Christian simplicity." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 231.

To the third: "He who comes from a place which is falsely thought to be infected by disease can deny that he comes from there, namely, as infected with pestilence, such as is and ought to be the mind of those asking." Scav., l. c.

And thus also "he who was compelled to marriage can assert that he did not contract it, namely freely. He who is not held to customs duties can say that he bears nothing, so that he is held to pay." Scav., ibid.

"Invited to table, and asked whether the food is good, he can affirm that it is such, although in fact it is tasteless, understanding, for mortification and penance; and otherwise all know that from urbanity, in that case, it is customary to respond thus, however the food may have been prepared." Scav., l. c.

1. "A Protestant emitted a vow of chastity, and also of poverty and obedience, by voice and in writing before an Anglican minister. It is asked whether it has at least the force of a simple and private vow, or whether it must be held as altogether void in the case of conversion to the Catholic religion?

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Exod. 20. 7.

By this precept every irreverence toward God is forbidden, whether by the vain use of His most holy Name, or by blasphemy, or by an oath or a vow, either unlawful or violated.

“6. God is praised by blasphemy.” Proposition of Eckhart condemned by John XXII.

Title of the Cause. — “I, the undersigned, appointed by the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord N. N., Cardinal Ponent or Relator of the Cause, as a secret Theological Censor for the examination of the writings attributed to the aforesaid Servant of God, touching these Most Holy Gospels of God placed before me, swear and promise faithfully to fulfill the office committed to me and to disclose my judgment in writing according to the truth, in accordance with the form prescribed by Pope Benedict XIV of holy memory. I further swear and promise religiously to preserve secrecy, and not to disclose in any way to anyone my appointment or judgment, except only to the aforesaid Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Cardinal, to the Most Reverend Father, Lord Promoter of the Faith, to his Subpromoter, to the Chancellor of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, and to his Substitute, under pain of perjury and excommunication latae sententiae, from which I cannot be absolved except by the Supreme Pontiff—even the Major Penitentiary being excluded—apart from danger of death. Thus I promise and swear; so may God help me and these His Holy Gospels. — Rome, on this day ____.”

— Signature.

“Since in certain missions the following question has arisen concerning the interpretation and force of the Bulls Ex quo and Omnium sollicitudinum, which Benedict XIV issued concerning the oath to be made by Missionaries to the Chinese and Indian peoples—namely, whether, besides European priests, native priests also are bound to take the said oath—the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, to which a doubt of this kind had been proposed, judged that the whole matter was to be referred to the Holy Office. Now, on Wednesday, the 29th day of last May, the aforesaid Congregation gave the following response concerning the doubt referred to it, which was thereafter confirmed by Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, namely: According to information newly received, they are bound. While I communicate to Your Amplitude this decision, to which thereafter the individual priests of every mission, whether European or native, will have to adhere faithfully, I also make use of this occasion to signify to you that the oath concerning which there is question above, once it has been taken before any Prelate of a mission, will always thereafter remain in its force; so that it is not necessary for it to be renewed if the Missionary passes to another mission and becomes the subject of another Superior. He will nevertheless have to exhibit to that Superior testimony concerning the same oath having been taken.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 21 June 1895.

“We do not condemn an oath; indeed, we believe with a pure heart that it is lawful to swear with truth, judgment, and justice.” Profession of Faith of the Waldensians prescribed by Innocent III.

“The third error of these persons—the Fraticelli—agrees with the error of the Waldensians, since both these and those assert that an oath is to be taken in no event, dogmatizing that those whom it should happen to be bound by the religious obligation of an oath are polluted by the contagion of mortal sin and held liable to punishment.” Error condemned by John XXII in a Constitution issued in 1318.

“101. Nothing is more opposed to the spirit and doctrine of Jesus Christ than to make oaths common in the Church, because this is to multiply occasions of perjury, to spread snares for the weak and uneducated, and to bring it about that the name and truth of God sometimes serve the counsel of the impious.” Proposition of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

“43. Oaths which are made to confirm human contracts and civil commerce are unlawful.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned at the Council of Constance.

“75. The doctrine which declares that, in the blessed times of the nascent Church, oaths seemed so foreign to the instructions of the divine Preceptor and to golden evangelical simplicity that even to swear without extreme and unavoidable necessity would have been regarded as an irreligious act, unworthy of a Christian man; which moreover maintains that a continuous series of the Fathers demonstrates that oaths were held to be forbidden according to the common understanding; and which proceeds therefrom to disapprove the oaths which the ecclesiastical court, following—as it says—the norm of feudal jurisprudence, adopted in investitures and in the sacred ordinations of Bishops themselves; and which establishes that a law is therefore to be implored from the secular power for abolishing oaths which are exacted even in ecclesiastical courts for undertaking functions and offices, and generally for every curial act: false, injurious to the Church, harmful to ecclesiastical law, subversive of the discipline introduced and approved by the canons.” Proposition of the Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI.

“1. Whether it is lawful for the Bishops and clergy to swear to the Spanish Civil Constitution of the year 1869 according to the formula prescribed by the Government. — 2. Whether the Spanish Bishops and the other local Ordinaries ought by pastoral letters to instruct the faithful people concerning the true sense of taking the oath.

“As regards the first question, it is readily evident to anyone that the prescribed oath is unlawful for clerics and laity alike, in view of the formula of the same oath, circumscribed by no limitations. For a Catholic man cannot be permitted to swear that he will observe those laws which are opposed both to divine and to ecclesiastical sanctions. Moreover, it is not hidden from the Bishops of Spain, and Your Eminence knows well, that in that Constitution are contained laws by which Catholic unity is gravely injured, a most extensive liberty of forms of worship and doctrine is introduced and established, and other things opposed to divine and ecclesiastical law are established, which were reproved by the united voice of the Bishops and by the votes of nearly all Spaniards. Hence it has happened that there have not been lacking those who, with a truly praiseworthy counsel, preferred to resign from public offices rather than bind themselves by an oath of this kind against conscience. Nevertheless, if the Government should persist in what it has begun—which may God avert—and the clergy should be compelled to make this oath, then, in order to avoid greater evils, and only in a case of coercion, the Sacred Penitentiary has judged that it can be tolerated that the taking of the oath be made according to the prescribed formula, provided that this limitation is added to the text of the formula: excepting those things which are opposed to the laws of God and of His holy Catholic Church.

“But as regards the second question, since from the taking of an oath of this kind, especially when made by ecclesiastics, an occasion of scandal would easily be furnished on account of the peculiar condition of the Spanish people unless they are rightly instructed concerning the aforesaid limitation appended to it, this Sacred Penitentiary has therefore judged it greatly expedient that the Bishops and local Ordinaries admonish and instruct the flock entrusted to them concerning the appended limitation by pastoral letters. Indeed, it would be desirable that these pastoral admonitions become known to the people before the aforementioned oath is made. But since other sacred Prelates of Spain have also proposed similar questions, I readily persuade myself that Your Eminence will courteously and willingly furnish them with a copy of these letters, so that in so great a matter all may be able and willing to proceed with equal step.” Cf. P. Villada, Cas. Consc. his praesent. tempor. accommod., part 1, On Liberalism, Brussels, 1884, p. 266 ff.; A. S. S., vol. 2, p. 675.

“Whether it is lawful to take the oath proposed by the intruding Government, in these or similar words, in which unlimited obedience is contained: I swear fidelity and obedience to Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, and to his successors. I swear that I will observe the Statute and every other law of the State for the inseparable good of the King and of the Italian fatherland. — Resp. The oath, as it is set forth, is not lawful; but an oath of merely passive obedience can be tolerated in all things which are not opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws, according to the form approved by Pius VII of holy memory and expressed in these words, namely: I promise and swear that I will never give assistance to a conspiracy, assembly, or sedition of any kind against the present Government; and likewise that I will be subject and obedient to it in all those things which are opposed neither to the laws of God nor to those of the Church.” Sacred Penitentiary, 10 Dec. 1860; A. S. S., vol. 1, p. 561.

“Can a Bishop who is asked take an oath, or can he at least promise a certain observance toward the new order of affairs? — Resp. In the negative, both because ecclesiastics are prohibited by the Sacred Canons from taking an oath before lay authorities, and because the oath, as it is proposed, is unlawful, as is evident from the Response in the Letter of 10 Dec. 1860.” Sacred Penitentiary, 14 Dec. 1866; A. S. S., vol. 2, p. 675.

“Moreover, it has been reported that in many regions of the Indies Catholics are accustomed, when the making of an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and presented by the Government; while, on the other hand, it is not difficult to obtain from the civil Government itself that Catholics be given the power of taking an oath upon their own Bibles. Therefore, let all Apostolic Vicars in whose missions a custom of this kind is usually employed diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian Government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church. But until they shall obtain this from the civil authority, let them prudently remain silent if they see the faithful taking oaths upon the Bibles of heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath. Meanwhile, let them inform the Sacred Congregation whether the Bibles of heretics presented for an oath are substantially corrupted; whether they are presented so that they may be approved by Catholics; whether our Latin Vulgate is customarily excluded; and finally, by whom, in what circumstances, and for what object oaths of this kind are exacted.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 8 Dec. 1869; C. 1664.

“Since Protestant officials preside over all tribunals, courts, customs houses, and public offices of the Government, both civil and military—in French, les bureaux—and the manner of swearing among them is by touching and kissing the Bibles, heretical Bibles are everywhere furnished to be touched and kissed, and it is conceded to the clergy alone that they swear by placing a hand upon the breast. These things being posited, it is asked whether the faithful are to be disturbed concerning the manner which has become prevalent of touching and kissing Bibles of this kind. — Resp. In the case and circumstances set forth, the response is to be in the negative; namely, they are not to be disturbed.” Holy Office, 23 Feb. 1820. — Cf. n. 367.

“14. Likewise, whether he believes that perjury knowingly committed for any cause or occasion whatsoever, for the preservation of the bodily life of oneself or another, even in favor of the faith, is a mortal sin.” Articles from the Bull Inter cunctas of Martin V concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Hus are to be questioned.

“24. To call God as witness to a slight lie is not such great irreverence that on account of it He should will or be able to condemn a man. — 25. With cause, it is lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is slight or grave. — 26. If anyone, whether alone or before others, whether questioned or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end whatsoever, should swear that he did not do something which he in fact did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or another manner different from that in which he did it, or anything else true added, he does not in reality lie, nor is he perjured. — 27. A just cause for using these equivocations exists whenever this is necessary or useful for preserving bodily health, honor, or family property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then considered expedient and deliberate. — 28. He who through recommendation or a gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able, with a mental reservation, to take the oath which by command of the King is customarily exacted from such persons, without regard to the intention of him exacting it, because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“The faculty of dispensing from vows does not of itself include the faculty of dispensing from an oath.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 19 May 1845; C. 2087.

“3. Vows concerning the doing of something are impediments to perfection.” Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

A vow of communities to celebrate certain feasts of precept with a vigil and procession, insofar as it has force from the vow, although confirmed by the Bishop, obliges only those making the vow. Sacred Congregation of Rites, Decrees 834, 2113.

"1. Whether it is lawful for the Bishops and Clergy to swear the Spanish civil Constitution of the year 1869 according to the formula prescribed by the Government? 2. Whether the Spanish Bishops and the other Ordinaries of places ought, through Pastoral letters, to teach the faithful people concerning the true sense of taking the oath? - As regards the first question, it is easily evident to anyone that the prescribed oath is illicit both for clerics and laymen, the formula of the same oath being considered, circumscribed by no limits. For it cannot be permitted to a Catholic man that he swear that he will observe those laws which are opposed both to divine and to ecclesiastical sanctions. Moreover, the Bishops of Spain do not fail to know, and Your Eminence knows well, that in that Constitution laws are contained by which Catholic unity is gravely wounded, the widest liberty of worships and doctrine is introduced and constituted, and other things opposed to divine and ecclesiastical right are established, which were reproved by the unanimous voice of the Bishops and by the wishes of almost all Spaniards. Hence it happened that there were not lacking those who, with a praiseworthy plan indeed, preferred to resign public offices rather than, with conscience resisting, bind themselves by an oath of this kind. Nevertheless, if the Government perseveres in what it has begun, which may God avert, and the Clergy is driven to issuing this oath, then, in order to avoid greater evils and only in the case of coercion, the Sacred Penitentiary judged that it can be tolerated that the taking of the oath be made according to the prescribed formula, provided that to the text of the formula itself the limitation be added: excepting those things which are opposed to the laws of God and of His Holy Catholic Church. - But as regards the second question, since from the taking of this kind of oath, especially when done by ecclesiastics, occasion of scandal would easily be provided because of the peculiar condition of the Spanish people, unless they are rightly taught about the aforesaid appended limitation, hence this Sacred Penitentiary judged it supremely expedient that Bishops and Ordinaries of places admonish and instruct the flock committed to them concerning the appended limitation by pastoral letters. Indeed, it would be desirable that these pastoral admonitions become known to the people before the mentioned oath is issued. But since similar questions have also been proposed by other sacred Prelates of Spain, I most readily persuade myself that Your Eminence will courteously and willingly deliver a copy of these letters to them, so that in so great a matter all may be able and willing to walk with equal step." Cf. Fr. Villada, Cas. Consc. his present. tempor. accommod., Part 1, De liberalismo, Brussels, 1884, p. 266 f.; Acta S. Sed. Vol. 2, p. 675.

"Whether the oath proposed by the intruding Government is lawful in these or similar words, in which unlimited obedience is contained: I swear fidelity and obedience to Victor Emmanuel, king of Italy, and to his successors. I swear that I will observe the Statute, and every other law of the state, as for the inseparable good both of the king and of the fatherland of Italy. Resp. The oath, as it is set forth, is not lawful; but the oath of merely passive obedience can be tolerated in all those things which are not opposed to Divine and Ecclesiastical Laws, according to the form approved by Pius VII of holy memory, and expressed in these words, namely: I promise and swear that I will never give assistance to conspiracy of any kind, whether assembly or sedition, against the actual Government; and likewise that I will be subject to and obey the same in all those things which are opposed neither to the laws of God nor of the Church." S. Poenit. 10 Dec. 1860. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 561.

"Can a Bishop, when asked, pronounce an oath, or at least what observance can he promise to the new order of things? - Resp. In the negative; both because it is prohibited by the Sacred Canons for Ecclesiastics to issue an oath before lay authorities, and because the oath as proposed is illicit, as is clear from the Response in the Letters of 10 Dec. 1860." S. Poenit. 14 Dec. 1866. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 2, p. 675.

"But it has been reported that in several regions of the Indies, Catholics have been accustomed, if the issuing of an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and exhibited by the Government; but from another side, it is by no means difficult to obtain from the civil Government itself that Catholics be granted the power of issuing the oath upon their own Bibles. Therefore all Apostolic Vicars in whose Missions a use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed should diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian Government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church.

But until they have obtained this from the civil authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful furnishing oaths upon Bibles of Heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath. Meanwhile let them teach the Sacred Congregation whether the Bibles of heretics, exhibited for the oath, are substantially corrupted, whether they are exhibited so as to be approved by Catholics, whether our Latin Vulgate is customarily excluded. Finally, by whom, and in what circumstances, and for what object, oaths of this kind are exacted." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 8 Dec. 1869.

The vow of Communities to celebrate certain Feasts of precept with vigil and procession, insofar as it is by the force of a vow, although confirmed by the Bishop, obliges no one except those making the vow. S. R. C., in the decrees apud Gardellini, nn. 1444, 1624, 1874, 1963, 2019, 4152.

Two secondary acts of religion are enumerated: oath, by which God is called as witness of truth, and vow, or a promise made to God. They are called secondary, not because they are less perfect than the acts described above, but because they are not so necessary for the exercise of religion.

We shall speak: 1. of its nature; 2. of its honesty; 3. of the obligation which it induces; 4. of adjuration, which is akin to oath.

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 89-90; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. V; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, lib. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 133-193; Bouquillon, n. 503-725; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 532-601; Muller, § 58-62; Lehmkuhl, n. 405-427; Noldin, n. 243-260; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, 4th Conference, p. 123; Codex, c. 1316 sq.

943. 1. Notion. An oath, which is also called a sacrament, is the invocation of the divine name in testimony of those things which are said or promised. When men wish to confirm the truth of the things which they say, they are accustomed to bring in witnesses for confirming the matter. But sometimes the matter of which there is question cannot be fully proved by human testimony, because it is hidden or future: then not rarely, especially if there is question of a momentous matter, God Himself is invoked as witness so that, when it pleases Him, whether in this or in the other life, He may confirm the hidden truth.

Therefore two things are required for an oath: (a) invocation of the divine name, either express or tacit, namely through external signs sufficiently expressing this invocation, such as the touching of the cross or of the Gospel, or the extension of the hand toward a crucifix. The word I swear does not of itself suffice for an oath, unless from the context or other adjuncts it is clear that God is truly invoked. Likewise, to swear by creatures or saints does not suffice, unless, from the adjuncts, the creatures have a special relation to God, so that their invocation is deservedly held as the invocation of the divine name.

(b) Besides, the calling upon God as witness of the truth declared is required, and therefore the intention of obliging oneself to speaking the truth; for the end of this invocation is the confirmation of the truth which is asserted. Psychologically the matter is declared thus: when the one swearing, who is supposed to fear God, confirms by oath the things which he says, he is judged sincerely to declare the truth: for he invokes God as witness, who can neither be deceived nor deceive, and is accustomed strictly to chastise the perjured, if not in the present life, at least in the other life. But, as is clear, the force of this confirmation arises from faith in God the rewarder, and therefore the oaths of atheists lack it.

944. Applications. (a) Among oaths these or similar expressions cannot be enumerated: by my faith, by the faith of a man, by the faith of a priest, by my honor, because then only the conscience, honor, veracity of man is called upon; otherwise if it were said: by the Christian faith. (b) To say: it is as true as it is true that God exists, or as true as the Gospel, is not of itself an oath, since God is not invoked as witness; nor generally is it heretical blasphemy, since the speaker does not will to equate the certainty of his own assertion to the truth of the Gospel; but, if it is brought forth for the sake of confirming a lie, it is not excused from simple blasphemy, since injury is inflicted upon God. (c) These formulas: may I die, may the devil snatch me, if this is not true, are not properly oaths, unless, from the adjuncts, there is the intention of calling upon God, but imprecations; otherwise, if it were said: may God destroy me if I lie: for then there is an execratory oath, by which God is invoked as the avenger of perjury. (d) Uncivil words, which the common people improperly call oaths (pardi, parbleu, sacristi, sacredii, etc.), although etymologically certain ones import blasphemy, are generally neither blasphemies nor oaths, the intention of the speakers being considered; but, according to common estimation, they are nothing other than meaningless words brought forth by an angry person; yet a Christian man will carefully try to avoid them.

945. 2. Divisions. (a) By reason of the object about which it is concerned, an oath is assertory, if God is invoked as witness of a past or present thing, for example, I swear that I saw Paul standing there, I swear that I am a cleric; or promissory, if He is invoked as witness of a future thing, for example, God is witness to me that I will give you one hundred coins: it is called promissory, because it is generally applied to confirming a promise.

(b) By reason of form, it is called invocatory, or contestatory, when God is simply invoked as witness; imprecatory, or execratory, when He is invoked not only as witness, but as avenger of perjury, namely when the one swearing imprecates evils upon himself or his own, if he asserts a false thing or does not keep what he promises, for example, may God destroy me, if I do not speak the truth. - The formula: so may God help me and these holy Gospels, approaches an imprecatory oath, and the sense is: if I speak the truth, may God help me; if a false thing, may God deprive me of His help.

(c) By reason of the mode in which it is uttered, it is simple, if it is made without any apparatus; solemn, if with special ceremonies, for example, by touching the Gospel, raising the hand, before a crucifix, with candles lit, etc.

Moreover these diverse oaths are of the same moral species, since all agree in the invocation of the divine name, and differ only accidentally.

946. Certain heretics contended that oath is prohibited under the new law, among whom were the Waldenses and certain Protestants, such as the Quakers, relying on these words of the Lord: "Again you have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not forswear thyself... But I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is His footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King; neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your speech be: yea, yea; no, no; and that which is over and above these is of evil."² Nevertheless not only Catholics, but most Protestants, hold that an oath is licit, certain conditions being posited.

² Matt. 5:33-37.

947. 1. Thesis: An oath, clothed with the due conditions, is honest and laudable.

(A) That oath was in use under the old Law and approved by God Himself is clear from many texts:³ "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and shalt swear by His name." In the new law likewise oath is often exhibited as something honest, used by the apostles; thus Paul writes:⁴ "For God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the Gospel of His Son, that without ceasing I make a commemoration of you... But I call God to witness... For God is my witness, how I long after you all in the bowels of Jesus Christ." Wherefore, unless a contradiction is admitted between the words of Christ and the words of Paul, it must be said that the passage cited above is to be understood of the prohibition of swearing without cause, without necessity; for in common circumstances it is not necessary to confirm by oath the truth of the things which are said; for Christians ought to be so sincere that, even without any oath, their words are believed confidently.

³ Deut. 6:13; cf. Josh. 9:15; Judg. 21:5; Ps. 14:4 and 62:18, etc.

⁴ Rom. 1:9; 2 Cor. 1:23; Phil. 1:8.

(B) The practice of the Church has approved this interpretation; for in judgments, whether ecclesiastical or secular, oath is frequently used, either so that witnesses may be induced by religion to manifest the truth completely, or to strengthen an argument otherwise incomplete. And deservedly; for, provided God is invoked as witness of the truth brought forth not frequently, but only in a matter of great moment, no irreverence is committed against Him, but on the contrary His supreme veracity is acknowledged, and His justice, which strictly pursues and chastises perjury. Wherefore in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is read:⁵ "For men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy."

⁵ Heb. 6:16.

948. 2. Conditions, moreover, are required for the liceity of an oath. Three are deduced from this text of Jeremiah,⁶ namely truth, judgment, and justice: "And thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice."

⁶ Jer. 4:2.

(A) Truth, that is, conformity of words with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes a lie in asserting or promising, and fiction, or an oath uttered without the mind of swearing or obliging oneself.

(a) He who by oath confirms that which he knows to be false commits the mortal sin of perjury, because he commits grave irreverence against God, bringing Him in as witness of falsity. Nor does lightness of matter excuse here; for, even in light or joking matter, it is gravely repugnant to invoke God as witness of falsity. Therefore this proposition 24 was deservedly reproved by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He wills or can damn a man."⁷

⁷ Apud Denzinger, n. 1041; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) It is not licit to swear with only probable knowledge of the matter, but moral certainty is required, namely that against which no prudent doubt fights; one swearing with prudent doubt concerning the truth sins mortally, because he inflicts grave irreverence upon God, by invoking Him as witness of something about which he doubts.

949. (c) Nor is it licit to swear with a mental restriction whose sense cannot be detected; indeed not even with a mental restriction whose sense can be detected, except from a most grave cause: for the former restriction is a lie; the latter is a distorted mode of speaking, which, when an oath accedes to it, can be used only in a case of true necessity, namely when there is no other means of protecting oneself or others against unjust aggression or a most grave evil.⁸ - Therefore these propositions were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI:

⁸ For understanding this, see what we wrote concerning lying, De Justitia, n. 408-417. - If the theory of equivocations and restrictions is rejected, and with moderns it is admitted that false speech is licit in a case of necessity, it must be said that false speech cannot be confirmed by oath, unless when there is no other means of averting a most grave harm, for example the death of an innocent person.

26. "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way than that in which he did it, or any other true addition, he in reality does not lie, nor is he perjured."⁹

⁹ Here there is question, from the context, of a purely mental restriction, whose sense cannot be detected by a prudent man.

27. "A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for the health of the body, honor, preserving family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."

28. "He who, by means of custom or gift, has been promoted to a magistracy or public office, will be able with mental restriction to take the oath which, by command of the king, is customarily exacted from similar persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one exacting it: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."¹⁰

¹⁰ As Viva testifies (on this proposition), thus is condemned the practice of those who use equivocation whenever, by command of legitimate authority, they swear that they were not promoted because of recommendations or gifts.

950. (d) He who promises something by oath without the intention of swearing or obliging himself, and therefore simulates an oath, commits a grave sin from its genus; for although he does not emit an oath, he uses the name of God in vain, and deceives others. Wherefore if this is done before a judge, or in contracts, the sin is grave. But in other matters of slight moment, the sin is probably light, according to many theologians, because it is nothing other than the vain use of the name of God. But all fictions of this kind, as unworthy of an honorable man and easily drawing one to perjury, are altogether to be avoided. - But he who with the mind of swearing promises something, yet without the intention of fulfilling it, sins mortally, since he brings God in as guarantor of a false promise.

951. (B) Justice, in an assertory oath, requires that the one swearing have the right of asserting what he says, and, in a promissory oath, that the thing promised be honest.

(a) Thus, in an assertory oath, he sins who manifests another's hidden crime without cause, or boasts of a sin committed: for he does not have the right of saying these things, nor, a fortiori, of confirming them by oath. Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the intention of the agent and on the gravity of the things which are said.

(b) In a promissory oath, he certainly sins mortally who swears that he will commit some grave thing: for he inflicts a grave injury upon God by making Him witness and, as it were, guarantor of this iniquity. But if the act which is promised under the faith of an oath is only venially evil, the malice against religion is probably only venial, although, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 146) and others, it is more probably mortal, on account of the injury inflicted upon God. Whatever the case, oaths of this kind are carefully to be avoided, not only because of the reverence due to God, but because they savor of foolishness: for who of sound mind can invoke God as witness of the promise of a thing less honest?

952. (C) Judgment, or discretion, requires two things, namely, that there be a just cause for swearing, and besides that the oath be furnished with that reverence, internal and external, which the divine majesty requires.

(a) Therefore they sin who frequently swear, without sufficient reason, that is, without necessity or great utility: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there are many falls... A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity, and a scourge shall not depart from his house. And if he make it void, his sin shall be upon him; and if he dissemble, he offendeth doubly; and if he swear in vain, he shall not be justified."¹ Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the frequency of the acts and on the intention of the agent; to swear once or twice without sufficient cause does not exceed venial sin, unless contempt of the divine majesty is present.

¹ Ecclus. 23:9-14.

(b) They also sin who utter oaths jokingly or in a manner little becoming. This happens by no means rarely when they are taken too frequently.² - Civil authority can indeed, from a just cause, exact an oath to be taken upon a book of Scripture; but it ought to permit Catholics to swear upon Catholic Bibles.³

² In the United States of America oaths are perhaps required too often in the matter of tributes and taxes; whence it happens that perjuries are easily committed in this matter. By a very excellent counsel all Christians ought to join their forces, so that they might obtain a change of the civil laws in this matter.

³ To the point, S. Cong. de Prop. Fide, Sept. 8, 1869 (Collectanea, n. 1664): "It has been reported that, in several regions of India, Catholics have been accustomed, if an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and presented by the government... Therefore let all Apostolic Vicars, in whose missions use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed, diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church. But until they shall have obtained this from the civil authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful take an oath upon the Bibles of heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath."

953. Here there is question only of a promissory oath; for an assertory oath produces no obligation for the future, since it consists in the mere affirmation of some thing. - Every promise induces an obligation of justice or fidelity, according to the principles set forth in the Treatise on Justice, n. 677; when an oath accedes to this, it produces a new obligation of religion: of which we must now speak.

954. 1. The existence and gravity of this obligation: A promissory oath, concerning an honest thing, induces an obligation of religion, grave from its genus, for the one swearing. For the one swearing invokes God not only as witness of the promise, but also as guarantor of its execution; and therefore, from reverence toward God, he is bound to execute what was promised. - Nevertheless, he who utters the formula of an oath without the intention of swearing, whether from inadvertence or from deliberation, does not contract an obligation: say the same of him who does not have the intention of obliging himself; for in both cases one of the elements necessary either for an oath or for contracting an obligation is lacking.⁴

⁴ But what obligation is incumbent on him who emitted a promissory oath in favor of a third party can be inferred from what was said in the Treatise on Justice, n. 621.

(a) Moreover, the gravity of the obligation depends on the gravity of the thing promised; for since the one swearing is judged to have had a sincere will of fulfilling what was promised, he sins only insofar as he does not put the same into execution; but if the thing promised is of slight moment, its non-execution cannot be grave; for an oath does not change the nature of the act, but only adds to it an obligation of religion.

(b) The obligation of a personal oath belongs to the one swearing, and therefore does not pass to heirs, while the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise itself can be real and can pass to heirs (De Justitia, n. 679).

955. (c) An oath concerning an impossible, illicit, or plainly useless thing induces no obligation. For no one is held to the impossible; besides, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity, or even of a vain thing, which in no way turns to the honor of God. If the thing afterward becomes licit or useful, an oath which was null from the beginning does not revive: for that which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not made firm by the passage of time.⁵

⁵ Rule of law 18 in the Sext.

(d) From the Code, can. 1317, "an oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior." Nevertheless, from can. 1318, "a promissory oath follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added. If an oath is added to an act directly tending to the harm of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act consequently obtains no firmness."

956. 2. Concerning the extension and interpretation of this obligation.⁶ (A) The general principle is that the obligation of an oath does not extend more widely than the promise itself to which it accedes; for an oath is something accessory to the promise itself, which it confirms; but it is fitting that the accessory follow the nature of the principal.⁷ - Except if the one swearing intended the matter otherwise; for the extension of the obligation, like its existence, depends chiefly on the intention of the one swearing.

⁶ In the Treatise on Justice, n. 662-664, there is weighed what sort of obligation an oath adds to a contract.

⁷ Rule of law 42 in the Sext.

(B) Moreover, two particular rules are to be noted: (a) The obligation ought not be extended beyond the sense of the words strictly accepted. For hateful things are to be restricted; but an obligation which arises from an oath is judged hateful, as restricting liberty. Besides, an oath depends on the intention of the one swearing; but he is not judged to will to oblige himself beyond the expressed and strict sense of the words.

(b) A promissory oath is to be interpreted according to the conditions and restrictions which are understood from the nature of the matter, or from the principles of law, or from the common sense of prudent men. Moreover, the chief restrictions of this kind are the following: - if I am able, physically and morally; - without prejudice to the right of superiors, who from a just cause can invalidate the obligation or dispense in it; - if the matter has not been notably changed: for if it is notably changed, the intention of the one swearing did not extend to it; - if the other has kept faith: for in vain does someone ask that faith be kept toward himself by him toward whom he himself refuses to keep the faith pledged;⁸ - unless the other cedes his right: for since a promissory oath is made in favor of another, and this other can renounce his right, it is in some way subjected to his will; - unless there is a grave reason for changing the proposal: for if execution cannot take place without a grave danger of death, infamy, etc., not foreseen before, the one swearing is not judged to have willed to oblige himself.

⁸ Rule of law 75 in the Sext.

957. Corollaries. (a) An oath of observing the statutes of some college, congregation, office, etc., ought to be understood of statutes already issued, not of those to be issued, - of those which then are in force, not of those which have fallen into desuetude or are not observed by the greater part of the community, - and indeed in that manner in which the statutes oblige, that is, under grave sin, under light sin, or only to a penalty, according to the statutes themselves: for an oath does not change the nature of the obligation, but only adds to it the bond of religion.

(b) An oath of observing a secret does not oblige when the obligation of the secret itself ceases (De Justitia, n. 421-425).

(c) An oath of fidelity and obedience to some Prince or Government, or of observing a Constitution, does not oblige except according to the common sense of honorable men; accordingly it does not oblige one to embrace in mind all things which are contained in the Constitution, but only to undertake nothing illegitimately against the same.⁹

⁹ Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 660-714, discusses learnedly the various political oaths.

(d) An obligation induced by oath ceases: by the cessation of the end, - by condonation made by him in whose favor the oath was uttered, - by invalidation, or dispensation, or commutation, according to the principles set forth below, n. 990 sq.

958. 1. Notion and species. (A) Adjuration, which is akin to oath, is called the interposition of the divine name or of a sacred thing, by which someone is induced to do or omit something. Accordingly it differs from an oath, because God is not invoked as witness or guarantor, for confirming truth, but as a motive for obtaining something more efficaciously.

(B) It is deprecatory when it is made through prayers, for example: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God..."¹; thus also God Himself is sometimes prayed by way of adjuration, for example, through the mystery of Thy holy Incarnation, through Thy Passion, etc. - It is preceptive, or imperative, when it is made by command or mandate; for example, when the high priest said to Christ:² "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ." - God can be adjured only deprecatorily, because no one can command Him; the devil only imperatively, because he is not capable of deprecation; man both imperatively and deprecatorily, because he is capable both of command and of deprecation.

¹ Rom. 12:1.

² Matt. 26:63.

Adjuration is called solemn when it is made in the name of the Church, by ministers specially deputed, as in exorcisms; but private if it is employed in a private name.

959. 2. Principles. (A) Adjuration does not induce an obligation of religion in the person adjured: for it is not used for this, but for exciting in him fear or love of the divine name, by which he may be moved more easily and efficaciously to perform what is asked. If a subject is already bound to obey a superior, he ought indeed to comply with him, not by force of the adjuration, but by force of the precept joined with the adjuration.

960. (B) But on the part of the one adjuring, certain conditions are required so that he may act licitly; for on his part, adjuration is an act of religion, which ought to be adorned with the same qualities as an oath: (a) truth, insofar as the one adjuring ought to set forth only a true cause: from this head a fictitious poor man sins who, by God or by the Virgin, asks alms without cause; (b) justice, insofar as only a licit thing can be asked; (c) judgment, that is, for a reasonable motive, but not from vanity alone, or curiosity. The defect of these conditions is grave or light sin, according as the matter is grave or light. Thus a fictitious poor man who squeezes out a great sum of money, or who asks for a gravely illicit thing, sins mortally; but venially, if he solicits a modest alms, or induces to a light sin.

961. 1. The second precept forbids that the name of God be taken in vain:³ "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." And deservedly; for the name of God is holy, and ought to be pronounced only with due reverence. The same must be said, due proportion being observed, of the vain assumption of the names of saints, since irreverence toward the saints or sacred things ultimately redounds upon God.

³ Exod. 20:7.

This vain appellation of the divine name arises especially from a twofold cause: from anger, and from lightness or custom.

(A) From anger, when from commotion of mind one says, for example: the name of God, a thousand names of God! For the most part that usurpation does not exceed venial sin, because it proceeds from sudden and little deliberated commotion; nevertheless it could be mortal, on account of deliberate contempt of God, or scandal.

962. (B) From lightness, or custom, when without cause the name of God is frequently used in conversation, for example: My God! Great God! Good Jesus! Sweet mother of God! This frequent appellation is indeed reproved by Scripture:⁴ "Let not the naming of God be continual in thy mouth"; and in reality it bears before it some irreverence toward God and the saints. But it does not exceed venial fault, since in it there appears only a light disorder; indeed, it often is free from all fault, on account of inadvertence.

⁴ Ecclus. 23:10; cf. above, n. 952.

963. 2. But by no means is frequent invocation of the divine name from an internal sense of reverence and from devotion of heart prohibited; rather, it is commended. Thus in the Scriptures the prophets more often say: The Lord liveth; thus also today pious Christians greet one another with these words: Praised be Jesus Christ!

Wherefore it is permitted to conclude with the Catechism of the Council of Trent:⁵ "Then we venerate and worship the divine name when, by reason of office and religion, we celebrate the divine praises, and give Him singular thanks for all things, both prosperous and adverse... Therefore, when we are tortured by pains of soul and body, when we are tormented by miseries and afflictions, let us at once turn all the zeal and powers of our soul to praising God, saying that saying of Job:⁶ Blessed be the name of the Lord!"

⁵ Catechism, second precept of the Decalogue, n. 4.

⁶ Job 1:21.

964. Through an oath God is assumed as witness of the things which are asserted or promised; through a vow a promise is made to God Himself; for just as we promise something to men, so likewise also to God. Moreover, a promise made to the Lord is counted among the acts of religion, because it tends to furnish service to Him. We shall speak: 1. of the nature of a vow; 2. of its honesty and obligation; 3. of the cessation of this obligation.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88; Suarez, op. cit., tr. VI, l. 1-6; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 194-262; Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 302-502; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 602-710; Noldin, n. 209-242; Berardi, Praxis, t. I, n. 489-562; M. d'Hulst, Careme, 1893, 4th Conf., p. 131-145; Codex, c. 1307-15.

In order that the nature of a vow may be better understood, it is fitting to declare its notion and species.

A vow is commonly defined as a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Hence two things especially are desired for a vow: a true promise made to God, and apt matter. When these have been rightly set forth, it will easily be understood what conditions are required for its validity.

965. 1. A true promise made to God. (A) The promise of which there is question here is a sincere will of obliging oneself to do or omit something; accordingly it differs from a mere proposal, or intention of doing something, which is elicited without the will of assuming a true obligation. The faithful sometimes doubt whether they have emitted a proposal or a vow; for solving this doubt, attention must be paid not only to the words which they used, but also and especially to their intention. For not rarely the word "I promise before God" signifies nothing other than a proposal; indeed "I vow" does not necessarily import a vow; but if there is the intention of obliging oneself under penalty of sin, there is a vow, whatever words were employed.⁸ If, all things considered, the matter remains truly doubtful, in practice there is not a strict obligation of fulfilling the vow, because its existence is not established.

⁸ The will of fulfilling the thing promised is not essentially required for the existence and obligation of a vow, but it is required that the vow be honest and an act of religion; for he who intends to contract an obligation, but not to fulfill it, by no means honors God, but offends Him, and therefore commits a sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter itself.

966. (B) A promise of this kind ought to be true, or deliberate: for no one imposes upon himself any moral obligation unless he sincerely wills this; but for this there is required a deliberate volition, namely that which is necessary for a truly human act (above, n. 78-84). Indeed, since a vow is an act grave in itself, a greater deliberation is required for its validity than for other common acts; and the graver the obligations which it imposes, the greater deliberation it requires. Nevertheless, in order that a vow be valid, lengthy and mature deliberation is not necessary, but only that which, according to the common estimation of prudent men, is proportioned to the gravity of the obligation to be undertaken. But when mature deliberation is lacking, the obligation contracted is less strict, and is more easily dispensed or commuted.

Therefore invalid are vows emitted by children not yet perfectly masters of themselves, - by the half-drunk or half-asleep, - by those who are wholly ignorant of the obligations which vows induce, or conceive them only imperfectly and confusedly: for in these and similar adjuncts, there is not found a deliberation proportioned to the gravity of the obligation.

967. (a) But an attentive consideration of all the circumstances of the thing promised is not required, but only of those which morally pertain to its substance. Thus he who emits religious vows, understanding sufficiently clearly what they substantially import, vows validly, even if he has not maturely considered all the burdens which naturally follow from them.

(b) Nor for a vow is there required an actual and explicit will of undertaking the obligation, but a virtual and implicit will suffices, provided it be true. A virtual will suffices, namely one which truly was had and still perseveres, although not actually elicited; thus an adolescent who freely resolves to receive the subdiaconate and, by force of this proposal, receives ordination, truly emits the vow of chastity, which he knows to be annexed to this order, even if at the time of ordination he does not actually think about it; the same must be said of him who emits religious profession. - An implicit will likewise suffices, namely one which is included in the general volition of undertaking all the obligations annexed to such a promise; thus he who wills to profess the religious state, by that very fact implicitly vows poverty, chastity, and obedience annexed to this profession, when he has sufficiently understood that all these things are included in the religious state.

968. (c) From this it also follows that all those impediments which harm the liberty of human acts obstruct the validity of a vow: if liberty is thoroughly destroyed, the vow is by that very fact invalid; if it is diminished, yet so that the one vowing enjoys liberty proportioned to the gravity of the obligation, the vow is indeed valid, but dispensation in it is easier.

1. Thus he who emitted a vow from error is not held to fulfill it, if the error is truly the cause of the vow, so that, the truth having been known, he would not have vowed the thing; for example, one who promises chastity, in no way knowing of what matter there is question, - one who vows a pilgrimage to a sanctuary which he thinks to be distant one hundred miles, while in reality it is distant one thousand, - one who vows a Mass for the health of his father, whom he falsely heard to be ill. - On the contrary, an error of less moment about the circumstances of the matter, knowledge of which would not have impeded the vow, does not render it invalid.

When there is question of religious vows, it is commonly held that they are not invalidated except by error concerning their substance: for since there is question of a complex of obligations, it suffices that their substance be sufficiently understood.

If an invalid vow is renewed because it was believed valid, by this it does not become firmer, because it was renewed only from error.

2. A vow emitted from grave fear unjustly inflicted for extorting the vow is not valid,⁹ because it lacks due liberty, and besides God cannot accept a promise of this kind, lest He seem to approve the very injury brought upon the one vowing. But it is otherwise if it is from light fear,¹⁰ or from fear justly inflicted, or not for extorting consent. Thus a vow emitted from fear of shipwreck or of another danger is valid: for then it is not made unwillingly, but from the soul, for obtaining the grace of safety.

⁹ This can be inferred from cap. 1 Perlatum, lib. I, tit. 40, and also from Trent, sess. XXV, c. 19.

¹⁰ Thus always in public vows; but in private vows, if it were established in fact that fear, even light fear, was the true and sole cause of vowing, the vow more probably would not be valid in the forum of conscience.

969. (C) A promise made to God: for a vow properly so called is an act of religion by which we furnish service to God and acknowledge His supreme dominion, and so it pertains to the worship of latria. Nevertheless, sometimes vows are said to be pronounced to the saints, that is, to God in honor of the saints, just as altars are dedicated to the saints, that is, to God in their honor: for the honor rendered to them redounds upon God Himself. - But if someone should directly intend to promise something to the saints themselves, it would not properly be a vow, but a religious promise, pertaining to the worship of dulia.

970. 2. Apt matter, that is, honest, concerning a better good, and possible.

(A) Honest, or morally good; for since a vow is emitted for furnishing service to God, nothing can be promised except a thing pleasing and acceptable to Him. Therefore a vow concerning a thing altogether indifferent is void, unless from the end or circumstances it becomes good: thus the one vowing sins venially, as taking the name of God in vain; and, a fortiori, a vow concerning a morally evil thing is void: thus the one vowing sins gravely in itself, unless he is excused by ignorance or inconsideration (as often happens), because he supposes that an evil thing can please God: which in itself brings a grave injury upon Him.

Here it is asked whether a vow of a good thing is valid, but from an end of the one vowing which is in some way evil. (a) It is indeed not valid, if the depraved intention is the motive and total cause of the vow, because then the act becomes totally evil (above, n. 150); for example, if someone vows alms that he may successfully commit injustice: for such an end renders the vow evil and impious. (b) But it is valid if the depraved intention is only the impulsive and partial cause of the vow, because then the whole act is not vitiated; for example, if someone vows alms both that he may please God and that he may be praised by men: for notwithstanding a vain intention of this sort, the action remains good in part and can be offered to God. - The same must be said concerning an evil condition added to a vow, for example, if someone promises a rich alms, on condition that he come out unharmed from a duel; for although the duel is evil, to preserve life unharmed is good, and the vow is not concerned with the evil thing, namely the duel, but with safety, which is certainly good.

971. (B) Concerning a better good, that is, concerning a work which is more perfect than its opposite, all the circumstances being considered; for since a vow is made for pleasing God, one cannot promise Him a good which impedes a greater good: for if a lesser good is promised, by that very fact the one vowing obliges himself to omit the greater: which surely cannot please God. Moreover, a better good must be estimated not only in itself and absolutely, but also in relation to the one vowing and all the adjuncts.

Thus a vow of marrying is not valid in itself, because it is opposed to a better good, namely virginity. But in special adjuncts matrimony can be the matter of a vow, for example, if someone, under the hope of matrimony, has corrupted some virgin, or if such a matrimony is very useful to the republic. Likewise a vow of not vowing is not valid in itself, because it concerns a lesser good; but a vow of not vowing except with the permission of a confessor is valid, since it is an act of prudence.

An action already prescribed can be the matter of a vow, because a thing prescribed is good; besides, from what is to be said, to do something from vow is better than to perform the same thing without vow. Nevertheless, that which already falls under a precept should not be vowed without reason, lest bonds be multiplied rashly in this way.

972. (C) Concerning a possible good, not only physically, but morally: because no one can oblige himself to the impossible.

Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even semi-deliberate ones, is not valid, since this is impossible without a special privilege of God, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 63; but a vow of avoiding all fully deliberate venial sins is valid, because persons firmly rooted in virtue can fulfill this, with the help of grace; but such a vow cannot be permitted to others, since it is above their strength. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is also valid, but is by no means to be counseled to the frail, lest perhaps by violating it they commit a double sin.

Since the matter of a vow ought to be in the power of the one vowing, we cannot properly vow the deed of another, or something to be performed by another; thus a mother cannot vow that her son will enter religion. If in reality such a vow has been emitted, it ought to be explained thus: that the mind of the one vowing was to oblige herself to take care, insofar as she can, that the other perform it; but his liberty remains intact. Vows made by cities, monasteries, or colleges do not bind posterity, unless the obligation arises from elsewhere, for example from a statute, law, or custom having the force of law.

973. If the matter of a vow is partly possible and partly impossible, before all else the intention of the one vowing must be explored: if he promised both indivisibly, or in the manner of one thing, he is held to nothing when either part is impossible; otherwise, if he promised two things divisibly, or independently from one another, because the useful is not vitiated by the useless. If the intention of the one vowing is not established, it ought to be presumed from the matter itself of the vow: when this is divisible, the possible part must be fulfilled; thus he who vowed ten fasts, and can fulfill only two, is held to these two. If the matter is indivisible, or if the impossible part is altogether principal in relation to the other, no obligation subsists; thus he who vowed a Roman pilgrimage, and can travel only half the way, is held to nothing; but if he promised to make the journey on foot (which he cannot do), yet can easily go to Rome by railroad, he should indeed do this, since the Roman pilgrimage itself is principal, and the mode of going is accessory.

974. 1. By reason of the object about which it is concerned, a vow is: (a) personal, if the thing promised is some action to be placed or omitted, such as the recitation of some prayer, a pilgrimage, etc.; (b) real, when the thing promised is directly some thing external to the one vowing and estimable by price, such as alms, the donation of a chalice, etc.; (c) mixed, if the object of the vow is at the same time an action and a thing, for example, a vow of going to Loreto, and there offering a chalice.

2. By reason of duration, it is called temporary or perpetual according as it is promised to be observed for a certain time or throughout one's whole life.

975. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is made, it is called absolute or conditioned, according as it is made simply, without any restriction, or with some condition added: an example of this is had if someone vows a rich alms on condition that he receive such an inheritance. - If the condition added is joined by way of a penalty to be inflicted, the vow is penal, as if someone promises alms, on condition that he shall have relapsed into such a sin.

976. 4. By reason of form and effects, a vow is public when it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private; - solemn, if it has been recognized as such by the Church; otherwise simple (Codex, c. 1308). - As to the fact, the Church regards two genera of vows as solemn: the vow of chastity emitted in sacred orders, and religious vows emitted in those orders which have been approved by the Church as solemn.

977. Hence arises the question, long debated among canonists and theologians, whence the solemnity of vows comes, or in what a solemn vow differs from a simple one. All today indeed confess that this distinction arises only from the authority of the Church, since neither Christ nor the Apostles established anything concerning this matter. This, moreover, Boniface VIII declared in the single chapter De Voto, in the Sext: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow has been found by the constitution of the Church alone"... Nevertheless it is further asked whether this solemnity is situated in the will alone of the Church, or in some special effect which, by the Church so establishing, has been annexed to a solemn vow.

(a) According to St. Thomas¹ and many others, the solemnity of a vow consists in a certain spiritual consecration, by force of which the person or thing designated by the vow is thoroughly withdrawn from human uses and, of itself irrevocably, is dedicated to God, so that it cannot be converted to profane uses without sacrilege. (b) According to others,² however, the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow is merely external, and consists in this, that the Church dissolves solemn vows far more difficultly than simple ones. - Nevertheless we hold the former opinion, rightly understood, as the more probable; for, although the solemnity of vows depends on the Church, it produces some effects permanent in themselves which do not proceed from a simple vow: thus acts contrary to solemn vows are rendered not only illicit, but also invalid; for example, a marriage contracted by him who has emitted a solemn vow of chastity is invalid. This can be declared thus: just as, in civil matters, those contracts are called solemn in the making of which public authority intervenes, which confers upon them a special firmness on account of the public good; so likewise, in our matter, the public authority of the Church intercedes, so that it may concede a special indissolubility to solemn vows, which it publicly recognizes as such. Moreover this indissolubility proceeds from this, that publicly, and from the very authority of the Church accepting and confirming the vows emitted, persons vowing are consecrated to God in a special and indissoluble manner, as regards those acts which they promised to do or omit.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 7 and 9; Lehmkuhl, n. 500.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 603; Noldin, n. 210.

Moreover, since this indissolubility arises from the authority of the Church, it is not so firm that dispensation cannot be made in it from a most grave cause.

978. 1. Errors. Many Protestants, from the fact that they reject the distinction between precepts and counsels, contend that vows concerning things not prescribed, from the motive of worshiping God, are not only illicit, but impious, since they suppose that there are certain supererogatory works which are by no means owed to God. Nevertheless, they concede that the same vows are licit if they are made from another motive, for example, for the sake of avoiding sin, or of freeing oneself from the bonds of the world. - Today, however, not a few rationalists and politicians reprove all vows, especially religious and perpetual vows, as harmful to liberty and to society: for since man is essentially mutable and progressive, no one can abdicate his liberty, especially in perpetuity; besides, religious, by vowing poverty, obedience, and chastity, become not only useless to society, but even harmful: for they produce nothing, and by their example draw others to idleness under the pretext of contemplation. - Hence we shall premise a few things concerning the honesty and excellence of vows.

¹ St. Thomas vindicated the excellence of religious vows in two opuscule works: Opusc. I, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem; Opusc. III, Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu (Works, ed. Vives, t. XXIX).

1. A vow (εὐχή, votum) is a free and deliberate promise made to God to do something that is good and possible, and better than its omission.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 1: “A promise proceeds from a purpose of doing. But a purpose presupposes some deliberation, since it is an act of the deliberate will. Thus, therefore, three things are necessarily required for a vow: first, deliberation; secondly, a purpose of the will; thirdly, a promise, in which the nature of a vow is perfected.”—Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 1307, § 1.

A vow is essentially an act of divine worship (cultus latriae) because it is, so to speak, a contract which a man makes with God and by which he deliberately assumes a new obligation that binds him in conscience.²

² St. Thomas, ibid., art. 5: “A vow is a certain ordination of the things which one vows to divine worship or service. And thus it is clear that to vow is properly an act of latria or religion.”

As a rule the taking of a vow is accompanied by prayers and sacrifices offered for the purpose of obtaining some particular grace. Pious persons wishing to be relieved from evil, or to secure the divine assistance in circumstances of particular difficulty or danger, have long been wont to add to their prayers the promise of some sacrifice, e. g., to perform a work of charity or self-denial, in order to make the appeal to God’s mercy stronger and more efficacious. The vows of which we read in the Old Testament were all hypothetical, i. e., subject to the fulfilment of some condition.³

³ Gen. XXVIII, 20–22; Numb. XXI, 2; Judg. XI, 30 sq.; 1 Kings I, 10 sq.; 2 Kings XV, 7 sq.—Cfr. A. Aust, die Religion der Römer, pp. 29 sq., 126.

Being a formal promise, a vow differs from the mere purpose of doing or omitting something, because a purpose does not per se oblige in conscience, whereas a vow does.⁴

⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., l. II, p. 12, c. 3 says: “A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which is more properly referred to God alone and to those things which are God’s. For to vow is, by the attestation of a spontaneous promise, to bind oneself to God and constitute oneself His debtor. For he who promises simply pledges that he will do something; but he who vows solemnly affirms his promise and confirms the promise itself. Where it is a promise, he is held; where it is an attestation, he is bound.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 521).

The mere intention of making a vow is not sufficient to constitute a vow, and involves no obligation. The essential constituent of a vow is an obligation assumed in conscience. This is a matter in regard to which the faithful ought to be instructed in confession, lest they erroneously believe that the mere resolve of making a vow or performing some virtuous act entails the same obligations as the vow itself. To fail to keep a good resolution may be a sin, if the failure results from carelessness, sloth, or sensuality; but it is a sin (usually venial) only per accidens, because the sinful character of the omission lies in the cause, not in the act itself.⁵

⁵ Cfr. F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 464.

2. To deny the religious and moral character of vows is to doubt or deny the value of prayer and the significance of sacrifice. To promise God to do something one is not obliged to do, is manifestly a religious act, which derives its moral quality from the fact that it may be made a powerful means of acquiring virtue. By a vow the will, which is so easily moved, is directed toward goodness, i. e., toward God, and thus a fruitful source of heroic virtue is opened.⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 6: “For three reasons to perform the same work with a vow is better and more meritorious than to perform it without a vow. First, because to vow is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious.... Secondly, because he who vows something and performs it subjects himself more to God than he who only performs it. For he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than one who gave him only the fruits. And thence it is that thanks are also given to those who promise. Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good. But to do something from a will confirmed in good belongs to the perfection of virtue.”—Ibid., qu. 189, art. 2.

It is true that a vow binds the will, but this very fact constitutes it a positive instrument for the acquisition of true Christian liberty, which is the result of self-control, and thus makes a vow a powerful aid to human frailty.

Christ never made a vow because he was God and confirmed in goodness.⁷ But for men vows are expressly approved alike in the Old and in the New Testament.⁸ We read in the Acts of the Apostles that St. Paul and other early Christians shore their heads in pursuance of a vow.⁹ St. Ambrose,¹⁰ St. Augustine,¹¹ and others of the Fathers warmly recommended the practice of making vows.¹²

⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 4, ad 3: “To Christ, considered in Himself, it was not fitting to vow, both because He was God and also because, inasmuch as He was man, He had a will confirmed in good, as one possessing comprehension.”

⁸ Gen. XXVIII, 20; Lev. XXVII, 2 sqq.; Ps. XLIX, 14 sq.; LX, 9; LXXV, 12.

⁹ Acts XVIII, 18; XXI, 23 sqq.—Cfr. J. E. Belser, Die Selbstverteidigung des hl. Paulus, pp. 141 sqq.; and the same author’s Beiträge zur Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, pp. 89 sqq.

¹⁰ De Offic., l. III, c. 12, n. 76–81 (Migne, P. L., XVI, 137 sqq.).

¹¹ Enarr. in Ps., 75, n. 16: “Let each one vow and render what he can. Do not vow and fail to render, but let each one vow and render what he can. Do not be slow to vow. For you will not fulfil it by your own powers.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 967).—IDEM, ibid., 131, n. 3: “Let no one presume to render by his own powers what he has vowed; He who exhorts you to vow, Himself helps you to render.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1717).

¹² J. B. Wirthmüller, Über das Sittengesetz, pp. 52 sqq.; Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, pp. 167 sqq., 195 sqq.

That abuses have arisen in connection with vows proves nothing against their legitimacy.¹³

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2, ad 3: “To vow entrance into religion is a certain confirmation of the will toward better things, and therefore, of itself, it does not give man an occasion of falling, but rather removes it. But if one who transgresses a vow falls more gravely, this does not detract from the goodness of a vow, just as the fact that some sin more gravely after baptism does not detract from the goodness of baptism.”—Cfr. H. Denifle, O. P., Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 61 sqq. (English ed. by Volz, I, 73 sqq.); A. Schulze, Das Gelübde in der neueren theologischen Ethik, Gütersloh 1906.

The Church by esteeming and recommending vows imposes no yoke on any one. The vowing individual imposes a yoke upon himself, and this act of self-denial, if prudently and deliberately performed, is truly moral. The Church by her legislation on vows and the binding force thereof does not impair liberty; on the contrary, her laws are liberty’s best guarantee, for, in the first place, they prevent the faithful from binding themselves thoughtlessly and without a divine call; and, secondly, they interpret the obligations incurred by vows leniently and dispense from them when fulfilment would prove harmful. This is a great advantage, especially when we consider that, had not the Church the power to interpret vows, individual Christians would often be sorely troubled in conscience when they wished to withdraw from such an obligation merely on the strength of their own private judgment.¹⁴

¹⁴ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 331.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88.—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., IV, dist. 38.—IDEM, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 138.—F. Suarez, De Religione, tr. VI, l. 1–6.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 194–262 (ed. Gaudé, I, 495).—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 538 sqq.—C. Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, Obligatione, Honestate, Münster i. W., 1897, pp. 5 sqq.—Marsot, Traité Pratique des Voeux, 9th ed., Paris 1919.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 273 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 27th ed., pp. 229 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 222 sqq.—Th. Bouquillon, De Virtute Religionis, Part II, Bruges 1880, n. 302–502.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 170 sqq.—J. d’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., Vol. III, 5th ed., pp. 178 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 321 sqq.

Vows may be divided according to substance, form, or effect.

1. With regard to substance vows are (a) personal, real, or mixed; (b) perpetual or temporary.

a) A personal vow is a promise of some act to be performed, e. g., fasting, nursing the sick, going on a pilgrimage.

A real vow is one by which a thing (e. g., a sum of money) is dedicated to God.

A mixed vow combines the qualities of both personal and real vows. Such a mixed vow would be a promise to fast for the purpose of being able to give alms to the poor.¹

¹ Codex Iuris Can., can. 1308, § 4.

b) In respect of time, vows are secondly divided into perpetual and temporary. They are called perpetual if the obligation is assumed for life; temporary, if it is assumed for a limited time only.

2. With regard to form, vows are (a) absolute or conditional; (b) explicit or implicit.

a) An absolute vow (votum absolutum) is one that has no condition attached to it; a conditional vow is one that has.

In conditional vows the fulfilment of the promise is made to depend upon some definite event, e. g., a prayer being heard. Consequently there is no obligation to keep the vow until that event has happened. To this class belongs the so-called penal vow (votum poenale), which is a promise made to God to perform a definite penance if one should have the misfortune to commit, or fall back into, a certain sin.

b) An explicit vow (votum explicitum) is one in which the promise is clearly expressed. An implicit vow (votum implicitum) implies an act necessarily connected with the act expressly promised, as, for instance, according to a theological opinion, the vow of chastity is implied in major orders.

3. With regard to their canonical effects, vows are divided into solemn and simple (vota solemnia et simplicia). The basis of this distinction is not the greater or less measure of solemnity wherewith the vow is taken, but solely the positive law of the Church.²

² Codex Iuris Can., can. 1308; cfr. Wernz, Ius Decretalium, III, 572.

The classification of vows into temporary and perpetual, simple and solemn, in reference to religious profession, is comparatively new. In the middle of the sixteenth century the only acknowledged form of profession was the solemn vow, which was supposed to be taken after the novitiate. With the exception of the Society of Jesus, this practice was followed by all religious orders until 1858, when the S. Congregatio super Statu Regularium enacted³ that, after the novitiate, the members of male religious institutes should take simple vows, which were to be continued for three years from the date of simple profession, or longer, according to the prudent judgment of the superiors, but not beyond twenty-five years. Leo XIII⁴ extended this decree to nuns with solemn vows. Yet up to a few years ago it was always the opinion of canonists and the practice of the Roman Congregations to consider these simple vows as perpetual. Lately the Roman Court commenced to regard them as temporary (triennial), and this view has been embodied in the new Code.⁵

³ Decree “Neminem latet.”

⁴ “Perpensis,” May 3, 1902.

⁵ Cfr. P. Augustine, O.S.B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. III, p. 254, St. Louis 1919.

Solemn vows are those recognized by the Church as such. They are perpetual and are made only in religious orders properly so called. They include the three essential elements of the religious life,—poverty, chastity, and obedience.

Temporary profession does not involve such an absolute and lasting contract as perpetual profession. In regard to the latter the difference between simple and solemn vows is most important. Simple perpetual profession implies no absolute and irrevocable covenant, whereas solemn per- petual profession, by its very nature, spells irrevocable consecration to God and acceptance of the act by a religious superior in the name of the Church.⁶

⁶ Op. cit., III, 259.

The distinction between reserved and non-reserved vows belongs to Canon Law rather than to Moral Theology. Of private vows, the only ones reserved to the Holy See under the New Code are that of perfect and perpetual chastity and that of entering a religious institute with solemn vows, provided the vow has been taken unconditionally after the eighteenth year of age completed.⁷

⁷ C. I. C., can. 1309.

A public vow is defined by the Code as one accepted by a legitimate religious superior in the name of the Church. All vows not thus accepted are private.⁸ A solemn vow is always public, but not vice versa.

⁸ C. I. C., can. 1308, § 1.

READINGS.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., p. 273.—IDEM, Las Religiosas, com. IV, n. 1 sq.—P. Chas. Augustine, O.S.B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. VI, St. Louis 1920.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 224 sqq.

By the object of a vow we understand its matter, or, in other words, that which is promised to God.

This object must be good, nay something better than its opposite.¹ It may be something that is not a matter of duty, but merely of counsel, or something which is a duty, as, e. g., patience in suffering or chastity corresponding to one’s state of life.² Vows of the last-mentioned kind are often made with the intention of insuring special fervor in the fulfilment of one’s duties. To the original obligation arising from the law a vow adds the additional one resulting from the promise made. The so-called baptismal vow, or a promise made in the confessional to avoid the occasion of sin, to keep the holydays of obligation, etc., are in themselves mere resolutions, but partake of the nature of vows if they are accompanied by a solemn promise to employ extraordinary means of grace.

¹ Ths. Slater, S.J., Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 247.

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2: “One and the same work done by vow is more praiseworthy than if it were done without a vow.”—Cfr. qu. 88, art. 6.

Nothing that is sinful, unjust, incompatible with one’s higher duties, or physically or morally impossible, can be made the object of a vow.

The matter of a vow, by its very nature, must be something which is physically and morally possible, for no one can reasonably assume an obligation which it is beyond his power to fulfil.³

³ Cfr. Matt. XV, 5 sq.; Mark VII, 11–13.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 315: “I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, indeed a better good, because God is not worshipped by an indifferent or less good action; for by a vow special worship is promised to God, which cannot be given except in the promise of a better thing. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to various circumstances. II. The matter of a vow must be a morally possible thing, because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of binding oneself; but no one can bind himself to something morally impossible for him. But if the thing is divisible and possible in part, the vow is valid for that part; it is not valid, however, if it is morally indivisible.”

If a vow can be kept only in part, and the matter is capable of being divided (materia divisibilis), the vovens is bound to do as much as he can, unless he has promised different acts as parts of one inseparable whole. Thus if a husband or wife had vowed to observe chastity, he or she would at least have to refrain from demanding the debitum. If one had made a vow to give a certain sum to the poor, and found that he was unable to give all he had promised, he would have to give as much as he could.

A similar rule governs all circumstances which may enter into the substance of a vow. Thus, if one has vowed to make a pilgrimage on foot, and finds himself unable to walk, he must go on horseback, or by train, or in some other way, if he can.⁴

⁴ F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 471.

A vow to avoid all, even the slightest venial sins, would be invalid because the matter promised is impossible. The case would be different if the vow referred to mortal sins, or to deliberate venial sins, or to venial sins of a determined species. Such vows are valid, though on account of the difficulty involved in keeping them, they are not expedient for all.⁵

⁵ Ferreres, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, p. 277; cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia, disp. 2, art. 5.

A vow to marry or get married would be, per se, invalid, even if it referred to some poor and pious person. The reason is that, for the vovens, the celibate state would be bonum maius. If, however, marriage is necessary for any individual, either to remove scandal or to escape the danger of incontinence, it would be for that person a bonum melius and hence a fit object for a vow. The same is true if one who had already made up his mind to enter the matrimonial state, would vow to marry a poor girl in order to rescue her from poverty.⁶

⁶ Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 231.

To vow absolutely never to make a vow would be invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow. To vow never to make a vow except with the permission of one’s confessor, on the other hand, would be valid, because it is better to make a vow without danger of imprudence than with that danger present. If one who has vowed never to make a vow except with the consent of his confessor would afterwards break his promise by making a vow without consulting his confessor, the act would be sinful indeed, but the vow would be valid, unless the vovens had expressly stipulated that any future vow thus taken should be invalid.⁷

⁷ Ibid.; cfr. P. Laymann, S.J., Theol. Mor., l. IV, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 5.

READINGS.—Gury, Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 315–318.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 549 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 471 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 276 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 229 sqq.

The conditions required to make a vow valid and licit, are the following:

1. He who makes a vow must have the serious and deliberate intention (animus vovendi) of binding himself by his promise under pain of sin, because every vow is a kind of particular law which the vovens takes upon himself before God.¹

¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 310: “For the validity of a vow there is required both a true and deliberate intention of making the vow, or a true promise made to God under pain of sin, because a vow is a kind of particular law which the vower imposes upon himself before God. However, the will and deliberation required for mortal sin suffice.”

Notion and essence. 1. An oath is "the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth" (c. 1316). It can be explicit, which is expressed in set words, or tacit, as if, as a sign of an oath, you touch the Gospel, or sign a formula. He who of his own accord signs such a formula by which he is judged both to declare certain things and to confirm them by oath, in reality lies or swears feignedly, unless he has the intention of swearing; but he who is compelled by law or by public authority will then lie only if he is lawfully commanded. One who unlawfully commands formal adherence to his intention or order cannot reasonably hope for it for himself, and therefore cannot consider such a subscription as sworn.

The intention alone of swearing suffices that you swear before God; but that you swear before men, suitable signs of the intention are further required. Doubts will of themselves be solved from the common acceptance of the words. The common use of words also begets a certain presumption in the internal forum. Here, however, in doubt one will answer in favor of liberty.

2. Suitable formulas are: I call God to witness; I invoke God as witness; so may God help me.

The word alone, "I swear," would indeed of itself suffice, but from common usage it does not signify an oath unless it answers to an oath that has been requested. Often also, although by accident, he is not judged to swear who says: by the Catholic faith, by the holy Gospel.

3. Unsuitable formulas are of themselves: God knows, - God will testify in His own time, - I speak before God, - God knows all things, - God sees my conscience, - God knows that I do not lie; because these are judged to be uttered only narratively, without invocation of God, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances.

More absolutely unsuitable are the formulas: Truly, certainly, in truth, on the faith of a good man, by my faith, on the faith of an honest man, of a good Christian, of a priest, of a king, by my conscience, upon my conscience; by these one merely declares that he speaks from the dictate of conscience and from knowledge of the truth.

From usage, these express only a strong affirmation: I expose my head, let my ears be cut off, unless.... Other sayings in the manner of imprecation will more easily be an oath, at least when the event is designated in which we are accustomed to recognize the hand of God. Therefore an invocation is quite easily had: may I be struck by lightning; may I fall dead unless.... But if an execration or choice of evil were had, a new species would be added.

The same must be said of comparative words: it is as true as the sun shines, as God is, as Christ is in the sacrament, as the Gospel is true; he is as innocent as the Blessed Virgin, etc.; these would be blasphemous if anyone wished to insist upon equality. If at the same time they affirm false things, they contain a lie, and where the name of God is pronounced, a vain usurpation of that Name.

Nor today is he judged to swear who says "by my soul." Although one can swear by the nobler creatures, if He is understood who is peculiarly present in them, for example by heaven, by the angels of God, etc.; today the use of such formulas is rather rare. - Since the Gospels represent Christ, to touch the Gospels is to touch Christ; to swear by the Gospels is to swear by Christ.

4. The invocation of God, which pertains to the essence of an oath, consists in this: that the one swearing, so far as is in him, desires and wills that God testify or confirm as true that which he swears (if at any time it shall please Him), and at the same time accepts divine punishments or divine vengeance if he lies, as the words prove: So may God help me....

Wherefore the philosophy of an oath is this: he who calls upon God in confirmation of falsity gravely derogates from the reverence of God and exposes himself to divine punishments; a religious man is not judged to will to do these things; wherefore, by such interposition of divine authority, he himself confirms his own statements.

Division. 1. From the exterior form, they distinguish a verbal oath, which is contained in words; a real oath, which is contained in an action, for example of raising the fingers, touching the cross, the Gospels; and a mixed oath, which is composed of both signs.

2. From the very force of the formula, it is invocatory or contestatory, and execratory or imprecatory. By the former God is simply invoked as witness; by the latter He is expressly at the same time called upon as avenger of falsity, whether one exposes himself or another beloved person, for example a son, to punishments. Since no one is accustomed seriously to imprecate evils from the heart upon himself or a friend, and every oath exposes the one swearing to divine punishments, that false oath does not seem, at least practically, to differ in species from a simple false oath.

3. From the object, it is distinguished as assertory and promissory. By an assertory oath past or present things are affirmed or denied; by a promissory oath at the same time a present intention is affirmed, and a future deed is promised.

To the promissory oath is referred the comminatory oath, by which someone swears thus, for example: by God, I shall strike you unless....

A promissory oath can be absolute and conditioned.

4. Finally, from the rite, an oath is distinguished as simple and solemn; the latter is made by a definite rite before a Prelate, judge, notary, etc. - It pertains to the canonical rite that it be made personally: "An oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be furnished through a procurator" (c. 1316 § 2).

Judges sometimes are ignorant of the proper force of an oath, so that they do not formally swear when they seem to swear; or sometimes they think a certain rite essential, for example really raising the fingers, so that if they do not raise the fingers rightly they think themselves immune from perjury. These things are to be observed by a judge; but by a priest they must be untaught.

Moral judgment. 1. An oath, furnished with due conditions, is honorable and praiseworthy. For it is an act of religion, since it contains a profession of divine truth, authority, and providence. But the words by which the Lord seems to condemn every oath are understood by tradition as concerning the reprobation of the evil custom of mixing oaths into every hour and occasion. That honesty is of defined faith.

2. The conditions of an honorable oath, moreover, are customarily expressed in the three words which the Code itself used, when c. 1316 § 1 says: "It cannot be furnished except in truth, in judgment, and in justice." a) Truth demands that you utter those things which you think to be true with that certitude which the solemnity of the thing manifests. Wherefore it is not licit to affirm as certain or simply that about which you doubt. Quite commonly, with St. Alphonsus, L. 4, n. 148, they say that moral certitude is enough for you to confirm a matter by oath. But, since moral certitude is not indivisible, that must be accepted cautiously. Let us rather say that such certitude is required as, for the circumstances, with the oath also considered, is reasonably expected by the hearers; or such as is tacitly affirmed with the thing itself, in these circumstances. For an oath is furnished more as a sign of veracity than of the truth of the thing; it properly confirms things as they are said, not as they are (2. 2, q. 89 art. 1). Hence a stricter certitude is required in the judicial forum, because of the gravity of the consequence. Wherefore what you know from another's report must be testified as received from another. Likewise, where you swear in particular that something is true, the thing must truly be established for you. In a prolix discourse, on the contrary, it is less necessary that you be so certain about the individual narrated points, even secondary ones; then by the oath you rather confirm the sincerity of your mind. But certitude of a future deed, in a promise, is of itself less established. It is enough that you think what you promise to be placed in your power.

Insofar as equivocation itself or defensive words are licit, it will be licit, if there is a just cause, to confirm the same by oath. Where they are prohibited under grave sin, one will sin gravely by such an oath.

This condition of truth is required under grave sin in an oath insofar as it is assertory, nor does lightness of matter excuse from grave sin.

b) Judgment requires that an oath be made with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and with sufficient utility. By every serious cause this condition is fulfilled, and its defect is only venial, like a vain usurpation of the name of God.

c) Justice is understood differently in an assertory oath and in a promissory oath. - In an assertory oath, a narration of a thing which you cannot licitly report, at least under oath, is said to be opposed to justice. Of itself that defect is venial. It would be mortal if you wished thereby to conciliate belief for grave detraction, or, as we may say more generally, to use divine authority as a means of iniquity. - In a promissory oath, where it has its proper seat, the condition of justice forbids you to swear that you will do what is not licit. And when grave sin is in question, there is committed a mortal irreverence of abusing divine authority for evil. This malice seems to remain even if the question is of committing a venial sin. Yet the benign opinion, which is that of several distinguished doctors, Lessius, Sanchez, Suarez, is probable. It will more easily be admitted not to be grave when the matter is opposed merely to evangelical counsel, as if you swear that you will not enter religion, that you will not give alms.

N. B. Concerning an oath requested from one who is going to perjure himself, cf. what was said at n. 124, 2; concerning a feigned oath, cf. here immediately, where we treat of a promissory oath.

What is contained in that oath. As is proved by the very notion, a promissory oath regards the truth both of the present intention and of the future fulfillment. God is called as witness of the present intention; wherefore, under this respect, a promissory oath does not differ from an assertory oath. As to future fulfillment, the interposition of divine authority has this effect, that from reverence toward God, and therefore from the virtue of religion, the one swearing must fulfill what he promises or proposes. Thus the ratio is shown to be akin to a vow; yet because the promise itself is not made directly to God, it recedes from the nature of a vow, and its violation is less grave than the violation of a vow (2, 2, q. 89 art. 8). At the same time the notion of an oath carries this with it, that God is called upon as witness, not indeed of future truth - for, since impediments can arise, that, at least absolutely, cannot be done - but that He is called upon as witness of constancy. But because constancy is not desired in him who is lawfully impeded or dispensed, nothing is done against the oath by one whom either excuse assists. And because God is the avenger of perjury, both notions composed together, i.e., of constancy owed from reverence toward God, and of the invocation of God as witness of that constancy, have the effect that a certain security concerning the execution itself is obtained through a promissory oath. This security can be called a divine quasi-suretyship.

Thus we seem able to reconcile the three modes by which a promissory oath as such is conceived: a) God is invoked as witness of future truth (cf. 2, 2, q. 89 art. 7); b) the faith itself is bound to God, so that you are bound almost from a vow (d'Annibale, II, 25); c) God is called metaphorically a quasi-surety, insofar as the intention of doing can no longer be changed without irreverence offered to God, and that invocation of God supplies a certain security of execution (most authors after Suarez, Rel., Tr. 5, Lib. 3, c. 16, n. 10-13).

The Code, c. 1317, simply has these words: "He who freely swears that he will do something is held by a peculiar obligation of religion to fulfill what he has confirmed by oath."

That oath can accede to a simple purpose, which then must be observed from reverence toward God; or to a promise obliging from fidelity, which then, from the same reverence, must be observed more carefully; or to a vow, so that a double obligation of religion has arisen; or to a contract already of itself obliging from justice: in which case a right has been acquired by the third party and fortified by the protection of religion.

The sworn fulfillment of a contract. The parties can be moved by a twofold intention to swear to the fulfillment of a contractual promise, or a promise obliging of itself from justice. Either, thinking the promise valid, they intend merely to increase the obligation already undertaken by the obligation of religion; then, from the very intention of the parties, the oath must follow the nature of the act; or, conscious of a defect or vice, they will to substitute an obligation of religion in the place of an obligation of justice; and then, unless from the nature of the thing or from the prohibition of law the object of the oath is illicit, an obligation of religion arises from the oath; and, unless positive law or harmful circumstances have introduced more, this alone binds the parties.

N. B. Formerly, an oath having been added, agreements had to be judged in the ecclesiastical forum; and acts which otherwise would have been destitute of action were confirmed civilly.

"An oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but it can be relaxed by a Superior" (can. 1317 § 2). For the Church did not will to invalidate such an oath, lest, by alleging the excuse of fear, too frequent an occasion of perjuring be given (Keiffenstuel in L. 1, t. 40, n. 58. 59). - An oath extorted by error or fraud will be valid or not, according as the error affected only circumstances of lesser moment or was substantial.

An oath of doing a bad thing, or a vain thing, or a useless thing, or a thing directly contrary to the evangelical counsels, or something so indifferent that it is made honest neither by the end nor by circumstances, produces no obligation. For an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, or bind us to vain and idle things, since obligations of this kind impede greater goods.

Wherefore, canon 1318, § 2 warns us that acts which tend directly to the harm of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation acquire no force from an oath.

Yet a valid promise or agreement can be confirmed by oath, by which someone is prohibited from taking, or rather professing, the way of the evangelical counsels, at least for a time or without Pontifical dispensation. Cf. n. 200.

The oath of a minor. Although, from c. 1317, an oath furnished neither by force nor by fraud, by which someone renounces a private good or favor conceded to him by law, must be observed as often as it can be observed without sin, that must be understood insofar as the one swearing is capable of such renunciation. Wherefore, if a minor, still a minor, has sworn that he would not rescind a void or rescindable agreement made by him, since our law, in view of the common good itself, renders that confirmation void, he seems strictly to need no dispensation. And indeed a dispensation, if it seems to have to be given, removes no acquired right, so that it can be granted by any suitable priest. If, I say, it seems to have to be given, because any priest can declare the emptiness of the act.

He swears feignedly or simulatedly who either inwardly dissents in mind from the words which he utters, or does not will to undertake the obligation of religion. Concerning this matter there is proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI: "with cause it is lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave."

And in reality that fiction contains a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God. This is of itself venial; but it would become grave: a) in contracts about a grave matter, because of fraudulent deception; b) when from a grave precept, as in a legitimate judgment, an oath is imposed: then one would be pressed at least by the obligation of religion; c) when one thus swears feignedly without the intention of fulfilling: because, since the name of God is invoked exteriorly, this character of exterior perjury is injurious to God almost as exterior blasphemy is. So rather with Suarez, Rel., tr. 5, L. 3, c. 17, n. 3. 4, than from the subtle reason of Sanchez, Decal. L. 3, c. 6, n. 8-11.

But when the stain of lying is absent from the fiction, as when it is requested unlawfully in circumstances which exclude a serious and sincere action, a feigned oath seems able to be excused by a grave cause. Cf. Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 211; Lehmk. I, 556.

A feigned and invalid oath introduces no obligation of religion as such. Yet easily, to prevent scandal or harm, it will have to be executed.

He who, terrified by the threats of a robber, has sworn that he will give him a sum of money, although, because of the rescindable contract, he is held by no obligation of justice, must and can be dispensed from the oath (c. 1317 § 2): which was controverted before the Code ¹; but he could also pronounce the words without the intention of swearing, so that the oath itself is null. But if the contract is null, for example because it is invalidated by civil law, then relaxation of the oath seems superfluous.

¹ Cf. e.g. Lehmk., I, 564. St. Thomas follows the severe opinion, 2, 2, q. 89 art. 7 ad 3.

He who, in favor of someone or of certain persons, has absolutely sworn that he will furnish something, so that, for example, from their consent a right has been acquired by them, is held to fulfill it as long as it is honorable, even if it impedes a better good, for example entrance into religion. Nor can he himself commute that oath into something better, but he must seek a dispensation. Hence is also explained c. 542, § 1, which declares invalid the reception into the novitiate of a candidate who is bound by an oath by which, for a definite time, he is held, by institution of the Holy See, to a mission or diocese. But in similar oaths there is easily understood the condition, "unless I shall have been called to the state of perfection." Cf. Lugo, Iust. d. 21, n. 67. 73; Nilles, De libertate clericorum religionem ingrediendi, n. 43. 44 and p. 120. 121. Wherefore, in the oath of a mission, an express promise is made of not entering religion without dispensation of the Holy See.

A promissory oath must be interpreted in the same way in which a promise not sworn would be explained. Wherefore, one who swears that he will observe the decrees and rules or statutes of some congregation, university, or chapter, is judged to have sworn not so much the statutes themselves as due subjection to those laws. Wherefore that oath is understood: a) of statutes already issued, not to be issued; b) as long as and insofar as they are in force by use; c) under grave sin, under light sin, under counsel, under penalty, according as the thing itself or the law in force demands it.

Concerning interpretation c. 1321 has this: "An oath must be strictly interpreted according to law and according to the intention of the one swearing, or, if he acts fraudulently, according to the intention of him to whom the oath is sworn." This is a most apt rule of the external forum (1). The intention of him to whom the oath is sworn will have to be gathered from the circumstances or from another demonstration. In the internal forum, the obligation of the oath does not exceed the intention of the one swearing. Yet the one swearing will have to repair the harms of harmful fraud.

An oath concerning civil constitutions does not affect laws contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law. If laws of this kind are brought forward or urged, a clause excluding them must be added to the oath. But if they lie as though buried, the oath is now of itself judged reasonably circumscribed by laws properly in force. Cf. Lehmk. I, 568.

The obligation of fulfilling a promissory oath is certainly grave if the object itself of the promise must be considered grave. But if it is light, grave authors, such as Lessius, Iust. etc. b. II, c. 42, dub. 5, judge the obligation to be under mortal sin, because God is invoked as witness of falsity. Lessius, however, concedes the probability of the more benign opinion, which Suarez then confirmed by his authority, Rel. tr. 5, Lib. 3, c. 16, n. 15-19; because a lie would be lacking if, when it was sworn, the intention of fulfilling the promise had been had, so that God was merely the surety of a light obligation. Yet we confess that, for the reasoning of the Excellent Doctor to be apodictic, it is necessary that you wholly omit that which seems sufficiently to cohere with the nature of an oath: that God was invoked as witness of constancy. More easily, although Suarez does not admit this, l. c. n. 8, we shall concede with most authors that one sins lightly who has omitted a moderate part of a grave object promised, because God was assumed as witness of substantial constancy, not of perfect constancy. But practically, in no light matter will the obligation of a sworn promise have to be urged under grave sin.

From c. 1319 itself, the obligation introduced by a promissory oath ceases: by remission proceeding from him for whose advantage it was sworn; - by substantial change of the thing, or if, the circumstances having been changed, the thing becomes bad, wholly indifferent, or impedes a greater good (here, however, as was said above, acquired rights must be attended to); - when the final cause, or the condition under which perhaps the oath was given, is lacking: for example, when the poverty of him to whom you had promised alms ceases, or when he dies for whose health you had promised a pilgrimage; - by irritation, dispensation, commutation. Moreover, all who can relax vows are permitted by canon 1320 to remove oaths also, by the same reason and in the same way.

I. What it is and with what conditions. A vow is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good," c. 1307 §1. (Cf. 2, 2, q. 88.)

1. A promise, therefore not a mere purpose. The criterion of distinction is not taken from the word alone, "I purpose" or "I promise," but from whether one intended to assume a special obligation or not. Hence doubts in this matter will have to be solved by the question: "Did you will to oblige yourself before God?"; and in doubt, the minimum is to be held.

2. Deliberate, with at least that deliberation which is sufficient for sinning mortally. Nor is every age or every deliberation sufficient for mortal sin sufficient for every vow. For he sins mortally who has known the gravity of the guilt, although he has not weighed the magnitude of the sin; but in order that you spontaneously assume an obligation, it is necessary not only that you know what an obligation is, but that you have perceived sufficiently clearly the quantity of the object ¹. Thus excellently Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 6, n. 605. From a sudden movement of the soul, from a custom such that the tongue anticipates the mind, sometimes from the heat of anger, either consideration or deliberation can be impeded. If a solidly probable reason suggests that there was only half-full deliberation, it is licit to answer in favor of liberty. With such a reason excluded, a vow made after the seventh year is presumed deliberate. Minds vexed by a scrupulous obsession of vowing are to be ordered by the confessor to care in no way for vows which they think they have made. Cf. I, 85 and 382. - Because direct deliberation is lacking, vows made in drunkenness do not oblige.

3. Free. For "a vow made through grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself." Thus at least from the positive disposition of c. 1307 §3. In the external forum, it is not presumed that light fear gave cause to the vow. If someone, from light but unjust fear alone, and for no other reason, has vowed, the vow probably is not valid, because God is not judged to accept such a vow, lest He pave a way for unjust coercion. Yet this is controverted. But when fear is not extrinsic or not unjust, nothing stands in the way of the value of the vow.

Error concerning the substance of the promised matter: the one vowing thinks that a chalice which he vows to be golden is silver; - concerning a substantial condition, that is, one so implicitly supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted: the thing promised is of twice greater price or is far graver than it was estimated; - concerning the final cause: the vow is made for the health of a person who is dead or was not sick; - errors of this sort make the vow null, since free consent is lacking. Indeed, any error which has given cause to the vow is of itself sufficient that you be judged immune from the obligation. Nevertheless, excepting properly substantial error, error does not vitiate religious profession. For both private and public good demand that those things which constitute a firm and irrevocable state should not easily waver and should be liable to few conditions. Moreover, the will of the one professing is judged to have accommodated itself to the nature of the thing, and therefore to have held the profession ratified, notwithstanding other errors. Ignorance or error concerning sexual matters also vitiates profession less: both because the force of that vow, as excellent, approved by God and the Church, emitted by many, and containing a renunciation of certain delights, is sufficiently apprehended through true elements; and because, as the young man is disposed by fervor itself, knowledge of the carnal act would not change his mind. For then he does not experience those grave and troublesome temptations which afterward suggest repentance for the obligation undertaken to certain less fervent persons. Although it is regularly expedient that those who profess the religious state be sufficiently instructed concerning the matter, and be warned that grave difficulties can arise afterward.

4. Made to God. A vow is properly made to God, and is an act of latria. But the cause of a vow can also be the honor which we thus render to the saints, while their worship impels us to acts of religion; just as we can promise certain things to God in order to obtain that the Saints be more honored: for each reason the vow is made in honor of the Saints. We can also confirm by a vow a promise made to a Saint (2, 2, q. 88 art. 5 ad 3).

Finally, nothing prevents us from promising to the Saints themselves, simply or conditionally, certain honors or services ¹. Then an obligation of dulia or hyperdulia arises, distinct from a vow, yet nevertheless analogous; this more approaches the obligation of a vow than the debt of human fidelity, and therefore remains grave in its genus. Cf. Quaest. de religione, 137.

5. Concerning a good. For a promise of an evil thing can neither honor God nor be acceptable to Him.

6. Concerning a possible good. For an impossible thing cannot be intended or promised efficaciously. This also seems to have to be transferred to those things which are morally impassable, because that obligation, as in itself harmful to the soul, cannot be acceptable to God or honorific to Him.

Here, however, prudent discretion is needed. The reason is well valid when someone directly vows those things which he cannot physically or morally carry out. Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins is not valid if it is so understood that, once one sin has been committed, the vow itself ceases to be. For to avoid all venial sins is not now in our power without an extraordinary privilege; nor is sufficient utility discerned in such a vow. But, as it seems to us, they pronounce too absolutely who say that such a vow is not valid even if it merely confirms the obligation which we all have of avoiding every sin: an obligation which perseveres even after sin. For, as Suarez excellently observes, Relig. tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, nn. 13 and 16, the vow is reasonably understood of avoiding venial sins insofar as it can be done, or of diligence to be applied in fleeing every sin. This care and diligence will of itself be very useful for every man. Wherefore we do not well understand why such vows are judged by Suarez, l. c. nn. 3 and 4, to be per se, or at least for many, little useful, to be disapproved, and simply to be dispensed. Nor can we assent to those who contend that a vow of avoiding deliberate sins can validly be made only by those who are of sufficiently proved virtue. Moreover, they admit the validity of a vow by which a positive good is promised to God, with which the obligation of avoiding all venial sins is connected, as is the vow of always doing the more perfect things, which is permitted to approved persons; nor is the validity of a vow of chastity, even imprudently emitted by the too fragile, doubted. Therefore rather than the vow itself, the negative form can displease, which can generate confusion and disturb the soul.

In practice also it will be expedient to conceive or circumscribe the vow in such a way that, with scruples avoided, it may increase the pursuits of virtue. Finally, because of the authority of others, we shall be able to treat as null a vow of avoiding all venial sins, or a vow emitted by a person not approved of avoiding all deliberate sins; indeed perhaps a vow of avoiding all grave sins, if it has been pronounced by a person too fragile.

7. And better. Every good indeed of itself pleases God. But since certain goods can obstruct better goods, it will always be acceptable to God that someone do what is better. Wherefore, by force of a vow, you will never be obliged to a less good, so that a vow concerning a lesser good, as such, would not be valid. In general, therefore, a vow of marriage will not be valid, since it remains intact for one to desire and choose honorable celibacy, which in itself is a better state. Therefore a good is understood which is better than the voluntary omission of it.

¹ At least if knowledge of the greater quantity would have prevented the vow. And this is the difference between sin and a vow. He who had known better would not have made the sin; nevertheless, now he has sinned. But if he had known the thing better, he would not have vowed; then, with the exception of vows by which a state is entered, he did not vow. And because the vow of chastity of religious would not be prevented by more perfect knowledge, the vow subsists from that very fact, even apart from that knowledge.

¹ But these things are not accustomed to be done in promises which affect the whole life. Wherefore he who vows chastity to the Blessed Virgin Mary is judged to vow it to God, moved by piety toward the Blessed Virgin Mary.

An implicit promise sometimes suffices: thus, in the Latin Church, the voluntary reception of Sacred Order, according to the common opinion, brings in a vow of chastity (nor is that step which those to be ordained to the subdiaconate who are not yet bound by the vow of chastity are ordered to make an essential rite). He who has not wished to vow, or has plainly been ignorant of that connection of the vow, as is more like the truth, will not be bound by the vow, but from the precept of the Church he will have to observe chastity from the motive of religion. Express mention of the vow is not had in cc. 132 and 211.

He who habitually has known the obligation of a vow, and deliberately promises something to God, makes a true vow, although he seems to himself not to have adverted to the obligation. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 201.

Yet he does not vow who has the intention indeed of promising, but not of obliging himself; but he does vow to whom only the mind of fulfilling the obligation is lacking.

II. Division of a vow. 1. A vow is absolute or conditioned. A penal vow is so called by which some expiation of penance or of a good work is promised if some less right act has been done.

2. A personal, real, and mixed vow. Strictly speaking, a vow from its very essence is the personal act of the one vowing, like every promise; nor, because it terminates in a thing, does that promise, which is of a certain fidelity toward God, affect the patrimony any more than a promise of fidelity to a man does. Nevertheless it is called personal, objectively, if one's own action or omission is promised: fasting, a pilgrimage, abstinence from luxury, from a certain drink; real, by which some external thing is promised; finally it will be mixed which is formed from each element: whether both can be separated, as if you promise a pilgrimage with a liberality; or whether they are joined by an individual bond, as if care of a sick person to be had by one's own hands is promised.

3. A public vow, which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior: thus the vows of religious profession; and a private vow.

4. A solemn and simple vow. It is solemn "if it has been recognized as such by the Church" (c. 1308 §2). Another vow is simple. Concerning the essence of solemnity, cf. the work Quaest. de religione.

5. A reserved vow, whose dispensation the Holy See alone can concede, and a non-reserved vow.

Besides public vows, whose dispensation or commutation is arranged by the legal regime itself (cc. 214, 633-636, 640, 648, 669), the reserved private vows are: "the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, and the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age" (c. 1309). Before the Code, absolute vows of the three pilgrimages also were reserved.

III. The utility of vowing. A vow supposes a will which can fall away from the good or change its purpose. Wherefore neither for Christ, whose will was always most firmly fixed in the good, nor for an Angel, who stands immovable by his decrees, was there ever a reason why they should vow. Nor does it belong to the blessed comprehensors in heaven to vow, since their will is altogether fixed in loving God.

To us vows of a twofold genus can prudently be advised: a) vows by which some peculiar necessity or weakness is met, such as certain medicinal vows; and vows, generally momentary, with which we are not rarely accustomed to surround petitions made to God; b) vows which are fruitful seeds of good works, such as vows of abnegation, of seeking the more perfect things, and especially vows by which the more perfect discipline of Christ is confirmed in the religious life.

Moreover, although a vow is praiseworthy and meritorious, discretion must nevertheless be observed in advising or multiplying vows. And generally it is better not to have vowed than to have been released from vows by dispensation: that is accustomed to diminish confidence in God. Wherefore, the more a vow is of an arduous and lasting thing, with the greater caution it must be advised or admitted. Cf. Quaest. de virtute rel., 140.

But by the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God, while by an oath we honor and cultivate His infinite veracity. Cf. Quaest. de virtute relig., n. 141.

Divine fidelity in promises. Since the divine will is altogether immutable, God is faithful eminently rather than formally. Therefore God promises us the things which He signifies that He wills to give us, nor can a distinct obligation of perseverance be conceived. And the divine benevolence and liberality, which is confirmed by no formal obligation just as by no translation of right from God to us, is perceived to be more gratuitous.

Nature of the obligation. The obligation of a vow is not of the same ratio as the obligation of a promise which is made to men. We ought to be faithful to men lest they be deceived, while God, better than the man promising, knows what is going to be. But a man can offer to God the future action itself, or a series of goods and perseverance in the purpose of a good work. Moreover, reverence owed to God, and therefore the virtue of religion, requires that an oblation once made not be revoked. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 124, 128.

Force of the obligation. Now the force of the obligation is that which the matter demonstrates, unless the one vowing has wished to assume a lesser obligation. For he who could promise nothing could also lessen the force of his obligation. Except vows which are required in the undertaking of a state. The intention also of the one vowing brings it about that small matters coalesce or not, according as the one vowing intends to vow to God a certain notable whole by parts, or to offer individual performances as such. Coalescence is easier in real vows than in personal vows.

For a vow, although it induces a graver obligation than that of fidelity, admits smallness of matter, because negligence in observing a vow of small matter is explained from a slight esteem of the thing, not of God.

Judgment concerning grave or light matter must be made prudently, by observing what the vow contributes to divine worship either directly or indirectly. Directly, when a grave act of religion is vowed; indirectly, when a thing grave in another order, by the vow itself, is referred to divine worship. Cf. Suarez, Rel. Tr. 6, L. 5, c. 4.

When a singular action has been promised to God, this rule can be admitted, that the matter is thought grave which, for the intended end, would of itself be urged under mortal guilt by divine or ecclesiastical law. Therefore grave matter is judged to be: hearing Mass, fasting, abstinence of one day, etc.

But when a series of actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; moreover, one action which, taken in itself, would be notable can be a slight part of the promised series; finally, the very object of such a vow must be defined accurately.

Thus a vow of doing the more perfect things concerns not so much the things in themselves as insofar as they are more perfect; but the excess of perfection of itself seems light matter. Thus he who substitutes another honorable action for the Mass which it would have been more perfect to hear, is not guilty of omitted Mass but of neglected more perfect action; and this is thought light. Wherefore scarcely in a singular act which is not mortal fault will there be grave guilt against such a vow. He also will have sinned gravely who often, as if habitually and with a clear mind, has done things which he has certainly known to be imperfect. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 129.

Is there an acquired right from a vow?. A right is sometimes said to be acquired for another from a vow. Properly speaking, however, an obligation of religion cannot, as such, transfer rights: only an obligation of justice can do that. Therefore, if after a vow a right has been acquired for someone, the cause of the right will be either an accompanying promise from justice made to a physical or moral person, or the execution itself which placed the thing in another's patrimony. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 130.

The extension of the obligation is to be taken from the words of the one vowing and from their reasonable or common acceptance, always inclining to the more benign parts. Wherefore he who vows the rosary satisfies, saving a different expressed intention, by reciting the third part; he who vows Mass or fasting for a month does not have to fast or hear two Masses on Sunday; he who vows the fast of a vigil will have to neither fast on Sunday nor now anticipate the vigil on Saturday, since from c. 1252 §4, vigils are now not anticipated.

He who has made a conditioned or penal vow will be able, according to his varied intention, to impede the condition, to do the action to which the penalty is annexed, or will be prohibited from doing so.

He who has not appointed a day for fulfilling the vow must execute the vow as soon as he conveniently can. Yet a lesser cause is required for deferring than for omitting. But an illicit delay of execution will be judged grave if the one vowing exposes himself to danger of forgetfulness or of inability, or if the matter is notably diminished, for example in the vow of entering religion which a person already super-adult has made.

He who doubts whether he made a vow is presumed free; he who doubts whether he was fully in possession of himself in a vow certainly emitted is presumed to have been conscious, unless a positive reason renders probable the defect of deliberation: in which case, a probable opinion permits that the vow be neglected; although then it is better to ask a dispensation.

II. Execution of the vow. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow also through another, although he who does not have his own ought not therefore to beg another's. If another has spontaneously done it for you, your ratification will suffice. The intention of fulfilling the vow is not necessary.

The burden of a real vow which the one vowing has imposed upon an heir by a valid testament must be fulfilled by the heir from justice toward the testator. Likewise the heir must satisfy from justice a real vow by which a third party has acquired a right. With this omitted, canonical law obliges the heir from religion to fulfill real vows: "The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, likewise the obligation of a mixed vow, for the part by which it is real" (c. 1310 §2).

By what title is the heir obliged? From the Code the obligation is said to pass. But it cannot pass except as the obligation which held the one vowing: this, however, was an obligation of religion. Yet most induce an obligation of justice. By what right, this plainly escapes us. Will you say with Suarez (Relig., Tr. 6, Lib. 4, c. 11, n. 7) that goods are received by the heir "liable to the payment of his debts"? But it must be denied that here there is a debt properly so called, which belongs to justice. For a promise from fidelity does not bind goods; and the obligation of a vow is from fidelity toward God (2, 2, q. 88 art. 3): it works no tradition of right. By what miracle, then, would an obligation from religion be converted, in the heir, into an obligation of justice? Why should goods be burdened in the case of an heir rather than in the case of him who made the vow? Therefore this must briefly be said: without positive law, an obligation of promise from fidelity, whether to God or to a man, even if it is personal, would not pass to heirs; now, because of positive law, the obligation of a real vow indeed passes to heirs; but, since the Code determines nothing else, it passes such as it was, i.e., as an obligation of religion. Cf. Quaest. de virtute religionis, n. 138.

He who has vowed the deed of another must merely strive in an honorable manner that the other voluntarily do the thing promised.

A vow of a community or for a community. Concerning this matter, in which no little labor is expended ¹, we think it must be said briefly as follows. Governors who represent a community, just as they can perform other things, can thus vow for the community. After the vow has been made, the obligation of religion passes to the successors of those who vowed, because through them acts the moral person, which remains the same. And if the promised act is one which does not demand the intervention of subjects, the execution itself will be liable to no difficulty. But if the subjects themselves must act, since they themselves promised nothing, they will have to be obliged by law or precept. If, however, the vow is not an action of those who represent the community, but is proposed to the very community of persons that they vow, certainly only those will be held by the vow who truly emitted the vow; nor, without a positive law, will successors be held.

¹ Cf. Op. theol., Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 634.

Specification. The violation of a simple vow differs specifically from sacrilege, concerning which below. It is graver than sacrilege, insofar as it is more directly against God; it is also graver than perjury strictly such.

Obligation of a purpose. A good purpose itself induces a certain light obligation proportioned to human constancy. For it is not reasonable that someone recede without reason from a prudently made choice. Cf. Lugo, De iust. d. 23, n. 1, against Suarez, Tr. 6, L. 1, c. 2, and Quaestiones de religione, n. 141.

I. Cessation from within. The obligation of a vow is taken away from within, not only by execution, but also by the extinction of the condition on which it depended, and by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good, or impossible, absolutely or morally. Cf. c. 1311.

An equivalent but not specific fulfillment of a condition does not suffice for the obligation, unless the intention of the one vowing carried something else. When the determinate thing which was promised perishes, another thing is not to be supplied ¹. But when the thing has been sold, generally the price is owed, because the one vowing is judged to have promised the thing with all its utility. Yet if a peculiar use, now impossible, was intended, for example of a mitre to be used by a bishop in a certain first solemnity, the obligation is taken away by sale of the mitre. But by voluntary sale against the vow he will sin. He who vowed something to be done at a certain time, when that time has passed, owes nothing, unless the time was added for urging the obligation; for example in a fast of thanksgiving.

A vow of a thing partially impossible obliges to the possible part, if the thing can and usually does conveniently be divided; otherwise it does not oblige. And the one vowing owes nothing who intended the whole by indivisibility, for example a church with a tower. Nor, if the principal part has become impossible, will the accessory parts remain: he who had determined to make an impeded pilgrimage in a hair-shirt does not have to wear the hair-shirt.

The vow also ceases when the final cause ceases, as was said concerning an oath.

¹ What if the promise was disjunctive: I shall give this or that, and either has perished? Although a disjunctive obligation does not of itself cease when one of the two remains possible, nevertheless it will often happen in vows that the loss of one of the two things renders the execution of the vow much more onerous, so that the obligation is thought to be taken away. Indeed many with St. Alphonsus himself, III, 224, admit that the vow always ceases if you have not yet chosen one of the two parts. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 620 and 651.

II. Cessation from without. From without, or by the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, a vow ceases by irritation, dispensation, and commutation.

1. Irritation of a vow is an act by which, with legitimate use of a power or right over the will of the one vowing, the vow is made void. In irritation, that general principle is applied: that one who is subject to the power of another cannot oblige himself validly by a vow, except insofar as this is not prejudicial to the right of the one to whom he is subject. Therefore the right of irritation belongs: to the father, with respect to children who are minors and not emancipated; to the tutor and mother, with respect to minors who are not emancipated; and probably also to paternal grandparents with respect to grandchildren who, lacking parents, remain under their power ¹. It belongs also to Superiors of religious, as to vows made after religious profession, excepting vows which are part of the religious profession and found the very faculty of irritating, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion: because that matter is withdrawn from the universal subjection of religious.

This faculty is not had with respect to novices. For c. 561, by which a novice is said to be subject to the power of the Master and Superiors, does not suffice for attributing that firm dominion which is required for irritation; and power under a higher law was denied. Cf. Suarez, De relig. Tr. 6, L. 6, c. 7, n. 11 and c. 11, n. 8; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, 233. The reason is that the power of irritating belongs to the Superior from the vow of obedience, which the novice lacks (Suarez, l. c.); nor can the private vow of a novice have the force of a religious vow and create a true Superior with dominative power ².

Does it belong to the husband with respect to the wife? The matter was controverted, nor did the Code settle the controversy. It depended on the way in which c. Noluit, C. XXXIII, q. 5, was to be interpreted. - This power affects all and only vows which were made during the time of subjection. But the fact that the one irritating consented to the vow does not stand in the way. If there is a right over the matter of the vow, the one irritating can suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow brings prejudice to him (c. 1312). For the one vowing could not detract from the rights of another or strip himself of his own obligations. Wherefore this irritation can be used by a Superior and by the Master of novices with respect to novices.

¹ Why authors also mention the paternal grandfather we do not know. Cf. Arregui, n. 213; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 235.

² The case would be different of a religious passing over, who, from c. 635 §1, is bound to obey the Superiors and even the Master of novices also by reason of the vow of obedience. For although he can return to his former religion, this is in no way by a precarious title, such as that of other novices, but by the firm bond of obedience by which he is bound as a religious.

2. Dispensation of a vow. flows from the power which ecclesiastical authority has of relaxing, in the name of God, the debt on which is founded the application of the divine law which urges the fulfillment of a vow. This power is contained in the words: "Whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. 16, 19).

The faculty of dispensing non-reserved vows, provided that a right acquired by others is not injured, is conceded by canon 1313: 1) to local Ordinaries as to all their subjects, even pilgrims; 2) to the Superior (therefore also the local Superior) of an exempt clerical religion, as to professed religious, novices, or others equated in this matter by c. 514; 3) to others to whom the power of dispensing has been delegated by the Apostolic See.

Since dispensation is made in the name of God, it is always an act of an inferior, and therefore requires a just cause, such as, in this matter, besides the common good of the Church, of the state, of the family, the greater progress of the one vowing himself; danger of transgression, great difficulty of execution, great scruples in execution; the imperfection of the act which was effected inconsiderately.

Lest excessive scruples arise, authors judge valid the dispensation which is conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. The difficulty and inconveniences of retraction seem to complete the cause. Something else would have to be said if no cause had truly existed.

An acquired right, which an inferior to the Pope cannot take away, is had in vows in which a certain ratio of onerous contract intervenes, as in vows which are made in religion; it is had also in vows accepted by a third party and made principally for his utility. For if the honor of God was the principal cause of the obligation, the other did not acquire a right except dependently on God to whom the promise is to be kept. (Cf. St. Alphonsus, L. 3, 255; Lehmkuhl, I, 622.)

As c. 1309 itself insinuates, reservation is to be understood strictly. And therefore, in order that vows of chastity and of entering religion be reserved, they must be perfect by reason of the end, insofar as they are made from love of the work itself or virtue, and by reason of the object, insofar as the matter is had perfectly. The end is imperfect in vows made under a condition concerning the future (and this even after the condition has been fulfilled); in penal vows; in vows made from fear, even light fear.

Matter is lacking in vows under a light obligation, under a disjunctive obligation, unless each vow was reserved; in a vow of not marrying, of preserving virginity, if these are conceived as distinct from the vow of chastity, in a vow of temporary chastity.

By the new disposition of law, no vow is reserved of him who has not yet completed the eighteenth year of age.

Among those who are accustomed to be delegated by the Holy See are numbered confessors of mendicant Orders or of those similarly privileged, according to the concession and moderation of their Superiors; and the power can be exercised outside the Sacrament (St. Alphonsus, De privil., n. 109).

3. Commutation. is not, as dispensation is, an absolute condonation of a vow, but is the substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow.

"A work promised by a non-reserved vow can be commuted by the one vowing himself into a better or equal good; but into a lesser good by him to whom there is the power of dispensing according to the norm of c. 1313." These last words are added in order that they indicate the necessity of a just cause when a lesser work is substituted, and the caution to be observed of not injuring an acquired right. Commutation into a better work demands no cause. A light cause suffices that commutation be made into an equal work. Indeed, when this is done by authority of a Superior, a greater inclination to that work, a lesser danger of transgressing, suffice. And in doubt concerning equality, notable trouble in fulfilling the work suffices. That one may act more prudently, it is to be advised that commutation by one's own authority be done with the counsel of a confessor. "A better or equal good is that which, the circumstances having been considered, especially the condition of the one vowing, appears more or equally to conduce to the glory of God" (Arregui, n. 217). Therefore the absolute excellence of the work is not a sufficient criterion.

A faculty given of dispensing-commuting extends the faculty of commuting to some dispensation; a faculty of commuting-dispensing restricts the faculty of dispensing, since some work must be substituted.

Reserved vows, however, are excepted from the faculty of commuting just as from the faculty of dispensing.

For him whose vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work, since the commutation was made in his favor. But he does not have to return to it if the work commuted by authority has become impossible or useless.

When the cause does not seem sufficient for dispensing, the promised work can be partly dispensed, partly commuted.

N. B. If the obligation of the heir to the very real vow has passed and is of religion alone, whoever can dispense or commute the vow will be able to relax it; but if, from the testament of the one vowing, an obligation of justice has arisen, he alone will be able to take away the obligation who can condone pious legacies.

From c. 1315, by every religious profession vows emitted before are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion. Before the Code, all prior vows were taken away by solemn religious profession. Concerning simple profession nothing had been established in law. Therefore the present law is of greater extension but of milder efficacy.

But, just as before the Code, now also the religious will be able to commute all prior non-reserved vows into the profession, at least perpetual, or to obtain that they be authoritatively commuted into it.

Counsels concerning dispensation and commutation. 1. In the internal forum, it generally is better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation. 2. In prescribing commutations, care must be taken, without anxiety, that we preserve the intention of the one vowing and the spiritual utility of the prior work promised. Wherefore: 3. Although a work which the one vowing was already accustomed to do can juridically be imposed, this is regularly not to be done, because the intention of the one vowing was that he add something to his accustomed works. Except perhaps a vow, such as not marrying, by which mere permanence in a state already admitted is promised. Wherefore, binding to monthly confession already customarily being made will well supply such a vow. - 5. Commutation can be made into a work of a similar ratio, or into a work of a better ratio, according to the hierarchy of virtues, of which charity is queen. Thus more frequent Communion of itself surpasses simple abstinence. - 6. If the work has the ratio of remedy, a medicinal work is to be prescribed. Let fasting be converted, for example, into abstinence; - abstinence from meats into abstinence from wine, cider, use of tobacco, sweetmeats, with some prayer; - exterior penance, assumed for chastity, into suppression of dangerous reading (for example, of a love story), or of some worldly festivity. - 7. The difficulty to be avoided must also be attended to. If a distant pilgrimage has been promised, business or expenses can at times stand in the way of execution. If business, it will best be commuted into a nearer pilgrimage, with the monies that will be spared being given to the poor or to a pious work. If costs stand in the way, let a nearer pilgrimage be substituted, with a lesser alms or visitation of the poor added. - 8. Where a work has been promised merely as one of devotion, then these are almost commuted among themselves: a rosary, confession, communion, Mass, abstinence, fasting.

I. A vow,. 1. is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good" (c. 1307). A promise supposes the will of obligation; deliberation is necessary at least that which is required for sinning mortally, besides a capacity of estimation proportioned to the gravity of the thing. In order that it be wholly free, it must be immune from unjust fear and from error. And a vow vitiated by grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself, at least from c. 1307 §2. Probably null also is a vow which has been emitted from light but unjust fear alone. Error concerning the substance of the thing promised, concerning a condition so supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted, concerning the final cause: makes the vow null. Indeed, in a merely individual vow, any error giving cause takes away the obligation; but a public vow is weakened only by substantial error. - A vow is made properly to God, but can be made in honor of the saints, when it has a cause in the honor rendered or desired for the saints. Besides, promises, approaching the obligation of a vow, can be made to the Blessed Virgin and to saints. - A vow can be made concerning only a good and one at least physically possible. And the good must be better, insofar as it is to be preferred to the voluntary omission of it, nor can the vow impede the faculty of doing what is better.

2. A vow is distinguished as absolute and conditioned, to which the penal is ascribed; real, personal, mixed; public and private; solemn and simple; private reserved and non-reserved. The relaxation of a public vow is defined by the legal regime. Reserved to the Holy See are private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entering a religion of solemn vows, which were emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age.

3. The reason for vowing proceeds from our inconstancy or mutability. Certain medicinal vows are to be advised, which, generally momentary, fortify petitions made to God; and vows which are fruitful seeds of good works.

By the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God.

II. 1. The nature of the obligation is of religion, by which we are forbidden to revoke an oblation made to God; its extension is gathered from the reasonable understanding of the formula applied, always inclining to more benign things; its force is demonstrated by the matter, unless someone, in private vows, has wished to lessen the obligation. According to the intention of the one vowing, matters coalesce or not. In a promised singular action, grave matter is thought to be that which, for the intended end, would be urged under grave obligation by divine or human law. But when a series of performances or actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; and several things must be distinguished according to that supreme rule of considering the gravity of the object from its intrinsic end, and of the parts from their relation to that end as to a whole. - He who doubts whether he has made a vow is presumed free; but he who, in a vow certainly emitted, doubts whether he was in possession of himself, is presumed to have been conscious. Yet if a positive reason makes probable a defect of deliberation, by a probable opinion he is excused from executing the vow.

2. Execution: a) When. A vow without a day must be fulfilled as soon as it conveniently can, yet in such a way that illicit delay does not become grave except because of danger of forgetfulness, inability, or notable diminution of the matter.

b) Through whom. A vow, as such, is always a strictly personal act. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow can also be fulfilled through another. A real vow, from c. 1310 §2, passes to heirs, who nevertheless, without a testament of the author or a right acquired by another, seem to be held by religion alone, not otherwise than the one vowing himself; cf. Quaest. de religione, n. 138. A vow of a community strictly and immediately obliges the Superior or those who vowed.

3. The violation of a vow differs specifically from sacrilege, and is graver than sacrilege or perjury, insofar as it more directly touches God. - Inconstancy itself in good purposes is not immune from light fault.

III. Cessation. A vow ceases from within by execution, by the removal of the condition or final cause, by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good or impossible. - From without it ceases: a) by irritation, or the use of a contrary right, which, with respect to a non-emancipated minor, the father, tutor, or mother has; the religious Superior has with respect to subjects for vows made after profession, and probably the husband with respect to the wife. These have a right over the person; wherefore they can validly irritate all vows, even internal and for future time, which were made during the time of subjection: this irritation is called direct. If the right falls upon the matter alone, the one irritating can merely suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow would harm his right; - b) by dispensation, or full condonation, which, divinely conceded by the words "whatever you shall loose," always demands a just cause, whether of the public or private order, yet is judged valid if it was conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. However, an acquired right of a third party, only the Pope can take away, on account of a public cause. Non-reserved vows, by canon 1313 itself, can be dispensed by local Ordinaries, by the Superior of an exempt clerical religion, by others (for example confessors of mendicant Orders) to whom the Apostolic See has delegated the power. This also is not rarely extended to reserved vows; - c) by commutation, or substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow. A non-reserved vow can be commuted into a better or also equal work by the one vowing himself; into a lesser good, by him to whom the faculty of dispensing belongs. For him to whom the vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work. - Moreover, by religious profession all vows previously emitted are suspended, as long as the one vowing remains in religion (c. 1315); he can also commute the same into religious profession, at least perpetual. It is generally better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation.

I. Notion and division. 1. Notion. Directly opposed to the will of worshiping God is a will insulting toward God, which blasphemy betrays. For blasphemy is an insult brought against God.

2. Division. a) Since God can read an insulting affection in the heart, a man can be blasphemous without any exterior sign; and he can manifest or exercise that mind exteriorly, either by signs of words, formal or equivalent, or by an insulting action. Hence blasphemy of heart, of mouth, and of deed.

Yet that division is not formal. When blasphemy is reserved, only that is understood which is done through speech, oral or written.

b) Direct blasphemy proceeds from a formal intention of dishonoring God; indirect blasphemy contains a virtual intention in the will of saying or doing things which are insulting toward God ¹. The former differs from the latter in degree, not in species.

c) Blasphemy can be either simply insulting, or heretical, which at the same time, at least exteriorly, denies a revealed truth; or imprecatory, by which evil is wished to God. And in its own genus it is completed by an affection of detestation or hatred, which at the same time is a most grave violation of charity.

d) God can be blasphemed in Himself, or in His saints and in sacred things. The former is graver, although, as blasphemy, it does not differ in species from the latter. But, according to the intention of the blasphemer, it can at the same time touch the Saints themselves or the Blessed Virgin in their own excellence, for example in the Immaculate Conception: then at the same time it will be against dulia or hyperdulia. St. Alphonsus judged that this regularly, in his time, did not happen. St. Alph., l. 3, n. 132.

e) Finally blasphemy is distinguished as vulgar, which is uttered in very customary formulas, often after the manner of an interjection, so that the blasphemer himself did not compose the words or arrange them into the form of a sentence; and deliberate, whose formula was invented or composed by the blasphemer himself.

¹ Under another respect, formal is called culpable; material, excusable.

II. Gravity. Of the sins which are opposed to religion, blasphemy is of its genus the most grave, so that true blasphemy does not admit slightness of matter.

An insulting word pronounced against the Saints in jest, not from contempt or hatred or indignation, is thought to be venial. But this is not done in jest except when the things treated are of lesser importance and give occasion to pleasantries, as if you call Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers.

The root of direct blasphemy, i.e., the impulsive cause which is accustomed to induce a man to formal blasphemy, is of itself the appetite of vengeance against God. Namely, bearing indignantly his lot, which he knows to be subject to God's judgment, an angry man seeks that vengeance of which alone he has the supply; and he attacks the honor of Him whom he cannot harm or touch. This root appears also in the selection by which, in various adversities, he blasphemes the saints who are invoked as protectors against definite calamities: as if, because cattle have been lost or are sick, you blaspheme St. Paschal, and because of pestilence, St. Roch.

The root of indirect blasphemy is too swift anger or impatience, together with a defect of reverence toward God or the Saints. The same defect of reverence also gives place to jocose blasphemies.

III. Examples. 1. As many as deny that God exists or are unwilling to worship Him are in reality, objectively, guilty of most grave blasphemy. Atheists hold the highest degree among infidels; then those who break off every positive relation between God and man, so that they put God as if outside intercourse. Those succeed who admit only natural religion; finally, those who wish to render to God only the diminished worship of Mohammedans, Jews, or heretics. This blasphemy becomes graver if there is added, through formal temptation of God, a certain provocation, as: "If He exists, or if He can, let Him punish the denier of the faith, of the Eucharist," etc.

2. Very grave, formal, and scandalous blasphemies are committed through impious books and newspapers.

3. He blasphemes not only who, raging against God, curses Him, or denies His wisdom and goodness in words, or has doubts; but also he who, without anger against God, seriously and knowingly utters things which, from their signification or from the manner of speaking and the circumstances, bring diminution upon the divine honor or rule. And other signs against God, such as spitting toward heaven, are blasphemous just as words are.

600 and 605 are confirmed by can. 1316 § 1. - 614 I and II can. 1317 § 1; III can. 1318. Note to I is confirmed by can. 1317 § 3. - 615 Rule 1 is confirmed by can. 1321, Rule 3 by can. 1319. - 617 Qu. 1º from can. 1318 § 2. Qu. 3º can. 1317 § 2. By canon 1320 the question about the power of dissolving from an oath is decided: namely, all who can irritate, dispense, commute a vow (see can. 1312, 1313, 1314) have the same power and in the same manner concerning a promissory oath, with one case excepted, if the dispensation turns to the prejudice of a third party, because then it is reserved to the Holy See. - 622 I is confirmed by can. 1151. Can. 1152 can be added, by which it is said that exorcisms can also be made over non-Catholics or excommunicates. - 623 is confirmed by can. 1307 § 1. To the division there is to be added: into public and private from can. 1308; the first is that which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate Superior. The rest is confirmed. - 625 is confirmed by can. 1307 § 1 and 2. Hence 4º can. 1307 § 3. - 626 can. 1307 § 1. - 629 can. 1310. - 630 can. 1311. - 632 can. 1311. - 635-636 can. 1311. - 637-638 can. 1312 § 1. - 639 can. 1312 § 2. - 640 can. 1312 § 1. - 641-645 can. 1313. - 645 Qu. 2º only two private vows from can. 1309 are reserved to the Apostolic See: 1º the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, and 2º the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, provided they have been emitted 1) absolutely and 2) after the completion of the eighteenth year of age. All public vows are reserved. - 646-650 are confirmed by can. 1314. Note from can. 1315, all vows emitted before religious profession are by this suspended by the law itself, as long as the one vowing remains in the religion. If therefore he goes out, of themselves they return into force.

741. Matter to be treated. - Besides divine things or sacraments, concerning which it will be spoken in volume III, we can assume the divine name either to confirm our own words in an oath, or to induce others in adjuration, or to invoke Him in divine praises.

359. • The Most Holy Name of God is said to be usurped in vain when it is taken without a reasonable cause, or without due reverence. But this is wont to be done especially in a threefold manner, namely:

1° From impatience, or indignation, against creatures even inanimate, or against oneself, for example: My God! Good God! how badly this matter proceeds! My God! how foolish I am!...

2° From admiration, by way of exclamation. Thus it is said: Jesus, Mary! O God! My God!

3° Superfluously, generally from a mere formula, or from levity, or from a certain custom. Thus it is said: My God, indeed,... it is so, or it is not so.

360. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is the vain usurpation of the name of God always a sin, and how great?

Resp. 1° Of itself it is a sin, because it injures the reverence due to the divine name. It is established moreover from Ecclesiasticus:² Let not the naming of God be continual in thy mouth.

Resp. 2° Of itself it is only a venial sin, because that reverence is not gravely injured. But it can become mortal because of formal contempt of God or grave anger against Him, because then it is judged to participate in the nature of blasphemy.

Resp. 3° Although fault is often absent because of inadvertence, yet they are not to be excused who, without any sense of reverence, from custom always have the Most Holy Name of God in their mouth. - On the other hand, if the Most Holy Name of God is usurped with due reverence, even in indifferent matters, not only will sin be absent, but, where it is thus usurped by way of invocation, it will be a good and meritorious work. For the rest, they will more easily be excused from sin who usurp the Most Holy Name of God by way of admiration or interjection, because then irreverence is more easily absent.

Quaer. 2° Is it a sin to usurp uselessly the names of the Saints?

Resp. Affirmatively. For what is said concerning the Most Holy Name of God must, proportion observed, also be said concerning the names of the Saints, as is established from the cited place of Ecclesiasticus, where it is added: And meddle not with the names of Saints. The same also must be said concerning the vain usurpation of the words of Sacred Scripture, when they are taken irreverently. Council of Trent, session 4.

Quaer. 3° Is the assiduous and useless usurpation of the name of the demon a sin?

Resp. Negatively, of itself. Yet it is to be reproved as less becoming in the mouth of Christians, especially of priests, who by reason of scandal sometimes are not free from mortal fault. - Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus,¹ Bouvier, etc.

361. Definition. - Blasphemy is speech injurious to God. Speech, however, can be done not only by explicit word, but in some sense also by mind and by deed. Yet if there is question of reservation or of other penalties inflicted on blasphemy, only oral blasphemy is properly understood.

Division. Blasphemy is distinguished first:

1° Direct, or indirect, according as dishonor of God is either directly and formally intended by the blasphemer, or, although not intended, yet in his sayings or gestures some contumely against God is contained. Direct blasphemy, since ordinarily it has hatred of God joined with it, differs in species from indirect blasphemy, which is uttered from anger against men or creatures.¹

2° Immediate, or mediate, according as it affects God Himself immediately, or only mediately, namely by dishonoring the Saints or sacred things in words. They do not differ in species.

3° Heretical, imprecatory, and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere contumely; these differ in species, since the heretical is also opposed to faith, and the imprecatory also to charity.

Principles. - I. Any formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether direct or indirect, whether immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason is that any contumely against God is a grave injury inflicted on the divine Majesty. - Yet it can become venial from imperfection of the act, namely from defect of advertence or of perfect consent.

II. For perfect blasphemy, by reason of the act, an express and explicit intention of dishonoring God is not necessary, but an implicit one suffices, namely when someone with advertence utters those things which contain true contumely against God, even from jest or from anger against creatures. The reason is that from these there follows grave dishonor of God, although indirect; for grave irreverence is committed against God when words contumelious to Him are employed for jest, or for expressing anger. - Reuter.² Except, unless the jest takes away every manner of irreverence toward God.

III. Words are to be held blasphemous of themselves which, from common apprehension, which has already attributed a determined sense to the words,³ or from a derisive or angry manner of speaking, or other circumstances, contain dishonor of God.

362. You will resolve. - 1° It is blasphemy to say: May the death, or blood of God destroy you; may the Sacraments destroy you. Likewise to spit toward heaven, to gnash the teeth against it, to say that one wishes to do something against God's will, and similar things.

2° It is blasphemy to say: God has wholly forgotten me. Why did God create me? - Yet except if these things are uttered in a human manner of speaking, from levity, or to show the gravity of pain or weariness, as is often wont to happen. But they are never to be excused from grave sin who advertently and seriously say: God is unjust. - God unjustly burdens me with tribulations. - He unjustly permits the wicked to be happy in the world. - Voit.

3° Ordinarily they are to be judged to have sinned gravely who, carried away by anger or some passion, uttered words of blasphemy; nor is their excuse to be admitted that they did not attend to the signification of the words, because ordinarily there was not lacking some advertence, at least confused, concerning the malice of blasphemy. The same is to be resolved concerning the habituated, excepting nevertheless those who, from an inveterate custom of blaspheming already retracted, break out indeliberately into words of this sort.²

4° He does not sin gravely who pronounces words indeed blasphemous in themselves, but halved or corrupted, so that he does not attend to the true sense; for these no longer have the nature of blasphemy. - St. Alphonsus,³ Bouvier.⁴

363. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it blasphemy to curse creatures?

Resp. Distinguish: it is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example rain, winds, as commanded by God, or with the word God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example our soul, the Catholic Faith, heaven, and the like. But otherwise, as almost happens, if the indignation is borne against creatures without relation to God. - Thus commonly.⁵ Hence:

Quaer. 2° Are the imprecations in English to be judged blasphemous: 1° "GOD DAMN ME or YOU"; 2° "GOD DAMN MY or YOUR SOUL"; 3° "GOD DAMN MY or YOUR SOUL TO HELL"?

The first formula seems scarcely, or hardly at all, able to be proved blasphemous; for the pronoun me or you, as is plain of itself, denotes the soul neither etymologically nor from common apprehension, at least among our people. Kenrick⁶ excuses it in practice from mortal sin, as for the most part containing nothing other than a merely material imprecation.

The second, considering the principles applied by St. Alphonsus to cursing the dead, seems blasphemous, and therefore of itself mortal, although in the genus of cursing or material imprecation it would be. For the Holy Doctor denies that cursing the dead is blasphemous also for this reason, that it is not referred to the soul; but in the second and third formula the soul is named in express words.

Quaer. 3° Is it blasphemy to curse the whole world?

Resp. Affirmatively, because just as to swear by creatures in which the divine attributes shine forth more is a true oath, so to curse those same things is true blasphemy, because in them God is indirectly contemned.²

364. • Quaer. 4° Is it blasphemy to curse the dead?

Resp. Negatively, unless the mind is specifically borne toward the souls of purgatory, because the dead in general do not have a special relation with God.²

365. • Definition. An oath is an invocation of the divine Name in testimony of truth.

Division. An oath is distinguished:

1° Assertory, by which present or past things are affirmed or denied, or promissory, which extends itself only to future things. Although not every oath concerning the future is promissory. For a twofold oath concerning the future is distinguished by Doctors: one bare and simple, which contains no promise toward another, for example if you swear that you will not enter this house or tavern, etc.; but another is promissory, which is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion.

2° Solemn, or simple, according as it is done in the form required by law, or with solemn ceremonies, or with these excluded.

3° Explicit, or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed as testimony in which the divine attributes especially shine forth.

4° Contestatory, or execratory or imprecatory, according as God is invoked as witness alone, or as witness and at the same time avenger of perjury.

Yet according to the common opinion all oaths are of the same species.¹

An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and licit, and, if it is promissory, obligates in conscience, unless a just cause stands in the way, or its obligation has legitimately ceased. - Thus all;² and it is established both from the definition of the Council of Constance, session 8, against Wycliffe (p. IX), and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, and also from various places of Sacred Scripture. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God... and shalt swear by His name.³

The obligation of swearing presses as often as an oath is either necessary for helping one's neighbor, or is legitimately exacted by a Superior.

I. On the requisites for the essence of an oath. - 366. - Two things are required for an oath, namely: 1° The intention of swearing, at least virtual; because without such intention there cannot exist a formal oath. 2° An oath-formula, either by God explicitly, or implicitly by creatures, or an oath-sign; because, since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath.⁴

367. You will resolve. - 1° A fictitious promissory oath, or one merely external, is not valid, because of defect of will or intention. Yet he who thus swears sins; but more probably, speaking of itself, only venially, because it is nothing but a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God.⁵ - Nevertheless it is mortal in contracts, or before a judge (because of grave deception against justice), or if the one swearing fictitiously does not have the mind of fulfilling the promises.⁶

2° An oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from religion, more probably is not valid, because this is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid.

3° It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness.... Let God be witness to me.... I invoke God as witness. Otherwise, if someone swore by creatures in which the divine goodness or power does not shine forth, for example by a beard, etc.¹

4° It is not an oath to say: God knows.... I speak before God, etc.... if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists,... as I exist,... as I am in this place,... on the faith of an honest man (upon my word and honor), by my faith,... by my conscience,... by priestly faith,... may I die, or may the devil destroy me, unless it be so.... Except when these last two are uttered by way of execration, and not rather, as is customary, by way of pledge. Indeed it is not even an oath to say: I swear or I swear that it is so, unless a question about giving an oath has preceded. - St. Alphonsus,² and many others.

II. On the requisites for the liceity of an oath.

368. • A threefold condition is required for the liceity of an oath according to that saying of Jeremiah:¹ Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.

I. Therefore Truth is required, that is: conformity of the assertion with intention and not with the fact. For an oath excludes only lying, not every error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath the existence of the intention.

II. Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a just cause.

III. Justice, that is, that the oath be about a just, licit, and honorable thing. Thus he would swear against justice who by oath would obligate himself to inflict damage unjustly on his neighbor, or to furnish something else prohibited.

369. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What is a sufficient cause for swearing?

Resp. Any honorable cause of some weight, for example peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc.¹

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to swear with probability of truth?

Resp. Negatively, because God cannot be invoked except in testimony of a certain thing; nevertheless a certain moral certainty, or sole probability, suffices.²

Quaer. 3° Is it licit to swear with mental restriction?

Resp. Negatively, if it is purely mental; but otherwise, if it is broadly mental, and a just cause is present, which nevertheless ought to be greater than that which is required for an unsworn restriction, and greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring.⁴ See what is to be said n. 513-515.

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to swear, touching and kissing Protestant Bibles, when they have been presented to us by magistrates?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, as is plain; hence one about to swear is accustomed to bring Catholic Bibles or a prayerbook in which some part of Sacred Scripture is contained. For the rest, solemn affirmation among us suffices. I said: Negatively, of itself, because ignorance often excuses. Collect. p. 630 n. 1180.

Quaer. 5° Is it licit to give an oath in public disturbances of the commonwealth?

Resp. This generally depends on the circumstances. Weigh what justice or the common good postulates, and what the obligations required by the oath are, whether positive or negative. - But especially it is expedient to consult ecclesiastical Superiors, to whom it belongs to define what, according to the various circumstances, is to be done.

370. • Quaer. 6° What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, judgment, and justice?

Resp. to the first. It is mortal, because to bring God forward in testimony of falsity is to will to destroy His veracity. It is established also from Proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI (see p. XV). L. IV. 147.

Resp. to the second. It is venial of itself, that is, with the danger of perjury excluded;⁵ because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. - Thus almost all, even the stricter authors.

Resp. to the third. An assertory oath must be distinguished from a promissory one. In the former, for instance if someone boasts with an oath about some sin, more probably there is only a venial sin against religion, because it is not done to confirm complacency in sin, but only to make others more certain about it, which is only a certain venial levity of soul. Except, however, an oath for confirming detraction; for it is employed as a means for making another's infamy more certain. In the latter oath it is certainly mortal, if there is question of a grave matter, as is plain; if of a light matter, St. Alphonsus¹ is more pleased by the opinion which affirms that even in this case one sins mortally, because it seems to be a grave irreverence to invoke God as witness and surety of sin, even light sin.

You will resolve. - 1° Among prohibited oaths are listed those which are customarily emitted in secret societies, and by which members obligate themselves to obey those things which perhaps will be ordered by certain superiors, or to keep secrecy even against legitimate power.² See n. 1721. 1°. d).

Yet there are certain societies of workers in which an oath is emitted, or is judged to be emitted, with a restriction, that it is licit to reveal its object to the Ordinary or to a priest; and these, indeed, if the oath contains nothing else which is opposed to justice, and the society is not illicit from elsewhere, are not to be disturbed. See n. 1721. 1).

2° The oath of preserving the Constitution of the United States is to be understood in the popular sense, which, namely, is received among all; for each person is not judged to embrace with judgment of mind whatever is contained in it, nor does the Constitution obligate to this.³ Nor is a law to be called evil, but good, which permits a lesser evil that it may prevent a greater one. Moulart, L'Eglise et L'Etat.

3° The oath of foreigners seeking the right of citizenship here is licit, even for him who shall have given an oath of fidelity to the prince from whom he departed. For that oath of fidelity was exacted for confirming the natural obligation of citizens, rather than for inducing a new one, and therefore it must be explained according to the nature of that obligation, by which no one, unless a public and grave cause presses, is bound to remain in his fatherland, and which he satisfies who obeys the prince while he dwells in his domain. But as regards the oath which is given here by foreigners seeking the right of citizenship, and by which every foreign prince is abjured, and consequently also that one from whom someone departed, it is understood of that natural obligation being abjured which, by departing from his domain, has already ceased; and therefore it cannot be called illicit.

4° He who, while war is raging among some nations, brings goods under a neutral flag and documents either fictitious or purposely made into a neutral port, so that thence they may be carried to one or the other of the nations which wage war between themselves, is sometimes compelled to swear that the documents are true. Such an oath cannot be given in the case. (o) p. 473.

371. Principles. - I. Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of justice or fidelity which arises from a simple promise, also induces an obligation of Religion. The reason is that the promise already obligates of itself, and it is confirmed and strengthened by divine testimony invoked. - But an oath concerning an illicit or wholly useless thing does not obligate at all, because an oath, as an act of Religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing.

II. The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly, and follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, and all its conditions. The reason for the first is that the one swearing is judged to have willed to obligate himself as little as he could; but the reason for the other is that the oath does not change the nature of the act, but adds to it only the obligation of Religion, and hence ought to have the same conditions and limitations.

III. The obligation of an oath is moreover to be interpreted according to the tacit conditions included or understood in it, which are: 1° if I shall be able without grave damage; 2° if the matter shall not have been notably changed; 3° if the rights or will of the Superior do not stand in the way; 4° if the other shall have preserved reciprocal faith; 5° unless the other cedes from his right.¹

372. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is smallness of matter given in the transgression of a promissory oath?

Resp. The FIRST OPINION denies, because not only a simple promise is violated, but a sworn promise. Therefore in any matter whatsoever grave injury is inflicted on God, whose testimony has been invoked in vain by the one swearing. - Bonacina, Lessius, Toletus.

The SECOND OPINION affirms, because in a promissory oath God is not properly brought forward as witness of the future execution of the thing promised, but only of the actual promise, or of the true intention of executing the promise. - Suarez, Navarrus, Laymann, etc. - St. Alphonsus in the Work² says each opinion is probable; but in the Homo apostolicus³ he adheres more to the second opinion.

Quaer. 2° Does a promissory oath emitted by error or deceit obligate?

Resp. Negatively, if the error or deceit concerns the substance of the thing; but otherwise if it affects only its accidental adjuncts; because a simple contract would be invalid in the former case, but not in the latter. St. Alphonsus.⁴ Yet the same St. Alphonsus⁵ notes that the opposite opinion is probable when the error or deceit concerns those circumstances which, although accidental, if they had been known from the beginning, would have deterred from the oath and promise.

373. • Quaer. 3° Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear obligate?

Resp. It is disputed. The more common OPINION, and in St. Alphonsus⁶ by far the more probable, affirms, because an oath, acceding to a contract not invalid of itself, must be preserved from Religion as often as it can be preserved without sin. But the one who has suffered fear can either rescind the contract by force of laws, or seek relaxation of the oath, that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can demand back in court what he gave, or compensate himself secretly.⁷ Cf. n. 867.

Quaer. 4° How does the obligation of an oath cease?

Resp. 1° It ceases intrinsically, as a law does, by cessation of the motive cause (n. 165).

Resp. 2° It ceases extrinsically by irritation, commutation, and dispensation, as a vow does, concerning which we shall speak in the following chapter. It also ceases by relaxation or remission of the obligation made by him in whose favor the sworn promise was emitted, because anyone can yield from his own right.

374. You will resolve. - 1° He who swore an evil thing is never obligated by the oath; indeed he sins doubly if he fulfills the oath, namely against Religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed.¹

2° He who confirmed a prodigal promise by swearing is not obligated by the oath, because that promise is at least lightly evil. - Thus Suarez, the Salmanticenses, and others commonly with St. Alphonsus, who admits this as more probable.²

3° He who swore that he promised marriage to a rich, healthy, virgin girl of good reputation is not obligated if she falls into poverty, infirmity, infamy, or fornication, because then the simple promise does not obligate.³

4° He does not sin against the oath who, for the sake of civility, swore that he would not sit, drink, enter the house, etc. before another, if compelled by the other he sits, drinks, or enters first; because generally an oath of this sort is null from defect of intention of swearing; or, if it is valid, it is relaxed by the other.⁴

5° He does not sin who reveals a sworn secret when the law itself of the secret ceases to obligate; because an oath, as we said, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined.

6° Parents rarely sin when not fulfilling an oath of punishing children, because generally the oath concerns a useless thing, or rather disordered vengeance; added to this is that the delinquents either are already corrected, or at least have promised amendment.⁵

7° Generally merchants also do not seem to be bound by an oath not to sell for less, or not to buy for more; either because oaths of this kind are, for the most part, concerning a useless thing, or because those men do not have the mind of swearing, or certainly because in the oath there is the tacit condition, unless matters seem to go better otherwise. - Thus more commonly.

8° The oath by which alumni of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide bind themselves (see p. LXXIII, note 2), and those who here or elsewhere are ordained to the title of the American Mission, that they will not enter any Religion or Congregation without permission of the Holy See, is valid, since it is in favor of a third party.¹ Besides, the condition added, without permission of the Holy See, causes no one to be prohibited absolutely from entering Religion. (x) p. 473.

But it is violated: 1) if someone, when the Bishop commands, should refuse to receive the Orders of diaconate or priesthood; 2) if he should refuse to betake himself to that place of the diocese in which the Bishop shall have judged that he ought to labor unto the salvation of souls; 3) if through his whole life he is unwilling to remain in the same diocese, or employs crafts and deceits to withdraw himself from the authority of the Bishop, or by this manner of acting introduces for the Bishop the necessity of dismissing him; 4) if he enters a religious Order without due permission.

Yet they are not to be judged to sin: a) subdeacons who, by the counsel of a confessor or agitated by scruples, would be unwilling to be promoted to the diaconate, or deacons who for the same reason would be unwilling to be promoted to the priesthood; b) those who for a grave cause seek leave of passing to another diocese; c) those who, knowing themselves not suitable, either from defect of knowledge, or because of infirmity of soul, decline the burden of laboring in the vineyard of the Lord; yet they ought not to trust their own judgment against the mind of the Bishop and confessor.²

9° Oaths imposed for securing observance of odious laws, or laws which are of strict interpretation, as, for example, those which pertain to customs duties and other burdens, are to be reduced to the narrowest limits which the words allow.³ - Resolve the same if those laws were unjust or are deservedly presumed unjust.⁴

For one or the other of these reasons, and often for both, those seem to be excused from perjury who see to it that a double document (invoice) of the goods which they have bought, for example from Europe, be permitted to themselves: one in which the lesser price of the goods is described, another in which the greater is noted; and, with only the former exhibited, swear that they bought at the price which is reported in this former one, provided nevertheless that the formula of the oath is not of such a kind as to preclude the possibility of broad mental restriction.

It happens besides that a merchant who paid the duties defined by law could scarcely gain anything by trading for the support of himself and his own, and this for the reason that either the duty is really excessive, or defrauding the duty as to this kind of merchandise has become common, from which it has come about that merchandise of this sort, if the whole duty is paid, cannot be sold at the price at which, because of common defrauding, it is generally sold. Such a merchant also seems to be excused, if he swears with words used in the strictest sense which they allow;¹ for in these cases the tax law has become unjust, either because it imposes an excessive burden, or because practically, namely from the fact that it is preserved by almost no one, it would burden too much the merchants who preserved it.

Nevertheless officials sin most gravely who, against the oath by which they have bound themselves, accept gifts so that they allow goods to be brought in immune from duty or under a duty lower than that which has justly been established.

378. Definition. - A vow is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a better and possible good.

It is said: 1) promise, that it may be distinguished from a simple purpose; - 2) deliberate; for a vow induces an obligation, which no one is judged to take upon himself without sufficient deliberation; - 3) made to God; for a vow is an act of latria, due to God alone. Wherefore, when we vow certain things to the Saints, the sense is that they are vowed to God at the same time in honor of the Saints; just as we build temples and altars to God in their honor; 4) concerning a better and possible good. Concerning a good; for otherwise it would not be pleasing to God; - better, that is, what is either absolutely or relatively better than its opposite; for a promise which impedes a greater good detracts from the worship of God, nor can it be acceptable to Him; - possible, lest the promise be ridiculous.

Division. A vow is distinguished:

1° Solemn or simple, according as it hands over the one vowing to God, and therefore renders him incapable of acts contrary to this handing over, and as such is accepted by the Church absolutely and perpetually; or, with that handing over and incapacitation and such acceptance by the Church excluded, it is emitted with a simple promise. Thus St. Alphonsus¹ as more probable.

2° Personal, real, or mixed, according as an action or omission, or some thing separable from the action of the person, or each is promised.

3° Temporary or perpetual, according as it is promised to be kept only for a certain time, or through the whole life.

4° Absolute or conditioned, according as its obligation depends on some condition or not. To the conditioned is also referred the penal vow, to which a penalty is annexed by way of condition.

5° Express or implicit, according as it is uttered in words or is contained in something which someone advertently wills and to which he knows a vow is annexed, as the vow of chastity in him who receives the subdiaconate.

We must treat: 1° of the conditions required for a vow; 2° of the obligation of a vow; 3° of its cessation.

The conditions required for the validity of a vow are contained in the very definition of a vow, and two are principal: 1° true intention; 2° apt matter.

379. • For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation; for a vow is like a certain law which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But the will and deliberation are required which are necessary for the perfect and direct voluntary. Wherefore a vow emitted in drunkenness, even if foreseen beforehand, is invalid.

Hence a vow differs essentially from a purpose; because a purpose, however firm, or even uttered with some solemnity - as the purpose among our people of abstaining from every intoxicating drink (the pledge) - does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is the omission of the thing proposed a sin, except perhaps sometimes accidentally, for example because of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin.¹

380. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is a vow valid when made with ignorance of the obligation, or with inadvertence to the obligation already known?

Resp. to the first. A vow made with complete ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid, because without the intention of obligating oneself there is no vow.

Resp. to the second. It is valid if he who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although he does not actually attend to it; or also if he who vows, although he does not know the obligation clearly, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly, or wills it implicitly, when, for example, he wills to vow this or that as others are accustomed to vow. Yet generally it must be held that no greater obligation is induced than that which someone shall have willed to impose upon himself and shall have apprehended.

Quaer. 2° Is a vow emitted from error valid?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the error concerns either the substance of the thing, as if you vow a chalice to some church which you believed silver, when it is gold; - or concerning substantial circumstances, as if someone vows a pilgrimage to the House of Loreto, thinking that it is distant only so many leagues, when it is distant by many more; - or concerning the final cause of the vow, as a vow of giving alms to poor Titius because he is a blood relative, when he is not.²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment, which would not have stood in the way of the vow if, error excluded, they had been known, as if you vow alms to poor Caius, whom you think upright, when he is not.³

Yet note that vows which are emitted in any approved religious institute are not invalid because of any error, unless only a substantial one concerning the substance. St. Alphonsus.⁴ "The reason is," says Lugo,⁵ "because in those things which constitute a state firm and irrevocable by its own nature, such as profession and matrimony, the will, according to the nature of the thing in question, accommodates itself and consents without restriction or condition, and altogether absolutely and independently from other conditions besides those which are of the substance of the same contract. For from those conditions marriages and professions would remain uncertain, and therefore the state itself, which is not according to the nature of the thing in question." And, as Sanchez¹ adds, "From dependence of this kind it would follow that many professions and most marriages would have to be judged invalid; which would yield to the grave harm and scandal of the commonwealth."

381. • Quaer. 3° Is a vow made by fear valid?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, and inflicted for extorting the vow. The reason is that what is extorted from someone by force through injury cannot be acceptable to God, when the law of nature postulates that the right be restored in full. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by the law of nature. But it is established from Canon Law as to solemn vows of Religion, and more probably also as to the other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians.²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away from the one vowing the use of reason; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary. Likewise if the fear proceeds from a light cause, because light fear is not judged to influence the act efficaciously, and is rather the occasion than the cause of the vow. - Thus commonly with Sanchez, Azor, the Salmanticenses; and St. Alphonsus says this is more probable.³

Quaer. 4° Is he bound by a vow who doubts: 1. whether he emitted a vow or a mere purpose; 2. whether he had sufficient deliberation; or whether he was compelled by grave fear?

Resp. to the first. Negatively. This is established from what was said on Probabilism (n. 67. 1°). But if while he promised he believed that he would sin if perchance he did not execute the thing proposed, it can be judged that he truly vowed.⁴

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, in any doubt, according to what was said n. 67. 2°, unless certainly he had vowed before the seventh year.⁵

382. Principles. - I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, because God is not worshiped by an action indifferent from every side; indeed it must be concerning a better good, that is, better than its opposite; otherwise it would impede a greater good, which cannot be pleasing to God. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to circumstances; and thus the vow of entering matrimony which someone emits because of experienced fragility is valid, although celibacy in itself is better.

II. The matter of a vow ought to be a morally possible thing; because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obligating oneself. But no one can obligate himself to something morally impossible for himself. But if the matter is divisible and in part possible, as a sum of money, for this part the vow is valid; but it is not valid if it is morally indivisible, as the parts of a church; or if it is indeed divisible, but it is established that the one vowing willed to obligate himself to each part by way of one thing, and had each indivisibly before his eyes. Thus commonly.¹

383. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is a vow concerning matter already prescribed from elsewhere valid?

Resp. Affirmatively; first, because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obligated by diverse titles; then also the vow of this sort concerns a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to have been prescribed; and finally it concerns a better good, since the new bond can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. - Thus commonly.²

Quaer. 2° Is a vow of a good thing with an evil end, or an evil condition, valid?

Resp. to the first. Negatively, if the evil end, although only impulsive, provided the vow would not be made without it,³ holds itself on the part of the thing vowed; for example, if you vow alms to obtain a happy success of theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as if God furnished help for sinning. Otherwise it must be said, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accidentally accompanies the vow, and the depraved end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself wholly on the part of the one vowing, for example if someone, vowing for the glory of God, afterward more gladly vows externally from vain ostentation.⁴

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, although joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although the theft is evil, nevertheless not to be injured is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. But much more does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition, as if someone vows alms if and as often as he blasphemes. - Laymann.¹

Quaer. 3° Is a vow of not sinning valid?

Resp. 1° A vow of avoiding all sins, even the slightest, is not valid, because this is impossible.²

Resp. 2° But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or all fully deliberate venial sins, is valid, because this is possible with divine grace and without a special privilege, and persons who love perfection avoid them sufficiently. Likewise a vow of not committing venial sins of a certain kind is commonly valid, for example never lying, especially in persons of great virtue; but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed in some matters, for example of dishonest thoughts, as to any and even the slightest subreption, of idle thoughts, etc., since they are inevitable as to all, the vow is null.³

384. Principles. - I. A vow obligates of itself, as a law or precept of the Church does, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter; for a vow is as it were a certain private law which one imposes on himself.

II. A vow obligates according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light sin in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or Superior can obligate under light sin only in grave matter, so also he who vows a grave thing can impose only a light obligation upon himself. - Yet conversely he cannot obligate himself gravely in a light thing, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation. - Thus commonly.⁴

385. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What matter of itself is judged light or grave in a vow?

Resp. That matter is judged grave which, when prescribed by the Church, gravely obligates, as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave, or contributes notably to the end of the vow or to the worship of God.

Quaer. 2° Do several light matters coalesce to make grave matter?

Resp. Negatively, if the light matters are vowed separately, so that the obligation is attached precisely to the time or day, or to sanctifying that day. - But otherwise, if the light matters are vowed by way of one thing, so that the determination of the day accedes only to urge execution, as generally happens in real vows; except nevertheless unless something else is established from the intention of the one vowing, on which the whole obligation and reason of obligation depend.

386. • Quaer. 3° Can someone be bound by another's vow?

Resp. Negatively, at least by reason of the vow; the reason is that a vow is a personal burden voluntarily taken up, and therefore no one can promise another's thing or action. - Hence the vows of parents devoting children to some Religion, or imposing on them an obligation, for example of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. But although children are not bound by such vow of the parents, the vow nevertheless obligates the parents so that, as much as in them lies, preserving the liberty of the children, they move them to embracing that which they vowed for them, and much more that they not hinder children willing to embrace it.

I said: at least by reason of the vow; for from justice the heir is bound to fulfill the real vows of the deceased (n. 874), and a law or custom can obligate descendants to a fast or feast introduced by a public vow.

Quaer. 4° What delay is to be judged grave?

Resp. 1° Of itself any delay of a vow gravely obligating is grave, when it is affixed to a determined time, as is the vow of fasting on such a vigil, etc.; because when the time has passed, the obligation of the vow ceases, which cannot be compensated.

Resp. 2° But if a determined time was not present, or was fixed only for urging execution of the vow, a notable delay in a grave thing will be a grave sin, according to St. Alphonsus and others. But a delay without just cause beyond two or three years in a temporal vow, and beyond six months in a perpetual one, is judged notable, as for example in a vow of entering religion made by one who is no longer quite young.²

387. You will resolve. - 1° Real vows must be fulfilled from one's own goods; but he who cannot fulfill from his own is not bound to beg from another in order that he may be able to satisfy. Yet he satisfies if another, either asked or spontaneously, wishes to fulfill for him, although he himself can satisfy; because what another gives, with the consent or ratification of the one vowing acceding, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow was determined by the one vowing for a peculiar reason; for then it must be expended in the individual thing.

2° Personal vows can be fulfilled only by the one vowing himself, nor do they pass to heirs. Hence he who vowed a pilgrimage does not satisfy by inducing another to it.

3° A vow indeterminate as to cessation of time, for example concerning a daily rosary, or a fast to be kept on each Saturday, obligates perpetually, unless something else is gathered from circumstances. In doubt whether the vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or a year, the minimum must be held.¹

4° He who vowed something without a certain quantity, for example alms, money, etc., satisfies by giving that which he wills, provided he does not contribute so little that he seems rather to mock God than to fulfill the vow.

5° He who vowed to hear Mass through a month or year more probably is not bound on feast days to hear two Masses, unless he explicitly vowed this; because the end of the vow is that on each single day he should gather the fruit of the Sacrifice. Likewise he is not bound to fast on Sunday who vowed to fast for a month, a year, or his whole life, unless he expressly obligated himself to this; because he is judged to vow fasting according to the custom of the Church.³

6° He who vowed fasting on the vigil of some Saint, if this falls on Sunday, can fulfill the vow on Saturday according to the custom of the Church.⁴

7° In a disjunctive vow (namely in a vow of furnishing one of two or several things, for example either fasting or giving alms on Saturday), the part which is chosen must be furnished, even if after the choice the other part becomes impossible. But if before the choice one part has become impossible without fault of the one vowing, the vow falls; otherwise the obligation remains for the surviving part.⁵

8° He who has emitted a conditioned vow, and impedes the verification of the condition by reasons or prayers, does not sin; otherwise if by force or fraud. But although in this case he sinned, nevertheless more probably he remains free from the vow, unless the contrary intention of the one vowing must be presumed, as it must be presumed for example in a son who vowed that he would enter Religion unless his father contradicted; for his intention seems to have been unless he contradicted from himself, spontaneously, with the son left to himself.¹

9° A vow of not striving either directly or indirectly for ecclesiastical dignities, which is emitted in certain Religious Institutes, according to Suarez: a) of itself is not violated by a merely internal desire of those dignities, although ambitious and therefore sinful from this heading; for to desire is not to strive;² b) neither is he to be said to strive indirectly who from this desire does something which is ordered only to this, that greater capacity for the dignity be obtained, for example to study more diligently;³ c) this vow is violated by him who through an external action, even indirect, for example a display of capacity, endeavors effectively to move another so that the dignity be conferred on him or procured for him by that other.⁴

388. • The obligation of a vow can cease:

I. Because of intrinsic causes, namely: 1° by cessation of the end or motive cause; 2° by substantial change of the matter; and 3° by impossibility, whether physical or moral, as was said above concerning laws, n. 137, III, 138, 165.

It is said: 1° by cessation of the motive cause. Titius, for example, a son of the family, when he was playing, having been caught by his father and vehemently rebuked by him, to turn aside his anger vowed that he would play no more. With the father dead, the obligation of the vow ceases; for the anger of the father to be turned aside was the cause of the vow, not only impulsive, but motive and principal, as appears from the case.

It is said: 2° by substantial change of the matter, and 3° by impossibility, whether physical or moral. - This happens: a) if the matter becomes illicit, or indifferent, or impeditive of a better good; b) if it becomes altogether impossible; c) if the state of the one vowing, relative to the matter of the vow, becomes morally diverse, for example if someone had vowed the building of a church, but afterward his wealth is so diminished that he cannot satisfy his vow without notable detriment of his state. - It is plain that the changes under a) and b) take away force from a vow, which ceases to be about a good, and a better and possible one (n. 378, 382). - As to the changes under c), the common opinion is that in every promise, and therefore also in a vow, the obligation is taken away through a change of matter notable of itself, since the thing becomes diverse from that which was promised; indeed probably, and perhaps even more probably, says St. Alphonsus,¹ a vow ceases if a circumstance supervenes which, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the vow, although it would not induce a change notable of itself. Yet in doubt one must stand for the vow, which possesses.

Except nevertheless: 1) If that inconvenience from the nature of the thing could reasonably have been foreseen. Hence even a simple vow of chastity does not cease through vehement stimuli of the flesh supervening, since there is scarcely anyone who does not sometimes suffer grave temptations in this matter; therefore against those stimuli other remedies must be employed,² or dispensation must be obtained. 2) If the public good demands the firmness of the vow. Hence through changes of this sort solemn vows emitted in religious profession or in the reception of Orders do not cease; nor simple vows which are emitted in religious Congregations, especially if an oath of perseverance is added; for then an onerous contract intervenes. Hence, just as a Congregation cannot dismiss an alumnus because of supervening changes, except those by which he would cease to be for edification, so neither can the alumnus desert the Congregation.³

II. Because of extrinsic causes, namely irritation, dispensation, and commutation, concerning which it remains to speak singly.

389. • Definition. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him to whose power the will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject.

Division. It is: 1° direct, or annihilation of the vow, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; 2° indirect, or its suspension, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow.

Principles. - I. Every Superior furnished with dominative power over the will of another (as a Regular Superior by force of the vow of obedience) can directly irritate all vows of subjects; nor do they ever revive once irritated. Therefore the vows of inferiors, whose will, by force of their state, is perfectly subject to the Superior, always involve this tacit condition: unless the Superior shall have opposed.

Hence, with the exception of the vow of passing to a stricter Religion, the other particular vows of Regulars and Nuns can be irritated: 1° by the Supreme Pontiff as supreme Prelate of all Regulars; 2° by the Superiors of the Order or house.¹

II. Every Superior or lord can irritate indirectly all vows of subjects in those things in which his power is injured; because anyone has the right not to be injured in things subject to his dominion; but these vows revive when they can be fulfilled without prejudice to another.

Hence: 1° A husband can irritate the vows of a wife which prejudice conjugal right, the education of children, or the governance of the house.

2° A wife can irritate the vows of a husband which injure the rights of matrimony, as a vow of chastity, of a long pilgrimage, of putting on the habit of a hermit, etc.

3° A master can irritate or suspend the vows of servants which impede or diminish owed service, as a vow of hearing Mass daily.²

III. All vows of the impubescent, even vows of chastity and Religion, can be directly irritated by paternal power. This is established from Canon Law.³ But males are pubescent when the fourteenth year is completed, and girls when the twelfth is completed.

Hence vows of the impubescent can be directly irritated by the father, and, in defect of the father, by the paternal grandfather, by a tutor, and, these failing, by the mother, and probably even when the father is present (provided however that he does not contradict), or the tutor.¹

390. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can a husband irritate all vows of a wife?

Resp. It is disputed. Some deny, and say that the husband can irritate only indirectly those vows which stand in the way of his rights. For as to the others the wife is not subject. - Thus Voit,² Laymann, etc. - Yet others better, with St. Thomas³ and St. Alphonsus,⁴ attribute to the husband the right of irritating even directly vows emitted while the marriage stands.

Quaer. 2° Can a father directly irritate the vows of pubescent children emitted before puberty?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided the children, after reaching puberty, have not confirmed them; indeed probably even if they have ratified them, not knowing that they are irritatable.⁵

Quaer. 3° Can irritation be made without cause?

Resp. Affirmatively, as to validity, because the lord validly disposes concerning his own thing; but negatively as to liceity, because the spiritual progress of the subject is impeded irrationally, etc. Yet this commonly does not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus,⁶ and others commonly.

Quaer. 4° Can a Superior directly irritate vows ratified by himself?

Resp. Affirmatively, as to validity, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects.⁷

Quaer. 5° Can spouses mutually irritate a vow of continence emitted by mutual consent?

Resp. In this case the wife cannot irritate the vow of the man; for the wife has only the right of indirectly irritating the vows of the husband, and she renounced this right by ratifying his vow. But since the man can directly irritate any vows whatsoever of the wife and cannot renounce this right, as was said in the first question above, a solid reason why he cannot do this seems hardly able to be brought forward; yet since the opposite opinion in this case is common, St. Alphonsus⁸ leaves the matter to be decided by wiser men.

A dispensation from a vow is its absolute condonation, made in the name of God by a legitimate Superior.

391. Principles. - I. The Church has true power of dispensing in vows, as also in oaths. This is established from the words of Christ, Whatsoever thou shalt loose, etc.;¹ and from the constant practice of the Church. - Common.

II. Only Prelates to whom jurisdiction in the external forum has been given can, by proper and ordinary right, dispense from vows, because this power pertains to the external governance of the Church, like the power of making laws and censures. Hence the Pope alone can dispense from vows, even solemn ones, for the whole Church; but Bishops or Regular Prelates only for their respective subjects (see however n. 155), and only in vows not reserved to the Pope.²

But by delegated or subdelegated right those dispense in vows who have obtained that faculty from those who can delegate or subdelegate it. Concerning these, n. 1144. III, 1203. I. But since it is doubtful whether he who has delegated power of dispensing in vows has by this very fact also the power of dispensing in oaths made without any vow or independently of it, the obligation of an oath, already certainly contracted, cannot be taken away by that doubtful power.³ (P) p. 479.

III. For the validity of dispensation a just cause is always required, because since vows are made to God alone, man cannot dispense from them except as delegated; but one delegated cannot validly dispense without a just cause, as was said concerning laws. - Thus commonly.⁴

392. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are just causes of this dispensation?

Resp. The good of the Church, of society, of the family, and also of him who is bound by the vow; for example, if because of the vow he is oppressed by scruples or grave temptations; if he experiences notable difficulty in fulfilling the vow; if the vow was emitted immaturely, namely with too great facility, or from imperfect deliberation, or without perfect liberty.... For this reason vows of the impubescent can be dispensed absolutely without any commutation and without another cause.... The same must be said if the vow was emitted because of light fear inflicted from without.... The same, when imperfect deliberation or liberty in vowing proceeded from sadness, or anger, or intrinsic fear of shipwreck, death, or another evil.

Quaer. 2° Can a Superior dispense in vows made for the utility of a third party?

Resp. Affirmatively, as to a gratuitous promise not accepted, or accepted but primarily made to God. Negatively, as to an onerous promise, or a gratuitous one primarily made in favor of a third party and accepted by him.¹

Quaer. 3° What vows are reserved to the Pope?

Resp. Besides vows emitted in a religious Community, concerning which more precisely there will be treatment in the Treatise on Particular States, there are reserved to the Pope: 1° the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, but not the vow of virginity only; 2° the vow of entering Religion in which solemn vows are pronounced. Thus from the Response of the Holy See of January 2, 1836, to the Bishop of Le Mans apud Gautrelet.³ From this and the preceding vow even our Bishops can dispense (p. LXX. 4). 3° The vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem to the sepulcher of Christ; 4° the vow of Roman pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles; 5° the vow of Compostellan pilgrimage to St. James. Yet this reservation, since it is odious, must be taken strictly; and therefore it ought not to be extended except to vows:

1. Properly so called. Hence a vow of emitting a reserved vow would not be reserved, because it would not be a vow made, but to be made; nor a vow emitted not principally in honor of God.

2. Absolute. Hence vows are not reserved to the Pontiff if they are penal; or conditioned, and this more probably even when the condition has been fulfilled. See nevertheless L. IV. 260. q. 3.

3. Altogether free. Hence vows are not reserved if they were emitted under light fear even inflicted by another.

4. Perfect. Hence they would not be reserved if they had been emitted under light obligation, or if they were not complete in their genus. Hence a vow of chastity, if it does not exclude every venereal act, is not reserved; wherefore a vow of not marrying, of not committing adultery, of not fornicating, of not seeking the debt, is not judged reserved; nor a vow which only indirectly regards chastity, such as would be a vow of receiving Sacred Orders.

5. Determined. Hence a disjunctive vow would not be reserved.

6. As to their substance. Hence the circumstances of reserved vows are not reserved, as of making a pilgrimage by begging; and if someone vows entrance into a stricter Religion, the Bishop will be able to dispense that he also enter a milder one.¹

Quaer. 4° Can a Bishop dispense a spouse from a vow of perpetual chastity emitted both before and after matrimony, in order to seeking the debt?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion against some; because he can dispense from every impediment hindering the exercise of the conjugal act.² Except, however, an impediment from a vow of perpetual chastity emitted by both spouses and by mutual consent; which nevertheless we think can be taken away by Bishops who, as ours, have the faculty of dispensing in the vow of chastity (p. LXX. 4).

393. • Commutation of a vow is the substitution of some work in place of the promised one. It can be done in a threefold manner, namely into a better good, into an equal one, into a lesser one.

Principles. - I. Whoever has the power, even simply delegated, of dispensing from vows, has by that very fact the faculty of commuting them; for he who can do the greater can also do the lesser in the same genus. - But not conversely, because the greater power is not contained in the lesser.³

II. Anyone can by private authority, and without a special cause, commute his vow into a work evidently better, provided that the Church has not prohibited this in a particular case; because while someone performs a work more perfect than the thing promised, by this very fact he preserves what he had promised, since the perfect is included in the more perfect. It is established moreover from Canon Law.¹ But that is judged better which conduces to the greater spiritual utility of the one vowing, or to the greater service of God. Except, however, vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state.²*

III. He who has emitted a vow cannot commute it into a lesser good by his own authority; for he ought to give to God whatever he promised. - Thus all. - But whether he can change his vow into an equal good is disputed. For St. Alphonsus³ the much more probable opinion is that of St. Thomas denying this, because God rather wills the thing promised than another, even if equal.

IV. A priest delegated merely to commute vows cannot commute them into a notably lesser work; because otherwise he would dispense in great part, and thus would exceed the faculty received. Nevertheless the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly that it is confined to a work altogether equal, but is to be taken in a broader sense, so that it extends itself to a work somewhat lesser; otherwise it would be liable to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Moreover, commutation almost ought to be made for the alleviation of him who has bound himself by vow.⁴

394. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is some cause required for commuting a vow into an equal or slightly lesser work?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, as to liceity, because otherwise the delegated person would commute prodigally, by using the power of commuting in vain.

Resp. 2° Probably also affirmatively as to validity, because the delegated person commuting without cause seems to exceed the limits of his power. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus⁵ calls the opposite opinion probable. Yet a lesser cause is required for commuting than for dispensing; and again a lesser cause is required for commuting into an equal work than into a lesser one; for greater propensity of the person, or less danger of transgressing the vow, suffices.¹

Quaer. 2° Once a commutation has been made, is it licit to return to the first work?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the commutation was made into a lesser or equal work, because the first work is equally pleasing to God, indeed it seems more pleasing. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, more probably, even if it was made into a better work, because commutation is made in favor of the one vowing.²

395. • Quaer. 3° Must you return to the first work, if the second becomes impossible?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the change was made by another's authority, even if by your fault it became impossible; because the prior obligation was dissolved by the commutation itself.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if you made the commutation according to your own judgment, because then the prior obligation is not dissolved, but is only supposed to be supplied by a better one. - Thus most commonly.³

Quaer. 4° When a reserved vow has been commuted, does the substituted matter also remain reserved?

Resp. Negatively, more probably, because that matter which is substituted is not reserved of itself, although it has the same bond of vow.⁴

For the rest, the faithful, especially women and adolescents, are diligently to be exhorted never to emit vows except by the counsel or approbation of a confessor, especially if there is question of the vow of chastity. But a confessor ought to grant leave or counsel of emitting a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity only with the greatest difficulty and only to persons long proved and of mature age; and often he will act prudently if he grants that leave with the condition added: until it shall seem good to the confessor for the time.

• Likewise those vows to which an obligation of justice is joined, as the vow of perseverance which is customarily emitted in certain religious Congregations; - real vows emitted principally in favor of a third party and accepted by him (n. 392, q. 2°); - and penal vows preservative from sin, unless the commutation is made into another penal work which conduces equally to preserving, as is plain from the Bulls of Jubilee. Cf. Heine, T. I. p. 256. q. 97.

Remember that thou sanctify the Sabbath day.¹

396. • The third precept of the Decalogue is natural insofar as it prescribes that some time be dedicated to public divine worship; but insofar as it determinately designates the Sabbath day, it is ceremonial, and in the new law abrogated, since for the Sabbath day the Church substituted the Lord's day in memory of the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Besides the Lord's Day, the Church instituted other feast days for recalling the benefits of our Redemption, or the merits and examples of the Saints, and commands that they, no less than the Lord's Day, be sanctified.

This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, prescribes certain works, and, insofar as it is negative, prohibits certain others; hence a double Chapter.

864. • An oath, as it is taken here, is the calling of God as witness of those things which are promised by contract. The obligation of an oath differs from the obligation of a contract also in this, that the obligation of an oath affects and binds immediately the person of the swearer, whence it does not pass to heirs; but the obligation of a contract confers on the other a strict right, or right of property, affecting the goods of the contracting party, and therefore the whole obligation passes to heirs.

865. Principles. - I. Contracts void by natural right are not strengthened by an oath. The reason is that an oath is an act altogether extrinsic to the contract, and therefore can in no way supply its force. Hence the axiom: An oath follows the nature of the act.

II. Nor are contracts ipso facto void by positive right strengthened by an oath if they are invalidated directly on account of the public good. The reason is that then the oath would be against the common good, and therefore an immoral bond, which God, the author of society, cannot sanction. But those void only in favor of the promisors must indeed be observed from the virtue of religion until the oath is relaxed, yet not from justice.¹

III. An oath is always invalid whenever it cannot be observed without sin of the one swearing. The reason is that an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, nor can it obligate against good morals. - Thus all Theologians.

I. Matter to be treated. - Sins committed against reverence for God are prohibited in a general way by the second precept of the Decalogue. They are very many; among them blasphemies, imprecations, and illicit oaths come more often to be attended to and healed by the confessor.¹

¹ Concerning these matters see all moralists. Especially to be seen are: Aertnijs, Th. M., I, l. II, concerning the second precept, n. 64 sq., Th. P., nn. 80-83; Reuter, Neo-conf., nn. 118, 185-186; Marc, Th. M., I, nn. 596-613; Haine, Th. M., I, concerning the second precept, nn. 39-59; Genicot, Th. M., I, nn. 292-303; Prummer, Th. M., II, n. 437 sq. and 529 sq.

II. Notions concerning blasphemy.² - Blasphemy is insulting speech against God, whether it immediately touches God Himself, or mediately through the saints or other creatures, insofar as their dishonoring redounds upon God.

² We are content with a brief and simple exposition and recollection of notions; for a more profound and accurate notion we refer to our work: Summa Theologiae Moralis, II, n. 781 sq.

It can be committed chiefly in five ways:

1. to attribute to God what is repugnant to Him, for example that He is cruel, a tyrant, unfaithful, lying;

2. to deny what belongs to Him, for example that He does not provide concerning human things; such is the expression: Whether God wills or not! or: Malgre Dieu;

3. to say true things but in an insulting or mocking manner, or with indignation or anger against God, for example: Bah! the goodness of God; or: blood of Christ; Bah! Thou who destroyest the temple of God; Thou hast suffered!; Thou hast conquered, Galilean;

4. to attribute to a creature what is proper to God alone, for example to say: I would do this as well as God; or to call the devil omnipotent, more faithful;

5. to utter abusive words against the saints or other creatures with a special relation to God, for example: Blessed Mary is not a virgin, she is a mother like the rest.

By reason of the sense of the words, blasphemy:

a) is sometimes heretical, which states a heresy or falsity against faith, for example: God does not wish or is not able to help me;

b) sometimes imprecatory, by which evil is wished to God immediately or mediately, for example: cursed be God! - may God perish!

c) sometimes dishonoring or simple, which contains only insult and is customarily uttered in the manner of despising or indignation, for example to say in this manner: the name of God!; Hail, king of the Jews; the blood or death of Christ; or also to spit into heaven, to trample on a cross.

On the part of intention, one kind is directly intended or diabolical, which is done from the explicit intention of dishonoring God and inflicting insult upon Him; another is indirectly intended, when it is done with sufficient deliberation without the express purpose of dishonoring God.

III. Principles for judging the malice of blasphemy. - The following points especially come to be attended to:

1. Blasphemy against God is a most grave mortal sin from its whole genus, because it inflicts the highest injury upon the supreme Majesty, even if it is mediated through the saints or creatures. If nevertheless the saints were not regarded as saints, but as men, without considering their relation to God, there would not be blasphemy properly so called against religion, but a sin against dulia alone, mortal from its genus, which admits smallness of matter, for example if it were done in jest and without contempt or indignation against the saints.

2. Those expressions are blasphemous which, either from their proper signification, or from the common acceptation of the words, or from the mind of the one uttering them, inflict injury upon divine honor.

3. For the sin of blasphemy a direct intention of dishonoring God is not required, but the assertive utterance of a blasphemous word suffices; consequently he blasphemes who deliberately utters a word which turns to the reproach of God, even if he speaks it from anger against neighbor alone.

4. To utter corrupted or halved words is not blasphemous by force of their proper signification, because for this it is necessary that the expression have a complete sense insulting against God: thus, for example, sacre nom, santo di, saterment, sangi de Dio, jarnidie, potverdomme, sangbleu. In these cases the conscience of the one uttering them and the mode of uttering them are to be attended to.

5. Equivocal expressions are not blasphemous, at least of themselves, for example: sacred name of God; it is as true as God; but the sense depends upon the intention of the one uttering it and the circumstances. Thus in the expression: true as God, the created and uncreated truth are not necessarily equated, but only a likeness mixed with some hyperbole is indicated.

6. To utter sacred words nakedly from anger or indignation, not against God but against men or creatures, is not blasphemous: the name of God, sainte croix.

7. In our regions there are formulas which of themselves are not blasphemous, though by their proper signification they can be insulting against God, because generally they are not held by men as blasphemous, for example: mort Dieu, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, sacre milliard de Dieu, tausend Herr Gott, tausend sakrament!

IV. Applications. - 1. To curse creatures (saints, priests, creatures considered in themselves, the devil) is not blasphemous, unless it is done insofar as they have a special relation to God. "Hence," says Marc, Th. M., I, n. 598, 3: "a) it is blasphemy to curse the saints, sacraments, sacred days or things, the Catholic faith, the Church of God, or even priests insofar as they are ministers of God; b) but to curse creatures insofar as they are creatures is not blasphemy, unless the word God is added, for example, cursed be the rain of God; or unless divine power shines forth in them in a peculiar way, as the soul, heaven, the whole world, etc.; in which case in them He would be indirectly contemned; c) to curse a man, living or dead, without uttering the word soul, is not blasphemy, unless the intention of the speaker refers the curse to souls; wherefore to say: may God damn me, may God damn you, is not of itself blasphemy, but a dire imprecation; d) to curse the devil, as author of evils, is not blasphemy; e) in anger to imprecate against oneself or others the devil, thunderbolts, etc., is likewise a dire imprecation, which for the most part, because of defect of serious will, is only venial fault. Nevertheless it is grave irreverence if subjects thus curse superiors, children parents, even if only materially, especially to the face."

2. The French expression Sacre Nom de Dieu from its proper and absolute signification can be taken in a good or bad sense, either as: blessed..., or as: execrable or cursed be the name of God. The sense depends upon the intention of the one uttering it. Nevertheless commonly it is not blasphemous, because those uttering it abstract from any sense whatever of the word, and ordinarily are indignant not against God but against men or creatures.

3. The Flemish expression God verdomme of itself is not blasphemy, but an imprecation which signifies: May God damn, or may God damn me; hence of itself it is venial, but mortal if someone seriously imprecated eternal damnation against himself.³

³ This also holds concerning the English expression: God damn me; but something altogether different must be said concerning the formula: God be damned, which signifies: let God be damned.

4. The vain usurpation of the name of God in the manner of an oath, for example per Deum, par Dieu, bij God, or in the manner of an interjection, for example, the name of God!, without indignation against God, is venial.

V. Practical rules for confessors. - 1. Those who accuse themselves in confession of blasphemies are often excused from mortal sin: a) because the expressions do not have a complete sense but are corrupted, and those uttering them do not have the intention of blaspheming or dishonoring God; or b) because they are equivocal expressions or rather non-serious imprecations; or c) because they are uttered without sufficient advertence and perfect consent, for example from a sudden movement of anger, or sudden pain; or d) because on account of their ignorance they do not understand the expressions and for the most part do not judge themselves to sin mortally.

2. As regards blasphemies uttered from custom, a distinction must be made: those who have not yet retracted the custom are easily to be blamed for blasphemies which they seem to utter inadvertently, if the formulas are truly blasphemous, because they are voluntary in their cause, and often in themselves on account of sufficient advertence; on the contrary, those who have retracted the custom and have seriously proposed to amend themselves, and have applied themselves to this by using means for this purpose, are not in the cause with respect to blasphemies which they utter inadvertently. See n. IX.

3. Let confessors beware lest they hear the fictitious excuses of blasphemers as legitimate: I do not utter the words with the mind of dishonoring God but from custom or anger. For the custom must be taken away and anger expressed otherwise.

4. Penitents are to be questioned a) concerning the words uttered: for often they confuse imprecations, curses, oaths, and blasphemies; and moreover it must be established whether the blasphemies proceeded from infidelity, desperation, or anger against God or the saints; b) concerning the times and occasion, so that they may thus know whether they are recidivists or in an occasion; c) concerning circumstances: whether they did this before children, servants, or others, because then scandal is present.

5. The confessor must take great care not to condemn as certainly sinful what in itself is doubtful; likewise lest those who sin gravely because of erroneous conscience be left in their error. Hence those who accuse themselves of equivocal expressions, such as: sacred name of God, or of imprecations which by many are held as blasphemies, such as: may God damn me, are to be questioned concerning what sense they attributed to them; and if they did not pronounce them from an explicit intention of dishonoring God, it is to be said that those formulas are not blasphemous, but are to be left as venial things.

6. For amendment the cause of the evil is to be considered. Blasphemies arise from irreverence toward God, from anger, from custom; these therefore are to be removed: irreverence, by considering the rights of God to our reverence, and the enormity, temerity, and uselessness of blasphemy; anger, by removing the causes which excite it and disposing oneself as far as possible to tolerate any injuries whatever; custom, by frequently renewing the purpose not to blaspheme (for example every morning) and by praying to this end, by imposing upon oneself some penance each time (for example a small alms, an act of contrition, striking the breast, asking pardon, an ejaculatory prayer, etc.), by not mixing the name of God into expressions, by substituting innocent expressions, etc. The confessor will opportunely be able to impose a penance to be recited for 7 or 14 days.

VI. Notions and principles concerning imprecations. - An imprecation or curse is an act by which someone calls down evil upon another under the aspect of evil. This sin is not always opposed to divine reverence, religion, and the second precept of the Decalogue, but only when it imports a dishonoring of God; otherwise it will be against charity or also justice, and thus against the precepts of the second table, for example against the fifth or eighth. Hence in particular:

A. Against religion and the second precept of the Decalogue are, and are grave sin:

1. imprecations directed immediately against God, because they are great imprecatory blasphemy;

2. likewise imprecations against creatures, but considered in relation to God, because then the curse redounds upon God: this easily happens concerning wind, rain, heaven, thunder, the whole world, etc., for example, cursed be the rain of God; and almost always concerning sacred things or persons; if nevertheless holy persons are considered in themselves, the sin will not be against religion but against dulia;

3. likewise curses against creatures considered in themselves, but by something divine or holy which exists not for cursing but for blessing, for example: may God's blood, death, head, wounds, passion, etc., destroy you.

B. They are not against religion, but against charity of neighbor and justice:

1. to curse rational creatures or any neighbors whatever considered without relation to God, which is mortal sin from its genus, if it is done from the heart; otherwise it will be venial, as for the most part happens: thus, for example, may the devil carry you off, may God damn you;

2. likewise to curse irrational creatures insofar as they serve the utility of men, for example cattle, because in fact this is to curse men;

3. much more to curse parents, which is not only mortal if a grave evil is wished seriously, but sometimes if a light evil is wished, because it is also great irreverence against piety; likewise to curse children or before children, which in parents is also a sin against piety, because they easily provide scandal and are the cause that children thereafter have no reverence and obedience toward them; likewise to curse superiors, especially when present, which also easily is grave and against observance.

We divide this article into eight paragraphs: 1. on the nature and division of a vow; 2. on the subject of a vow; 3. on the object of a vow; 4. on the obligation of a vow; 5. on the intrinsic cessation of a vow; 6. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through invalidation; 7. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through dispensation; 8. on the cessation of a vow or of its obligation through commutation.

388. Definition. A vow (Greek εὐχή) is a promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Thus a vow is most commonly defined.³¹⁵ Therefore three things are required for the essence of a vow, namely: 1. that it be a true promise; 2. that it be a promise made to God; 3. that it be a promise concerning a possible and better good. We shall treat of this last condition in paragraph 3, where there will be discussion of the object of a vow.

1. A vow must be a true promise; and therefore a mere resolution does not suffice. For in Sacred Scripture a vow is customarily explained through a promise: "If thou hast vowed any thing to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him."³¹⁶ "It is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised."³¹⁷

In practice it is often not easy to distinguish whether a true promise or only a resolution was present. And nevertheless, it is entirely necessary to distinguish between a resolution and a promise. A promise is defined as an act by which someone intends to do something under an obligation manifested to another; but a resolution is the mere will to do or omit something, without a man thereby wishing to impose a strict obligation upon himself. Hence, if a confessor doubts whether a mere resolution or a true promise and consequently a true vow was present, let him ask the penitent: When you resolved upon that work, did you wish to impose upon yourself a true obligation, and that under sin, or did you not wish to establish such an obligation for yourself? If the penitent responds negatively to the first part of the question, there is no vow nor grave obligation to execute the resolution, since a resolution of itself produces no moral obligation. Per accidens, however, namely, because of negligence or sloth joined to it, even the violation of a resolution can be sinful. If, after investigation, a doubt remains whether an obligatory promise or a resolution was present, the presumption stands for liberty, and therefore no obligation of a vow is present.

2. A vow must be a promise made to God Himself, because a vow is an act of latria by which someone obliges himself to God to do or omit something for His worship and service. Although vows are often customarily made in honor of the Blessed Virgin and the saints (e.g., someone vows that he will say the Rosary daily in honor of the Blessed Virgin), nevertheless such vows are not properly made to the saints and the Blessed Virgin, but to God alone. The signification of vows of this sort can be threefold: a) a man vows to God that he will fulfill that which he promised to the saints; or, in other words, that which is promised to the saints is not the vow itself, but the matter of the vow;³¹⁸ b) the vow is made to God, but before the saints, who are as it were witnesses of our promise; c) the vow is made principally to God, but secondarily in honor and memory of the saints, in almost the same manner as churches are erected principally for the worship of God, but secondarily in honor of the saints, and as Mass is said in honor of the saints. But if someone were to make a vow to the Blessed Virgin or to some saint without any relation to God and without the intention of obliging himself to God, but to the Blessed Virgin or the saint alone, it would not be a vow properly so called, but a certain sacred promise and an act of hyperdulia or dulia. Hence, e.g., if some girl should say: Most Holy Virgin, I promise thee perpetual chastity because I love thee; but if she thinks nothing about entering into an obligation toward God, such a promise is either no vow or a doubtful vow, and therefore a dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff is not required to free her from such a promise, as is necessary for removing a vow of perfect chastity.

³¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2. Code of Canon Law, c. 1307, § 1.

³¹⁶ Eccles. 5:3.

³¹⁷ Ib., v. 4.

³¹⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 3.

389. The moral value and utility of vows. Since a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, and indeed of latria, as is apparent from the things said, it follows that it is a good and useful act. Protestants, however, with Wycliffe, Luther, and Calvin leading them, teach that vows (especially the vows of religious) are harmful, sinful, and immoral, since they injure human liberty.³¹⁹ Modern Protestants, however, do not agree concerning the moral goodness of vows.³²⁰ Yet they rather commonly reject the vows of religious orders. Already in the times of St. Thomas, William of Saint-Amour indirectly attacked religious vows by condemning the religious state of the Mendicant Orders. Blessed Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and St. Bonaventure fought victoriously against "those who attack the worship of God and religion."³²¹ The Quietists also spread errors concerning vows. Hence Innocent XI condemned the following propositions:³²² "Vows concerning the doing of something impede perfection"; "Superiors are to be obeyed in external things, and the extent of the vow of obedience of religious reaches only to the exterior; but in the interior the matter stands otherwise, into which God alone and the director enter." Against all these let there be the following:

Thesis. Vows prudently made from the motive of worshiping God are morally good and very useful.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. In the Old Testament the Patriarchs and most holy men made vows and on that account were blessed by God.³²³ In the Mosaic law fulfillment of vows is prescribed: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³²⁴ In the New Testament Christ and the Apostles frequently invited men to embrace the evangelical counsels, which are not customarily put into practice without vows.³²⁵ Concerning Aquila, a disciple of St. Paul, it is said: "For he had a vow."³²⁶

Proof 2. From the whole Christian tradition. From the first Christian centuries onward, pious men and women made vows³²⁷ and either went into the desert following the examples of Pachomius and Anthony, or lived holily in their own homes. Especially was the vow of chastity frequently made. Let St. Augustine alone be heard, addressing certain spouses who, after making a vow of chastity, intended to break it: "But now, because thy pledge is held before God, I do not invite thee to great justice (if I exhort thee not to withdraw from the vow), but I deter thee from great iniquity. For thou wilt not be such as thou wouldst have remained if thou hadst vowed nothing of this sort. For then thou wouldst have been less, not worse. But now, which God forbid, thou wilt be the more wretched if thou breakest that same thing with God, by as much as thou wilt be the more blessed if thou fulfillest it. Nor therefore repent that thou hast vowed; indeed rejoice that it is no longer lawful for thee to do that which would have been lawful to thy detriment.... Happy is the necessity which impels toward better things."³²⁸

Proof 3. From the definitions of the Church. The Council of Trent³²⁹ defined: "If anyone says that men are so to be recalled to the memory of the baptism they received that they understand all vows made after baptism to be invalid by force of the promise already made in baptism itself, as though by them something were detracted from the faith which they professed and from baptism itself, let him be anathema." The same is apparent from the propositions of the Quietists condemned by Innocent XI and already mentioned above.

Proof 4. From reasons. It suffices to adduce the words of the Angelic Doctor:³³⁰ "For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to perform the same work with a vow than to perform it without a vow: first, because to vow ... is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious. Hence the act of an inferior virtue is better and more meritorious from the fact that it is commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through command; just as an act of faith or hope is better if it is commanded by charity. And therefore the works of the other moral virtues (for example, to fast, which is an act of abstinence, and to practice continence, which is an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious if they are done from a vow, because thus they now pertain to divine worship as certain sacrifices to God. Hence Augustine³³¹ says that 'virginity itself is honored, not because it is virginity, but because it is dedicated to God, which the continence of piety cherishes and preserves.' Secondly, because he who vows something and does it submits himself to God more than he who only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as regards the act, but also as regards the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than he who gave him only the fruits.... Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in the good. But to do something from a will confirmed in the good pertains to the perfection of virtue.... Just as also to sin with a mind obstinate in evil aggravates the sin and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost."

Protestants indeed object that liberty is destroyed by vows; but this objection is very weak. For even through marriage the liberty of withdrawing from the contract is removed; indeed, in every human contract a man is obliged to do or omit something. Therefore marriage also and all onerous contracts would have to be repudiated. Moreover, even the saints in heaven no longer have liberty to sin or to separate themselves from God, and nevertheless they are supremely free. Happy, therefore, is the necessity which impels toward better things, as St. Augustine says in the text cited above.³³² Never is man more free than when, liberated from the yoke of the passions, he perfectly fulfills the duties of the Christian life.

³¹⁹ Cf. Luther's short work on monastic vows.

³²⁰ Cf. Realencyklopädie für prot. Theol., s.v. "Gelübde."

³²¹ Cf. St. Thomas, Opusc. I, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, and Opusc. III, Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu.

³²² Denz. nn. 1223 and 1285.

³²³ Cf. Gen. 28:20 and Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlex., s.v. "Gelübde bei den Israeliten."

³²⁴ Deut. 23:21.

³²⁵ Cf. Matt., cc. 16 and 19; 1 Cor. 7:25.

³²⁶ Acts 18:18; cf. 21:23ff.

³²⁷ Cf. St. Ignatius, Ep. ad Polyc. c. 5 (Migne, Patr. graec. 5, 724); Tertullian, De virg. velandis c. 11 (Migne, Patr. lat. 2, 954); St. Cyprian, De habitu virg. c. 4 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 456).

³²⁸ Ep. 127 (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 487).

³²⁹ Sess. 7, can. 9, De bapt. (Denz. n. 865).

³³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 6.

³³¹ De virg. c. 8.

³³² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 4.

390. Divisions. Vows are divided in many ways. The following divisions seem to be the principal ones:

1. By reason of the object, a vow is divided into personal and real. A personal vow principally obliges one to perform or omit some personal action, e.g., a vow of fasting, of not gambling, etc. A real vow principally obliges one to some thing, e.g., to give alms.

Besides the personal and real vow, some theologians distinguish a mixed vow, in which an action and a thing are intended and promised equally principally, e.g., a vow of making a pilgrimage to some miraculous image and offering a candle there. But a mixed vow of this kind is nothing other than two vows joined together: one personal, the other real.

2. By reason of duration, a vow is distinguished into temporary, which obliges for a determined time, e.g., for a year; and perpetual, which is promised to be observed for the whole of life.

3. By reason of manner, a vow is divided into absolute, which is made without any condition added, e.g., I vow perpetual chastity; and conditional, which does not oblige unless some condition is verified, e.g., I vow a pilgrimage if I shall have recovered my health; I vow entrance into religion if my parents shall have given consent. If someone, under the condition of a determined future fault, vows that a punishment is to be inflicted upon himself, such a vow is called penal; e.g., if I shall have become drunk again, I vow that I shall give an alms of one hundred francs.

4. By reason of form, a vow is distinguished into express, which is made in formulated words; and tacit, which consists in some free action to which a vow is annexed. Thus, e.g., if someone in the Latin Church freely receives the subdiaconate, he tacitly vows chastity.³³³ In ancient times there also existed a tacit religious profession of the three vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty.³³⁴ The greatest part of vows made today are express vows. Akin to this distinction is the division of a vow into explicit and implicit. For an explicit vow is the same as an express vow, but an implicit vow is that which is contained in another. Thus, e.g., a religious who explicitly vows obedience according to the rule implicitly vows poverty and chastity.

5. By reason of the acceptance of the Church, a vow is distinguished into private and public. A private vow is that which is made by the person vowing alone without the intervention of the Church; e.g., someone vows to say the Rosary daily. A public vow is that which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical superior.³³⁵ All essential vows of religious orders and congregations are public vows, provided these have been duly approved by the Church.

³³³ There are, however, some authors who teach that a subdeacon is obliged to preserve chastity not by force of a vow but by force of ecclesiastical law; discussion of this controversy will recur below, III, 819.

³³⁴ Cf. the canonists concerning this matter.

³³⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1308, § 1. A public vow, therefore, is not opposed to an occult vow.

391. Public vows are distinguished into simple and solemn. Simple public vows are those which are made in all approved religious congregations and in the ancient orders during the first three years after the novitiate. (The Society of Jesus, however, has special laws concerning this matter.) Solemn vows are those which by the authority of the Church are made a) in religious orders after three years of simple vows;³³⁶ b) in the Society of Jesus by certain members according to the special laws of that Society; c) the vow of chastity made in the reception of the subdiaconate.³³⁷

It has been much disputed down to our days wherein precisely the essential difference between solemn vows and simple public vows is situated. Since this controversy seems to pertain more to canon law than to Moral Theology, it can be touched upon here only in passing. First, a twofold solemnity must be distinguished: one essential, the other accidental. The accidental solemnity of a vow consists in the Rubrics, circumstances, and conditions which must necessarily be observed by the statute of the Church, e.g., the statute of the Church that solemn vows cannot validly be made before the completion of the twenty-first year of age; or that they cannot be made unless the novitiate and at least three years of simple vows have preceded. This accidental solemnity undoubtedly depends solely upon the institution of the Church, which can freely change it and has in fact changed it several times. For it belongs to the Church to determine wisely under what conditions someone is capable of making solemn profession; just as it also belongs to the Church to establish certain things which are essentially required for validly entering Christian marriage. And just as the Church, in the course of time, instituted certain diriment impediments of marriage, so likewise it attached certain conditions without which solemn profession is not held valid. The Supreme Pontiffs Boniface VIII³³⁸ and Gregory XIII³³⁹ seem to speak of this accidental solemnity of profession when they assert: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow was devised solely from the constitution of the Church...."

The essential solemnity of vows is that by which those vows are intrinsically distinguished from all other vows. Several authors, e.g., Suarez,³⁴⁰ Schmalzgrueber,³⁴¹ and Wernz,³⁴² think that solemn vows differ essentially from simple vows because of the juridical effects annexed to them by the Church. Others, namely, St. Thomas,³⁴³ the Thomists,³⁴⁴ and several others, e.g., Lehmkuhl,³⁴⁵ teach that the essence of solemn vows consists in a certain internal spiritual surrender and consecration of the person vowing, which the Church accepts in the name of God; but that simple vows contain only a spiritual surrender. This opinion seems better to us, especially because of the Council of Trent defining: "If anyone says that a ratified but unconsummated marriage is not dissolved through the solemn religious profession of one of the spouses, let him be anathema."³⁴⁶ For a ratified marriage is a true marriage and indissoluble by divine law itself. If nevertheless solemn profession dissolves such a marriage, this cannot come from ecclesiastical law alone, but from divine law; otherwise even some Supreme Pontiff could abolish the canon of Trent just cited, which indeed seems impossible. Although solemn vows consist essentially in the spiritual consecration of the person vowing, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiff can for a grave cause dispense from their obligations, just as he can also permit a consecrated chalice to be employed for profane uses.

³³⁶ By decree of the Pontifical Commission on 15 July 1919, special laws were established concerning the profession of religious who must perform military service. Cf. our Man. iur. can. q. 212.

³³⁷ This vow is more accurately called solemnized.

³³⁸ C. unic. 3, 15 in VI°.

³³⁹ Const. Ascendente Domino, 22 May 1584.

³⁴⁰ De relig. tr. 7, l. 2, c. 108ff.

³⁴¹ Ius can. l. 3, tit. 34, n. 8.

³⁴² Ius Decret. III, n. 684, and IV, n. 377.

³⁴³ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2.

³⁴⁴ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 5.

³⁴⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 647ff.

³⁴⁶ Sess. 24, can. 6 (Denz. n. 976).

392. Since a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, in the first place those things said above in n. 326 concerning the subject of religion apply to the subject of a vow. Since, however, a vow is customarily made in order to confirm the will in a good resolution, those persons whose will is perfectly confirmed in good no longer need a vow.

Hence the saints in heaven, the good angels, and Christ did not make vows. St. Thomas³⁴⁷ writes: "It was not fitting for Christ in Himself to vow, both because He was God and because, insofar as He was man, He had His will confirmed in good, as one existing in the state of comprehension." That the damned are not the subject of a vow is evident of itself, since they are not capable of any act of religion.

With these excepted, therefore, all men are the subject of a vow, or capable of vowing, provided that 1. they are endowed with the perfect use of reason; 2. they have the intention of vowing; 3. they have sufficient deliberation and 4. liberty; 5. they are not prohibited by positive law from making vows.

All men can make vows.

The reason is that all men can worship God. Therefore not only Catholics but also Protestants, indeed even unbelievers, can make valid vows. Therefore the Sacred Penitentiary declared on 29 Nov. 1842 that a Protestant who made the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience before an Anglican minister is bound to the observance of these vows if he had a true intention of vowing.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 4 ad 3.

³⁴⁸ Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 959.

393. 1. Perfect use of reason is required on the part of the person vowing for the validity of a vow.

For a vow is a certain particular law. But just as no one who does not have the perfect use of reason can establish an obliging law, so no one can impose upon himself the obliging law of a vow unless he has the perfect use of reason. Hence infants under seven years of age (unless, however, they have already attained the perfect use of reason) cannot make vows. For infants the rule is valid: If they can devote themselves to the devil through mortal sin, they can also oblige themselves to God through a true vow. Likewise invalid are the vows of a man who is completely drunk, insane, or hypnotized. Since the vows of religious institutes are so gravely obligatory, the Church has established that no one can make these vows before a more perfect use of reason, namely, before completion of the sixteenth year of age.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 573.

394. 2. The intention or will of vowing is required for the validity of a vow.

Hence a fictitious vow, i.e., one made only externally without the internal intention of vowing, is null. A threefold quality of this deficient intention is subtly distinguished:

a) Someone promises and vows in words alone, but internally has absolutely no intention of vowing. In this case there is certainly no true vow before God. Hence St. Thomas says briefly: "A promise is sometimes made with the mouth and not with the heart, and such a promise, as regards God, is not a vow."³⁵⁰ A fictitious vow of this sort can occur, e.g., if someone is compelled by other men to vow in some religious institute. But if someone were to make a fictitious religious vow without external compulsion, he would sin gravely; for he would mock the religious institute; sometimes he would also cause material harm, and he would be bound to repair all injuries committed.

b) Someone indeed intends internally to vow and to oblige himself, but at the same time determines not to execute the promise made. In this case theologians commonly teach that a vow truly exists, because fulfillment is not of the essence of a vow, but only the deliberate mind of obliging oneself. Nevertheless, as is evident of itself, such a person vowing sins mortally, because it is a grave irreverence inflicted upon God to promise something in honor of God and at the same time to will to derogate from this promise.

c) Someone indeed wills to promise in a vow and also to execute the promise, but by no means wills internally to oblige himself. In this case it is not so certain whether a vow is truly present. The negative opinion seems to be truer, because the internal resolution to oblige oneself is of the essence of a vow.³⁵¹ Moreover, in this case, whether a vow is present or not, the obligation of fulfilling the promise remains.

If defects of intention of this kind occur in a religious profession which someone made for merely earthly motives, or in the reception of the subdiaconate, then the confessor must insist that the penitent make a true vow as soon as possible, or refer the matter to the competent ecclesiastical authority. Since, however, some authors teach that a subdeacon is obliged to perpetual chastity not by force of a vow properly so called but by force of ecclesiastical law, such a subdeacon can receive sacramental absolution, provided he has promised that he will preserve perfect chastity.

As regards the quality of intention necessary for a vow, an actual or explicit intention is not required, but a virtual or implicit intention suffices. For an actual intention is not necessarily required, because in no human act is an actual intention required for its validity, but a virtual or implicit intention suffices. Hence, e.g., one who has the will to receive the subdiaconate, knowing that the vow of chastity is joined to this order, has a sufficient virtual or implicit intention of making the vow of chastity. An indirect or interpretative intention does not suffice; and therefore, e.g., if one who knows that he is prone to vowing when drunk voluntarily makes himself drunk and, while drunk, vows, his vow does not seem to be valid.

³⁵⁰ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, solut. 1 ad 2.

³⁵¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 201.

395. 3. Sufficient deliberation is required for the validity of a vow.

The reason is that no one is considered to impose upon himself a grave obligation, such as the obligation of a vow is, without sufficient deliberation. But the question immediately arises: What deliberation is truly sufficient for the validity of a vow? Full or perfect deliberation is customarily distinguished from imperfect or semiplena deliberation. The most common opinion is that full and perfect deliberation is required for the validity of a vow. This consists in the person vowing a) being fully master of himself; b) attending to and truly knowing that which he imposes upon himself to fulfill through the vow. Hence theologians commonly teach that for the validity of a vow there is required as much deliberation and knowledge as is necessary for completing an onerous contract or another grave business; or even as much as is necessary for constituting a grave sin from a perfect and direct voluntary act. Hence a confused notion of the obligation does not suffice for a vow, but a confused notion of the gravity of the guilt suffices for mortal sin. The reason for this opinion is that every vow, even in light matter, imposes a serious obligation of religion before God. But no one either ought or is considered to impose such an obligation upon himself without full deliberation. Nevertheless, not every disturbance or emotion of the mind destroys the validity of a vow; otherwise all those vows which are made either in a vehement spirit of devotion, in a very great desire to obtain some benefit, or at the instigation of fear would be invalid, which assuredly no one will say. Therefore only that disturbance impedes the validity of a vow which clouds the mind or at least removes the perfect use of reason.

Because of a lack of sufficient deliberation, invalid are the vows of a child not yet in perfect possession of reason, of a half-drunken man, or of a man so gravely ill that because of fever he cannot think seriously. Often invalid also are the vows of those who suffer from hysterical disease or from so-called "fixed ideas." Nevertheless, a long and prolonged discussion of all circumstances is not absolutely necessary for making a vow, although it is commonly to be counseled, provided, however, that the vow is not made precipitately. In practice a serious doubt can sometimes arise whether some vow was made with sufficient deliberation. Then, for greater security, it is expedient to obtain a dispensation or commutation of the vow so made, which indeed will easily be obtained. The faithful are diligently to be admonished not to make vows from a sudden emotion; indeed, praiseworthy is the custom of several confessors who strictly prohibit their penitents from making any vow of greater moment, e.g., a vow of chastity, without the previous consent of the confessor.

396. Sufficient deliberation is also absent if a vow was made from a notable error. But an error which invalidates a vow is twofold:

a) A substantial error, i.e., either concerning the very substance of the thing promised or concerning a substantial condition.

An error concerning the very substance of the thing promised is present if the person vowing intends an altogether different thing, e.g., if someone were to vow to give away his possession which he thinks to be made from base material but which in fact has a very great value. An error concerning a substantial circumstance or condition is considered present if some circumstance or condition inheres in the object of the vow which, had it been known, would most certainly have prevented the vow, e.g., if you vowed a pilgrimage to some sanctuary, thinking the expenses of the journey to be a few francs, when in fact they are one hundred francs.

b) Error concerning the final cause of the vow.

E.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage for the recovery of the health of his father, whom he thought to be sick but who in fact had always enjoyed excellent health, such a vow is invalid because the principal end of the vow is absent.

But if an error concerns accidental conditions or merely impulsive causes, the vow is not indeed invalid of itself, but nevertheless it can easily be commuted or even dispensed.

E.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles but did not know all the difficulties connected with such a pilgrimage, he is not by that very fact excused from fulfillment of the vow, but a commutation or dispensation will rather easily be conceded.

Note. The essential vows in religious institutes cannot be impugned because of unforeseen inconveniences which someone afterwards experiences in observing them, e.g., in chastity or obedience. For these inconveniences could and ought to have been foreseen. Nevertheless, according to the present discipline of the Roman Curia, a dispensation from religious vows also is rather easily conceded if someone proves that he was led into error concerning even the accidental obligations of the religious state which he professed.

397. 4. Liberty likewise is required for a vow, since a promise which was given not freely but under compulsion cannot be pleasing to God. Opposed to liberty are not only force and violence, which destroy the voluntary act and consequently every vow, but also fear.

Concerning a vow made from fear, the following things seem to have to be said:

A twofold grave fear invalidates; likewise a twofold fear does not invalidate a vow:

a) If the fear under whose influence the vow was made was so grave that the use of reason was disturbed, such a vow is certainly invalid. Thus all teach, and the reason is obvious, for such fear removes everything voluntary and all deliberation.

b) Grave fear, although it does not disturb the use of reason, nevertheless invalidates all vows if it was unjustly inflicted in order to extort the vow. Thus from positive ecclesiastical law.³⁵² The reason for this law seems to be that God does not accept a vow of this sort, since otherwise He would seem to approve the grave injury inflicted upon the person vowing.

c) Grave natural fear, or even grave fear justly inflicted by a free cause, does not of itself invalidate any vows whatsoever.³⁵³ Hence, e.g., if someone in the greatest danger of shipwreck or death vows perpetual chastity; or if an ecclesiastical judge were justly to condemn a cleric to deposition unless he entered a strict monastery and made vows there, then such vows, according to the more probable and more common opinion, are valid.³⁵⁴ The reason is that no injury is done to such a person vowing, and his act, notwithstanding the fear, remains free and deliberate. The same things hold concerning the validity of a vow made under the influence of grave fear which was indeed inflicted unjustly, but not in order to extort the vow. For such fear, in its relation to the vow, is not distinguished from natural fear. Hence, e.g., the vow is valid which someone made in order to escape a danger of death arising from an attack by robbers.

d) Light fear does not invalidate vows. Although some authors cited by St. Alphonsus,³⁵⁵ e.g., Busembaum, Navarrus, and, among the moderns, Schindler and Noldin, think that even light fear invalidates a vow because such light fear also removes at least full liberty of consent, nevertheless the far more common and more probable opinion asserts that a matter as grave as a vow is not invalidated by light fear.³⁵⁶

³⁵² Code of Canon Law, c. 1307, § 3.

³⁵³ Cf. Billuart, l.c., and Ernest Müller, Theol. mor. II, § 52.

³⁵⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 197.

³⁵⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 197.

³⁵⁶ Dominic Soto discusses this matter excellently, De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 2, a. 1.

398. 5. On ecclesiastical law prohibiting certain vows. By natural and divine positive law, no one capable of reason is prohibited from making vows concerning suitable matter. But it is asked whether by positive ecclesiastical law certain persons are forbidden to vow. The answer is:

a) The Church renders several men incapable of making public vows, whether simple or solemn; and therefore it has attached certain conditions without which vows made in religious institutes are altogether invalid from the beginning. Canonists treat of these conditions essentially required for religious profession, whether simple or solemn.³⁵⁷

b) Since, according to a probable opinion, the Church can prescribe even internal acts, nothing prevents the Church from also attaching certain conditions to private vows to be made, without which vows of this sort are invalid. Nevertheless, it is not certainly established that the Church has in fact attached conditions of this sort to any private vow.

c) Religious bound by the vow of obedience cannot make any private vow which is contrary to the will of their superiors or to the rule professed. The reason is that such a vow would concern a thing evil and prohibited.

d) Religious can make a vow of entering a stricter order, as has been established by several Supreme Pontiffs.³⁵⁸ But the transfer itself can no longer be made without the authority of the Apostolic See.³⁵⁹

e) Professed religious cannot make other private vows which are firm and not subject to invalidation by the superior. Therefore St. Thomas says simply: "No vow of a religious is firm except with the consent of his prelate."³⁶⁰

f) Generally, it is not expedient for religious to make private vows, at least without the express permission of the superior. For first, it is not certain whether these vows are valid, and secondly, a religious already bound by the three essential vows and the observance of the rule, if he wishes faithfully to observe all these things, is already sufficiently bound without needing a new obligation from some private vow.

g) Private vows made by a professed religious seem to be valid unless the superior has invalidated them or vows of this kind are expressly prohibited by the rule. Thus the more common opinion, which Cajetan,³⁶¹ John of St. Thomas,³⁶² Suarez,³⁶³ the Salmanticenses,³⁶⁴ and many others hold. The reason is that such vows inflict no detriment upon the jurisdiction of superiors and their right administration. For when the superior judges them inopportune, he can invalidate them. Therefore, if, e.g., some religious gravely obliged himself under vow to recite the Rosary daily, this vow is valid and its transgression is a grave sin; or if a religious bound himself by a private vow to the observance of some rule otherwise obliging under no fault, he sins by transgressing this vow which he made.

³⁵⁷ Cf. our Manuale iur. can. q. 213.

³⁵⁸ Cf. Innocent III, c. 18, X 3, 31.

³⁵⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 632.

³⁶⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3.

³⁶¹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8.

³⁶² In 2, 2, q. 88, disp. 29, a. 16.

³⁶³ De relig. l. 3, c. 5, n. 3.

³⁶⁴ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, punct. 8, n. 185.

399. The object of a vow is that which is promised in the vow, e.g., alms to be given, a prayer to be said, chastity to be preserved, etc. It is also customarily called the matter of the vow. But for the validity of a vow, suitable matter is required, having three conditions, namely: 1. that it be possible for the person vowing; 2. that it be morally good; 3. that it concern a better good.

1. The thing promised must be possible for the person vowing.

For an impossible thing, whether physically or even morally, i.e., to be performed with extraordinary difficulty not foreseen, cannot be promised in a vow, since no one can seriously oblige himself to such impossible things. Hence a vow of working a miracle is invalid; likewise a vow by a poor man of distributing great alms.

It is customary to ask here: a) Is a vow of avoiding all sins valid? The answer is given with a distinction: α) If someone vowed that he would commit no sin, not even the lightest, throughout his whole life, such a vow is invalid; for it concerns a morally impossible thing, since no one can, without a special grace, avoid all even the lightest sins. β) If someone vowed that he wished to avoid all mortal sins, or even all fully deliberate venial sins, such a vow is indeed valid in itself, because this is possible with the ordinary help of God; but nevertheless, for a man not proved by long exercise of the virtues, such a vow is imprudent, because it is not expedient to promise under vow that which will more probably not be observed faithfully.

b) Is a vow concerning a thing partly possible and partly impossible valid? It is necessary to ascertain whether the matter of the vow is indivisible and whether the nature of a vow is still at least partially contained also in the possible part.³⁶⁵ If the matter is indivisible, the vow becomes invalid if the whole is not possible, even though a part is possible. Thus, e.g., if someone promised by vow a pilgrimage to Lourdes and the whole journey has become impossible for him to make because of lack of strength or money, he is not bound to the part of the journey possible for him. But if the matter of the vow is divisible, and in the possible part of this matter the nature and end of the vow are still preserved at least in some manner, this possible part is to be performed; e.g., if someone promised to make a pilgrimage fasting and cannot observe the fast but can make the pilgrimage in another manner, he is not totally freed from the obligation of the vow, but is bound to make the pilgrimage, although not fasting. Moreover, in these and similar cases inquiry must first be made concerning the precise intention of the person vowing, and from this it is necessary to judge whether the obligation of the vow persists or ceases.

³⁶⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 202.

400. 2. The matter of a vow must be morally good and pleasing to God.

For a vow is an act of worshiping God. But God is not worshiped by dishonorable acts or by acts altogether indifferent and vain.³⁶⁶

a) To vow a dishonorable thing or to make a vow in order to obtain an illicit thing is a grave sin unless an erroneous conscience excuses. Hence St. Alphonsus³⁶⁷ writes: "It is also more probable to me that to vow an evil, even a venial evil, is of itself a grave fault; since of itself it is blasphemy to will that evil redound to the honor of God. But commonly, because of ignorance, this is only venial." When the end of the person vowing is evil, although the matter promised by vow is good in itself, then the vow is invalid and gravely sinful if this was the principal end; but if it is only a secondary end, the vow is valid. Hence, e.g., a vow of giving alms in order to obtain good success in theft, causing harm, adultery, etc., is invalid and constitutes a grave sin; but a vow of giving alms indeed in honor of God, but also in order to have some vain glory of one's own, is valid, although to seek vain glory is evil in itself.³⁶⁸

b) To vow a vain and indifferent thing, both in itself and in its circumstances, is a venial sin; but the vow itself is null. The reason is that a foolish promise of this kind displeases God. Hence a vow no longer to pass through a certain street would be invalid and lightly sinful. Almost always, however, things indifferent in themselves become good or evil because of annexed circumstances or because of the end of the agent. Therefore the vow of some girl no longer to pass through a certain street because there she experiences dangerous delights upon seeing a certain young man would be valid and lawful.

³⁶⁶ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2.

³⁶⁷ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 205.

³⁶⁸ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 206.

401. 3. A vow must concern a better good, i.e., it ought not to impede a greater good in the subject vowing.

a) Thus this quality of the object of a vow is more commonly and more correctly explained. For something can be called a greater or better good in two ways: first, comparatively to another good, e.g., it is better to render obedience than to perform bodily mortifications, but each is good. In a second manner, comparatively to the contrary omission of the same good, e.g., it is better to give alms than not to give, it is better to preserve chastity than not to preserve it. For suitable matter of a vow, it suffices that it be a better good in this second manner. For if it were necessary that the good promised by vow be better comparatively to another good, it would follow that no vow would be valid unless it concerned the most perfect work of all, since only the most perfect work has no other work more perfect than itself.³⁶⁹

b) From these things it is inferred that not only works called supererogatory, or falling under counsel, but even works already prescribed from another source can be the matter of a vow. Certainly works of counsel or supererogatory works most properly fall under vow, as the Angelic Doctor says,³⁷⁰ but prescribed works are still sufficient matter of vows, or vows can also be made concerning them. The reason is that a work imposed under a precept, whether natural, divine, or ecclesiastical, nevertheless remains free and induces only a moral obligation. Nothing, therefore, prevents someone from binding himself by a new bond of religion to perform that work already prescribed from another source. Hence, e.g., a vow never again to become drunk can be excellent when made by one who has a depraved habit of intemperance. This doctrine can also be confirmed from a promissory oath, which induces an obligation of religion similar to a vow. But a promissory oath is very often employed not only by Catholics but also by non-Catholics to confirm treaties, pacts, contracts, etc., to the observance of which natural and divine law already oblige. Why cannot vows be employed in the same manner?

c) Moreover, it is to be noted that for sufficient matter of a vow it is not required that the work promised be absolutely and objectively better than its omission, but it suffices that this work be better than its omission subjectively, or relatively to the person vowing. Therefore a vow contrary to the evangelical counsels can sometimes be lawful, e.g., of entering marriage with virginity abandoned. For although the state of virginity considered objectively is more perfect than the state of marriage, nevertheless for some men marriage is better than virginity. For St. Paul says: "It is better to marry than to burn."³⁷¹ Besides the danger of incontinence avoided, other special goods can also arise from a determined marriage, e.g., the cessation of scandal, the cessation of concubinage, the legitimation of offspring, etc. Hence St. Alphonsus calls certain and far more probable the opinion which teaches that in these cases a vow of marrying is valid and lawful.³⁷² Nevertheless, several grave authors contradict this, such as Dominic Soto,³⁷³ John of St. Thomas,³⁷⁴ John of the Cross,³⁷⁵ Concina,³⁷⁶ etc., because marriage is not the only remedy for concupiscence and other equally efficacious means are also at hand. In practice a vow of marrying does not seem to be counseled, both because perhaps it is invalid and because its utility is customarily very small. Hence, if someone agitated by the impulses of the flesh does not wish to use other remedies for preserving chastity, let him contract marriage, but let him not make a vow of marrying.

d) St. Alphonsus³⁷⁷ here appends the question: "Whether, if someone too prone to vowing vows no longer to vow except with the permission of his confessor, but afterwards nevertheless vows, that vow is valid?" The answer is: 1. A vow absolutely made not to vow is indeed invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow; but a vow not to vow except with the permission of the confessor is certainly valid for one who is too prone and inconsiderate in vowing, since it impedes imprudent vows. 2. By making the second vow without consulting the confessor, the person vowing sinned. 3. Nevertheless, this second vow is valid, provided all the other essential conditions of a vow were present.

e) Here another question is also appended which today is indeed antiquated, but which in former times occurred not rarely: Can parents devote their children to some monastery or to the ecclesiastical state in such a way that the children by force of that vow are bound to enter the monastery or embrace the clerical state? The answer is negative, for such a vow would be equally unjust and impossible. For children are altogether free in the choice of a state, and therefore parents injure justice if they compel their children to embrace a determined state. Then, if the children refuse to embrace the state designated for them by the parents, execution of the vow becomes at least morally impossible. But if in ancient times some parents nevertheless devoted their infant children to some monastery or to the clerical state, the Church either did not approve such vows or, after the children so devoted had arrived at the years of discretion, conceded that they could freely leave the monastery and choose another state.

f) Finally it is asked: Is the vow made in baptism of renouncing Satan, the world, and its pomps a true vow? It is not a vow in the strict sense, but in a broad sense, so that a baptized person sinning against the promises given indeed commits a graver sin than an unbaptized man, but nevertheless does not commit true sacrilege because of violation of the baptismal vow. Thus the common opinion.³⁷⁸ The reason is that he who gives such promises in baptism does not intend to oblige himself under a special sin against religion, but only promises faithful observance of all the commandments of God.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Concina, In Decal. l. 4, diss. 1, c. 5, n. 5.

³⁷⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2.

³⁷¹ 1 Cor. 7:9.

³⁷² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 209.

³⁷³ De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 1, a. 3.

³⁷⁴ In 2, 2, q. 88, disp. 29, a. 7, concl. 4.

³⁷⁵ De voto dub. 2, concl. 4.

³⁷⁶ L.c., n. 7.

³⁷⁷ L.c., n. 210.

³⁷⁸ Cf. St. Raymond, Summa l. 1, De transgress. voti; St. Thomas, IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2; St. Antoninus, S. theol. P. 2, tit. 2, c. 2.

Note. Since a vow is after the manner of a law which the person vowing has freely imposed upon himself, the principles concerning the obligation of a law are also generally applicable to the obligation of a vow, with this difference, however, that the obligation of a vow arises from the virtue of religion, whereas the obligation of a law arises from the virtue of obedience.

402. Quality of the obligation. Principle. Every valid vow obliges, from the virtue of religion, only the person vowing.³⁷⁹

That a valid vow obliges is of faith; hence St. Thomas³⁸⁰ calls him a heretic who pertinaciously denies the obligation of a valid vow. Even the pagans acknowledged that the transgression of a vow is a sin, and therefore one who had violated a vow was called guilty of a vow. The fulfillment of a vow is most strictly inculcated in Sacred Scripture: "If thou hast vowed any thing to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him; but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised."³⁸¹ "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³⁸² St. Paul speaks severely of widows who, through their will to marry, violated a vow of chastity which they had made: "Having damnation, because they have made void their first faith."³⁸³ The intrinsic reason, however, is that a vow is a promise made to God. But every true promise, provided that it is lawful and its fulfillment possible, obliges in conscience. Therefore much more does the promise which someone has made to God by making a vow oblige. For if it is an offense against a man to break the faith pledged to him, it is a much greater offense against God to break the faith pledged to Him in a vow.³⁸⁴

I say, however: a vow obliges from the virtue of religion only the person vowing. Therefore a vow, as it is a vow, never obliges others. Hence children are not bound by the personal vows of their parents; e.g., when a father made a vow of making a pilgrimage or fasting, the son is not bound to fulfill those vows if the father is impeded or has already died. Indeed, personal vows can in no way be fulfilled by another; and therefore, e.g., if someone vowed a prayer, he cannot fulfill this vow through another who is even freely willing to say that prayer. If some community, e.g., a city, parish, etc., has vowed some personal action, such as a fast to be performed on a stated day (because of a victory obtained or a calamity overcome), then the inhabitants who descend from them do not indeed violate the vow if they do not fast, but nevertheless they must fast from a particular law.³⁸⁵ But real vows (and the same applies to mixed vows insofar as they are real), although they cannot impose an obligation of religion upon the heirs of the person vowing, must nevertheless sometimes be fulfilled from justice (if they do not injure the legitimate portion of the heirs or exceed the resources of the inheritance), since they are, as it were, burdens incumbent upon the inheritance. For he who accepts an inheritance ought also to take upon himself the burden connected with it.³⁸⁶ Hence heirs who do not pay legacies stipulated from the vow of the testator injure justice and are bound to restitution. Real vows can also be fulfilled by another during the lifetime of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., one who has vowed alms to be given can ask another to be willing to bestow the promised alms in his place.

St. Alphonsus,³⁸⁷ following the opinion of the Salmanticenses³⁸⁸ and Cajetan,³⁸⁹ notes that violations of vows are all of the same moral species, namely, violations of the fidelity owed to God. Hence (speaking absolutely) some penitent can declare the matter of the sin separately from the circumstance of the violated vow, saying, e.g., so many times I broke the fast, so many times I committed fornication, without expressing the vow concerning these matters, and afterwards say: so many times I broke a vow in a grave matter, without expressing the matter. The reason is that, if a circumstance is separable from the substance of the sin, the sin and the circumstance can be declared separately; just as one who stole in a church satisfies by saying: I stole; and afterwards: I committed sacrilege. Although these things are true theoretically speaking, nevertheless they are not to be put into practice, because thereby a right judgment by the confessor concerning the conscience of the penitent and concerning the means of correction to be counseled is rendered very difficult.

³⁷⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1310, § 1.

³⁸⁰ Cf. Quodl. 3, a. 12.

³⁸¹ Eccles. 5:3ff.

³⁸² Deut. 23:21.

³⁸³ 1 Tim. 5:12.

³⁸⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 3.

³⁸⁵ In some regions and cities there exist vows of this kind made by a community and transmitted to posterity. Thus, e.g., at Rome, from a vow, a fast is observed before the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary. All indeed concede that such obligations truly descend to posterity, but they do not agree whether by force of the vow. The better explanation seems to be that which asserts that such an obligation still now exists not by force of the vow but by force of a particular law or of legitimate custom having the force of law. For by making the vow the community was able to establish a particular law which also obliges posterity, unless, however, this law has been duly revoked (cf. Decr. auth. S.C.R. nn. 834, 932, 2113). Concerning the dispensation of such an obligation, the same things apply which were said concerning the dispensation of a law.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1310, § 2; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 214.

³⁸⁷ L.c., n. 224.

³⁸⁸ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 101.

³⁸⁹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 5.

403. Scholion. Whether the violation of every vow is sacrilege.

It is disputed among authors whether the culpable violation of any vow has the species of true sacrilege, or only of infidelity or perfidy. Cajetan³⁹⁰ affirms that the violation of every true vow is true sacrilege, because the thing promised by vow is made sacred. But the violation of a sacred thing is sacrilege. The common opinion, however, denies that the sin of sacrilege is present in every violated vow. For if someone, e.g., violates a vow of fasting by an ample supper, he does not seem to have violated a truly sacred thing. Others teach that no violation of a vow other than the violation of a vow of chastity (even a private one) is sacrilege. Finally, others think that the violation of a public vow of chastity (whether simple or solemn) is true sacrilege. This controversy is a dispute about a name. For whether the violation of any vow is called sacrilege or not, there is always a violation of the virtue of religion, and it is grave or light according to the gravity of the matter and the intention of the person vowing.³⁹¹

³⁹⁰ Ib., q. 99, at the end of the question.

³⁹¹ Cf. below, n. 544.

404. Quantity of the obligation. Principle. A vow obliges under grave or light sin according to the quantity of the matter and according to the intention of the person vowing.

Therefore, in order that some vow oblige under grave sin, two things are required: gravity of matter and the intention of the person vowing to bind himself gravely. The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a private law. But a law obliges according to the quantity of the matter prescribed and according to the intention of the legislator, yet in such a way that light matter cannot be prescribed under grave sin, whereas matter grave in itself can be imposed under light sin. Thus similarly, in a private vow, someone can vow matter grave in itself under light sin; but he cannot vow matter light in itself under a grave obligation, since light matter is not capable of a grave obligation.³⁹²

All public vows in religious institutes and in the reception of the subdiaconate are excepted, the matter of which, grave in itself, cannot be undertaken under a light obligation. For grave harm would be inflicted upon ecclesiastical discipline if religious and subdeacons were bound only lightly to those things which they promised by vows.

³⁹² There are several authors, such as Dominic Soto (De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 2, a. 1), Wigandt (Tribunal confessar. tr. 10, exam. 3, n. 32), and Concina (In Decal. l. 4, diss. 2, c. 1, n. 18ff.), who assert that not only public, but also all private vows in grave matter do not admit of an obligation that is merely light, because the person vowing cannot change the nature of the matter of the vow. For just as the person vowing cannot bind himself under grave sin to light matter, so likewise he cannot bind himself to grave matter under light sin. Concina (l.c.) subtly defends this opinion. Nevertheless, the opposite opinion is common today. The reason is that according to St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 3), "the obligation of a vow is caused by one's own will and intention." But the fact that the person vowing cannot bind himself under grave sin to light matter proceeds from this, that such a vow would be foolish; on the contrary, it can be very prudent for the person vowing to take upon himself under a light obligation matter otherwise grave.

405. The question immediately now arises: What matter is grave in a vow? General rule: Grave matter in a vow is that which, if it were prescribed by an ecclesiastical law, would oblige under grave sin.³⁹³ But what is grave matter in an ecclesiastical law depends greatly upon the end and circumstances of the law. Thus a law prescribing that a few drops of water be poured into the wine to be consecrated is considered grave, although the matter considered in itself is most light. For this infusion has the grave signification of the union between the humanity and divinity of Christ, or of the conjunction of the faithful people with Christ the Head.

Applications. 1. Matter grave in a vow is considered to be, e.g., Communion to be received, a fast even for one day, a Rosary of five decades to be said, alms of fifty francs to be given, etc., provided, however, that it is not established that the person vowing intended in all these matters promised by vow only a light obligation.

2. In real vows, according to some authors, matter is considered grave which would be grave if the notion of justice intervened. Nevertheless this rule is not to be pressed too much. For if the same quantity were to be called grave in the violation of a vow which is grave in the violation of commutative justice, then in the violation of a vow matter absolutely and relatively grave would also have to be established; or the sin would be lighter if a rich man did not give the sum of fifty francs promised by vow than if a poor man did not give the same sum promised by vow. This certainly disagrees with the common sense both of the faithful and of theologians. Rather, the contrary is to be said: a rich man omitting a real vow of fifty francs sins more gravely than a poor man, because the rich man has greater facility in fulfilling the vow. Besides, if the culpable omission of a Rosary promised by vow is most commonly assigned as grave matter, why would alms of fifty to one hundred francs promised by vow and not given without sufficient reason not also be grave matter? Is saying a Rosary considered more grave than giving alms of fifty to one hundred francs? Hence I think that even a very rich man can bind himself under grave sin by a vow to give the sum of twenty francs, although this matter relative to him is not yet grave in justice. Lehmkuhl³⁹⁴ thinks that to subtract about one percent from a notable sum promised by vow does not seem so notable as to constitute a grave sin. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give ten thousand francs to some church and retains one hundred francs, he does not yet sin gravely. This opinion indeed is not approved by me if the person vowing wished to bind himself under grave sin to give the whole sum of ten thousand francs. For in the matter of justice the sum of one hundred francs is without any doubt grave matter. But the obligation of the virtue of religion toward God arising from a vow seems not merely lesser, but rather greater, than the obligation of justice toward one's neighbor; just as other sins against God are also generally graver than sins against one's neighbor.

3. Light matters promised by vow can coalesce into grave matter, so that one who has repeatedly violated a vow in light matter is finally guilty of grave sin. Generally, however, it can be said: Matters do not coalesce in personal vows, but they customarily coalesce in real vows. Nevertheless, exceptions are given. Hence, if someone vowed to recite a decade of the Rosary each day and neglected this vow for one month, there are indeed several venial sins, but no mortal sin, since that vow is personal; nor is there coalescence, since the daily decade of the Rosary was promised by vow as a singular thing. But one who vowed to give alms of two francs each week and neglected this vow for several weeks sinned gravely, since those matters coalesced. If, however, someone vowed to give alms every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary and violated this vow for a long time, it is not established whether the alms thus omitted coalesced into grave matter. The presumption indeed stands for coalescence, because the person vowing certainly wished to honor the Blessed Virgin Mary, but nevertheless seems to have intended more principally the worship of God through the relief of the poor. But if the worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be rendered on Saturday was altogether primary, whereas the relief of the poor was the secondary end of the person vowing, the omitted alms do not coalesce. In practice, therefore, the intention of the person vowing is first to be investigated; but if this intention is not clearly established, the position favoring the non-coalescence of the matters is to be maintained.

³⁹³ Cf. Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 105.

³⁹⁴ Theol. mor. I, n. 595.

406. Fulfillment of the obligation. Principle. Vows are to be fulfilled in that manner and at that time which the person vowing intended in the act of vowing. But when a doubt arises concerning the manner of the obligation and fulfillment, the same rules of interpretation are to be employed which apply to the interpretation of laws.

This principle is easily understood if it is kept before one's eyes that a vow is after the manner of a law in which the person vowing is himself the legislator, who can freely determine and limit for himself all the circumstances of the obligation.

Concerning the time for the fulfillment of a vow, the following things are to be noted:

1. A negative vow (e.g., of not frequenting taverns, of not gambling, etc.) obliges immediately, always, and forever, just as in general all negative laws oblige. Therefore, immediately when such a vow has been made, it is no longer lawful to perform the action concerning the omission of which the vow was made. This is evident of itself.

2. If the time for the fulfillment of the vow was determined by the person vowing, then the vow is to be fulfilled at that appointed time, without its being necessary to anticipate it, even if an impediment to its fulfillment otherwise arising is foreseen. Hence, e.g., a young man who vowed that he would make a pilgrimage in the month of October is not bound to make the pilgrimage in September, even if he now knows that he will be impeded in October because of military service. The reason is that no one is bound to fulfill a law before it obliges.

3. One who did not fulfill a vow at the appointed time is no longer bound, nor can he even fulfill it at a subsequent time, if the appointed time was set as the terminus of the obligation or, as it is customarily said, for terminating the obligation. Hence, e.g., one who vows a fast every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary neither ought nor is able to make up such an omitted fast on the following Monday. Therefore, if the omission of the fast on Saturday was inculpable, he committed no sin and is bound to nothing further. But if the omission was culpable, he committed a sin and can no longer satisfy the vow. The time is considered to have been appointed for terminating the obligation when it is intended per se and not accidentally, e.g., because of a special devotion to be rendered at that time, such as to make a meditation on the Passion of Christ every Friday in Lent. But if the person vowing designated the time not as the terminus of the obligation, but rather to urge the fulfillment, namely, lest the fulfillment be deferred too long, then, when such time has elapsed, the obligation of the vow does not cease, but remains to be fulfilled as soon as possible. But one who did not observe the time determined for the fulfillment of the vow sins if the omission was culpable, and that gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter.

What matter of delay is grave is difficult to assign in practice, since this depends upon many circumstances, e.g., upon the nature of the vow, the age of the person vowing, the danger of the obligation not being fulfilled, etc. Especially in vows which suffer some diminution from delay will grave matter more easily be present. St. Alphonsus³⁹⁵ thinks it to be a grave sin if someone without sufficient reason defers for more than six months entrance into religion promised by vow; but he calls lax the opinion of those who teach that a delay of this vow for two or three years made without a just cause is not a mortal sin. Certainly, if someone without any sufficient cause were to defer entrance into religion promised by vow, he would not only deprive himself of the great spiritual good of the religious life, but would also expose himself to the proximate danger of losing a religious vocation. But if some reasonable cause for the delay is present (e.g., bodily health not yet sufficiently firm, the resistance of parents, some business still to be completed, etc.), and if the proximate danger of losing the religious vocation is absent, a delay even for several years does not seem sinful. In other vows, however, which suffer almost no detriment from delay, according to several authors any delay whatsoever, even one made without cause, does not exceed a venial fault; because, they say, when someone gives all that he promised and no harm comes to the promisee from the delay, he does not seem to be condemned for a grave fault, but for light negligence.³⁹⁶

4. When no determined time has been appointed for the fulfillment of a vow, the person vowing should earnestly strive to fulfill that which he promised as soon as it can be done. For it is said in Sacred Scripture: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 221.

³⁹⁶ Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 3, § 2.

³⁹⁷ Deut. 23:21.

407. On the obligation of a conditional, disjunctive, penal, and doubtful vow.

1. If a vow was made not absolutely but conditionally, it does not oblige unless the condition has been verified. Hence the obligation of the vow remains suspended so long as the condition has not been fulfilled. It is not lawful, however, by fraudulent and unjust means to impede the occurrence of the condition. Hence, e.g., he sins against his vow who vowed to God that he would enter a monastery after the marriage of his sister, but now by fraudulent and unjust means dissuades his sister from entering marriage.

I say, however: by unjust means; for no one is prohibited from employing just means. Hence he who by opportune entreaties or persuasion impedes the fulfillment of the condition is not guilty of a violated vow. Likewise, a conditional vow does not strictly oblige if the condition was fulfilled not properly but only equivalently. E.g., if someone vowed entrance into a monastery when his mother, whom he is bound to support, should find a suitable marriage, he is not bound (strictly speaking) to enter the monastery if the mother should unexpectedly die, although the obstacle to entering the monastery, namely, the support of his mother, has now been removed. The reason is that a vow is a bond. But a bond ought not to bind beyond the limits clearly established. It is evident of itself that in this and similar cases it is better either to fulfill the vow or to seek a dispensation or commutation.

2. Concerning the obligation of a disjunctive vow, note a few things from St. Alphonsus³⁹⁸ and the Salmanticenses.³⁹⁹

a) If someone has vowed disjunctively a good thing or an evil, vain, or impossible thing, such a vow is null. The reason is that the person vowing can choose the evil, vain, or impossible thing, and then the vow would be null because of the unsuitability of the matter. But since he is free to choose either matter, the whole vow is null from the beginning. E.g., if someone very oppressed by financial difficulties were to vow: either I shall enter among the Carthusians or I shall commit theft from a very rich man, the whole vow is null from the beginning.

b) If someone has vowed disjunctively several good things and consequently suitable matters of a vow, he must choose one of them. But if after the choice has been made the other things promised under the disjunction become impossible, he is nevertheless bound to perform the thing once chosen. Conversely, if either thing promised by vow perishes or is rendered impossible before the choice without fault of the person vowing, the vow ceases. The reason is that the person vowing has now been deprived of the liberty of choice, and that without his fault. E.g., if someone promised by vow that he would give one of two chalices which he possessed, and one chalice was lost to him by theft or fire, he is no longer bound to hand over the other chalice. But if, through the fault of the person vowing, for example because he culpably deferred fulfilling the vow, either thing became impossible, the person vowing is bound to perform the other part, since no one ought to derive an advantage from his own fault. Moreover, in these disjunctive vows the intention of the person vowing is especially to be attended to; if it is clear, the vow is to be fulfilled according to it and not according to the material sense of the words: for God, to whom the promise is made in the vow and who searches hearts, is not to be deceived by the subtleties of casuists.

3. Concerning the obligation of a penal vow, a doubt can arise whether the penalty imposed for the transgression of the promise is to be paid once, or as often as the promise is violated. E.g., when someone vowed that he would give ten marks if he became drunk again, is he bound to give this promised sum once after the first drunkenness committed, or as often as he should afterwards become drunk? St. Alphonsus,⁴⁰⁰ following the Salmanticenses,⁴⁰¹ replies that the penalty is to be paid only for the first time if the vow made was simple; but if the vow was twofold, namely, not to become drunk and to pay the penalty, then the penalty is to be paid as often as the vow is violated, unless, however, this penalty is most grave, such as a pilgrimage or the bestowal of great alms. In practice the intention of the person vowing is to be attended to; if it is doubtful, the position favoring the lesser obligation is to be maintained.

4. Concerning the obligation of a doubtful vow, judgment is to be made according to the rules given above, I, nn. 328ff., concerning a doubtful and probable conscience. Then the rules of right interpretation, to be given immediately, are to be attended to.

³⁹⁸ L.c., n. 224.

³⁹⁹ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 141.

⁴⁰⁰ L.c., n. 223.

⁴⁰¹ L.c., n. 177.

408. On the interpretation of vows.

Rule 1. A private vow is first to be interpreted according to the expressed or presumed intention of the person vowing.

The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a private law, whose legislator is the person vowing himself. But the best interpretation of a law is that which conforms to the expressed or presumed mind of the legislator. Therefore a private vow also is to be interpreted first according to the mind of the person vowing.

Public vows, such as the essential vows in religious institutes, are to be interpreted according to the sound doctrine of authors.

Rule 2. When the intention of the person vowing neither clearly appears nor can prudently be presumed, then the vow is to be interpreted according to the common usage of men or the general custom of the Church.

Hence one who vowed the Rosary can recite it alternately with a companion, for thus the custom of the Church bears. One who vowed a fast for a month is not bound to fast on Sundays, since fasting on Sunday is contrary to the custom of the Church; he can also use milk foods and generally employ those dispensations which are granted in his region to all the faithful during Lent. One who vowed to enter the religious state can enter any approved religious institute; but if after entrance he is dismissed by the superiors, he is not bound to make the attempt again in another religious institute, especially since according to the discipline now in force⁴⁰² no one dismissed from some religious institute after profession can be received into another religious institute without a special Apostolic dispensation. But the petition for such a dispensation (which is not so easily granted) seems to be an extraordinary means to which no one is bound for the fulfillment of his vow. One who vowed to hear Mass daily is not bound on Sundays and feast days to hear two Masses, etc.

Rule 3. In a doubt concerning the existence or extent of some vow, it is lawful to embrace the more benign part.

For the bond of a vow is not to be supposed but proved; and "in obscure matters the minimum is to be followed."⁴⁰³ But when a doubt arises whether the vow has been fulfilled or not, the same rules are to be employed which were indicated above, I, nn. 230 and 333, concerning a law doubtfully fulfilled.

⁴⁰² Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, 7 Sept. 1909 and 4 Jan. 1910; Code of Canon Law, c. 542.

⁴⁰³ Rule of law 30 in VI°.

409. Preliminary note. A vow can cease in two ways: 1. intrinsically, namely, a) from a change of matter or b) from the cessation of the end; 2. extrinsically, namely, through the intervention of legitimate authority; this indeed can occur a) through invalidation, b) through dispensation, and c) through commutation. The cessation of a vow, or at least of its obligation, through extrinsic authority will be treated in the following paragraphs; now the cessation of a vow intrinsically is to be treated briefly.

General rule. A (private) vow ceases intrinsically when so great a change has supervened either on the part of the person vowing or of the matter promised that, had it been present from the beginning, it certainly would have impeded the vow; or, as St. Thomas⁴⁰⁴ briefly says: "That which would impede a vow from being made if it were present also removes the obligation after the vow has been made."

The reason is that a private vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the person vowing. But the person vowing is deservedly presumed not to have wished to bind himself in the case in which a notable change should occur either on his own part or on the part of the matter. For every vow, since it concerns a better good, essentially requires suitable matter, concerning which there was discussion above in n. 399. Therefore, just as a vow is null if the matter was unsuitable from the beginning, so a vow ceases when matter previously suitable afterwards becomes unsuitable. St. Thomas⁴⁰⁵ writes to the point: "He who vows in a certain manner establishes for himself a law binding himself to something which is good in itself and in most cases. It can happen, however, that in some case it is either simply evil, or useless, or an impediment to a greater good; which is contrary to the nature of that which falls under a vow. And therefore it is necessary that in such a case it be determined that the vow is not to be observed."

⁴⁰⁴ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, sol. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 10.

410. 1. On the part of the person vowing, a notable change causing the obligation of a vow to cease is present, e.g., in the following cases:

a) if a rich man vowed alms but afterwards himself becomes poor, he is now freed from the vow;

b) if someone vowed entrance into a monastery but afterwards falls into a grave and incurable illness, he is no longer bound by his vow;

c) if someone vowed to receive Communion on a stated day, but on this day broke the natural fast, he now neither can nor is bound to receive Communion without fasting;

d) if someone vowed to make a pilgrimage on a fixed day, but on that day he must altogether attend to his sick father, he is no longer bound to the vow.

One who before lacked temptations but now is agitated by most vehement temptations against chastity is not, however, freed from a vow of chastity made. For he could and ought to have foreseen this change.

2. On the part of the matter promised, a notable change is present, e.g., in the following cases:

a) if the matter becomes illicit, e.g., if someone promised by vow to give alms to a determined poor man whom he knows will now abuse the alms received in order to become drunk;

b) if the matter becomes impossible (physically or morally), e.g., if someone vowed the construction of a chapel in some place and the civil government strictly prohibits this construction;⁴⁰⁶

c) if the matter becomes useless relative to the principal end intended by the person vowing; e.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage in order to recover the health of his father, he is no longer bound to the vow if the father has died in the meantime; or one who vowed not to enter some house because of a seductive girl dwelling there is now freed from the vow if that girl has died or dwells elsewhere. But if the matter has become useless relative to the secondary end intended by the person vowing, the vow does not cease. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give certain alms each week, and he who until now received those alms has died, the vow does not thereby cease, since the determined person of the poor man was not the principal but the secondary end of the vow.

Note. No public vow ceases because of intrinsic causes. Hence essential vows made in approved religious institutes and the vow of chastity in the reception of the subdiaconate do not cease because of a notable change on the part of the person vowing or on the part of the matter. The reason is that otherwise many inconveniences would arise both for the person vowing himself and for religious institutes. Moreover, if there is an urgent reason for obtaining a relaxation of vows of this kind, a legitimate dispensation can be obtained. It is evident of itself that temporary vows, whether private or public, cease when the time of the vows has elapsed.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. the things said above in n. 399(b) concerning matter partly possible and partly impossible.

411. Definition. Invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by one who has dominative power⁴⁰⁷ over the will of the person vowing or at least over the matter of the vow. Invalidation, therefore, is an act of dominative power and not of jurisdiction. According as this dominative power is exercised either over the will of the person vowing or over the matter of the vow, a twofold invalidation is distinguished: the one direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by one who has dominative power over the will of the person vowing, e.g., by a father with respect to all the vows of his children before puberty; the other indirect, or improper, which is not the direct annulment of the vow but its suspension made by one who has dominative power over the matter of the vow. Thus a master can indirectly invalidate vows of servants which impede the service owed.

⁴⁰⁷ I.e., dominion (Verfügungsrecht).

412. Principle 1. Direct invalidation entirely extinguishes the vow; indirect invalidation, however, only suspends the obligation of the vow.

Thus from positive law,⁴⁰⁸ which, however, is founded upon natural law.

For direct invalidation dissolves the act itself of the vow and renders it, as it were, not done; but indirect invalidation does not touch the act itself of the vow (which consequently remains intact), but only the matter of the vow. But it can easily happen that this matter of the vow is afterwards withdrawn from the power of the one invalidating. Then, however, a vow thus indirectly invalidated revives again. Hence, e.g., if a father directly invalidated the vow of his son before puberty to enter a monastery, this vow is entirely extinguished; but if a master indirectly invalidated the vow of a maidservant who promised to assist at Mass daily, this vow revives after the maidservant leaves the service of her master.

⁴⁰⁸ Code of Canon Law, c. 1312.

413. Principle 2. For the valid invalidation (whether direct or indirect) of vows, no sufficient cause is required; but for lawful invalidation a sufficient cause is required.

All authors agree concerning the first part of this principle; for the vows of subjects always involve this tacit condition: unless my superior should contradict.⁴⁰⁹ But a superior can always validly exercise the power belonging to him. The other part of the principle was disputed. St. Antoninus,⁴¹⁰ Sylvester Prierias,⁴¹¹ Cajetan,⁴¹² Suarez,⁴¹³ the Salmanticenses,⁴¹⁴ etc., teach that a cause is not required even for lawful invalidation. The reason is that the vows of subjects are always made with the tacit condition of the superior's consent. But the superior is compelled by no right to furnish this consent, but can deny it according to his judgment; just as, if someone were to promise alms from the goods of another under the condition that the owner should give consent, the owner can freely deny this consent without any cause. On the contrary, Dominic Soto,⁴¹⁵ Sanchez,⁴¹⁶ Lessius,⁴¹⁷ Laymann,⁴¹⁸ and others teach that a cause is required for lawful invalidation, because otherwise the superior would impede without sufficient reason both the worship rendered to God through the vow and the utility of the subject arising from the fulfillment of the vow. This second opinion is now to be held, since the Code of Canon Law, c. 1312, § 1, establishes: "One who legitimately exercises dominative power over the will of the person vowing can render his vows invalid validly, and also lawfully for a just cause." All authors teach, however, that an unreasonable invalidation of a vow does not of itself exceed the measure of venial fault, but per accidens, e.g., if it causes grave harm or is done from contempt of religion, it is a grave sin.

Likewise, he who without sufficient reason seeks the invalidation of a vow from a competent superior sins only venially.⁴¹⁹

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 1 and 2.

⁴¹⁰ S. theol. P. 2, tit. 11, c. 2.

⁴¹¹ Summa Summ., s.v. "vow," c. 4; but he does not speak so clearly.

⁴¹² Summula, s.v. "vow."

⁴¹³ In 3, disp. 4, sect. 2.

⁴¹⁴ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 3, n. 31.

⁴¹⁵ De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 3, a. 1.

⁴¹⁶ In Decal. l. 4, c. 24, n. 13.

⁴¹⁷ De iust. et iure l. 2, c. 40, dub. 10.

⁴¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 4, tr. 4, c. 7, n. 18.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 3.

414. Principle 3. One who has the power of directly invalidating some vow, even if he gave the subject permission to vow, or promised that he would not invalidate his vow, or finally expressly approved the vow made, can nevertheless afterwards invalidate this vow. But one who has only the power of indirectly invalidating, once permission or approval of the vow has been granted, can no longer invalidate it.

The reason for the first part is that, notwithstanding the permission given or the promise and approval made, the superior does not cease to govern the subject in all his acts and retains full dominion over the will of the subject. Therefore he can also use his power of invalidating the vow made, especially if a sufficient reason is present. This doctrine is confirmed by the fact that the successor of this superior can certainly invalidate that vow. And yet this successor does not have greater power than his predecessor.⁴²⁰ Concerning the other part, the older authors dispute at great length.⁴²¹ The proposed opinion seems to me more probable. For one who has only the power of indirectly invalidating vows cannot dispose of the will of the person vowing, but only of the matter of the vow. But he permitted this matter to be handed over to God through the vow of the subject. Therefore he can no longer make any disposition of this matter by revoking the vow made by the subject.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Suarez (De voto c. 6, nn. 15ff.), Concina (In Decal. l. 4, diss. 3, c. 5, n. 6), and others indeed admit this doctrine if it concerns the power of a religious superior; but not if it concerns paternal power.

⁴²¹ Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8.

⁴²² Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 3.

415. Invalidation of a vow of conjugal chastity. From the things said follows the solution of a case proposed by St. Alphonsus:⁴²³ Two spouses, with mutual consent after marriage had been contracted, made a vow of continence. The husband, perceiving that there is a grave danger of incontinence in his wife, directly invalidates her vow by virtue of the dominative power which he is said to have over the will of his wife. After the wife has thus been freed from her vow, she has the right of seeking the debt from her husband. But since he is still bound by the vow of chastity, his wife indirectly invalidates his vow, and thus both spouses are no longer bound by the vow of continence made with mutual consent. St. Alphonsus favors the opinion of those who say that this manner of acting is lawful, yet he concludes in these words: "Since this opinion is against the common opinion, ... I leave it to the wise to determine." Gury-Ballerini⁴²⁴ calls this opinion safe. Likewise Lehmkuhl⁴²⁵ favors this opinion, yet adds: "Nevertheless I would counsel that, at least for greater caution, a dispensation also be sought afterwards." Unless there is grave danger in delay, this opinion does not seem able to be safely put into practice, since this manner of acting is a dangerous evasion of the vow and deception of God. For in this manner spouses could very easily free themselves mutually from every vow. Moreover, St. Augustine⁴²⁶ already writes concerning the same case to Ecdicia, who had made a vow of chastity with her husband: "For that which you both with equal consent had vowed to God, you both ought perseveringly to have rendered even unto the end." Add that authors commonly teach that in this case a dispensation from the vow is to be sought from legitimate authority. But it is not safe to act against the common opinion.

⁴²³ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 239.

⁴²⁴ Comp. theol. mor. I, n. 331, at the end.

⁴²⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 612.

⁴²⁶ Ep. 262 (199); Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 1078.

416. Who can directly invalidate vows?

Only he who has dominative power over the will itself of the person vowing, as was said above. Such dominative power is possessed by:

1. The Pope, bishops, and a religious superior (superioress), over professed religious.

For religious in their profession freely vowed obedience to legitimate superiors, and thus subjected themselves to them, so that they can perform no act without their express or at least tacit consent.

The Pope is the supreme superior of all professed religious and therefore has most perfect power over them. This power, however, extends only to those who have made the vow of obedience. Therefore it does not extend to novices not yet professed, and a fortiori not to ordinary faithful, whose vows the Pope can indeed dispense by virtue of his most perfect jurisdiction, but cannot invalidate, since he lacks dominative power over their wills.

Since, according to the present discipline, bishops are sometimes superiors properly so called of women religious, the same dominative power seems to belong to them, so that they can invalidate the private vows of such women subject to them in diocesan institutes.

Religious superiors who can invalidate the private vows of their professed subjects are the general, provincial, and local superior. Certain restrictions, however, are to be added: a) An inferior prelate cannot invalidate those vows of his subjects which have already been ratified by a superior prelate. b) A religious superior cannot invalidate a subject's vow of passing to a stricter religious institute. The reason is not only the positive statute of the Church,⁴²⁷ but also the liberty of choosing a state of life, especially a more perfect one. For just as no one can be prohibited from choosing the religious state, so neither is it lawful to impede a suitable person from choosing a stricter and more perfect religious state. Hence the Salmanticenses and Noldin⁴²⁸ deservedly teach that not even the Supreme Pontiff can invalidate a vow of passing to a more perfect religious state. c) A religious superior cannot invalidate the public vows of his subjects, such as the three essential vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The reason is that through such vows an onerous contract is entered between the religious and the institute. This contract cannot be dissolved by a superior, at least through his dominative power. d) Certain authors, such as Cajetan⁴²⁹ and Sylvester Prierias,⁴³⁰ teach that the private vows of religious which in no way disturb the governance of the superior, e.g., of saying no idle word, of making certain ejaculatory prayers, of exercising certain interior pious acts, etc., cannot in any way be invalidated, but can only be commuted by superiors, because the will of a religious is not totally subject to the superior, but only according to the profession of the Rule. Whatever may be the theoretical truth of this opinion, in practice a religious superior can, when a reasonable cause exists, invalidate at least indirectly absolutely all the vows of his subjects, because any private vow of a professed religious can at some time impede those things which the superior considers necessary for governance. Therefore St. Thomas⁴³¹ also says without any limitation: "Even if someone [a religious] can do something for an hour when he is not occupied with other things by the prelate, nevertheless, because no time is excepted in which the prelate cannot occupy him about something, no vow of a religious is firm unless it is made with the consent of the prelate."

Superioresses also can invalidate the vows of their professed subjects, because they have true dominative power, although they lack ecclesiastical jurisdiction properly so called.⁴³²

⁴²⁷ Cf. c. 18, X 3, 31.

⁴²⁸ De praeceptis n. 220. Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 3, n. 38; cf. also above, n. 398.

⁴²⁹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 and q. 104, a. 5.

⁴³⁰ Summa Summ., s.v. "vow," c. 3, q. 3.

⁴³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3.

⁴³² Certain theologians, such as Cardinal Gennari (Quest. can. n. 469) and Ojetti (Synopsis rer. mor. n. 2533, near the end), undeservedly think that the private vows of those simply professed cannot be directly invalidated by superiors. For superiors have dominative power over the will even of those simply professed (c. 501). But nothing further is required by the Code of Canon Law, c. 1312, § 1, for direct invalidation.

417. 2. A father can directly invalidate all vows made by his children before puberty.⁴³³

Puberty is considered to occur for males in the fourteenth year of age, but for females in the twelfth year of age.⁴³⁴ If the father is absent or consents, the same right belongs to the mother, guardian, and generally to all who succeed to the rights of the father.⁴³⁵ This paternal power of invalidating the vows of children is derived from several texts of the old canon law,⁴³⁶ and moreover is derived from natural law itself. For those before puberty at that tender age are customarily of weaker judgment and reason; and therefore it is considered equitable both in ecclesiastical law and in civil laws that all their acts be rescindable by the father or one acting in his place.

Concerning this paternal power, two things are to be noted: a) Vows made by one before puberty can be invalidated by the father not only during the child's prepuberty, but also afterwards, provided that the person vowing, having reached puberty, has not ratified them, and indeed by a new vow independent of the first vow. Thus the more common opinion.⁴³⁷ But for the person vowing to be considered to ratify his vow in this manner, it is necessary that he be conscious that the first vow is subject to invalidation and that he will to bind himself anew, just as if he had never been bound. Therefore it does not suffice that he either began to fulfill the prior vow or frequently renewed it. For this is to approve the prior infirm bond, not to undertake a new and firm one. b) Absolutely no vow made by one before puberty is excepted from the paternal power of invalidation. Hence a father can invalidate even reserved vows, e.g., a vow of entering an approved order.

Certain authors, such as Vermeersch,⁴³⁸ Génicot-Salsmans,⁴³⁹ and Arregui,⁴⁴⁰ think that the vows not only of those before puberty but also of unemancipated minors can be directly invalidated by the father or those acting in his place. The argument for this opinion drawn from the Code of Canon Law, c. 89, seems weak.

⁴³³ S. theol., l.c., a. 9.

⁴³⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 88, § 2.

⁴³⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 230.

⁴³⁶ Cf. c. 15, C. 22, q. 5; c. 14, C. 32, q. 2; c. 2, X 3, 33.

⁴³⁷ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 3, § 2.

⁴³⁸ Theol. mor. II, n. 224.

⁴³⁹ Theol. mor. I, n. 325.

⁴⁴⁰ Summarium n. 213.

418. 3. Whether a husband can directly invalidate all vows made by his wife during marriage is greatly disputed.

Many affirm it,⁴⁴¹ because the man is the head of the woman and therefore has dominative power over her will. The negative opinion, however, seems to be truer and more common, because the subjection of the wife arising from marriage extends only to matrimonial duties, but not to absolutely all her acts. Moreover, the right of the husband is sufficiently and completely preserved if the power of indirectly invalidating the vows of his wife belongs to him. But the arguments which are brought forward for the husband's power of directly invalidating all the vows of his wife are not convincing. For the text cited from Num. 30:7-16 is not so clear, and then it seems to contain only a judicial precept of the Old Law, which no longer obliges. Moreover, that complete subjection and dependence of the wife upon the husband is founded upon no law: not upon natural law, because women are endowed with greater firmness of judgment than those before puberty, and indeed sometimes surpass their husbands themselves in ability; not upon positive law, for no such law exists; finally, not upon the contract and bond of marriage, since these extend only to the use of the body and the administration of the family.⁴⁴² Therefore the vows of a wife can be invalidated by her husband only indirectly, i.e., by reason of their matter, insofar as they obstruct him in the use of marriage, the administration of the family, or the governance of household affairs, e.g., a wife's vow of continence, of many prayers, pilgrimages, mortifications, alms, etc. But those vows (whether personal or real) which in no way derogate from marital rights, such as, e.g., vows of certain prayers or of alms from free paraphernal goods, cannot be invalidated by the husband. A fortiori, the husband cannot invalidate the vows of his wife concerning things prescribed from another source, e.g., of hearing Mass on feast days, of not lying, etc.

⁴⁴¹ St. Alphonsus (l.c., n. 234) calls this opinion more probable and cites for it St. Thomas, Dominic Soto, Sanchez, Peter Ledesma, the Salmanticenses, and several others. Certainly, considered at first sight, the words of St. Thomas teach this opinion: "No vow of a religious is firm unless it is made with the consent of the prelate. Likewise neither is the vow of a girl living in the house, unless it is made with the consent of her father; nor of a wife, unless it is made with the consent of her husband" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3). But nevertheless commentators more commonly explain the Angelic Doctor as speaking here only of the indirect invalidation of the vows of a wife (cf. Billuart, l.c.).

⁴⁴² Cf. Billuart, l.c., § 2.

419. Who can indirectly invalidate vows?

Every superior who has power over the matter of the vow can indirectly invalidate the vows of subjects which injure his right. The reason is that a vow cannot injure the right of another, and no one can firmly promise something over which he does not have full dominion. Hence:

1. The Supreme Pontiff can indirectly invalidate any vows whatsoever of the faithful which prejudice his rights, and notably vows made concerning ecclesiastical goods, since he is the supreme administrator of ecclesiastical goods.

2. Parents can indirectly invalidate vows of their children who have reached puberty but are not yet exempt, which impede the free and lawful administration of the family, e.g., a vow of a distant pilgrimage.⁴⁴³

3. A religious superior can indirectly invalidate the vows of novices which impede the discipline of the novitiate. But private vows which a professed religious may have made before his profession are suspended and therefore indirectly invalidated by the law itself for as long as the person vowing remains in religion.⁴⁴⁴

4. A husband can indirectly invalidate all vows of his wife, even those made before marriage, which are opposed to his matrimonial rights, as was said above. The same applies to a wife with respect to the vows of her husband; e.g., a wife can indirectly invalidate a vow of her husband by which otherwise he would be incapable of rendering the conjugal debt.

5. A master or lord can indirectly invalidate vows of servants and subjects which obstruct the service owed or the obedience owed, e.g., of visiting a church daily.

⁴⁴³ Cf. S. theol., l.c., ad 2.

⁴⁴⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 1315.

420. Definition. Dispensation can be defined: the relaxation of the obligation of a vow, made in the name of God by one having competent jurisdiction. From this definition appears the great difference between dispensation and invalidation. For:

1. Dispensation is made in the name of God, whereas invalidation is made in the name of the one invalidating.

2. Dispensation supposes jurisdiction exercised in the name of God; invalidation, however, requires no jurisdiction, but requires dominative power either over the will of the person vowing or over the thing promised by vow. Hence a woman having dominative power can indeed invalidate the vows of subjects, but can never dispense, as being without ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

3. A just cause is required for a valid dispensation, because dispensation is exercised in the name of God. But the just God cannot approve a dispensation granted without sufficient cause; for valid invalidation, however, no cause is required, as was said above, since anyone can use his dominative power even without cause.

4. The invalidation of a vow can be made against the will of the person vowing himself; but dispensation supposes the consent of him who made the vow, since he imposed upon himself the obligation of the vow. Thus at least if it concerns dispensation from a private vow.

All these things indeed are agreed among all, but it is not so agreed in what precisely the essence of dispensation consists, and whether a legitimate dispensation totally destroys the vow made, or only suspends its obligation.⁴⁴⁵ This indeed seems certain: dispensation is not a mere declaration or interpretation of the non-obligation of a vow. For such a declaration would either be doctrinal, and then it could be made by any prudent man without the power of jurisdiction being necessary, which is false; or it would be authentic, but in the style of the Roman Curia no indication of such an authentic declaration is found. According to modern practice, not only the obligation of the vow but also the vow itself is customarily removed through dispensation.

⁴⁴⁵ Gestaltung einer Ausnahme; cf. Stiegler, Dispensation etc. im Kirchenrecht I, Mainz 1901, 24 and 40.

421. Requisites for dispensing. For dispensing validly two things are required: a just cause and the faculty of dispensing.

1. A just cause is required both for the lawful and for the valid dispensation of a vow, as was already said.

For the one dispensing acts not in his own name (as does the one invalidating), but in the name of God. But a manifest injury would be inflicted upon God if that which had been promised to Him in a vow were not performed without sufficient reason or were removed through a frivolous dispensation. Hence both the one dispensing and the one dispensed sin by employing a dispensation without sufficient cause. The Angelic Doctor,⁴⁴⁶ however, notes that the one dispensed can and ought to acquiesce in the judgment of the dispensing superior concerning the sufficiency of the cause of dispensation (and not in his own judgment), because he himself does not act in the place of God, but the superior does. If, however, the cause of dispensation were evidently insufficient, the subject dispensed could not lawfully use the dispensation thus granted.⁴⁴⁷

What causes are sufficient for dispensing? Innocent III⁴⁴⁸ admonishes that three things are to be attended to in the dispensation of vows: 1. what is lawful according to equity; 2. what is becoming according to uprightness; 3. what is expedient according to utility. In ancient times dispensation (at least in greater vows) was not customarily granted except for public causes and the common good; but in our days all vows are dispensed even for a private cause and good. All causes for dispensing can be reduced to two classes, namely, to the utility of the Church or community and to the utility or necessity of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., a dispensation from a public vow of chastity and other religious vows is granted if a member of some religious institute, because of a dissolute life, causes scandal to the whole community. A dispensation is granted if the person vowing is in grave danger of transgressing the vow; if he suffers a great and unforeseen difficulty in observing the vow; if he is troubled by great scruples because of the vow made; if the vow was made without perfect deliberation or liberty, namely, precipitately or under the influence of fear, even light fear.⁴⁴⁹ Generally speaking, a superior ought not to be too tormented by scruples concerning the sufficiency of a cause for dispensing. For if a subject greatly insists upon obtaining a dispensation and cannot be turned away from petitioning for a dispensation, he is ordinarily already in grave danger of transgressing the vow, and therefore a sufficient cause for dispensing is present. Hence, according to the present discipline, even the Sacred Congregation of Religious grants religious a dispensation from vows if they seriously declare that they are incapable of living any longer in such an institute.

⁴⁴⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 2.

⁴⁴⁷ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 251.

⁴⁴⁸ C. 5, X 3, 34.

⁴⁴⁹ St. Alphonsus, l.c., nn. 252-253.

422. 2. The faculty of dispensing from vows certainly belongs to the Church; this is established both from Sacred Scripture and from the perpetual practice of the Church.

Christ, speaking to Peter, said: "I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven."⁴⁵⁰ Since these words are general, they must be understood concerning every bond which man can contract toward God. And in truth, just as in the name of God the Church can remit sins and the punishments of sins, although God has a strict right of exacting satisfaction and punishment for sins, so a fortiori the faculty of remitting for just causes an obligation arising from a vow belongs to the Church. This faculty of dispensing has also always been in use in the Church from the most ancient times. In the first centuries there did not indeed occur so many dispensations from vows, but the Holy Fathers knew them, which were sometimes called absolution or oikonomia.⁴⁵¹ But it would be rash and indeed heretical to assert that the Church for so many centuries had usurped for itself a power which does not belong to it.

In the Church this faculty of dispensing is exercised by: 1. the Supreme Pontiff with respect to all the Christian faithful; 2. the local Ordinary and the superior of an exempt clerical religious institute⁴⁵² with respect to their own subjects, yet with dependence upon the Supreme Pontiff and with certain limitations; 3. all who have legitimate delegation. Since the faculty of dispensing supposes not the power of orders but ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whoever is capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction can also (at least by delegation) exercise the faculty of dispensing.

⁴⁵⁰ Matt. 16:19.

⁴⁵¹ Cf. Stiegler, l.c., 3ff.

⁴⁵² Code of Canon Law, c. 1313.

423. The Supreme Pontiff, having the most ample jurisdiction, also has the most ample faculty of dispensing from vows. Hence St. Thomas⁴⁵³ says: "Because the Supreme Pontiff acts fully in the place of Christ in the whole Church, he has the plenitude of the power of dispensing in all dispensable vows." Therefore the Angelic Doctor seems to suppose that not all vows are dispensable. And in truth there is a difficulty concerning how the Pope can dispense 1. from solemn vows; 2. from vows made for the utility of a third person.

Solemn religious vows consist in a certain consecration and are probably of divine law, as was said above in n. 391. For this reason, in the thirteenth century, the doctors (thinking that a thing once consecrated could no longer be desecrated if it remained intact) denied to the Supreme Pontiff the faculty of dispensing from solemn vows. Indeed, Innocent III himself,⁴⁵⁴ speaking of the dispensation of vows of this kind, wrote: "Nor should the abbot think that he can dispense with some monk concerning the possession of property; because the renunciation of property and the custody of chastity are so annexed to the monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant permission against it." St. Thomas,⁴⁵⁵ St. Raymond,⁴⁵⁶ St. Bonaventure,⁴⁵⁷ Blessed Albert the Great,⁴⁵⁸ and many others defend this opinion. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Supreme Pontiffs have often granted permission that religious of either sex, after solemn profession had been made, might lawfully and validly enter marriage. Indeed, Leo XIII⁴⁵⁹ gave a general faculty of dispensing with the dying who, notwithstanding solemn vows, attempted marriage; this faculty the Code of Canon Law, cc. 1043-1045, has further enlarged. But it is rash to assert that so many Supreme Pontiffs arrogated to themselves some power of dispensing which in no way belongs to them. Even before the times of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, certain Supreme Pontiffs are said to have permitted marriage to solemnly professed religious; e.g., Celestine III permitted the nun Constance, daughter of Roger of Sicily, to marry Emperor Henry VI; Benedict IX is said to have made a similar concession to Casimir, King of Poland, and Ramiro, King of Aragon.⁴⁶⁰

Vows made in favor of some third person (whether physical or moral), e.g., a vow of giving alms to a determined person, not even the Supreme Pontiff can of himself dispense if that person has accepted the promise confirmed by the vow and is not subject to the dominative power of the Pope. The reason is that through such a dispensation the strict acquired right of the third party, and consequently natural law itself, would be injured. In the following cases, however, the Pope and his delegate can dispense even from vows made for the utility of a third party:

1. if that third party has freely renounced his right. This is evident of itself, since then no injury of a right is now present.

2. if that third party is a religious person or an ecclesiastical institute. For the Supreme Pontiff has full administration of ecclesiastical goods and consequently can, for sufficient reasons, dispose of the rights of all religious (professed) and ecclesiastical institutes.

3. if the promise was gratuitous and not yet accepted by that third person. For then there intervenes only the obligation of a vow and not of justice. But the Pope can dispense from the obligation of a vow. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give a stipend for one hundred Masses to be said for the relief of the dead, the Pope or his delegate can dispense from a vow of this kind, since acceptance of the vow cannot be made by the dead. The same applies if someone vowed to give one hundred marks to undetermined poor persons.⁴⁶¹

4. if the promise was gratuitous and principally in honor of God and only secondarily for the utility of a third person. Thus at least according to an opinion both intrinsically and extrinsically probable. The reason is that then the utility of one's neighbor is something secondary and accidental, which ought to follow the condition of the principal thing, namely, the vow, which is dispensable.⁴⁶²

From the things thus far said, it appears clearly that in practice scarcely any vow exists from which the Pope cannot grant a dispensation for a just cause.

⁴⁵³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 3.

⁴⁵⁴ C. 6, X 3, 35.

⁴⁵⁵ S. theol., l.c., a. 11.

⁴⁵⁶ Summa l. 1, tit. 8, § 9.

⁴⁵⁷ IV, dist. 38, q. 3.

⁴⁵⁸ In IV, dist. 38, a. 18.

⁴⁵⁹ 20 Feb. 1888.

⁴⁶⁰ These dispensations are rejected as apocryphal by several authors; cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 9.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Billuart, ib., a. 8, § 6.

⁴⁶² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 255.

424. On vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. The Supreme Pontiff has reserved to himself the faculty of dispensing from several vows, which are:

1. Almost all public vows.

Such public vows are: a) all solemn vows made in religious orders and in the reception of the subdiaconate. Although the Supreme Pontiff has sometimes dispensed so that priests who had attempted an invalid marriage could convalidate the marriage, e.g., at the time of the English schism and the first French Revolution, nevertheless no example (publicly known) exists in which the Supreme Pontiff granted to a priest of the Latin rite that he could enter a new marriage. b) All simple vows made in religious institutes approved by the Holy See. It makes no difference whether these vows are perpetual or temporary. Hence, e.g., a member of such a religious institute having vows lasting for three or five years can be dispensed from these vows before the time of obligation has elapsed by no one except the Supreme Pontiff or his special delegate.⁴⁶³ But when someone having temporary simple vows (whether in an order in which solemn vows are made or in a religious congregation) is legitimately dismissed from religion by the superiors,⁴⁶⁴ his simple vows cease by that very fact.⁴⁶⁵ But when someone simply professed and having perpetual vows is legitimately dismissed, he is not by that very fact dispensed from his vows, but must still seek a special dispensation from the vows. Thus at least by common law, whatever may be the case concerning privileges granted to some particular institute.⁴⁶⁶

Note. Public vows are sometimes not reserved to the Holy See. For with an indult of secularization, which in religious institutes of diocesan right can also be granted by the local Ordinary, public religious vows cease by that very fact.⁴⁶⁷ Likewise with the dismissal of a religious who has pronounced temporary (but not perpetual) vows,⁴⁶⁸ as was already said.

2. Two private vows, namely: a) of perfect and perpetual chastity; b) of entering an approved religious institute with solemn vows, provided these two vows were made absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age.⁴⁶⁹

Since reservation, which is considered in canon law an odious matter, is of strict interpretation, these two vows do not fall under reservation unless they are perfect both on the part of the matter and of the manner.

The matter of the vow is considered perfect if precisely that which is reserved in the two vows was promised. Hence there do not fall under reservation: a vow of virginity, a vow of not marrying, a vow of temporary chastity, a vow of receiving holy orders, a vow of entering some religious institute with simple vows only. The reason is that all these vows are neither a vow of perfect chastity nor of entering religion with solemn vows. In practice a doubt not rarely arises whether a member of the faithful made a vow of perfect chastity or only of virginity. Then it must first be investigated whether the person vowing principally intended the celibate life or rather perfect chastity of body and mind. If the former, the vow is not reserved; if the latter, the vow is of perfect chastity and therefore reserved.

The manner of these vows is considered perfect when they were made absolutely and with perfect liberty. Hence reservation is not present:

a) if such a vow was made with a condition concerning a future contingent event, e.g., I vow entrance into the Franciscan religious institute if I recover health. But when a condition concerning a necessary future event, or concerning the past or present, was attached, the vow is only apparently conditional and therefore in truth is absolute once the condition has been verified. Hence, e.g., once the condition has been verified, the following vow is absolute and reserved: I vow perfect chastity if my father perished in this shipwreck.

b) if the vow was disjunctive or penal; e.g., I vow either entrance into religion or the reception of holy orders; if I contract the habit of drunkenness again, I vow entrance into the order of Trappists.

c) if the vow was made under the influence of fear, even light fear;⁴⁷⁰ e.g., a girl vowed entrance among the Poor Clares in order to avoid a marriage into which her parents wished to compel her under light fear.

d) if the person vowing expressly intended to impose upon himself only a light obligation. The reason is evident, since the violation of such a light obligation is a light sin, which cannot be the matter of reservation. Hence, if someone vowed under a light obligation perpetual chastity or entrance into religion, his vow is not reserved.

e) if the person vowing had not yet completed eighteen years of age.

Note. When these two vows have been commuted by legitimate authority into other pious works, the matter thus commuted no longer falls under reservation. Hence, e.g., if a girl, after making a vow of perfect chastity and obtaining a commutation of this vow, is bound to say the Rosary daily, any confessor having the privileges of the Mendicants can now for a reasonable cause dispense from this obligation of saying the Rosary.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶³ Const. Conditae II; Normae, art. 112.

⁴⁶⁴ The manner of this dismissal was newly determined by the Code of Canon Law, c. 647.

⁴⁶⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 648.

⁴⁶⁶ Ib., c. 669.

⁴⁶⁷ Ib., cc. 638 and 640.

⁴⁶⁸ Ib., c. 648 and c. 669, § 1.

⁴⁶⁹ Ib., c. 1309.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 258.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 260.

425. The local Ordinary and other prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction (such as the superiors of an exempt clerical religious institute for their subjects, even those not professed) can not only dispense for a just cause from all other non-reserved vows, but also from the two reserved private vows:

1. when there is an urgent necessity and recourse to the Supreme Pontiff is morally impossible.⁴⁷² Such a case can easily occur when all things are prepared for a marriage which cannot be deferred without great inconvenience, and it is discovered that one of those about to marry is bound by a vow of perfect chastity. Then the local Ordinary can dispense from the vow of chastity.⁴⁷³

2. when it concerns a vow of imperfect chastity (i.e., of not seeking the conjugal debt) made after marriage was contracted. The reason is that such a vow is not of complete chastity, since it cannot oblige one not to render the debt. But if it concerns a vow of perfect chastity, i.e., of neither seeking nor rendering the conjugal debt, a bishop cannot dispense by his own authority unless there is grave danger in delay.⁴⁷⁴ A spouse cannot make such a vow of perfect chastity unless a) with the consent of the other spouse; b) unless the other spouse has lost the right of seeking the debt, e.g., because of adultery committed.

3. when it concerns doubtful vows.

4. when they have special delegated faculties, as is sometimes customary in our times. Therefore a confessor lacking the faculty of dispensing from some vow better seeks this faculty through the diocesan bishop, who can almost always grant it.

Note. The local Ordinary can dispense from vows not only with his own subjects but also with travelers.⁴⁷⁵ But if he grants a dispensation by virtue of special faculties, attention is to be paid to the clauses which may exclude travelers from the dispensations to be granted.

⁴⁷² Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 258.

⁴⁷³ Cf. ib., l. 6, n. 987, and Code of Canon Law, c. 1045.

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 986.

⁴⁷⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1313.

Blasphemy is a Greek word signifying the same as in Latin malediction. It is taken by theologians for a malediction detracting from the excellency of goodness, especially divine goodness. Hence I say 1°: Blasphemy can be defined⁴⁷: « A speaking of the heart or of the mouth by which, in the manner of an insult, something is said derogating from the excellency of the divine goodness. » Or more briefly: « A contumelious utterance against God. » ⁴⁷ This q. 13, a. 1, o.

It is explained. It is said 1° « of the heart or of the mouth; » because we speak with both, and the demons, who speak only in mind, blaspheme.

It is said 2° « in the manner of an insult. » By this it is distinguished from simple infidelity, which consists in assent against the faith. For blasphemy does not require assent against the faith, but it suffices that something be said of God in the manner of an insult.

Nor is there required for this, mark well, an explicit and express intention of insulting and dishonoring God, but virtual and implicit suffices, insofar as by words, or by the manner of pronouncing them, according to the common apprehension, God is dishonored and contemned. Hence I do not assent to those who say that it is not blasphemy but only a vain use of the divine name, when someone, out of indignation against man, not against God, utters his head, his death, his blood, and the like. For those words so pronounced are contumelious to God, though uttered on occasion of another. Consequently there is there a virtual and implicit intention of dishonoring God. And otherwise blasphemies would be exceedingly rare, whereas they are reckoned most frequent. Hence St. Thomas, this a. 2, ad 3, says that he who suddenly breaks out into blasphemous words from some passion, adverting to their signification, commits mortal blasphemy; but he who utters these and the like words not only contumeliously, but either recitatively, or historically, is not a blasphemer: whence special attention must be given to the manner of pronouncing.

It is said « derogating from the excellency of the divine goodness. » And this is done not only when something contumelious is said directly against God, but also against the saints and sacred things; not indeed per se (for thus it would not be properly blasphemy, but the vice of irreligion, opposed to dulia), but with some relation at least virtual to God. For just as, says the Author, God is praised in his saints, insofar as the works which God works in the saints are praised, so also blasphemy committed against the saints redounds consequently to God. Therefore he who would say that St. Peter was impious and damned, that the Blessed Virgin was a harlot, would be a blasphemer. But he who spoke of them, not as saints, but as they were men on earth, e. g., if he called St. Peter bald, St. Crispin a shoemaker, would not be properly a blasphemer, since here there is no respect to God. But if he uttered these things out of hatred and indignation, he would sin mortally against dulia and the observance due to the saints; if however out of jest or levity, it would be venial sin.

Therefore blasphemy is committed: 1° by denying to God what befits him, or asserting of him what does not befit him: and this whether it be done enuntiatively, optatively, imperatively, or in imperfect speech; 2° by attributing to him what befits him, but mockingly and as something blameworthy, as by naming contemptuously the members of Christ and of the saints; 3° by attributing to a creature what is proper to God, as omnipotence; 4° by deeds equivalent to contumelious words, as spitting upon a crucifix.

I say 2°: Blasphemy is divided into heretical and non-heretical⁴⁸. Heretical is that which asserts something contrary to the faith, or denies something pertaining to the faith. Non-heretical is that by which, although nothing openly contrary to the faith is contained, nevertheless the things that are of faith are uttered contemptuously and contumeliously, as if they were blameworthy. ⁴⁸ Ibid., o.

I say 3°: Blasphemy is of its genus the gravest mortal sin⁴⁹, nor can it become venial from smallness of matter, but only from involuntary indeliberateness of the act. ⁴⁹ Ibid., a. 2, c. et ad 3.

The first part is clear, 1° from the gravest punishments by which it is punished⁵⁰. In the old law, Lev., XXIV, 16, the blasphemer was stoned. In canon law several punishments are established against blasphemers; and if they despise these, they are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial, cap. Statutum, tit. de maledicis, lib. V Decretal., and elsewhere. 2° Because it gravely repugns charity, since it is against the excellency of the divine goodness; likewise it is opposed to faith and religion, as I shall say presently. ⁵⁰ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

The second part is also clear; because, however slight anything may be per se, that God should be dishonored and held in contempt is always the gravest evil.

The third part is clear in like manner; because in every species of sin involuntary indeliberateness excuses from the whole or grave sin, because from it it comes about that the act is not perfectly human.

I said « involuntary indeliberateness; » because, if it arise from a habit which the blasphemer does not care to eradicate as far as he can, it does not excuse from mortal sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, namely in that voluntary habit. Let confessors attend to this.

You will ask against what virtue blasphemy is opposed.

I answer. Insofar as it contains implicitly or explicitly something false concerning God, it is opposed to the confession of faith; insofar as it is a dishonoring of God, it is opposed to religion, whose formal object is worship, honor rendered to God.

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. - Exod. xx, 7.

By this precept any irreverence toward God is prohibited, whether through vain usurpation of his most holy Name, or through blasphemy, or through an oath or vow either illicit or violated.

The most holy name of God is said to be usurped in vain when it is assumed without reasonable cause or without due reverence. But this can happen in many ways, for example, from impatience against creatures; from admiration by way of ordinary exclamation; or also superfluously by way of interjection, as from mere formula or custom.

But blasphemy is speech against God by way of insult. This speech can be made not only by words, but also by exterior signs, for example, by gestures or by some indecent action. In whatever way it is made, if it is insulting toward God, it contains in itself the whole malice of blasphemy; if, however, it is a question of reservation or of other penalties inflicted for blasphemy, only oral blasphemy is properly understood.

Blasphemy is distinguished in three ways, namely: 1st, direct or indirect, according as the dishonoring of God is directly and formally intended by the blasphemer, or is not intended in itself, yet is contained in sayings injurious to God which are uttered by him with advertence to the sense which the words contain, with the intention, for example, of jesting or manifesting anger; 2nd, immediate or mediate, according as it immediately affects God himself or only mediately, namely the Saints or sacred things, and in them the sanctity of God which they participate; 3rd, heretical, imprecatory, and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere insult.

I Say 1st. To usurp the name of God in vain is indeed always a sin, excluding the case of inadvertence; but of itself it does not exceed venial sin. The reason of the first is taken both from the law of nature, which openly prohibits usurpation of this kind, and from positive law, for in Ecclus. xxiii, 10, it is said: "Let not the naming of God be continual in thy mouth." But the reason of the second is that, since that irreverence is not toward the very person of God, it is not apprehended as something grave, as is clear from the common interpretation of theologians and the sense of the faithful. - I said of itself because it can become mortal by reason of contempt, or of anger against God; for then it is judged to participate in the malice of blasphemy. Hence:

1st. Those expressions employed among our people, "by God" or "God damn," of themselves contain only venial malice, because they are reduced to vain usurpation of the name of God.

2nd. The same must be said, with proportion observed, concerning the useless usurpation of the names of Saints and words of Sacred Scripture. But to utter the name of the demon uselessly and frequently tastes only of some indecency.

3rd. To utter the most holy name Jesus with anger, and with eyes turned upward to heaven, or in such a way that from the circumstances contempt appears to be present, is a grave sin, because it contains the malice of blasphemy, concerning which it will be spoken at once.

I Say 2nd. Any formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether it is direct or indirect, immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason is that the malice of insult is taken from the excellence of the person to whom it is inflicted; and since in this case it is infinite, blasphemy always and by its nature has a certain infinity, and therefore will always be a mortal sin. - I said 1st, formal and deliberate, because sin can become venial from imperfection of the act. - I said 2nd, whether direct or indirect, because although the indirect voluntary is less intense, if you attend to the degree, nevertheless if you attend to the theological species of the sin, it does not differ from the direct. - I said 3rd, whether immediate or mediate; for St. Thomas says: "Just as God is praised in his Saints insofar as the works which God effects in the Saints are praised, so also blasphemy which is made against the Saints, consequently redounds against God." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 13, art. 1 and 3.

I Say 3rd. Words are to be held as blasphemous of themselves which, from common apprehension, or the usage of the country or region, or from a derisive or angry manner of speaking, or other circumstances, contain dishonoring of God and from common apprehension are reputed as blasphemous, although of themselves they do not properly sound blasphemy. The reason is that words and formulas of speaking do not have efficacy merely from grammatical force, but also from the sense attached to them by common usage and estimation. - Cf. Reuter, n. 442. - Kenrick, tract. 3, nn. 37 and following.

Question 1. Is it necessarily to be opened in confession whether the blasphemy was direct or indirect, immediate or mediate?

Response. Negatively, probably, for just as for blasphemy to be direct is only an aggravating circumstance, so to be mediate is only a diminishing one, but the specific malice is the same in either case. But if the blasphemy was heretical, that must certainly be opened, because then besides the virtue of religion, faith is injured. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 291, and note (a), p. 293.

Question 2. Is it blasphemy to curse creatures?

Response. It is certainly blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example, rain or winds, as commanded by God, or with the word God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example, our soul, the Catholic faith, heaven, and similar things. But one must speak otherwise if indignation is directed toward creatures without relation to God. Wherefore that formula accustomed to be employed by our people, "God damn your soul," whether "to hell" is added or not, of itself is blasphemous. Indeed, besides the malice of blasphemy it also contains another specific malice against charity. I said of itself, for often each malice is lacking, because the soul is not usurped as a creature in which divine goodness shines forth in a special way, and because there is not an affection or desire of harming one's neighbor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 128. - Kenrick, n. 44.

You Will Resolve. It is greatly to be commended to the faithful that they associate themselves with those Sodalities which in a special way turn members away from blasphemy and other sinful modes of speaking of this kind, such as, for example, is the Society named from the Most Holy Name.

An oath is the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth; and it is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1st. Assertory or promissory, according as it is assumed for asserting things present or past, or for confirming something future. But this is called promissory, not because every oath concerning the future contains a promise, but either because more often it is ordered to confirming that, or because, even with any pact excluded, it is equivalent to a promise, insofar as it induces the obligation of carrying out the sworn proposal.

2nd. Solemn or simple, according as it is made in the form required by law, and with solemn ceremonies, or with these excluded.

3rd. Explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed in testimony in which divine attributes specially shine forth.

4th. Attestatory or execratory or imprecatory, according as the one swearing invokes God only as witness, or also as avenger of perjury.

I Say 1st. For the essence of an oath two things are required, as is clear from its definition, namely, the intention of swearing, at least virtual, and some formula or sign by which it is sufficiently expressed that God is invoked as witness, either explicitly or implicitly through creatures, unless, however, the oath is directed to God alone. - I said 1st, unless, etc., because when an oath is directed to God alone, it can be wholly completed in the mind of the one swearing by interior words. - I said 2nd, some formula or sign, because an oath uttered among men must be considered both with regard to the law of nature alone and with regard also to positive law; in the first case any external sign suffices, in the other a certain formula of words or a certain rite can be required under pain of nullity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 134. Hence:

1st. A fictitious or merely external oath is not valid because of defect of intention; nevertheless one swearing thus sins, as is clear from proposition 25 proscribed by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "With cause it is licit to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light, or whether it is grave." But according to the more probable opinion, speaking of itself, only a venial sin is then committed, because nothing is uttered except a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God. Yet often this is mortal by reason of common or particular damage. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 17.

2nd. It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, by the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness. ... Let God be witness to me. ... I invoke God as witness. It is otherwise if someone should swear by creatures in which divine goodness or power does not specially shine forth, for example, by the beard, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 134 and following.

3rd. It is not an oath to say: God knows. ... I speak before God, etc., if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists ... as I exist ... as I am in this place ... on the faith of a good man ... by my faith ... by conscience ... may I die ... or may the devil destroy me, if it is not so. Indeed, according to St. Alphonsus, it is not an oath to say: I swear, or I swear that it is so, unless a question about taking an oath has preceded. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

I Say 2nd. For the liceity of an oath, however, three conditions are required according to that saying of Jeremiah, iv, 2: "Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice." - And so there is required, 1st, truth, namely conformity of the assertion with the intention and knowledge of the one swearing, and therefore a lie is excluded, but not error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath, the existence of the intention. There is required, 2nd, judgment, that is, that it be made with discretion, prudence, and reverence, and not without grave cause, of which sort would be peace to be confirmed in families, or greater security in contracts, etc. There is required, 3rd, justice, that is, that the oath be concerning a thing or promise, proposal, or assertion that is licit and honorable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 144; and Hom. Ap., n. 14.

§ 2. An oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be taken through a procurator (Can. 1316).

Question 1. What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, judgment, and justice?

Response to the 1st. It is always mortal even in light matter; because to bring God forward as witness of falsity is to will to destroy his truthfulness. This is also clear from proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "To call God as witness of a light lie is not so great an irreverence that on account of it he would wish or could condemn a man." Yet this does not prevent someone from being able to swear with moral certainty alone of the truth, or with a restriction that is not purely mental. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., nn. 14 and 15.

Response to the 2nd. It is venial of itself, that is, with the danger of perjury excluded, because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God.

Response to the 3rd. Certainly it is mortal in a promissory oath, if it concerns perpetrating a grave sin, because it savors of grave irreverence to invoke God as guarantor of some grave iniquity. Indeed, according to St. Alphonsus it would be mortal also if it concerned committing only a venial sin; but Suarez with others denies this, because then, they say, the irreverence would be light by its nature. - Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tract. 5, lib. 3, chap. 19, n. 3. - Baller., note (a), p. 307.

But in an assertory oath, more probably it is only venial of itself, because the oath of itself falls upon the assertion, not as evil, but as true. Thus he who boasts under oath about fornication committed, although by this boasting he sins lethally, nevertheless by virtue of the oath does not of itself confirm the boasting, but only the truth of the fornication. Except, unless the oath is assumed as an instrument or means of sinning, for example, to confirm detraction. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 146.

Question 2. What must be said concerning an oath of observing the American Constitution?

Response. It is altogether licit, for Kenrick says: "The oath to observe the Constitution, which American citizens emit, must be understood in the popular sense, namely, the one which is received among all; nor is each one judged to embrace with the judgment of his mind whatever things are contained in it, but he promises obedience to magistrates and to laws according to the tenor of the Constitution. The things which are handed down concerning liberty of opinions and of worship, concerning the right of divorce, and concerning whatever other matters, do not necessarily demand the assent of the mind; but one is held to obey, and to help that the laws be entrusted to execution, always with the right and law of God preserved." - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 68.

Question 3. Is it licit for foreigners who have emitted an oath of fidelity in their own fatherland to immigrate here, and to bind themselves by a new oath for obtaining civil rights?

Response. Affirmatively, for the obligation of an oath of fidelity is to be understood according to the natural obligation of remaining in one's fatherland, which does not subsist whenever a fair cause of utility is given for acquiring a new fatherland without detriment to the former one. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 5, n. 19.

Question 4. Is it licit among us to swear by kissing Protestant Bibles?

Response. Negatively, as it seems, because such an act is of itself approbative of that book and besides could give rise to scandal. Nor should you say that it is difficult to act otherwise, for a Catholic version is usually given to the one asking, or he who is about to swear is even permitted to bring it with him.

NOTE. Concerning oaths of preserving a secret, which are accustomed to be made among societies of workers, it will be said where secret societies are treated in the tract on censures.

I Say 1st. Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of fidelity or even of justice, also induces an obligation of religion; but it in no way obliges if it is concerning an illicit or plainly useless thing. The reason of the first is that, when a new bond imposed by a different virtue has been added, a new obligation ought to arise. But the reason of the second is that an oath, as an act of religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing; nor does that oath afterward revive, even if the thing ceases to be idle or illicit, for according to the rule of law 18, in 6: "What does not subsist in law from the beginning is not made firm by the passage of time." - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 307.

§ 1. He who freely swears that he will do something is held by a peculiar obligation of religion to fulfill what he has confirmed by oath (Can. 1317).

I Say 2nd. The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly, and it follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, and all its conditions. The reason of the first is that one swearing is judged to have wished to oblige himself as little as he could; but the reason of the second is that an oath does not change the nature of the act, but superadds to it only the obligation of religion, and therefore ought to have the same conditions. - Besides, the obligation of an oath is to be interpreted according to the tacit conditions included or understood in it, which are: 1st, if I can without grave damage; 2nd, if the thing shall not have been notably changed; 3rd, if the rights or will of a superior do not stand in the way; 4th, if the other has kept reciprocal faith; 5th, unless the other yields concerning his right. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 180.

§ 3. An oath taken neither by force nor by fraud, by which someone renounces a private good or favor granted to him by law, must be observed whenever it does not incline to the detriment of eternal salvation (Can. 1317).

I Say 3rd. § 1. A promissory oath follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added.

§ 2. If an oath is added to an act directly tending to the damage of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act obtains no firmness from it (Can. 1318).

I Say 4th. An oath is to be interpreted strictly according to the law and according to the intention of the one swearing, or, if he acts by fraud, according to the intention of him to whom it is sworn (Can. 1321).

Question 1. Is there smallness of matter in the transgression of a promissory oath?

Response. Affirmatively, probably. For in a promissory oath two things are to be distinguished, namely the actual truth of the promise, or of the intention of carrying out the promise, and the future execution itself of the promise. Now God is indeed invoked as witness of the truth of the intention; but as regards the execution itself, he is brought forward only as guarantor, or as a person furnishing authority to the obligation which arises from the promise made before him and otherwise valid, just as a prince by his authority renders pacts contracted before him firmer. But since we now suppose that the intention of fulfilling the sworn promise was sincere, the malice of this transgression is to be measured not from injury toward the truthfulness of God, but only from irreverence inflicted upon his authority. But since this is not direct and formal, nor greater - indeed according to St. Thomas less - than that which is had in the transgression of a vow, it follows that smallness of matter can exist in the transgression of a promissory oath. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 173; and Hom. Ap., n. 13. Baller., note (a), p. 308.

Question 2. Does a promissory oath emitted through error or fraud oblige?

Response. Negatively, if the error or fraud concerns the substance of the thing, because then a simple contract would be invalid; but if it affects only accidental circumstances, one must subdistinguish: it indeed obliges in onerous contracts, but not in gratuitous ones, at least probably, if the circumstances, although accidental, are nevertheless such that if they had been foreseen from the beginning, they would have deterred one from both the promise and the oath. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 175. - Baller., note (b), p. 308.

Question 3. Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear oblige?

Response. § 2. An oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior (Can. 1317).

Question 4. In what way does the obligation of an oath cease?

Response. The obligation induced by a promissory oath ceases:

1st. If it is remitted by him for whose advantage the oath had been emitted;

2nd. If the sworn thing is changed substantially, or, the circumstances having been changed, becomes either evil or altogether indifferent, or finally impedes a greater good;

3rd. If the final cause or condition under which perhaps the oath was given is lacking;

4th. By irritation, dispensation, commutation, according to the norm of can. 1320 (Can. 1319).

Question 5. Can he who has a delegated faculty of dispensing in vows also dispense in oaths?

Response. Affirmatively. Those who can irritate, dispense, or commute a vow have the same power and by the same reason concerning a promissory oath; but if the dispensation of the oath inclines to the prejudice of others who refuse to remit the obligation, only the Apostolic See can dispense the oath on account of necessity or the utility of the Church (Can. 1320).

A vow is a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. - It is distinguished in four ways, namely:

§ 1. A vow is public, if it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise private.

§ 2. Solemn, if it has been recognized as such by the Church; otherwise simple.

§ 3. Reserved, the dispensation of which only the Apostolic See can grant.

§ 4. Personal, by which the action of the one vowing is promised; real, by which some thing is promised; mixed, which participates in the nature of the personal and the real (Can. 1308).

The conditions required for the validity of a vow are contained in the very definition of a vow, and there are two principal ones, namely, true intention and suitable matter. Wherefore:

I Say 1st. For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise of itself suitable to inducing an obligation; for a vow is like a certain law, which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. Hence a vow essentially differs from a proposal, because a proposal, however firm, does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is omission of the thing proposed a sin, except perhaps sometimes by accident, for example, on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 196 and following.

I Say 2nd. The matter of a vow ought to be not only morally possible, but also morally good, indeed better than its opposite. The reason of the first is that no one can oblige himself to something morally impossible to him; and the reason of the second is that God is not worshiped by an action whose placing is not better than omission. But a better good is here understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to circumstances. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 202.

I Say 3rd. § 1. A vow, that is, a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good, must be fulfilled from the virtue of religion.

§ 2. Unless they are prohibited by law, all possessing suitable use of reason are capable of a vow (Can. 1307).

Question 1. How great ought deliberation to be in emitting a vow?

Response. It is commonly taught by theologians that the deliberation which suffices for mortal sin suffices for a vow. But this is indeed so if in each case the relation of the deliberating mind to the object is considered; but if attention is given to the fact that it is more difficult to deliberate about some obligation to be assumed than about the violation of some law, it must be said that greater discretion of judgment or deliberation is required for emitting a vow than for perpetrating mortal sin. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 313.

Question 2. Is a vow valid which has been made with inadvertence to an obligation already known?

Response. Affirmatively, if he who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although actually he does not attend to it; or also if he who vows, even if he does not know the obligation clearly, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly and wills it implicitly, while, for example, he wills to vow this or that, as others are accustomed to vow. - Nevertheless it must generally be held that no greater obligation is induced beyond that which someone wills to impose upon himself and has apprehended. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

Question 3. Is a vow emitted from error valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the error regards accidental circumstances of lesser moment; for he who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergoing merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. But one must answer otherwise if the error concerns the substance of the thing, or accidental circumstances indeed, but which are principally intended, or notably change the substance itself, or are of such a nature that, if they had been known, the vow would not have been emitted; for then the promised thing could not be said to be sufficiently known and willed. - Nevertheless vows emitted after the novitiate in any approved order must always be excepted; for these are not invalid except by error properly and strictly substantial. The reason is that otherwise they would not be sufficiently accommodated to the firmness which is essential to the religious state. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 198. - Lugo, de jure et just., disp. 22, n. 88. - Baller., note (b), p. 314, and note (a), p. 315.

Question 4. Is a vow made through fear valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the fear, however grave, provided it does not remove the use of reason, arises from within, or from a necessary extrinsic cause; for those things which are done from fear are simply voluntary. But can. 1307, § 3, says that a vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself. The reason is that the law of nature, which demands that an injured right be restored in its entirety, dictates that what is extorted from someone through injury cannot be acceptable to God. It is also clear from canon law as regards solemn vows of Religion, and more probably also as regards other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians. - I said if it is grave; for light fear never invalidates a vow, at least for the external forum. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 197. - Baller., note (b), p. 315.

Question 5. Is he who doubts whether he emitted a vow or a mere proposal held by the vow?

Response. Negatively, as is clear from what has been said concerning probabilism. Nevertheless it must be noted that if he who thus doubts believed, in promising, that he would sin if perhaps he did not carry out the proposed thing, it can be judged that he truly vowed. I say can, and not ought, because simple people who propose before a priest to recite some pious prayers at their proper time, or never to drink a certain kind of liquor, surely think that they would sin if afterward they violated that promise, and yet it is certain that they emit no vow. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 316.

Question 6. Is a vow not to sin valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the vow regards all mortal sins or fully deliberate venial sins, or sins of a certain kind, for example, a vow never to lie. But a vow of avoiding all sins, even the very lightest, would not be valid, because without a special privilege this is impossible. Cf. Mazzella, de Gratia, disp. 2, art. 5.

Question 7. Is a vow concerning matter already commanded from elsewhere valid?

Response. Affirmatively, both because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obliged by different titles, and because a vow of this kind concerns a thing good in itself, otherwise it could not have been commanded; it is also concerning a better good, since the new bond can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 203.

Question 8. Is a vow of a good thing with an evil end or an evil condition valid?

Response to the 1st. Negatively, if the evil end holds itself on the side of the thing vowed, for example, if you vow alms in order to obtain the successful outcome of a theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as if God were bringing help for sinning. - But one must answer otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accidentally accompanies the vow, and the evil end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself entirely on the side of the one vowing, for example, if someone, vowing for the glory of God, afterward from vain ostentation more willingly vows externally. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 206.

Response to the 2nd. Affirmatively, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, even if joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not to be harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more, however, is this valid if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition; as if someone vows alms, if and as often as he blasphemes. - Cf. Laymann, lib. 4, tract. 5, chap. 2, n. 7.

I Say. The obligation of a vow is always light in light matter; but in grave matter it is light or grave according to the intention of the one vowing. The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 211 and 213; and de Legibus, n. 143.

Question 1. Can someone be bound by another's vow?

Response. Negatively, at least by reason of the vow; because a vow does not oblige, by reason of itself, except the one emitting it (Can. 1310, § 1), and therefore no one can promise the thing or action of another. - Hence vows of parents devoting children to some Religion, or imposing upon them an obligation, for example, of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. Yet the parents are bound to this, that as much as is in them, with the liberty of the children preserved, they opportunely move them to embrace that which they had vowed for them, and much more that they not stand in the way if the children wish to embrace it. - § 2. The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, likewise the obligation of a mixed vow for the part by which it is real (Can. 1310); and from obedience at least, which transfers the obligation to the genus of the virtue with a view to which it is induced, subjects are held, both those who now live and those who in the future will become members of the community, to fulfill vows emitted in their name by a civil magistrate, with the Bishop assenting, or by religious superiors. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 213 and 216. - Baller., note (a), p. 320.

Question 2. What delay is to be judged grave in fulfilling a vow which indeed obliges gravely, but which has not been fixed to a determinate time?

Response. If the vow is for the perpetual service of God, say, of entering Religion, of serving the infirm through one's whole life, etc., it seems probable that its fulfillment can be deferred for two or three years without grave fault, especially if there is a just cause, and the age of the one vowing is not advanced. But if the vow has been emitted for a temporary service of God, as would be a vow of so many fasts, pilgrimages, etc., then, excluding the case in which by the delay the danger is induced of never fulfilling the vow, it seems probable that any delay whatever does not reach mortal sin. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 321.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Real vows are to be discharged from one's own property; but he who cannot discharge them from his own property is not held to beg from another so that he can satisfy them. Nevertheless he satisfies if another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to discharge for him, although he himself could satisfy; because what the other gives, with the consent or ratification of the one vowing being added, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow has been determined; for then that very thing in particular must be given out. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 217.

2nd. A vow indeterminate as to cessation of time, for example, concerning a daily rosary, or a fast to be made every Saturday, obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. In doubt whether the vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or year, the minimum is to be held. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 221.

3rd. He who has vowed to hear Mass for a month or year is more probably not held on feasts to hear two Masses, unless he has explicitly vowed this; because the end of the vow is that on individual days he should gather the fruit of the sacrifice. Likewise he is not held to fast on Sunday who has vowed to fast for a month, a year, or his whole life, unless he has expressly obliged himself to this; because he is judged to vow fasting according to the custom of the Church. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 224.

4th. He who has vowed a fast on the vigil of some Saint, if this falls on a Sunday, can fulfill the vow on Saturday, according to the custom of the Church. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

A vow ceases by lapse of the time appointed for ending the obligation, by substantial change of the matter promised, by failure of the condition on which the vow depends or of its final cause, by irritation, dispensation, commutation (Can. 1311).

Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him to whose power the will of the one vowing or the matter of the vow is subject. But it is called direct, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow. In the former case the vow is altogether annulled; but in the latter only its obligation is suspended.

I Say 1st. § 1. He who legitimately exercises dominative power over the will of the one vowing can validly, and from a just cause also licitly, render his vows invalid, so that in no case does the obligation afterward revive (Can. 1312). The reason is taken from the right which the superior then has of directing their will, and consequently of preventing them from taking up a new obligation. Hence particular vows of Regulars and Nuns can be irritated: 1st, by the Supreme Pontiff as supreme Prelate of all Regulars; 2nd, by superiors, even women, of the Order or house; 3rd, by the proper Bishop, if the Orders are not exempt from his jurisdiction. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 227.

I Say 2nd. § 2. He who has power not indeed over the will of the one vowing, but over the matter of the vow, can suspend the obligation of the vow as long as fulfillment of the vow brings prejudice to him (Can. 1312); because each one has a right not to be injured in things subject to his dominion. Hence:

1st. A husband can irritate the vows of a wife which prejudice conjugal right, the education of children, or the governance of the house.

2nd. A wife can irritate the vows of a husband which injure the rights of marriage, such as a vow of chastity, of a long pilgrimage, of putting on the habit of a hermit, etc.

3rd. A master can irritate or suspend the vows of servants which impede or lessen the service owed, such as a vow of hearing Mass daily. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 241 and following.

Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended as long as the one vowing has remained in religion (Can. 1315).

Question 1. Can a father directly irritate all the vows of children?

Response. Affirmatively, if the children are impubescent, as is clear from canon law, C. Puella, causa 20, q. 2, c. 2, determining natural law. Indeed not only can the vows of the impubescent be directly irritated by the father, but also, in default of the father, by the paternal grandfather, by a tutor, and, these being lacking, by the mother; indeed also, at least probably, by the mother when the father or tutor is present and yet does not contradict. - But if the children are pubescent, it will also be answered affirmatively if it is a question of vows emitted before puberty, and they still remain under paternal power. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 229, 230 and 238.

Question 2. Can a husband irritate all the vows of his wife?

Response. It is controverted; for some deny it, and say that a husband can only indirectly irritate those vows which stand in the way of his rights; but others with St. Alphonsus attribute to the husband the right also of irritating directly vows emitted during matrimony, because, as the Apostle says, Ephes. v, 22 and 23: "let women be subject to their husbands ... because the man is the head of the woman." - From this it follows that spouses who by mutual consent have emitted a vow of continence can again use matrimony, if the husband first directly irritates the vow of the wife, and she afterward, having recovered the right of petitioning what is due, indirectly irritates the vow of the husband. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 234. - Baller., note (b), p. 326.

Question 3. Can irritation be made without cause?

Response. Affirmatively, as regards validity, because an owner validly disposes of his own thing even without cause. Indeed also as regards liceity, speaking of itself, or by reason of the irritation itself; for the vows of subjects are emitted under the condition of the consent of the superior, which the superior of himself is not held to give. But by accident, or by reason of circumstances, some fault will rarely be absent, either because the act is imprudent or because the spiritual progress of the subject is irrationally impeded, etc. Yet this of itself, with an evil affection or grave harm of the subject excluded, scarcely exceeds venial sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 228. - Baller., note (a), p. 328.

Question 4. Can a superior irritate vows ratified by himself?

Response. Affirmatively, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. But on the other hand, if the superior who once irritated the vow of a subject later repents, the vow is not for that reason revalidated. The reason is that by direct irritation a vow is extinguished; but that something extinguished may revive, the repentance of the superior who irritated does not avail, but the will of the subject who again obliges himself by a vow is required. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 239. - Baller., note (b), p. 326, and note (a), p. 327.

Dispensation of a vow is its absolute condonation, made in the name of God by a legitimate superior.

MALEDICTION is defined by St. Bonaventure in the Declaratory Dictionary of Theological Terms: To curse is for anyone to wish that blows or punishments be impressed upon someone by word. So also St. Thomas.

St. Thomas, art. 1. Filliuc, Tract. 40, cap. 5, num. 146. Fagundez, l. 8, cap. 12, num. 18, and others cited by him, define cursing as: An imprecation of evil, under the aspect of evil, and they add that a curse can be made either imperatively or optatively; but I do not see that they can exercise a proper command unless they order someone killed or struck, which is not to curse.

THEY SAY, further, that "an imprecation of evil, under the aspect of evil," is added to the definition because someone can imprecate evil under the aspect of good, as when someone is justly punished for a fault.

THEY ADD that to curse with the mouth only is only a material cursing, such as certain Fathers usually commit, and who therefore do not sin gravely. So in Bassaeus, v. maledictio.

I ASSUME here that if we imprecate evil out of justice, it is not a sin. Thus Noah in Genesis 9 cursed his grandson; Genesis 27, Isaac: Let him that curseth thee be cursed. Genesis 49, Jacob against Simeon and Levi: Cursed be their fury. In Deuteronomy 27 Moses heaps up many curses against sinners. Joshua imprecated a curse on those who would rebuild Jericho, cap. 6; 4 Kings 2, Eliseus cursed the mocking boys.

THIS IS PROVED from St. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Pharetra, from the Fathers, from St. Gregory, l. 4, Moral., cap. 6: A curse is uttered one way under the pretext of justice, another through the rancor of vengeance: when holy men pronounce a sentence of cursing, it bursts from them not from a desire of revenge, but from the justice of judgment. Therefore Gregory of Valencia, in the place cited, warns sons to fear the curses of their parents when they are just; but those who curse without cause sin most grievously.

MOREOVER, cursing is of itself a mortal sin.

THIS IS PROVED first from St. Bonaventure, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 1, §. Item solium discordiae, and l. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 3, §. 1, according to the exposition of Sts. Augustine, de conflictu vitiorum, cap. 9, and Gregory, l. 3, Dial. cap. 15, from that first verse to the Corinthians 6: Nor shall cursers possess the kingdom of God.

IT IS PROVED secondly from St. Bonaventure in the Pharetra, from the Fathers, from St. Gregory, l. 22, Mor. cap. 6: They who assail an enemy with curses, what else do they wish God to do to him than what they themselves either cannot do, or blush to do? And in the Register, book 2, index 10, cap. 34, to a certain Archbishop: You show nothing of thinking on heavenly things, but you signify that you have an earthly thought: while for your own vengeance for an injury — which the sacred rules forbid — you have invaded with the curse of anathema. And lib. 3, Dial. cap. 15, on the Apostle's words: Nor shall cursers possess the kingdom of God. Consider how great is the guilt that separates from the kingdom of heavenly life.

ST. AUGUSTINE, lib. de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum, cap. 9: What is to be said of those who, in the fury of blindness, burst forth even into words of cursing, except what the Apostle says: Nor shall cursers possess the kingdom of God?

And in Proverbs 26: A curse uttered in vain against anyone shall come upon the one who utters it, where the Interlinear gloss has: Upon the one who utters it.

NEVERTHELESS (as the Holy Doctor says above) the word of a curse can be venial, either because of the smallness of the evil desired, or because the words are spoken in jest, or by surprise, or out of zeal for justice, or without a wicked affection. And in this way St. Augustine, sermon 41 on the Saints, indicates it is venial.

SOME DOUBT: whether it is lawful to imprecate an evil upon someone for a right end, that is, sickness upon a sinner, so that he may repent.

SOME DENY it, because what is not lawful to do is not lawful to desire.

THE TRUER opinion is affirmative. So St. Thomas, quaest. 76, art. 7; Sotus, l. 5, quaest. 12, art. 1; Filliuc, tomo 2, tract. 40, cap. 5, numer. 149; Fagundez, lib. 8, cap. 22, num. 21. The reason is that the end is more important, and therefore a good is wished to him when some penalty, ordered to a good end, is wished. And what is lawful to desire is lawful to pray for, as Bass. 4 and Sanci. sel. disp. 2 and 6 say.

FINALLY THEY ASK: whether it is lawful to curse irrational creatures.

ST. BONAVENTURE ANSWERS, in his commentary on Psalm 39, universally that it is not lawful to curse these. He proves it from Romans 12: Bless, and curse not: and from that passage of 1 Corinthians 6 cited above.

THEY OBJECT that David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, 2 Kings 1.

IT IS ANSWERED with St. Bonaventure, de gradibus virtutum, cap. 16, that David was lamenting the ruin of Israel, and rather cursed the misfortune of the men. So also St. Thomas, quaest. 76, article two.

THEY OBJECT secondly that Job cursed the day of his birth and the night of his conception.

ST. BONAVENTURE ANSWERS, in the Mirror of the Blessed Virgin, lecture eleven, that Job cursed the night of his conception not as it was a day or night, but as it was stained in it by original sin. So Fagundez also answers, lib. 8, cap. 13, number 24.

GREGORY OF VALENCIA ANSWERS, quaest. 19, p. 2, that the curses of things read in Scripture cannot be referred to things that are not capable of evil in order to the free attainment of the supernatural end, but only to the men themselves, as at Job 3 and 2 Kings 1 cited above; Matthew 21: Never shall fruit come forth from thee henceforward; Genesis 3: Cursed is the earth in thy work.

THEREFORE, says Tannetus, number 157, curses upon irrational creatures, as rustics do, are idle words; but to curse them as they are creatures of God is blasphemy, just as it is to curse the Saints insofar as God dwells in them. But to curse them as they are someone's goods is the same sin as cursing the Lords themselves: so also Bassaeus, num. 5.

AGAIN, to curse creatures as they are related to human goods — for example, to curse the day on which one was born, because you wish he had never been born, as if he had been born unto evil — is a mortal sin; but to curse them as they are referred to evils, for example the day of one's birth because of the evils that followed from it, provided that this does not contradict the ordination of the absolute will of God, is not a sin, says Tanner, number 158; and thus Job cursed his day, cap. 3, and David the mountains of Gelboe, 2 Kings 1, as St. Thomas also teaches, quaestion 76, artic. 2, and Cajetan, on the word maledictum.

FURTHER, a curse does not belong to one single genus of sin; for if anyone wishes an evil to be inflicted on another not by an unjust way but through God, or the elements, or other creatures, without injustice, it will belong to the order of charity and will be opposed to charity, as St. Thomas indicates, quaest. 76, art. 3. But if he wishes evils of this kind to be inflicted unjustly, for instance by homicide, etc., then it is opposed to justice. See Tanner, number 159.

SOME TREAT here of Suspicion and Rash Judgment, of which we treated in disput. 23, quaest. 7; therefore nothing now occurs to be said of these, except what the Doctors assign as the rule for discerning one from the other, namely when you judge an evil of your neighbor with near certainty and the firmness of a judgment upon slight conjectures, so that if someone publicly questioned you about it, you would affirm the same.

OTHERS ADD that you would not fear to confirm it even by oath; and then indeed the sin is grave, against love of neighbor, who always stands in possession of his good character until he loses it by so open a prostitution that he cannot sustain it by any evasion. Understand this, however, of that neighbor who is of so entire a good reputation as to be commonly so regarded. For to judge of a soldier who is used to spending his time over cups that he is drunk, when he leaves the tavern with a flushed face, will not be a sin so grave, even if in fact he is not tipsy.

IF, HOWEVER, the Judgment falls away from this firmness of asserting; then it will be only suspicion, which is for the most part venial, unless it happens concerning a very honorable person; as if you suspected theft or adultery of a man of noted sanctity because you saw him leaving the house where these were committed; for then upon a slight conjecture you inflict a grave injury on him. The Doctors are accustomed to interpose always: Upon slight conjectures; for if you formed a judgment of anyone with such evidence of reason that no defense to the contrary could be offered, then he is not judged rashly, nor consequently is there sin. Yet since judgments of this kind are accustomed to burst forth from some depraved affection or passion, one must strenuously guard lest anyone indulge himself too much while judging.

RELIGION is the Golden Chain by which we are bound to God; and the Vow is the knot of this chain, by which we are bound more tightly to Him. For man is of so unstable and wandering a nature that, straying continually from his Creator, he is compelled not only by scourges and many blows to return, but, once returned, is restrained by chains and knots, so that he may depart no more; yet of his own accord, and with his own execution of it, he submits his neck willingly to his own bonds. Heretics, coveting a detestable liberty of wandering, detest these chains, which they hold so suspect that they do not even strive to draw near to God by them; hence, vagabonds, running outside the Church, they cast against us revilings and the empty darts of petty reasonings; these I shall blunt below, treating of solemn Vows; here, however, before I come to the quiddity and conditions of the Vow in general, I shall first set out the solution of certain arguments by which not so much sectarians as men of more easy judgment, in the name indeed of Christian, dissuade from vowing, thinking it to be the condition of slaves, and equal for Christians; so that, just as they [slaves] cannot validly confer on their Masters the dominion of any thing or the promise of obedience, since they are wholly His with their goods and services, so man, however free, is wholly God's, who, as he can abdicate nothing from himself, so can acquire nothing anew: Moreover, if the vow is a bond of obligation by which we are held to give something to God which we have not before given, we owe all things to God by a better right, both by force of that precept by which we are held to love Him with the whole heart, and by reason of so many benefits with which He is wont to heap us daily; In addition, the Evangelical law proclaims that we are free sons, not to be pressed down by the necessity of vows: These, like scarecrows of birds, are easily driven away; for who does not know that, although God absolutely disposes of us and ours at His pleasure, He nevertheless leaves to us that dominion over our acts and things by which we can freely use or abuse them, for His glory or our own ruin; whence although He be the universal Lord of all things, He does not therefore exclude the particular dominion founded in the liberty of each; And although the servant is wholly his Lord's, he nevertheless possesses the natural liberty by which he can devote or deny his fidelity to him: Nor does the precept of Divine love so press, that for its execution we must do all whatsoever things are possible of doing: But suppose it were so; it is not incompossible with the Vow that a thing otherwise precepted be taken up into its object, as we shall demonstrate in its own place: Nor will anyone of even moderate mind deny that there are many acts in individuo which do not fall under a precept; for it befits a rational and free creature that, as it does certain things under another's command, so also it do some things of its own free and free-willed choice; which votive promise does not violate; partly because it is undertaken voluntarily; partly also because, once undertaken, it suffers no necessity other than that of the precept, which in no way opposes the liberty of the sons; since, in that very respect in which they are the just sons of God, they are of necessity subject to the precepts of loving, honoring, obeying God and the like. And let these things have been said even of simple vows: But from solemn Vows (of which there will be question in the following disputation) how great a profit and increase the Church of God has always reaped from the very beginning of her existence, who even half-blind would not see? And although in our own tempestuous age many keep watch over the censured manners of Monks with Vigilantius; yet no one solicitous even in the least degree for his own salvation will deny that the eminence of the Religious state is such that, while the Monastic life is assaulted with chaff, the secular life meanwhile is crushed under beams: and however much worldly men trust in their own strength, there can be set against them that saying of Augustine, reported by D. Bonavent. Apolog. paup. resp. 1. cap. 2.: Slippery is the hope by which, amid the fomentations of sinners, he hopes to be saved; uncertain the victory to fight amid hostile arms, and impossible the deliverance to be surrounded by flames and not to burn; and that I may speak with Saint Jerome, contra vigilantium epist. 53.: There is no security in sleeping near a serpent, nor is it necessary to dismiss what is certain and pursue what is uncertain; for if I flee, I have escaped the sword; if I stand, I must either conquer or fall. Add the Scriptures, which counsel to sell or to destroy all the emoluments of this world; as the Seraphic Doctor shows most fully everywhere in his works. But this matter, inasmuch as it is sufficiently copious, we shall better cut into several disputations and questions.

BEFORE I assign the Definitions and Conditions of the Vow, I shall note something of its name; for it is taken in various ways in Sacred Scripture; for not rarely it is used for a good purpose, or pious desire, in which sense Exodus 36: Every morning the people offered their vows. So also in Proverb. 31 it is said: What, my beloved, of my vows, that is, of my desires, as Suarez notes tract. de voto in proaemio; likewise when in the Mass it is said: and to you they render their vows; for in every Mass we do not always fulfill some promise from the obligation of a vow: It is also often taken for a spontaneous promise, inducing an obligation, as num. 13. Psal. 49. Psal. 65. and Eccles. 5, in which places there is frequent mention of rendering the vow; because it obliges the one vowing; whence in the last-cited place we have: If you have vowed anything to God, you will be mindful to render it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him; this is the proper acceptance of the vow, now approved by very many writers: Sometimes also it is taken for the very thing which is either vowed or offered; as in Deuteronom. 12: You shall offer Holocausts, vows, and gifts; this too is not unusual in other words, that the matter about which the action is concerned transfers to itself the denomination of the action, and conversely, as is clear: these things having been premised, let us come to the rest.

A VOW is a promise made to God concerning a better good. So D. Thomas, D. Bonaventure, and the others commonly. D. Bonaventure hands down another definition of a vow by way of the argument "sed contra": A vow is a conception of a better good, confirmed by deliberation of the mind.

The Socratic Doctor brings forward another definition, 3rd part, Centilog., section 55, from Hugh of St. Victor, book 2, part 12, chapter 3: It is the testimony of a promise made spontaneously, which ought to be made to God, and concerning things that pertain to God.

For deriving the essence of a vow from this, know from D. Bonaventure in the body of the text, and D. Thomas, article 1, that a promise properly so called is that by which we promise something to men, which therefore requires that it be made in a human manner, by words or by signs; and thus he says that by the first definition is defined a Solemn Vow, which is made in the face of the Church.

For the latter indicates a Vow according to externals: but by the second definition he says that the essence of a Vow is handed over simply before God. Sanchez adds, however, that the promise extends also to an internal pledge made to God. In which sense, in the definition of every vow, a Vow is called a Promise.

Next observe from D. Bonaventure that this pledge must be made to God; for it is an act of religion, by which we render to God what is owed, as to the giver of all things, either for giving thanks for things received, or for obtaining benefits.

The object of a Vow is said to be not only a good, but a better one, namely, it must be better than its opposite, that is, of greater virtue, as Sanchez notes De voto, cap. 1, and Azorius, book 11, Inst. cap. 14, n. 10.

But since this pledge must be morally good, it is necessary that it be voluntary, for which is required first deliberation, which is an action of the intellect and a full knowledge of the object. Second, proposal, which is confirmed freely from the knowledge of the object. Third, promise added to consent, as D. Bonaventure notes ad 1, and Sanchez loc. cit., Tanner, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1, with D. Thomas, art. 1 and 2 in corpore, and art. 5 ad 3, with whom all agree.

As regards the first condition, deliberation, and its necessity for a vow, the question is: whether every deliberation sufficient to avoid mortal sin suffices, or whether there is required such deliberation as has weighed all the circumstances of the matter.

Some think that the prior deliberation which proceeds from the heat of passion, anger, or love does not suffice, but that a perfect one is required, which can be proved from c. si quis iratus, 2. quaest. 4, and the rule Quidquid calore, 48. ff. de regulis iuris and l. 3. ff. de divortiis: whence is also drawn what kind of pledge ought to be in marriage. So the Gloss on c. dudum, verb. calore, and there Hostiensis on the same word; Antoninus, c. sicut ex litteris de iureiurando, n. 9; Panormitanus on d. c. dudum, num. 8, and c. sicut ex litteris, num. 2, and c. si vero, num. 7 de iureiurando; Romanus, singulari 508; Tiraquellus, de poenis temperandis, causa 1, num. 26; and among the Theologians, Richard in 4, dist. 38, art. 2, quaest. 2.

The opposite opinion, however, is that deliberation suffices which suffices even for committing a mortal sin. So Navarrus, summa Latina, cap. 18, num. 7; Molina, T. 1, de iustitia, tract. 2, disp. 267, where they teach this generally in every promise made to a man; but concerning a vow and an oath, John Andreas teaches it, c. dudum, n. 10, de consecr., d. 5, ubi Antoninus n. 25, Cardinalis n. 2, oppositione 5; Ancharanus n. 10; Alexander de Nevo, c. sicut ex litt. de iureiurando, n. 18, where Imola at the end, Faelinus num. 3 and 4.

I. Various definitions of blasphemy are given by the Doctors, all of which nonetheless amount to the same thing, and convey the same sense. St. Augustine (Bk. II, Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, ch. 11) gives an extended discourse on blasphemy, and describes it in these words: "What, then, is blasphemy, but when evil things are said of things good? Now blasphemy is commonly understood as nothing other than to speak evil of God." St. Thomas (II-II, q. 13, art. 1) defines it more precisely: Blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. This can occur in two ways. First, by attributing to God what he neither has, nor could have. Second, by removing from him what he cannot lack. This can occur either by the intellect alone, or accompanied also by a depraved affection of the will. If it remains in the heart alone, it will be blasphemy of the heart; if it breaks out into words, it will be blasphemy of the mouth. When this wickedness is conceived only in the mind, by attributing to, or removing from, God something in the manner described, it is opposed to unformed confession of faith; if a wicked affection of the heart is added, it is opposed to faith formed by charity.

II. It should be noted, following Cajetan's commentary on this article, that derogation of the divine goodness can occur in three ways. First, by the intellect alone, holding a false opinion about God. Second, by adding to this false opinion the will's detestation. Third, finally, without a false opinion, exercising the will's detestation alone — as most often happens among Christians, whether the blasphemy remains internal, or breaks out into external words. For someone, believing God to be omnipotent, can nonetheless wish to say, in order to insult God, that God cannot do this or that. Finally, the sin of unbelief is opposed to faith; but blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, not to faith by its very nature. Blasphemy, properly speaking, consists in words. As for what St. Paul says (Titus 1): "They confess that they know God, but in their works they deny him," and St. Peter (2 Peter 2): "By whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of," these do not express blasphemy properly so called.

III. The common division of blasphemy is into heretical and simple. Heretical blasphemy is that whereby, with the mind's assent, something is attributed to God, or something proper to him is removed from him — as, for instance, if someone blurts out that God is unjust, or that he is not omnipotent. Simple blasphemy is that whereby, without the mind's assent, but only through the perversity of the will, something is attributed to, or imprecated against, God — as if someone says, "Cursed be God." Theologians commonly teach that heretical blasphemy is committed when such propositions are asserted, and simple blasphemy when they are merely imprecated. But note that blasphemy would by no means be heretical unless the propositions "God is unjust," "God is a fool," and the like are asserted with pertinacity, and with the mind's actual assent. It scarcely happens, however, except through slip of the tongue, that such propositions are asserted without the mind's assent; the external forum, then, would condemn such a person as guilty of heresy — since judgment on internal matters is reserved to God alone.

IV. Blasphemy is further divided into that which is against God, and that which is against the Saints. The former is opposed immediately to God; the latter concerns the Saints. Moreover, blasphemy can be enunciative — as when someone says, "I wish to do this to injure God"; detestative — as if someone says, "May God perish"; derisive — as, "Ha, may the temple of God be destroyed"; and finally, injurious — as when someone blasphemes while swearing, "May God perish, if..."

V. Question I. Does blasphemy against God differ in species from that against the Saints? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 124) deny this, along with Sánchez, Azor, Bonacina, and others — citing in support Cajetan, Bañez, Diana, and others. Their reason is that blasphemy is a sin opposed to religion; and religion is one virtue. Therefore there is but one species of blasphemy. They confirm this by the parallel of an oath, which is of one species, whether one swears by God or by the Saints.

VI. The opposite opinion seems to me more probable. For although several vices may be opposed to a single virtue, they can nonetheless differ in species among themselves. Moreover, that the aforesaid two forms of blasphemy differ in species is proven from the very definition of blasphemy itself. For blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. But divine goodness is not univocal to God and to the Saints; rather, the goodness that is in God differs by more than mere kind from the goodness that is in the Saints. The former is infinite, the latter finite; the latter created, the former uncreated. Moreover, blasphemy is opposed to the honor and worship owed to the person against whom it is hurled. But the worship owed to God differs by more than species from the worship owed to any creature. The worship due to God is latria; the worship due to the Saints is dulia, and to the Blessed Virgin, hyperdulia. Now these forms of worship differ by more than mere species. Therefore so do the corresponding forms of blasphemy. Finally, the definition of blasphemy applies, per se and primarily, to the injury done to God, and only secondarily to that done to the other Saints. This is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, q. 9), Fr. Paolo Comitoli, Leander (tract. 1, q. 19), where he cites in support Aragón, Hurtado, and others.

VII. Fr. Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 4, Bk. 1, ch. 6, n. 19) most excellently adds that, whatever the case may be, this much is certainly true: that it must be explained in confession whether one's blasphemies were against God, against the Virgin, or against the Saints. This is likewise admitted by the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca, together with Sánchez, Bonacina, and others. Wherefore the excessive laxity of Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, who writes as follows (Bk. II, Method of Confession, ch. 3), cannot be tolerated: "Although it is more probable, with Suárez and Sánchez, that blasphemies against God, against the Blessed Virgin, and against the Saints differ in species, it being probable nonetheless, following Azor as cited in Diana, that they do not differ, it will suffice if the number of blasphemies is disclosed in confession; nor will it be necessary to explain... whether they were against God, or the Blessed Virgin, or the Saints."

I. Question I. Is blasphemy, by its very kind, a mortal sin? Response: The common opinion affirms this. Since blasphemy is opposed to the divine goodness, and to charity toward God. "Whatever," says the Angelic Doctor (II-II, q. 13, art. 2), "is repugnant to charity is, by its very kind, a mortal sin." But blasphemy, by its very kind, is repugnant to divine charity, since it derogates the divine goodness. St. Thomas confirms his view by the authority of Sacred Scripture: "Whoever shall blaspheme the name of the Lord, dying let him die" (Lev. 24). Now the penalty of death is not inflicted except for a mortal crime. Blasphemy, then, will never, on the side of its matter, be a venial sin — since this matter admits of no degree of smallness — though one blasphemy, within the genus of mortal crime, may be graver than another. St. Augustine (Bk. Against Lying, ch. 19) writes this of blasphemy: "It is worse to blaspheme than to perjure oneself; for in perjury, God is called falsely as witness to a matter; but in blaspheming, false things are said of God himself. And the more inexcusable is anyone, whether perjurer or blasphemer, the more they knew, or believe, that what they assert, in perjuring or blaspheming, is false."

II. St. John Chrysostom (Homily 95 on the Psalms): "Nothing is more impious than blasphemy against God" — and on the Apostle's words, "Use a little wine" (1 Tim. 5): "Nothing is worse than blasphemy; no good is equal to the act of thanksgiving." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 8, ch. 7): "Blasphemy," he says, "is a most grave sin." And the reason, following St. Thomas, is that blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, and therefore carries the gravity of unbelief — a gravity increased still further if the detestation of the will is added, and increased yet further if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through confession and love. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest of sins, so too is blasphemy. Hence the Gloss on Isaiah 18 says that every sin, compared to blasphemy, is lighter; and indeed, as regards the object of the sin, it is graver than homicide, since blasphemy is directly against God, while homicide is against one's neighbor.

III. Question II. Is blasphemy the greatest of all sins? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 121) deny that blasphemy is, by its very kind, the gravest of sins, and teach that it is lighter than heresy, hatred of God, and despair; and they contend that this is the common opinion of St. Thomas and of theologians. What ought, in my judgment, to be said on this, I will briefly explain.

IV. Perfect blasphemy, which involves an error of the intellect together with hatred, or detestation, of the divine goodness, is the greatest of all crimes — since, under this consideration, it is opposed both to faith and to charity, and is the proper sin of the damned. Blasphemy that arises from hatred of God, even without including the error of heresy, is opposed to charity, and is worse than heresy — since charity is a more perfect virtue than unformed faith. Finally, blasphemy, by its very kind, is graver than heresy itself. For although it does not involve a false assent of the intellect, it nonetheless involves a wicked will toward God, and includes unbelief, and increases it, as St. Thomas teaches (art. 3): "Blasphemy... has in it the gravity of unbelief; and the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added; and still more, if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through love and confession. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest sin, it follows that blasphemy too is the greatest sin, belonging to that same genus, and aggravating it." St. Thomas is speaking here of blasphemy according to its kind. This opinion is defended by St. Antoninus (loc. cit.), Navarrus (in his Summa, ch. 12, n. 51), Trovamala (s.v. Blasphemia, n. 4), Armilla (s.v. Blasphemia, n. 2), Comitoli (Bk. 4, q. 9, ch. 5).

V. Question III. Does one who blasphemes out of an inveterate custom and wicked habit sin? Response: The laxity of certain casuists on this question inspires horror. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini writes as follows (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 7, §4, n. 17): "Words against God uttered in drunkenness, or in madness, or through inadvertence arising from an inveterate custom, are not blasphemous in the least." He teaches the same in Bk. III, Method of Confession, ch. 3, §3, q. 22.

VI. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 1, on oaths, disp. 5, q. 17) copies out this exceedingly lax opinion of Tamburini's, and teaches it in these words: "When one blasphemes out of habit, without full and sufficient awareness of committing a mortal sin, he does not then commit a new mortal sin, but has sinned only in the cause, insofar as he did not remove the habit, to which he did pay attention." He cites, in support of this opinion, Bonacina, Filliucci, Toledo, Sánchez, Tamburini, and others.

VII. Question IV. Does one who blasphemes inadvertently, and who is so habitually disposed that even were he to notice, he would still blaspheme, sin mortally? Response: Hear Leander, declaring this probable with the utmost and most horrifying laxity: "New words must be found to express this unheard-of kind of doctrine. I answer that it is probable — indeed more than probable — that he does not sin mortally by an actual sin in this proposed case. For in order for someone to sin actually, and to commit a new sin, it does not suffice that he be habitually disposed, and prone, to sin; it is necessarily required that he be actually, and in a 'second act,' [conscious of it]; for God, as St. Augustine says against the Semipelagians, does not impute to us what we would do, if this or that occasion arose, but what we actually do. Otherwise, men given to lust or avarice, who, given the opportunity, would give their consent to these sins, would always be actually sinning — which is altogether false." He cites, for this lax opinion of his, Valentia, Sánchez, Filliucci, Layman, Trullench, and others. See our second Theological-Moral Letter, and the Decree of the Holy Office against the book of a certain young author, containing false and scandalous propositions — among which, in my own judgment, are those defending unchaste touches, and blasphemies uttered out of inveterate habit, as though lawful.

VIII. Who could read, or transcribe, such things without feeling a certain indignation rise within him? Are we at fault, if, to arouse a similar hatred against such teachings, we ourselves have been somewhat harsh and bitter in tone? Such things, indeed, deserve rejection more by detestation than by mere refutation. This author, to shield his own laxities, calls upon Augustine himself as his patron, and does not blush to foist upon so great a Doctor so monstrous an error. What has the Semipelagian heresy concerning conditional sins to do with this matter? Is this good faith, in citing the Fathers — neither the word, nor the place, indicated? Is the present discussion not about future conditional matters? Is not the question proposed rather about one who actually blasphemes inadvertently, out of habit? Does one who fornicates out of inadvertent lust go free of the guilt of fornication? What, then, does he mean by claiming it follows from this that a man given to lust is always actually sinning, because, given the opportunity, he would give his consent? Do we say that one animated by a spirit of blasphemy does not actually break out into blasphemy?

IX. We answer this little question briefly: one who, from habit not removed or renounced through penance, utters blasphemous words — however inconsiderately and inadvertently — is guilty of blasphemy. For the inconsiderate utterance of blasphemy is voluntary in that habitual disposition toward blaspheming, even if the person would notice it were he to attend to it. The sin, then, is not conditional, but absolute; and an indirect and interpretive voluntariness is present, as theologians of the schools put it. Now for sinning, an indirect voluntariness suffices. Therefore, whoever is accustomed to blasphemy, and does not strive to root out the custom, sins — even though he does not realize that he is blaspheming. For one bound by a wicked habit, who does not detest it, has an implicit deliberation. He sins, then, a mortal sin, as often as he blasphemes — even if he does not advert his mind to the blasphemy, whether through a fit of anger, or through the inclination of that same habit. But one who is not accustomed to blaspheme, and who, through a slip of the tongue, utters a blasphemous word without attending to its sense — such that, had he attended to it, he certainly would not have uttered such words — does not sin, at least not gravely, since the blasphemy will then be merely material. One who repents of the habit of blaspheming, and who labors to root out the custom, if, with no prior thought at all, he should fall into blasphemy, will sin only lightly.

X. Question V. Does jest remove from blasphemy the character of a mortal sin? Response: The common opinion draws a distinction. If the jest does not remove from the blasphemy the character of an insult, or of irreverence toward God, it will always be a mortal sin. If the jest is such that, all things considered, it removes from the blasphemy the character of an insult and a reviling of God, then it will not be a mortal sin. So teaches Leander (q. 14), citing in support of this opinion Castropalao, Tamburini, Bassaeus, Sánchez, and others.

XI. This distinction seems to me empty and worthless. Is it permissible to jest and trifle with God, and against God, and to utter blasphemous words for the sake of amusement? Can jest strip blasphemy of every character of insult and reviling against the divine majesty? On the contrary, jest does not diminish, but increases, the wickedness of blasphemy: for, in my own opinion, one who deliberately, for the sake of a jest, breaks out into blasphemous... words sins worse than one who blasphemes out of anger, or some other passion. For what could be more wicked than to tear apart the majesty of God with blasphemous and insulting words purely for the sake of a jest? What, indeed, is more contrary to reason than to say that blasphemies and insults against God, because uttered in jest, diminish the guilt of the offense? This holds true, in my view, when someone with deliberate mind twists real blasphemy against God. It is otherwise when someone utters words which, taken strictly, smack of blasphemy, but which, according to common understanding, are not blasphemous — as when men call some woman a "goddess," their own "divine one." For although it would be an enormous blasphemy to attribute to a creature what belongs to God alone, such expressions are nonetheless universally regarded as mere hyperbole, and are in no way considered blasphemy. Men ought nonetheless to abstain from them, and should be ashamed to dignify the lowest of all rational animals with such a title.

XII. It is worth exposing another of Leander's laxities, especially since he falsely attributes it to St. Thomas himself. This author writes as follows (q. 16): "But if someone blasphemes somewhat, following the judgment of reason, yet not fully and altogether deliberately, he will then sin, but only venially — even in the case where the lack of full deliberation arose from an unjust and unlawful cause. So Navarrus, following St. Thomas, II-II, q. 13, art. 2." Leander here misrepresents both Navarrus and St. Thomas. For Navarrus is speaking of one who blasphemes out of an anger that forestalls all use of reason — and it is for this opinion that he cites St. Thomas — not of one who, in some way aware that he is blaspheming, neglects to restrain his tongue; for in that case, on account of his negligence in restraining his tongue and attending to so grave a matter, and on account of his failure to remove the unlawful cause of his inconsideration, he sins gravely, as has been said above.

I. To swear seriously by false gods, by Jupiter, by Mercury, and the like, is blasphemy, since the worship owed to God alone, or to the Saints on account of God, is thereby attributed to false gods and demons. But one who, for the sake of jest, and with the intention of mocking rather than worshipping the false gods, swears by Jupiter, does not blaspheme, nor commit any fault. Blasphemous words are those by which the faith, or those things which must be believed by divine faith, are denied — as when someone says: "I renounce God, the sacraments, the virginity of Mary," and the like. Blasphemies also include all those words that derogate from the divine omnipotence — as when someone blurts out, "Whether God wills it or not, this will happen" — commonly, "in spite of God" [al dispetto di Dio]. To praise God with obscene words, or to swear by the shameful parts of Christ or of the Saints, is blasphemy. But to swear by the honorable parts of Christ — by his head, by his body — is not blasphemy. And since Christ is God, the oaths of Christians sworn absolutely by his head, or by the body of God, are not blasphemous to unbelievers; for they know, and believe, that Christ is God. Nevertheless, because such oaths are full of scandal — especially since those who swear them almost never make such fine distinctions — such swearers are to be most severely rebuked, and kept from the sacraments, until they amend themselves. But those are especially to be considered blasphemers who, in fits of indignation, exclaim, "O blood of God! O body of God!" And although some casuists distinguish indignation against God from that directed at the man they are addressing when swearing — holding that it is blasphemy in the first case, but not in the second — it seems to me, however, more certain that such swearers are, absolutely speaking, to be reckoned as blasphemers. This is also taught by Fr. Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 6).

II. It is likewise blasphemy to declare the devil omnipotent, or holy. To call a beloved girl a "goddess," as we have already said, is not commonly blasphemy, since no real divinity is attributed to her; such expressions are nonetheless unworthy. Free of the guilt of blasphemy, likewise, are these words: "I was born under this fate," or "It was fated to be so" — since this manner of speaking by no means denies contingent events, nor implies absolute necessity, but the common sense is that it was so ordained by God to happen, human freedom remaining unharmed. Not blasphemous, either, are such expressions as "May it please God," "By the power of God," "God's will be done" — since those who utter these words do not mock, but admire, God's power. Many also deny that this is blasphemy: "In spite of that goat who feeds and sustains me in this world" — meaning, in Latin, "In defiance of that billy-goat who feeds and sustains me, I shall act thus in this world." This locution, however, seems to me to carry, though indefinitely, a strong presumption of blasphemy — for he alone who nourishes and sustains men in the world is God.

III. Question I. Are expressions such as these blasphemy: "I do not believe in God," "I deny God, the Cross, the Gospels, the sacraments" — even if they are only conditional? Response: Tamburini (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 7, §4, n. 12) denies this. But the affirmative opinion is common, and true — since the existence of God is denied for the present, even under a future condition; but that condition does not affect the negation, but only the future circumstance. Guilty of blasphemy, likewise, are those who swear by the life of God, or of the Saints, saying, "May God perish, if this is not so." When, however, they say, "By the life of God, this is so," according to some Doctors they do not blaspheme, but pronounce not an execratory oath, but an assertory one; whereas one who says, "May God perish," does blaspheme. Yet just as in the external forum such formulas are judged blasphemous, so too, unless the swearer's express intention plainly indicates that he does not wish God's life to be otherwise than it is — namely, unchangeable — nor does he place it in jeopardy, as if it were capable of perishing, they must likewise be judged so in the internal forum. "God lives" is a formula of swearing employed in Scripture, and includes no blasphemy. But formulas such as, "This is as true as the Trinity, as God, as that Christ was born of the Virgin," are not blasphemies, according to some casuists, who press the swearer's intention. But intention is wrongly invoked as an excuse when the words themselves, by their very nature, present a manifest blasphemous sense. Now the formulas cited are indeed really blasphemous, since they equate the truth of a creature to divine truth, and attribute to a creature what is proper to God alone. Heretical blasphemies are such words as: "By the body of God the Father," "By his beard," "By the entrails of the Holy Spirit" — this is clear enough.

IV. Question II. Is one who swears falsely thereby a blasphemer? Response: Some affirm this. But the contrary opinion is true, which St. Thomas holds (II-II, q. 13, art. 3, ad 2): "One who commits perjury does not say, nor believe, something false of God, as a blasphemer does; but he calls upon God as a witness, not indeed thinking that God is a false witness, but hoping that God will not manifest this by some evident sign."

V. Question III. Does one who, in a single fit of anger, utters several blasphemies, commit one sin, or several? Response: Fr. Leander, according to his custom, asserts absolutely, as more probable, that this angry blasphemer commits only a single sin, citing several authors in support, and concludes at last: "See on this matter the most wise and most learned Amadeo Guimenio, treatise on penance, prop. 7." See the eloquence of casuists in mutual praise! Fr. Leander extols a booklet stuffed full of laxities, errors, and impostures, so often condemned by anathema by the Holy See. To this question I answer that the circumstances of time, of person, and of the customary habit of blaspheming must be weighed. For if the anger is prolonged — say, for a quarter of an hour, during which time the blasphemer could notice, and could, if he wished, check his anger — who doubts that there are several sins? But this question is of lesser importance in practice. For practical purposes, it suffices that the blasphemer disclose the duration of his fit of angry blasphemy, and his habit of blaspheming.

I. Under the Old Law, blasphemers were punished with death: "He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die: all the multitude shall stone him, whether he be a native or a stranger" (Lev. 24). Likewise, the common civil law decrees that all blasphemers are to be punished with the ultimate penalty. Although these laws, as regards this ultimate penalty of death, have fallen out of use through disuse, nevertheless kingdoms and principalities generally still punish blasphemers with the gravest penalties. In some places, common blasphemers are first flogged, then have their lips branded with a hot iron, and, for a third offense, their tongues are cut out. Elsewhere they are exposed to public derision. Canon law (ch. Statuimus, on maledictions) commands that blasphemers stand before the doors of the church for seven Sundays while the sacred rites are being performed, and, every Sunday, without their cloak, barefoot, a rope bound about their neck, present themselves to public view; and that on seven Fridays they fast on bread and water. If they neglect to do this, they are to be barred from entering a church, before which they must stand; and, living, are to be barred from entering the church, and after death, deprived of ecclesiastical burial. The Fifth Lateran Council (session 9, ch. Abusum) punishes blasphemous Clerics for a first offense with the forfeiture of a year's income from their benefice; afterward it removes them from the benefice; and finally declares them incapable of holding any ecclesiastical revenues whatsoever. For noble laymen, it imposes a fine of twenty ducats for a first offense, fifty for a second, and finally pronounces them stripped of their nobility. Common people who have blasphemed twice must stand before the doors of the church with a shameful miter placed on their head. If they have become habitual blasphemers, they are condemned to the galleys, or to prison.

II. Question I. Is one who hears a blasphemer bound to denounce him to a judge? Response: The common opinion affirms this; and this is prescribed both by Julius III in his constitution beginning "In multis," and by the Lateran Council, in these words: "Whoever shall hear a blasphemer is bound to rebuke him sharply with words, if this can be done without danger to himself; and he is bound to report, or notify, this to an ecclesiastical or secular judge within three days; and if several hear the same blasphemer together, each individually is bound to accuse him, unless perhaps they all agree that one should perform this office on behalf of all." Several points arise here concerning this denunciation, which I prefer, however, to postpone to another place. This much only I will say here: that fraternal correction is enjoined on everyone, and that it is only to be omitted for a truly urgent reason, or under the pretext of a fleshly prudence. Prudence is indeed necessary; I do not deny this in correcting one's brethren; but I would likewise warn that love of earthly things, worldly regard, and considerations of convenience must not be allowed to disguise themselves as Christian prudence. If you hear a blasphemer overcome by anger, correct him once his anger has subsided. Sometimes correction ought to be made immediately, depending on the character of the one blaspheming. If the blasphemies are heretical, they must be denounced to the legitimate judge, in accordance with the pontifical precepts on this matter. The judges of heresy are either the Inquisitors, or the Bishops. But more on this in its proper place.

III. Question II. How ought a confessor to conduct himself with blasphemers? Response: If the blasphemies are simple, the confessor can absolve the penitent of them, since such simple blasphemies are commonly not reserved. The Bishop, however, may reserve even these simple blasphemies, and once such a reservation is made, an ordinary confessor cannot grant absolution.

IV. Blasphemy is sometimes external and heretical in form, insofar as the words uttered smack of heresy; yet the blasphemer harbored no internal error in his mind while blurting them out. In this case, the common opinion teaches that a regular confessor can absolve the penitent in the internal forum, just as he can absolve from sortilege, magic, or sorcery — provided there was no error in the mind. On this matter, see the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 131). But more on this in the treatise on penance.

V. Question III. What penance ought a confessor to impose on penitent blasphemers? Response: The Lateran Council decreed that blasphemers are not to be absolved except with a most rigorous penance imposed by confessors. These are the Council's own words (session 9): "To be abolished. In the forum of penance, let no one guilty of blasphemy be absolved, except with a most rigorous penance imposed at the severe confessor's discretion." More recent Probabilist authors answer that this decree is not received in practice. And this is true in a sense. For if blasphemers were subjected to the gravest penalties, as the Council commands, and as the equity of judgment demands, God's holy name would not be blasphemed so frequently. But because not a few confessors absolve false penitents of the crime of blasphemy, as of other crimes, with only a light penance imposed, crimes of every kind run rampant, and flood the whole earth. But it is one thing to say that this decree is not received in practice, or that casuists and confessors, in fact, rarely impose the most severe penances on blasphemers as its prescription requires; it is quite another to say that the decree itself has become obsolete. This latter claim we deny, against Leander (disp. 5, q. 16), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 131), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 1, §3, n. 2), Sánchez (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 32, n. 44), and many others. If you ask them why this decree has no force, they answer only that it is not received in practice. This is their sole reason — which, if it held good, would mean the death and burial of every law that transgressors fail to receive in use, or execution. Ought not satisfaction to God be the graver, the graver the offense? Does not the Council of Trent command that penances be imposed proportionate to the gravity of the crime? Since blasphemy is a most grave crime, why should the gravest penances, which the Council commands, not be imposed on blasphemers? Both divine and natural law prescribe this equality of proportion. See, Christian reader, where the leniency of casuists tends! They make both the prescription itself, and the divine and natural laws themselves, subject to disuse. Away with so cruel a kindness! Let confessors, then, take care not to grant absolution without subjecting penitent blasphemers to worthy penances.

VI. Question IV. Are those bound by a habit of blaspheming obliged to abstain from confession beforehand, until freed from the habit? Response: Leander affirms, according to his custom (disp. 5, q. 17), that it is more probable, in his own view, that blasphemers ought to be absolved even if they have not amended, provided they truly grieve for their sins — even if often admonished, they have not reformed; and for this opinion of his he cites Sánchez, Castropalao, Hurtado, Trullench, and others. How lax this opinion is, everyone can see. They believe they escape every mark of laxity by saying, "provided they truly grieve for the blasphemies committed." But on what basis can you presume that a penitent is affected by sincere sorrow, if, having repeatedly spurned admonition, he has in no way turned to a better way of life, and shown no sign at all of amendment? Let the confessor, then, seriously consider with what zeal, effort, and diligence blasphemers have striven to restrain their tongue. Let him weigh whether they have put into practice the remedies prescribed for their amendment by other confessors. If he perceives progress, if he discerns a real effort at amendment in the penitent, he may absolve him. If not, let him defer absolution, and prescribe remedies more surely by which the penitent may abstain from blaspheming. An inveterate custom of long standing cannot be entirely rooted out all at once. It must, then, be broken and interrupted little by little, until, with the utmost diligence applied, it is entirely uprooted. Let him prescribe an alms to be given at once, if the penitent's means allow, as often as he happens to blaspheme; or let him impose the marking of so many crosses with the tongue on the bare ground, or some similar or harsher penance. If penitents truly grieve by this method, they will quickly amend themselves; and within a week or two, each will find himself reformed. The opinion of Leander and others cited above has been proscribed by Innocent XI, in this proposition: "To one who has a habit of sinning against the law of God, of nature, or of the Church, even though no hope of amendment appears, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred, provided he says with his mouth that he intends to amend." Our younger casuists will, no doubt, clamor as usual for us to consult the theologians they cite, or will claim that similar teachings are found in other theologians too (which, if true, is only worse), or that their opinions have been reported without due fidelity. This is a rather stale objection, which we have several times, quite rightly, dismissed as ridiculous.

VII. But more on this when we come to discuss proximate occasion [of sin]. For now I will indicate what Comitoli teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 9, q. 9). He was accustomed to require his penitents, habituated to blasphemies against God and the Blessed Virgin, to recite the seven penitential psalms and the litanies with prayers, thirty, forty, or fifty times more or less, on bended and bare knees, touching the ground. He likewise required them to beg pardon of God, the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints ten times, on their knees; to mark a cross with the tongue on the ground ten times each day; and to strike their breast ten times. Confessors may impose these and similar penances on blasphemers, so as to free them from the habit of blaspheming. If they are wealthy, let confessors order them to give twenty solidi in alms for each blasphemy or perjury. If poor, let them oblige them to trace twenty crosses on the ground with the tongue, and to recite as many prayers. By these or similar means, some remedy will be found against this most wicked vice of blasphemy.

[Introductory remarks] Vows which men make to God pertain to the first commandment of the Decalogue, as far as our present concerns are relevant. The sanctity and piety of vows, by their very nature, are self-evident. God is worshipped by our vows, and tokens of a grateful spirit are shown for benefits received. Sometimes to obtain divine clemency, and to secure graces; sometimes to appease and mitigate the severity of justice, we offer our vows to God. These are the chief duties of the Christian religion, and tokens of our servitude toward God. It is an innate inclination of our souls, either to implore divine aid by vows in calamities, or to adorn temples with tablets of thanksgiving for benefits received, to the glory of the divine majesty. Even before God gave us the written Law, the Patriarch Jacob offered his vows to God — for he made a vow, saying, "If God shall be with me..." (Gen. 28). The Prophet Isaiah, describing the offering of vows as a signal prerogative of God's people, says: "They shall worship him with victims and offerings; and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them" (ch. 19). What of the fact that Marcus Tullius himself notes the frequency of the pagans' vows, and the votive tablets which they hung in the temples of the gods — either those who had escaped shipwreck, or those who had obtained some notable benefit? And from this he infers the providence of the gods, and their governance of the world. Thus he represents himself addressing his friend Diagoras: "You, who think that the gods take no notice of human affairs, do you not observe how many, by so many painted tablets, have poured out their vows in the face of the storm's violence, and arrived safely in port?" (Bk. III, On the Nature of the Gods, near the end).

Undertaking, then, in this Book, a treatise on vows, I shall set forth all the difficulties which theologians commonly discuss. Monastic vows I omit for the present, referring them to the treatise on the religious state. Of vows in general, then, I shall now speak.

I. Among the heretics who condemned vows, first are those called the Waldensians. These rejected all vows, on the grounds that vows impose necessity and coercion upon men. This impiety, long buried, was dug up again by the pseudo-apostles, into whose hands John Wycliffe placed it. Luther, a more shameless disciple of Wycliffe, disseminated this heresy of his to his own disciples. Yet he vomited forth his blasphemies chiefly against monastic vows above all others. Therefore, when we come to discuss these, I shall refute his impious sophistries. John Calvin, who adopted the principal errors of both Wycliffe and Luther, mixing in his own besides, and adding a yet more pestilent heresy, sharpens his pen — dipped in his own gall and ungovernable spite — against the making of vows, which he calls rash (Bk. IV, Institutes, ch. 13). He divides this entire chapter into two parts: in the first he treats of vows in general; in the second, of monastic vows. At the outset he laments and bewails that the Church, whose freedom was purchased at the inestimable price of the blood of Christ Jesus, has been oppressed under the weight of man-made traditions, and torn apart by the cruel tyranny of vows and human ingenuity. As is his custom, he twists the vilest and most scurrilous reproaches against Catholics, and audacious fabrications, striving to embellish them with the flowers of his elegant style and eloquence, which he wickedly abuses. But the more polished he is in the surface of his diction, the madder he is in the pursuit of truth. Sometimes he condemns all vows; sometimes he admits some; now he condemns only rashly made vows, now even those made cautiously and with deliberate mind. His aim throughout, however, is to consign all Catholic vows to superstition and idolatry. I will cull a few passages from among the many he writes, so as to refute him by his own teaching, and by the words of his own impudence and folly.

II. Calvin says (loc. cit., n. 4): "No one can disapprove of a vow, provided some holiness resides in it — if it looks to some end not perverse. Who is there, at least among Christians, who recognizes any holiness at all in abstinence from wine, once every other good end is removed? The Turks abstain from wine; many other nations abstain. No one would say that abstinence from wine constitutes holiness." Abstinence from wine, if vowed simply because it is abstinence, contains no holiness at all in itself, at least by natural necessity. But one who vows it does not vow it as though some sanctity resided in the mere absence of wine; rather, one who vows it to God takes it up as a means by which he might restrain his own concupiscence, and subject it to the spirit; and might dispose himself more securely to keep the law of God, and more easily and abundantly obtain from God the heavenly aids by which he might govern his appetites. This is what the vows of Catholics aim at. What, then, does this heresiarch slander in Catholics who vow abstinences and fasts to God? We do not recognize sanctity in fasting as such; but we call fasts holy insofar as they are instruments by which the sanctity of the soul is either acquired or increased — chiefly through charity, and the theological virtues — if the fasts are directed to God's glory. What superstition is there in this?

III. Calvin distinguishes four kinds of vows, of which two look to time past, whereby we either testify our grateful spirit toward God for benefits received, or, exacting punishment from ourselves for sins committed, seek to soften the divine vengeance — the former he also calls exercises of thanksgiving, the latter, of penance. The other two kinds look to future time, whereby we are rendered more cautious concerning some evil already committed, or spurred on to some good. "To future time," he says (n. 5), "belong those vows which partly tend to render us more cautious, partly to spur us on, as it were by certain goads, to duty. Someone sees himself so prone to a certain vice that in an otherwise indifferent matter he cannot restrain himself, but immediately slides into evil; he will do nothing absurd if he cuts himself off, by a vow, from the use of that thing for some period. As, if someone recognizes that a certain bodily adornment is dangerous for him, and yet desires it with vehement allurement — what better could he do than free himself from all doubt by imposing a curb upon himself, by vowing to abstain? Likewise, if someone is forgetful, or slothful, in the necessary duties of piety, why should he not, having undertaken a vow, sharpen his memory, and shake off his sluggishness? In both cases, I admit this has the appearance of a kind of pedagogy; but for this very reason — because they are aids for weakness — they are employed by the rude and imperfect, not without some benefit. Accordingly, we should say that vows which look to one of these ends, especially in external matters, are legitimate, provided they are supported by God's approval, and are limited according to the measure of grace given us by God, and suited to our calling."

IV. I wished to quote this at greater length than perhaps was strictly necessary, so that I might draw arguments against Catholic vows from Calvin himself, rather than from elsewhere, to stop his own slanderous mouth. For at the beginning of this chapter, discussing the vows made in the Catholic Church, he said this: "Moreover, so that it may better appear how grievous a mischief has been brought in by vows, let readers keep in mind the principles laid down earlier. For we have taught, first, that whatever can be desired for establishing a pious and holy life is contained in the Law." From this arises a difficulty concerning vows made otherwise than by the express word of God — where are they to be placed? Let Calvin tell us now: is it held by the express word of God in Scripture that one may vow abstinence from choice foods, and from splendid attire? Let him tell us where it is expressed that the forgetful and the slothful should take up vows, by which, sluggishness shaken off, they might become more diligent in the duties of piety owed to God. Let him tell us how he himself can know that such vows are suited to his calling, and to the gift of divine grace. Are all these things defined by the express word of God? If he says yes, then why does he rail against Catholics for offering vain acts of worship to God through vows, contrary to the express word of God? If he denies it, why then does he find fault with Catholics for vowing to God things not explicitly found in Scripture? What more is there to say? If vows displeased God, he would certainly not command their observance, as in fact he does command in Ecclesiastes 5: "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." Likewise, Psalm 75: "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God." And again, Psalm 55: "I will render to thee sacrifices of praise... I will pay thee my vows, which my lips have uttered."

V. To evade these most manifest testimonies somehow, the Lutherans and Calvinists concede that vows may be made for a defined time, but not in perpetuity — since, says Calvin (loc. cit., n. 6), "If you bind yourself by a perpetual vow, either you will grow weary from great tedium, and dislike it, or, worn down by its long duration, you will one day dare to violate it." He gives another reason: that such perpetual vows are contrary to Christian liberty — than which nothing more inept could be said. For if temporary vows do not conflict with the liberty of Christians, why should perpetual ones conflict with it? Tell me: where in Scripture is it expressly stated that it is lawful to make temporary vows to God, but not perpetual ones? Indeed, the perpetuity of vows is most clearly gathered from Scripture itself. For Hannah, Samuel's mother, dedicated a perpetual vow to God (1 Kings 1): "And Anna, being in bitterness of soul, prayed to the Lord, shedding many tears... and made a vow, saying: O Lord of hosts, if thou wilt look down on the affliction of thy servant... and wilt give to thy servant a man-child, I will give him to the Lord all the days of his life." And this vow was so pleasing to God that he immediately granted the one who made it her request. If a mother can dedicate a perpetual vow to God concerning her son, how much more can the son himself concerning himself — since everyone has greater right over himself than a mother has over him! Moreover, to utterly demolish Calvin's sophistry: it is the slavery of sin that is opposed to the liberty of the sons of God — not the slavery of justice and honor, as the Apostle says (Rom. 6): "But being made free from sin, you became servants of justice." The liberty of the new law, then, frees us from sin, and from the most grave yoke of vice. To this Christian liberty, the things that bind us to God are not only not opposed; they rather perfect it — as Augustine expressly says (Bk. On the Greatness of the Soul, ch. 34): "This is the true, this is the perfect, this is the only religion, by which the soul is reconciled to God, whose greatness we inquire into, and by which it is made worthy of the liberty it seeks. For he alone sets us free from all things, whom it is most useful to serve in all things, and in whose service, to find favor, is perfect liberty itself." The vows which all Christians make even in baptism, even according to Calvin, are perpetual, and yet do not for that reason offend against Christian liberty. The bond of matrimony is perpetual, and graver than any vow, and yet it in no way conflicts with the liberty given us through Christ. Why, then, should a perpetual vow conflict with it? These wretched men do not understand that... to serve God is to reign. It is, indeed, often burdensome and laborious to pay vows made to God. But this happens both in temporary and in perpetual promises. What of the fact that Calvin himself recommends the making of vows to shake off sluggishness, and to spur on a torpid will? It could indeed happen that not a few of these vows would be violated. What of it? Did not Christ foresee the difficulty of his law, and the innumerable transgressions of it, from its very promulgation? If the difficulty of keeping a promise, or the danger of violating it, ought to deter men from promising, no covenants would ever be made, no promises ever given. Vows which are made to God concerning things commanded by God himself are, Calvin admits, licit acts of religion; but not, he says, vows concerning things not commanded. He contradicts himself at every turn. He abstains from lavish living, from wine, and similar things — and vows to shake off sluggishness — are not about commanded matters. The vows that the Patriarch Jacob, Hannah, and many others recorded in Sacred Scripture made were not concerning commanded things, but free ones, as anyone who reads can see. And yet that these vows pleased God is gathered from the fact that he severely exacted their fulfillment. But we need not dwell longer on so plain a matter, especially since we shall discuss it further when the subject of monastic vows recurs.

I. Among the propositions of Miguel de Molinos proscribed by Pope Innocent XI, two concern the subject of vows. The first is proposition 64 of the said propositions, and reads as follows: "Fates concerning anything are impediments to perfection." The other: "Obedience to superiors in externals, and the strictness of the vow of obedience, extends only to the exterior. In the interior, however, the matter stands otherwise, wherein God alone, and direct [inspirations], enter." Both propositions plainly contradict the holy word of God. It was shown in the preceding chapter, from Isaiah 19, that God is worshipped with sacrifices and vows: "They shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them" — from which the falsity of the first condemned proposition is clear. St. Paul likewise condemns the other (Hebrews 13): "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them; for they watch, as being to render an account for your souls." If prelates must render an account for souls, they must necessarily have knowledge and oversight of their governance. But more on this in its proper place. Now certain opinions of some recent authors, which seem to us excessively lax, must be reviewed.

II. "Can a married person, hindered by a vow, by an oath, or by spiritual kinship, from requesting the marital debt, request it whenever he is troubled by vehement stirrings of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust?... I follow the affirmative opinion... if a married person is so troubled by vehement fleshly stirrings that he is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into the sin of fornication, or something worse, unless he requests the debt... For when someone, through the observance of a vow, exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust intrinsically evil, requesting the debt from one's own spouse is not intrinsically evil; and then neither the vow, nor the observance of the vow, is manifestly a matter of the better good..." etc., and much more to this effect in the very learned Quintanadueñas... "It seems to me exceedingly difficult now to deny all practical probability to the opinion of Quintanadueñas. So the most experienced casuist Gobat, with whom I rightly agree." Fr. Patritius Sporer (tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, sect. 2, §3, n. 65, p. 234). See below, ch. 5, n. 12.

III. "Is a vow of chastity, of the religious life, or of not marrying, made by one for whom marriage would be more salutary on account of incontinence, valid, and does it prevent marriage from being lawfully contracted? The negative opinion — namely, that such a vow is not valid, nor an impediment to marriage — can be argued for on these grounds... because a vow of chastity, or of the religious life, made by one whom the troubles of the flesh, and the frequent danger of ruin precede, is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; indeed it is rather made contrary to St. Paul's counsel... The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same in the case where, having made the aforesaid three vows, or one of them, it would be more advisable, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh, and subsequent lapses into venereal matters, for someone to contract marriage... because what, prior to the vow being made, renders the promised matter unsuited matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the preceding vows... This opinion is probable speculatively... But I answer, probably, that the aforesaid opinion is also probable in practice... Here and now, such an opinion can also be embraced practically, in some sense, and safely by one who now finds it speculatively probable, speaking somewhat probably. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana may unjustifiably doubt) that what is here probable will also be practically probable. Therefore it can safely be held that marriage will also be, for him for whom it would be more salutary on account of his incontinence than remaining in religion or chastity, etc. Therefore he can, without dispensation, enter marriage." So expressly held the aforesaid John Sanchez. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 9, on Marriage, disp. 23, q. 2 and 3, pp. 324 and 325). See below, ch. 5, n. 17.

I. The Wycliffites, Lutherans, and Calvinists have raved against sacred vows, especially the monastic ones, whose errors the Council of Trent condemned. Michael Molinos too was impious concerning vows, of whom Innocent XI proscribed these two following theses, the first of which is: Vows about anything to be done are impediments of perfection. The other is: Superiors are to be obeyed in exterior matters, and the breadth of the vow of obedience of Religious extends only to what is exterior. But in interior matters the thing stands otherwise, into which God alone and the director enter.

II. "Can a married person, impeded from asking the debt on account of a vow, or incest, or spiritual kinship, ask for it, whenever he is agitated by vehement stimuli of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust? ... I follow the affirmative, if a married person is so agitated by vehement stimuli of the flesh that he exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into the sin of fornication, or something more shameful, unless he asks for the debt ... Because since, from the observance of the vow, one is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust intrinsically evil, and then the non-observance of the vow (namely, asking the debt from one's own wife) is not intrinsically evil, it is manifest that neither the vow nor the observance of the vow is of a better thing, etc. This and far more the most learned Fr. Quintanadueñas [teaches] on this matter ... It seems to me most difficult now to deny all practical probability to Fr. Quintanadueñas's opinion ... So the most expert Casuist Gobat, to whom I rightly assent." Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second precept of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 2, § 3, number 65, page 234.

III. "Whether a vow of chastity, or of Religion, or of not marrying, hidden from the one to whom marriage was promised, on account of incontinence, is valid, and impedes marriage from being licitly entered upon? The denying opinion — namely that such a vow is neither valid, nor impedes marriage — can be urged by these arguments... Because a vow of chastity or of Religion made by one whom frequent troubles of the flesh and ruinous falls precede is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; nay rather it is against the counsel of St. Paul.

"The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same thing in the case where, the three said vows having been made, or one of them, it would be wiser for someone, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh and supervening lapses into venereal matters, to contract marriage ... Because what, before the vow was made, causes the promised thing to be an unfit matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow ... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the antecedent vows ... This opinion is more probable speculatively ... But I answer that the aforesaid opinion, speaking even practically, is probable to some degree, and can be safely embraced. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana doubts undeservedly) that what is here and now speculatively probable is also practically so ... Therefore here and now such an opinion will also be practically probable. Therefore it can be safely embraced by one for whom marriage is more wholesome than the vows of Religion or of chastity are on account of his incontinence, etc. Therefore he will be able to enter marriage without dispensation. So expressly held the aforesaid Juan Sánchez." Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 9 on marriage, disputation 24, question 2, page 324, § 3, page 325.

IV. "Sometimes a vow of running bulls in honor of the Saints can be valid, even in Spain ... Whence in Spain we see the canonizations of Saints solemnized with bull-runnings, besides the solemnities of Processions, Masses, and the like." Juan Martínez de Prado, Tome II, chapter 31, § 4, summary number 30, and at the end of it, page 640.

V. "A vow made in thanksgiving for a shameful act already done is valid." Leander, treatise 2 on the vow, disputation 4, question 31, page 341, from Filliucci, treatise 26 on the vow, chapter 2, question 6, number 54.

VI. "What obliges a vow of abstaining from wine? It would suffice under grave fault that wine be drunk temperately, in that quantity which is used by those who drink for one meal." Castropalao, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, page 72.

VII. "It is probable that he who has vowed virginity is not bound to perpetual chastity, but only to preserving the integrity of the flesh, which that word 'virginity' properly signifies." Marín, treatise 9, disputation 3, section 2, number 39, from Burgh, century 1, case 9.

VIII. "If you wished to redeem the loss of time, you comprehended even moderate play, and likewise play for another's sake: because you would truly be playing with a loss of time. Yet you can play through another, although you lose time watching ... If you vowed to this end, that..."

that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit for you to play under another's name, or through another; nay, it will even be licit to play through another, even if these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." La-Croix, book 3, part 1, number 454, page 175, from Tamburini, Palao, and others.

I. Question I. What is a vow, and what its conditions? Answer. It is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better thing. Five conditions are assigned: 1. deliberation; 2. the will of promising and of executing the promise; 3. the promise itself; 4. that this promise be made to God; 5. that it be concerning a better thing, or one pleasing to God. Each condition must be explained.

II. For a vow, full deliberation is required, which consists in this: that the one vowing be master of himself, and advert to and know what he promises. Not to say more: that liberty which suffices for committing a sin, for perfecting a contract, suffices for a vow. Wherefore vows, even sudden ones, can be valid, when they proceed from a deliberate will. Vows of this kind, however, suffer from imprudence, which, on account of such a precipitate emission, according to the variety of circumstances, can be dispensed with or commuted. A virtual deliberation suffices, however, as in all other actions, contained in other preceding actions, provided the one vowing be master of himself. A mere purpose does not suffice for a vow, since a purpose is nothing other than a will of doing something. A promise, then, is necessary. Often the unlearned confuse a purpose with a promise, and conversely. Wherefore a prudent director of souls will gather from the circumstances whether a vow has been made or not. If someone should vow with the mind of promising and binding himself, but with the will of not fulfilling the promise, he would elicit and constitute the vow: because the latter purpose of not fulfilling is inefficacious and inept.

III. The other clause, promise made to God, indicates that vows are made to God alone. When someone pledges that he will do some work in honor of some Saint, this is not a vow properly so called, but the matter of a vow. Wherefore vows which are made in honor of some Saint are called vows in a broader signification, which nevertheless have the force of binding. These vows are not acts of latria, owed to God alone, but of dulia, or hyperdulia. Catholics, then, vowing to the Blessed Virgin, to SS. Augustine, Benedict, Dominic, etc., vow to God before these Saints as witnesses, patrons, and helpers.

IV. Question II. What does the other clause, "concerning a better good," signify? Answer. The matter of a vow must be honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not impeding a greater good. Things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, as the common opinion teaches. The clause "concerning a better good" has a twofold sense: first, compared to another good — as it is better to succor an endangered girl than another poor person exposed to no danger of soul. Secondly, with respect to the omission of that same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give. For fitting matter of a vow it suffices that it be a better good in this second way. Matter opposed to the evangelical counsels is in no way fit for a vow. Hence a vow of contracting marriage is invalid, because it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. If marriage were necessary for preserving the Commonwealth, for confirming peace between Princes — which scarcely, or not even scarcely, happens — they say that then the vow would be valid: because the matter of the vow is not so much the marriage, as the common good of the Commonwealth and of the Church. A vow of marrying, in order to bridle and restrain concupiscence, is null.

V. If a married person, impeded by a vow made from asking the debt, is troubled by stimuli of concupiscence, can he ask the debt? Fr. Sporer affirms it, citing Fr. Gobat. But this opinion is lax and false. Even laxer is the other opinion of Leander, denying that a vow of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying is valid when made by one for whom marriage is more wholesome, and who suffers grave rebellions of concupiscence. Nay, the same most benign Leander adds that supervening temptations and anxieties of the flesh render a vow of not marrying null. Read Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 12 and following. A vow of not vowing is invalid. That a vow of not seeking a dispensation is valid, if it is more useful to the soul not to seek a dispensation; on the contrary, that it is null, if it is more wholesome to the soul to request a dispensation, St. Antoninus and Richard teach.

VI. Question III. Are indifferent, useless, or vicious things the matter of a vow? Answer. All deny it. Yet if a thing which is by its own nature indifferent should, on account of some circumstance, put on honesty, it is fit matter for a vow. A vow whose execution is a sin is null. Wherefore Jephthah sinned in killing his daughter. Similarly, a vow made concerning a good thing for a depraved end is null: since then the vow is taken as an instrument for procuring a depraved end. Invalid too are vows of offering God gifts, of celebrating Masses, of laying out alms, which certain Christians are wont to make, this condition being added: if they come off victors in a duel, or in an unjust war. Likewise a vow made in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already committed is invalid, and unbefitting God — as for a gain procured from unjust gambling. But valid is a vow made to obtain the safety of a son begotten of a concubine: because the health of the son is a good, although sin has preceded it. Equally valid are vows of punishing one's own crimes. Vows of a good thing for an indifferent end are null. A vow concerning an impossible thing is null.

VII. Question IV. If one who cannot fulfill the whole vow is bound to fulfill a part? Answer. You vowed to build a Church: unable to build the whole, are you bound to a part? That this one vowing is bound to nothing, Tamburini, Leander, Castropalao, and others teach. But a distinction must be made. If the separated part redounds to the honor of God, then the one vowing must execute it; but not if the separated part would be useless. But in this case the one vowing should build a Chapel in another Church, or something else in some temple, which would redound to God's honor. When the matter of a vow is mixed, partly good and partly evil, or vain, the good part must be fulfilled, the other neglected. Hence a vow of coming to Rome with a naked body is valid as regards the making of the journey; only the manner of nakedness must be omitted.

VIII. Question V. Is a vow of not gaming valid? Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it, because it concerns a better good. For gaming is something fortuitous in order to gain, or loss, and a source of evils. Therefore abstinence from gaming concerns a better good.

IX. Fr. Claude La-Croix teaches lax opinions on this argument, book 3, part 1, number 453 and following. An error crept into my Tome 3 on the Decalogue, page 117, number 8, where, in editing the lax opinion of this author, in place of "you wished" [voluisti], by an error certainly of the printers, "you vowed" [vovisti] was printed. This material error, although trivial and of no moment, I now correct, that I may satisfy my censors, and give thanks, since by objecting such very light blemishes to me they make plain to the whole World that Christian Theology is free both from Rigorism and from Laxism.

X. "If you vowed to this end" ("vowed" here, not "wished," says Fr. La-Croix, place cited, number 454) "that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit to play through another, even though these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." You are not playing, indeed, under your own name, but under another's; so neither do you blaspheme, quarrel, or swear with your own mouth, but with another's mouth. How lax these things are, and others which La-Croix teaches in the same place, let others judge.

XI. Question VI. Is a vow of never sinning valid? Answer. If the vow is of abstaining from every mortal sin, it is most valid. But if the vow is of avoiding all faults, even venial ones, taken collectively, the vow is null, inasmuch as it concerns a matter humanly...

impossible to human weakness. Valid, however, is a vow of avoiding this or that determinate deliberate venial sin — for instance, of not lying. But there is no need to dwell on unraveling these vows, since Christians must be persuaded to abstain in very deed from sins, not to burden themselves with a load of vows.

I. A vow is divided: 1. into absolute, conditional, and penal; 2. into solemn and simple; 3. into necessary and free; 4. into common and particular; 5. into real, personal, and mixed; 6. into affirmative and negative; 7. into perpetual and temporal; 8. into reserved and non-reserved; 9. into public and hidden; 10. into express and tacit, or into mental and vocal.

II. An absolute vow is free from every condition. A conditional vow has a condition attached — as if you say: "I vow alms, if I recover." Penal is when a penalty is attached, as if you say: "If I gamble, I vow a scourging." A penal vow differs from a conditional one, in that in the latter a condition is attached as condition, in the former as penalty.

III. A solemn vow is made in the sight of the Church, by which it is accepted through a Superior. A simple vow is made privately by a person. A necessary vow is that which all make in Baptism, renouncing the devil and his pomps. It is called necessary, because it concerns the observance of the evangelical law necessary for salvation. Free is that concerning a matter not necessary for salvation, such as entering Religion; or, if it concerns something already commanded, someone freely adds a vow. Common is the same as necessary, and particular the same as free.

IV. A real vow is that by which an external thing is offered to God. A personal vow is that by which an action or omission affecting the person is promised to God. A mixed vow concludes both, namely both a thing, such as alms, and an action, such as a pilgrimage. An affirmative vow is that by which something positive is pledged to God, such as alms. A negative vow abstains from something, such as from flesh, from gaming, from a sin.

V. A perpetual vow lasts until the death of the one vowing, such as a vow of monastic profession, of a perpetual alms, etc. Reserved vows are called those from which interior Prelates cannot dispense, but can from those not reserved. An express vow is that which is made in conceived formulas. An implicit, or tacit vow is that which is not made in express words, but is attached to another thing or state, such as the vow of chastity which Subdeacons make in receiving sacred Orders. A public vow is that which is made openly. A hidden vow, that which is made secretly. All these are obvious.

I. It is a truth of faith that a vow produces an obligation, and indeed a grave one, by which the one vowing is bound to execute what he pledges to God, as is had in Deuteronomy 23: When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it. This obligation pertains to the virtue of religion and of fidelity. An action done from a vow is of greater merit than one done without a vow, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 6.

II. Question I. Is there parvity of matter in a vow? Answer. The obligation of a vow is by its nature grave; its violation can become light from imperfect deliberation, from an unwitting slip of mind. The difficulty is whether it can be light on the part of the matter. If the matter of the vow is divisible — as if you vowed to recite the whole Rosary and omit one decade — the omission is light from parvity of matter. If the whole matter of the vow is small — such as a vow of reciting one Our Father — then Cajetan, with others, teaches that the omission is mortal; but the opposite opinion is more probable. This little question, as regards practice, is inept. For men commonly make their vows concerning a grave matter, both on account of the end and on account of the dignity of the vow itself. The Theologians dispute whether the one vowing can bind himself gravely in a light matter, and lightly in a grave matter. To the first part of the question I say that when the matter is on every side light, one cannot bind himself gravely under mortal sin. On the contrary, when the matter is by its own nature grave, one cannot bind himself only lightly. For he who wills a vow wills, by that very fact, what necessarily follows from a vow. But a grave obligation follows from a vow in grave matter. Now it is not in the power of the one vowing to pervert the natures of things. St. Thomas is ineptly alleged for the contrary opinion. Men can freely make vows or not make them, says St. Thomas; but, this being posited, that they make vows, they must conform themselves to the nature and law of vows. Nor is the question of such moment that it needs greater discussion. Read Tome 3, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 1, number 20.

III. Question II. Does he who violates several vows in a light matter on the same day sin gravely? Answer. The more common and more probable opinion affirms it. For although vows differ in number, they nevertheless pertain to the same virtue, and are of the same nature. When, therefore, from several light matters subject to a vow a grave matter is made, then a grave injury is inflicted upon God. Would not he who pledged to a man a grave sum of money in several promises sin deadly if he retained for himself a notable sum of the promised money? They also dispute whether one who has vowed to recite one Our Father and Hail Mary daily for several years sins mortally if he omits it for several days: and commonly they affirm it — although some distinguish concerning a vow that affects the day, and one that does not; but these disputes have been devised by the disputants themselves to exercise the keenness of their wit. Wherefore, these petty distinctions set aside, I say that the deliberate violation of a vow through an entire year is mortal.

IV. Question III. Must children fulfill the vows of their parents? Answer. Personal vows must be fulfilled by the one who made them, because they affect that very person. These vows of parents in no way bind children. For vows must be free. The vows of parents sometimes bind children, insofar as the children consent to those same vows. Hence it follows that the one vowing, who cannot fulfill the vow, is not bound to have it fulfilled through another. Real vows can be fulfilled by others, even without the knowledge, but not against the will, of the one vowing. If the one vowing has become unable to pay a real vow, he comes off free, as is plain in other debts. When a vow is mixed — namely, partly personal and partly real — if the one vowing has become unable to fulfill the personal vow, he must fulfill the real vow through another.

V. Question IV. Are heirs bound to fulfill the vows of the testator? Answer. To personal vows they are not bound. But heirs are bound to pay real vows, even if the testator expressly said that he did not wish to bind his heirs to pay such vows. For once the inheritance has been burdened with a just debt, it is no longer in the power of the testator to free it. But heirs are not bound to pay these real vows beyond the resources of the inheritance, nor before the inheritance has been entered upon, since they can repudiate it. Nor is an heir bound, to the detriment of his own Legitim, to fulfill the vows of a testator who could not burden the Legitim. Heirs can fulfill the real vows of the testator through others, just as the testator himself could have done. A Monastery too, succeeding by hereditary right to the goods of a professed Religious, is bound to fulfill the real vows which he made before his profession, because the inheritance passes to the Monastery with this burden. When the inheritance is burdened with several debts, first debts of justice must be paid, and afterwards legacies and vows. If there are several vows, those of greater moment must be paid first. If there are several heirs, each is bound to pay his own part. If, however, the thing owed to God is in the hands of one heir, the other heirs are bound to make compensation...

A donee is bound to fulfill real vows which affect the thing donated, if the donor has become unable, whatever several say to the contrary: because a debt always follows the thing to which it is attached. A legatee, according to all, is bound to pay the real vows of the one leaving the legacy.

VI. Question V. At what time must vows be fulfilled? Answer. When a determinate time is set for execution, then it must be fulfilled at that time. When the time is indeterminate, then the one vowing must fulfill it as soon as he conveniently can, as is said in Deuteronomy 23 — unless a reasonable cause of deferring is present, so that the vow may be better fulfilled. If you foresee that you will be impeded in the future from fulfilling a vow attached to no particular day, you are bound to anticipate the execution of the vow. A vow not fulfilled at the designated time must be fulfilled after that time has elapsed. You vowed to repay Peter a hundred, which you owe within a month; the time having elapsed, you are bound to fulfill it. If, however, you vowed to fast on the vigil of such a feast, the feast having passed, the vow is extinguished. But those who vowed to fast on each Friday of this month — it is more probable to me that, the month having elapsed, they are bound to fast on each Friday of the following month: since all the Fridays of the whole year are of the same nature. He who vowed to fast on the vigil of St. Francis is not bound to anticipate it, even if he foresees that on that day he will not be able to keep the fast: because the vow is attached to a determinate day.

VII. Question VI. What must be said of a doubtful vow? Answer. You can doubt: 1. whether you made a vow; 2. whether you fulfilled it once made; 3. concerning the quantity of the thing promised. The discourse is not of a light suspicion, or vain scruples, but of a grave doubt, arisen from probable opposing reasons, which keep the intellect in suspense. The Probabilists, relying on that principle, "The condition of the possessor is the better," absolve this one vowing, when doubtful, from the obligation of the vow. This opinion is no less false than the Probabilism on which it rests. Wherefore the Antiprobabilists defend the opposite. St. Thomas, on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, ad 8 [recte], has this: But if he doubts how he conducted himself in vowing, he ought to choose the safer way, lest he commit himself to danger. The same St. Antoninus and the sacred canons teach. See Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 4.

VIII. If you are certain of the vow, and doubt whether the execution has been fulfilled, according to all you are bound to fulfill the vow. If you doubt the quantity of the thing promised, you must choose the safer part, as the sacred canons prescribe. You doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty; you are bound to pay a hundred. He who vowed to give a chalice to the Church, but doubts whether a golden or a silver one should be given, ought to offer a golden or silver one according to the custom known to him of the Church to which he promised, bronze or copper being excluded. He who vowed that he would not approach a woman, but doubts whether the approach was fornicatory or conjugal, should abstain from either approach. He who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or the use of reason, is bound to the vow, as the common opinion teaches: since it is established that a vow was made, and it is only doubted at what time it was made. Scarcely anyone vows before the use of reason: therefore it must be presumed that, the use of reason having been completed, the vow was made. One certain of having made a vow, but doubting whether he had the intent of binding himself, is bound to fulfill the vow: because, the deed being proved, all things that naturally accompany such a deed are presumed. Similarly, he who made a vow extorted by fear must be presumed, in a doubtful case, to have had the intention of binding himself: because to presume simulation in one vowing or swearing is to presume a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime. If the one vowing doubts, in the aforesaid event, whether he used amphibology of words, or mental restriction, some say the vow does not bind; but this opinion is false for the reason given, and because in doubt the safer part must be chosen. He who, provoked by anger, makes a vow, but afterwards doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, is bound absolutely to fulfill the vow: because anger rarely so disturbs reason as to take away the liberty sufficient for sinning, and so for vowing. Wherefore if the doubt cannot be laid to rest, the rule must be kept: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen.

IX. Question VII. He who vowed to abstain from wine — is he bound to abstain from beer, and other liquors distilled from wine? Answer. He who vowed to abstain from wine to avoid drunkenness must abstain from all liquors that produce drunkenness. Wherefore Fr. La-Croix is mistaken, who, book 3, part 1, number 459, with his Gobat, teaches that the one vowing, although he intended in his vow to avoid drunkenness, can take any other drinks apt to inebriate. No less lax is the opinion of Fr. Castropalao, who, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, teaches that he who vowed to abstain from wine can drink only so much wine as would suffice for temperate drinkers at one meal. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second commandment of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 3, § 2, number 86, page 238, delivers this judgment: "Surely Castropalao, too laxly, even by German reckoning, requires that quantity which would suffice for some man drinking temperately at one dinner." The laxity of certain Probabilists is sometimes so ample that it displeases even the Probabilists themselves.

X. He who vowed to fast, determining nothing, must keep the vow according to the rite of the Church. Wherefore Sanchez and Tamburini teach too laxly that this man need not abstain from milk-foods in the time of Lent. This opinion falls, it seems to me, into the following condemned thesis: It is not evident that the custom of not eating eggs and milk-foods in Lent obliges. He who vowed to fast, no fixed number of days being set, satisfies the vow if he fasts a single day. He who vowed several fasts does not seem to satisfy it with two fasts: because plurality is not signified by the number two, according to common signification. He who vowed to fast for a month is free from the fast on Sundays: because the fast must be interpreted according to the rite of the Church. Yet some Catholic, led by a singular devotion, all superstition being removed, could fast on Sundays too — and especially to tame the flesh and concupiscence, as so many holy men have done, keeping a continual fast.

XI. He who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfies the vow on feast days by hearing one Mass: since the reasonable intention appears to be that he wills to let no day pass without hearing Mass. A girl who vowed virginity is bound to preserve it after the first shameful act committed. It is otherwise if she had vowed expressly only to avoid the first shameful act: because the vow depends on the will of the one vowing. He who made a vow of pilgrimage satisfies it by an equestrian pilgrimage: because this is a true pilgrimage, provided he did not intend to bind himself to a journey on foot; but he would by no means satisfy it if hired for a wage, or forced by violence: because the execution of a vow is an act of virtue; yet if he consented in mind and intention, even though outwardly compelled, he would fulfill the vow.

XII. He who vowed alms, without determining its quantity, can determine it after the vow was made, just as he could have before the vow. He who vowed to give one of his animals, or of the Church's vessels, can offer whichever of the promised things he pleases: for he is not bound to give either the more precious vessel or the better animal. A moderate mean must be kept in these cases. If, of the things promised, all but one should perish, this one must be offered. If you vowed to give to one of two Churches, designating neither, you can select whichever you prefer.

XIII. Question VIII. Does an error concerning the substance of the vow render it invalid? Answer. The common opinion affirms it: because error takes away the voluntary; for nothing is willed that is not first known. But error concerning adventitious matters and the circumstances of a vow does not render the vow null. But whence is it to be gathered whether circumstances redound to the substance of the vow, or not? Those redound to the substance of the vow which regard the end of the vow; but those are occasions of vowing, which excite one to vow. You vow alms to be conferred upon an honest poor man. The relief of poverty is the end of the vow...

the vow. The honesty of the poor man is the occasion which excites and impels you to the vow. In doubt whether some circumstances have the character of the end of the vow, or of the occasion, one must examine whether, these being removed, the end of the vow would still stand: for if it stands, all the other things have merely the character of occasion. But if, on the contrary, these being absent, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end.

XIV. Question IX. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Answer. One fear is grave, falling upon a constant man; another is light. A grave fear can arise intrinsically, as from infirmity, a storm, or an imminent shipwreck. A vow made by force of intrinsic fear is valid both by natural law and by positive law: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself. Valid, then, are vows made to avoid death, shipwreck, or another misfortune. A vow is also valid on account of fear justly inflicted from outside: because when fear is justly inflicted in order to extort a vow, the one vowing is unreasonably unwilling. Light fear does not invalidate a vow, because it lightly injures free consent.

XV. The difficulty is concerning a vow made from a grave fear unjustly inflicted from outside, in order to extort it. That this vow is valid by natural law is the common opinion of the Theologians, given that the man, though unjustly compelled, truly and sincerely wills the vow, and in very deed makes it. For fear diminishes, but does not take away, the voluntary, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3. To this the Theologians commonly subscribe. As to ecclesiastical law, if the discourse be of a solemn vow made in monastic profession, all affirm that this vow is null, as all the laws declare. If the discourse be of other vows, the Theologians dispute on both sides, and all affirm that each opinion is probable. The former opinion holds that vows of this kind are valid, because the laws speak only of a solemn vow, and moreover the invalidation of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the law of nature. And this opinion seems more probable, because in very deed the adversaries have adduced no text of this kind that declares such vows null.

XVI. Question X. What must be said of a conditional vow? Answer. In any vow, even an absolute one, certain general conditions are included, such as: if I shall be able, if it please God, if the Superior decree nothing else. Particular conditions depend on and are added by the free will of the one vowing himself. The execution of a conditional vow is suspended until the condition occurs. But a condition concerning the present, or the past, or a necessary future, does not make a vow conditional; only a condition concerning a contingent future event does so. A shameful condition, against the substance of the vow, invalidates it, because an error of the substance of a contract renders the act involuntary — not so if it is against the accidents of the contract. A vow under an honorable contingent future condition does not oblige until the condition occurs. If the condition depends solely on the will of the one vowing, he can suspend it at pleasure before it occurs, and free himself from the vow; if it depends on another's will, he is bound to await its arrival — as if he had said: "I vow Religion, if my father consents; if my sister marries," etc. If by his own malice he impedes the occurrence of a condition that depends on another's will, he is bound to fulfill the vow: because he who by his own fault becomes unable to execute a vow is bound to compensate for the vow, as St. Thomas teaches on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, article 3.

Lucia, an Anglican, makes the three perpetual vows of religion in a certain congregation of Anglican women called Saint Margaret’s. While she was faithfully observing her vows, by reading Catholic books she gradually became persuaded that the Catholic religion alone was true. Therefore she left the Anglican Church and the congregation without any permission of the superioress, and was received into the Catholic Church by Julius, a Catholic priest. She asked Julius whether and to what extent she was still bound by the vows made in the Anglican Church, and what she must do if she were bound; he answered that she was by no means bound by them, inasmuch as they had been made from error, and that even if she were bound, he dispensed her from them in such a way that she remained entirely free. Hence it is asked: