Truthfulness and Reputation (Eighth Commandment)

¹ "You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor." Ex. 20:16.

This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits primarily false testimony, whether in judgment or outside judgment; secondarily, however, it prohibits lying and the unjust lesion of the reputation and honor of one's neighbor which is done by words. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that we always speak the truth. Therefore by this precept generally it is prohibited that damage be inflicted on one's neighbor by words or equivalent signs. Wherefore one must treat: a. of veracity and fidelity; b. of lying; c. of detraction; d. of insult; e. of violation of a secret.

Although violation of a secret can harm one's neighbor not only in the goods of reputation and honor, but also in goods of life and fortune, and therefore can also be opposed to the fifth and seventh precept, nevertheless authors are accustomed to refer the treatment of it to the eighth precept.

¹ St. Thomas II-II, q. 72-74; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 962-1003; Lugo, De iustitia et iure, disp. 14; Tamburini, Explicatio decalogi, l. 9; Reuter, Theologia moralis II, n. 395-432; Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis II, tract. V, n. 630-776; Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus Theolog. moral. II, n. 1050-1102; Lehmkuhl, Theologia moral.^10 I, n. 1172-1200; Genicot, Theologiae moralis institut.^3 I, n. 412-433.

The Eighth Commandment of the Decalogue is, “ Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”¹ Primarily it forbids the giving of false evidence, especially in a court of justice, against one’s neighbour, by which his reputation is unjustly injured. But because the same effect is produced by rash judgements, calumny, tale-bearing, backbiting, contumely, lying, and the betrayal of secrets, all these sins are also forbidden by this commandment. Inasmuch as it is virtually positive, it prescribes the telling of the truth.

¹ Exod. xx. 16.

A JUDGEMENT is a firm assent of the mind to a proposition without fear of mistake, and if such an assent is given without sufficient grounds it is a rash judgement. The term, however, is used here only of judgements without sufficient reasons against the character of others, as that such a one is wicked, untrustworthy, a drunkard, and so on.

Such rash judgements, when they are formed deliberately with the consciousness that there is not sufficient ground for them, are sinful, and if the matter be serious they are gravely sinful. The reason is because all have a right to our good esteem unless they have forfeited it by their bad conduct; in judging others rashly we arrogate to ourselves an authority which we do not possess, and we use it unjustly against the character of our neighbour.” We thus violate justice, which in serious matters binds under grave sin.

Rash judgements, however, to which depraved human nature is so prone, are not usually grave sins in those who are striving to lead good lives. Rash and evil doubts, or suspicions, or opinions about others are frequent, but these, although wrong, are not as a rule gravely sinful, for they do not inflict serious harm on our neighbour’s reputation. 3° Jas. iv 11:

It is no sin to think that another is wicked or has committed a sin if we know it to be a fact. Nor are we obliged to think that all men are good until we know something to the contrary. We may suspend our judgement about such as we do not know sufficiently well to be able to say whether they are good or bad. We know, moreover, that there are many bad people in the world, and prudence suggests that we should be on our guard against all whom we do not know well, though justice and charity incline us to think no evil of anyone.

Rash judgements frequently arise from the malice of our own hearts, or from hatred and envy.¹ If we purify our own hearts from vice and wickedness, we shall think thoughts of others. kindlier

¹ Rom. ii 1.

DETRACTION, slander, or backbiting is committed by unjustly depriving another of his good name in his absence. If this is done by falsely imputing to him something which injures his reputation it is called calumny. Tale-bearing is a similar sin, and consists in making mischief between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them. All these are sins against justice and charity, for they tend to deprive our neighbour of his good name, “ which is better than great riches,” and to which he has a strict right until he forfeits it by his public conduct. Even if what is said to the disadvantage of our neighbour be true, we have no right to make it known to his discredit, as long as it is not public, for he still retains his reputation, he still has a right to it, and he must not be deprived of it without just cause. Even the dead retain their right to their good name, for death does not make them non-existent, and men are prepared to do and suffer much for the sake of leaving a reputation behind them. Besides, speaking ill of the dead frequently besmirches the living. Not only individuals but corporate bodies have each their reputation, and detraction may be committed against a Religious Order, for example, or a diocese, as well as. against individuals.

Inasmuch as detraction is contrary to justice and charity, which, as we have seen, bind under a grave obligation, it will of itself be a serious sin, though frequently only venial on account of levity of matter. The measure of the gravity of the sin will be the harm which it causes to the person whose reputation suffers. The making known of the grave but secret sin of another with malicious intent or to his serious injury will certainly be a mortal sin. The disclosure of a venial sin of another, or even of some hidden defect for which he is not responsible, as, for example, illegitimacy, may cause him serious damage and constitute a grievous sin. However, the making known of even a grievous sin of another is not always mortally sinful, for sometimes no serious harm follows from it. A notorious drunkard will not be injured appreciably if a secret sin of drunkenness is made public, nor a woman of doubtful reputation if some specific fall is mentioned. On the other hand, although a man has lost his reputation in one particular matter, he may still have one to lose in other matters, and if his secret sins in these matters be made known, a more or less grievous sin of detraction will be committed. A man may be of notoriously loose morals but with a character still to lose for honesty and uprightness.

When a man has been tried and condemned in an open court of justice, there is no wrong done him by publishing the fact in the newspapers, or telling it to those who would not otherwise have heard of it. The judicial sentence penalizes him and deprives him of the right to his reputation in the matter touched by the sentence. .This holds true of distant places and countries, and even of distant times. No injustice, then, is committed against one who has been legally convicted of crime by making this known in a place to which he has come in the hope of its not being known. Uncharitable harm might be done against such a one if he was trying to lead a good life in his new surroundings.

Similarly, the sin of detraction is not committed when a sin which is matter of common report in one place is made known in another, if the knowledge of it would be sure to penetrate there before long. It is a disputed point among theologians whether or not sin is committed in such a case if otherwise the knowledge would not penetrate to the place where it is made known. At any rate, it is advisable to keep silence about such cases unless there be some good reason for making known the truth. If someone is thinking of employing an unknown servant whom we know to have committed theft from her - former mistress in another part of the country, we are justified in making the fact known to the person concerned. It does not follow that we are justified in publishing elsewhere the sin of another which was well known indeed to a particular circle or community, but which was not really public. In such a case the right to one’s reputation with the outside world has not been lost.

The right to one’s reputation is not absolute. We are, of course, never justified in calumniating another by imputing false charges to him. But for just and sufficient reasons we may make known the secret sin of another. There are cases when this is necessary for the public good or for the protection of the rights of the innocent, and in a conflict of rights the stronger should prevail. Thus, when lawfully summoned to give evidence in a court of justice we may witness to secret crime, and generally, whenever the defence of ourselves, or of the innocent, or the good of the delinquent himself, or of our hearers, require the truth to be made known.

If by listening to a detractor we encourage him to slander another, we are formal co-operators in his sin and are as guilty as the detractor himself. If our listening is not indeed the efficacious cause of the detraction, we do not sin against justice, but we sin against charity if we could prevent the detraction and do not do so. For charity obliges us, as we saw above, to correct an erring brother and to prevent harm being done to our neighbour as far as possible. It is true that private individuals will seldom be bound by a grave obligation in this matter; frequently they could not intervene without doing more harm than good; but those in authority are more frequently and more strictly bound to correct their subjects and to defend their reputation against slander.

Inasmuch as detraction, calumny, and other sins of the like nature are contrary to justice, they will always leave the obligation of making restitution as far as possible for the unjust damage which they cause, as we saw above when treating of restitution.

Our neighbour has a right not only to his good name but also to the honour or the external marks of our esteem, befitting his qualities and position. The Apostle exhorts us to “love one another with the charity of brotherhood, with honour preventing one another,’’¹ and in another place he bids us render honour to whom honour is due.² The sin of contumely is committed by any act or word which is contrary to the honour which we are bound to show our neighbour. It may be committed by neglecting to show him the honour which is his due, or by saying or doing something in his presence which expresses our contempt of him.

¹ Rom. xii 10.

² Rom. xiii 7.

Contumely of itself is a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation, as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Our Lord’s words show how grievous a sin is committed by treating another with contumely: “‘ Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.”¹ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be only a venial sin, for levity of matter, and chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate another, is of course harmless provided that it keeps within due bounds.

¹ Matt. v 22.

Inasmuch as contumely violates justice, proper satisfaction must be made for insults. The kind and manner of making satisfaction will depend much on the relative condition of the parties. Sometimes the person injured may be reasonably presumed not to wish the memory of the insult to be revived by formal apologies, and the danger of again arousing bitter and angry feelings may also excuse one from open acts of satisfaction.

A LIE is defined by St Thomas to be a speech contrary to one’s mind.¹ It is, then, of the essence of a lie that there should be an intention of saying what is false, that there should be a contradiction between the mind and the external expression of it. One may tell a lie, then, by saying what is true if it is believed by the speaker not to be true, and a lie is told by denying what is false if it is believed to be true. Although a liar usually has the intention of deceiving others, yet such an intention is not of the essence of a lie. A man may be well aware that he has no chance of being able to deceive another, but may say what he knows to be untrue in order to excuse himself or not to stand self-convicted. Men who are known to lie habitually do not expect others to be deceived by what they say, but still they lie when they say what is not true. One may lie to God, though he knows that he cannot deceive him.

In saying that a lie is a speech contrary to one’s mind we understand not only words but gestures, or any signs by which our thought is manifested to others. As St Augustine says: “* He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says something else by word or by any signs whatever.”² For we may and do constantly speak not only by word of mouth, but by our tone, looks, gesture, actions, and by the very circumstances in which our words are uttered. The words “I am not guilty ” in the mouth of a murderer have quite a different meaning when they are uttered in the dock and at the feet of his confessor. The words, the tone, the look may be the same; the circumstances make it a true speech in the first case and a sacrilegious lie in the second.

A lie in action is called hypocrisy or simulation, but the malice is the same as in lying words.

Lies are divided by theologians into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies, A jocose lie is told to amuse others; it is something said in joke which the speaker knows to be false, and uttered with the intention of saying what he knows to be false. If what is not true is said in joke without any intention of lying, and in such a way that ordinary hearers would understand, there is no lie. To speak ironically is not to lie.

An officious lie is a lie of excuse, or a falsehood which, while procuring some advantage, does nobody any harm.

A hurtful lie does an injury to someone.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 110, a. I.

² De Mendacio, c. 3,

According to the common Catholic teaching, lying of every kind is intrinsically wrong; so that, inasmuch as we may not do evil that good may come of it, we are never justified in telling a lie, not even if the life of another or the safety of the world depended on it. St Augustine, St Thomas, and other Catholic Doctors and theologians gather this doctrine from the teaching of Holy Scripture which in many places seems to forbid all lying as absolutely as it forbids theft or homicide. Pope Innocent III gives expression to this teaching when he says in the Decretals, “‘ Since Holy Scripture prohibits lying even to save the life of another.”¹ Reason teaches us the same doctrine. For a lie is something inordinate in itself. It is a perversion of the moral order which the law of nature prescribes should be observed between the mind and the expression of it in our intercourse with others, We are endowed with the faculty of making known our thoughts and feelings to others; right order requires that the external expression should agree with the internal thought, that the machinery should be correctly regulated, that there should be no contradiction between the parts of the same agent, as there is when a lie is told. The moral turpitude which there is in such a contradiction between the mind and its external expression is well seen in the vice of hypocrisy. When a man pretends to be other than he is, there is the same perversion of right order that there is in lying. in nature; It is like a monstrosity the parts of one whole do not fit harmoniously together; they are out of gear and offensive to the view. There is, then, a special virtue of veracity which prescribes that when we have to make known our thoughts and feelings we should do it truthfully, or, in other words, we should make the outward expression agree with the thought. This virtue of veracity exists and is of obligation apart from any right to the truth that there may be in others. Veracity is something which we owe to ourselves as well as to our neighbour. It is true indeed that society is very much interested in sincerity and veracity. Social intercourse is very much hindered by lying and the mistrust which lying generates.² But although this is true, yet lying must be avoided primarily because it is unworthy of the dignity of man; it is a perversion of right order; it is intrinsically, in itself, wrong.

Some of the Greek Fathers held a different view from the above, and thought that lying was not wrong under all circumstances, but that it was occasionally allowable, like medicine, on account of inevitable necessity. English moralists have very commonly held a similar opinion, that a lie is only told when what is false is said to one who has a right to the truth. Some modern Catholic theologians have also adopted this opinion, which places the malice of lying in the denial of the truth to one who has a right to it. They do not, however, sufficiently explain the nature of that right, whether it is a strict right of justice, or a right in a vague sense demanded by the good of society, and so due out of legal justice, or charity, or piety, or obedience. Moreover, it is as difficult to determine when that right exists as it is to determine what is a lie according to the common opinion, and the door seems to be opened to promiscuous lying provided that no injury be done to our neighbour. The only lie which the theory acknowledges seems to be the hurtful lie. Nor does it sufficiently answer the arguments on which the common opinion is based.

¹ C. Super eo, De usuris.

² Eph. iv 25.

If it is never lawful to tell a lie, if the lie of necessity cannot be allowed, what means have we of safeguarding a secret ?

Catholic theologians answer this question by propounding their doctrine of mental reservation. Mental reservations are either strictly or widely so called. The former is the restriction of one’s meaning in making an assertion to the proposition as modified by some addition made to it within the mind of the speaker. As if on being asked “ Are you going to town ?” one were to answer “ Yes,” meaning “‘ in imagination.” In wide mental reservations the words used are capable of being understood in different senses, either because they are ambiguous in themselves, or because they have a special sense derived from the circumstances of time, place, or person in which they are spoken. Thus, when a servant says that her master is not in, the words may mean either that he is absent, or that he does not wish to see the visitor. The servant’s real meaning is restricted to one of these senses. In the same way a defendant on his trial in an English court .of justice pleads not guilty—i.e., until the charge be proved. A lawyer or a doctor questioned about professional secrets replies, “ I don’t know ”—i.e., I have no knowledge which I can communicate.

Although strict mental reservations are lies, and therefore sinful, yet wide mental reservations are in common use; they are necessary, and they are not lies. They are necessary because justice and charity require that secrets should be kept, and frequently there is no other way of keeping them. They are not lies because, as we saw above, words take their meaning not only from their grammatical signification, but from the circumstances in which they are used. When a priest is asked about a sin which a penitent has confessed to him, and he answers, ‘‘I never heard of it,” he speaks as a man, not as a confessor who holds the place of God in the tribunal of Penance. All are aware that he is a priest, and to all his words mean, “‘ I never heard of it outside of the confessional.” He never speaks of what he has heard inside the confessional, and nothing can, or should, be gathered about what he has heard there from the words which he uses. Although these wide mental reservations are not lies, yet they must not be employed without just cause, for the good of society requires that we should speak our mind with frankness and sincerity in the sense in which we are understood by our hearers, unless there be a good reason for permitting their self-deception when they take our words in a sense that we do not mean.

Truth requires not only that we should say nothing that we know to be false, but also that we should weigh our statements and not make rash and unconsidered assertions. There are some people whose talk runs babbling along like a stream in a fresh, and with as little meaning. A man with a love for truth will be more sparing of his words, and will weigh them before giving them currency.

A SECRET is some hidden matter concerning another which cannot be made known without causing him injury or displeasure. Besides the secret of the seal of confession, which is treated of elsewhere, divines distinguish three kinds of secret: the natural secret, the promised secret, and the secret which is communicated under an express or implied contract of secrecy.

When we come to the knowledge of something concerning another which cannot be made known without causing him injury or displeasure we are under the obligation of a natural secret not to make it known. This obligation arises from charity and justice, inasmuch as these virtues forbid us to do anything to the hurt or annoyance of our neighbour.

If we come to know something concerning our neighbour and then give a promise not to reveal it to others, we are bound by a promised secret. If the matter was of its nature secret, there would be the obligation of a natural secret independently of the promise. When the promise is given, a special obligation arising therefrom binds the party to secrecy. In case the matter was not of itself secret, the only obligation would be that arising from the promise. It depends to some extent on the intention of the promisor as to.what obligation he takes upon himself by his promise. He may intend to bind himself to keep his word by the virtue of fidelity, because it is the duty of an honest man to keep his promise. In this case, as fidelity only binds under pain of venial sin, there will only be this obligation to observe the promised secret. However, if the other party to whom secrecy was promised would suffer serious loss from the violation of the secret, or if the parties were bound by mutual promises, then justice would require the secret to be kept, and the violation of the obligation would of itself be gravely sinful. Apart even from these circumstances, the promisor may intend to give the other a right to secrecy in justice, and then he will be bound to observe it under pain of mortal sin, A secret which is confided to another under the condition that secrecy is to be observed constitutes the matter of an onerous contract and binds more strictly than either a natural or a promised secret. Such are secrets of office which officials of all sorts become aware of in the execution of the duties entrusted to them; professional secrets of doctors, lawyers, priests, and others, who are consulted as experts by people in doubt or difficulty; as well as all others which are entrusted to any person under the express or implied condition of secrecy.

The obligation to observe a natural secret will cease after the secret has become public property. The party whose secret it is may sometimes be reasonably presumed not to be unwilling that the matter should be communicated to another, as, for example, to somebody who can and who will be of assistance to him. If the public good requires that the secret should be made known in order to prevent public wrong, the obligation of secrecy will cease, for the public welfare is of greater importance than that of an individual. If serious harm threatens one’s self or some other innocent person, or the party whose secret is in question, and the harm can only be averted by making known the secret, this will be allowed in the case of natural or promised secrets. The right of defence from impending evil prevails over that of natural and promised secrets.

Even the obligation of the third class of secrets will cease when they cannot be observed without serious harm to the public weal. The natural law, however, which requires that people should be able to consult others in their difficulties in all security, demands that this class of secret should be observed in the case when even serious harm threatens some innocent person, unless he whose secret is in question is the cause of the impending evil. Thus, if I know as a professional secret who is the real culprit in the case of a crime wrongly imputed to an innocent person, I may disclose the real culprit if by some special means he caused the false accusation of the innocent person, otherwise I must keep the secret. ‘It is a disputed point among theologians whether I am bound to observe a secret at the peril of my life when it was entrusted to me under that express condition, some maintaining that no one can pledge his life in that way, others more probably holding the contrary. ’Whether or not I am bound at my own serious loss to keep a secret entrusted to me under the condition of secrecy depends to some extent on circumstances, Sometimes I cannot be supposed under the circumstances to have bound myself by so strict an obligation; but as a rule professional secrets will continue to be binding even when the observance of them entails serious loss.

We are bound to make known natural and promised secrets at the command of lawful superiors. The obligation of obedience to lawful authority prevails over that of secrecy due to individuals in those cases. And so a witness in a court of justice when lawfully questioned about what he knows under the obligation of natural or promised secrecy must give the evidence required. Similarly, secret impediments to marriage must be declared according to the precept contained in the proclamation of banns. Professional secrets, however, and, in general, secrets which belong to the third class, are privileged, and must not be declared, unless they have ceased to be binding for some such reason as those mentioned above. Secrecy in this case is demanded by the natural law, which gives the fullest possible security to those who consult others in their difficulties, and even the precept of one’s superior cannot avail against the natural law, as St Thomas teaches.¹

English law acknowledges the privilege of state secrets and of the professional secrets of lawyers, but in the case of doctors and clergymen it does not as yet go the full length of the doctrine laid down above.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 70, a. I, ad 2.

The doctrine with regard to secrets is applicable to the opening and reading of letters, unless it is known that they contain no secrets and the writer is not aggrieved. It is, however, a general rule of Religious Orders that letters written by and to religious may be opened by the superior, except such as contain matters of conscience, and communications between higher superiors and their subjects.

IV. The daughters of pride are:

1. Presumption, "which is the inordinate appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. It is commonly only venial. It becomes mortal, however, if it brings harm to God or one's neighbor; for example, if you presume ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the power of sacred Order, likewise the office of physician, advocate, confessor, etc., without due skill" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66).

2. Ambition, "which is the inordinate appetite for dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; as if you seek a benefice or office of which you are unworthy; or by an illicit manner and means, for example, by simony. It is per se a venial sin. But it becomes mortal either by reason of the means through which honor is sought, or by reason of the harm which is brought upon one's neighbor. Finally, if honor is sought moderately for an honorable end, it will be an act of magnanimity" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of praise and fame to be obtained by the manifestation of one's own excellence. "It is called vain when it is sought from a bad, false, or fictitious thing; or from something which is not worthy of glory, or not of so much glory, as from riches, trifles, etc.; or among those who do not judge rightly about the thing; or without a due end. It is per se a venial sin; often mortal by accident, as was said concerning ambition" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

By vain glory one sins in two ways:

a) "Directly; and this either by words, and it is boasting, which is venial per se, if it is about good things, for example, fasting, prayer, etc., although by accident, often by reason of harm, if it is false, it becomes mortal; as also: 1. If one says something against the glory of God, as in Ezekiel 28: 'I am God.' 2. If he breaks forth into insults; for example, 'I am not as the rest of men, an adulterer, etc., or even as this man.' 3. From an evil end. 4. If it is done with notable harm to one's neighbor. 5. If it is about a mortally evil matter... Or by deeds, which, if they are true and have something of admiration, is called the invention of novelties, for the common people are accustomed to admire these, such as foreign garments, opinions, etc.; mortal, if it notably corrupts youth or morals. But if the deeds are false, it is hypocrisy; for example, if someone does some good thing so that he may seem good, although he is not" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5).

b) "Indirectly, insofar as someone does not wish to be less than another. This happens in four ways: 1. Through the intellect; and it is pertinacity, by which someone adheres too tenaciously to his own opinion, which is mortal if truth of great moment is opposed, or if it is joined with danger to a third party, for example, if a physician remains in his opinion with danger to the sick person. 2. Through the will; and it is discord, by which one sins mortally when it concerns the good of God or of one's neighbor, in which they ought to be concordant. 3. Through words; and it is contention, which is mortal when, with a mind to contradict, you wrangle about truth pertaining to the faith or to the salvation of soul or body. 4. Through deeds, when someone does not wish to carry out what he ought; and it is disobedience" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

II. Cooperation in bad books, newspapers, etc. 1. It is illicit to compose, publish, and undertake for printing bad writings, because those acting thus harm the common good most gravely. There is added the fact that those who compose act in this way, while others easily proceed in this way with the intention that the bad writings be bought and worn out by use; in which case they must be charged with formal cooperation (n. 555).

2. It is lawful for a grave cause to perform those things which are remotely related to printing or reading, such as procuring paper and other implements, preparing paper, arranging printed sheets or books, carrying bought books to buyers. This follows from what has been said about remote cooperation in common harm (n. 556). For a very grave cause those things are lawful which are less remotely related to printing and reading, such as arranging type or inking it, placing paper underneath, turning the press, correcting printed sheets. Yet if there is question of a printing shop specially erected to attack good morals or religion, for example by communistic, socialistic writings, etc., by reason of scandal it will scarcely ever be right to remain in it. Moreover, everyone should strive that provision for support be made in another way.

3. It is illicit to circulate bad writings by commending them, because there is formal cooperation. Nor is it of itself lawful to expose them publicly or announce them, for example in shops, in newspapers, at railway stations. Yet these things of themselves involve mere pronouncement (notification), not invitation, and therefore of themselves contain material cooperation only; and this, even with common estimation considered, is sufficiently probable. From intention, indeed, commonly approval and invitation are had; but if one proceeds in the name of another, that is, of the one commanding, abstraction can be made from a depraved intention. This being posited, on the part of the agent there remains only material cooperation, which seems to be excused for a very grave cause. Yet one should strive that as soon as possible he obtain a livelihood in another way.

4. With respect to the sale of bad writings, first note these things from the Code: "The prohibition of books¹ brings this about, that a book without due permission can neither be published, nor read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor communicated with others in any way" (can. 1398, § 1). Sellers of books should not sell, lend, or retain books treating professedly of obscene matters; they should not have other prohibited books for sale unless they have obtained due permission from the Apostolic See, nor should they sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are legitimately sought by the buyer (can. 1404). With these things noted, I say:

a) Owners of bad bookstores not only most gravely violate public honorableness and most gravely harm the common good, but also, since they proceed with this intention, that others buy and wear out by use what has been bought, are guilty of formal cooperation (n. 555). I have said owners of bad bookstores; since a somewhat milder judgment must be made concerning lower assistants: for on the one hand they are more easily immune from that depraved intention; on the other hand the acts placed by them do not necessarily involve approval of sin - neither of themselves, as is clear, nor from the circumstances, because it can be believed that they intend only the support of life. Hence they can be immune from formal cooperation (n. 555), and therefore can be excused for a proportionate cause. Yet, with scandal and the danger to which the faith and morals of the assistants are often exposed considered, a proportionate cause will be present only with difficulty. Moreover, one must always strive that livelihood be provided in another way.

b) With respect to others - for example, to owners of bookstores which cannot be called bad, and their assistants - this must be said: to sell bad writings is of itself illicit, unless there is question of those to whom it is sufficiently clear that reading is lawful; to commend the purchase of bad writings is simply illicit, unless again there is discussion of those who enjoy permission to read them.

5. To write, from time to time, some article for a bad newspaper is lawful for a reasonable and just cause. Yet attention must be paid to can. 1386.²

6. To subscribe to a bad newspaper is lawful for a grave cause, for example if someone needs it for conducting business.

7. To announce in a bad newspaper one's things to be sold is lawful for a middling cause. Yet work must be done so that announcements of this kind do not become necessary, and that they be made in good rather than bad newspapers.

8. To display bad papers in one's inns or houses is illicit; nor is it lawful from the fact that those gathering there seek them, otherwise being about to go elsewhere. Yet if such a paper is asked for on account of announced matters necessary to know, it is lawful to display it in a separate place. Further, on account of notable loss of profit otherwise to be feared, it is lawful to display those newspapers which only now and then contain something dangerous.

Moreover, what is to be said about the prior censorship of books and their prohibition and about penalties should be compared.

¹ "The things prescribed under this title concerning books are to be applied to publications, newspapers, periodicals, and any other published writings, unless something else is clear" (can. 1384, § 2).

² Canon 1386 states: 1. Concerning secular clerics: "Secular clerics are forbidden without the consent of their Ordinaries, and religious without the permission of their major Superior and the Ordinary of the place, to publish books, even those which treat of profane matters, and to write in newspapers, sheets, or periodical pamphlets, or to moderate the same" (§ 1). 2. Concerning Catholic lay persons: "In newspapers, sheets, or periodical pamphlets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, not even Catholic lay persons should write anything, unless a just and reasonable cause advises it, approved by the Ordinary of the place" (§ 2).

II. Cooperation of workmen and merchants. 1. It is lawful to make and sell indifferent things, even under the sole title of ordinary profit; and this holds even if you know that many will abuse them. Nor is there an obligation of inquiring into the intention of buyers. If in a particular case abuse is rightly feared, a cause proportionately grave is required, and it must be graver if harm to be inflicted on a third party is feared. Hence in practice it will scarcely ever be lawful, for example, to sell weapons which evidently are sought for killing, or a drug which is judged to be bought for procuring abortion (St. Alphonsus, II, 66, with note f., 71, 76; III, 571, 697).

2. Things to which a great danger of abuse is attached, such as poisons, it is not lawful to sell unless there is sufficient certainty about a right intention (St. Alphonsus, II, 72).

3. Things which can serve almost only for sin - such as instruments destined for preventing conception, obscene images - are to be judged thus with respect to making and selling: owners of factories and shops, as was said about owners of bad bookstores, not only most gravely harm public decency and the common good, but also proceed with the intention that others buy and, having bought, use them up; and for this reason they are guilty of formal cooperation (n. 558). But concerning lower ministers, what we said about lower ministers of bad bookstores in the cited number must be said.

4. With respect to the advertising and display of bad things, apply what was said about the publication (n. 558) and display (n. cited) of bad writings.

II. Discord is a dissent of wills concerning a good which we ought to will from charity. It is a grave sin from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns a good necessarily or not necessarily to be pursued (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 37, a. 1).

III. Object. Besides what was said in n. 832 and following about objects unfit for contracts in general, these things are specially to be noted:

1. The sale of another's thing, with natural law considered, is invalid; for no one enjoys the faculty of disposing in any way of the thing of another. But the seller, if he has acted in bad faith, is bound to render the owner and the buyer unharmed; if in good faith, he ought to refund the price to the buyer. The buyer, if he has proceeded in bad faith, is bound to restore his own thing to the owner and to reimburse him for other damages perhaps following; if in good faith, he is per se bound to restore the thing to the owner, but, if otherwise he cannot recover from the seller the price paid, he can return the thing bought (n. 983).

Nevertheless, let it be seen what civil law establishes, which one who has proceeded in good faith may licitly follow and urge.

2. The sale of a determinate thing already sold to a third party, with natural law considered:

a) Is invalid if the sale, with civil law considered, confers a right in the thing, as obtains, for example, in France. The reason is that there is had the sale of another's thing.

b) If the sale, with civil law considered, confers only a right to the thing, and delivery, by which a right in the thing is conferred, has not followed, it is likewise invalid, because the seller cannot grant to a third party the right which he has already granted to the former buyer. Nevertheless the delivery of the thing, although injurious to the former buyer, seems valid, because the seller, since he is still owner of the thing, is able to grant its ownership or right in the thing to the third party. But in the case he is per se bound to take care that the former buyer obtain the thing, and in addition, if he has proceeded in bad faith, to reimburse the former buyer for damages perhaps following from the injury.

What the law is, with civil law attended to, see in the Civil Code.

c) The sale of a thing which at the time of sale has totally perished is manifestly invalid. If the thing has perished only in part, with natural law considered, it must be resolved according to what is to be said in n. 898.

d) Finally, a thing bought with another's money belongs to the buyer; who nevertheless, as is clear, ought to return the money to the owner.

VII. Obligations of the seller. 1. The seller, as regards defects of the thing to be sold, is bound to manifest:

a) Substantial defects, and the defect of a quality to which he perceives the buyer's consent to be bound. For otherwise the contract, because the buyer's consent to the object of the present contract is lacking, is invalid, and therefore the seller cannot accept the agreed price (n. 837; St. Alphonsus, III, 819; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 77, a. 3).

b) A notable and hidden defect. The reason is that a thing is sought by the buyer which lacks a notable defect; this being posited, the seller, by furnishing the thing and not disclosing the defect, tacitly affirms that it lacks such a defect, unless that defect itself is manifest; and therefore he uses deceit and inflicts injury on the buyer. Hence authors generally add that even a notable and manifest defect must be disclosed if it is noticed that the buyer is laboring under invincible ignorance (St. Alphonsus, III, 823). Besides, there must be manifested:

c) A defect about which he is specially questioned, unless the buyer can discover the defect by his own inquiry. The reason is that otherwise buyers would lack a means of inquiring what sort of thing it is concerning which they are going to contract; and this cannot be admitted.

d) Outside the cases assigned there is no obligation of manifesting defects, not even hidden ones; both because otherwise trading would become almost impossible, and because universal custom confirms this.

Corollary I. If some defect can bring damage to the buyer and is not noticed by him, the seller must always - even in a case in which, according to what has been said, he is not held from justice - warn the buyer; as if a horse is furious, or a house ruinous.

Corollary II. The seller, even if he is not bound to manifest a defect, ought nevertheless to take account of the existing defect in establishing the price; if he has not done so, he is bound to restore part of the price received.

Corollary III. A seller who has not manifested defects that had to be manifested is bound, if the contract nevertheless was valid, to restore the excess of price and to reimburse other damages perhaps following from the silence; indeed, if the buyer's error gave cause to the contract, he is bound also to rescind the contract at the buyer's judgment (St. Alphonsus, III, 823).

Corollary IV. "If the seller," says St. Alphonsus with others, "protests that he does not wish to give an account of any defect whatever, but to sell as is commonly said: A sacco d'ossa rotte; then he is bound to nothing. Hence Tamburini deservedly approves the custom which flourishes in some places, especially in great fairs, that animals are sold in this way, even if the defects are most hidden. The reason is that, for removing lawsuits on account of the common good, this can be sufficiently rendered honorable by custom: provided it is understood that the thing is not sold beyond the just price, at least the highest," which the thing has when account is taken of that hidden defect (St. Alphonsus, III, 823). Apply the same to sales by an antiquarian.

Question 1. Whether it is licit to sell a "something for something else," as is said, provided that what is handed over is equivalent to the natural thing, for example to wine, butter, vinegar.

Response. It seems licit, because there is not present a substantial diversity as regards "the end of the buyer" (St. Alphonsus, III, 821). Except: 1° if the buyer manifestly wants the natural thing or a thing of a determinate species; 2° if merchants are held by custom to declare the imitation.

Question 2. Whether it is licit to sell merchandise mixed with cheaper merchandise, provided the just price is retained.

Response. Per se it is illicit. By accident it is licit: 1° if the seller's merchandise is better than usual; 2° if custom so bears. Except if the buyer offers a price greater than usual for this end, that he may certainly receive merchandise not adulterated.

2. The seller is bound to deliver the thing sold to the buyer, who, according to the diversity of civil law, by delivery acquires either a right in the thing and possession, or possession alone. In what way the thing must be delivered is established by civil law; what things must be observed by him or by the buyer as regards the place of delivery, expenses, etc., should be gathered from civil law and from the special stipulations of the contracting parties.

3. The seller is bound to furnish eviction, that is, he is bound to render the buyer unharmed if the thing bought is reclaimed totally or partially by a third party who proves himself to be owner. Hence he is bound to return the price perhaps received.

But what if a seller who proceeded in good faith no longer possesses the price either in itself or in an equivalent?

Response. Most judge that the seller is nevertheless obliged, namely by reason of the contract, whose nature carries this obligation with it. But with St. Alphonsus (III, 800) it seems that it must altogether be denied, because the seller is bound to nothing by reason of the contract, since it is invalid and destitute of all value (n. 894).

The eighth precept declares: "You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor";¹ it therefore prohibits a lie by which the neighbor's reputation is injured. It is extended by some to every injury which is inflicted on the neighbor by words or by equivalent signs. Whatever the case may be, at least because of the connection of the matter, we shall speak: 1° of the injury of truth, or of lying; 2° of the injury of reputation, or of detraction; 3° of the injury of honor, or of insult; 4° of the injury of secrecy.

¹ Exod. XX, 16.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 110, 111; St. Alphonsus, cf. Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 157-171; Homo Apostolicus, tract 5, nn. 15 and 16.)

To truthfulness is opposed every act of manifestation discordant with the internal concept. If that act is contained in words, signs, or writings, it is called a lie; if it consists in deeds, it is called simulation. Hence what we are going to say about lying should also be applied to simulation.

I. Notion. A lie is customarily defined: speech contrary to the mind. It is said:

1. Speech; by this word is understood the ordering of concepts toward another, by means either of words, which hold the principal place among signs, or of other signs (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 2).

2. Contrary to the mind, i.e. which is opposed to the concept of the mind.

Corollary I. For a lie there are required: 1° the will of saying what is false, i.e., insofar as false is taken here, what is contrary to the concept or what is held as false; 2° speech contrary to the concept. "The account of a lie is taken from formal falsity, namely from this, that someone has the will of uttering what is false; whence also a lie is named from this, that it is said contrary to the mind" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 1). But there are not required: 1° a concept false in reality, hence he lies who holds as false what he says, although what he says is true; 2° the will of deceiving, for "that someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another, by deceiving him, does not pertain to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.); nor 3° deception of the neighbor, as is clear in the accused person who, before a judge who was an eyewitness, denies the crime.

Corollary II. It is not a lie: 1° to say what is false, when the speaker holds it as true; 2° to say in jest things which are openly false, because the circumstances remove the ordinary signification of the words; 3° ironic or hyperbolic expressions, by which words are really transferred to another signification; 4° equivocal expressions, or those uttered with a broad mental restriction, as will presently be explained more fully; nor 5° is it a lie if I sufficiently show that I am unwilling to manifest the truth, because then the words from that circumstance again receive another meaning.

II. Division. A lie is distinguished as threefold: jocose, officious, and pernicious or damaging, according as it is done for the sake of pleasure or utility, whether one's own or another's, or with damage to a third party (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 2). But under the word pernicious lie there can also be comprehended a lie which is done with injury to God (cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4).

III. Morality. 1. A lie is a sin, and is never licit. It is a sin, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from reason. For an act is illicit which is opposed to the end which has been appointed to the act by nature, i.e. by the Author of nature. But a lie, i.e. speech contrary to the concept, is opposed to the end which has been appointed to speech, i.e. to the ordering of concepts toward another (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3). Then, "because man is a social animal, naturally one man owes to another that without which human society could not be preserved; but men could not live together with one another unless they believed one another as manifesting truth to one another" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1). Nor is it ever licit, because the prior disordering, about which we have spoken, cannot be removed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3; Quodlibet 8, a. 14; St. Alphonsus, III, 171).

Objection. An act with a double effect, when the things to be posited have been posited, is licit. But speech contrary to the mind sometimes becomes an act with a double effect, of which one, namely the defense of a secret, is intended, while the other is permitted.

Response. For an act with a double effect to be licit, it must be at least indifferent in itself, not disordered. But speech contrary to the mind is disordered in itself, or sinful, as follows from what has been said.

What if someone cannot hide without a lie a truth which must be positively hidden?²

Response. In the case, the obligation of hiding ceases, and the obligation of not lying prevails, because the intrinsic disordering of a lie cannot cease. But the case scarcely occurs except from the dexterity of the one asking and the weakness of the one responding.

If someone subjectively believes that he must positively hide a secret, and no possibility appears of doing this without a lie, from a perplexed conscience the lesser evil is permitted.

2. A lie as such, or insofar as it is opposed to truth, is only a venial sin. The reason is that the abuse of a sign and the deception to follow from it, as such only, i.e. without bringing damage to the neighbor or injury to God, involve only a slight injury of the social order.

3. A pernicious lie is grave from its kind, i.e. grave or slight according as it brings grave or slight damage to the neighbor. If it is pernicious to God, i.e. if it brings injury to God, it is grave.

Corollary. To lying pertains, as we noted above, simulation, which is had when "someone by certain signs of deeds or things signifies something contrary to that which is in him ... whence simulation is properly a certain lie consisting in exterior signs of deeds; but it does not matter whether someone lies by word or by any other deed whatsoever ... whence, since every lie is a sin, as was said above, it follows also that every simulation is a sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 111, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 171). Moreover, a species of simulation is hypocrisy, "by which someone simulates the person of another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 111, a. 2).

¹ Prov. VIII, 5; Col. III, 9.

² With respect to a secret, there is no obligation of positively hiding it, but only the obligation of not manifesting it; yet it can happen that a secret is in some way manifested unless it is hidden. Besides, accidentally there can be an obligation of positively hiding a secret, for example by reason of charity.

IV. Concealment of truth as such is not a lie, because it does not involve the will of saying what is false, but only the will of keeping silent about what is true. Moreover, truth is concealed not only by being silent, but also by speaking with some mental restriction; about this more must be said.

1. Notion of mental restriction. It is had when the speaker mentally restricts words to a meaning which they have either in no way, or which they have, whether from themselves or from the circumstances, besides another meaning.

2. Division of mental restriction. It is distinguished as twofold, broad and purely mental. It is purely mental when the speaker mentally restricts words to a meaning which they have in no way, so that in no way, i.e. neither from the words themselves nor from the adjuncts or circumstances, can it be perceived; as if, asked whether he had been in Paris, he affirmed it, understanding silently: "in mind." Broad mental restriction is had when the speaker restricts words which have a double meaning to the less obvious meaning, permitting the more obvious meaning to be taken by the hearer; as if, asked whether he knows something, he replies, "No," understanding silently: "with communicable knowledge." Broad mental restriction is also called equivocation or amphibology, which, namely, is had when the words uttered have a double meaning (St. Alphonsus, III, 151, 152; Homo Apostolicus, tract 5, n. 15).

3. Morality of mental restriction. a) Purely mental restriction is never licit. For it falls into a lie: namely, the words in the case in no way express the meaning which the speaker intends, while the expressed meaning is supposed to be opposed to the speaker's judgment; therefore there is speech contrary to the mind (St. Alphonsus, III, 152). There are added the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, namely:

26: "If anyone, either alone or before others, whether asked or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, by understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition whatsoever, in reality he neither lies nor is perjured";²

27: "A just cause of using these amphibologies is present whenever this is necessary or useful for protecting the health of the body, honor, family property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and diligent";³

b) Broad mental restriction, with which equivocation coincides, is per se illicit; for it is opposed to sincerity, and in fact commonly leads the hearer into error. Yet it becomes licit if a just cause is present, and there is not from some other source an obligation of opening the truth, for example from the precept of a Superior. This is clear both from the example of Christ,⁴ and from the fact that in broad mental restriction the words also contain the meaning intended by the speaker, so that there is not speech contrary to the mind, or that intrinsic disordering which inheres in a lie (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary I. Besides other applications of the doctrine explained which occur in different treatises, it is useful to report certain ones from St. Alphonsus:

1. "One in need, with goods hidden for his sustenance, can respond to the judge that he has nothing. Likewise an heir who has hidden goods, if he is not held from them to satisfy creditors, can respond to the judge that he has hidden nothing, understanding silently: from which he is held to satisfy" (III, 158).

2. "He who accepted a loan, but afterwards satisfied it, can deny that he accepted a loan, understanding silently: so that he must pay" (III, 159).

3. An adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed the crime, can deny it, understanding silently: in such a way that she must manifest it (III, 162).

4. A servant by order of his master can respond that he is not at home, understanding silently: for speaking with someone (III, 165).

5. One bound to a secret can respond to the one asking that he knows nothing, understanding silently: for example, with communicable knowledge (III, 153).

6. One asked to give or lend money can respond that he does not have it, understanding silently: money which he wishes to give or lend (III, 163).

7. One invited, who is asked whether the food, which is tasteless, tastes good, can respond that it is good; for responses of this sort need not necessarily be taken in an absolute sense (III, 160).

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge; Koenraedt, in N. K. Stemmen, 1925, p. 297; Gregorianum, 1920, pp. 11, 278; A. Kern, Die Luge.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1176.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1177.

⁴ John VII, 8; Matt. XXIV, 36.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 3; qq. 72-73; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 962-1003; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, nn. 1-2 and 7-22.)

Reputation, from speaking, is the common opinion or estimation of many concerning the morals of another. It is called good or bad according as morally good or morally bad things are adjudged to someone. Speech pertains to the perfection of reputation. Reputation is injured externally through detraction, internally through rash judgments. Each must be discussed.

We shall treat first the notion, division, and morality of detraction, then restitution on account of detraction, then the causes excusing detraction, and finally the one hearing detraction.

I. Notion. Detraction is the unjust denigration of another's reputation. If it is done before the defamed person, there is added insult or injury of honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

II. Division. Detraction is distinguished into simple detraction and calumny, according as it is committed by revealing what is true, or by imputing what is false.

III. Morality. 1. Detraction, both simple detraction and calumny, is opposed to justice and is grave from its kind. It is opposed to justice because it deprives a man of a good justly possessed. It is grave from its kind, which is clear from Sacred Scripture,¹ and likewise from reason; for "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which it is said in Ecclesiasticus 41: Have care for a good name, for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures; and therefore detraction, speaking per se, is a mortal sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2). Yet they can become venial because of slightness of matter. Finally, that the aforesaid sins are opposed to justice is sufficiently elicited from what has been said (St. Alphonsus, III, 966). Besides, note:

a) The malice of calumny is graver than the malice of simple detraction; for the former injures an absolute right to reputation, the latter a limited right. For everyone has the right that what is false never be imputed to him; but with respect to revealing what is true, he has only the right that it not be revealed without a relatively grave cause.

b) The gravity of matter, if there is question of injury of reputation, depends: 1° on the gravity of the thing revealed; 2° on the judgment which the hearers make, considering their region and condition; 3° on the greater or lesser authority of the detractor; 4° on the condition of the person against whom detraction is made (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Objection. A bad man does not have the right of retaining the reputation of goodness.

Response. I deny the assertion, since on the one hand no one is certainly held to deprive himself of reputation; and on the other hand, per se it belongs to no private person to deprive another of a good which the latter has and possesses without injury to another; nor can public authority do this unless public order demands it.

2. Simple detraction and calumny, insofar as they are opposed to justice, do not differ in species, because they injure the same good or right. But to calumny there is added the species of lying. Furthermore, detractions in different matters seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to reputation, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Objection. Reputation consists of parts distinct in species; for one reputation is that which someone possesses concerning chastity, another concerning justice, and therefore injuries of reputation ought to differ in species according as they violate parts of a different species.

Response. The parts of which reputation consists are indeed diverse in species in themselves, but insofar as they constitute reputation, they differ only according to more and less.

Corollary I. Ordinarily it is venial to reveal: 1° natural defects of mind or body; 2° venial faults; 3° a defect which is indeed grave, but which is sufficiently common in men of such a condition (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Corollary II. Generally, unless the matter is known, it is mortal to say of a superior that he is a liar; of a religious or priest, that he has been drunk, or that he is a lover of girls; likewise to use words which provide occasion for suspecting something grave, as if "you should say nothing in particular, but only in general, for example, that you know something about him, which, if you should say it, would affect him with great shame" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary III. He who narrates the hidden crime of someone who has already been defamed in other matters sins gravely if the new revelation notably increases the prior infamy, or brings a new grave infamy, for example if about one infamous in one species a crime of another species is narrated, not very connected with the prior one (St. Alphonsus, III, 976).

Corollary IV. He who, in reporting someone's hidden crime, at the same time reports his repentance, is guilty of grave detraction, unless the repentance is so great that it entirely destroys the infamy.

Corollary V. Several slight detractions can coalesce into grave matter, because taken together they can contain a grave injury of reputation.

Corollary VI. What has been said about injury of reputation should also be applied to defamation of the dead, although it is less grave to detract from the dead than from the living, and the detraction is the less, the longer the person has been dead. But what is lawful for historians, see n. 1070.

3. Detraction from some person also contains a graver sin if the infamy of the defamed person redounds to the community, or to the family, to which he belongs; and the sin is graver in proportion as a greater and more common good is injured. Yet note that the defamation of a member commonly redounds into the community the more, the smaller it is in number, and therefore redounds more into a family, which of itself is smaller in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 978; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16).

¹ Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 30, 32; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Jas. III.

Question 1. How great a sin is it to reveal a grave defect to one or another person who certainly will keep the matter secret?

Response 1. If it is done on account of a just cause, for example for the sake of instruction or counsel, there is no sin. The same seems to be said if it is done only for the sake of consolation, but not from the intention of blackening the neighbor. The reason is that one affected by injury seems to have the right of lessening his grief with some damage to him who inflicted the grief. Hence servants, wives, and children who reveal injuries inflicted on them by a master, by a husband, or by a father seem to be excused (St. Alphonsus, III, 973).

Response 2. If it is done without cause, it is disputed whether it is a grave or slight sin. Now a sufficiently probable opinion recognizes only a slight fault, because, since reputation consists in the common estimation or the estimation of many, it does not appear that it is notably injured by the bad opinion of one person or another (St. Alphonsus, III, 973; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2). Nor should it be said that by defamation before one person, just as by one person's rash judgment, reputation is gravely injured. For it is answered that in rash judgment there is an accusation of a false or wholly uncertain crime, but in our hypothesis the revelation of a true crime is supposed. Yet authors except the case in which someone reveals the offense to a person, for example to a superior or master, from whom the delinquent reasonably wishes it to be hidden before others (St. Alphonsus, III, 973). Moreover, the narration of a false crime is always mortal, because I have a firmer right that a false crime not be imputed to me than that a true crime not be revealed to another. Finally, even the revelation of a true crime to one trustworthy man can accidentally be grave, namely if it contains whispering or tale-bearing (n. 1079).

Question 2. Of what kind and how great a sin is it to reveal a defect which per se would constitute grave matter, but as heard from others?

Response 1. If you report it in such a way that others, by force of the narration itself, believe what is reported, there is a grave sin against justice; for example, "if you assert that you heard it from a person worthy of trust, ... because you give a sufficient cause for believing the evil" (St. Alphonsus, III, 977).

Response 2. If you report it in such a way that others are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you do not sin gravely against justice, because you are not the cause but only the occasion of grave damage. But you sin against charity, because everyone is held to impede grave damage to the neighbor as much as he conveniently can (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Indeed, if there is discussion of an enormous crime, there is also grave sin against justice. The reason is that on the one hand even suspicion of such a crime gravely injures reputation; on the other hand the narration must be called at least a cause of suspicion (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Question 3. To what extent is it a sin to report the crime of a person entirely unknown, or without the person being named?

Response. Per se this contains no detraction. Yet except: 1° if there is danger that the person can afterwards become known or come under suspicion; 2° if a report of this sort redounds to the family, community, etc., of him whose crime is reported; in which case there is grave or slight sin according as that person's reputation is gravely or slightly injured. Hence, for example, he would sin gravely who said that someone from this religious community had committed such a crime (St. Alphonsus, III, 978). "Nevertheless, if the order were large, it should not be considered a grave sin ... to name the order which is not of strict observance" (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16; p. 9).

Question 4. Whether it is lawful to detract from the deceased.

Response. No, because the soul of the deceased, no less than a living man, has a right to reputation. Yet "to defame a dead person is less grave than to defame a living one," because he has less need of reputation (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Question 5. To what extent is it a sin to divulge further a notorious crime?

Response. A crime can be notorious: 1° by law; 2° by fact; 3° by report. It is called notorious by law when it is established by a sentence of a judge. It is notorious by fact when it has been committed before so many persons of the community that it will certainly and quickly be divulged more and more. It is notorious by report when it has been narrated to so many persons of the community that it will certainly and quickly be narrated more and more (St. Alphonsus, III, 975; VII, 141). Furthermore, some crime can be notorious either only relatively, for example with respect to a college, community, family, or neighborhood, or absolutely, with respect to all who inhabit the same region or city. Now:

1. A crime notorious by law can be divulged without injustice in whatever place and time. For the judge by law deprives the accused absolutely of reputation, just as he can deprive him of goods of fortune; indeed public trials are held for this end, that from publicity a partial penalty may be had through defamation. Nor does he who divulges a crime of this sort per se, i.e. unless he acts from evil affection, sin against charity. For the accused has also been condemned for this reason, that others may be deterred from crime; there is added that it has been expedient for the common good that each one be known as he publicly is (St. Alphonsus, III, 974).

2. A crime notorious either by fact or by report may be revealed as follows:

a) It is lawful to reveal it to members of the same convent or college.

b) With respect to revelation in another community, this must be said:

alpha) It is lawful if, considering the circumstances, knowledge of the crime is going to arrive there quickly. Wherefore note that today communications between convents are more frequent, so that revelation will with difficulty be a grave sin. The contrary must be said about a different province and about an autonomous monastery.

beta) If knowledge of the crime is not, or is not quickly, going to arrive in another community, it is illicit and unjust to reveal it there, if there is question of a restricted community, i.e. of a house, convent, or college. The same must be said theoretically if there is question of a city, town, or village, because one defamed in one place still justly possesses reputation in the place to which knowledge of the crime is not going to arrive quickly; therefore he does injury to him and sins against justice who defames him there. Nor is it valid if you say that he no longer has anywhere a right to reputation, from the fact that his crime is public somewhere. For by what reason would he have lost this right? Not through the crime itself according to itself; otherwise whoever had committed a crime, however hiddenly, would no longer have a right to reputation, and no one would sin against justice by spreading it abroad; which no one admits. Not through the crime as public in one place; for it is and will be unknown elsewhere unless you reveal it, and accordingly it is so related there, where it is unknown, as if it were absolutely hidden.¹ I have said theoretically, because practically, on account of more frequent communication between different places, a crime public in one place will quickly be divulged in another place. Finally, it is always lawful to divulge crimes which render a man pernicious, because it is expedient for the common good that pernicious men be known by all: such are, for example, murderers, thieves, scandalously lustful persons, etc. (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Question 6. Whether it is lawful again to reveal a crime which through forgetfulness has become hidden.

Response. Affirmatively, if there is question of a crime notorious by law, as was said above. Otherwise, if there is question of a crime notorious by fact or by report. To manifest this again is certainly opposed to charity; and also to justice, as it seems, because through forgetfulness the matter has been reduced to the state in which it was before publicity (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 13).

¹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iustitia, diss. 15, a. 1, § 5.

I. Calumny is never licit, as is clear both from what has been said about lying and from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."¹

II. The following can render simple detraction licit:

1. The consent of the delinquent, since he is master of his own reputation, and therefore per se can abdicate himself from that good.

2. The public good to be protected. Hence, if you know that a man given over to lust wishes to receive Sacred Orders, you are held to denounce him to the Superior (St. Alphonsus, III, 968); likewise, per se, you ought to manifest a dishonest physician who is to others an occasion of sinning.

3. The spiritual good of the delinquent himself; hence they rightly excuse "those who indicate to parents the hidden crime of children, or to masters that of servants, or to the prelate of religious as to a father, in order to correction; as also a wife speaking with her husband about the hidden crimes of children or servants" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

4. A temporal or spiritual good, grave with respect to defamation, whether of the revealer himself or of a third party. Hence it is lawful to manifest the guilty person if an innocent person is accused; likewise to inform a mistress about the bad morals of a maidservant whom she intends to hire; likewise, sometimes, to indicate a hidden crime to someone for the sake of taking counsel or help, etc. (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. and n. 969).

5. With respect to historians, I note:

a) It is lawful for them to write down the public things of their own time, even if these, consigned to letters, are transmitted to the knowledge of posterity, and thus injure in perpetuity the reputation of the authors of those deeds.²

b) With respect to those things which were public but have been completely obliterated, authors commonly concede more to historians on account of the integrity of history and for the instruction and terror of others. Besides, since archives, even more secret ones, in our age are easily accessible to all students of history, it can be doubted whether hidden crimes which are contained in old documents ought to be called hidden.³ And this can be urged all the more because it is better that many things, which of themselves would better remain buried in eternal oblivion, be narrated according to truth by an upright historiographer, than that they be mixed with falsehoods by the impious and propagated for wicked ends.³

Yet note that, in a historical book which is intended for the common people, many things can be passed over in silence which cannot be passed over in others.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194.

² Sweens, De virtute iustitiae, n. 473.

³ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, 1426.

I. Subject of restitution. 1. He who unjustly and with grave theological fault has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held under grave obligation to restitution "just as to restitution of any thing taken away" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who with slight fault or inculpably has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held to remove the cause of damage placed by him and morally persevering, i.e. to revoke the detraction or deprive it of force, if he conveniently can.

3. What has been said about the detractor should also be applied: 1° to him who positively influenced an unjust detraction, for example by asking, applauding, etc. (n. 1075); 2° to a Superior, in the case in which from justice he is held to provide for reputation to be restored, according to what is to be said in n. 1075.

II. Object of restitution. The obligation is of restoring: 1° the reputation unjustly injured; 2° the real damages following from the injury of reputation and at least confusedly foreseen. Moreover, "the obligation of restoring reputation, since it is purely personal, does not pass to heirs. But the obligation of compensation for the aforesaid damage, since it has respect to the goods of the defamer, passes to heirs" (St. Alphonsus, III, 996).

III. Mode of restoring. 1. He who narrated what is false ought openly to retract the false thing imputed, for example by saying that he erred or, if that is not sufficient, that he lied; indeed, if there is need, he should prove the retraction and confirm it by oath or even by witnesses (St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who revealed what is true ought prudently to correct the opinion of the hearers, for example by saying with equivocation that he erred, etc. If the matter does not succeed in this way, he should strive to furnish an equivalent compensation, for example by praising the defamed person in the same or in a different matter, etc. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 992).

3. A detractor, in default of the immediate hearers, is held to restore reputation before mediate hearers, as follows:

a) He is not held if he narrated the matter before those whom he thought would hide it, because damage not foreseen is not imputed to him.

b) It is disputed whether he is held if he could foresee that the hearers would not keep the secret. But he seems per se to be held, because in the hypothesis posited the detractor becomes not merely an occasional cause of damage to be inflicted by the immediate hearers, but an occasional cause which puts on the character of culpable cooperation toward that damage. But he who culpably cooperates toward the damage of someone acts formally unjustly, and therefore is held to restitution. I have said per se, because practically he will often be excused, either because the immediate hearers will restore the damage, or on account of moral impossibility (St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

IV. Causes excusing from restitution of reputation are customarily enumerated:

1. Physical or moral impossibility. But with respect to moral impossibility note that the detractor is not held to restoration of reputation with damage much greater. Damage to one's own reputation does not excuse, unless the reputation of the detractor is necessary for the public good (St. Alphonsus, III, 1002). Yet no one is held to compensate injured reputation with money (St. Alphonsus, III, 1000). But if you ask whether the defamed person can compensate himself with money of the defamer, it seems this must be said: if the defamer unjustly refuses restoration of reputation, the defamed person more probably can compensate himself, relying on the principle: if you unjustly deny me what is owed to me, it is lawful for me to take something from you which is yours; almost as "you are not compelled to restore his right to another if he refuses to restore yours to you" (St. Alphonsus, IV, 999). If the defamer is excused from restoring reputation, it seems it must be denied, because on the one hand the right to money is doubtful, and on the other hand compensation on account of a doubtful right is not admitted (n. 1033; cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 1001).

2. Cessation of damage; as if someone has already from elsewhere, for example by sentence of a judge or by forgetfulness, been purged from infamy. In doubt whether the crime of the neighbor has been given over to oblivion, ordinarily the obligation of restoring will cease, both because there will be danger of harming the defamed person more, and because restitution cannot be made without one's own damage, which no one is held to suffer for repairing an already doubtful damage of the neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 997, 998).

3. Condonation by the defamed person, whether express or presumed. Yet damage of reputation cannot be presumed to be condoned as easily as damage in goods of fortune. Condonation is prohibited if the infamy redounds to others, or harms the common good, as if there is question of a priest or religious (St. Alphonsus, III, 1003).

4. Compensation, understood in this sense, that after injury has been inflicted on both sides, you can sufficiently probably defer restitution until the other is prepared to make satisfaction. Yet from these things do not conclude that the defamer can likewise be defamed (St. Alphonsus, III, 999). Yet that is lawful, that you may lessen belief in the defamer, or that you may lead him, unwilling, to restore reputation or to omit further detraction.

Note. Excuse from restitution of reputation per se does not bring with it excuse from repairing real damages following from the injury of reputation.

I. He who positively influences detraction, for example by asking, laughing, or applauding, sins against justice. Yet sufficiently probably he sins only slightly who fishes out the crime of the neighbor without the intention of divulging it (n. 1069; St. Alphonsus, III, 979).

II. He who only internally rejoices over detraction sins against charity with respect to the defamed person; likewise with respect to the defamer, insofar as he omits fraternal correction in a case in which he is held to it (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

III. He who does not rejoice over detraction as such, but over the hearing of a new thing, or over curious knowledge of the crimes of others, or over the witty manner of narrating, or over the thing narrated as amusing, is excused at least from mortal sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

IV. He who does not impede detraction which he can easily impede sins against charity. But practically the obligation at least grave of positively impeding often is absent, "because in this matter of detraction it can be most difficult to establish that correction would be profitable, and from another source detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; indeed there is danger that they would rather increase or confirm the detraction. ... But according to all, those are excused even from venial sin who, noticing the detraction, either depart, or divert the conversation, or turn away the face or show it sad" (St. Alphonsus, III, 981). The contrary must be said about a Superior who does not impede detraction, namely:

1. The Superior of the defamer per se is held from charity, even more than others, to correct the subject; indeed even from justice, if he is the pastor, although he is not the Superior, or the Bishop of the defamer. But with respect to a defamer who is not a subject he is held no otherwise than others are.

2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held, even more than others, from charity to impede the evil of the subject; not, however, from justice, even if he is his pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to attend to the temporal good of the subject (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

But what if the Superior has not impeded the detraction?

Response 1. The Superior of the defamer is held from charity to compel the subject to restore reputation; indeed from justice, if he is pastor or Bishop.

Response 2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held from charity to provide for the restitution of reputation; not, however, from justice, even if he is pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to provide for the temporal good of the subject.

Response 3. If there is question of the Superior of both, and the defamed person implores the authority of the Superior, more probably he is held from justice to take care of the restitution of reputation, because in the case he seems to act as a judge, who from justice speaks the law (St. Alphonsus, III, 980).

I. Notions. Judgment or certitude, opinion, and doubt respectively involve firm assent, weak assent, and suspension of assent concerning the truth of some proposition. Suspicion is reduced to doubt (n. 215). They are called rash here if they are made without sufficient foundation and regard the evil of the neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 962).

II. Morality. 1. Judgment, opinion, and doubt, rashly conceived, are sins, and indeed against justice. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which at least teaches that they are sins,¹ and from the fact that he inflicts injury on the neighbor who holds him to be evil without sufficient reason.

2. With respect to the gravity of the sin, receive these things:

a) A rash judgment is a grave sin if the conditions to be explained are present; if any of these is lacking, there is only a slight sin. The conditions are:

alpha) That judgment is truly present, or that the assent is firm or quasi-firm; in other words, it is required that the matter be held as certain or morally certain (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 962).

beta) That the judgment is about grave matter, i.e. about matter which, if it were revealed, would contain grave detraction (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

gamma) That the judgment rests on reasons which do not suffice for conceiving an opinion. If they suffice for opinion, there is no grave sin, even if the judgment is wholly firm (St. Alphonsus, III, loc. cit.).

delta) That the judgment is about a determinate and known person. Therefore grave sin is absent if you rashly judge that in some place some crime has been committed by someone indeterminate; or if you judge the same thing about a man who meets you, but is unknown to you (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Now, when these conditions have been fulfilled, there is grave sin, because there is grave injury; otherwise, if any of them is lacking.

b) Rash opinion, suspicion, and doubt ordinarily are only slight sins, because the injury, and consequently the sin, is only slight (St. Alphonsus, III, 963). Many make an exception if someone, on account of the slightest reason, should suspect or hold as probable that a grave and honorable person is guilty of an enormous crime: "as it would be, to suspect about a pious religious that he is a heretic, or that he has committed incest with his mother; or about a man commonly held as Catholic, that he is a Jew or an atheist. The reason is that perhaps a greater injury is inflicted on them by suspecting such things than if a certain judgment were had about them concerning ordinary grave offenses" (St. Alphonsus, III, 964; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 3).

c) It is disputed whether or not detraction and rash judgment differ in species. Some deny it, because by detraction reputation is injured before others, by rash judgment before ourselves; which difference seems merely material. Others affirm it, because by detraction there is taken away before others the knowledge which they have of someone's goodness; by rash judgment I do not take away from myself the knowledge of someone's goodness, but I deny the assent of the intellect due to the knowledge had; which difference seems formal to the patrons of this opinion.

Corollary I. Since rash judgment, etc., are opposed to justice, they oblige to a certain species of restitution, namely that one lay aside the aforesaid judgment, etc., and judge better about someone.

Corollary II. Doubts about the uprightness of the neighbor are to be interpreted in the better part, unless someone prefers to abstain from judging. It can indeed "happen that he who interprets in the better part is more often deceived; but it is better that someone more frequently be deceived, having a good opinion about some bad man, than that he be deceived more rarely, having a bad opinion about some good man; because from the latter injury is done to another, but not from the former" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1).

Yet these things do not prevent someone, if there is question of avoiding damage, from conducting himself as if the other were harmful; for prudence advises this.

¹ Luke VI, 37; Matt. VII, 1-2; Rom. XIV, 4; 1 Cor. XIII, 5.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book V, n. 72.)

I. Notion. Whispering is evil backbiting directed to dissolving true or ordered friendship. The whisperer and the detractor intend to take away reputation.

"They differ," says the Angelic Doctor, "in the end, because the detractor intends to blacken the reputation of the neighbor; whence he chiefly brings forward those evils about the neighbor from which the neighbor can be defamed, or at least his reputation diminished; but the whisperer intends to separate friendship ... and therefore the whisperer brings forward such evils about the neighbor as can move the mind of the hearer against him, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 28: 'A sinful man will trouble friends, and in the midst of those having peace he will cast enmity'" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 72).

II. Morality. 1. Whispering is opposed to charity and is a grave sin; indeed it is graver than detraction and insult. It is opposed to charity because it deprives the neighbor of a good. It is a grave sin, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture,¹ and from the fact that it deprives the neighbor of a grave good. It is graver than detraction and insult, because it takes away from the neighbor a good which is greater than reputation and honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 72). Yet it can be venial on account of slightness of matter, for example if it is apt only to lessen friendship a little.

2. To whispering there is added a sin of injustice if it is done by an unjust means, as by detraction or unjust revelation of a secret; but in that case it obliges to restitution properly so called, as is clear (St. Alphonsus, V, loc. cit.).

What if someone deprives another of acquired friendship, using a means not unjust in itself, for example by manifesting natural defects publicly known?

Response. Many judge that in the case there is sin only against charity, not against justice; neither by reason of the good, i.e. friendship, since it is not owed from justice; nor by reason of the means, for in this case this is not unjust. But with St. Alphonsus and others it seems it must be said that there is sin also against justice, because if there is question of a good already acquired, no one, as it seems, can without injustice cooperate in any way toward deprivation of the good; to deprive him of such a good belongs only to him who continuously and gratuitously grants that good (St. Alphonsus, V, loc. cit.).

¹ Ecclus. VI, 15; XXVIII, 15; Rom. I, 29, 30.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 72, 75, 105; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 966, 984-990; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, nn. 3-6.)

Honor is a testimony concerning someone's excellence, in his presence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 103, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966). It is said:

1. Testimony; namely, either through words, or through actions, for example genuflection, etc., or through honorific things, for example through the erection of a statue, etc.

2. Concerning excellence, i.e. concerning superiority in some perfection, whether with respect to the one honoring, or with respect to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 103, a. 2). Moreover, "in anyone there is found something from which someone can reckon him superior, according to that saying in Philippians 2: in humility, considering others superior; and according to this also all ought to anticipate one another with honor" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 3).

3. In his presence; these things will be clearer from the notion of the opposite, or insult, about which something must now be said.

I. Notion. Insult is an undue dishonoring of someone, or an undue testimony concerning someone's baseness, in his presence. It is said:

1. Undue; i.e. one which is made without a just cause.

2. Testimony; this can be made both by words and by deeds, insofar as they are signs or have the force of signifying words (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 1), as if you strike someone with a slap, thereby signifying that he is base.

3. Concerning someone's baseness, or concerning this, that someone is unworthy of honor and worthy of contempt.

4. In his presence. "The insulting person," says St. Thomas, "speaks to a man to his face; whence if someone speaks badly about another before many people, with him absent, it is detraction; but if with him alone present, it is insult (II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2); if with others present together with him, it is detraction and insult." But it suffices that someone be present through a representative; likewise, that someone should write injurious things to another.

Insult differs from that disordering which is called negative insult, and which consists in this, that someone merely omits to furnish due honor; this is opposed to observance. But the omission of due honor accidentally rather often contains true insult, namely if, considering the circumstances, it involves a signification of contempt, as if someone, meeting several equal superiors, shows honor only to one.

II. Morality. 1. Insult is a grave sin from its kind, and indeed against justice. It is said to be grave from its kind; this is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the fact that it contains a sin of injustice, which is grave from its kind (n. 978). It is opposed to justice; for everyone has the right that another not illegitimately signify to him that he is unworthy of honor and worthy of contempt (St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

The gravity of matter depends: 1° on the matter considered in itself, with attention both to the native signification of the words and to the affection from which they proceed, since this can temper the signification not a little. "Signification," says Aquinas, "proceeds from the interior affection; and therefore in sins of words it seems especially to be considered from what affection someone utters the words" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2). The gravity of matter depends 2° on the condition of the person injuring and the person injured; 3° on the common judgment of men in that region concerning the injury. Hence, for example, men of the lowest condition, who affect one another with insults, ordinarily do not sin gravely (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 37).

2. The diverse modes by which insult is inflicted, as such, seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to honor, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less.

3. The mere omission of due honor, or negative insult, which I have added because of the affinity of the matter, is opposed to observance, as we have already noted, and per se and for the most part is venial; yet accidentally, as was likewise noted, it rather often is equivalent to true insult.

Corollary I. "Since the sin of abusive speech or insult depends on the mind of the one speaking, it can happen that it is a venial sin, if it is a slight abusive speech, not greatly dishonoring the man, and is uttered from some levity of mind or from slight anger, without a firm purpose of dishonoring someone; for example, when someone intends to sadden someone slightly through a word of this sort" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 3).

Corollary II. "Just as it is lawful to strike someone, or to damage him in his things, for the sake of discipline, so also for the sake of discipline someone can say some abusive word to another whom he ought to correct; and in this way the Lord called the disciples fools, and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. Yet, as Augustine says in book 2 On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount (ch. 19), 'rebukes are to be employed rarely and from great necessity'" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 2).

Corollary III. "To eutrapelia it pertains to say some slight abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; and this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 1).

¹ Matt. V, 22; Rom. I, 30.

III. Restitution on account of insult. Insult always injures the honor of him against whom it is inflicted. Besides, if it is inflicted before others or afterwards becomes known to others, it can also have other connected damages, namely both a diminution of good estimation and the omission of due honor on the part of others. Now:

1. The insulting person is held to furnish satisfaction for the injured honor; but the damages perhaps connected with the insult, and at least confusedly foreseen, he is held to repair or avert.

2. With respect to the mode of making satisfaction and restoring, there is required such a mode as, considering the circumstances of the person injured and the person injuring, the gravity of the injury, the custom of the place, etc., suffices for repairing honor (St. Alphonsus, III, 986). Hence:

a) If the one dishonoring was a superior, it will suffice if he honorably greets the dishonored person, invites him home, shows benevolence, etc. The contrary holds if he was an equal or inferior; then greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate him in greeting, yield place, ask pardon. This mode indeed is more apt for compensating insult. Besides, such a request for pardon is not necessary except when satisfaction cannot be made otherwise; hence a prelate is not held to ask pardon from a subject, a master from a servant, or a husband from a wife (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

b) If honor has been taken away publicly through insult, it must also be restored publicly before those who were present at the dishonoring, or at least in a mode by which the satisfaction can easily come to their knowledge (St. Alphonsus, III, 984). But if the dishonored person is judged rather to refuse than to desire that public satisfaction, lest the memory of the injury received return among others, or lest he himself be affected with more shame, another way of making satisfaction should be sought, for example by honoring the dishonored person with extraordinary actions (St. Alphonsus, III, 988).

3. The same things which excuse from restitution of reputation exempt from restitution of honor (n. 1074). Moreover, many times it will happen to be expedient that the confessor omit warning a penitent existing in good faith, who has dishonored another, about furnishing satisfaction, for example: 1° if he foresees that the warning will not be profitable; for experience establishes that penitents easily promise such satisfactions, but with difficulty actually fulfill them, on account of the shame which they afterwards feel or apprehend in this; 2° if there is danger lest, in the act of satisfaction, hatreds between the offended person and the offender be renewed (St. Alphonsus, III, 988).

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 75.)

I. Notion. Derision occurs when someone, by jesting, objects something vicious to another, for this end, that he blush or be confounded; by jesting, i.e. by turning someone's defect into laughter.

Derision differs from insult, detraction, and whispering, because derision intends someone's blushing; insult, the injury of honor; detraction, the injury of reputation; whispering, the dissolution of friendship.

"Sins of words," says St. Thomas, "are principally to be weighed according to the intention of the one uttering them; and therefore sins of this sort are distinguished according to the diverse things which someone intends when speaking against another. For just as someone by abusing intends to depress the honor of the one abused, and by detracting to diminish reputation, and by whispering to take away friendship, so also by mocking someone intends that he who is mocked should blush; and because this end is distinct from the others, therefore also the sin of derision is distinguished from the aforementioned sins" (II-II, q. 75, a. 1).

II. Modes of deriding. Derision can be done: 1° by the mouth, namely by words and laughter, and it is called mockery; 2° by wrinkling the nose, sticking out the tongue, etc., and it is called scoffing; 3° by deeds, for example by bending the knee, etc., and it is called ridicule. But the aforesaid modes, as is clear, do not differ in species.

III. Morality. 1. Derision is a grave sin when someone's defect grave in itself is turned into laughter; for true or grave contempt is had in this, that someone is so little esteemed and held so base that his grave defects are turned into sport, as if they were the defects of a child or a fool (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 75, a. 2). But if a defect slight in itself is turned into laughter, there is not true or grave contempt, and therefore only a slight sin.

2. Derision "is a sin so much the graver, as greater reverence is owed to the person who is mocked" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

"Whence it is most grave to mock God and the things which are God's, according to that saying of Isaiah 37: Whom have you reproached? and whom have you blasphemed? and against whom have you exalted your voice? and afterwards it is added: Against the Holy One of Israel. Next place is held by mockery of parents; whence it is said in Proverbs 30: The eye that mocks his father and despises the birth of his mother, let the ravens of the torrents pluck it out and the young of the eagle eat it. Next, the derision of the just is grave; because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is said in Job 12: The simplicity of the just is derided; and this derision indeed is very harmful, because through this men are impeded from doing well" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

3. Derision is free from fault: 1° if it is done so that the one derided may recover from sin; 2° if friends, without danger of offense, for the sake of recreation, jokingly object certain slight things to one another.

I. Notion. A secret is a hidden matter which cannot be manifested.

II. Division. A secret is distinguished into natural, promised, and entrusted. A natural secret is one which, from the nature of the matter, must be kept, namely because it cannot be revealed without damage or grief to one's neighbor; as if you know where someone has hidden his money, and you reveal this to a thief. A promised secret is one which someone, after receiving knowledge of it, has freely promised to keep; it can at the same time be natural. An entrusted secret is one which has been communicated to someone who did not know it, and who expressly or tacitly promised that he would keep it. By force of a tacit pact, for example, physicians, advocates, theologians, religious superiors, and others to whom recourse is had because of the office which they discharge, for the sake of seeking counsel, are bound to an entrusted secret (St. Alphonsus, III, 970). I said by force of a tacit pact; for by undertaking the office they undertake an obligation without which, if it had not been undertaken, subjects and clients would not approach them with sufficient security for the sake of seeking counsel or imploring help.

III. Obligation of keeping a secret. 1. A natural secret obliges from charity if the revelation merely creates sorrow; from justice if it creates damage for one's neighbor. Hence the said obligation is grave from its kind.

A proportionate cause excuses from the obligation, as was said concerning manifestation of a hidden crime or defect (n. 1070). Yet it is clear that a secret cannot be revealed if common damage would be imminent from the revelation (St. Alphonsus, III, 970).

2. A promised secret obliges from fidelity or from justice, according as was said concerning a promise in general (n. 864).

The obligation of a promised secret ceases or does not subsist: 1° by the consent, even presumed, of the promisee; 2° if from another source there was, or there arises, an obligation of revealing the secret, as if you are legitimately questioned by a judge or by a superior (St. Alphonsus, III, 970; IV, 268); 3° if it cannot be kept without such inconvenience that the one promising cannot be judged to have wished to bind himself with so great a burden. Moreover, these statements hold even if the promise was confirmed by oath.

Sometimes a promise is added to a natural secret; in that case the added promise is judged to be merely confirmatory of the obligation already existing, so that it stands or falls with the latter. Yet it is not repugnant that an obligation independent of the existing obligation be intended and assumed. Apply the same to an oath, if perhaps it is added to a natural secret.

Question. To what extent is he obliged who expressly promised that he would keep a secret of very great importance even with the loss of life? I said of very great importance, because otherwise the promise would certainly be prodigal and therefore invalid.

Response. Some say that he is not obliged, because from the precept of charity each person is bound to prefer his own life to another's good, however very grave. Others maintain the obligation, because every promise of an honorable object obliges. But the promise about which we are speaking regards an honorable object; since it is permitted "for an honorable end to omit the preservation of one's own life in order to save another's life... because this is not directly to bring death upon oneself, but not to protect life, which is permitted for a just cause: therefore very probably the doctors... say that in the proposed case you are sufficiently obliged to keep the secret even with danger of life, if you promised it" (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). Yet note that the words even with danger of life must more often be taken less strictly according to the mind of the one promising.

3. An entrusted secret obliges from justice, and therefore by an obligation grave from its kind (n. 978). Moreover, the said obligation is stricter by reason of the onerous contract intervening. With respect to the promise at least tacitly made by the adviser, there is added the fact that it is of the greatest interest to the common good that the secret entrusted to him bind most strictly, namely so that men may be able to seek counsel without fear of revelation. Yet it is sufficiently probable that it is not a grave sin to reveal an entrusted secret to one or another person who will certainly keep it and will not even reveal it to one or another person. Moreover, this is sufficiently probable because in that case the secret remains safe as to its substance. Except, however, if the secret is revealed to him from whom the one entrusting it wishes it to be hidden before all others; in that case it would be a grave sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). I said sufficiently probably, because a contract is involved, and it is doubtful whether that more benign interpretation is valid; with respect to a natural secret, the matter is certain.

The obligation of an entrusted secret ceases: 1° by the consent, even reasonably presumed, of the one entrusting the secret; 2° if, from the secret being kept, grave damage is imminent either to the common good, or to the one entrusting the secret himself, or - provided he accepted the secret without force or fraud - to the one accepting the secret. The first two are sufficiently clear; the latter is drawn from this, that "no one is presumed to have obliged himself to such a burden, unless this certainly appears from the circumstances" (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). The obligation of an entrusted secret does not cease from the questioning of a judge or superior; and "you can respond that you know nothing, namely nothing to be revealed" (St. Alphonsus, III, 970). Except if the obligation of the secret has already ceased from another heading (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 970, 971; IV, 49, 248, 268).

What if grave damage is imminent to a third party from an entrusted secret being kept?

Response 1. If the damage is neither created nor culpably permitted by the one entrusting the secret, it is not lawful to reveal the secret; suppose that an advocate knows that an innocent man will be condemned, but the guilty man will be freed. If, because of special circumstances, the guilty man can permit the damage of the innocent man, the advocate also is bound to keep the secret entrusted to him.

Response 2. Outside the aforesaid case, I distinguish between those who are not bound by force of office and those who are bound by force of office to keep the secret. Now:

1. One who is not bound by force of office to keep the secret can certainly reveal it: 1° if the damage to the third party is created by the one entrusting the secret himself; as if a syphilitic, who pretends that he is healthy, intends to marry a bride ignorant of the bridegroom's disease; 2° if the damage to the third party is not indeed created by the one entrusting the secret, but nevertheless is culpably permitted by him; as if the guilty man mentioned above would culpably permit the damage of the innocent man. The reason for both is that charity demands that the secret be disclosed in order to avert damage to one's neighbor, unless the common good stands in the way. But the common good does not require that one who is not bound by force of office to be silent should be obliged to be silent, if a grave cause for speaking, i.e. for revealing the secret, exists (St. Alphonsus, III, 971).

2. The same, with St. Alphonsus and others against many, seems to be admitted if there is question of those who are bound by force of office to keep a secret; as if a physician knows that the bridegroom is afflicted with a contagious disease, and nevertheless does not wish to abstain from marriage. For on the one hand the reason just given is valid; on the other hand, the common good in this case does not demand that secrets of this sort be kept even with grave damage to a third party. For it is more in the interest of the common good that provision be made for the innocent person than for the harmful one, i.e. for him who wishes to inflict unjust damage on an innocent person, or who does not wish himself, by manifestation of the secret, to avert the damage to be inflicted on the innocent person (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). Yet the physician, etc., would be excused if grave damage to himself, for example hatred of citizens, a penalty to be imposed, etc., would be imminent from the revelation.

Objection 1. The common good demands that each person be able, without fear of revelation, to entrust a secret to those who furnish counsel by reason of office.

Response. On account of the reason just given, I deny the assertion with respect to those about whom the discussion is here. Nor, for that reason, will others to whom these things cannot be applied reasonably seek counsel with fear.

Objection 2. One who knows an impediment of marriage under an entrusted secret is not bound to reveal it, although there is question of averting damage.

Response. I deny the assertion taken generally; namely, one is bound to reveal an impediment, however known under an entrusted secret, if it is supposed and known that the impediment is known to one of the persons about to marry and unknown to the other, and therefore that formal injustice will be committed by one of the persons about to marry. And a case of this kind is especially intended by us.

Note 1. To an entrusted secret also belongs what is called a quasi-sacramental secret, namely one which arises from the manifestation of conscience to a superior or spiritual director, for the sake of seeking counsel or obtaining spiritual direction. Before this secret can be revealed, or even merely used, to avert some damage, even common damage, generally the one seeking counsel should first be warned concerning his obligation of preventing that damage by spontaneous manifestation or use of the secret; if he refuses, it should be well weighed whether in the case the gravity of the damage in question is not to be postponed to the gravity of that common damage which arises from the fact that, at least apparently, faith is broken in this matter.¹

Note 2. In some kingdoms a promissory oath concerning keeping a secret must be made by physicians; this oath, as is clear, is not valid insofar as you suppose that in some respect it is opposed to the law of nature.

¹ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 1004.

IV. Investigation of a secret. 1. Per se it is illicit and unjust to seek out another's secret against his will, for example by questioning deceitfully, reading letters, spying on the things which someone purposely does secretly, or by extorting a secret by a certain force. The reason is that one acting thus deprives another of his own thing; since a secret or hidden matter is most proper to a man. Moreover, it is a grave or light sin according as there is question of a grave or light matter. Except, with respect to a grave matter, if someone fishes out another's secret with the intention of keeping it to himself; this is sufficiently probably only light (n. 1069).

2. It is lawful to seek out a secret if there is at least presumed permission of the owner, or a proportionate cause, of which sort is damage to be averted, whether common damage, or grave damage to oneself or one's own. The reason is that there is no injury if the other consents or is bound to consent to the investigation itself of the secret.

Corollary I. It is lawful to read another's letters (i.e. whether written by subjects or sent to subjects): 1° as was said, from consent, even presumed, either of the writer or of the recipient; 2° if from the secret of the letters common damage, or damage to oneself or a third party, is feared; 3° if the rule of a religious institute prescribes or permits this, namely for the common good. Besides, parents, guardians, and superiors of institutes generally can read the letters of subjects, namely lest some evil befall them. A husband, however, per se cannot inspect letters given to his wife, since she is not plainly a subject but a companion. Often there will be consent at least presumed. For the rest, what a religious superior can do should be drawn from the rule and from custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 969; V, 70).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to join and read fragments of letters that have been torn very small and thrown away, because the owner, by tearing the letters, sufficiently signifies that he does not wish them to be read. The contrary must be said if the owner tore them into larger parts and voluntarily threw them into a place accessible to all (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

Discord.—As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that they be in agreement.

(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires. Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is a disagreement in judgments.

(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but not in the second.

(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor. Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who is not in harmony with the divine will.

(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g., justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a creditor is dishonest.

There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter about which charity requires that he agree;

(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.

Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity. Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.

Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.

By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.

Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus, St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7). But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his using evil means for a good end.

The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT); (b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way” (Rom., xiv. 13).

Contumely.—Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his presence.

(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak words that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in Luke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples “foolish and slow of heart”; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as “senseless”). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person by a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter or pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no harm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule some of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since most persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken seriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in serious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine declares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms sparingly and only in case of great necessity.

(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious words that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends reputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for another’s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural perfection given by God, such as virtue, authority, nobility, rank, wealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one ostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the salute or title or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as when one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to virtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile and contemptible).

(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an affront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of Eliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or mediately (e.g., the dishonor of David’s ambassadors by the Ammonites, in II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St. Paul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation that their words would be carried to him).

Are all persons deserving of honor? (a) If honor be taken in its strictest sense for reverence shown to a person who is one’s superior in some good quality, or for veneration for the proper excellence of mankind (viz., virtue), then honor cannot be shown except to those who are more exalted than oneself or to those who are virtuous. (b) If honor be taken in its wider and more usual sense for respect for a good quality, natural, moral or supernatural, in which a neighbor is more worthy at least than some others, then honor can be shown to every rational creature (except the damned, who are irretrievably wicked and outside the pale of friendship); for there is no one, however bad or lowly, in whom there is not something that deserves respect. St. Paul exhorts Christians to be beforehand in honoring one another (Rom., xii. 10), and he urges that each esteem the other as better than himself (Philip., ii. 3).

Various Forms of Contumely.—(a) By reason of the signs used or the external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the names “thief,” “lunatic,” “bastard”) or in deeds that are equivalent to word (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or postcards, “poisoned pen” letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious gestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).

(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that it ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach, which accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement (convicium), which ascribes to another either a fault or its consequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of alcoholism), taunting (improperium), which twits another with misfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the favors one formerly showed him).

Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.—(a) Circumstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change the species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact that contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed against a cleric or parents). (b) Circumstances that are merely accidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be mentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin of contumely.

The Sinfulness of Contumely.—(a) From its nature contumely is a grave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized than any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue and to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often sacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls his brother a fool is deserving of hell (Matt., v. 22), and the contumelious are classed with those who are delivered over to a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable only in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious words are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose to inflict serious disgrace (e.g., Titus applies to Balbus an epithet that is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest his supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this (e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Sempronius by a very disgraceful title, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Sempronius will feel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be greatly dishonored).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter, contumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried away by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another person a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave offense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses another in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not sufficient harm done to constitute a mortal sin.

The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the character of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.

(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended party, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his superior a liar or an ass is a more grievous fault than for a superior to give the name to his subordinate.

(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely, or the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the dishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for vituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words. A person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a very abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would sin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or teachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc., there is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence the use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is not being made.

Is the gravity of contumely lessened by the fact that the offended person feels the injury less?

(a) If the contumely is felt less because the dishonor itself is less, the gravity of the sin is of course lessened, for example, if the person offended is less deserving, or the person who offends is not taken seriously (see 2015).

(b) If the contumely is felt less only because the person dishonored is very meek and patient, the gravity is not lessened, but is rather increased (see 1725). If the person offended does not feel the injury at all (e.g., because he is very thick-skinned or is very fortunate), less damage is done, but the wrong remains, otherwise, theft from the rich could be excused on the plea that they will not miss what is stolen.

The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.—(a) As to the internal disposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without making any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of patience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and to give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for such restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one turn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His teaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were implacable or who only sought material for accusations.

(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are good and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord protested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and which the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also refuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac, or political disturber. But if no good end will be served by self-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should be made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and fame—viz., virtue and a worthy life—than to possess honor and fame themselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not unfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be persecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the good men of the past (Matt., v. 11).

The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a fool, lest he think himself wise.

(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without fruit.

(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.

The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame; otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage the other party the more by disregarding the attack).

(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).

The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.—(a) If contumely is not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of restitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the refusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make restitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance or reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be different, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable as to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of a distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who remains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.

(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is due. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely becomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of onlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem contemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case when contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there are no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person appear vile in his own eyes.

Opinions on the Duty of Restitution for Revilement.—(a) One opinion holds that injury is done, not damage, and hence that satisfaction is owed rather than restitution. Further, it is held that satisfaction is penal and so not obligatory (except out of charity) before judicial sentence.

(b) Another opinion says that damage is done as well as injury, since men regard an insult, even though offered in private, as an unjust deprivation of a great good. Satisfaction of a very humiliating kind, such as the begging of pardon on bended knees, as being penal, can await an order from authority, but the ordinary forms of reparation, such as expression of regret or request for forgiveness, should be made without any such order (Matt., v. 24).

What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?—(a) In general, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of the same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was deprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by respect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being made, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of contumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if one foresaw that one’s affront would lead to money losses, enmities, quarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses also.

(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is generally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done and a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required, for if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps not sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the indignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is sufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of restitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings, a pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one’s home, a dinner or toast, a eulogistic speech, etc.

The Manner of Making Apologies.—(a) They should be made with at least as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury was public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They may be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person cannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his regrets by letter or through a representative.

Since the gravity of contumely depends on the relations between the parties and other circumstances, an apology is not always necessary.

(a) Thus, if the offender is an inferior or an equal, an apology should be made for a serious insult, at least when the offended person insists on it. Thus, a cheerful salutation by a child does not atone for a vile name applied to his father. If an inferior dishonors a superior through ignorance, he makes amends by acknowledging his ignorance and showing respect, as was done by St. Paul (Acts, xxiii. 5).

(b) If the offender is a superior, an apology is never necessary, lest by abasing himself he lose the prestige which his office should have. Hence, if a father has used harsh language to his child, it would not be seemly for him to ask the child’s pardon, but he should show some mark of kindness to heal the wound.

Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of restitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a) Thus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without renewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b) Forgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives the debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have an apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally injurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his adversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.

A confessor should not impose the duty of an apology in certain cases.

(a) Thus, if this command would be harmful, it should be omitted, as when a penitent is in good faith and would be put in bad faith by the admonition. (b) If this command is not necessary, it should be omitted, as when the duty of an apology has ceased for one reason or another. In the case of children who speak or act disrespectfully to their elders, it may at times be taken for granted that the elders, especially the parents, do not expect an apology for trifling cases of disrespect. But, on the other hand, it may often be advisable to require such children to apologize for their rudeness, in order to cure them of it.

The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.—(a) They differ in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in his reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to hurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of others. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is behind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is injured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to face him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner despises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.

Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.—(a) By reason of the intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence, there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation (e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he was a sober man).

(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen. Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.

(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation, challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his amendment).

(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not found in spoken words.

Examples of Direct Defamation.—The following are examples of direct defamation:

(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a neighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were dictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;

(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults or crimes;

(c) exaggeration, as when one magnifies a venial into a mortal sin, an exceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin; or when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far more heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because one of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail or circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are proverbial examples of exaggeration: “Fama crescit eundo”;

(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny without serious sin as a defense of one’s own justice and honor (see Denzinger, n. 1194).

Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known Defects.—(a) It is not unjust, per se, since it does not take away fame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no sufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful per se, since grave harm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already bad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of uncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the listeners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that is caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it prepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for calumny.

Restitution for Defamation.—Restitution for injuries committed is necessary (see 1759), and hence it is required of the defamer. In the language of Scripture (Prov., xiii. 13), he that speaks ill of his neighbor obliges himself for the future. The two injuries to be repaired are: (a) the unjust taking, that is, the fame of which he has deprived his neighbor; (b) the unjust damage, that is, the detriment to fame or the losses that resulted from the defamation (such as failure to obtain or keep a position, decline of business, etc., which were foreseen at least in a confused manner). It is clear there is no duty of restitution, if in spite of talk against a neighbor he suffered no loss (e.g., if the listeners gave no heed or credence to the talk).

Gravity of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of restitution for defamation is grave or light according to the degree of injury done, and the grave obligation binds even at the expense of serious inconvenience, the light obligation at the cost of small inconvenience. But the following points should be noted:

(a) the injury is not necessarily grave if the defect imputed to another is grave, for many circumstances have to be considered (e.g., blasphemy is a serious charge, but it would not be very harmful to a man publicly known as very impious, see 2053 sqq.);

(b) the injury is not necessarily slight if the defect imputed is slight, for circumstances may make the injury considerable (e.g., it is not very defamatory to say that a woman is very talkative, or unable to speak or spell correctly, but this would be very damaging if it lost the woman a very lucrative position as secretary).

Conditions Which Entail Duty of Restitution.—Restitution is not obligatory unless one is the unjust and efficacious author of the damage (see 1763). Hence, disclosures unfavorable to the reputation of others entail the duty of restitution only when the following conditions are present:

(a) the detriment to fame or other loss must be unjust objectively, and hence those who have a just reason for exposing the vices of others are not held to restitution;

(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in good faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and public, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to restitution, if he discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been removed (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the neighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from that moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take steps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);

(c) the detriment must be due to oue’s act as to its efficacious cause, and hence one is not bound to restitution if a listener understands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.

Cooperators and Restitution.—Those who cooperate in injustice are also held to restitution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following are bound to indemnify a defamed person:

(a) positive cooperators are held to restitution, such as those who command, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those who share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by their questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to continue, or to speak with more assurance;

(b) negative cooperators are also held to restitution, if they were bound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply chiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the defamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a non-subject (see 2080 sqq.).

Circumstances of Restitution.—We shall now speak of the circumstances of restitution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to restitution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners, etc.; (b) the persons to whom restitution is to be made; (c) the manner of making restitution; (d) the time for making restitution (see 1781 sqq.).

Restitution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the Defamer.—(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not bound, since the duty of restitution of fame is a personal one, that is, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an obligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation may be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that, if the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the infamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.

(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound, since restitution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property or estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are sometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.

The Persons to Whom Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.—(a) To the person defamed restitution of fame is owed, and this is true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors the dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their memory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their reputation to make restitution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in conscience to insist upon this restitution, and it seems they cannot condone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.

(b) To the listeners restitution is not owed, since no injustice was done them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory. And, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other reparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to whom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the honorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with the same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.

Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.—Is the defamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned them from his first listeners?

(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond the circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon his listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his remarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the common opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the subsequent listeners.

(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if he gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well that they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to reparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible, especially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners have the first duty of restitution will depend on the relationship in their cooperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should admonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.

The First Way of Making Restitution for Defamation.—(a) If the defamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must take back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If necessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit that he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right to his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to confess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice to say merely that his former statement was not correct.

(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully say that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or indirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the person he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their belief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his statements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he wishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct revocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by strengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true, the defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should so honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to believe, not that restitution is being made, but that the former good opinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect revocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has reformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now has; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be excused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does possess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the listeners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the defamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter, etc.

What is the eighth precept of the Decalogue? - The eighth precept of the Decalogue is: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. Ex. 20:16.; Matt. 18:19. By this precept, insofar as it is negative, false testimony is primarily prohibited, especially in judgment; but secondarily every unjust injury of neighbor in the goods of reputation and honor is prohibited, which is reduced to false testimony as to a principal injury; such are rash judgment, detraction, contumely, lying. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that, all simulation and fallacy removed, simple and naked truth be spoken. Catech. Rom. n. 2.; L. 961.

What is reputation? What is rash judgment? Reputation is: the common opinion about the life, morals, and other qualities of someone, which can increase or diminish his moral estimation. Good reputation therefore is the common opinion about the virtue, wisdom, or deeds excellently performed by another; if this goes out into external verbal testimony, it is called praise; but if into testimony, whether verbal or real, it is called honor. Hence the good reputation of someone can be unjustly injured not only through detraction and contumely, but also through an internal rash judgment about some crime or moral defect of another. One must distinguish rash doubt, suspicion, opinion, and firm judgment. Rash doubt is had when someone without sufficient reason remains suspended, yet without inclining rather into judgment of vice than of virtue. Rash suspicion is given when someone without sufficient motive inclines rather into a judgment of vice than of virtue of another; yet he suspends actual judgment. Rash opinion is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits assent concerning the vice of another, yet with fear concerning the opposite. Finally, rash judgment is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits a determined judgment concerning the vice of another without fear concerning the opposite. L. 962, 965.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.

What kind of sin is rash judgment? Rash judgment is a sin opposed to justice, and from its genus mortal.

The 1st part is proved, because anyone has the right not to be judged by another to be evil as long as he does not give to this other a sufficient motive of judging that he is evil; and therefore rash judgment from its generic concept, and with any other malice prescinded, is repugnant to justice. The 2nd part is proved, because good reputation is a notable good of man; and rash judgment, although it takes away the estimation of only one person, namely of the one judging, and not also the common estimation of others, nevertheless, since it always contains contempt of neighbor, hence even only partial injury of the aforesaid reputation is grave of itself, as detraction would be grave of itself even if made before only one person. He who judges another ill from slight judgments, in a grave matter, contemns him, which is a mortal sin. Hence in 1 Tim. 6:4, evil suspicions also are numbered among mortal sins. From its genus, because more often it is only venial on account of smallness of matter, whether according to itself or with respect to the persons about whom there is question, or on account of imperfection of the act. Matt. 7:1.; L. 962.; Lugo d. 14, n. 11.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3, 4.

When is rash judgment a grave sin? - In order that rash judgment be a mortal sin in the individual case, three conditions are required: 1. That it be firm and deliberate. 2. In grave matter. 3. Rashly conceived, without a grave indication, about a person known to you, not about an indeterminate person or one unknown to you. This is proved, because rash judgment, unless it is firm, in grave matter, and rashly conceived, is not a grave injury of neighbor against the reputation of neighbor; but if it is not sufficiently deliberate, it is not perfect on the part of the act and the consent of the will. Therefore, unless it has the aforesaid three conditions together, it is not perfect on the part of the act and the consent of the will. Therefore, unless it has the aforesaid three conditions together, it is not a mortal sin. L. 962.; Lugo d. 14, n. 11, 23.

What kind of sin is doubt, suspicion, rash opinion? Positive doubt, suspicion, or rash opinion about another's sin is of itself only venial. This is proved, because even an opinion, if it is fearful, concerning another's crime, speaking of itself, does not inflict grave injury on him, since, simply speaking, it does not take away by judgment another's reputation; for it is not a firm judgment. - Positive rash doubt is given when someone ought from graver motives to judge someone to be good and innocent; nevertheless from other lighter motives he positively doubts, or reflexively judges that it is doubtful whether he is good or evil, innocent or guilty.

Of itself, for per accidens it can sometimes become grave; if, e.g., these acts are concerned with very extraordinary sins, or graver ones by reason of the condition of the persons whom they regard, and the opinion or suspicion proceeds from slight indications, the doubt from very slight indications; because such opinion, suspicion, or doubt is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave ordinary sins. Thus also such acts are a grave sin if they proceed from malevolence without cause; for then they proceed from contempt of another, and therefore are reckoned a grave injury. Moreover, because for the most part thoughts of this kind creep into the mind even without deliberation, whoever does not advert with full deliberation both to the gravity of the thing thought and to the lightness of the indications is excused from grave sin. 1 Cor. 13:5.; L. 963, 964.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.; Cajetan ib.; Quodl. 12, a. 34.; Lugo d. 64, n. 17.

What of negative doubt? - A purely negative doubt concerning the innocence or crime of another is no sin. This is proved, because in such doubt, arisen from some indication concerning another's crime, no graver motive existing, no one is held positively to judge another to be good and innocent, and so to expose himself to the danger of error; and therefore by suspending every judgment concerning the goodness or malice, concerning the innocence or crime of another, he does not sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4.; Less. l. 2, c. 11, n. 32-36.; Lugo d. 14, n. 21.

Note: Practically, in doubt that axiom of prudent men is to be observed: In the order of caution worse things are to be presumed, but in the order of charity and justice better things. The reason of the first part is: because each one has the right to guard against evil, especially his own or that of his own; and therefore in the order of caution he can presume worse things, at least practically, and precisely in order to avoid evil. But this does not rest on a rash judgment against someone in particular, but on a general judgment by which someone thinks it can happen that someone who is judged good is truly evil. But the reason of the latter part is: because an error precisely speculative, against truth, is a lesser evil than a practical one against charity and justice; and therefore in the order of charity and justice toward another, better things are to be presumed. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4 ad 3.

What is detraction; what is calumny? - Detraction is: the hidden and unjust violation of another's reputation. Hidden, i.e., in the absence of the other from whom reputation is taken. Hidden; for if it is manifest, it is contumely. Of another's, for he who injures his own ordinarily is not unjust, since he is its owner. But reputation is the public opinion about the excellence of another.

Violation of reputation can be done in various ways: 1. Positively, if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister way. 2. Negatively, namely by denying the good works of neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others are praising, or by praising coldly. If reputation is taken from someone by opening a true crime, it is called simple detraction; if by imputing a false one, it is called calumny, which is graver and differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds to detraction a lie damaging to neighbor. Yet this diverse species, "precisely insofar as it is against truthfulness, is not mortal malice, and therefore does not bring a diverse mortal species necessarily to be explained in Confession." Lugo d. 14, n. 36. Detraction differs from whispering, which is a word sowing discord among friends. Yet whispering agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, because each says evil about neighbor; but it differs in species on the part of the end, because whispering moreover intends the dissolution of friendship. And therefore it is from its genus mortal, of a species diverse from and graver than detraction; hence it is to be expressed in Confession. Prov. 6:16, 19.; Eccli. 28:15.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 74, a. 2.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 1.; E. M.

What kind of sin is detraction? - Detraction is a sin opposed to justice and from its genus grave. This is proved, because it is opposed to the right which another has to his reputation, or good name, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; therefore it is a sin opposed to justice and, from its generic concept, mortal. 1 Cor. 6:10. Moreover detraction of itself is worse than theft, just as reputation is better than money, according to that saying of Prov. 22:1: A good name is better than many riches. And Eccli. 41:15: Have care for a good name, for this will remain for you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. - That calumny is opposed to justice is manifest. For since the crime is false, someone is in peaceful and legitimate possession of his reputation.

But as regards detraction there is difficulty; yet it is clear from this, that as long as the crime is not public, since reputation is not something consisting in the truth of the thing, but in the opinion of men, one is still in peaceful and legitimate possession of his reputation, of which he is despoiled through detraction. - But the same is always a sin in species, whatever the person may be from whom reputation is taken, because the reputation of a man is not distinguished into species; whatever the sin may be in which someone takes reputation from another; and whether in one thing or in several; because always it is one and the same thing which is injured by all these, namely estimation: hence in Confession it is not necessary to explain from whom and in what someone took reputation. L. 966, 967.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 33, a. 7 c., q. 73, a. 2.; E. M.

Whether it is grave to reveal the natural defects of another? To reveal another's natural defects, speaking of itself, is not a mortal sin. This is proved, because such defects are inculpable and ordinarily known to many; and therefore to reveal them is not usually gravely harmful to reputation. Thus it is not usually gravely harmful to reputation if someone says that another is ignorant, imprudent, etc.; nor if he says that another is one-eyed, lame, hunchbacked, etc. Speaking of itself; for if from the revelation of some natural defect another would suffer damage, or be gravely saddened, the revealer would sin gravely against justice or charity, unless he had a just cause for manifesting such a natural defect to someone. L. 967.

Note: The same must be said, generally speaking, of all those moral defects which, although without sin and without crime, can nevertheless render a person less worthy of honor; and the same must be said of merely civil defects in the same case, e.g., if someone says of an honorable girl that she suffered violence, or of an honorable and grave man that he exercised the butcher's trade.

Whether it is grave to reveal another's light sin? - To reveal another's venial sin, or to speak about sins by general words, speaking of itself, is not a mortal sin. This is proved, because in many things we all offend; and therefore to reveal another's venial sin, or sins by general words, from which it cannot be gathered that another has sinned mortally, is not usually gravely harmful to reputation. Speaking of itself; for the condition of some person can be such that in him even venial sins are judged to be of great moment; e.g., if it is said of a grave and religious man that he is mendacious, or lies frequently; or if certain sins are reported about some religious community by words even only general, e.g., I know many things about it which charity forbids me to disclose, etc.; or if so many things are said, although not individually grave, that the reputation of some person established in conspicuous dignity is notably injured, even if this is done over a long time. L. 997.

Whether it is always grave to reveal another's grave sin? - To reveal another's mortal sin is a mortal sin when on account of it he suffers grave detriment to reputation, but not when he suffers only slight detriment. The reason as regards the 1st part is clear of itself. The reason as regards the 2nd part is that certain mortal sins are so frequently committed by persons of a certain condition that they are now almost presupposed concerning them; and therefore to report a certain mortal sin about a person of like condition diminishes his reputation little; as, e.g., if it is said of a soldier that he committed a duel or seduced a girl. It would be the same if someone revealed a delict about which another is accustomed to boast, or one of the same reason, or species, concerning which he was already publicly defamed before. - L. 967.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2, 3.

Resolutions: It is inferred that he does not sin mortally who reports another's grave crime, if he is of so low a condition and authority that he can prudently persuade himself that those hearing will not believe him. The reason for this is that such a person does not cause in the hearers a firm judgment concerning another's crime, but at most some light suspicion. But if the detraction is atrocious, even to excite only suspicion is grave. He does not sin mortally who narrates to a friend an injury inflicted on himself by someone, in order that he may receive some consolation from him, and by the complaint set forth may lessen the bitterness of the pain.

The special reason for this is that it would be too difficult if someone had to digest a grave injury in silence, and under grave obligation could not report it even to a friend for the sake of consolation. There is a certain collision of rights; nor is the reputation of another properly and strictly injured. Hence servants disclosing to someone injuries inflicted by masters, wives by husbands, sons by a father, religious by a prelate, only for the sake of mitigating pain, are excused at least from mortal sin. L. 973.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 3.; 1. 2, q. 38, a. 2. Cf. 1494, 1496. It is not mortal to speak ill of someone unknown or indeterminate, if such is not the case that infamy redounds upon others known and determinate.

Thus, e.g., he sins who detracts from a religious order, or names a monastery in which someone committed a grave hidden sin. For this gravely harms such an order or monastery. They make exception if there is question of some large order, and it is not of stricter observance, since in any large place there are almost always some unruly men. L. 978. It is not a sin against justice, at least not a mortal one, to ask the cause of someone's captivity or to speak about it; for just as the captivity is public, so also the cause seems to have been made public. L. 974. To defame a dead person is less grave than a living one, since he no longer needs reputation for living and working rightly for the utility of others; nevertheless it can still be mortal and obliging to restitution, because no one wholly dies, and the estimation of the dead often pertains to the living.

And scandal can also easily be had from the publication of a thing hitherto unknown. Nor does the reason avail against this that if you do not narrate that evil deed, others will narrate it. The fact that others do an illicit thing cannot make it licit for you. L. 978. Cf. here 1493, 1494. To call back into memory crimes already given over to oblivion is grave of itself against justice, since it takes away recovered estimation. But constantly to renew the memory of crimes which have not yet been given over to oblivion is grave of itself against charity, since this, without just cause, as is supposed, affects neighbor with grave sorrow.

Whether calumny or detraction is ever licit? - It is never licit to place a false crime upon another, as is clear from propositions 44 and 45 condemned by Innocent XI. Yet for a just cause it is licit to manifest another's hidden crime, even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right. L. 972.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 69, a. 2.; E. M.

For what causes is it licit to reveal another's crime? - The causes on account of which another's crime can licitly be revealed, indeed sometimes even ought to be, are the following: 1. The notable utility of the revealer himself, e.g., for asking counsel or help in a grave matter, with any affection toward detraction nevertheless excluded. 2. The utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc. 3. Public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the republic or religion or some community. 4. Grave utility also private, whether of those hearing or of others, e.g., that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. The reason of these things is that then one manifesting the sins of another injures neither justice nor charity. He does not injure justice, because neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are obliged to cover the truth when its manifestation is necessary for avoiding grave damage, whether one's own or that of others, to which others also have a right. Hence a collision of rights occurs. The good of others altogether prevails over the good of one's own reputation, which is a false reputation. Nor does he injure charity, because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; and just as you are not held to impede the damage of your neighbor, even if great, with grave damage to yourself, so neither in the case are you held to conceal the hidden crime of neighbor.

L. 968.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2.; Lugo d. 14, n. 97, 112, 113.; Gousset 1070.

Resolutions: If someone unjustly injures your reputation, either by calumny or by simple detraction, by denouncing your altogether hidden delict, and you cannot defend it or recover it by another way than by diminishing his reputation also, this is licit, provided you do not say false things, and only insofar as is necessary for preserving your reputation, and you do not injure more than you are injured, with your person and the other person's compared. L. 972. It is licit to defame another in order to avoid grave torments, if the crime is true; because you do no injury to another, since you have the right of revealing it in necessity; but it is not licit if the crime is false, because it would be a pernicious lie. L. 982.

You also licitly diminish someone's reputation if the estimation falsely conceived of his doctrine and probity is pernicious to others, provided there is no other more suitable reason for impeding the evil, and the damage which is feared for neighbor is greater than, or at least equal to, the damage which would come to the other from the manifestation of his defect or crime. Less. 968. Indeed, according to Lugo d. 14, n. 112, neither excess nor equality of your damage or that of others is required, "provided the damage which you fear for yourself or others is not slight, but grave and notable." Thus also St. Alphonsus 968. For the correction of the delinquent himself, it is licit secretly to reveal hidden delicts to parents, prelates, teachers, masters. It is also licit by reason of avoiding damage to manifest to some master that a servant is a thief, that a maidservant admits a lover at home when the master is absent.

Whether it is mortal to reveal another's grave sin, which gravely dishonors him, to one prudent and discreet man, with special malice excluded? The first opinion, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is 1. because injury of reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave. 2. Because often men bear more painfully that they are injured before one grave person than before three or four others. Indeed it is grave to be held as good or as evil by a grave man. The second probable opinion denies it. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name only before one or another. But the parity of rash judgment does not stand, because in it there is the imposition of a false crime; and in the case at issue, the naked manifestation of a true crime. Except unless one reveals it to him from whom the guilty person most and before all others would wish to be hidden, and it gravely concerns him that it not be revealed to that person. Cf. n. 1481.; L. 973.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 11, a. 13 ad 3.

Whether another's hidden crime can be revealed by also narrating the penance performed? Resp. Negatively. For that manifestation of the delict is not equally compensated by the subsequent penance. For always a certain sinister opinion is introduced into others. - L. 974.

Whether it is grave to manifest a hidden grave sin of a certain person, who is already defamed by another known grave sin? Resp. Affirmatively of itself, if the sins are disparate among themselves. For one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation as regards other virtues. But negatively if they are connected among themselves and one implies the other, because then the infamy is not notably increased. Yet it must not be denied that it can be a grave sin to manifest even a crime committed by someone a second time, because again grave detriment is inflicted on his reputation; as if someone says of another, of whom it is known that he committed theft only once, that he stole again. L. 976.; H. A. 14.

Whether, in order to avoid grave damage of your own, you can reveal the hidden crime of another, if you received the knowledge unjustly through force or fraud, for instance by opening letters, etc.? These are St. Alphonsus's words, 969: "In this question there are several opinions. But among these so various ones, the opinion of Lugo pleases me more. This great theologian teaches that you cannot, generally speaking, use that knowledge unjustly received with the damage of another for escaping any damage whatever of your own. The reason is that the unjust action by which you received the secret obliges you to restoring all damages about to come to neighbor on account of it. Only then do Lugo etc. rightly admit that you can manifest the crime: 1. If the revelation were necessary for the common good of the republic. 2. If the other were held from justice to reveal the secret, for repairing your damage. 3. If he were unjustly vexing you."

Whether a public crime can be revealed to those ignorant of it? Resp. Affirmatively, because this seems to be neither against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law or by publicity of fact. L. 974.

Whether a crime public in one place can be revealed in another place, where it is unknown? - Resp. More probably affirmatively of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a neighboring place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public. The reason is that a reputation shortly and necessarily to be lost is of no or certainly of no great estimation, and morally speaking, it has already been cast away. Except, however, unless someone is going to suffer grave damage from it. - If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to arrive, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish.

As regards notoriety of law, or through the sentence of a judge, it is not against justice, because when the judge publicly condemns someone, he intends to despoil the guilty person of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be spread everywhere, so that the punishment may be more efficacious, and the guilty person may be known also by the inhabitants of a remote region, who could have business to transact with him. L. 974. As regards notoriety of fact, or through the mere knowledge of many, it is controverted. The first, very probable opinion says that it is not of itself illicit, because one sins neither against justice nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that infamy, from whatever source it has arisen, simply takes away good estimation; and it conduces to the public good that wicked men be known, so that all can beware of them. L. 974.; H. A. 12.; In Retr. n. 12. The second opinion, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity. Against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, to which the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive; therefore he does injury to him who defames him there. Moreover, as infamy begins by the fact of divulgation, so it ceases by the fact of silence. Against charity, because the one defaming harms neighbor in a grave thing, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury to anyone; nor at least always is there any necessity of the public good for the crimes of others to be spread more widely; indeed it concerns public tranquility and order, and the delinquent, namely that he may more easily be amended, that hidden crimes not be spread abroad without just cause, and that crimes already spread abroad not be published more and more.

Note: From St. Alphonsus, H. A. 12: "A delict published in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public; hence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order, which would have frequent communication with that one." From the same holy Doctor, l. c. 13: "A delict of someone public at one time cannot be published at another time, in which it has become hidden, without grave fault, at least against charity, unless the delict were public not only by notoriety of fact, but also by notoriety of law, i.e., through sentence of a judge, or confession of the accused in court." Yet this does not prevent public delicts from being narrated in public histories for the public good, for preserving the truth of facts, for instilling horror of vice, for commending divine mercy, etc. Cf. n. 1492.; Lugo d. 14, n. 87.

When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious? - It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community or city, town, village, etc. It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be hidden by any evasion, and it is morally impossible that it not come into the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required that a crime ought to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common opinion a crime can be called public if fifteen know it from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty of diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons. Thus St. Liguori 975. But, as Billuart better says, de Iust. diss. 15, art. 2, § 5, this is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with attention to the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - L. 11 App. n. 33.; l. 6, n. 593, 1111.; l. 7, n. 76, 78.

Whether one who merely reports another's grave sins heard from others sins gravely, e.g., if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I heard this or that about such a person? He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports it in such a way that others are more likely and deservedly going to believe it, e.g., if he asserts that he heard the things which he narrates from a trustworthy person, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing evil; otherwise, if probably no faith is given to the words, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as merely doubtful, another's enormous sin, e.g., of heresy, sodomy, etc.; because the mere suspicion of these enormous crimes greatly defames. He sins gravely against charity if he reports things heard before those who will probably believe them from levity or malice of their own; because each one is held under grave obligation from charity to remove the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage. L. 977, 978.; Billuart ib. art. 2, § 4.

How does one hearing detraction sin? - He who efficaciously induces another to detract certainly sins gravely not only against justice, but also against charity. The reason is that he is not only the unjust cause of further detriment to the reputation of him from whom reputation is taken, but also of the further sin of the detractor. Therefore, with respect to the first he sins against justice, with respect to the latter against charity on account of scandal and cooperation. - He sins gravely against charity, as regards him from whom reputation is taken, who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of neighbor.

Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself. He also sins against charity as regards the one detracting; for he furnishes to him the occasion of consummating the exterior sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4. A superior, in the spiritual order, sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because a special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject.

But more probably he does not sin against justice: 1. the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another not subject to him; 2. the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent on him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. L. 979. Yet the superior of the detractor "is not excused from grave fault against charity, and also against justice, if he is a Bishop or pastor and does not correct, because these are held from justice to correcting subjects."

L. 580.; Struggl 40. It is the office of the civil magistrate also to protect our estimation; but with the order of law observed, and therefore regularly at the instance of the party. A private person is for the most part excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame or fear or from some negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, nor does another damage besides infamy accrue.

The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction is going to profit; indeed often it is dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. Likewise someone is excused at least from grave sin if he is silent because he does not know whether the things which the detractor reports are hidden. But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they advert to detraction, depart, break off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, according to that saying of Prov. 25:24: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue. Yet he will not be without some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction. "And therefore it is turned into fault for him if he does not resist when he can resist, for the same reason by which someone is held to lift up the ass of another lying under a burden, as is prescribed in Deut. 22." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4.; L. 980, 981.

What obligation of restitution is present in the detractor? - The detractor is held from justice, as much as can be done: 1. to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2. to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority: therefore, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, on that account that injury must be repaired. The reason for the second is that all damages arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in either case the detractor has unjustly injured reputation. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - L. 613, 991, 994, 995, 996.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2, q. 73, a. 2.; C. B. 824.; C. L. 2389, 2390.

How is reputation to be restored? Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence 1. the calumniator is held to retract what was said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if reparation cannot be made otherwise; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on that account. 2. A simple detractor cannot retract what was said, because thus he would lie; but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying of Prov. 14:22: They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among intelligent and crafty persons, who rather gather from these formulas that the crime is true which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent about what was said, ought, when the occasion is given, with dexterity and truth, to praise and honor him from whom he took reputation. L. 992.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, q. 73, a. 2.

Whether someone ought to restore reputation even with inconvenience to himself? - He who, by injuring another's reputation, sinned only venially, is not held to restore the same with grave inconvenience to himself. But he who sinned mortally is held to restore the same even with grave inconvenience, yet one proportionate to the damage of the other. The 1st reason is that from only light and venial fault, in the simple damaging of neighbor, there cannot arise a grave obligation, and under mortal sin, of restitution in the forum of conscience, at least from justice. Yet if he who sinned venially in detracting from half-full advertence can conveniently restore reputation in a grave matter, he is held from charity and from justice under mortal sin to restore this; for charity obliges gravely to avert the grave evil of neighbor even if someone is in no way the cause of it; and justice obliges gravely that our action not continue gravely to influence the damage of neighbor. The 2nd reason is that such a one is held to restore reputation from justice, and on account of preceding mortal fault; but an obligation from justice and from mortal fault and in a grave matter obliges with grave inconvenience. The 3rd reason is that if the evil which the detractor would have to suffer is of a higher order, or in the same order is by far notably greater than the evil which the innocently defamed person ought to suffer, the defamer could, in the order of charity, prefer his own greater good to the lesser good of the innocent, as theologians commonly note. Yet if direct restitution of reputation by retraction of words cannot be made, or is not expedient, at least indirect restitution is to be made, by praising, honoring the injured person, etc. L. 994.

Whether one defaming is held to restore reputation also before those who received the crime revealed by him mediately? - Resp. Affirmatively, if he violated reputation before hearers whom he foresaw would easily spread the infamy. The reason is that then he himself was the first and efficacious cause of the damage. But with secondary causes failing, the first cause always remains obligated. But otherwise he is not held; rather those are held who afterward detracted before others. L. 991.

What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation? The following are commonly admitted: 1. If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., through sentence of a judge, etc. 2. If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through the course of time. 3. If restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life; because life is a good of a higher order than reputation; likewise if restitution of reputation is of far much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honored man and especially very useful to the public good or religion. 4.

If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are found especially in the reparation of simple detraction; e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preoccupied opinion. 5. If it is judged that no faith was given by the hearers to the detraction, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger. 6. If the defamed person has expressly or tacitly remitted the obligation, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal, or damage either common or of his own, etc.; e.g., if there is question of the infamy of a priest, etc. L. 997, 998, 1003.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4 ad 1.

Whether you are excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation and does not wish to restore? - Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny it; but it must more probably be affirmed with St. Alphonsus 999, because you are not held to render his right to another if he refuses to render yours to you. "Equal delicts are dissolved by mutual compensation." L. 40. de Sol. matr.

Whether you are held to compensate reputation by money if you cannot restore it? - Resp. More probably at least negatively, because justice obliges only to rendering what was taken away, or an equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction; nor is it itself equivalent to reputation, since it is of another order.

L. 1000.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2.

What is to be done if it is doubtful whether the defamation has been given over to oblivion? - These are St. Alphonsus's words, 998: "Retraction of itself brings infamy on the one retracting; hence, when there is doubt about the oblivion of the defamation, it does not seem that someone is held to suffer certain damage in order to repair the uncertain damage of neighbor. And although the injury inflicted is certain, and therefore possesses, nevertheless, because restitution is not owed on account of injury alone, but on account of damage truly inflicted, as we say with St. Thomas, there does not seem to be an obligation of repairing doubtful damage with certain damage of the one restoring, unless when only the danger of another's infamy in some case would be esteemed more than the certain infamy, or damage, of the detractor." Add that if the defamation has truly been given over to oblivion, the defamed person certainly prefers that its memory not be recalled further.

What is contumely, how manyfold is it, and what kind of sin is it? Contumely is: the unjust violation of the honor of a present person. Therefore contumely differs from detraction first in this, that detraction directly injures reputation, or the internal estimation which others have of neighbor; but contumely directly injures honor, or the external attestation of such estimation, whether it is done by words or deeds. Secondly, contumely differs from detraction in this, that detraction is done secretly and in the absence of the other; but contumely is done openly and in the presence of the other, through contempt of him, whether in himself, who is present, or in another, e.g., in his legate or statue; for contumely is so called from contemning. Nevertheless, as honor can be shown to an absent person, e.g., by a laudatory oration before many, so also contumely can be done to an absent person by an atrocious injury before many, because namely it is foreseen at least confusedly that the offended person will find it out. L. 1. 3, n. 334.

Contumely is done in three ways, namely by word, writing, and deed. Moreover, under contumely which is done by word are comprehended reviling, reproach, opprobrium, and curse. Under contumely which is done by writing from the mind of defaming another is comprehended a defamatory libel. And finally under contumely which is done by deed are comprehended mockery, derision, and scoffing. "Meanwhile, however, these species of contumely in the theological forum are only material; for formally all pertain to the unjust injury of another's honor." Struggl 33. But from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1, "derision is a special sin." For "just as someone by reviling intends to depress the honor of the one reviled... so also by mocking someone intends that the one mocked blush." Hence derision, which is done by mouth, word, and laughter, and scoffing, which is done by wrinkled nose, "differ from contumely as shame differs from dishonoring: for shame is fear of dishonoring." St. Thomas ibid. ad 1. Indeed, "from a virtuous work someone merits among others both reverence and reputation, and within himself the glory of a good conscience; according to that saying, 2 Cor. 1:12, this is our glory, the testimony of our conscience." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1 ad 2. Hence conversely "from a base or vicious act, a man's honor and reputation are taken away among others; and to this end the contumelious man and the detractor say base things about another; but within himself, through the base things which are said, someone loses the glory of conscience through a certain confusion and shame, and to this end the mocker says base things." Now security of conscience and its quiet is a great good. "And therefore he who disquiets someone's conscience by confounding him inflicts on him some special harm." Injury of due honor is not only against charity, but also against justice; for individuals have a right to a certain honor, and not to be held in contempt. Yet greater honor and a certain quasi-worship is owed to Prelates and persons excellent in dignity, and to parents; which in the former belongs to observance, in the latter to piety. But any injury of honor, if only that is considered and not other extrinsic effects, is of the same lowest species, except that which is against parents and which also violates observance or piety. Lugo de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1.; q. 73, a. 3.; q. 75.; q. 103, a. 1, 2.; L. 966.; Struggl 23-27.; Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5.

What are reviling, reproach, opprobrium, mockery, scoffing, derision, imprecation? "Reviling, as if called a clashing of voices, properly signifies voices of several persons striking against each other, or a disordered clamor; and because reproaches are often hurled with contention employed, therefore in strictness it ought to be used for contumely done by several; yet usage bears that reviling be confused with contumely, as if it is an injury by which some crime, or also an evil either of punishment or of nature, is thrown in the face of someone present.... Reproach is an injury by which someone objects to another a benefit previously conferred upon him, upbraiding his ungrateful mind toward the benefactor.... Opprobrium in law means the same as reproach, L. Probrum ff. de Verbor. signific.; it is as though a reproach objected; hence, since reproach signifies dishonor or infamy from delict, opprobrium is an injury by which someone objects to another the dishonor with which he is affected on account of a crime.... Mockery and derision mean the same thing and are derived from deriding and mocking, which signify laughing with contempt of another. And according to St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, it happens when someone turns another's evil or defect into play and laughter so that the other may blush. If laughter or loud laughter is added to words, it is properly called derision; it should be called scoffing if a movement of the nose, head, or some other member of the body is added, indicating another's vice, so that he is suffused with shame; but if other deeds are added to words for this same end, derision will be called mockery. But it will be called irony if you then especially blame another when through derision you praise him.... To these add imprecation, that vice... by which someone calls down upon another some evil of fault, punishment, or nature." Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5. A curse, made against an absent person, is repugnant only to charity; for through a curse evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But made against a present person, it often is repugnant also to justice; namely when it injures the honor owed to another, and takes on the nature of contumely. Struggl tr. 4, q. 5, n. 13.; Lugo d. 14, n. 193.; St.

Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1; q. 75, 76. "Reviling and reproach consist in words, as also contumely does, because through all these some defect of someone is represented to the detriment of his honor. But a defect of this kind is threefold: namely a defect of fault, which is represented through contumelious words; and a defect generally of fault and punishment, which is represented through reviling.... But sometimes someone represents to another a defect of diminution or indigence...; and this is done through the word of reproach, which properly is when someone injuriously recalls to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him while he was suffering necessity." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3.

"It happens that a word of curse uttered is a venial sin either on account of the smallness of the evil which someone calls down upon another by cursing, or also on account of the affection of him who utters the words of cursing, while he utters such words from a slight movement, or from play, or from some surreption, because sins of words are weighed especially from affection." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 76, a. 3.

Whether contumely and mockery are grave sins? - Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. For from the fact that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to make little of him; hence from this very thing he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. Therefore from this it is per se a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery. For man does not love his honor less than a possessed thing. And it is a graver sin than detraction itself, as robbery is graver than theft. For it brings greater contempt of neighbor. This is clear besides from the words of Scripture, Matt. 5:22: But whoever shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and whoever shall say: Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire. From its genus; for it will be venial both from imperfection of the act, and "if it is a light reviling, not much dishonoring a man, and is uttered from some levity of mind, or from slight anger, without a firm purpose of dishonoring someone." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 2.; q. 73, a. 1, 3.; L. 966.; E. M.

Mockery, or derision, or illusion is done only concerning some evil or defect which is turned into laughter or play, and therefore is taken as if small. For what is great is taken not for play, but seriously. Therefore when someone puts the evil or defect of another person into play or laughter, because according to itself it is a small evil, it is a sin according to itself venial. But if he puts the evil or defect into play or laughter as small by reason of the person, then to mock or deride someone in this way is to make altogether little of him, and to esteem him so vile that there is no need to care about his evil, but it is to be held as if for laughter and play. And thus derision and mockery are per se mortal sins, and graver than contumely; because the contumelious man takes another's evil seriously, but the mocker turns it into play and laughter; and therefore there is greater dishonoring and contempt. But the sin is so much graver as the reverence owed to the person who is mocked is greater. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 2.

Whether an obligation of restitution arises from contumely? - Contumely of itself induces a strict obligation of restoring honor and repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they were foreseen confusedly. The reason is that contumely contains injury, and any injury requires satisfaction, and if it is damaging, moreover compensation of damages. - Cf. 1506 seqq.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 3.; C. A. 1330.

Resolutions: Honor publicly taken away through contumely is to be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who asks pardon in the name of the one dishonoring. L. 894. That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the offended person. For if he who dishonored was a superior, it will regularly suffice if he greets the one dishonored, visits him at home, or shows benevolence to him.

But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot sufficiently satisfy in another way. L. 986.; Lugo d. 15, n. 57. If the one dishonored has taken revenge, e.g., by striking, wounding the other, for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because that one seems to accept revenge as satisfaction, and the other, by not resisting, seems to confess his fault and his estimation of the other. L. 989.

Likewise rustics are exempted from restitution of honor if equal revilings or reproaches have been mutually hurled among them, because by that very fact compensation is made. In practice many times it is expedient that the confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that admonition is not going to profit; or if he thinks that he who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame, etc. L. 988.

1. Anastasius, greatly desiring to think and judge well of all, experiences on the contrary in himself a continual inclination to judging badly of others. And this is altogether vehement when evil indications appear, which, although absolutely they could be taken in a good sense, nevertheless he is inclined to take them in a bad sense from a certain judgment which spontaneously arises in his mind, namely that matters are not to be considered speculatively and in the abstract, but practically and in the concrete, not according to the possibility of the same matters, but according to the depraved nature of men.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Anastasius does not seem to be accused of grave sin; since he does not form a rash judgment concerning persons, but only has some suspicion, which, with attention to the subjective disposition of Anastasius deliberately to think and judge well of all, is rather indeliberate than at least fully voluntary. Besides, the aforesaid suspicion of Anastasius in particular cases does not seem altogether rash, since it arises from those evil indications. Nor truly, speaking per se, is suspicion a mortal sin.

For “in those things which are mortal sins from their genus, imperfect movements are not mortal sins, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely when the will is complete, but not when it is incomplete; for not every movement of concupiscence is a mortal sin. But judgment is twofold, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always a mortal sin, say to say that giving alms is evil. But judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it is false, nevertheless is not always a sin, except when it is altogether rash.... But when from a slight matter a firm judgment proceeds in the heart, sometimes it is a mortal sin, because it is with contempt of neighbor; but suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment, and therefore is an imperfect movement, and therefore it is not mortal from its genus; although if it is done from hatred, it will sometimes be mortal.” S. Th. Quodl. 12. a. 34. But Anastasius is far from hatred. Therefore he is by no means to be disturbed as guilty of grave sin. — S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3; I. M. 1483.

Nevertheless that judgment of Anastasius, which spontaneously arises in his mind, is certainly not the right rule of judging, in doubt, concerning the malice of others. For from this very thing, that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and consequently affects him with injury. But no one ought to contemn another, or inflict any harm whatever, without a sufficient compelling cause. And therefore where manifest indications do not appear concerning the malice of someone, we ought to hold him as good, by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part. But it would be otherwise if there were question of applying a remedy to some evil: for then, in order that the remedy be applied more safely, it is expedient that that which is worse be supposed, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil. But to suppose is not determinately and definitively to judge evil concerning others. S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3, 4; I. M. 1485.

2. Aquilinus, in order often to excite the languishing conversation of friends, narrates the sayings and deeds of some persons, whence grave detraction against the reputation of others follows; but since he himself does not intend that, nor, as he himself says, does he narrate these things from an evil mind, he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin. But he has contracted so strong a habit of detracting from the reputation of others that sometimes he scarcely even adverts that the things which he reports can bring grave harm to others.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Aquilinus is guilty of detraction at least in cause. For it is evident that he himself sufficiently knows the depraved habit contracted, which he ought to strive efficaciously to uproot. By reason of actual inadvertence he can sometimes be excused from actual grave fault. For detraction can easily be venial not only on account of lightness of matter, or slight damage inflicted on the neighbor, but also on account of defect of sufficient advertence, on account of the sudden impulse of passion.

“Sins of speech,” says S. Th. 2.2. q. 73. a. 3, “have some lightness, insofar as they easily proceed from a slip of the tongue without great premeditation.” But Aquilinus is not to be excused from grave sin from the fact that without the intention of harming others, but from mere lightness of mind, he gravely detracts from others. For it makes no difference that detraction is not directly intended; it suffices that it is implicitly willed, namely if those things are advertently said from which detraction arises.

3. Guido constantly speaks about Iulius, and constantly reports his slight defects, which he sometimes exaggerates, at one time adverting that what he says is not true, at another almost inadvertently from his very slippery loquacity. Nevertheless Guido thinks himself immune at least from mortal sin, because in truth he says and manifests only slight things, and this seems to him to be done by himself without a malicious mind. — Does Guido sin gravely?

R. It can easily happen that Guido sins gravely. For by this very fact, that Guido reflexively considers his manner of speaking, whence he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin, that Iulius, concerning whom he speaks so easily and freely, does not seem to be any common person whatever, but a person of some note, and to whom perhaps grave damage can thereby be brought. Wherefore, for rendering a definitive judgment, it is necessary that Guido expose the personal conditions of Iulius. For if grave harm is brought to Iulius as to reputation, or even as to temporal goods from that manner of speaking, there is no doubt that Guido sins gravely both against charity and against justice. That he himself does not speak thus from a malicious mind does not of itself excuse from grave sin, objectively speaking, just as it does not impede real grave damage. Therefore Guido perhaps could then be excused from grave sin, but only on account of his subjective ignorance and some good faith. Nevertheless, without doubt, if in truth he gravely injures the reputation of Iulius and brings him some other grave damage, he himself is placed in a grave illusion. G. 427, 428; I. M. 1487, 1488.

4. Menander, a servant, was dismissed by his master Balduinus because of a hidden theft. When Lord Martinus wished to take Menander as a servant in his house, he asks Balduinus whether Menander is honest and faithful. Balduinus then opens to him the reason on account of which he dismissed him.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Balduinus could, without detraction, manifest the theft of Menander to Martinus. There was present a grave and sufficient reason for such manifestation, namely the grave damage of Martinus to be averted. In truth, the grave defects of others and grave sins can generally be manifested to some person, if this is done from a grave reason of averting grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, from some community, or family, or private person. For then those whose defects and sins are revealed no longer have a right that they not be uncovered with the damage of others. Others also have a right, and a prevailing one, to avert damage of this sort from themselves; to whose right in the Case the right to one’s own reputation yields, for this right cannot exist with the injury of others.

Hence also a maidservant, e.g., who has left a master depraved in morals and dangerous to maids, can warn another maid who, ignorant of the matter and in good faith, is arranging to devote her services to the same master. Hence also generally someone can reveal the defects and sins of another by reason of grave damage of his own or of another to be impeded, although in this way a marriage is impeded, or the obtaining of an inheritance, or the obtaining of another benefice. — I. M. 1494; G. 426, 427.

5. Alexius, whatever evil he hears concerning others, in familiar conversation with his friends and companions, is accustomed at once to report to others. Hence it happens that discords and dissensions arise among friends and companions, and since no one dares to manifest to others the cause of his own displeasure, Alexius easily enjoys the friendship and confidence of all, and dominates all despotically. Alexius, adverting his own malice, often confesses that he has detracted from the reputation of his neighbor, nevertheless adding that the matter was of little importance, and was done rather for the sake of laughter and jest than with a malicious mind. Whence, easily receiving absolution, he frequently receives the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Alexius is to be numbered among whisperers, an abominable race of men, since secretly they sow discords among brothers and friends. How many evils whisperers cause in families, in colleges, in seminaries, in religious communities, cannot easily be said. A whisperer and a double-tongued man is accursed; for he will disturb many who have peace. Eccli. 28:15. But Alexius, speaking per se, does not sufficiently confess his sin, or rather his continual sins. For the sin is not light, but grave, although perhaps the matter of detraction is light, by reason, namely, of the depraved effect gravely evil and harmful, i.e., of the grave displeasure engendered in the souls of his friends and brothers against friends and brothers, and of grave dissension and discord arisen among them. Alexius perhaps deceives himself in this so grave and delicate matter; but a prudent confessor ought not be content with so superficial a confession. Nor truly does Alexius sufficiently explain his sin by saying that he detracted from the reputation of his neighbor. For whispering is of a diverse species and graver than detraction. S. Th. 2.2. q. 74. a. 2; I. M. 1486.

1. Magdalena, a wife, is accused by her own husband concerning adultery altogether hidden, so that he can institute divorce before a judge and enter another marriage. Hence Magdalena asks her confessor whether she is held to confess her sin in court. The confessor responds that she can deny that she committed adultery.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. “It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether hidden, she ought not to confess her sin in court, nor ought an oath concerning speaking the truth to be demanded from her, because hidden things are reserved to the divine judgment alone; according to that saying, 1 Cor. 4:5: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord comes, who will illuminate the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy proceeds from adultery, or some evident signs appear which can cause vehement suspicion, or when it has been half-proved, then an oath concerning speaking the truth ought to be demanded from her, and she herself is held to confess the truth.” S. Th. Quodl. 5. a. 16. Therefore, since in the Case there is question of adultery altogether hidden, Magdalena can, by mental restriction, deny it, saying, I did not commit adultery, and understanding, which I am held to confess in court. For the response is of itself to be understood according to the question made. But a question made by a judge concerning adultery is evidently a question concerning adultery about which he himself can ask and render sentence, and which consequently the guilty woman is held to confess in court. I. M. 1530, 1535; G. 418, 419.

2. Galenus, a most skilled physician, knew a most powerful herb for checking the flow of blood. He communicated the secret only to Laelius, his dearest friend, under the latter’s promise of keeping the same secret. Galenus having died, Laelius, who alone knows the secret, would like to manifest the secret for public utility; and he proposes the doubt to his confessor.

Q. Can Laelius, in the Case, manifest the secret?

R. It seems that Laelius can manifest the aforesaid secret. The reason is that from that manifestation no damage at all can come to Galenus, indeed good can come, namely praise and honor for him. Nor truly can damage of this sort come to any other, since Laelius alone knows the secret. Whence, communication of that secret having been made to him by Galenus, he himself is now the absolute owner of this secret. Besides, the secret is altogether useful to the common good of others. Wherefore it would rather seem to be against charity not to communicate a salutary remedy to all. This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 12. a. 21, raises the question: “Whether one receiving the teaching of some experiment under an oath not to communicate it is held to observe the oath”; and he responds: “One thing must be said here simply, and another in the Case. Speaking simply, he is not held, but he acted badly by swearing. An oath loses force not only when the oath is illicit, but also when he swears to worse things; because an obligating oath ought to have judgment, justice, and truth. But even if I sometimes swear something which it is lawful for me not to do, say, not to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful to swear (forever), because although it is lawful for me for some time to do or omit this good, which is to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful for me to interpose an oath and to harden my soul toward not doing some good, because this is to act against the Holy Spirit. And therefore an oath against everything which is of the genus of good things is illicit and not to be observed. Nevertheless, in the Case, he is held to observe it, say if that man or another sufficient physician were present and were prepared to cure and to use that experiment for the bodily health of others.” Scavini, ed. 12, Milan 1874, l. 2. n. 229, speaking of an oath of keeping a secret concerning the art of making some medicine, of healing some infirmities, says: “Notwithstanding the oath, you are held from charity to reveal it, if otherwise someone would undergo grave danger of death, or if the art would therefore die with him, with harm to the commonwealth, and the sick cannot otherwise be healed, since an oath is not for damage.”

3. Eustachius, under the strictest promise of secrecy, manifested to Hilarius that Amalia, his daughter, was spurious. Moreover Hilarius in his own mind had proposed to marry Amalia; but, her condition having been learned, he altogether changed his mind and married another.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Hilarius used his own right, nor did he act illicitly in any way. A secret is, as it were, another’s thing, and consequently of itself it is not lawful to explore or extort it. For that would be, as it were, to snatch his own thing from the owner, although someone proposes to himself not to reveal the secret to others. But after someone has in whatever way naturally learned a secret, that knowledge has now been made his own, and he is not prohibited from using it without any unjust damage to another. Hence, if the secret is some invention of art or science, I can use it, if utility follows for me and no damage follows for another; indeed also, according to Lessius, if some damage to another follows, because that knowledge is mine. If the secret regards some fact, someone can then use it, namely by doing those things to which he already had a right before the knowledge was accepted; for after the knowledge has been accepted, he does not lose the right, as, e.g., if someone seeks a benefice or office which he has learned to be vacant, or buys a field in which he has learned that a treasure lies hidden. Less. l. 2. c. 12. n. 131.

4. Sempronius had written his wife as heir in usufruct, with the burden added that she furnish support to Caius and to Titia, his mother; but in ownership he had named Caius himself as heir, and if he should die without offspring, he had substituted the sons of his niece Bertha, from his sister, who, the testament excluded, by law would have succeeded to the inheritance of her maternal uncle. After the death of the testator, Bertha pressed in civil judgment for the nullity of the testament, since he had called an adulterine son to the inheritance, namely Caius himself, as she said, born from Titia at a time when marriage with his wife was standing. But truly, since the arguments deduced for proving this did not exceed the limit of mere conjecture, and Bertha had declared that in the episcopal Chancery and in the baptismal parish archive documents existed by which the true status of Caius, as she contended, would be placed in clear light, the presiding judge asked the bishop that he exhibit the mentioned documents.

Q. Could the bishop manifest and hand over the commemorated documents?

R. Negatively, as is evident from the Response of the S. C. EE. et RR. 25 Feb. 1842, Bizzarri Collectan. ed. 1855, p. 101. But the reason is that it is especially of the public good that the things which are committed to some person established in some ministry by reason of office, it be unlawful to publish and manifest; for otherwise it would be done with the faith owed to public authority, especially of the Church; for no one would any longer be found who would entrust himself to the same. And thus the Civil Laws themselves exempt Advocates, Physicians, Surgeons, and other professionals from giving testimony concerning those things which become known to them by reason of profession. Nor truly could the bishop or pastor have exhibited the aforesaid documents, entrusted to his faith, from the fact that Bertha already knew the tenor of the documents from the rumor of the crowd. For if truth is obligated to guarding a secret, it cannot confirm public report and rumor, often doubtful and uncertain, by its assent and its affirmation, and render it undoubted and certain. For then it would already be done against the law of secrecy. And although perhaps Bertha knew the matter certainly from the corrupted faith of officials, and so from a shameful and unjust fact, nevertheless to continue and confirm baseness and injustice is altogether illicit. Nor truly is he to be heard in court who alleges his own baseness. Whence Bertha could acquire no right from this to the exhibition of the aforesaid documents.

5. Lucianus, by a fortuitous event, received letters directed to Lucius. Recognizing the handwriting of Rufinus, by whom many damages had already been inflicted on him, and fearing lest those letters contain something against him, whence Lucius, his friend and a powerful man, could be turned away from his friendship, he at once opens and reads the letters, and in them he in fact finds several calumnies asserted against him. Hence, saying nothing about the letters received, by opportune means he forestalls the mind of Lucius, and easily frees himself from every evil machination of Rufinus.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Lucianus licitly read the letters in the Case. For he did this not with the intention of prejudicing the right of another, but with the intention of averting from himself an unjust burden threatening him, judging probably, indeed morally certainly, that the aforesaid letters had been written to his prejudice. But it is lawful to read another’s letters, just as it is lawful to manifest a natural secret, for forestalling unjust damage to be inflicted on oneself or on another. Elbel 616; I. M. 1545.

But what if Lucianus had deceitfully stolen the letters beforehand: could he still use them for removing from himself the grave danger of damage which he first learned from the letters themselves was threatening him, or which he otherwise knows to threaten him? Generally it is not lawful to use another’s letters deceitfully stolen, especially if damage to that other follows from it. The reason is that no one can continue in sin and in injustice. But if someone uses that knowledge, unjustly acquired, for driving away from himself grave and unjust damage, that is not illicit. It is lawful in those very circumstances in which someone licitly reveals another’s sin and reads another’s letters. For just as someone would now licitly acquire that knowledge and licitly use it, so now he can licitly use knowledge already acquired, although its acquisition was unjust in the beginning. I. M. 1494, 1495, 1545; G. 429, 430, 440-442.

You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. Exod. 20. 16. - You shall not say false testimony. Matth. 18. 19.

437. • This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits, 1. chiefly and primarily, lest false testimony be said both in judgment and outside judgment; 2. indirectly and secondarily, lest the reputation and honor of the neighbor be injured.

But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that, every simulation and fallacy being removed, simple and naked truth be said ¹.

¹ Thus the Roman Catechism (De VIII Praec., n. 2): "In this precept... two laws are to be noted, one prohibiting lest false testimony be said; the other commanding that, simulations and fallacies being removed, our words and deeds be measured by simple truth." But this part is drawn over to the affirmative precept so that that may be suggested which is common to all affirmative precepts, namely that they bind always, but not for always, since on the contrary it is often necessary to hide the truth.

Hence it prohibits, 1. perjury against the neighbor; 2. lying; 3. detraction; 4. contumely; 5. rash judgment and injurious suspicion. We must speak about each, except perjury, concerning which enough was said in the second precept.

“44. Why should it not be only venial to overthrow, by a false accusation, the great authority of a detractor when it is harmful to oneself? — 45. It is probable that one does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend one’s own justice and honor. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“5. One who reviles someone praises God by the very sin of reviling; and the more he reviles and the more gravely he sins, the more he praises God.” Proposition of Eckhart condemned by John XXII.

Cf. no. 554.

836. 1. Notion. (a) Discord is the dissent of wills concerning a good in which, by charity, we are bound to agree. Therefore two things are required for discord: a dissent of wills, and not of the intellect alone; and a dissent concerning a necessary good, or one about which we are bound to agree. For if it concerns free opinions, and does not exceed the limits of moderation, it is not a sin.³ For the most part it arises from pride, by which we love our own judgment and our own will more than is just.

³ Such was, very probably, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15:35-40).

(b) From discord contention often arises, that is, an inordinate battle of words, or altercation, by which truth is attacked, or is defended with excessive acrimony. This, moreover, is frequently increased from vain glory, by which each of those contending strives to gain victory over the other. Sometimes also it arises from immoderate nationalism, by force of which certain persons, fostering love of their own nation more than is just, despise and pursue with hatred peoples of another stock, after the manner of pagans; for thus contentions are sown between foreigners and citizens, indeed even among citizens themselves who differ in stock.

Sometimes contentions are had in a religious matter, and schism arises, by which certain Catholics of their own accord withdraw from the unity of the Church. But since the unity of the Church consists in two things, namely, in the connection of members with one another, and again in the order of all members to one head, namely Christ and His vicar on earth, those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, or to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 39, a. 1.

837. 2. Malice. Discord and contention, in those things in which we are bound to agree, are mortal sins from their genus; moreover schism is a most grave sin not only against charity, but also against the obedience due to the Church.

(A) Scripture often reproves discord as altogether contrary to the Christian spirit, and gravely sinful. For Paul, hearing that there were contentions among the Corinthians, beseeches them to put these away, and to live in concord and peace: "Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you; but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment."⁵ Those who indulge in discords are still carnal:⁶ "For whereas there is among you envying and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to man?" For God hates dissensions:⁷ "For God is not of dissension, but of peace." Elsewhere he enumerates contentions and quarrels among lethal sins.⁸ Wherefore he exhorts Timothy to avoid contentions, as useless and harmful:⁹ "Do not contend in words: for it is useful for nothing, except for the subversion of the hearers."

⁵ 1 Cor. 1:10.

⁶ 1 Cor. 3:3.

⁷ 1 Cor. 14:33.

⁸ Gal. 5:20.

⁹ 2 Tim. 2:14.

838. (B) Tradition frequently inculcates the same. Among the Fathers, let Cyprian be heard, who before the rest commends concord, and strictly reproves discords or schisms:¹⁰ "For God commands that men be peaceful and concordant and unanimous in His house, and as He made us by the second birth, so He wills those reborn to persevere; that we who have begun to be sons of God may remain in the peace of God, and that those to whom there is one spirit may also have one mind and sense. Thus God does not receive the sacrifice of one dissenting, and commands the one returning from the altar first to be reconciled to his brother, so that by peaceful prayers God also may be appeased. Our peace and fraternal concord, and a people united from the unity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is a greater sacrifice to God... But one discordant and dissenting and not having peace with his brethren, according to what the blessed Apostle and sacred Scripture testify, even if he should be killed for the name of Christ, will not be able to escape the crime of fraternal dissension."

¹⁰ St. Cyprian, De oratione Dominica, c. 23-24, P. L., IV, 535-536. He develops the same more fully in the book De Unitate Ecclesiae, P. L., IV, 493-520.

(C) Reason itself dictates that nothing is more contrary to the Christian spirit, nothing more harmful to individuals or to the Church itself, than discords, contentions, or schisms. For Christ wills that His disciples be one as He Himself is one with the Father:¹¹ "Holy Father, keep them in Thy name, whom Thou hast given Me, that they may be one as We also are"; but dissensions destroy this moral unity. On the other hand, one of the notes of the Catholic Church, one of the causes which bring strength and consolation to it, is the perfect unity of its members; therefore those who sow discords and contentions among Catholics, by that very fact perform a diabolical work, tearing up the foundations of the Church itself and diminishing its strength; for Christ testifies:¹² "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand." Therefore those gravely sin who knowingly scatter the seeds of discords and schisms.

¹¹ John 17:11.

¹² Matt. 12:25; cf. Luke 11:17.

839. 3. Remedy. In order to avoid dissensions of this kind, which have introduced so many and so great evils into the Church of God, two things especially are to be done: (a) we ought to pass over those things of slight moment which tend to cause dissensions, and, on the contrary, attentively consider all those things which bind us by a manifold and sweet bond; concerning these hear the Apostle:¹³ "Careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. One body and one spirit, as you are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all." And truly, when there are so many motives for loving neighbors as brothers, would it not be foolish to break the bond of charity because of certain slight differences which exist between us and them? (b) Since the chief cause of discords is disordered love of self, we ought to cultivate humility and meekness, and thus root out the very roots of dissensions. To the same point the Apostle says: "I therefore, a prisoner in the Lord, beseech you that you walk worthy of the vocation in which you are called, with all humility and meekness, with patience, supporting one another in charity¹⁴... If therefore there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of charity, if any fellowship of the spirit, if any bowels of commiseration, fulfill my joy, that you be of one mind, having the same charity, being unanimous, thinking the same thing; let nothing be done through contention, nor through vain glory, but in humility, each esteeming others better than themselves; each one not considering the things that are his own, but those that are of others."¹⁵ These words indeed preach charity and humility together so sweetly and strongly that they need no commentary.

¹³ Eph. 4:3-6.

¹⁴ Eph. 4:1-2.

¹⁵ Phil. 2:1-4.

1103. 1. There are prohibited: (a) false testimony against any man whatever, even for favoring him, not only in judgment, but also outside judgment; (b) detraction through calumny and backbiting; (c) the stirring up of discords; (d) flattery; (e) lying; (f) simulation; (g) contumely; (h) rash judgment.

2. But there is commanded: (a) that judges exercise forensic judgments justly and according to the laws; (b) that the accused and the guilty confess the truth when they are legitimately interrogated; (c) that witnesses bring true and certain testimony when they are questioned by a judge according to the norm of law; (d) that advocates defend just causes justly and measure their fee according to right and equity by their work; (e) that accusers and petitioners exactly observe truth and justice toward all, even adversaries.

Concerning these things the treatment was given in the Treatise on Justice: (a) concerning rash judgment, n. 365-373; (b) concerning detraction, or defamation, through evil-speaking and calumny, 374-395; (c) concerning contumely, or injury to honor, 397-400; (d) concerning false testimony and lying, 401-417; and in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, where the duties of judges, accused persons, witnesses, advocates, etc., are treated, n. 992-1020.

36. Principle: Man has direct and useful dominion over his own reputation, although limited. It is certain as to useful right; it is commonly held as to direct dominion.

The first part is proved, namely that he has direct and useful dominion, inasmuch as we can not only use a good name for our own advantage, but also renounce it for a higher good.

For we have not only useful but also direct dominion over those things which we acquire by our own labor, or legitimately obtain from those who have acquired the same things by their own labor; but so it is with good reputation: for we acquire or increase this by our own labor, namely by the upright exercise of our faculties; or we have received it from our parents by quasi-hereditary right; therefore we have true dominion over reputation. - Therefore we can protect it against unjust aggressions by our neighbor; and when taken away, reclaim it before judges as our own thing. - This indeed will appear even more manifestly if it is observed that reputation is truly estimable by price: for he who is engaged in commerce, or in an art or industry, conducts his affairs with a more prosperous outcome the more distinguished the reputation he has acquired for himself; therefore injury to reputation often also injures fortune, and therefore can oblige to pecuniary compensation.

Moreover, since reputation is truly ours, we can permit the loss of it in order to obtain a greater good, e.g., to cultivate humility, to seek counsel, to restore reputation to another, etc.; for, between two goods, it is permitted to choose the more excellent.

37. The second part is proved. Nevertheless that right is limited by a manifold obligation, namely (a) by duties toward oneself, inasmuch as it is no more permitted to defame oneself without cause than to dissipate goods of fortune, nor to sin or falsely impute sin to oneself for the sake of humility: for evils must not be done that goods may come. Hence rightly it is read in Scripture:¹ "Have care of a good name: for this shall continue with you more than a thousand precious and great treasures; the number of days of a good life is limited, but a good name shall continue forever." (b) By duties toward the neighbor: inasmuch as we cannot bring infamy upon ourselves if the infamy redounds upon the neighbor, e.g., upon one's family, convent, or community, or upon an accomplice; or also when reputation is necessary to someone for furnishing to the neighbor a duty which is owed to him by strict right, as it is necessary to a bishop or pastor for rightly fulfilling his duties; finally, when it is required for furnishing a duty which is prescribed not by justice, but by charity. In the first and second cases there is injustice, because of harm unjustly inflicted upon the neighbor; in the third, charity is injured.

¹ Ecclus. XLI, 15-16.

365. 1. Notion. (A) The good estimation to which the neighbor has a right, as long as his malice is not clear, is injured as often as by slight and insufficient indications we think evil about him and give consent to this thought.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 60, a. 2-4; Sotus, lib. III, quaest. IV, a. 3-4; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 10-33; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, Venice, 1618, lib. XII, c. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 962-967; Carriere, n. 860-868; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 1056-1066; Lehmkuhl, n. 1185-1187; Haine, De Decalogo, q. 167-169; Noldin, n. 647-650.

(B) There are various grades toward rash judgment: (a) doubt concerning the neighbor's honesty, when we deliberately suspend judgment concerning his probity, and indeed from insufficient motives; (b) suspicion, by which, from slight indications, not indeed firmly, but with great fear of erring, we judge that the neighbor has done something evil; (c) opinion, by which not certainly, but probably, from insufficient motives, we pronounce that the neighbor has done something evil. - Rash judgment properly so called is a firm assent of the mind concerning the sin or fault of the neighbor conceived without sufficient reason. - Psychologically, the transition from doubt and suspicion into firm judgment is easily made.

In all these grades, rashness arises from this, that someone judges evil of the neighbor without sufficient reason; but if he were judging according to proofs and things alleged, doubting when a sufficient reason for doubting is present, or pronouncing certainly when moral certainty is present, the judgment would be prudent, not rash, and therefore not sinful under this head.

366. (C) The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are assigned as three by St. Thomas:² "In one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as if conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it comes from this, that someone is badly affected toward another; for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evil about him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it comes from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because many times they have experienced the defects of others.'" - Therefore there are three causes: the depravity of the one judging himself; hatred and envy; experience of human frailty. The first two show perversity of affection and increase the malice of the act; the third diminishes the same.

² St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3.

367. 2. Principle: Rash judgment properly so called in a grave matter is a mortal sin against justice.

It is explained; here there is question of rash judgment properly so called, that is: (a) certain, not indeed metaphysically but morally, insofar as it is firmly judged that the neighbor has done something evil; for if the judgment is only doubtful, generally the injury inflicted upon the neighbor is not grave.

(b) Deliberately brought forth, that is, after sufficient advertence of the mind, by which the one judging rashly attends to the gravity of the matter and the slightness of the motives, and nevertheless wills to give assent; therefore, if the judgment is sudden, conceived from levity rather than from malice, the sin will be only light; and under this head many rash judgments, grave of themselves, do not exceed venial sin.

368. (c) From insufficient motives; for he who from a grave or even probable motive judges sinisterly about another does not sin gravely; yet he sins lightly if, with all the circumstances considered, the judgment exceeds the limits of prudent assent. Hence in practice attention must be paid to the various circumstances of person, time, place, etc. - Thus if a man of depraved morals speaks lingerlingly with a suspect woman, it is not rash to judge that something evil is being transacted there; otherwise, if an upright man has conversation with the same woman; - if someone unknown secretly and at night enters another's dwelling, it is not rashly judged that a depraved intention is present in him; otherwise if by day a known person enters openly; - likewise if seditious men gather in a dark place and converse there in a low voice, they are deservedly judged to be conspiring toward something evil; otherwise, if there is question of upright men who are gathered in an open place.

(d) In a grave matter, for if the matter is light, the sin will be only venial. But matter is held grave which, with attention paid to the quality of the person and other circumstances, notably injures his reputation; e.g., if someone rashly judges that some soldier, who has several times fought a singular combat, provoked an enemy to a duel, the sin is not grave, since the soldier in question would by no means judge himself injured by this judgment; otherwise if the same judgment were made concerning a priest.

369. It is proved. (A) Each one has a strict right to preserving a good reputation and good estimation among others, as long as it is not morally certain that he is wicked; now that right is gravely violated by rash judgment clothed with those conditions which we have set forth above; since, in a grave matter, without sufficient motive, deliberately and certainly, we judge that the neighbor is guilty of some sin or vice, and unjustly deprive him of the good estimation to which he had a right among us.

This indeed will be better understood if we attend to the three things required for a judgment to be brought equitably: authority in the judge, accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity, or immunity from prejudices and passions; now these three things are lacking in rash judgment: (a) authority is lacking, since private men, superiors excepted, have received no mandate for judging others; (b) accurate knowledge of the matter is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash; on the other hand, often judgment is brought from fallacious appearances or from false testimonies of others, and not only concerning external acts, but also concerning intentions which are known to God alone; (c) integrity is lacking, since judgments of this kind for the most part arise from envy, hatred, or prejudices.¹

¹ Bourdaloue solidly develops this, Careme, Sermon for the Friday of the Fifth Week, on Rash Judgment.

370. Hence Scripture prohibits us from judging and condemning the morals of others: "Judge not, that you may not be judged: for with what judgment you shall judge, you shall be judged... Condemn not, and you shall not be condemned";² and especially lest, while we ourselves are bound by the same or greater sins, we judge severely concerning the lesser sins of others: "Wherefore you are inexcusable, O every man who judges; for in that in which you judge another, you condemn yourself: for you do the same things which you judge";³ hence he who judges his brother offends the law: "He who detracts from a brother, or who judges his brother, detracts from the law, and judges the law."⁴

² Matt., VII, 1-2; Luke, VI, 37.

³ Rom., II, 1.

⁴ James, IV, 11.

371. 3. Corollaries. (A) Rash doubt, suspicion, and opinion concerning the probity of the neighbor generally are only venial sins, because they do not utterly take away the good estimation of the neighbor, but only diminish it, and therefore do not inflict a grave injury.

Yet in a twofold case they can be mortal: (a) if they are deliberately brought forth concerning most grave sins, without any probable foundation, e.g., if someone rashly suspects that a pious priest is a heretic, or that an upright man and one above every exception is guilty of theft; for simple suspicion in the case inflicts grave injury;⁵ (b) if someone from envy or hatred, without sufficient motive, voluntarily fosters suspicions concerning a grave matter; for then the sin is grave, on account of the evil affection from which it arises.

⁵ A few theologians indeed deny this (in St. Alphonsus, n. 964), relying on the authority of St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3; but the holy Doctor there hands down a general rule, saying nothing about the exception; therefore his authority is alleged in vain.

372. (B) In relation to the mode of conducting oneself with respect to the neighbor: (a) we are not indeed bound, when there is reason for doubting whether the neighbor's actions are to be taken in a good or in an evil part, always to bring a judgment favoring the neighbor; but it is licit to abstain from judging.¹ (b) In the external mode of acting, we are by no means prohibited from applying precautions for guarding against our own or another's damage, just as if the neighbor were wicked; thus it is licit to lock money in a chest, lest it be stolen by servants or unknown guests; for since among men who are judged upright there are some who are in reality wicked, he acts prudently who uses precautions of this kind, without nevertheless doubting without reason concerning the probity of this or that individual.

¹ Yet charity counsels that, insofar as this can be done, we understand the actions of the neighbor in the better part; charity is kind, and does not think evil. I Cor., XIII, 4. - Faber discusses Christian kindness at length, Spiritual Conferences, on kindness, in French Confer. spirituelles, Bonte.

373. (C) All rash judgments, whatever the object concerning which they turn, are of the same moral species, because they violate the same right; therefore it is not necessary in confession to set forth the object of the rash judgment, but it suffices to declare whether the matter is grave or not.

377. 1. Principle: Simple detraction and calumny, which are done from the intention of injuring the reputation of the neighbor, are from their kind mortal sins against justice.

It is proved. (A) For from what has been said each one has a strict right to his own reputation; now that right is injured by defamation; this is clear when there is question of calumny, which, by imputing a false crime or defect, deprives the innocent man of the reputation owed to him; it is also clear as regards detraction, for as long as an offense remains hidden, the offender retains the right to reputation among others (unless a grave reason stands in the way, as will be explained below), and therefore he is deprived of his right when his hidden vices are manifested without reason. - Nor may it be said that truth has its rights, and demands that hidden offenses be uncovered; for it belongs to God, as supreme judge, to illuminate the hidden things of darkness and to manifest the secrets of hearts at the opportune time; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, uncovers the hidden vices of others usurps the rights of God, who is the sole judge of the living and the dead; and also harms the good of society; for if it were licit for all to bring the hidden basenesses of the neighbor into the light, contentions, quarrels, envies, and jealousies would arise on every side; the peace and tranquility of families would be gravely disturbed. Therefore defamation is unjust, and indeed of itself gravely, since it injures reputation, which of itself is more precious than gold.

378. (B) Scripture not rarely reproves detractors as hateful to God and men, and assimilates them to sinners who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven; thus it is said: "The detractor is an abomination of men";¹ - Paul, describing the pagans, depicts them as "filled with all iniquity... whisperers, detractors, hateful to God,"² as if by all these vices they had been made hateful to God; elsewhere he teaches that revilers are excluded from the kingdom of God.³

¹ Prov., XXIV, 9.

² Rom., I, 29-30.

³ I Cor., VI, 10.

379. (C) Likewise the Fathers many times condemn that vice as truly diabolical;⁴ St. Augustine, in order to keep his guests away from this vice, had written on his table:⁵

⁴ For their testimonies see in Buseus, Panarium, word Detractio.

⁵ In Possidius, Vita S. Augustini, in Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52.

"Whoever loves by words to gnaw at the life of the absent

Let him know that this table is forbidden to him."

Especially let these words of St. Bernard be noted, which set forth the threefold malice of detraction: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Very fierce indeed: namely, one which so lethally infects three with one breath"; namely, as he explains below, the detractor kills himself, - the hearer - and him against whom he detracts.¹

¹ Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

380. 2. Rules for judging the gravity of detraction. The sin of defamation, which is grave from its kind, can be venial under a twofold head: from inadvertence of mind, which attends little to the damage of the neighbor, and from lightness of matter, concerning which especially we must treat. Now the general principle is that the gravity of the sin is to be taken from the gravity of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. But the gravity of the damage ought to be considered not only in itself, but also in relation to the person injured, to the condition of the one detracting, to the number and quality of the hearers. Therefore attention must be paid:

381. (A) To the defect which is manifested; thus detraction in those things which pertain to honesty of life is much graver than that which turns upon natural defects of soul and body, both because these do not notably diminish reputation, and because they more easily become or can become public knowledge; whence generally the former defamation is grave, but the latter light. Yet if the natural defect is very disgraceful, and brings great sadness to the one injured (e.g., if it is said of a distinguished man that he is illegitimate), the sin can be mortal. - Likewise to call someone in general proud, irascible, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which these defects are actually manifested; for general propensities denote natural inclination more than personal fault. - Thus also it is not mortal to report concerning him who has already been defamed by some sin something connected with that offense, e.g., to say of a husband who is known as a drunkard that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise, if the fact is altogether dissimilar, e.g., if it is said that a priest who has already lost reputation in doctrine is depraved in morals; for he who has lost reputation in one matter has not for that reason lost the same in a matter wholly dissimilar.

382. (B) To the person injured, and to his condition and dignity; for he who enjoys an intact reputation necessary to him for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than another who neither enjoys nor needs an intact reputation.² Likewise the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much on the condition of the person; thus an accusation against chastity harms a priest more than a layman, a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an insinuation of cowardice brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl; to say that a merchant is dishonest, that a physician is ignorant, harms these especially, not only as regards reputation itself, but also as regards the profit which they can make. - To detract concerning the dead, whether by words or writings, although less damaging than concerning the living, nevertheless is unjust, because they have not lost the right to reputation, and on the other hand something of disgrace redounds from this upon the family; hence historians who, shortly after the death of some man, narrate his life, ought to take care not to injure the reputation of the deceased or of his family.¹ - It is not licit to detract concerning some family or community, because the disgrace redounds upon the whole community, e.g., if someone were to say that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such or such a vice; otherwise, if it were said in a general way that in monasteries there are not lacking those who sin gravely, although this mode of speaking is to be avoided before those who can suffer scandal from it.

² It is not licit to reveal the hidden sin of the neighbor, while adding at the same time that penance for it was performed, because, even with this correction, his reputation is injured.

¹ But if they write long after his death, they can reveal even hidden vices, by reason of the public good, so that men may be deterred from vices; hence even a little after his death they can collect documents in which these offenses are narrated, so that memory of them may exist. - Cf. Baller. P., n. 1097; Noldin, n. 642.

383. (C) To the person of the detractor; since a man who is regarded as grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one who is light, talkative, and lying; likewise if someone affirms something as certain from sight, he inflicts greater damage than if he reports the same as heard from persons of uncertain authority. Yet if someone narrates a grave matter as heard from a person worthy of faith, or if he foresees from the circumstances that the hearers will believe it, he can commit a grave sin.

He who narrates a hidden crime, without naming the person guilty of this sin, indeed does not sin against justice, if he knows that the hearers cannot know this person; otherwise, if he foresees that the same can easily be known.

384. (D) To the number and quality of the hearers; for, other things being equal, detraction brought forth before many is worse than in the ear of one, - before talkative persons who will preach the matter over the roofs than before men tenacious of secrecy.

On this occasion theologians ask whether he sins gravely who, without malice, manifests a grave defect of the neighbor to one prudent man, who is not going to divulge the matter. Now if this is done from a reasonable cause, for seeking counsel or consolation, it certainly is not a grave sin. But if it is done without cause, it is controverted: some say, with Cajetan,² that the damage is not notable, because reputation is lost before one only; others assert, with Lugo,³ that the damage is notable, precisely because reputation is lost before a grave man, concerning whose good estimation men especially care; and indeed this reason is not lacking in solidity. - In practice, those who act thus are not to be disturbed, but they are to be exhorted to abstain from manifesting the defects of the neighbor when no reason is present.¹

² Commentary on q. 73, art. 2.

³ Lugo, l. c., n. 51-52.

¹ You will find the French laws concerning calumny and defamation in the Supplement, n. 72.

385. A point to be noted for practice. Detraction and calumny are sins specifically diverse, insofar as calumny, besides detraction, contains a lie. Some say that this malice, as against truthfulness, is not mortal, and therefore does not have to be declared necessarily in confession.² - Yet this does not seem consonant with right reason; for the lie in question is pernicious, and therefore grave, if the matter itself is grave.

² Thus Noldin, n. 637, who nevertheless adds: "Yet for the most part the confessor ought to know this, both so that the gravity of the sin and so that the mode of restitution can be determined."

But detractions in diverse matters, e.g., to say that someone is a robber, a liar, or a drunkard, are more probably not sins diverse in species, since they injure reputation in the same mode, if not in the same degree; therefore the confessor is not bound to inquire concerning the very matter of detraction, except insofar as this is necessary for judging whether the defamation is grave or not.

386. 1. Principle. From what has been said, it is never licit to calumniate; indeed generally it is illicit to uncover the hidden defects of the neighbor; but, when a proportionately grave reason is added, this can be licit; for the obligation of keeping silent about the defects of others ceases when their revelation is demanded by the public or private good, proportionate to the damage which follows from the manifestation itself, provided the intention is held not of harming, but of obtaining a good effect; for the manifestation of a vice which really exists is not of itself something intrinsically evil, and therefore can be permitted from a proportionately grave reason.

Now a sufficient motive can be:

387. (A) The public good, namely when the revelation of the offense is necessary for impeding an evil which threatens society or the community; for it is better to avert such damage than to preserve the reputation of a harmful person. Thus, if there is question of conferring an office upon someone unworthy or incapable, it is licit to uncover his hidden vices to the superior, when these are going to harm the whole community; newspaper writers can uncover the vices of candidates who seek public dignities or offices, as often as this knowledge contributes to the public good; if any secretly teach a very bad doctrine, from which faith or morals are corrupted, they must be denounced to superiors.

388. (B) Private good: (a) of the offender himself, as often as it cannot be procured without injury to his reputation, e.g., when children or subjects cannot be corrected unless their secret vices are manifested to parents or superiors; when someone cannot be kept away from an invalid marriage without manifestation of a hidden impediment. - Many also teach that this is licit for obtaining the prayers of the pious for the amendment of the offender; yet this must be done only prudently and with a right intention; for there are some who, under this pretext, but in reality from an itch for manifesting the vices of others, say to many: "pray for such a person, who greatly needs prayers, because..."; and this often is nothing other than open detraction or calumny veiled by hypocrisy.

(b) The good of the one revealing, when someone, for the sake of consolation or counsel, narrates to a friend injuries inflicted upon himself, even if thus another's hidden vice is uncovered; or uncovers to a judge the hidden crime of an accuser, in order to destroy the force of his testimony; for we can prefer our own good to the good of the neighbor.

389. (c) Also the private good of the neighbor; namely, when innocents can easily be deceived and seduced by the wicked, it is often expedient to manifest the secret offenses of these, so that the temporal or spiritual ruin of the unwary may more easily and efficaciously be averted; for the good of the innocent must be preferred to the reputation of the guilty. - Therefore if inquiry is made concerning the honesty of some servant, concerning the skill of a certain physician, etc., it is licit to disclose the truth, yet prudently and while observing the laws of charity.

In all these cases, revelation ought to be made with the least damage to the guilty person, - namely by manifesting only that which is truly useful for averting the evil, and only to those for whom the matter can be useful. - But it is never licit to impute what is false to someone in order to avoid one's own damage or that of others: for this would be a pernicious lie; therefore deservedly the following propositions (43-44) were condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "Why should it be anything but venial to destroy the great authority of one detracting from oneself by a false crime? - It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone, in order to defend his own justice and honor."¹

¹ In Denzinger, n. 1060-1061.

Hence more probably it is not licit to manifest a hidden crime when knowledge of it has been acquired unjustly (e.g., by unjustly reading another's letters), even for defending oneself.¹ For the public good demands that fraud and injustice be able to patronize no one; therefore if someone has known another's secret by truly unjust means, the common good demands that he cannot use it. But otherwise it would have to be said if someone had the right of examining private letters, according to the rules to be set forth below.

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 100-108.

390. 2. Corollary: on the manifestation of a public crime. When a crime is public, generally it is licit to manifest it without injustice even to those who are ignorant of it, because the right to reputation has been lost. Yet, so that the matter may be determined more accurately, certain distinctions are necessary.

(A) When an offense is public by notoriety of law, that is, by force of "a judicial sentence publicly promulgated,"² it can be manifested, even without cause, in the region where it has been denounced, unless it has been amended and already destroyed by oblivion; for the judge by a legitimate sentence deprived the offender of the right to reputation, at least in this matter; and, by promulgating this sentence, gave to others license to divulge the offense, so that citizens may more easily beware of criminal men. - Yet I said in the region where the sentence has been promulgated; for if the offender has gone away into a distant region, and there harms no one, charity at least can demand that his crime not be revealed, lest otherwise he come into despair. I likewise said unless it has been amended and already destroyed by oblivion; for if, even in the region where the sentence was made public knowledge, the offender has amended himself and enjoys a good reputation, it would be against charity, and perhaps against justice, to recall the memory of the past and expiated crime, and to deprive the guilty man, now amended, of his restored reputation.

² There is question of a sentence which passed into a judged matter, or of the confession of the offender made in judgment, according to the norm of the Code, c. 1750 and 2197, 2.

391. (B) But if the fact is public only by notoriety of fact, insofar, namely, as it is publicly known and cannot be concealed by any evasion,³ it can be manifested unless it has been amended and destroyed by oblivion. - For, even if no judicial sentence has intervened, the public good demands that criminal men, who have offended not once but several times and can inflict damage upon others, become known to all. - But if the offender is truly amended, and therefore by no means harmful to society, and otherwise his offense has been destroyed by oblivion, he who recalls the memory of this offense certainly sins against charity, and more probably against justice; for the offender, who had lost the right to reputation by a public offense, recovered it by amendment of life.

³ Code, can. 2197, 3.

392. (C) If the crime is public by notoriety of fact in one place, more probably it is not licit, whether from charity or from justice, to divulge it in another distant place, unless it is foreseen that the same will shortly be public in that place, or it is feared lest the offender harm others in that place. The reason of the general rule is that the offender has not lost the right to reputation in that remote region; but if reputation is going to be lost within a short time, it can morally be held as already lost; on the other hand, if the guilty man is harmful to others, on account of the public good it is expedient that he be denounced. - Even when the neighbor has lost the right to reputation, to narrate his offenses from an itch for speaking wittily is often a venial sin against charity, as being very unpleasant to the neighbor.

393. 1. Those who induce others to detract, by inquiring concerning the defects of the neighbor, or by praising him in such a way that they move others to detraction, or by approving their narration, sin in the same way as those detracting themselves, not only against charity, but also against justice; for formally they cooperate with an unjust action; besides, they give scandal, by provoking others to sin.

2. Those who voluntarily rejoice concerning detraction, without nevertheless formally cooperating with it, sin against charity, because they rejoice concerning the evil of the neighbor; gravely, if they do this from hatred, envy, or revenge, or another motive of this kind, and otherwise the matter is grave; venially, if from curiosity, or from the mode of narrating, or from another lightly sinful motive.

394. 3. He who neither approves detraction, nor rejoices concerning it, but only does not impede it, sins against charity, unless he is excused by some reason, - both because he does not avert evil from the defamed person, and because he does not impede the sin of the detractor; but he does not injure justice, because he is not bound from justice to avert that twofold evil.

That obligation of impeding detraction chiefly lies upon superiors; since the superior of the one defaming ought to correct the detractor, and the superior of the one defamed ought to avert the evil of his subject; whence, other things being equal, superiors sin more gravely in this case than subjects or equals; yet not against justice, because by force of their office they ought to watch over the spiritual, not the temporal, good of subjects, and therefore they are not bound from strict justice to impede their defamation.

It was said unless he is excused by some reason; for there are those who do not sin even venially by not impeding detraction: (a) because they prudently foresee that every correction will be useless or even harmful, e.g., because the detractor is thereby stirred up to increase the detraction; (b) because a grave inconvenience is feared, e.g., quarrels, insults; (c) or because he does not dare to say anything, on account of reasonable shame.

In practice, nevertheless, one ought or at least it is expedient to manifest a certain displeasure, if possible, whether by departing, or especially by diverting the conversation to other things, as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

395. Whispering (in French rapport, delation) is the manifestation of some saying or deed of another for disturbing peace and friendship among families or friends. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the end, because properly it intends not the blackening of the neighbor, but the sowing of discord; nevertheless it generally involves detraction or calumny, and therefore contains a twofold malice. - Whisperers in Scripture are called double-tongued, because they often use a double mode of speaking, conversing in one way before one person, in another way before another, so that they may more efficaciously sow the causes of quarrels.

396. Whispering is a grave sin from its kind, directly indeed against charity, but indirectly also, at least for the most part, against justice, insofar as it involves detraction or calumny. It is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it tends to destroy friendship, which is the greatest good, according to Scripture as witness: "A faithful friend is a strong protection: and he who has found him has found a treasure; there is no comparison to a faithful friend... a faithful friend is a medicine of life and immortality."¹ - Hence in the same place whispering is often reproved as a sin hateful to men and God, and worthy of death: "A whisperer shall defile his own soul, and in all things he shall be hated... The whisperer and the double-tongued are accursed: for he will disturb many having peace."² And elsewhere:¹ "Six things there are which the Lord hates, and the seventh His soul detests... him who sows discord among brothers"; wherefore, according to St. Paul,² whisperers are worthy of death. Therefore whispering is of itself a grave sin: "And therefore whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved than to be honored."³

¹ Eccli., VI, 14-16.

² Eccli., XXI, 31; XXVIII, 15.

¹ Prov., VI, 16, 19.

² Rom., I, 29, 32.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 74, a. 2.

But the sin is the graver the more intimate and more necessary the friendship is which is dissolved, and the worse the effects are which can be foreseen from this; therefore if friendship is dissolved between parents and children, or between spouses, or between defenders of the Catholic faith, and from this dissensions, quarrels, and other things of this kind can be foreseen, the sin is greater.

But he does not commit whispering who dissolves by counsels or fraternal correction a harmful or dangerous friendship.

397. 1. Notion and species. Just as reputation is injured by rash judgment and defamation, so honor is injured by contumely. For honor is the external manifestation of reverence owed to the neighbor on account of his excellence; it is owed to all those who, although otherwise imperfect, are endowed with certain distinguished gifts. - To this is opposed contumely, which is the unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and knowing it; or at least with the intention that it become known to the one injured, whether through a messenger or through letters. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the object, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while for the most part detraction is done concerning one absent. - Yet sometimes contumely is done before others, to whom a hidden offense of the offended person is manifested, and in this case it is joined with detraction.

⁴ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 72; Soto, lib. V, quaest. 9, art. 1; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 189-196; Sayrus, lib. XI, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, n. 984-990; Carriere, n. 977-980; Martinet, lib. IV, art. 14, § 2; Noldin, n. 651-654.

Contumely can be inflicted positively by words or deeds which express contempt; and negatively, by omitting due honor, e.g., a greeting in circumstances in which this is owed. To contumely is referred mockery or derision, by which the defects of the neighbor are turned into laughter, to his shame and confusion; and also insult, or reproach, by which a vice is disgracefully cast before him. For the most part contumely, mockery, and insult arise from anger, or from hatred.

398. 2. Principle: Contumely is a sin mortal from its kind against justice.

For every man has a right to honor on account of the natural or supernatural gifts with which he is endowed, - for example, on account of the grace and virtues with which he is adorned, doctrine or prudence or other qualities by which he shines forth, or by reason of the duty or office committed to him; and this indeed is true even if he labors under certain defects or vices, since by these the excellent gifts with which he is furnished are not taken away. Now contumely violates that right, by despising the neighbor through words, deeds, or omission of due reverence; but this injury is of itself grave, because honor, by the common estimation of men, is placed before the goods of fortune, and therefore is held as a good of great moment; yet it can be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the voluntary act. Hence Scripture strictly prohibits injuries of this kind, under most grave penalties: "But he who shall say to his brother, raca, shall be guilty before the council; but he who shall say, fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire";¹ on the contrary, it wills that Christians be "anticipating one another with honor,"² and "in humility esteeming one another superior to themselves";³ wherefore he who despises his brother is wholly opposed to the evangelical spirit.

¹ Matt., V, 22.

² Rom., XII, 10.

³ Philip., II, 3.

399. 3. On the gravity of contumely. In order that judgment may be made rightly concerning the gravity of contumely or mockery, attention must especially be paid to these things:

(A) To the dignity of the person offended and the gravity of the injury; generally the more honorable the offended person is, the graver the contumely is, other things being equal; but the gravity of the injury is not taken only in itself, but in relation to the person; thus insults with which common people affect one another injure honor less than similar words held among persons of a nobler condition.

(B) To the person offending, and his dispositions; if he is endowed with authority, the offense is greater, because more care is taken of it; if he is of a more lowly condition, it is more easily held as nothing; likewise, if it arises from anger or levity, it is certainly less grave than if from hatred, envy, or contempt.

(C) To the effects going to follow from it; namely, the sin is greater if it is done before many persons, who take scandal from this; likewise if it is foreseen that quarrels, enmities, and contentions are going to arise from it.

400. Corollaries. (A) Mockery is a sin of the same species as contumely; therefore the same must be said concerning its gravity. Yet an urbane kind of joking is more easily excused from sin, if it is done by way of honorable recreation, among friends who plainly understand the matter. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, let it be used soberly and prudently, and not for too long, lest perhaps he concerning whom there is question be made too sad or be provoked to anger.

(B) Sometimes insult and reproach are not only excused from sin, but are praiseworthy, namely when they are done cautiously and moderately by superiors or friends from the intention of correcting a subject or brother. But then let them be done with right intention, when a grave reason is present, and indeed in such a way that it can be understood that they are brought forward not from anger or passion, but from the mind of correcting and amending the offender.

Prior law

74. 1. The first part renews the disposition of the prior law, by which, in the General Decrees, § 2, n. 13, all writings of this sort were punished. Cf. Arndt, p. 148, n. 119.

Whether it is required that it be done of set purpose

2. Because words are to be taken properly, and the Legislator is accustomed to express the clause of set purpose wherever he requires it; indeed because in this same article, in the third part, he inserts the expression by designed effort, we cannot agree with the distinguished Pennacchi, who thinks that clause is to be understood here. With us are Génicot,¹ Card. Gennari,² Moureau.³

Yet practically we do not differ much. For, arguing from the inscription of this fifth chapter, "On Certain Books of Special Subject Matter," we think it necessary that the book be injurious to God, etc., sufficiently notably, although not yet of set purpose, so that it can be said to be of this special subject matter.⁴ Otherwise, moreover, contrary to the mind of this Constitution, this condemnation would extend itself to too many books. Finally, as Génicot, cited place, observes, scarcely will those books be apt gravely to wound or diminish the just esteem of God, etc., unless they are books in which the detraction is developed to some extent. But that grave wounding seems altogether necessary. Therefore it is necessary either that the detraction "be made in a notable manner,"⁵ or that from those detractions the work itself be morally reputed impious. Desjardins elegantly translates: "impious works, which attack God," etc.⁶

Wherefore a work in which detraction against the Blessed Virgin Mary is continued through two or three pages, even if in other parts honorable, we judge to be prohibited by this article.

What it is to disparage? Formal detraction is required

3. Furthermore, to disparage is to take away, diminish, the fame or esteem of someone by words. In French you would say: vilipender, dénigrer, discréditer. Thus detraction differs from heresy, by which a dogma is not derided but denied. But detraction is to be taken as formal, flowing from a depraved intention, not merely material or beyond intention.

Examples

4. God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the saints, the Catholic Church, and her worship or sacraments. Pennacchi, cited place, and C. Gennari⁷ report many examples of detractions of this sort, and well selected ones. Yet we do not, with Pennacchi, take the worship of the Church concerning the honor due to the Church, which would make that clause plainly useless, but concerning the divine worship which is exercised through liturgical actions. Thus the obvious sense has it, thus also the structure of the words which joins worship with sacraments: "and her worship or sacraments"; and with us say Desjardins, cited place, Son Culte; Gennari, cited place, Il sacro Culto; Hollweck, Ihr Cult; Planchard.⁸

What worship is

5. Apostolic See. This is not the person of some Pontiff as such. Yet if, from the intention of attacking the Holy See, reproachful narrations against various Supreme Pontiffs are heaped together, the present clause will obtain.

¹ Cited work, I, 452.

² On this place, p. 43.

³ Rev. des Sciences Eccl., t. 6, pp. 100, 101.

⁴ C. Gennari, cited place, sins here by excessive severity: "in whatever measure it is done (provided it is in grave matter)"; and Moureau, cited place: "it suffices that it be [injurious] in fact in some place."

⁵ Wernz, n. 111.

⁶ Études, t. 71, p. 208.

⁷ "He disparages God who blasphemes God or denies His goodness, justice, omnipotence, or any other attribute. He disparages the Blessed Virgin Mary who denies her virginity, divine maternity, sanctity, mercy, or in another way calumniates her excellence. He disparages the Saints who holds them as vicious or useless men, who are unworthy of honors, or who contemns their virtues and supernatural gifts. He disparages the Catholic Church who attacks some note or endowment of hers, or her divine origin, or equates her with other human institutes. He disparages sacred worship who exposes Catholic rites, as divine honors, to mockery, or detracts from their necessity and reasonable fittingness; he disparages the Sacraments who denies that they are necessary or useful, makes them ridiculous, or holds suspect the intentions of the Church administering them (that seems to us rather to be referred to detraction of the Church). He disparages the Apostolic See who contemns its supreme authority, divine institution, sublime and infallible magisterium." Thus nearly C. Gennari, on this place.

⁸ Desjardins, cited work, p. 34; Planchard, Rev. Th. Fr., n. 41.

1. NOTION.—The term honor may be taken either subjectively or objectively.

Subjectively, honor is the dignity of a person (honor, dignitas) based on his worth, character, or distinguished service. Objectively, it is any consideration due or paid to a person by others, on account of worth, character or distinguished service; or, to express the same idea somewhat differently, recognition of a man's personal excellence, virtue, and ability by his fellowmen (aestimatio, existimatio).¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 2, art. 2: “Honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of his, and thus it is a certain sign and testimony of that excellence which is in the person honored.”—IDEM, ibid., 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 2: “Honor is nothing other than a certain public acknowledgment of the excellence of someone’s goodness.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 459: “Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone’s life and morals.”—Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 819: “Reputation is the good estimation which a man enjoys among others; honor is the indication or manifestation of this estimation according to virtue, dignity, and merit.”

There are several degrees of honor.

a) The first or lower degree is a good name or reputation (fama seu gloria humana).² This may justly be claimed by every man who conscientiously follows his chosen vocation and has not forfeited his claim to the recognition and esteem of his fellowmen by public crimes or blunders. b) The second or higher degree of honor is that which is due to a man on account of his state of life or social position, regardless of whether these are acquired by his own labor or inherited from his ancestors.

² Lehmkuhl, ibid.: “A good reputation is the foundation of honor, so that, if considered precisely, reputation is a greater good than honor; but honor, if taken together with its foundation, signifies something more than reputation. Hence it is that honor is valued more highly among men than reputation, and an injury to honor is borne even more grievously than an injury to reputation; for since estimation lies hidden within, whereas honor is also manifested outwardly and is the natural indication of inward estimation, he who shows honor is judged to give more than he who esteems someone inwardly.”

2. VALUE.—Although intrinsic honor, i. e., the consciousness of one's personal worth, is superior to exterior honor, which is merely the consideration or recognition received from others, the latter, too, is a valuable possession, whose loss may entail serious consequences.

The high value of exterior honor becomes evident from the following considerations: a) Honor is the medium through which the individual exercises his authority or influence upon society; b) Without honor no man can exercise a fruitful activity among and upon his fellows, and the loss of honor often entails moral death or absolute exclusion from the society of respectable men.³ "Take my honor, take my life," says an Irish proverb.

³ Cfr. Prov. XXII, 1; Ecclus. XLI, 15; John V, 44; Rom. XIII, 7; 1 Cor. IX, 15; 2 Cor. VIII, 21; Phil. IV, 9. —St. Augustine says, Serm., 355 (al. 49 de Diversis), c. 1, n. 1: “There are two things: conscience and reputation. Your conscience is for yourself; your reputation is for your neighbor. He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation is cruel, especially when placed in that position concerning which the Apostle says (Tit. II, 7), writing to his disciple: ‘Showing yourself an example of good works toward all.’” (Migne, P. L. XXXIX, 1569).—IDEM, De Bono Viduit., c. 22, n. 27: “Whoever guards his life from the crimes of shameful and wicked deeds does well for himself; but whoever also guards his reputation is merciful toward others. For our life is necessary to us and our reputation to others; and certainly that which we mercifully minister to others for their salvation also redounds to our benefit.” (P. L., XL, 448).—IDEM, Contra Faustum Manich., l. 22, c. 56: “Popular reputation, by which even greater and more illustrious renown is acquired, is not to be sought for its own sake, but is entirely necessary to the intention of good men by which they take counsel for the human race.” (P. L., XLII, 436).

c) A man's moral character not infrequently depends upon his good name, and many are deterred from doing evil by the fear of disgrace.

"Honor," says St. Thomas, summarizing the doctrine of the Fathers, "is the greatest among the exterior things that affect man, both because it ranks next to virtue, being as it were a testimony to man's virtue, and also for the reason that it is shown to God and those in authority, and men prefer the attainment of honor and the avoidance of disgrace to all other things."⁴

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 129, art. 1: “The things which come into man’s use are external things, among which honor is absolutely the greatest, both because it is nearest to virtue, since it is a certain testimony concerning someone’s virtue, and because it is shown to God and to the best persons, and also because men set aside all other things in order to obtain honor and avoid reproach.” —Cfr. qu. 131, art. 1, ad 3.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 2 sq.; 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 1 sq. —F. Kattenbusch, Ehren und Ehre, Giessen 1909. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 76 sq., 655 sqq., 678 sq.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, pp. 258 sqq.

1. Every man is in duty bound to safeguard and preserve his honor or good name to the best of his ability.

a) This means, first and above all, that he must endeavor to acquire the basis of a good reputation by irreproachable conduct and to become ever more worthy of honor by faithfully performing his vocational duties and especially by conforming himself to Christ.¹

¹ Rom. VIII, 29.—Cfr. Virgil, Aeneis: "Famam ostendere factis, hoc virtutis opus."

b) We are exhorted to let our "light shine before men," that they may see our good works and glorify the Father who is in Heaven,² and to declare the virtues of Him who hath called us out of darkness into His marvellous light.³ We comply with this duty if we, each in his own particular sphere, faithfully and punctually do the things that are given us to do, or, as the Apostle puts it, "provide good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of men,"⁴ and avoid even the semblance of evil. "Do ye all things without murmurings and hesitations, that you may be blameless and sincere children of God, without reproof, in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among whom you shine as lights in the world."⁵

² Matth. V, 16.

³ 1 Pet. II, 9; cfr. Acts XXIV, 16.

⁴ Rom. XII, 17; 2 Cor. VIII, 21.

⁵ Phil. II, 14-16. —Cfr. St. Jerome, Ep., 123 (al. 11), n. 15: “Avoid persons in whom there can be a suspicion of evil conduct, and do not have ready that commonplace saying: ‘My conscience is enough for me; I do not care what men say about me.’ And certainly the Apostle provided good things not only before God but also before men, lest through him the name of God should be blasphemed among the Gentiles (Rom. II, 24). He assuredly had the power to take about a woman as a sister, but he did not wish himself to be judged by an unbelieving conscience (1 Cor. X, 29).” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1056). Cfr. Ep., 148 (al. 14), n. 33 (P. L., XXII, 1215).

He who does his share towards the well-being of society according to his insight and gifts,⁶ has no responsibility with regard to the recognition of his work by others. For, in the first place, the duty of providing for the proper recognition of his personal dignity and activity does not go beyond that of furnishing the object of recognition, which is dignity and activity itself; and, secondly, the judgments of society upon the moral worth of an individual and his work are uncertain and fallacious, because men do not always esteem one another according to their true value, but are often deceived by appearances and swayed hither and thither by error and prejudice. "Not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth," says the Apostle,⁷ and our Divine Saviour admonishes us to "judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment."⁸

⁶ Rom. XII, 5.

⁷ 2 Cor. X, 18. —Cfr. 1 Cor. XI, 3.

⁸ John VII, 24; VIII, 15. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 3: “Another thing also must be considered: human knowledge is often mistaken, especially concerning singular contingencies, of which kind human acts are; and therefore human glory is frequently deceptive. But because God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; for which reason it is said: ‘He is approved whom God commends.’”

It is entirely legitimate for a man to try to make himself worthy of honor before God and his fellowmen by leading a virtuous life. The love of honor, in its true sense, is not opposed to humility, for humility does not enjoin self-contempt, but merely forbids conceit. Both Church and State acknowledge man's right to strive after positions or offices of honor, and reward with titles and privileges those who distinguish themselves by extraordinary courage, zeal, or fidelity. Monuments are sometimes erected in their honor, whereas those guilty of certain public crimes, e. g., perjury, are formally deprived of honor (capitis deminutio).

To seek honor for its own sake, or as an end rather than as a means to a higher end, to delight in it unduly (vanity), to covet it without regard to God,⁹ to demand recognition for qualities which one does not possess (hypocrisy) or to seek it through actions which are forbidden, e.g., by neglecting one's duty, or doing evil, or omitting good which one is bound to do, are sinful acts.¹⁰ It is also sinful to be careless of honor or reputation, to hold them lightly or to despise them cynically. The last-mentioned attitude is generally a result of disguised pride.

⁹ Ps. CXIII, 9; 2 Cor. XI, 30.— Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 131, art. 1.

¹⁰ Cfr. Luke IX, 26. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 132, art. 1-4.

"There are honors which dishonor him who seeks them," truly says a modern novelist.¹¹ Every honor or dignity, according to an ancient proverb, entails its own peculiar responsibilities and burdens.¹²

¹¹ "Il y a des honneurs qui déshonorent" (G. Flaubert).

¹² "Honos habet onus."

An ancient saw declares that honors and dignities often change a man's character.¹³ Unfortunately, the change is not always for the better, and consequently those who receive honors or dignities should strive to employ them as a means of moral improvement. "It is sure proof of nobility of character," says Jean Paul, "if a man uses honors and dignities as means of acquiring virtue."

¹³ "Honores mutant mores."

The foundation of true happiness is neither honor nor wealth, but honesty, sincerity, and trust in God. Human glory frequently evaporates like smoke, but nobility of character is a stable possession. "The Lord rewards his servants, not according to the dignity of their office," says St. Francis de Sales, "but in proportion to the humility and love with which they discharge the same."¹⁴

¹⁴ De la Vie Dévote, III, 2.

c) Every man is bound to preserve his honor and good name by faithfully complying with the duties of his vocation, leading a pure and upright life, and avoiding whatever might justly cause offense to others. If, despite all reasonable care, he has the misfortune to give scandal, either by making mistakes or letting his zeal run to ex- cess, let him candidly admit his fault and humbly seek forgiveness. One whose honor is unjustly attacked has the right to defend it, nay, he is in duty bound to do so if his office, or the interest of his family, or the good name of those associated with him, or the danger of scandal render it necessary. Sometimes, however, it is an act of heroic virtue to suffer persecution silently, like Christ and His Apostles, or to sacrifice one's good name for the honor and glory of God. Our Lord says: " Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, for my sake."¹⁵ And St. Paul: "We labor, working with our own hands, we are reviled, and we bless; we are persecuted, and we suffer it."¹⁶ A good conscience and the conviction that an omniscient God governs the universe and draws good out of evil, will give us the consoling assurance that we have nothing to fear, especially since we know from Revelation that the names of Christ's faithful servants, even though they be traduced by men, are held in high honor by God and indelibly graven in the Book of Life.¹⁷

¹⁵ Matth. V, 11; Luke XVII, 3.

¹⁶ 1 Cor. IV, 12; Col. III, 12; 1 Thess. V, 15; 1 Pet. II, 23.

¹⁷ Luke X, 20; XII, 7; Phil. IV, 3. —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduitatis, c. 22: “Since no amount of human caution can in every respect avoid the suspicions of the very malicious, when we have done whatever we rightly can for our reputation, if some try to discolor our reputation either by inventing evil things about us or by wrongly believing them, let there be the consolation of conscience and indeed even joy, because our reward is great in heaven, even when men say many evil things about us who nevertheless live piously and justly (Mt. V, 11-12). For that reward is like the pay of those who fight with the weapons of justice (2 Cor. VI, 7-8), not only on the right hand but also on the left—that is, through glory and dishonor, through ill repute and good repute.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 449).

When a man has lost his good name through his own fault, silence and patience may be recommended as suitable means of atonement. A person who has been innocently robbed of his good name and sees his career endangered or ruined, may find that the simple continuance of his accustomed mode of life is the most effective weapon of self-defence. Where deeds fail to convince, words generally prove of little or no avail.

It is never allowed to employ immoral means, such as lies or duelling, for the restoration of one's honor.

To hide secret sins and defects from others, in order to preserve one's honor and good name, is not forbidden. No human authority can pass judgment upon the secret deeds and motives of men. ("De internis non iudicat praetor.")

d) If a man has lost his good name through his own fault, he must try to regain it as soon and as fully as possible. The means by which it may be regained depend as a rule on the manner in which it was lost. A reputation that is completely shattered may be difficult to rebuild; but the obligation of trying to do so remains and binds especially in those cases where the welfare of a family or the good name of a community depend upon the honor of the individual member.

If honor has been lost through neglect or the commission of some minor fault, it may be restored by increased zeal, fidelity, diligence, and prudence. If the fault was grievous, sincere penance and a genuine purpose of amendment are not only a strict duty, but the only suitable means of making amends for the sin committed and repairing the scandal given. However, as Christ has expressly declared that there will be more joy in Heaven over one sinner who does penance than over ninety-nine just who need it not, every penitent sinner who atones his fault, regains the right to his good name, and it must not be denied him. Nor should it be forgotten that even in the impenitent sinner, no matter how deeply he may have fallen, there is always the human dignity to be respected.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cfr. Luke XV, 7, 10; Gal. VI, 1; Eph. VI, 8 sq.; Jas. II, 1-9.

α) The teaching of Catholic Moral Theology on the subject of honor has been denounced as a hindrance to progress and as subversive of that self-respect which no man can afford to surrender. This is a grievous mistake. Seeking honor and fleeing from it seem indeed contradictory acts, but the apparent contradiction is solved by a higher unity. In preaching contempt of the world and of oneself¹⁹ the Church does not mean to imply that, to be truly humble, a man must be indifferent to mundane things, but merely that he who is truly humble will patiently suffer contempt for Christ's sake, though he will never stoop to anything that would degrade his dignity as a man. Inordinate self-humiliation is not a virtue, but a sin (per excessum) against humility, which consists essentially in submission to God, and to men for God's sake,²⁰ in the service of truth and charity.²¹ Humility, therefore, keeps the pursuit of honor within the bounds of reason and, together with charity, is the foundation of the Christian life. This noble virtue was practiced in a preeminent and exemplary degree by Jesus Christ, "the truth, the way, and the life," who was able to say of Himself: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart."²²

¹⁹ "Spernere mundum, spernere sese, spernere nullum, spernere se sperni."

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 161, art. 1, ad 5. —St. Bernard, De Gradibus Humilitatis, c. 1, n. 2: “Humility is the virtue by which a man, through the truest recognition of himself, becomes lowly in his own estimation.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 942).

²¹ Matth. XX, 28; XXIII, 11; Gal. V, 13. —St. Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia, c. 34, n. 38) “It is rightly held that humility should be placed rather on the side of truth, not on the side of falsehood,... lest humility, placed on the side of falsehood, lose the reward of truth.” (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 265).

²² Matth. XI, 29; John XIV, 6.— Cfr. St. Augustine, Ep., 118 (al. 56), c. 3, n. 22: “I should wish you, my Dioscorus, to submit yourself to Him [Christ] with complete piety, and to prepare for yourself no other way for pursuing and obtaining truth than that which was prepared by Him who, as God, saw the weakness of our steps. The first thing on that way is humility; the second, humility; the third, humility; and however many times you were to ask, I should say this.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 442).

Catholic ascetics neither condemns the striving after honor nor justifies carelessness in this regard, but merely forbids vainglory (gloria vana), which has for its end and purpose not God, but self.

Contempt of worldly distinctions and honors does not imply want of self-respect if it is inspired by a desire for eternal glory. This desire lives only in noble souls. St. Paul, who did not hesitate to say of himself that he had labored more than all the rest and was "made a spectacle to the world, and to angels, and to men,"²³ nevertheless declared: "I am the least of the apostles, who am not worthy to be called an apostle."²⁴

²³ 1 Cor. IV, 9.

²⁴ 1 Cor. XV, 9 sq.

β) The question has been raised whether a man may deprive himself of his good name (seipsum infamare). In answering this question the casuists draw a distinction. If one can defame himself without detriment to his vocational duties and without injury to others, they say the sacrifice is permissible because it violates neither justice, as man has full ownership of his good name (dominium famae suae), nor charity, because charity requires regard for external goods only in so far as they are necessary for one's own salvation or the salvation of others. According to Gury and others of this school, however, it would be grievously sinful to deprive oneself of one's good name if the latter were an indispensable requisite of one's official position or if the defamation would result in danger to one's own life or injury to the good name of others.²⁵

²⁵ J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 469: “It is asked whether it is lawful to defame oneself. The answer is affirmative in itself, if it is done with a right intention, scandal and harm to others being excluded. The reason is that it is not contrary to justice, since each person is the owner of his own reputation, nor contrary to charity, because charity does not bind one to preserve external goods except insofar as one’s own salvation or that of one’s neighbor requires it. But accidentally you will sin, and indeed gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if harm to your life or infamy to others ought to follow from this.”

We cannot quite agree with this view, but maintain that defamation of one's own character is forbidden for reasons which may be briefly stated as follows: a) To preserve one's honor and good name is a precept of the moral law of nature as well as of divine law, and the duty arising from both, while it differs in pro- portion to the concrete conditions or circumstances of each, can never cease entirely. b) Self-defamation no matter by what motives it is inspired or how useful it may appear to be, by its very definition presupposes the telling of a lie. Now, no one is allowed to attribute to himself sins or vices of which he is not guilty because to lie is forbidden absolutely and in all circumstances.

To reveal one's real but secret faults (e. g., to a superior) is not self-defamation but an act of humiliation or the expression of a strong purpose of amending one's life and correcting the fault in question. Such an act of humility, far from injuring one's good name, is apt rather to enhance it.

For the rest, there is hardly a vocation in which men do not feel the need of occasional recognition and encouragement from their fellowmen.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 76 sq., 656 sq. —Thos. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, New York 1919, p. 346.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 818 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 326 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 258 sqq.

1. DEFINITION.—To lie is knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others.¹

¹ St. Augustine, De Mendacio, c. 4, n. 5: “Whether one who has no will to deceive lies . . . and whether anyone who wishes to state what is true for the sake of deceiving lies can be doubted. But no one doubts that he lies who willingly states what is false for the sake of deceiving; therefore it is manifest that a false statement uttered with the will to deceive is a lie.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 491).—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. 12, n. 26 (P. L., XL, 537).—IDEM, Enchirid., c. 22: “Everyone who lies speaks contrary to what he feels in his mind, with the will to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 243).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 453: “A lie is speech contrary to the mind, with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. P. Ch. Kierkegaard, De Notione atque Turpitudine Mendacii, Göttingen 1829.

To constitute a lie, the false declaration, whether made in word or deed, must be opposed to the interior conviction or belief of him who makes it (enuntiatio contra mentem), and further, it must be inspired by the intention (voluntas fallendi) of deceiving and misleading others, especially those who have a right to know the truth.

The matter of a lie (materia), therefore, is the untruth uttered,—not objectively, however, but subjectively, i.e., as opposed to that which one knows or believes to be true.

Consequently, an objectively false statement which one believes to be true is no lie, and, vice versa, an objectively true statement which one believes to be false, is a lie. It is the intention that constitutes a lie (ream linguam non facit nisi mens rea).² One who makes a false statement which he believes to be true, does not wish to deceive others, but is himself deceived.³

² J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching, pp. 108 sqq.—St. Augustine, Serm., 180 (al. 28 De Verbis Apost.), c. 2, n. 2 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 973); De Mendacio, c. 3, n. 3: “He lies who has one thing in his mind and states another in words or by any other signs. Hence the liar is also said to have a double heart, that is, a double thought: one concerning the thing which he knows or thinks to be true and does not state, and another concerning the thing which he states in its place, knowing or thinking it to be false. Thus one may state what is false without lying, if he thinks it is as he says although it is not; and one may state what is true while lying, if he thinks it false and states it as true although in fact it is as he states. For a man must be judged a liar or not a liar according to the judgment of his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the things themselves. Therefore one who states as true what is false, yet believes it to be true, may be called mistaken and rash, but he is not rightly called a liar, because when he states it he does not have a double heart and does not wish to deceive, but is himself deceived. The liar’s fault, however, is his mind’s desire to deceive in making a statement, whether he does deceive when his false statement is believed, or does not deceive, either when he is not believed or when he states what is true with the will to deceive, not believing it true. When such a statement is believed, he certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive—except insofar as he deceives by being thought to know or believe as he states.” Ibid., n. 4: “Although it is most subtly asked whether, when the will to deceive is absent, there is no lie at all.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 488).—IDEM, Enchir., c. 22: “Every lie is therefore to be called a sin, because a man ought to state what he bears in mind not only when he himself knows what is true, but also if he sometimes errs and is deceived, as a man may be, whether that thing be true or only thought true and is not so.” (P. L., XL, 243).

³ Ibid., c. 18: “No one is to be judged a liar who says what is false while thinking it true, because, so far as he is concerned, he does not deceive but is deceived.” (P. L., XL, 240).

Substantially false statements which are not inspired by the intention of deceiving others (e.g., symbolic or figurative locutions, fables, fairy tales, novels, dramas, riddles, etc., in fact poetry in general) do not partake of the formal character of lies because they are designed merely to veil, sugar-coat or elucidate, not to misrepresent, the truth.

Materially untrue phrases and expressions of which everybody knows that they are not to be taken literally, or the true sense of which is sufficiently revealed by the context or the accompanying circumstances, are not properly lies. To this category belong the complimentary phrases customary in polite society, figurative or metaphorical locutions, such as hyperboles, irony, etc., as well as stratagems and deception in war, at games, and on the theatrical stage.

St. Thomas teaches that the intention to deceive does not belong to the essence of a lie, but rather to its perfection.⁴ Others hold a different view.⁵ According to the Angelic Doctor all that is required to constitute a lie is the intention of telling an untruth. A common example adduced by the defenders of this theory is that of the convicted criminal who denies his guilt. But what is it that inspires his persistent lying if not the intention of deceiving others? Purposely telling an untruth always includes, at least indirectly, the intention to deceive. If the object is not achieved, this is not owing to the liar or his false statement, but solely to the will of the hearer. A lie, therefore, is more correctly defined as telling an untruth with the intention of deceiving others. It must be admitted, at any rate, that the indirect or interpretative intention to deceive is practically always present in the mind when a man lies, because deception is the natural result of lying, though the actual accomplishment of this purpose is not required for the essence of lying, so that he who knowingly tells an untruth is guilty of lying even though he accidentally finds no credence among his hearers.⁶

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: “It does not belong to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.” On the controverted question whether the purpose to deceive belongs to the essence of lying, the student may consult J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 133 sq., and Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215 sqq.

⁵ “A statement of the false (a false statement) uttered with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, p. 166.—St. Augustine, De Mendac., c. 3, n. 3: “He certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 489).

⁶ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 67 sqq.—Lehmen, S. J., Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., p. 170.

The notion of a lie, therefore, in contradistinction to that of error, includes (a) the conscious telling of an untruth and (b) the intention to deceive. In popular parlance even objective untruths which are not intended to deceive, are often called lies, e. g., historical lies. But such phrases are misleading. A statement may be an untruth without being a lie. The so-called lies of history are for the most part merely errors and blunders.

Usefulness. - It is necessary that in this tract we learn to esteem greatly the noble virtue of truth and sincerity; to discern well and preserve the various offices of secrecy; and finally so to protect secrecy itself that we may continue to detest and flee lying according to its true notion.

Order of speaking. The order of speaking, intimated by the very usefulness proposed, will be this: that in three successive chapters we treat of veracity, of secrecy, and of lying.

1. Notions. The noble virtue of truth or veracity inclines to the right use of signs by which man communicates with others or has commerce. Through it there is effected "that one show himself exteriorly, by exterior signs, such as he is" (2, 2, q. 109, art. 1, c.). From that moral virtue, the truth itself which it procures is called moral truth. We can fall short of the true both by amplification, or by saying the greater, and by attenuation, or by saying the lesser. Therefore the formal object of the virtue, or the honesty of moral truth, is discerned to have been placed in the mean. Even on the part of its act, this virtue is in the mean; for if more principally we are commanded to manifest the soul in speaking, nevertheless we must open the mind in such a way that we do not derogate from the office of preserving secrecy.

Therefore properly and strictly the virtue of truth fosters the cult of taking care that words or equivalent signs are consonant with our mind. That unity of the exterior and interior man is seen to be honorable per se, and is shown to contribute to the good of human society. Moreover, the virtue of truth appears joined per se to justice; for it procures a certain equality, and makes our conversation with others right: therefore it contains respect of others. Its office can also, in certain cases, be commanded by commutative justice.

2. On sincerity. For the good of social living together, it also helps that man be not only true in his speech, but also sufficiently open, or that he not deny to others an opportune manifestation of himself. Sincerity regards this, which makes us inclined to a full, yet prudent manifestation of ourselves. It is in the middle between distrustful dissimulation and indiscreet revelation of one's own affairs.

3. The opposite vice by excess is indiscretion; by defect, lying. - Simulation is lying by deeds. - Hypocrisy denotes this particular simulation by which someone simulates himself as different from what he is; while dissimulation merely hides one's own person.

1185 concerning the obligation of preserving a secret, e.g., can. 1623 §§ 1, 2, 3 treats for judges. - 1190 sqq. the penalties against those who injure another's reputation are had in can. 2355. Can. 1618, 1938 treat of satisfaction to be rendered and damages to be repaired.

S. Th. II-II, q. 109.

849. Truth or veracity (waarachtigheid) is a moral virtue inclining one to say what is true conformably to the mind of the speaker; or, the virtue by which someone, in life and speech, shows himself to be such as he is (a. 1 and a. 3, ad 3). According to its essence it conforms words and signs to the mind; yet there pertain to it as integral parts, both:

1. simplicity, which makes the intention upright, by excluding duplicity by which someone shows one thing outwardly and has another in his mind (a. 2, ad 4; q. 111, a. 3, ad 2);

2. fidelity, which inclines the will to carrying out promises sincerely, and so conforms deeds to promises (q. 110, a. 3, ad 5; q. 89, a. 7; q. 98, a. 3, ad 1 and 3).

It is a virtue because its act, to say what is true, is good. It is a moral virtue: for although to know the true is an act of the intellect, the external manifestation of truth pertains to the will, which moves to the use of the external organs and members (a. 1, ad 3; a. 3, ad 2).

It is a special virtue because it has a special goodness, which consists in the order by which external words or deeds are duly ordered to signifying something (a. 2).

850. Object of truth. - The material object which truth exhibits is external signs (words or deeds) by which we manifest our mind to our neighbor; the primary material object which it principally intends to exhibit is equality, or conformity, due from honesty, by which external signs agree with the mind; the formal object or motive on account of which is the honesty of this equality.

851. Corollaries. - 1. The debt which truth considers of itself is not a legal or strict debt, but rather a moral debt, insofar as, namely, from honesty one man owes to another the manifestation of truth; and therefore of itself it does not oblige under grave obligation. Yet it is a debt necessary for honesty: for men could not live together with one another unless they believed one another, as manifesting truth to one another. "Because man," says St. Thomas, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1, "is naturally a social animal, from a certain honesty he owes the manifestation of truth to other men, without which the society of men could not endure." Cf. q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.

2. Hence truth is not justice strictly so called, but its potential part: for it is a) annexed to justice, because it is toward another and establishes equality; b) yet it falls short of justice, because of itself it is concerned with a moral debt, although one necessary to the social order, and only accidentally with a strict debt when there is added the obligation of fidelity, charity, religion, piety, or justice, as in contracts (a. 3).

3. Since truth is a moral virtue, it is in the mean, and indeed in a twofold way: a) on the part of the object, because the true imports equality of the intellect or of the sign to the thing understood or signified; moreover equality is a mean between more and less; b) on the part of the act, because it says what is true when it ought, and how and where it ought: it is superfluous to say what is true when one ought not, a defect not to say it when one ought (a. 1, ad 3).

4. Hence two vices are opposed to truth on the part of the act: by excess there is opposed every indiscreet manifestation of the true, but especially violation of a secret, which can also be injustice; by defect, lying with its various species. Of these we must now speak.

6. The sixth duty of a Doctor is of a different kind. There exists a tacit or implicit contract between him and his patients that he shall keep their secrets of which he becomes possessed in his professional capacity. It is always wrong wantonly to betray the secrets of others; but the Doctor is bound by a special duty to keep his professional secrets; and it is doubly wrong and disgraceful in him to make them known. For instance, if he has treated a case of sickness brought on by sinful excesses of any kind, he is forbidden by the natural law to talk about it to such as have no special right to know the facts. Parents and guardians are usually entitled to be informed of their children’s and their wards’ wrong-doings, that they may take proper measures to prevent further evil. Besides, the Doctor is properly in their service; he is paid by them, and, therefore, his contract is with them rather than with the children. He can, therefore, prudently inform them of what is wrong, but he cannot inform others.

It is a debated question in Medical Jurisprudence whether the Doctor’s professional knowledge of criminal acts should be privileged before the courts, so that he should not be forced to testify to a crime that he has learned from his patients while acting as their medical adviser. Dr. Ewell speaks thus on the subject (p. 2): “The medical witness should remember that, by the common law, a medical man has no privilege to avoid giving in evidence any statement made to him by a patient; but when called upon to do so in a court of justice, he is bound to disclose every communication, however private and confidential, which has been made to him by a patient while attending him in a professional capacity. By statute, however, in some of the United States, communications made by a patient to a physician when necessary to the treatment of a case are privileged; and the physician is either expressly forbidden or not obliged to reveal them. Such statutes exist in Arkansas, California, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, and Wisconsin. The seal upon the physician’s lips is not even taken away by the patient’s death. Such communications, however, must be of a lawful character and not against morality or public policy; hence, a consultation as to the means of procuring an abortion on another is not privileged, nor would be any similar conference held for the purpose of devising a crime or evading its consequences.

“A report of a medical official of an insurance company on the health of a party proposing to insure his life is not privileged from production; nor is the report of a surgeon of a railroad company as to the injuries sustained by a passenger in an accident, unless such report has been obtained with a view to impending litigation.”

The practical rule for a Doctor’s conscience on the subject of secrecy is, that he must keep his professional secrets with great fidelity, and not reveal them except in as far as he is compelled to do so by a court of justice acting within its legal power or competency. If so compelled, he can safely speak out; for his duty to his patient is understood to be dependent on his obedience to lawful authority.

As to the question of Jurisprudence whether the courts ought to treat the physician’s official secrets as privileged, in the same way as they do a lawyer’s secrets, this will depend on the further question whether the same reasons militate for the one as for the other. The lawyer’s privilege is due to the anxiety of the state not to condemn an innocent man nor a guilty man beyond his deserts. To avert such evil, the accused party needs the assistance of a legal adviser who can guide him safely through the mazes and technicalities of the law, and, even should he be guilty, who can protect him against exaggerated charges and ward off unmerited degrees of punishment. Now, this can scarcely be accomplished unless the attorney for the defence learn from his client the entire truth of the facts. But the client could not safely give such information to his lawyer if the latter’s professional secrets were not held sacred by the court of justice.

Can the same reasons or equivalent ones be urged in behalf of the physician? I do not see that they can. And I notice besides that, if he be excused from testifying against his patients, all their servants and attendants would seem to be entitled to the same privilege. Many persons, I think, labor here under a confusion of ideas; a Doctor is as sacredly bound to keep his patients’ secrets as a lawyer is in regard to his clients, but it does not follow that the law cannot grant a privilege to the one and refuse the same to the other, for reasons which require it in the case of the lawyer and not in that of the Doctor.

510. • A lie is speech or signification against the mind with the will (at least implicit. Nouv. Rev. Th. T. 18. p. 479 sq.) of deceiving. - A threefold genus of lie is distinguished: 1° harmful, by means of which unjust damage is inflicted on someone; 2° officious, which is uttered for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3° jocose, which is done from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

Principles. - I. A lie properly so called is always intrinsically evil. The reason is, 1° because it is repugnant to right reason to use words against their natural end and institution; 2° because, if it were licit to deceive others in speaking, the order of society, which rests upon the mutual commerce of men, would be altogether overturned. Hence: Do not lie to one another.¹ - St. Thomas,² St. Augustine.³

II. A harmful lie is grave according to the measure of the damage which is inflicted on a neighbor; for this reason there follows from it the obligation of repairing the damage. - Thus all. St. Thomas.⁴

III. An officious lie is of itself a venial sin, because in it grave disorder is not apprehended. - Thus all. - A fortiori a jocose lie of itself does not exceed venial sin. Indeed sometimes that which is called a jocose lie is altogether free from all fault; because it is not a lie properly so called, but a jest used for the sake of recreation without the will, even implicit, of deceiving, and consequently our definition does not belong to it. But this alone can be admitted when such are the adjuncts of things that the hearers can easily understand that the speaker wishes only to joke. - Thus commonly.

511. You will resolve. - 1° Those do not lie who assert a false thing which they believe true, but only err. On the contrary, those lie who say a true thing which they judge false, because they speak against the mind.

2° Tropic, ironic, hyperbolic expressions are not lies, when they can and are wont easily to be taken as such by the hearers. Much less are parables lies, which Christ Himself used so frequently. - Nor are equivocations lies, if they do not impede the speaker's sense from being able to be known.

3° Those do not lie who compose fables, or from jest say things openly false, as is manifest.

4° To lying are referred formal simulation, hypocrisy, flattery, and vain boasting, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin; yet they can become mortal, or rather mortal sin can accede to them on account of another species of sin which supervenes.

512. • Mental restriction is an act of the mind diverting or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one.

Mental restriction is 1° purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is properly called mental; 2° broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from the adjuncts, for example from the mode of responding, from received usage, etc.

To mental restriction are reduced equivocations or amphibologies, which are expressions having a twofold sense, but one more obvious and the other literal.

513. Principles. - I. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, nor amphibology not perceptible in a human manner; a fortiori it is not licit to swear with the same, because it is simply a lie. This is clear also from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI, pp. XV and XVI.¹

514. • II. Sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use broad restriction, that is, improperly mental restriction, and equivocal words, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; on the other hand, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly concealing a secret; but sometimes no other means is supplied besides equivocation or broad or improperly mental restriction. - I said: from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would yield to the greatest damage of human society. - Thus the theologians most commonly. St. Alphonsus.¹ - Lacroix.² - Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Sporer, Elbel, and innumerable others.

But it is licit to use a broad restriction of this sort even with an oath; although then a greater cause is required, since the divine testimony is not to be usurped without judgment, and indeed the greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring. But outside judgment, or unless there is question of entering an onerous contract, it is only venial to swear in this way without just cause.³

515. You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from fault who uses a restriction even not purely mental, or an equivocation perceptible in some way, 1) if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2) if the one questioning has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth and uses that right legitimately, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity.⁴ Add 3) if from this some damage of a neighbor would emerge which from the precept of charity we are bound to avert; 4) while onerous contracts are celebrated; in which case justice demands that naked words be uttered according to the mind of the contracting party.⁵

2° A confessor, questioned by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide, can and ought to respond: I do not know; because the confessor does not know this by communicable knowledge. Indeed even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this by communicable knowledge? He could still respond: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant well knows that he does not have the right of questioning concerning this, nor does the confessor understand himself to know as a man, but as the vicar of God, and consequently by incommunicable knowledge.

3° A guilty man questioned by a judge not juridically, or not legitimately, can respond that he has not committed the crime, by understanding: one concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is bound to confess.¹

4° All public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use a restriction of this sort, as are secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has office and reason of concealing some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from this in society.

5° A servant by command of his master can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such speech is generally received by usage for signifying that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Yet attend to the custom of places.²

1° On the vice of detraction; 2° on restitution of reputation.

516. • Detraction is the unjust denigration of the reputation of an absent neighbor. But reputation is the good estimation which others have concerning our excellence, whether true or apparent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by the revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if violation of reputation follows from the imposition of a false crime.

Detraction can be done in various ways: 1° directly, if either a false crime is imposed, or a true one amplified, or a hidden one manifested, or a good work explained sinisterly; 2° indirectly, namely either by denying the good works of a neighbor, or diminishing them, or also sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly. - But all these modes are, of themselves, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet per accidens they could add a new species, for example contumely, injury in goods of fortune, whispering (which intends the dissolution of friendship), a sin against piety, if the person from whom detraction is made is joined to the detractor by a most close bond, and this mortally, unless there is question of persons joined outside the second degree. Scav.²

517. Principles. - I. Every direct detraction, whether it is calumny, or detraction simply, is mortal from its own genus, because it is against justice; and indeed it is a graver sin than theft, because it unjustly deprives the neighbor of a greater good, as is clear from common sense and from Sacred Scripture: A good name is better than riches; and A detractor is an abomination of men.²

II. The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the damage which the neighbor can suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor. Hence for knowing in a particular case the gravity of detraction, one must attend to the quality 1° of the person detracting, for greater faith is given to a grave man than to a chatterer; 2° of the person harmed, because the more entire reputation and greater dignity he has, the more gravely he will take damage; 3° to the common judgment of men concerning the thing divulged, because by this very judgment, which varies according to the adjuncts of the persons to whom (n. 526. 4°) detraction is made, reputation consists.³

518. III. It is never licit to impose a false crime on another, as is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI. Yet it is licit from a just cause to manifest another's hidden crime even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of one's neighbor to conserving reputation is broken by a more powerful right.⁴

IV. But the causes on account of which, duly under conditions, another's crime can licitly be revealed are the following: 1° the notable utility of the one revealing himself, for seeking counsel or help in a grave matter, yet with any affection toward detraction excluded; 2° the utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3° public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the Republic or Religion or some Community, in which case, of itself speaking, each one is bound to reveal; 4° grave utility, even private, either of hearers, or of others, for example so that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. Thus you can make a master more certain concerning the infidelity of a servant; reveal to another, who consults you about this on account of a grave business,¹ the defects of some person; indeed sometimes you will be bound to this according to the rules of charity. Thus a murderer will have to be revealed if some innocent person were accused of this crime; for the condition of the innocent is stronger.

The reason for these things is that the right in true reputation and false, or apparent and estimated reputation, differs to this extent, that the former is absolute, or to be observed by all always and everywhere, and therefore calumny is never licit (this number III); but the latter is limited, that is, it ceases when others would take grave damage from error concerning someone's excellence: - indeed it ceases even in doubt concerning the gravity of the damage, because in such doubt the innocent must be favored. Wherefore in the cases alleged neither is justice violated, since the neighbor's right is limited, nor charity, because this does not obligate with grave inconvenience.²

I said: duly, however, under conditions, namely 1° that knowledge of this sort has not been had from Sacramental Confession, which, as is clear, it is never licit to use; 2° that the damage cannot be avoided in another way; 3° that it is sufficiently proportionate to the loss of reputation; 4° that neither more nor to more persons be manifested than is necessary for averting the damage; 5° that you have not received the knowledge unjustly by force or fraud, suppose by opening letters, etc., unless nevertheless, because of changed adjuncts, it would be licit for you to seek it even in this way; which case would be if a) revelation were necessary for the common good; b) the other were held from justice to reveal the secret for repairing your damage; c) he were vexing you unjustly.²

519. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he sin gravely who reveals one mortal sin of another?

Resp. 1° It is not always a grave sin to reveal the sin of another, even if it is manifested to several. Therefore one must attend to the adjuncts of things and persons, from which you will gather whether someone suffers grave loss of reputation from the revelation of the sin.

Resp. 2° If the sin would gravely dishonor either in itself, or relatively to the one defamed, certainly the detractor sins gravely as often as he manifests a sin of this sort, although one only, to several, because grave damage of reputation is inflicted on the neighbor.

Resp. 3° But whether it is mortal to reveal a sin of this sort to one prudent and discreet man, from whom namely there is no danger that it be manifested to others, with the spirit of harming and damage of another genus excluded, is controverted.

The first sentence, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is, 1° because injury to reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave; 2° because often men bear it with more distress to be harmed before one grave person than before three or four others.

The second sentence, sufficiently probable, denies. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name among one or another only.¹

520. • Quaer. 2° Does he commit sins diverse in number who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse contumelies, or detracts from one man before several?

Resp. See what was said in n. 227, questions 1° and 2°.

Quaer. 3° Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, who dwell in the place where it is already public?

Resp. In the affirmative, because this seems neither to be against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law, or by publicity of fact.²

521. • Quaer. 4° Can a crime public in one place be revealed in another place where it is unknown?

Resp. 1° In the affirmative, more probably of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a nearby place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public, and no grave damage follows for the one defamed from the anticipation. The reason is that reputation to be lost shortly and necessarily is of no estimation, or certainly not of great estimation, and morally speaking is already cast away.³

Resp. 2° If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to come, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish:

1° As regards notoriety of law: 1° It is not against justice, because the judge, when he publicly condemns someone, intends to despoil the guilty man of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Thus commonly. - 2° Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be divulged everywhere, so that the penalty may be more efficacious, and the guilty man may be known also by inhabitants of a remote region, who could have to conduct business with him. - Thus more commonly,¹ with Lugo, Salmant.

2° As regards notoriety of fact, it is controverted among theologians.

The first sentence, very probable, says that it is not of itself illicit, because neither is there sin against justice, nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that it conduces to the public good that criminal men be known, so that all can guard against them.² (Q) p. 480.

The second sentence, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity: 1° against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, where the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive: therefore he does injury to him who defames him there; 2° against charity, because the one defaming harms his neighbor in a grave matter, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury. - Billuart, Antoine.

522. • Quaer. 5° When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious?

Resp. 1° It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community, or city, town, village, etc.

Resp. 2° It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be concealed by any evasion, and morally it is impossible that it not come to the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required for a crime to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common sentence a crime can be called public if fifteen know from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty from at least three diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons.³

But, as Billuart rightly says,¹ in practice this matter is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances attended to, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - St. Alphonsus also warns² that a delict made public in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public, and therefore cannot be manifested elsewhere, not even in another monastery of the same Order, although it had frequent communication with it.

523. • Quaer. 6° Can a delict formerly public, but now hidden, be made public without grave fault, at least against charity?

Resp. In the negative, unless there is question of a delict formerly public by notoriety of law, or one pertaining to history.³

Quaer. 7° Does he sin gravely who only reports the grave sins of another as heard from others, for example if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I have heard such or such about that man?

Resp. 1° He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports in such a way that others are more probably and deservedly going to believe it, for example if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of faith, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing the evil; otherwise, if probably faith is not given to the things said, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as a mere doubt, the enormous sin of another, for example heresy, sodomy, etc.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity if he reports what has been heard before those who will probably believe it from levity or malice of their own; because each one is bound under grave sin from charity to take away the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage.⁴ - Billuart,⁵ and others commonly.

524. • Quaer. 8° In what way does one hearing detraction sin?

Resp. 1° He certainly sins gravely against justice who efficaciously - for example, by exciting, praising, questioning - induces another to detract. (a) p. 480.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of his neighbor. Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself.

Resp. 3° A Superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because the special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject. But the Superior does not sin against justice, either of the detractor or of the defamed; for neither is this one bound from justice concerning the temporal good of a subject, nor that one concerning the temporal good of one not a subject. But a Bishop and pastor are bound from justice to correct a subject detracting, as one sinning.¹

Resp. 4° A private person for the most part is excused either altogether, or at least from grave sin, if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame, or from fear, or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, and no other damage besides infamy accedes. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be clear that correction will be profitable; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared that detraction will rather be increased or prolonged. Yet he will not be free from some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction.²

But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they notice detraction, depart, turn the conversation to other things, or avert the face and show themselves sad according to that saying: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue.³

525. • Quaer. 9° Is it licit to defame oneself?

Resp. In the affirmative, of itself, if it is done with right intention, scandal and the damage of others being excluded. The reason is that it is not against justice, since each one is master of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not obligate one to conserve external goods except insofar as one's own salvation or that of a neighbor requires it.

But per accidens you will sin, and even gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if from this damage of life could arise for you, or of infamy for others.⁴

526. You will resolve. - 1° It is a grave sin to detract even from the dead in a grave matter; for they are not despoiled of the right to reputation, although they have departed from the living. Hence historiographers can sin gravely by branding a mark of ignominy upon the memory of the dead without sufficient cause, by manifesting hidden things, exaggerating known things, and not reporting penance done.¹

2° It can be lethal to reveal so many things, although not individually grave, concerning someone constituted in conspicuous dignity, that his reputation is notably harmed. Yet the faithful scarcely attend to the grave malice.

3° It is mortal if you say that someone is an adulterer, although you have probable indications concerning this; because you bring grave harm to his reputation. Indeed the same must be held, even if you said it was probable that he is such.

4° It is grave to say concerning a priest that he has committed a duel, that he is a lover of girls, and other things of this sort. But often it is not lethal to assert this concerning a soldier, or even concerning a young man of mediocre reputation; nor to say concerning a girl that she is talkative, proud, etc.²

5° It is not grave detraction to speak badly concerning someone indeterminate, for example, that in such a place there are many wicked, drunken, immodest persons; because grave injury is done to no one. Likewise, it is not grave to report some crime concerning someone whom the hearers do not know, nor ever will recognize, even if he is named: indeed this of itself is free from all fault, because there is no estimation of one unknown.

6° Yet it is lethal, at least commonly speaking, to detract gravely from some Monastery, although no Religious is named, for example, if it is said that in it an evil life is led, that a grave sin has been committed. The reason is that the Religious of the same Community are so joined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as though responsible in common one for another. Hence the whole Community is wont to be stained before the imprudent and simple.³

527. • 7° It is not mortal to say concerning a public drunkard that he has become drunk on this day, even if he did it secretly; indeed sometimes no sin is present, if someone has lost every reputation as regards something, for example if you say concerning a prostitute that she has fornicated. Nor is it mortal to dishonor one infamous in one crime concerning another crime closely related, for example, if you say concerning an adulterer that he has sent love letters, or concerning a drunken man that he has quarreled with his wife; because such revelation is not a new infamy, or at least not grave. Yet to defame someone concerning a disparate and unconnected crime can be mortal, because he who is dishonorable in one genus of vice has not therefore lost the right of reputation as regards the rest.¹

8° He does not sin, at least gravely, who, only for the sake of solace, with intention of detracting excluded, narrates to some friend an injury done to him by another, even if from this some infamy comes to the author. Hence servants revealing injuries inflicted on them by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, Religious by a Prelate, etc., are probably excused, at least from mortal sin; because the author of the injury cannot be reasonably unwilling, and demand so difficult a thing, that the one harmed lack solace or necessary counsel. Yet one must take care lest it be said to more persons, and lest the person be named more openly than is necessary for counsel or solace.²

9° Unless someone is to be affected by grave damage (as, for example, can happen from the revelation of illegitimate birth by which one is deprived of desired nuptials), or by great sorrow, it is slight to uncover the natural defects of the soul or body of another, for example his stupidity, or certain dispositions to more common vices, for example that someone is proud, avaricious, irascible; for the former are not moral, and neither the former nor the latter are judged gravely defaming.³

10° It is not licit in general to reveal another's hidden crime by at the same time narrating the penance done, because some sinister opinion always remains.

11° Of itself it is grave to name a person directly, but only to indicate his defects indirectly (by saying, for example, I know many things about him, but charity forbids me to disclose them), if such things are apt to cast in grave suspicion. (b) p. 480.

528. Principles. - I. The detractor is bound from justice, as much as can be done, 1° to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2° to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen.

The reason of the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority; and so, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, that injury must be repaired. - Thus all.¹

The reason of the second is that all damages proceeding from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in each case the detractor has unjustly harmed reputation. - Thus commonly.²

II. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - The obligation of restitution urges also if someone has detracted from the dead. Nor can heirs condone it, since they are not masters of another's reputation.

529. • III. Restitution of reputation is to be done in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence:

1° A calumniator is bound to retract the things said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on account of this.

2° A simple detractor cannot retract the things said, because thus he would lie, but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, for example, that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying:³ They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among the intelligent and clever, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent concerning the things said, on an occasion being given, ought with dexterity and truth to praise and honor him from whom he detracted.

Let the confessor take care that compensations of reputation of this sort, when they can conveniently be made, be made before absolution, because afterward they will be fulfilled with difficulty.⁵

530. You will resolve. - 1° He who has unjustly defamed another by manifesting a true crime is bound to repair the whole damage coming from this and foreseen, at least in common, because that unjust revelation of his is the true and sole cause of the damage.¹ Hence he who in this way impeded someone from entering into a contract with a merchant, who would have perceived honorable profit from it, must satisfy him according to the estimation of the profit. Likewise he who for this reason deprived another of an office - for example, by accusing a man who is now upright of a delict which he secretly committed some years before - is bound to satisfy for the measure of the emolument lost. But in estimating damages, the hope of gain indeed, speculatively speaking, is to be considered with St. Alphonsus;² yet practically the estimation of the hope will have to be judged from the gain itself, account being taken also both of the labor which he was compelled to spend on the office lost and which he now spends on another business, and of the uncertainty whether he would otherwise have discharged the office for a long time, which uncertainty must be attended to especially in our region. Cf. Kenrick.³

2° He who detracted through a libel is bound, so that the restitution be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings or by public revocation. Likewise the reparation ought to become known, if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown to whom it came.⁴

3° Likewise, in default of the defamer, those who cooperated in propagating the defamation are bound to reparation of reputation, and all these are equally bound concerning damages of fortune, if any have occurred.

4° A defamer is not bound to petition pardon if he cannot repair reputation; because through the petition of pardon the lost reputation is not restored; nor is he more urged by the obligation of seeking pardon than he who cannot restore goods of fortune in which he has harmed someone. - Thus commonly.

531. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Resp. The following are commonly admitted:

1° If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, for example by a sentence of a judge, etc.

2° If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through passage of time. - But in doubt, a true crime in general is not to be recalled into the memory of men, unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into memory in another way; for then restitution obtains the desired effect with more difficulty. But if the crime is false, the defamation is to be recalled. Except, however, if perhaps the greater good of the defamed man counsels otherwise, or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction, unless the doubtful damage of the defamed in some case ought to be estimated higher.¹

3° If restitution of reputation cannot be done without much greater damage of the one defaming, as if the danger of life were imminent for him, and not for the defamed, or if a prelate must undergo much graver infamy from restitution of reputation taken away from a lowly man: in which case it will suffice afterward to extol the defamed man with merited praise. L. IV. 1002.

4° If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction; for example, if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from their preconceived opinion.

5° If it is judged that faith was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger.

6° If the defamed man has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices.² But he remits it invalidly if another, suppose an accomplice, loses reputation thereby; illicitly, namely with charity or piety forbidding, if someone, for example a priest, needs reputation for the utility of others.³

Quaer. 2° Is there given an obligation of restoring reputation harmed without formal injustice, for example, if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Resp. In the affirmative, because each one is bound to repair damage arising from his action, although damaging only materially, if he conveniently can, as we shall say in the Treatise on Justice and Right.⁴

532. • Quaer. 3° Is the defamer bound to restore reputation also before those who have received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, if you violated reputation before hearers whom you foresaw would easily divulge the infamy; because then you are the true and voluntary cause of the damage; otherwise you are not bound.¹

Quaer. 4° Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the one harmed has also violated your reputation, and is unwilling to restore it?

Resp. Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny; but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus;² because you are not bound to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. (c) p. 481.

Quaer. 5° Are you bound to compensate reputation with money if you cannot restore it?

Resp. In the negative, at least more probably, because justice obligates only to rendering the thing taken away, or its equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction, nor is it the equivalent of reputation, since it is of another order.³ - Yet foreseen damages are to be repaired. See n. 528. (d) p. 481.

533. • Contumely is the unjust injury of honor inflicted on one present and knowing. But honor is the external attestation of the estimation which is held internally concerning someone's excellence. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image, and through another thing in which he is in some way represented.

But contumely can be done 1° negatively, through omission of honor due here and now; 2° positively, both by words and by deeds or signs of contempt.

To contumely are referred 1° derision,³ by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2° mockery, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; 3° reproach, by which indigence, defects, or obscurity of birth is objected to someone.

534. • I say I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its own genus. For it is something graver than detraction, which of itself is grave. Besides, this is clear from the words of Scripture:⁴ But he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be guilty of the council; but he who shall say: Fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire.

I say II. Contumely of itself induces the strict obligation of restoring honor and of repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they have been foreseen in a confused way, as is clear from what was said about restitution of reputation.

But although we are bound to tolerate contumelies - by casting aside the spirit of vengeance - nevertheless sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance could harm the common good, for example if a Prelate by tolerating were rendered contemptible, and thus the petulance of subjects were increased, etc.

535. You will resolve. - 1° Honor publicly taken away through contumely is to be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who in the name of the one dishonoring seeks pardon.¹

2° Honor harmed through hidden contumely must likewise be restored, because a true damage of honor has been inflicted on the neighbor; yet reparation can be made secretly.²

3° That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the person offended. For if he who dishonored was a Superior, it will suffice if he greets the dishonored man, visits him at home, or shows him benevolence. But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way.⁴

4° If the dishonored man has taken vengeance, for example by striking the other, wounding, ... for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because he seems to accept vengeance for satisfaction, and the other by not resisting seems to confess his own fault and estimation concerning the other.⁵ - Likewise rustics are exempt from restitution of honor if equal insults or reproaches have mutually been hurled between them, because by that very fact compensation is made.

5° In practice it is often expedient that the confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the admonition will not be profitable; or if he thinks that he who has been dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation especially public, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be affected by more shame, etc.¹

536. • 1° Rash judgment is firm assent, conceived from light indications, concerning some sin or defect of one's neighbor: it must be distinguished from opinion, which is assent less firm and with fear concerning the opposite.

2° Rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor from an insufficient reason.

3° Doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither part.

537. Principles. - I. Rash judgment concerning the fault of one's neighbor is a mortal sin from its own genus against justice; for each one has a right to a good estimation of himself before individuals, nor should anyone be presumed evil until he is proved: consequently he inflicts grave injury on the neighbor who judges rashly against him in a grave matter. Yet more often it is venial because of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.

II. For the gravity of rash judgment it is required 1° that it be firm, or without doubt; 2° that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3° that it be in a grave matter concerning a determined and known person; 4° that it rests upon indications which are known as light and inept for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. But often it is slight because of the defect of some one of the conditions commemorated.²

III. Rash suspicion, opinion, and doubt concerning the stain of a neighbor are venial from their own genus. The reason is that on account of weak and easily movable adherence they ordinarily bring only slight damage to the neighbor, since they do not remove reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful.³ - But doubt concerning an extraordinary sin is grave, because it inflicts a greater injury than certain judgment concerning an ordinary one.¹

538. You will resolve. - 1° He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly about a neighbor if the judgment rests on indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certainty and true probability are not so distant that it is judged a grave injury to hold as almost certain that which is very probable.²

2° He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not advert fully to the insufficiency of the motives, or to the grave matter of rash judgment, or admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment.³

3° He does not sin gravely who rashly judges concerning someone indeterminate among several, for example of some assembly or community, or even concerning a determined person whom, for example, he sees from afar but does not know.⁴

4° You would not judge rashly if, hearing something from an upright and trustworthy man against a neighbor, you believed it. Much less if you only suspected or doubted, since much less is required for prudent suspicion or doubt than for prudent judgment; but otherwise if you heard something from a perverse man or one badly affected toward another.

5° Doubtful things are to be interpreted in the better part in this sense: that if in doubt about someone you wish to make a firm judgment, you are bound to make it in the better part, since in doubt he cannot be despoiled of his right; but not in this sense, that, a founded doubt having been left, you ought to conceive a firm judgment concerning him in the better part: for you are not bound to expose yourself to the danger of erring.⁵ Hence:

6° It is licit to guard against damages from fear not altogether imprudent; and so, for example, you can keep your things under guard, lest they be stolen by a stranger staying in your house; because, although you cannot judge positively that this or that man is a thief, nevertheless you can consult for yourself excellently, since you know for certain that there are sometimes thieves among men. Wherefore Superiors also deservedly observe subjects.

539. • A secret in general is called whatever is hidden: as regards our matter, we call secret whatever either from its own nature, or from a special contract, ought to be kept hidden.

A threefold secret is distinguished:

1° Natural, which, without any contract, arises from the mere nature of the thing, as if you cannot manifest it without harm to another, either in estimation, or in goods, etc.

2° Promised, which someone, hearing from another or learning by chance, promises by the gratuitous contract of promise to preserve.

3° Committed, if someone manifests something to another, and at the same time tacitly or expressly demands silence from him concerning it.

540. Principles. - I. A natural secret in a grave matter obligates of itself under grave sin, and indeed from justice, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that from the revelation of the secret there follows of itself damage to the neighbor, who has the right not to be harmed without reasonable cause.¹

II. A promised secret obligates of itself gravely or lightly according to the quality of the matter (which namely would demand a natural secret apart from any promise), and the nature of the obligation undertaken, which, unless it is clear concerning the intention of the one promising wishing to obligate himself from justice, for the most part is from fidelity alone. The reason is that the contract is contained in a simple promise, which of itself obligates only from fidelity and according to the intention of the one promising, as was said concerning a vow.⁴

III. A committed or communicated secret, which is also called rigorous, obligates of itself under grave sin from justice, and indeed more strictly than a merely natural secret, and also than a promised one; because beyond the natural obligation there urges also the obligation from an onerous contract expressly or tacitly undertaken.⁵

541. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the just causes of manifesting a secret?

Resp. 1° The rightly presumed consent of him whose interest it is that the secret be concealed. - 2° Divulgation of the matter arising from elsewhere. - 3° Damage to the Republic or to private persons that is going to follow from the secret. Yet if there is question of damage already inflicted, you cannot licitly reveal a committed secret, until the one causing the damage himself is bound to betray himself. And in this a committed secret differs from a merely promised one: that in this latter the one promising did not receive knowledge of the matter by force of his promise, but gratuitously promises secrecy about knowledge received in whatever way. Moreover, while afterward he promises this, even with an oath added, he cannot by his promise exempt himself from an obligation by which he is already held. Therefore since each one questioned legitimately by a judge is bound to open the truth, the promise of secrecy cannot be extended to the case of the judge legitimately questioning. But the contrary happens in a committed secret. For the common good demands that men not, from fear of revelation, be deprived of the convenience of seeking necessary counsel or help, which nevertheless they would never seek unless they were certain of secrecy to be observed. Therefore the common good demands that as long as the one committing can licitly preserve his secret, he retains the right that the other not betray it. Hence the reason why physicians, advocates, midwives, theologians consulted, etc., are not bound to open to even a judge questioning the matter known by a committed secret; indeed why they are bound not to open it, which nevertheless, insofar as it concerns physicians, surgeons, and midwives, is not acknowledged by our common law, nor can it be demanded by those committing, since this disposition of law is judged known to them.

Quaer. 2° Can you reveal a secret if you promised to preserve it even with loss of life?

Resp. 1° In the affirmative, if the common good demands it, because a promise made against the common good is null.

Resp. 2° In the negative, if there is question of your own damage simply grave, because it is better to preserve a secret promised by this special contract. In the negative also, very probably, if there is question of your extreme damage, because you have expressly renounced your right, nor is it illicit to omit the conservation of life, that you may keep a promise. - Thus Lugo, Lacroix, and St. Alphonsus.² - Yet St. Author deservedly says the opposite also is sufficiently probable.

542. • Quaer. 3° Does he sin gravely who reveals a secret to one or another upright man under the same secret?

Resp. In the negative, probably, of itself; because in this case a grave injury toward another does not seem to be committed, provided it is not revealed to a person to whom the one committing the secret to you is deservedly presumed to have specially wished it to be concealed.¹

I said, of itself; because in practice, on account of the circumstances, revelation of a secret easily becomes grave, namely when you suppose too lightly that the persons to whom you commit a received secret are so discreet that they will certainly preserve it, especially if there is question with women. For a secret was committed to you because you were thought discreet; but if you violate it, do you think another, in whom you confide, will be more discreet than you yourself?

Quaer. 4° Does he sin gravely who opens or reads the letters of another?

Resp. In the affirmative of itself, or from its own genus. The reason is that by natural right and by the law of nations there is an obligation of leaving the secrets of letters unharmed; otherwise human commerce would be ruined. - St. Alphonsus,² and others commonly. And indeed in this way there will be committed in genus a sin against justice and against charity; but only mortal against charity, if it is thought that matters of small moment are contained in the letters, and he to whom or by whom they are sent is to be gravely saddened by it. - The same is valid for those who, against the master's will, read another's writings by stealth, and probably for those who join and read letters torn into small pieces. - But damage perhaps inflicted against justice must be repaired.

Except the following cases: 1° if the tacit or presumed consent of him who writes, and of him to whom the letters are sent, is present; 2° if it is known or presumed that the letters contain matters of slight moment; 3° if it is done from a just cause, for example, for averting public or private damage even of another, provided one has the right of opening the letters for driving away that evil, and reads no more than is necessary for this end. In what cases one enjoys that right, see above n. 518. - 4° If the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence.³

543. You will resolve. - 1° A promised secret obligates in no way whenever otherwise you were held to manifest the matter, for example if you are legitimately questioned by a Superior or by a judge.¹

2° A committed secret must generally be preserved by you, even if you are questioned by a Superior or judge, etc.; but you must answer that you know nothing about this; since you have knowledge of this sort just as if you did not have it.²

3° A secret only implicitly or tacitly committed must be preserved in the same way as if it had been expressly committed. Thus, strictly speaking, counselors of Princes, leaders of war, advocates, physicians (concerning physicians cf. what was said for this region n. 541, question 1° at the end), theologians consulted concerning some question, and universally all to whom a secret is committed for the sake either of counsel or of solace or of help, are bound to secrecy.

4° A religious Superior licitly opens the letters of his subjects or of others sent to them either by the statute of the Religion, or by custom, or from prudent suspicion that they contain something less right.³

5° Yet the Superior cannot open and read letters which subjects send to mediate Superiors and in turn those Superiors to subjects; for the right manner of governing demands that supreme Moderators be able to communicate freely with all subjects.¹

6° "He who by culpable revelation of a secret has harmed another must repair every damage, whether of reputation or fortune, which he at least foresaw in a confused way as going to arise therefrom for another, by title of damage unjustly inflicted."

7° "There is given an obligation of justice, grave from its own genus, of not seeking out the secret of another unwilling person without sufficient cause, neither by deed, namely by observing from a hidden place the things which others secretly do, nor by words, namely by scrutinizing and questioning others who know hidden things. Because each one has a strict right in his own secret, as in a thing of his own. - It is said: without sufficient cause, because it is licit to seek out another's morals, even secret ones, for avoiding one's own or another's damage, for example where Matrimony is to be contracted. It is said: grave from its own genus: hence the things which according to what has been set forth above excuse from grave fault, or from all fault, the revelation of a secret, also fall upon the one fishing out the secret itself; therefore also he who seeks out a secret with the intention of betraying it to no one does not seem to sin mortally, unless the other feels from this some other grave damage, or wishes to conceal it in a special way."

B. Contumelies, namely those which unjustly harm honor:

1. among the rude are not always held grave;

2. if they are truly grave, especially if they concern secrets, they constitute mortal sin. Thus if they are false; if they are done against one who brought forth no injury; if by one offended, but in such a way that the limits of indignation are exceeded.

C. Rash judgment also is mortal sin:

1. if it is greatly important to the person that it not be formed;

2. if it proceeds from hatred;

3. if it is done with great malevolence;

4. if it is in great contempt of a superior or otherwise has grave consequences.

But it is required that it be formed with great temerity and be perfectly rash, i.e., that there be great disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that firm assent is furnished by light motives.

D. Detraction, or the unjust blackening of another's reputation by hidden words, can be done in many ways, whether directly: by falsely imputing evil, or exaggerating it, or revealing what is occult, or attributing good to an evil intention; or also indirectly: by denying good, or maliciously keeping silent about it, or diminishing it, or praising coldly. Nor are the direct modes always more efficacious, but the indirect modes of speaking or keeping silent sometimes are more malicious.

But detraction is mortal sin from its genus, and not only against charity but also against justice; its gravity is to be weighed from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation.

But to manifest to another who is ignorant of it a public crime is not against justice:

a) in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a judicial sentence promulgated for this region;

b) also in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of fact alone, unless the delinquent has recovered reputation;

c) also in another place in which it is foreseen that it is soon to be legitimately manifested.

Otherwise a public crime, just like an occult one, cannot be manifested except for a grave and indeed proportionate reason.

E. Of itself there is an obligation of restoring reputation unjustly taken away, especially if the injury redounds upon others, just as also of repairing other damages which are strictly and of themselves connected with defamation.

Nevertheless, per accidens there is no obligation of restoring reputation:

1. if reputation remained uninjured, as if faith was not given to the detractor, or his detraction was not understood or not spread;

2. if the other has recovered reputation, or infamy has now been deleted by oblivion;

3. if the other inflicted a greater injury which he does not care to repair;

4. if by prudent estimation the other is judged to have condoned;

5. if reputation either cannot be compensated at all, or only with a much greater inconvenience; in which case nevertheless a certain compensation is to be made in some better manner, whether by honoring the other, or by saying good of him.

Restitution of reputation sometimes is done more opportunely through a third person of great authority.

Those cooperating in detraction, who in some way induce the detractor to defaming, are subsidiarily bound, just as he himself is, to restitution; but not those who only internally approve the defamation, or merely take delight in it, or only do not impede it.

F. Nevertheless there is an obligation of charity to impede detraction as far as one can; nevertheless in practice this will rarely be grave. It will be grave if three conditions are verified: a) another is certainly detracting unjustly; b) there is a founded hope of impeding the detraction; c) this can be done without relatively grave inconvenience; which conditions are rarely present.

Often it will be more opportune to employ indirect means of impeding rather than direct ones, unless the matter concerns superiors who can intervene authoritatively.

Preliminary note. Rightly and deservedly St. James called the tongue "a world of iniquity,"²⁸⁷ because very many iniquities and injustices are caused by the tongue. But we shall treat, as was already said above, art. 4: 1. of truthfulness; then of the vices opposed to it, namely, 2. of lying, where also there will be discussion of simulation, boasting, and irony, 3. of mental restriction, 4. of violation of a secret, 5. of wounding of honor, 6. of wounding of reputation, 7. of rash judgment. Thus we comprise all those things which other authors are accustomed to treat under the eighth precept of the Decalogue.

²⁸⁷ Jas. 3, 6.

166. Definition. Lying is usually defined: voluntary speech against the mind. This definition, if rightly explained, seems better than others.²⁹⁷

It is explained. It is said 1: speech; but under the name of speech is understood any external sign whatever by which interior concepts are signified, whether this is done by words or nod or gesture or writing, etc. Nevertheless, lying is chiefly and almost always done by speech, and for this reason it is deservedly called a sin of the mouth and defined: voluntary speech against the mind. - It is said 2: voluntary speech against the mind,²⁹⁸ for if someone were to speak what is false from ignorance and without consent, it would not be a lie, but objectively false speech. St. Thomas writes to the point: "The notion of lying is taken from formal falsity, namely, from this, that someone has the will of enunciating what is false; hence also lying is named from the fact that it is said against the mind. And therefore if someone enunciates what is false, believing it to be true, it is indeed materially false, but not formally, because the falsity is outside the intention of the speaker; hence it does not have the perfect notion of a lie.... But if someone formally says what is false, having the will of saying what is false, although that which is said is true, nevertheless insofar as such an act is voluntary and moral, it has falsity of itself and truth by accident; hence it attains to the species of lying."²⁹⁹ Therefore he who affirms what is false, which he thinks true, errs; he does not lie. On the contrary, he who affirms what is true, which he thinks false, does not indeed err, but lies.³⁰⁰

Theologians dispute whether the intention of leading others into error pertains to the essence of lying. For four elements can be distinguished in a lie, namely: a) the will of saying what is false, b) speech discordant from the interior judgment of the mind, c) the will of deceiving another, d) the deception really following. Without any doubt this fourth element is not of the essence of lying; hence, e.g., an accused person whom no prudent man believes when he asserts his innocence lies if without mental restriction he denies the crime committed. Therefore the deception of another is sometimes the effect of lying, but not lying itself. The third element, namely, the will of deceiving, is commonly asserted by the Scotists to be of the essence of lying, but the Thomists deny it after St. Thomas, who teaches: "That someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another by deceiving him does not pertain to the species of lying, but to a certain perfection of it."³⁰¹ Therefore a true lie is present, even if the one lying certainly foresees that the hearer will by no means believe his fallacious speech. Waffelaert,³⁰² however, tries to prove that in fact there is no distinction between the Thomistic and Scotistic opinion, rightly understood. For by the very fact that someone knowingly and seriously speaks something false, he intends at least implicitly to deceive another. Hence if even this implicit will of deceiving is manifestly lacking, a lie is no longer present. Thus modern authors deservedly teach that there is no lie a) if someone openly says false things from jest; b) if he brings forth things false indeed, but only materially; c) if someone uses locutions manifestly ironic or hyperbolic, or even locutions which are not usually understood as the words sound; e.g., if a servant responds to one asking, "The master is not at home," he does not wish to say that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot be approached.³⁰³ Therefore even according to the Thomists, an implicit intention of deceiving pertains to the essence of lying, but an explicit intention is by no means required; it is only an aggravating circumstance.

²⁹⁷ Especially the definition given by Berardi (Praxis confess. I, n. 1095) and others seems defective: "A lie is false speech against the right which another has of knowing the truth or of not undergoing deception."

²⁹⁸ i.e., against one's own knowledge and conscience.

²⁹⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰⁰ Cf. St. Augustine, Enchir. c. 8.

³⁰¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰² Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge (Bruges 1884) p. 16 sqq.

³⁰³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 916, and St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 6.

167. Division of lying. According to St. Thomas and other theologians there are two divisions of lying:

1. On the part of the end there is distinguished the officious lie, the jocose lie, and the pernicious or damaging lie.

An officious lie (Nutzlüge) is that which is chiefly brought forth in order to be useful, namely, for one's own or another's utility, without directly harming anyone, e.g., lies of children lest they be punished on account of committed delicts.

A jocose lie (Scherzlüge) is that which is chiefly made for the sake of trifling and delighting, e.g., the tales of hunters.³⁰⁴ But those locutions are not jocose lies which, considered materially indeed, are false, but from the very mode of pronouncing can immediately be understood as false (and not as really true), e.g., narratives made by the so-called Münchhausen or by Don Quixote. St. Augustine writes to the point: "Therefore excepting jests, which have never been thought lies - for they have, from the pronunciation and the very affection of the one joking, a most evident signification of a mind by no means deceiving, even if not enunciating true things - whether this kind is to be used by perfect souls is another question, which we have not now undertaken to untie";³⁰⁵ and: "Lies are performed seriously by liars, not in jest; but when things which are not are said as jokes, they are not reckoned lies."³⁰⁶ Nevertheless in oral conversation jokes of this kind are better avoided, because they easily degenerate into true lies, although jocose.

A pernicious or damaging lie (Schadenlüge) is that which causes special damage. Indeed every lie (even a jocose one) causes damage to another, insofar as by its nature it is inductive of error in the minds of hearers. For error is always something evil. But that sometimes a lie causes no error in fact to the hearers is by accident, and does not prevent every lie from causing damage of itself. Certain lies, however, produce special damages to the neighbor, e.g., concerning knowledge, goods of fortune, goods of the body, etc., and for this reason they are called, in the strict sense, damaging or pernicious lies.

2. On the part of opposition to truth there are distinguished boasting and irony.

Boasting,³⁰⁷ as it is taken here, is a violation of truth by excess and can be defined: a vice by which someone externally raises himself above that which is in himself.³⁰⁸ It very often arises from pride or from vainglory.

Irony³⁰⁹ is not taken here for a figurative locution by which something is mockingly said through the contrary, but for simulation by which someone either asserts of himself something vile which he does not recognize in himself, or denies of himself something great which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself. Hence it is opposed to truth by defect.³¹⁰ The sin of irony is very often accustomed to occur in false beggars, who externally simulate the greatest need, although in reality they are by no means so poor.

³⁰⁴ Commonly Jägerlatein, tall stories.

³⁰⁵ De mendacio c. 14.

³⁰⁶ In Gen. q. 145.

³⁰⁷ Ἀλαζονεία (Aristotle, Ethic. lib. 4, c. 7), Großtuerei, Prahlerische Selbstüberschätzung, Aufschneiderei, gasconnade, bragging.

³⁰⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 112, a. 1, and above I, 414.

³⁰⁹ Εἰρωνεία (Aristotle, l.c.), Kleintuerei, fausse dépréciation de soi-même; false undervaluation of one's self.

³¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 113, a. 1.

168. Scholion. On simulation and hypocrisy. Simulation and hypocrisy can be reduced to lying. For it belongs to the virtue of truth that someone show himself externally through external signs such as he is. But external signs are not only words, but also deeds. Falsity in words is lying; but falsity in the signs of external deeds is simulation³¹¹ (Verstellung). But hypocrisy is a species of simulation; for it is the simulation of another person and notably the vice of him who does not have holiness, but nevertheless externally so conducts himself that he may be regarded as holy. Simulation and hypocrisy must be judged especially from the end of the agent. For often they are assumed as means for obtaining a very depraved end, e.g., the kiss of Judas. When a dishonorable end is absent, they are venial sins or even wholly lack culpability. For external deeds are not so clearly and certainly significative as words, but often are of ambiguous interpretation, and therefore they must be regarded as amphibologies, which sometimes can be permitted from a reasonable cause. Thus, e.g., from a grave cause a cleric can proceed in lay dress, although then many will regard him as a lay man.

The malice of lying.

³¹¹ Ibid. q. 111, a. 1.

169. Principle 1. Every true lie is intrinsically evil, so that it can be made honorable by absolutely no reason.

Thus, after St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is the most common opinion, with few Catholic theologians contradicting it. Clement of Alexandria,³¹² Origen,³¹³ St. Chrysostom,³¹⁴ St. Hilary,³¹⁵ and especially Cassian³¹⁶ seem to have taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is lawful to use a lie as a medicine. Here are the words of Cassian: "Therefore one must think about lying in such a way and use it in such a way as if the nature of hellebore [Nieswurz] were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease threatens, it becomes healthful; but if it is received without the necessity of supreme danger, it is of present destruction.... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience."³¹⁷ There are, however, several Catholic theologians³¹⁸ who explain the Fathers and older ecclesiastical writers as if they spoke concerning the liceity of mental restriction, not of lying properly so called.³¹⁹ Hence there would only be a dispute about words. Certain modern Catholic theologians distinguish between a moral lie, which is never lawful, and a psychological lie, or false-speaking, which in a case of necessity is lawful according to Bolgeni,³²⁰ Piat, O. Cap.,³²¹ Tanquerey,³²² and several Protestants, such as Luther, Grotius, Pufendorf, Martensen.³²³ Again there seems to be a dispute about words; because that which they call a psychological lie or false-speaking (fausseté), others call mental restriction. Nevertheless it would be much better if the expressions "psychological lie" or "false-speaking" were avoided. For in practice it is not so easy to distinguish between a psychological and a moral lie, and it sounds very bad if a Catholic theologian says that some lie is sometimes lawful. - These things having been premised, it is proved that lying properly so called is intrinsically evil:

1. From Sacred Scripture, which indiscriminately prohibits every lie. You shall flee a lie;³²⁴ Do not lie, nor let each one deceive his neighbor;³²⁵ Do not lie to one another.³²⁶

2. From the Holy Fathers. St. Cyprian,³²⁷ citing Prov. 12, 22, says that one must not lie, because lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. - But especially St. Augustine strenuously proved in his diverse writings³²⁸ that a lie is never lawful, neither for anyone's temporal safety, nor for preserving chastity, nor for the safety of the neighbor. But since lies seem to be approved in not a few places of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Jacob, who deceived his father Isaac; the midwives, who concealed the children of the Jews by a lie; Judith, who deceived Holofernes by a lie, etc., St. Augustine shows that the alleged deeds either are not lies properly so called, or are not to be imitated. St. Thomas assumed the doctrine of St. Augustine, and simply asserts: "Every lie is a sin";³²⁹ and, "We concede that lying is always a sin."³³⁰

3. From reason. a) Lying is repugnant to the natural end of speech: "For since words are naturally signs of understandings, it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice that which he does not have in the mind. Hence the Philosopher says³³¹ that 'lying is of itself depraved and to be fled; but the true is good and praiseworthy.'"³³² Therefore lying is an abuse of the voice.

b) Lying is repugnant to the natural commerce of men. For without truthfulness human society cannot stand in peace.

c) Lying is repugnant to the good of the neighbor hearing. As was said above, any true lie by its nature induces the hearer into error. Now to induce another into error is to harm him. If sometimes a lie does not induce into error, this is by accident, and therefore does not change its absolute culpability.

d) Lying is repugnant to the good of the speaker himself. For although an (officious) lie sometimes seems to be useful to the speaker himself, nevertheless in reality it harms, since it excites to many evils. Hence it is evident from experience that a lying man loses nobility of soul and often sins especially from cowardice or even from a cauterized conscience.

³¹² Strom. l. 7, c. 9 (Migne, Patr. graec. 9, 474).

³¹³ Strom. l. 6 (Migne, l.c. 11, 102).

³¹⁴ Hom. 3, n. 3 in 2 Cor. 1, 17 (Migne, l.c. 61, 408).

³¹⁵ Comm. in Ps. 14, n. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 9, 305).

³¹⁶ Collat. 17, c. 17.

³¹⁷ L.c., in Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062. This doctrine of Cassian seems taken from Plato, who taught that lying is sometimes salutary: ψεῦδος δὴ ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (De republ. l. 3 [ed. Didot n. 389]). Socrates and the Stoics spoke in the same way. On the contrary Aristotle calls lying from its very nature something evil: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν (Ethic. l. 4, c. [13] 7, 6).

³¹⁸ Waffelaert, Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge p. 41 sqq.

³¹⁹ Especially it is not so clear what St. Jerome thought in this question. In his Commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians c. 2, 11-12 he had written that St. Paul did that very thing concerning which he rebuked St. Peter, and therefore did not speak so according to truth. St. Augustine, vehemently moved by this, invites St. Jerome to sing a palinode in this matter (Ep. 67 among the works of St. Jerome; in Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 650), but he took this very badly and wrote rather vehement letters to defend his opinion; yet he expressly asserts that he does not wish to defend an "officious lie," as Augustine imputed to him, but that the holy Apostles committed simulation from a certain "honest dispensation" (Ep. 113; ib. 923). St. Augustine was unwilling to admit even this, and strenuously defended St. Paul (Ep. 116; ib. 936 sqq.). Therefore between St. Augustine and St. Jerome there exists rather a controversy about St. Paul's manner of acting than about the liceity of lying. Nevertheless it must be confessed that St. Augustine extended the words of St. Jerome to an officious lie. - Concina treats this whole matter excellently, both historically and theologically (In Decal. l. 5, diss. 3, c. 20 and l. 10, c. 5), and also clearly shows that St. Raymond of Pennafort is falsely cited as permitting an officious lie in grave necessity.

³²⁰ Mélanges théologiques de Liége, 4th series (1850-1851), p. 409-413.

³²¹ Appendix 4 to Theol. mor. by Van der Velden I, 524 sq.

³²² Theol. mor. De iust., n. 4105 sqq.

³²³ Die christl. Ethik II (1879), 245 sqq.

³²⁴ Ex. 23, 7.

³²⁵ Lev. 19, 11.

³²⁶ Col. 3, 9; cf. also Prov. 12, 22; Eccli. 20, 26.

³²⁷ Lib. 3 testim. ad Quirin. c. 104 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 807).

³²⁸ De mendacio, Contra mendacium, Sermons 81, 133, and 166 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 494-497 and 541-547).

³²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3.

³³⁰ Quodl. 8, a. 14.

³³¹ Ethic. l. 4, c. 7.

³³² S. theol., l.c.

170. Principle 2. Lying, insofar as it is chiefly opposed to truthfulness, is a venial sin; but insofar as it is opposed to justice, religion, and other virtues, it is from its genus a mortal sin.

The reason of the first part is that the abuse of speech and the other disorders found in a pure lie do not seem to be so grave that they constitute a mortal sin. Thus also bears the common sense of the faithful, even those who fear God, who do not think that they have sinned mortally if they have told a purely jocose or officious lie. And truly it seems too harsh to condemn someone to the penalty of Gehenna who departed from this life with a jocose or officious lie. Concerning these lies St. Augustine says:³³³ "There are altogether two kinds of lies in which there is no great fault, but nevertheless they are not without fault, when either we joke, or lie in order that we may help. That first, in joking, is therefore not most pernicious, because it does not deceive. For he to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. But the second is milder, because it retains some benevolence."

The reason of the other part of the principle is that these virtues (charity, justice, faith, religion) of themselves oblige under grave matter. Hence without any doubt he commits mortal sin who by lying causes grave scandal and thus wounds charity, e.g., if a bishop should tell a pure and foul lie; or if someone by lying causes grave damage, because it is a grave wounding of justice; or if someone tells a lie with an oath, because he wounds the virtue of religion; or if someone speaks against the true faith, because he wounds the virtue of faith. - Therefore lies which, besides truthfulness, also wound other virtues, are from their genus mortal sins; but they become venial sins either from lightness of matter or from imperfection of the act.³³⁴ But when in Sacred Scripture it is said: You will destroy all who speak a lie,³³⁵ and: The mouth that lies kills the soul,³³⁶ such and similar places are to be understood of the pernicious lie.³³⁷

³³³ Enarr. in Ps. 5, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 86).

³³⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 4. - The opinion proposed by Tanquerey seems too harsh: "Lying properly so called ... is of itself a grave sin" (Theol. mor., De iust. n. 411). But if under lying properly so called only a damaging lie is understood, the proposition is indeed true, but then that manner of speaking is not pleasing, because it is repugnant to the common usage of theologians. Mausbach also speaks less rightly in this matter (Kathol. Moraltheol. III, 59).

³³⁵ Ps. 5, 7.

³³⁶ Wis. 1, 11.

³³⁷ Cf. S. theol., l.c. ad 1.

171. Declarations. Strictly speaking, equivocation, amphibology, ambiguity, and mental restriction are distinguished:

For equivocation is a word which signifies two diverse things, e.g., volo (from willing or flying), Gallus (a rooster or a man sprung from Gaul). Christ Himself used such equivocation when He said: "Lazarus our friend sleeps";³³⁸ for sleeping is said of sleep or of death.

Amphibology is a proposition or phrase having several senses, e.g., Peter is at home (Petrus est domi): Peter is present at home, and Peter eats at home.

But ambiguity is said not only of words and propositions, but also of other signs or things. Thus, e.g., to weep can be a sign either of great sadness or of great joy.

Mental restriction is an act of the mind by which, while we speak, we restrict words to another sense than the obvious one. If this sense, with attention paid to all the circumstances of the speaker and hearer, in no way appears nor can be understood, it is called a purely mental restriction; e.g., someone asked whether he has seen Peter responds affirmatively, understanding within himself, in a picture. But if the sense of the words can be understood by a prudent man because of the accompanying circumstances, it is called a broadly mental restriction; e.g., if a maidservant responds to one wishing to visit the master: the master is not at home; any prudent person immediately understands that by this phrase it is not certainly expressed that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot receive the visitor. By not a few authors this restriction is, not undeservedly, called rather a restriction of diction than of mind, because the diction is restricted to one of two or several senses.

³³⁸ Jn. 11, 11.

172. Principle. A purely mental restriction is never lawful; but if necessity or a reasonable cause is present, it is lawful to use a broadly mental restriction (or restriction of diction), or amphibologies and equivocations.

Thus now all Catholic theologians teach; thus in daily life all prudent men act, even those Protestants who indeed accuse the so-called "lax Catholic Morality" with such calumnies, but nevertheless admit a psychological lie or false-speaking, as was said above.

The first part is proved. A purely mental restriction is a pure lie. But a pure lie is never lawful. Therefore neither is a purely mental restriction lawful. For in a purely mental restriction the external speech has a sense so diverse from the interior concept that no hearer could suspect the truth. Therefore it is a pure lie. Hence Billuart³³⁹ deservedly says: 1. If the use of purely mental restrictions were lawful, no one except a dull and leaden man would lie, since nothing is easier than mentally to twist the sense of words to anything else. 2. The use of mental restrictions harms human society no less than lies, since hearers are equally deceived by it. - Innocent XI condemned the following propositions:³⁴⁰ "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned or spontaneously, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he did not do something which in truth he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way (day) than that on which he did it, or any other true addition, in truth he neither lies nor is perjured"; and: "A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for preserving the safety of the body, honor, family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then considered expedient and studious."

The second part is proved. The end of broadly mental restriction is the concealment of truth. But in necessity or from a reasonable cause it is lawful to conceal the truth by means not intrinsically evil. Therefore broadly mental restriction, which does not employ means intrinsically evil, is lawful in necessity or from a reasonable cause. St. Augustine³⁴¹ says: "Although everyone who lies wishes to conceal what is true, nevertheless not everyone who wishes to conceal what is true lies"; and St. Thomas³⁴² teaches: "It is not lawful to tell a lie; ... nevertheless it is lawful to conceal the truth prudently under some dissimulation." - Indeed concealment of truth is not only lawful, but sometimes gravely commanded, e.g., an entrusted secret is commanded. But broadly mental restriction employs means not intrinsically evil for concealing the truth. For the words uttered can have the intended sense; indeed the hearer, with all the circumstances seen, ought to suspect this sense. Hence the hearer is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is rather only indirectly permitted. But deception of this kind can be permitted if a reasonable cause or necessity is present. For the good of human society and the legitimate defense of oneself require that there be a means of lawfully concealing truth and preserving a secret. But sometimes no other means is present except equivocation or broadly mental restriction. For such is the disposition of men that, if you keep silent or if you refuse a response to one questioning, they immediately conclude that the matter is as they think or ask. - Christ Himself seems sometimes to have used mental restriction. For when the disciples asked Him to go up to the feast day, He responded: "You go up to this feast day, but I do not go up,"³⁴³ and nevertheless afterward He went up. Yet He neither changed His purpose, nor still more strongly lied, because in truth He did not go up solemnly and publicly, as the Apostles asked, saying: "Pass hence and go into Judea, that Your disciples also may see Your works; manifest Yourself to the world";³⁴⁴ but He went up "not manifestly, but as it were in secret," as the Evangelist notes. Likewise with mental restriction Christ seems to have responded to the Apostles asking concerning the day of judgment: "But of that day or hour no one knows, neither the Angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father."³⁴⁵ For certainly the Son of God knows the day of judgment, but He does not know it so as to manifest it to the Apostles.

Although, therefore, broadly mental restriction is lawful, nevertheless in its use some necessity is always required; hence he sins who rather often employs an equivocation or restrictions of this kind in lighter matters. For if this were lawful, the hearer in almost any saying would have to suspect ambiguity and could almost never safely believe the speaker; and this indeed certainly would tend toward the detriment of peaceful living together. But for discerning when there is a sufficient cause for employing amphibologies of this kind, let this be the rule: When the one questioning has a strict right of knowing the truth (e.g., in essential matters of an onerous contract), it is not lawful to conceal the truth by broadly mental restriction; but when someone asks importunately and unjustly, and a response cannot be refused without offense of the one questioning and without danger of violating a secret, then it is lawful to use these amphibologies.³⁴⁶

³³⁹ De relig. diss. 9, a. 2.

³⁴⁰ Prop. 26 and 27 (Denz. n. 1176 sq.). These errors are taken from T. Sanchez, In Decal. l. 3, c. 6, n. 15. Cf. also prop. 24, 25, 28 (Denz. n. 1174 sq., 1178).

³⁴¹ Contra mendacium c. 10.

³⁴² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4.

³⁴³ Jn. 7, 8.

³⁴⁴ Jn. 7, 3 sq.

³⁴⁵ Mk. 13, 32.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Billuart, De mendacio a. 2.

173. Applications. Although the principle enunciated is admitted by all modern authors (with certain ancient authors contradicting it), nevertheless its application in practice is not without difficulty, because sometimes it is difficult to discern between a purely and broadly mental restriction. Hence we give the following practical resolutions:

1. A confessor asked about any matter known from confession can always, indeed sometimes must, say: I do not know. For every interrogation thus posed to a confessor is unjust, and truly the confessor as a man does not know those things which he heard in confession as a minister of God. But I say, sometimes he must say: I do not know, namely, if otherwise the seal of confession would come into danger. For cases can happen in which, from a refused response, the questioner easily suspects an affirmative response to his question. - A confessor can say even under oath: I do not know. - A penitent also can use amphibologies when the confessor puts a certainly undue question concerning sins already confessed; for he then lawfully responds: I did not commit this sin (understanding, which I am held to reveal to you, because I have already confessed it).

2. All who are held to preserve the so-called professional secret, e.g., secretaries, advocates, physicians, pharmacists, midwives, etc., can use broadly mental restriction for preserving that secret, if no other means is available. The reason is that each hearer easily understands that these persons neither can nor wish unduly to violate professional secret.

3. He who, invited to a meal, is asked whether the food pleases him, can respond affirmatively, although in reality the food is tasteless. Thus at least if otherwise inconveniences would be prepared both for himself and for the host of the meal. The reason is that words of politeness of this kind (commonly compliments), just as also subscriptions: most devoted, most obedient, most attached servant, etc., are taken by no prudent person in the strict and obvious sense.

4. A servant, by order of the master, can say to a visitor: The master is not at home; and this locution indeed, at least in our regions, signifies nothing other than: the master cannot be seen, or the master is not at home so as to receive visitors. - Likewise to one asking for a loan or for a loan for use, it can often (but not always) be answered: I do not have it, namely, what I can easily give to you.

5. Some restrictions which by certain older authors were held lawful nevertheless seem to be rejected. Thus, e.g., to affirm something in a loud voice, adding in a low voice the restriction, as if someone says in a loud voice: I did not do it, and mutters softly: today. For he who acts thus is deservedly regarded as a deceitful and lying man. Likewise in our times it seems illicit that a cleric, even if not obliged from canon law to pay tax, should declare that he carries or has nothing (understanding, that is subject to taxes). For if goods subject to tax are discovered with the cleric, he is regarded by all as a defrauder and causes grave scandal.

174. Warning. Generally speaking, all mental restrictions are to be avoided as far as possible, and they can be employed only if true necessity exists which cannot be avoided in another way. But these restrictions are especially to be avoided in an oath. For if someone were found to have made an oath with mental restriction, according to the modern practice of tribunals he would immediately be condemned as a perjurer. Therefore he who is required to give testimony or to confess the truth should use the right conceded to him of refusing testimony.

On account of the use of mental restriction no small odium has been caused for moral theology, but undeservedly! For although certain authors exceeded too far in this matter and therefore were also condemned by Innocent XI, nevertheless true Catholic moral theology has always restrained mental restriction within just limits.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ Cf. Billuart, De mendacio diss. 9, a. 2, who excellently discusses this matter and also explains well 14 places from Sacred Scripture in which lies or mental restrictions seem to be present. Even Caramuel himself, who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," writes most beautifully: "An aversion against mental restrictions is innate in me. For if they are contained within the bounds of piety and sincerity, they are not necessary. For all things which they can furnish, the co-signifying circumstances will furnish. But if such are said that they are to be admitted even where signifying circumstances are lacking (let their authors and defenders forgive me), they take away human society and security and have been condemned as pestiferous. For once admitted they open the way to every lie, to every perjury. And the whole difference will be in this: that what yesterday was called a lie changes not its nature and malice but its name, so that today it is ordered to be named mental restriction; which is to season poison with sugar and to color wickedness with the appearance of virtue" (Theol. fund. II, n. 1805 [p. 182]).

Just as lying violates the virtue of truthfulness by defect, so violation of a secret violates it by excess, as was already said above. Hence, conveniently, after lying and mental restrictions there is discussion of violation of secret.

175. Notion. Secret taken objectively is the hidden thing itself; but accepted subjectively it is knowledge of that hidden thing and the obligation of not betraying the knowledge received. Concerning this secret accepted subjectively there is treatment here.

Division. A threefold secret is usually distinguished:

1. A natural secret, which is an obligation of concealing something arisen not from contract, but from the very nature of the thing, because, namely, such a secret cannot be manifested without another being reasonably unwilling, even if no entrusting or promise has intervened. This natural secret indeed is again distinguished as either simple or extorted. A simple natural secret is that which someone knows either by chance or because of the levity or lack of consideration of another, e.g., someone by chance sees another's hidden disgraceful vice. - An extorted natural secret is that which someone has known after a crafty investigation has been made; e.g., someone by design investigates concerning the private life of another.

2. A promised secret is that which someone promised to another after knowledge of the matter had been received. This promise indeed can be given in a twofold way. a) Someone has already known another's secret matter from another source, and now promises him that the secret is to be kept. b) Someone has heard a matter from another without secrecy and afterward promises him secrecy. Therefore in a promised secret, knowledge of the secret precedes the promise, and that promise is (ordinarily) gratuitous.³⁴⁸

3. An entrusted or strict secret (anvertrautes Geheimnis) is that which was not communicated except after there had first been an implicit or explicit pact of keeping secrecy. If this pact was implicit or tacit, the secret is called official (Amtsgeheimnis), because it arises from an office undertaken. By such an official secret, e.g., physicians, midwives, counselors, etc., are bound. But if the pact was explicit, this secret is called a privately entrusted secret; e.g., Peter says to Paul: I wish to narrate to you a matter of great moment, provided you promise me strict silence. Paul, having promised silence, hears the matter. This secret is entrusted to him in a private way. - Stricter is the secret which obliges from an oath taken, such as, e.g., officials of the Roman Curia emit. But the highest degree of entrusted secret is obtained by the sacramental secret, or the confessional seal, concerning which there will be discussion in the treatise on penance. In an entrusted secret, knowledge of the secret follows the promise, and that promise is onerous.

³⁴⁸ Under promised secret, privately entrusted secret also is included by some authors, e.g., by D'Annibale, Haine.

176. Principle 1. It is not lawful by unjust means to explore another's secret; but when sufficient cause accedes, it is lawful to use just means for knowing another's secret.

The first part of this principle is plain of itself, since it is never lawful to use unjust means for obtaining some end. There is added that a secret truly is another's thing. Now, just as it is not lawful to usurp another's thing, so neither is it permitted to explore another's secret. Hence it is not lawful to listen at a wall or door, to open another's letters, to discover an invention of art by unjust means; much more strongly, it is not lawful to use knowledge of a secret unjustly received, for this would be to renew or continue the injustice already committed.³⁴⁹ But he who uses knowledge of a secret unjustly received with grave damage to another is held to restitution; e.g., he who unjustly opens another's letters and from this causes grave material damage to another must repair this damage. When it is lawful to manifest a secret will be said below, n. 180 and 192.

The second part of the principle likewise is easily proved. For just as it is not a sin to take away another's material thing when a legitimate cause accedes, namely, if the owner is now not reasonably unwilling, so also from a sufficient cause it is lawful to use just means for exploring another's secret. Thus, e.g., it is lawful by just means to explore in war the forces and positions of the enemy; a father may inquire concerning the hidden crimes of a son for correcting him.

³⁴⁹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 969.

177. Principle 2. A natural secret obliges of itself under grave matter.

The reason is that the neighbor has a strict right to a natural secret from the very nature of the thing. But from the revelation of such a secret the neighbor is saddened, and quite often damages arise for him in the goods of fortune or of reputation. Hence it is plain that he who without just cause wounds a natural secret sins, and indeed from its genus mortally, in almost the same way as a thief who takes away another's thing. From lightness of matter or of the damage caused this sin becomes venial. Therefore he sins who without sufficient cause reveals the hidden sins or hidden defects of another. - What are just causes of revealing a natural secret will be said below.

178. Principle 3. A merely promised secret of itself ordinarily does not oblige except under light matter.

I say 1: a secret merely promised. For often a secret of this kind is also natural, and then the preceding principle must be applied. - I say 2: of itself it does not oblige; for by accident violation of a promised secret can be a grave sin, namely, if because of this violation grave damage is caused to the neighbor. - I say 3: ordinarily it does not oblige except under light matter; for it can happen (although rarely) that someone promises under grave matter that he will keep a secret; e.g., I promise you the secret so firmly that, if I break it, I shall pay 1000 francs. - The principle taken with these clauses is proved in this way: Violation of a promised secret is only violation of a gratuitous promise or of fidelity. But the virtue of fidelity, which is a certain part of truthfulness, does not oblige of itself except under light matter, as was said above, n. 165 and 170, concerning lying. Therefore violation of a promised secret of itself is only a venial sin. - Nevertheless, violation of a promised secret is greatly to be avoided, because quarrels and grave enmities often arise from it.

179. Principle 4. An entrusted secret obliges of itself under grave matter, and indeed more gravely than a natural and a promised secret.

The reason is 1. because in an entrusted secret there is always a contract (implicit or explicit) of not revealing those things which are known, and 2. he who violates an entrusted secret wounds the right both of the neighbor and of society. For the neighbor would not have revealed his secret except under the condition of faithfully guarding it. Besides, the good of society demands that all can safely seek counsel or help from those who, from a special office approved by public authority, are able to furnish it. But if those officials could, without a legitimate and urgent cause, reveal secrets entrusted to them, no one would now approach them; and this would certainly bring great inconvenience for the common good. - Hence civil Codes also gravely punish the wounding of an entrusted secret.³⁵⁰

As appears from what has been said, the obligation of diverse secrets is diverse. As a general rule it can be held:

A secret obliges according to the quantity of damage which is unjustly brought upon either the public good or private good from its violation.

³⁵⁰ Cf. German Penal Code § 300.

180. Just causes of manifesting a secret. Just as the neighbor's material thing can lawfully be taken away under certain conditions, so equally also a secret, to which otherwise the neighbor has a right, can sometimes be revealed, indeed must be. For the keeping of a secret is prescribed on account of both private and public good. But the general principle is: When the end of a law ceases contrarily, i.e., when the law has become not only useless, but even harmful, the law itself ceases. Hence in the case in which the law concerning keeping a secret by no means profits but rather harms private or public good, this law ceases; or in other words: a just cause of manifesting a secret is urgent necessity of public or private good. For in that case the neighbor is irrationally unwilling that the secret be revealed; or he is considered to renounce his right concerning the keeping of his own secret.

1. Therefore urgent necessity of the public good demands the manifestation of a secret; and therefore the Angelic Doctor: "Against the common good it is lawful to receive no secret."³⁵¹ But I say: urgent necessity; for if only some utility is present, it is not lawful to disclose a secret. For this reason the same principles are to be applied here which above were established concerning the obligation of denunciation. E.g., a physician is held to denounce some sick person who could easily infect others gravely.

2. Necessity of a private good regards either a) the one knowing himself, or b) a third person, or c) the very one who handed over the secret.

a) The proper good of the one knowing is then a just cause of manifesting a secret when otherwise grave damage would follow for him. This damage indeed ordinarily must be graver than that which follows for the other from revelation of the secret. If there is question of keeping a secret which is altogether necessary for the common good, it can in no way be revealed, even if death threatens; e.g., a soldier captured by enemies can in no way reveal the secrets of his fatherland. But if there is question only of the secret of some private man, then almost always no one is held to keep a known secret with great damage to himself, because no one is supposed to undertake such a secret with so great an inconvenience. The exception is if someone explicitly promised to keep the secret even with the greatest inconvenience. For then, according to the truer opinion, the promise is to be kept. There are nevertheless several authors who even in this case permit violation of the secret from a most grave reason.³⁵²

b) The good of a third person requires revelation of a secret if otherwise he would unjustly suffer great damage. E.g., Peter, knowing under secret that Paul is preparing death for Andrew, must first, as far as he can, turn Paul away from a perverse plan of this kind; but if he does not wish to desist, Peter must make Andrew more certain concerning the danger threatening him. Or a physician, knowing by force of his office that a bridegroom, who feigns himself healthy, labors under a grave and contagious syphilitic disease, must turn him away from marriage; but if this will have been vain, he can manifest the matter to the bride, in order to forestall the greatest danger to her and to the offspring perhaps to be born. Thus at least from natural law. For in practice the statutes of positive law in this matter must also be attended to, because otherwise grave penalties are usually inflicted.³⁵³

But what must be said if Peter knows from an entrusted secret that Titius is the murderer, but in his place innocent Sempronius has been accused, condemned, and is now about to be punished by death? The general rule is: I am held to keep an entrusted secret so long as the one entrusting the secret has a right that I not betray it. But in that case Titius is not held to confess his crime with the most immediate danger of his own death. Therefore he retains the right to the secret. Therefore Peter cannot manifest the entrusted secret for saving Sempronius.³⁵⁴ - Nevertheless this opinion does not seem sufficiently proved. For although the rule proposed is excellent, nevertheless it is not sufficiently proved that in that case Titius still has a right to the secret. For although he is not held to betray himself, because he can love his own life more than the life of another, nevertheless it by no means follows from this that neither can nor ought I betray him for saving an innocent man. For in this case two lives are endangered, namely, the life of the innocent man and the life of the guilty man. Now, other things being equal, I ought rather to save the life of the innocent man than the life of the guilty man. But the guilty man cannot be reasonably unwilling that I save the life of the innocent man, although this cannot be done without revelation of the entrusted secret.

c) The good of him who handed over the secret permits or requires manifestation of the secret if otherwise great damage would come to him. For he is not presumed to be unwilling in that case, and if nevertheless he resisted the manifestation of the secret, he would be irrationally unwilling. Hence if someone secretly entrusts to you that he wishes to enter marriage notwithstanding the impediment of bond, and you cannot impede him otherwise, you are held to reveal this impediment to the proper pastor, so that concubinage may thus be avoided.

³⁵¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 68, a. 1 ad 3.

³⁵² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 971; St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 70, a. 1 ad 2.

³⁵³ Cf. German Penal Code § 300.

³⁵⁴ Thus Laymann in Noldin, De praeceptis n. 670.

181. Scholion. On reading another's letters.

He who reads another's secret letters or writings without the consent of the sender or recipient, or without legitimate authority or a just cause, or otherwise by force or fraud fishes out another's secret, sins against justice. Thus rightly Billuart.³⁵⁵ The reason is that he acts like a thief or robber who unjustly takes goods away from another. For a secret is a good to which the neighbor has a strict right. This sin will be mortal or venial according to the quantity either of damage, or of danger, or of the intention of damaging gravely or lightly. Hence he sins only venially who opens letters which he knows with moral certainty contain nothing except greetings or matters of lighter moment. On the contrary, he sins mortally if he knows or even doubts that they contain matters bringing infamy, or matters which it much concerns him who sends or receives that they remain secret.³⁵⁶ In practice all who unjustly intercept or read another's letters must be corrected severely. Modern criminal Codes also are accustomed to punish gravely those who violate epistolary secrecy.³⁵⁷

But I said 1: another's secret letters or writings, such as closed letters, or even open ones if they are kept in a secret place, e.g., in a cabinet, or even by chance have been lost; otherwise, if they have been thrown away, because then they are regarded as abandoned. But letters torn into minute pieces and thrown into a public place are nevertheless considered secret. Wherefore with St. Alphonsus³⁵⁸ I judge that he sins against justice who astutely gathers, composes, and reads the fragments. The reason is that it is too difficult to burn all letters or destroy them in another way than by tearing. But such a throwing into an accessible place by no means signifies (as Lugo³⁵⁹ wishes) that the owner yields his right in letters thus torn into minute pieces, the reading of which he cannot prevent.

I said 2: without the consent of the sender or recipient. This consent indeed can be express or tacit. Thus a husband ordinarily does not sin by reading the letters of his wife, since she does not wish to conceal anything from her husband.

I said 3: or without legitimate authority. In several religious and also civil institutes (e.g., in prisons, in hospitals of the insane, etc.) it is established that superiors can or must read the letters of subjects. Excepted, however, are letters directed to major superiors or sent by them. Statutes of this kind are not unjust, because anyone either freely entered such an institute, and then is considered to have given consent concerning his letters, or because of his moral or physical defects he is compelled to enter such an institute, e.g., into prison, and then the opening of letters is either a just penalty or is necessary for the common good. But if these letters open secrets of conscience, let the superior abstain from reading.

I said 4: or a just cause. Namely, for averting grave damage either to oneself or especially to the republic. Hence in time of war the leader of an army can lawfully open the letters of enemies. The father of a family can read the letters of his children, at least if they are minors. A private man who foundedly fears that some letter may unjustly bring grave damage upon him can read it.

³⁵⁵ De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 4, appendix.

³⁵⁶ Cf. Billuart, l.c.

³⁵⁷ Cf. German Penal Code §§ 299 and 354 sqq.

³⁵⁸ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 7.

³⁵⁹ De iust. et iure diss. 14, n. 151.

182. Notions. Honor is the testification concerning someone's excellence.³⁶⁰ This testification indeed is usually made in a threefold way: by words, when someone pronounces by mouth the excellence of someone; by deeds, such as by inclinations, by yielding the first place; by external things, e.g., by the offering of gifts, the conferring of dignity, etc. But this testification must be shown to the person present, or at least to his image or another representative. Thus the king present is honored, or represented through his delegate; thus the saints are honored in their images or relics. When the testification of excellence regards someone absent, it pertains more to his reputation than to his honor.

The difference from St. Thomas between honor, reverence, praise, and glory must be noted.

"Reverence is not the same as honor. But on the one hand it is the first motive for honoring, insofar, namely, as someone from the reverence which he has toward someone honors him; but on the other hand it is the end of honor, insofar, namely, as someone is honored for this, that he may be held in reverence by others."³⁶¹

"Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways: in one way, because praise consists only in signs of words (whether oral or written); but honor consists in any external signs whatever, and according to this praise is included in honor. In another way, because through the exhibition of honor we render testimony concerning the excellence of someone's goodness absolutely; but through praise we testify concerning someone's goodness in order to an end, as we praise one who works well for the sake of the end. But honor is also of the best things, which are not ordered to an end, but are already in the end.

"But glory is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports; ... for glory is clear knowledge with praise."³⁶²

The difference between honor and reputation must also be noted. Honor is a testification of another's excellence; reputation is public opinion concerning another's excellence. Honor is shown to one present; reputation is borne concerning one absent. Honor is wounded by contumely; but reputation is wounded by calumny, detraction, and whispering.

³⁶⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1. But since the excellence of a man is considered especially according to virtue (ibid. q. 145, a. 1), all other things which are below virtue are honored insofar as they assist toward works of virtue, such as nobility, power, riches (ibid. ad 2). H. Gay has written well on honor, L'honneur, sa place dans la Morale (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1913).

³⁶¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1 ad 1.

³⁶² Ibid. a. 1 ad 3.

183. Injury to honor. Honor is chiefly wounded by contumely,³⁶³ which can be defined: unjust dishonoring of a person present. This dishonoring for the most part is done by a positive act, namely, by word or deed; but ordinarily the omission of an honorific act does not suffice. Thus, e.g., when a friend from anger or for another reason now no longer greets a former friend, he does not yet commit contumely, unless nevertheless that omission, on account of special circumstances, is equivalent to a positive act.

Dishonoring can be done in many ways: 1. by objecting moral vices to another, e.g.: you are a thief - and then this dishonoring is called contumely in the strict sense;³⁶⁴ 2. by objecting physical defects to another: you are one-eyed, or blind cow; and especially "when someone injuriously brings back to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him suffering necessity. Hence it is said in Eccli. 20, 15: He will give little things and reproach much."³⁶⁵ Dishonoring of this kind is called reproach;³⁶⁶ 3. by deriding another with words and laughter, and then there is mockery³⁶⁷ or derision; 4. by manifesting contempt for another with ridiculous gestures, as the soldiers did when genuflecting before Christ crowned with thorns, and then there is derision with contempt.³⁶⁸ All these diverse modes are indeed diverse sins,³⁶⁹ but they are reduced to the same moral species of contumely, because their end is the same, namely, externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored. Hence it is not necessary to indicate in confession in what way the contumely was done.

³⁶³ Beschimpfung, outrage, insult. Rash judgment also and detraction wound honor, but concerning them there will be special discussion afterward.

³⁶⁴ Schmähung.

³⁶⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3. The Angelic Doctor himself asserts in the same place: "Sometimes, however, one of these is put for another."

³⁶⁶ Vorwurf, opprobre.

³⁶⁷ Verspottung; if it is done jokingly: Fopperei, Hänselei, Spöttelei, "Aufziehen," raillerie.

³⁶⁸ Verhöhnung.

³⁶⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 75, a. 1.

184. The malice of contumely. Contumely is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

That contumely is from its genus a mortal sin is plain from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall say (to his brother), Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna."³⁷⁰ But St. Paul numbers the contumelious among those whom God handed over to a reprobate sense.³⁷¹

That contumely wounds justice is clear from the fact that any man has a strict right to honor; and this right indeed contumely violates. And certainly honor is a good more excellent than riches. But to steal the riches of another is from its genus a mortal sin against justice. Therefore, more strongly, to take away honor, which contumely does, is such a sin.

Honor, which is founded upon true virtue, obtains the first place among all the external goods of man. Hence not rarely men sacrifice riches, health, indeed even life itself, for acquiring or retaining honor. Concerning this matter St. Thomas teaches: "Things which come into the use of man are exterior things, among which simply the greatest is honor: both because it is nearest to virtue, as being a certain testification existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for attaining honor and avoiding blame."³⁷² From these things it follows that unjust wounding of honor is a very grave sin against justice. Nor is that sin diminished from the fact that he who is dishonored does not always feel great damage, although this sometimes happens. For a very rich man upon whom notable damaging is inflicted does not even feel damage of this kind much, on account of abundant other riches; and nevertheless the damaging inflicted remains a great sin.

Contumely often has other malices joined to it, such as: irreligiosity, if, e.g., a cleric or religious is dishonored; wounded piety, if, e.g., the contumely is against parents; blasphemy, if it is against God or the saints; scandal, etc.

Contumely becomes a light sin:

1. from imperfection of the act, e.g., inadvertence, lack of deliberation, from sudden anger;

2. from the intention of not gravely wounding honor, e.g., if someone from jest or not so seriously says to another: You are an ass;

3. from the condition of the speaker and hearer. Hence Soto, Sylvius, and others deservedly teach that insults by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelsome women attack one another, crying that the other is a prostitute, an adulteress, a scoundrel, the devil himself, etc., are not mortal sins. The reason is that by these exclamations no great wounding of honor is caused to anyone. The same holds for contumelious words which are brought forth by parents against children, by teachers against pupils, etc.

Mockery, which, as was said above, is reduced to contumely, is often no sin; indeed, it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done jokingly concerning another's small defect and with small embarrassment for him; for it pertains to honorable recreation.³⁷³ Yet let there be nothing excessive! For from jokes of this kind charity is sometimes wounded.

³⁷⁰ Matt. 5, 22.

³⁷¹ Cf. Rom. 1, 28-30.

³⁷² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 129, a. 1. Cf. also Aristotle, Ethic. l. 4, c. 8.

³⁷³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 2 ad 1.

185. Restitution of honor. He who has inflicted true contumely upon another is held to sufficient reparation of honor. Therefore he who publicly inflicted contumely is held also publicly to repair the honor taken away; but he who privately and secretly dishonored another ought at least privately to satisfy. This obligation of repairing honor is of itself grave and to be done as quickly as possible. For after Christ said: "Whoever shall say to his brother: Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna," He adds: "If therefore you offer your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to your brother."³⁷⁴ Satisfaction, or restitution of wounded honor, must be made by a new exhibition of honor and reverence. But how this ought to be done in individual cases depends both on the person wounded and on the person who inflicted the contumely. Subjects and equals who have inflicted contumely are often held to ask pardon, especially if the person wounded by grave contumely demands this and does not wish to accept another satisfaction. Nevertheless, in some regions it is not the custom, and therefore there is no obligation of asking pardon. Superiors who have inflicted a not so grave contumely upon their subject are, generally speaking, not held to ask pardon, "lest," says St. Augustine,³⁷⁵ "among those whom it is necessary to be subject, while humility is observed too much, the authority of governing be broken." Therefore superiors can satisfy wounded subjects by exhibiting special signs of benevolence. - Wounded honor ought not to be repaired by payment of money.³⁷⁶ Sometimes nevertheless a monetary fine is imposed by the judge on the one who committed contumely, to be paid for the poor or for pious causes.

³⁷⁴ Matt. 5, 22 sqq.

³⁷⁵ Regula ad servos Dei (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1383).

³⁷⁶ Cf. nevertheless below, n. 204.

186. Scholion. On contumely to be tolerated patiently. In a special article St. Thomas³⁷⁷ investigates whether and when someone ought patiently to tolerate contumelies inflicted upon himself. A man indeed is held with great patience to tolerate contumelies inflicted and not to exact satisfaction solely on account of desire for private honor. Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary to repel the contumely inflicted, especially on account of two things: first, indeed, on account of the good of him who inflicts the contumely, namely, so that his audacity may be repressed and that he may not attempt such things afterward; ... in another way, on account of the good of many, whose progress is impeded on account of contumelies inflicted upon us. Hence Gregory says: "Those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them, lest those who could hear their preaching do not hear it, and thus, remaining in depraved morals, they contemn living well."

As to the manner of repelling contumely, the moderation of blameless defense must altogether be observed. Wherefore it is not lawful to provoke to a duel, nor to kill an aggressor of honor.³⁷⁸ Sometimes, however, it is lawful to retort contumelious words or blows upon the one committing contumely by the same words or blows, namely, if otherwise reparation of wounded honor cannot conveniently be obtained.

³⁷⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 3.

³⁷⁸ Cf. proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI.

187. Notions. Reputation taken generally is frequent and common speech about some matter; thus we speak of the rumor of war, of the bad reputation of some evildoer. But more strictly reputation (good reputation) is the common estimation (brought forth in speech) concerning someone's excellence. In this strict sense we now speak of reputation, and thus we say, e.g.: This man has a good reputation (guten Ruf), when, namely, many proclaim his good morals or other excellences. Good reputation principally concerns a virtuous life, secondarily also other good qualities,³⁷⁹ e.g., concerning medical skill. That to every man there belongs a strict right to a good reputation has been said above, n. 7, concerning the object of dominion. This right indeed is preserved even for dead men, since their immortal soul still exists. Hence it is not lawful to take away good reputation even from them without sufficient reason. Likewise this right belongs to moral or juridical persons, e.g., a monastery, a society, etc.; and therefore it can be a grave sin to say unjustly concerning some monastery that grave disorders are committed there. - The good reputation of a man is injured by defamation.

Defamation is the unjust blackening of another's reputation.

It is explained. It is said 1. unjust blackening, because not every blackening of reputation, but only one made without sufficient cause, is defamation or detraction. It is said: blackening, because just as a man shines with a good reputation, so by defamation, through the revelation of a true or imputed crime, he is blackened or obscured, although his good reputation is not always totally taken away. It is said 2. of another's reputation, because, properly speaking, no one can commit detraction against his own reputation. St. Thomas, Bl. Albert, and many others add in the definition: by hidden words. Here is the text of St. Thomas:³⁸⁰ "Just as someone harms another by deed in two ways: manifestly indeed, as in robbery or any violence inflicted; but secretly, as in theft and a deceitful blow; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely; in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction.... Detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the manner of proposing the words, because, namely, the contumelious man speaks openly against someone, but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the intended end, or as to the harm inflicted, because, namely, the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation." Therefore only an injury to reputation, while the defamed person is absent, is defamation or detraction. But he who openly detracts from him while the defamed person is present commits contumely; because then honor is injured together with reputation. Other authors, however, teach that in this case there is both contumely and detraction.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 1, § 1.

³⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1.

³⁸¹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 1.

188. Divisions. Defamation is twofold: formal and material. Formal defamation is had when someone by his words explicitly intends to blacken the reputation of another. But material defamation is present when someone from talkativeness or levity of mind brings forth defamatory words, yet without having an intention of defaming. - Each defamation (formal and material) is again twofold, namely, either direct, when another's vices are narrated, which occurs in four ways, namely: a) by imputing a false crime, b) by exaggerating a true crime, c) by revealing a hidden crime, d) by interpreting a good work sinisterly; or indirect, when another's endowments are diminished, which also happens in four ways: a) by denying the good works of one's neighbor, b) by diminishing those good things, c) by being silent when others praise, d) by praising coldly.³⁸² - These eight modes indeed were expressed by ancient authors in these little verses:

Imputing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil, Who denies or diminishes, keeps silent, or praises faintly.

Modern theologians more briefly distinguish defamation from narration of a true but hidden defect, which they call simply detraction,³⁸³ and lying defamation, which arises from narration of a false crime or defect, which they call calumny.³⁸⁴ We also shall take detraction and calumny in this way in what follows.

Whispering also is reduced to detraction,³⁸⁵ which is detraction by which discord is sown among friends. Therefore whispering adds to detraction the end of sowing discords. E.g., Peter and Paul are friends. Andrew narrates to Peter the vices of Paul, with the intention that the friendship between Peter and Paul may be destroyed. - Whisperers in Sacred Scripture are called double-tongued, because they are accustomed to use a twofold manner of speaking, namely, otherwise before one and otherwise before the other. Whispering is a vice which renders a man not only sinful, but also contemptible and hateful; it destroys at once the reputation and the friendship of one's neighbor. Hence it is deservedly said in Sacred Scripture: The whisperer will defile his own soul, and he will be hated in all things.... The whisperer and the double-tongued man is cursed: for he will disturb many who have peace.³⁸⁶ But St. Thomas says: "And therefore whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved than to be honored."³⁸⁷ - It is self-evident that he by no means commits whispering who destroys a truly harmful or dangerous friendship by lawful means, and indeed even by manifesting the true crimes of either friend.

Rash judgment also is in some way reduced to defamation; special discussion about it will return in the following paragraph.

³⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1 ad 3.

³⁸³ Ehrabschneidung, médisance.

³⁸⁴ Verleumdung, calomnie.

³⁸⁵ Ohrenbläserei, rapport, délation.

³⁸⁶ Eccli. 21, 31 and 28, 15.

³⁸⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2.

189. The generic malice of defamation.

Principle. Unjust defamation (whether it is simple detraction, or calumny) is from its genus a mortal sin both against justice and against charity.

It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. "A good name is better than many riches."³⁸⁸ But unjustly to snatch away riches is a mortal sin. Therefore, a fortiori, the detractor commits a mortal sin who unjustly takes away from his neighbor a good name. - The evil-speaking will not possess the kingdom of God.³⁸⁹ But every defamer is a true evil-speaker.³⁹⁰

2. from the common sense of theologians and Fathers. Thus St. Augustine, that he might deter his guests from this vice, had an inscription placed above the table:

Whoever loves by sayings to gnaw the life of the absent, Let him know that this table is forbidden to him;³⁹¹

and St. Bernard inveighs vehemently and with great eloquence against detractors, saying: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Most savage indeed, surely, which so lethally infects three with one breath," namely, it kills itself, the hearer, and him from whom detraction is made.³⁹²

3. from reason. Man has a strict right to reputation, as is clear from what was said above concerning dominion. But this right is violated through defamation. Wherefore St. Thomas³⁹³ teaches: "To take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things. On account of which it is said:³⁹⁴ Have care for a good name; for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin." "Yet contumely is a graver sin than detraction, insofar as it has greater contempt of one's neighbor; just as also robbery is a graver sin than theft."³⁹⁵

That calumnious defamation is of itself a mortal sin against justice is easily understood. For it causes great injury to one's neighbor, to whom, although innocent, it falsely imputes a crime. Hence calumny is gravely punished not only by God, but also by civil law. The matter is not so clear if it is a question of simple detraction, i.e., the undue revelation of a true crime. Civil laws are accustomed rather rarely to punish revelations of this kind. But from this it does not yet follow that simple detraction is not even punished by God. For there are many things which civil law does not punish (e.g., simple fornications), which nevertheless are grave sins before God.

The reason why even simple detraction is sinful is that by it 1. the right of one's neighbor is violated, 2. the rights of God are usurped, 3. the social good is damaged. - The right of one's neighbor is violated, and therefore justice is truly injured, because a hidden sinner still possesses a good reputation, from which possession he cannot be expelled except by a just title. But the unjust detractor does not have a just title of expelling the hidden sinner from the good reputation possessed; otherwise it would no longer be detraction, but the lawful revelation of another's crime, concerning which below, n. 192. - The rights of God are usurped by the detractor, because it belongs to God alone to judge the living and the dead according to the hidden things of their hearts, all of which indeed will be made manifest in the last universal judgment. - The social good is damaged by the detractor, because from the undue revelation of a hidden fault there are accustomed to arise contentions, quarrels, and very great hatreds.

That unjust defamation also injures charity is almost self-evident, because, as St. Thomas most rightly says: "Reputation is a disposition toward friendship and ill repute toward enmity";³⁹⁶ and: "He who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning the love of one's neighbor."³⁹⁷

³⁸⁸ Prov. 22, 1.

³⁸⁹ Cf. 1 Cor. 6, 10.

³⁹⁰ St. Thomas also cites the text of St. Paul (Rom. 1, 30), where detractors and whisperers are called hateful to God, but many exegetes understand this text otherwise (cf. Cornely, Comm. in ep. ad Rom.).

³⁹¹ In Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 52.

³⁹² Sermo 17 de diversis n. 4-5 (Migne l.c. 183, 585). Cf. also De modo bene vivendi c. 33 (Migne l.c. 184, 1256).

³⁹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 2.

³⁹⁴ Eccli. 41, 15.

³⁹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 3 ad 2.

³⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2 ad 2.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. ad 3.

190. The specific and numerical malice of defamation.

1. Calumny and simple detraction do not differ in moral species (at least mortal species),³⁹⁸ since the end and effect of each is the same, namely, the defamation of one's neighbor. In calumny indeed a lie is added, but this is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless, when it is a question of grave calumny, this must commonly be declared expressly in confession, because then the confessor can more easily know both the gravity of the sin and assign the fitting mode of reparation. Yet there are authors who teach that calumny and detraction differ in species,³⁹⁹ because calumny injures the reputation of one's neighbor in a wholly other way than simple detraction does.

2. Defamation does not seem to acquire a diverse moral species according as this or that crime is unduly narrated (e.g., that someone is an adulterer or a thief). For this difference seems to be only material in the injury of reputation. Hence just as theft does not have diverse species according as someone has stolen, e.g., money or clothes, so also defamation is not specified by the diverse crimes narrated or imputed. Thus Cajetan, Serra, Noldin,⁴⁰⁰ etc. But St. Alphonsus,⁴⁰¹ with many others, judges that in this case several sins are committed; but it is not so certain whether the holy Doctor wished to say that there are several sins numerically, or even specifically distinct. In practice, at least when defamation of this kind has been made in one impulse of passion, it seems to be one sin both in species and in number. Concina also,⁴⁰² who otherwise theoretically asserts that there are several sins in this case, seems to admit this for practice. Hence the confessor would act imprudently who asked from the penitent the diverse matters of detraction, unless this were necessary for judging concerning the gravity of the detraction and concerning the modes of making reparation.⁴⁰³

3. He who detracts from someone before several people seems indeed to commit a graver but single sin. "The reason is, because to detract before several people is only an aggravating circumstance, since the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple."⁴⁰⁴ Hence it suffices to confess: I detracted before several people.

³⁹⁸ Thus also Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1418; Noldin, De praec. n. 648.

³⁹⁹ Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de iust. n. 385; Marc, Instit. mor. I, n. 1195; Mausbach, Kathol. Moraltheol. II, 2, § 57.

⁴⁰⁰ De praeceptis n. 648.

⁴⁰¹ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 48.

⁴⁰² De pecc. in commun. diss. 1, c. 6, n. 21.

⁴⁰³ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 1.

⁴⁰⁴ S. Alph., l.c. n. 49.

191. Rules for judging the gravity of defamation.

The sin of defamation, which is from its genus a mortal sin, becomes venial 1. from imperfection of the act, 2. from lightness of matter, i.e., from the slightness of the damage caused. - From the first reason, detractions are often venial sins on account of inadvertence or an erroneous conscience, since no sins seem to be more subject to lack of consideration and false judgment than those which are born from talkativeness. Moreover, how easily a talkative man finds reasons excusing him from keeping silence concerning the defects of others! Hence innumerable detractions are accustomed to be made even by persons otherwise good. Nevertheless, let the confessor fight with all his strength against this evil manner of acting, mindful of the verses of St. Augustine related above. - From the other reason likewise, many detractions are only venial sins. But in each case it must be weighed, not indeed what vice has been revealed or calumniously imputed, but whether, all the circumstances of the persons and the speech being considered, grave damage has truly been caused or not. Hence:

a) The person speaking is first to be considered; if he is serious and prudent, he harms more than if he is frivolous and talkative. Hence, if talkative women publicly known as liars detract or calumniate, often there is no mortal sin, because no one believes them. Nevertheless, let the confessor not indulge them too much, mindful of that saying: "Calumniate boldly; something always sticks." The truth of this saying, alas, appears too much in newspapers and pamphlets, which often calumniate priests and other religious persons.

b) The injured person and his condition and dignity are then to be considered. For one who is of unimpaired reputation and great dignity suffers much greater detriment from detraction and calumny than a person of low condition. Hence it can happen that grave damage is inflicted if a light sin is narrated concerning some very dignified person, e.g., if someone should say: The Pope is a liar. On the contrary, perhaps slight damage would be caused, and therefore there would be a light sin or no sin, if someone should narrate that a certain soldier known to be undisciplined had entered a brothel.

To manifest natural defects without sufficient reason, e.g., to say that someone is ignorant or illegitimate, ordinarily is not a grave sin, because defects of this kind easily come to the knowledge of others and do not injure reputation as gravely as moral defects. I say, however, that ordinarily it is not a mortal sin; for if a natural defect is very disgraceful and reputation is greatly diminished by its revelation, it is a grave sin to reveal it; e.g., to narrate that a certain pastor is an illegitimate son, which until then had been wholly unknown.⁴⁰⁵

c) The hearers of the defamation likewise are to be considered. For if they are numerous and talkative, grave damage will more easily be present than if they are few and discreet. But theologians do not agree whether it is a grave defamation to manifest to one prudent person a grave defect of another. If this manifestation is made for a reasonable cause, e.g., for seeking counsel, there is no sin; but if it is made from talkativeness, some theologians judge such a manifestation to be a grave sin, because it is truly hard to lose one's reputation with a dignified and prudent person. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion, saying: "Although even if someone speaks evil of an absent person to one alone, he corrupts his reputation not in whole but in part";⁴⁰⁶ but Billuart, who treats this question excellently,⁴⁰⁷ adds: "From the opposite opinion it follows, 1. that a prudent man, to whom you reveal the crime of another, can with equal right reveal it to another prudent man, and he to another, and thus one's neighbor will be gravely defamed among several people without mortal sin. It follows, 2. that he who alone hears a grave detraction could tolerate it as venial, accounting himself prudent, which is against the common opinion." Nevertheless, Cajetan,⁴⁰⁸ Navarrus, Bonacina, and others deny that this is a mortal sin, because grave damage is not thereby caused to the defamed person. The matter is therefore uncertain. But to calumniate in a grave matter even before one person is a mortal sin, because it is a much greater injury to impute a false crime to someone than to manifest a true hidden crime.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 967.

⁴⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 1 ad 2.

⁴⁰⁷ De iure et iust. diss. 15, a. 2, § 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Comm. in II, II, q. 73, a. 2.

192. d) Finally, the motive on account of which the defects of others are manifested is to be considered. If it is a question of calumny, an honest motive can never be present; and therefore, if a grave defect is falsely imputed to another, there is almost always a mortal sin, unless, however, it is certain among the hearers that the calumniator is lying. Wherefore Innocent XI condemned the following propositions (44): "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone, that he may defend his own justice and honor. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable"; and (43): "Why should it not be merely venial to destroy by a false crime the great authority of one detracting, which is harmful to oneself?"⁴⁰⁹

On the revelation of a hidden crime. If it is a question of simple detraction, then there is no sin at all if the manifestation of the defect is made for a proportionately grave cause. Proportionately grave causes are: the public good and a private good, whether this latter is that of the delinquent himself, of the revealer, or of another neighbor.

The public good not only permits, but altogether demands, the manifestation of a harmful defect; e.g., defects ought to be manifested to a canonical visitor; a lustful boy dwelling in some college and seducing others ought to be denounced to the legitimate superior, that harm to many may be forestalled.

The good of the delinquent himself likewise sometimes permits the manifestation of a crime, if, namely, this is necessary for his correction or for forestalling great harm to him; e.g., a girl given to dangerous love affairs, from which she is unwilling to desist, can be denounced to her father, that she may be corrected and her honor preserved.

The good of the revealer excuses the manifestation of a crime if this is necessary for the sake of defense, consolation, or seeking counsel; e.g., a penitent can sometimes confess his sin even if the confessor thereby recognizes the accomplice. In this case, however, it would at least be more perfect to approach another confessor, with whom the reputation of the accomplice would remain unimpaired.⁴¹⁰

Finally, the good of one's neighbor permits or demands the manifestation of some delinquent, as is clear in the example given above of the lustful boy seducing several persons in some college. Thus also it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to inform a betrothed woman of the hidden crimes of the bridegroom, at least those which will probably render the future marriage unhappy.

Question. Is it lawful for a grave reason to manifest a hidden crime, knowledge of which was acquired unjustly (e.g., by reading another's letters)? Lugo⁴¹¹ and St. Alphonsus⁴¹² deny it; Lessius, Concina, and others⁴¹³ affirm it, because to acquire knowledge in this way is indeed illicit, but for a grave reason to use this knowledge once acquired is contrary to no natural or positive law; just as, by an almost parallel case, to acquire money through prostitution is illicit, but to use such money is not of itself illicit. In practice, even the authors of the negative opinion sometimes permit the manifestation.

⁴⁰⁹ Denz. nn. 1194 and 1193.

⁴¹⁰ Cf. below in the tract on penance, concerning the accomplice not to be manifested, III, n. 381.

⁴¹¹ De iust. et iure disp. 14, nn. 100-108; cf. also above, n. 160, concerning excuses from giving testimony, and n. 176.

⁴¹² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 969.

⁴¹³ In S. Alph., l.c.

193. On the spreading of a notorious crime.

A public or notorious crime cannot indeed be revealed, as is self-evident, but it can be spread more and more.

a) A twofold notoriety must be distinguished: of law and of fact. Notoriety of law is had when the crime is established by a sentence of a judge or by the judicial confession of the accused. But notoriety of fact is present when the crime is already known to the greater part of the community (an altogether public or widely known crime), or so many and such talkative persons know it that the whole community will shortly know it (a simply public or notorious crime).⁴¹⁴

b) This distinction having been premised, the following principles seem to be observed:

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 2197.

194. Principle 1. Without sufficient reason and from mere talkativeness or from an itching to narrate bitter things, to speak about the crimes of others, even public ones, is always at least a certain imperfection, which produces nothing good and often much evil; indeed, sometimes it is against charity, but not against justice.

The reason is that, even if he whose crime has become notorious by notoriety either of law or of fact has indeed lost a strict right to reputation, nevertheless he is deservedly and reasonably unwilling that his reputation be destroyed more and more without sufficient advantage either to the speaker, the hearer, or the commonwealth. Hence, e.g., it seems to be a sin against charity when highly defaming condemnatory sentences passed against a delinquent who will no longer bring harm either to his neighbor or to the commonwealth are published in newspapers without sufficient reason. Certainly it is lawful to spread condemnatory sentences or crimes of this kind if certain harms are thereby forestalled. For it is expedient that the wicked not be held as upright. From these things it also follows that it is illicit, without a cause of true utility or necessity, to narrate a crime which in former times was notorious but has now been given over to oblivion and amended; likewise, to spread a crime wholly unknown in one place which is notorious in another distant place. - But a violation of commutative justice, and therefore an obligation of restitution, does not seem to be present in these cases, because he whose crime was once truly public has simply lost the strict right to conceal that crime.⁴¹⁵

Principle 2. Even the deceased retain a right to reputation; hence it is not lawful for historians to reveal and spread their vices and crimes without sufficient reason.

Nevertheless, in our times there is almost always a sufficient reason for narrating all things which are historically true. For history ought to be the teacher of life, the witness of truth, and the vindicator of divine justice; hence it is of great importance that all historical facts be set forth according to the truth of the matter. Wherefore Leo XIII ordered the Pontifical Archives to be accessible to all, so that history might be composed according to the truth of the matter. Yet in writing the history of recent times care must be taken lest survivors who are connected with the deceased person suffer any harm.

⁴¹⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 974.

195. On those cooperating in defamation.

1. He who induces another to detract, e.g., by inquiring about the defects of one's neighbor, by praising and approving the narration, sins in almost the same way as the detractor himself; indeed, if the reputation of one's neighbor is thereby injured among other persons hearing it, he sins against justice and is held to reparation. Hence, e.g., he who in some gathering unduly induces someone publicly to narrate the hidden crimes of one's neighbor is held in solidum to repair the injured reputation and the other damages thence ensuing. It is clear, because he is an unjust cooperator.

2. He who rejoices in, and willingly hears and approves, grave detraction sins gravely against charity; indeed, in affection also against justice, because he consents to the detractor, who assuredly sins against justice. Hence St. Bernard says: "To detract or to hear one detracting, which of these is more damnable, I could not easily say."⁴¹⁶ Thus, at least objectively speaking. Subjectively, however, it is often only a venial sin, because that joy is accustomed to arise more from a certain disordered curiosity than from hatred against one's neighbor. But curiosity is a venial sin.

3. A superior who does not prevent the defamation of his subject (whether active or passive) fails in his office and therefore sins,⁴¹⁷ since he is held to correct the defaming subject, but to protect the defamed subject. The superior in these cases indeed sins against charity and piety, but not against strict justice, because by reason of his office he is not held thus to watch over the temporal good of his subjects. St. Alphonsus⁴¹⁸ calls this opinion perhaps the more probable. Lugo,⁴¹⁹ however, rightly observes that if the defamed person and the defamer are subjects of the same superior, and the defamed person implores the authority of the prelate that his reputation be restored to him, then the latter is held to this from justice, provided he can do it without fear of graver harm.

4. A private person who is displeased by the sin of detraction, but who "from fear or negligence or even a certain shame omits to repel the detractor, indeed sins, but much less than the detractor, and for the most part venially." Thus St. Thomas.⁴²⁰ But he who for a reasonable cause does not correct the detractor in no way sins. Reasonable causes are, e.g., the uselessness of the correction, uncertainty whether the defamation is truly unjust, the great anger of the detractor, etc. The reason is that fraternal correction, which would have to be employed in this case of detraction, does not oblige with great inconvenience, such as would often occur if the detractor were corrected before others. Yet if it is a question of certain calumny, and not of simple detraction, even a private person is more easily bound under grave sin to resist the calumniator; because there can never be a cause excusing calumny, whereas there is often a sufficient reason for speaking about the true crimes of one's neighbor. He who hears an unnecessary narration concerning the crimes of others should at least show displeasure by his countenance; for "a sad countenance ... dissipates a detracting tongue."⁴²¹

⁴¹⁶ De consid. l. 2, c. 13 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 757).

⁴¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 4.

⁴¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 980.

⁴¹⁹ De iust. et iure disp. 14, n. 131 sqq.

⁴²⁰ L.c.

⁴²¹ Prov. 25, 23.

196. On the restitution of reputation.

1. The obligation of the defamer. An unjust defamer (whether he is a detractor or a calumniator) is held from justice to repair: a) as soon as possible, the injured reputation; b) all material damages which he foresaw, at least in a confused manner, would follow from the defamation.

For the defamer is an unjust damager. But an unjust damager is held to repair all damages culpably caused and foreseen at least in a confused manner, as is clear from what was said above, n. 93. The former obligation, namely, to repair the injured reputation, is a strictly personal obligation, and therefore does not pass to the heirs of the defamer.⁴²² But the other obligation is rather real and, when the defamer has died, falls upon his heirs, yet not beyond the goods received from the inheritance. Each of these obligations is grave if the defamation itself was gravely culpable; otherwise it is light. It must be recalled, however, that defamation does not become gravely culpable from the nature of the crime revealed or imputed, but from the evil effect ensuing and foreseen. Hence if someone, e.g., by unjustly narrating that a certain man is talkative, thereby brings it about that the office of secretary which was about to be conferred upon him is denied to him, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, provided it was foreseen at least in a confused manner.

Since the defamer is an unjust damager, the same principles concerning the obligation of reparation must be applied in defamation as in damaging. From these is resolved the controversy whether the defamer is held to repair the reputation not only among those to whom he himself narrated the hidden vices, but also among others to whom the same vices were afterward narrated by them. The answer is: If the defamer could and ought to have foreseen such spreading, and if reparation is morally possible for him, he is held; otherwise not. Yet there are authors who excuse the first defamer from this obligation, since he is not always the cause, but only the occasion, that his defamation is propagated further.⁴²³

⁴²² S. Alph., ibid. n. 996.

⁴²³ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 991.

197. 2. The manner of repairing the effects of defamation.

Reparation must be made in one way by a calumniator and in another way by a detractor.

The calumniator is held openly and effectively to retract his calumnious lies, "confessing that he spoke falsely,"⁴²⁴ unless sufficient excusing causes are present, concerning which there will immediately be discussion. - Hence he is held to say that he narrated something false; if he calumniated in public newspapers, he is held also to sing a recantation in the newspapers.

The detractor indeed cannot properly say that he lied, but he can and ought to excuse the crime revealed by all lawful means by which he can; he ought also deliberately to praise and treat honorably before others him from whom he detracted.

⁴²⁴ The Angelic Doctor briefly embraces the diverse modes of repairing defamation in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, where he seems also to teach that the defamer ought to compensate with money for the injured reputation if another restitution is impossible. St. Alphonsus holds the contrary opinion as the more probable, Theol. mor. l. 3, nn. 627 and 1000.

198. 3. Causes excusing from the reparation of reputation:

a) If no grave defamation actually followed from the unjust speech, e.g., because no one believed it.

b) If the defamation has already been given over to oblivion by the lapse of time.⁴²⁵ It is self-evident.

c) If the defamed person has legitimately remitted the reparation either expressly or tacitly. Compensation can be held as remission, i.e., if the defamed person has also defamed the defamer, and neither wishes to repair the injured reputation. A man placed in public office often cannot remit defamation, and especially calumny, which has gravely injured not only his person but also his state; e.g., a priest, magistrate, etc., cannot gratuitously remit calumnies, because otherwise their state and also the public good would be injured.

d) If reparation is morally or physically impossible, e.g., if the hearers of the detraction are unknown or cannot be approached, if the crime has become public by another way, or if reparation cannot be made without far graver damage to oneself. Certainly the defamer (and especially the calumniator) is held to repair the injured reputation even with great damage; but nevertheless, if that damage far exceeds the harm caused to the defamed person, the latter is judged to renounce his right.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1438.

⁴²⁶ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 1002.

199. Notions. With respect to acts of the mind not externally manifested and concerning the evil of one's neighbor, it is useful to distinguish four degrees, which are: doubt, suspicion, rash opinion, and rash judgment.

Rash doubt is the suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another without sufficient reason.

Rash suspicion (ungerechter Verdacht) is a certain inclination of judgment concerning the evil of another without sufficient reason.

Rash opinion is a probable and non-firm assent of the mind concerning the evil of another without sufficient motive. - There is not so great a difference between rash opinion and rash suspicion; for suspicion is nothing other than a weak opinion.⁴²⁷

Rash judgment (ungerechtes, freventliches Urteil) is the firm assent of the mind concerning the vice of another without sufficient reason.

These four acts of the mind are sinful for this reason, that they proceed not so much from an objective consideration of the matter as rather from an evil will bending the intellect without sufficient objective motives. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "Rash suspicion [the same holds for rash judgment] occurs from three things: in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very fact, conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others, according to that saying: A fool walking in the way, since he himself is foolish, judges all to be fools.⁴²⁸ - In another way it arises from this, that someone is badly disposed toward another; for when someone contemns or hates another, or is angry with or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evil things concerning him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. - In a third way it arises from long experience...."⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 7, a. 2.

⁴²⁸ Eccles. 10, 3.

⁴²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 3.

200. Moral malice. Rash judgment properly so called is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

I say: rash judgment properly so called, i.e., insofar as it includes firm assent and is distinguished from rash suspicion and opinion. For theologians dispute greatly whether rash suspicion and opinion also are from their genus mortal sins. Báñez, Sylvius, Medina, and others⁴³⁰ are cited for the affirmative opinion; Cajetan, Ledesma, Navarrus, Lessius, and others stand for the negative. This controversy is theoretical rather than practical, because in practice it is difficult to distinguish between rash judgment and rash opinion. Billuart treats this controversy excellently, as also the matter of rash judgment in general, thinking that rash suspicion is more probably a mortal sin from its genus.⁴³¹ - At least that rash judgment is from its genus a mortal sin is proved from the fact that everyone has a strict right to a good reputation and the esteem of others so long as he is not proved evil. But he who rashly judges concerning a vice of his neighbor acts against that right and unjustly esteems his neighbor lightly. Nor let anyone say that justice, since it concerns exterior things and operations, cannot be injured by a judgment which is an interior act. For justice is truly injured by those interior acts which of themselves are ordered toward just or unjust external things and operations. Thus the will to steal is an act of injustice, but the will to restore is an act of justice.

Bourdaloue⁴³² demonstrates excellently the unlawfulness of rash judgment, teaching, with the Angelic Doctor preceding him, that three things are required for lawfully rendering a judgment: authority in the judge, accurate knowledge of the case, and perfect freedom from prejudices. But in rash judgment legitimate authority is lacking, since private men are so often deterred in Sacred Scripture from rendering judgment: "Judge not, and you shall not be judged; condemn not, and you shall not be condemned."⁴³³ Accurate knowledge of the matter is lacking; otherwise there would no longer be a rash judgment but a just one. Freedom from prejudices is lacking, since judgments of this kind are accustomed to arise from envy, hatred, etc., as St. Thomas explained above.

All rash judgments are of the same moral species, because they all violate the same right, namely, the right to good esteem. Hence the particular matter of a rash judgment need not be set forth in confession.

⁴³⁰ The Angelic Doctor says: "From this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he injures and contemns him" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 4). But he who contemns another and injures him commits a sin which is from its genus mortal.

⁴³¹ L.c.

⁴³² Carême, "Sermon sur le jugement téméraire." St. Thomas had already taught the same, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 2.

⁴³³ Luke 6, 37; cf. Matt. 7, 1 sqq.; Rom. 2, 1; Jas. 2, 4.

201. Required conditions. For rash judgment to be a mortal sin in the individual case, three things are required: 1. that it be perfectly deliberate; 2. that it be fully rash; 3. that it concern a grave vice of one's neighbor.

Because the first condition, namely, perfect deliberation, is lacking, he does not sin gravely who is ignorant or does not advert that he is judging from insufficient signs concerning the existence of a grave vice in his neighbor. Hence in persons of timorous conscience, who are not blinded by hatred nor are accustomed to consent firmly to suspicions or judgments of this kind, grave sin occurs most rarely in this matter.

Because the second condition, namely, full rashness, is lacking, those judgments concerning a grave vice of one's neighbor which rest upon true, although insufficient, indications are not mortal sins. For lawfully forming a judgment, however, indications inducing moral, but not absolute, certitude suffice. Since no one is presumed evil, indications ought to be interpreted in the better part, unless all the circumstances compel the contrary. Hence, e.g., if a lascivious young man has been seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl in a somewhat dark place, there is a sufficient indication for judging that some evil lies beneath; on the contrary, if the same young man is seen conversing with a girl in an open place and at midday, there is not yet a sufficient indication for suspecting some evil.

Because the third condition, namely, grave matter, is lacking, all judgments, even rash and deliberate ones, which concern vices not so disgraceful, are not gravely evil. Grave matter in rash judgment, as also in detraction, is only that which, considering the quality of the persons and the fact, is very disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good esteem of one's neighbor. Wherefore, e.g., rashly to think that some unruly maidservant is also a liar is not a grave sin; but rashly to judge that some bishop is a liar is a mortal sin.⁴³⁴

Note. 1. Although it is not lawful rashly to suspect or judge that one's neighbor is vicious, nevertheless it is not necessary to hold him positively good. Hence it is lawful to judge that he can become evil, and therefore to forestall damage which perhaps could come from others. Therefore it is lawful, e.g., to lock up money, to carry defensive weapons, to bar doors, etc.

2. A rash judgment which is conceived only interiorly and in no way manifested exteriorly is rarely a mortal sin, because the three conditions enumerated above are rarely present. But when a rash judgment is manifested to others, it will more easily be a mortal sin, because then the character of defamation is added.

⁴³⁴ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 7, a. 2.

Nota that suspicion, doubt, opinion, and judgment, where the evil of one's neighbor is in question, are often taken as one and the same by the learned and the unlearned. The reason of this confusion is, because all these acts are about the evil of one's neighbor and from insufficient indications, insofar as they are rash, as they are taken here.

However, if we speak strictly, all these acts are distinguished from one another. For doubt is, when the mind is moved toward either side, but assents to neither, and remains suspended between both. Suspicion is, when the intellect, receding from the doubt or mean, is more inclined to the assent of one side, yet so that it does not yet assent. Some do not distinguish it from opinion except by more and less, and will it to be a weak opinion or one with great misgiving ; opinion however is assent to one side with fear of the opposite side. Judgment is certain and firm assent to one side, without fear of the opposite side.

We treat here of rash suspicion insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, and the principal question is whether it is of its genus mortal sin, so that in the individual it is always mortal when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor. There is difficulty also about the mind of Saint Thomas. That we may begin from the more certain,

I say 1°: Rash judgment is of its genus mortal sin. This is certain and common with the Author^{330 330} Hic q. 60, a. 3, o.

Proof. 1° from Scripture. Matt., VII, 1, it is said : Judge not, that ye be not judged. Luke, VI, 37 : Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. To the Romans, XIV, 4 : Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?

Proof. 2°. Rash judgment is not without injury and contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore is against justice and charity³³¹. Therefore it is of its genus mortal sin. ³³¹ Ibid.

It is confirmed. Everyone has the right that a good estimate be had of him by others, so long as he is not proved wicked. Now he who judges rashly of the evil of his neighbor acts against this right. Therefore he is against justice. Also against charity : 1° because against that principle of charity and right reason :

« What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it cannot be that he who thus judges of his neighbor be well disposed toward him.

I say 2°: It is more probable that rash suspicion concerning the evil of one's neighbor, insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, is of its genus mortal sin, and accordingly in the individual always mortal sin, when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor.

Proof. That is mortal sin of its genus which is contrary to justice and charity. Now such is rash suspicion. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. 1° Because, as Saint Thomas says³³², it is not without contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore does him an injury. 2° Everyone has the right to be esteemed upright by others, so long as his malice does not sufficiently appear. Now he acts against this right who rashly suspects evil of him, or doubts of his uprightness. Therefore against justice. Also against charity : 1° because he acts against this first principle of all social life : « What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it can scarcely be that he who rashly suspects evil of his neighbor be well affected toward him. Therefore. ³³² Ibid., ad 2 and a. 4, o.

The adversaries answer, and it is their chief foundation, that there is indeed injury and contempt, but incomplete ; because suspicion is something incomplete in the genus of judgment.

On the contrary. Grant that contempt is incomplete in the genus of judgment, thence it is not proved that this incomplete contempt is not mortal of its genus ; because, although it is incomplete in the genus of judgment, it is nevertheless complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act. So, v. g., fully voluntary doubt in matters of faith is an incomplete judgment and incomplete contempt in the genus of judgment ; but, because it is complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act, it is sufficient for mortal sin. So again detraction concerning one's neighbor before a single upright man only is incomplete contempt, and yet, according to the highly probable opinion, it is mortal sin of its genus. Or, if you will, detraction before ten is less complete contempt than detraction before twenty, and yet in both cases it is mortal sin of its genus.

Proof. 2°, and this chief refuge of the adversaries is more strongly shaken. Rash suspicion of the gravest evils of one's neighbor is in the individual mortal sin. Therefore rash suspicion of its genus is mortal sin. — The consequence is plain ; because what is venial of its genus, however much it be increased within its species, remains venial, nor becomes mortal unless by some circumstance it be drawn to another species, as theologians commonly teach after D. Thomas, Ia 2ae, q. 88, a. 5. — Proof. of the antecedent. Rash suspicion gravely contemns one's neighbor in the grave case and inflicts on him a grave injury. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. No one exists who does not think himself gravely contemned and suffering grave injury, if someone without cause suspects of him, or even doubts, that he is a sodomite, incestuous with his mother, a heretic, a magician, a sorcerer, etc., so that he would rather lose a notable sum of money than have such a suspicion held of him. I appeal to the very adversaries as witnesses.

There remains the difficulty about the mind of D. Thomas.

The conclusion is therefore proved from D. Thomas, or rather the argument already made from him in the prior proofs is renewed. For, according to Saint Thomas here a. 3, c, rash judgment is mortal sin of its genus, because it is with contempt of one's neighbor. Now, according to the same holy Doctor in the reply to the second objection and in the body of the next article, suspicion also is with contempt of one's neighbor : « From this very fact, he says, that anyone holds an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore does him an injury » ; so that the holy Doctor speaks in exactly the same way of both. Therefore.

Serra answers that Saint Thomas speaks of suspicion in the second degree, in which it is taken for certain judgment.

On the contrary. Saint Thomas speaks of that suspicion of which he speaks in the argument to which he responds. But in the argument to which he responds, he speaks of suspicion as distinguished from certain judgment. It is plain to one reading the argument, which is thus : « By illicit judgment some injury is done to one's neighbor. But evil suspicion consists in the mere opinion of a man, and thus does not seem to pertain to the injury of another. Therefore the judgment of suspicion is not illicit. »

You will object : Saint Thomas here a. 3, c., distinguishing three degrees of suspicion, says : « The first degree indeed is, that a man from light indications begin to doubt of the goodness of someone, and this is venial and light sin ; it pertains, says Augustine, to human temptation, without which this life is not led!...³³³ » ³³³ Aug., in Ps. LXX enarr., n. 3.

I answer. Saint Thomas, like Saint Augustine on whom he is founded, is speaking of sudden suspicion not fully deliberate. Which is plain first from his very words : « That, he says, a man begin to doubt » ; for no one is said to begin to doubt who after full advertence deliberately doubts and continues to doubt, especially of the grave evil of his neighbor. Second it is plain from the reason he adduces from Augustine, namely that such suspicion « pertains to human temptation, without which this life is not led. » Moreover, rash suspicion fully deliberate of the grave evil of one's neighbor pertains not to human but to diabolical temptation, as Bannez well notes ; and it is false that the life of many is not led without such suspicions.

To be noted for practice.

That suspicion or rash judgment be mortal sin in the individual, three things are required : First, that it be perfectly deliberate ; second, that it be fully rash ; third, that it be concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor : if any one of these is wanting, there will be only venial sin.

As to the first, Sylvius notes, after Lessius and others, that for mortal sin in suspicious or rash judgment it does not suffice to suspect or judge howsoever deliberately ; but that you must advert to and know, or at least doubt that you judge or suspect, from insufficient signs and concerning a grave matter ; otherwise, he says, the judgment will not be voluntary, at least as regards its being rash or concerning a grave matter. This indeed I admit as regards the condition of the grave matter, not only on account of the said reason, but because then you do not gravely contemn your neighbor. As to the insufficiency of the indications truly, it must, I think, be restricted thus : unless, blinded voluntarily by malevolence, envy, hatred, or similar passion, regarding the insufficiency of the indications you neglect to examine them and precipitate your judgment ; for then you virtually advert to it, since you ought and can advert. And besides, otherwise there would scarcely ever be any rash judgment, since a man ill-disposed toward another easily persuades himself that the indications he has of the evil of an enemy are sufficient.

As to the second, rightly did I say that rash judgment is not mortal sin unless it be fully rash, since its whole malice arises from rashness : so that, if it were in no way rash, that is, if altogether sufficient indications were present, it would by no means be sin ; for then it would be prudent and reasonable judgment, nor through it would injury be inflicted on one's neighbor. For the neighbor has lost his right of reputation and good estimation with respect to him whose guilt is proved by sufficient indications.

But if the indications are not indeed altogether sufficient, yet approach near sufficiency, neither will it be mortal sin ; because great probability does not much differ from moral certitude : whence there will not be grave rashness, nor consequently grave injury.

And because to judge with certainty is somewhat more than simply to opine, to opine than to suspect, and to suspect than to doubt, therefore greater indications are required for judging than for suspecting, and for suspecting than for doubting.

As to the third, note that grave evil in this matter, as in the matter of detraction, is that whole and only thing which, the quality of persons and fact being considered, is highly disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor, whether sin or not ; because the malice of this sin consists in contempt of one's neighbor.

Although therefore mortal sin per se is grave matter, and venial sin light matter, nevertheless per accidens, from the quality of persons or of fact, the contrary often happens. For there are some who are not defamed among men even for certain mortal sins, nor are they ashamed themselves, but sometimes are counted to their praise, v. g., dueling or fornication with respect to a soldier, drunkenness with respect to a commoner in these parts, concerning which if you judge rashly you do not sin mortally, because with respect to them it is not grave matter. On the contrary there are some who are much contemned for venial sins, or even for things that are not sins : as if you judge rashly of a bishop or the supreme Pontiff that he is habitually a liar.

[On the contrary, S. Ligorius³³⁴ holds suspicion to be only venial sin of its genus. « Suspicion, he says, and rash doubt seem of their genus to be sins only venial, especially if they proceed from error of the intellect, whereby the indications are apprehended as sufficient. So Layman³³⁵, from Saint Thomas..., against many who think it mortal. The reason is, because commonly suspicion is only a kind of incitement to assent ; for there remains in the mind of the one suspecting in some way a good estimation of his neighbor. Therefore no grave injury is done him, since he is not wholly cast down from possession of a good name ; yet some injury is done, because he is rashly doubted. » I said, « especially if from error », because such, since it is not per se voluntary, nor pertinacious, merits excuse ; if truly from malevolence you persist in grave suspicion, it will be mortal, as Lessius etc. teach, on account of the gravity of the injury. However the same holds of positive doubting arising from malevolence, without cause ; for it proceeds from contempt of the other, and consequently is reckoned grave injury. »] ³³⁴ Lib. IV, n. 963. ³³⁵ N. 466, 3°.

With S. Ligori Gury agrees in this³³⁶. ³³⁶ Ubi supra, n. 964.

The same Doctor³³⁷ against Cajetan, Navarrus, and several others saying that suspicion howsoever rash can never reach mortal sin, holds as more probable the opposite opinion, « if suspicion or doubt were made without indications concerning most grave sins, as to suspect a pious religious that he is a heretic..., or a man commonly held as Catholic that he is a Jew or atheist. The reason, because perchance greater injury is inflicted on them by suspecting such things, than if a certain judgment were had of them concerning ordinary grave delicts ». And this accords with what Billuart said above concerning the third. ³³⁷

Thence it appears that disputants among themselves, whether evil suspicion be mortal or venial sin of its genus, agree in deciding that it can reach mortal sin, for diverse reasons, namely either from its nature, when grave matter occurs, or from aggravating circumstances. This must be retained, as regards practice, whatever be judged of the speculative question, about which it is licit for each to abound in his own sense.

[Note what S. Ligorius warns³³⁸ : « In this matter let the confessor observe that many simple persons accuse themselves that they judged rashly. He must bring it about that they know : 1° when sufficient grounds are present for judging thus of some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore not sin ; 2° very often, such judgments are those they are bound to hold, lest some sin be impeded, v. g. lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by consorting with men, and other things of this kind. Only let care be taken lest suspicions of this kind be communicated to others without necessity. »] ³³⁸ Homo apost., XI, 2.

A doubt can be interpreted in the better part in two ways: one way, negatively, by not declining into the worse; the other way, positively, by declining into the better.

I say 1°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor must be interpreted in the better part negatively. It follows from the preceding article and from the same principle.

Proof. By this very fact that someone has an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he despises him and injures him, as was said; which is illicit. Now he who does not interpret a doubt about the evil of his neighbor in the better part at least negatively, but declines into the worse, has an evil opinion of his neighbor without sufficient cause, since the reasons for doubting lie on both sides, and are therefore insufficient for suspecting or opining in the worse direction. Therefore.

The same is proved by all that we have said against suspicion and rash judgment.

I say 2°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor are not always to be interpreted positively in the better part, but only in certain cases.

Proof. 1° because the precept of judging one's neighbor well in doubt is affirmative, like the precept of honoring or loving him, which does not bind always.

Proof. 2°. Either there are sufficient reasons for doubting, or there are not. If the first, we can remain in doubt, suspending judgment and not declining to either side; because the doubt is not rash, but reasonable. If the second, the doubt must be rejected at once, because it is rash. But that is not our case; for we are dealing with a founded and reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless — and this is the second part of the conclusion — supposing that, with the matter doubtful on both sides, some act must be elicited concerning the goodness or malice of one's neighbor, that act must be done in the better part, and consequently the doubt must be interpreted positively in the better part; and the reasons of the first conclusion prove this directly.

You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. Exod. xx, 16. - You shall not say false testimony. Matth. xix, 18

This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits chiefly and primarily that false testimony be said, both in judgment and outside judgment; indirectly and secondarily, that the reputation and honor of one's neighbor be injured. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands, according to the Roman Catechism on the 8th precept, n. 2, "that, simulation and deceits having been removed, we measure our words and deeds by simple truth." Wherefore by this precept there is prohibited: 1st. perjury against one's neighbor; 2nd. lying; 3rd. detraction; 4th. contumely; 5th. rash judgment and injurious suspicion. Of each, except perjury, concerning which enough was said in the second precept, one must speak.

A lie is speech against the mind, or, as St. Augustine says, it is "to say something knowingly otherwise than we think." If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation, which again is called hypocrisy when someone simulates the person of another, e.g., when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. - For a true lie it is not required that there be expressly the intention of deceiving, for as the same holy Doctor says: "Everyone who lies speaks against that which he thinks in his soul, with the will of deceiving." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 110, art. 1. - St. Augustine, Enchir., chap. 18 and 22.

A threefold kind of lie is distinguished: 1st. harmful, by which unjust harm is inflicted upon someone; 2nd. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3rd. jocose, which is said from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

But mental restriction differs greatly from a lie; it is an act of the mind turning or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one; whence it happens that they are not true unless they are taken according to the sense which they have in the mind of the speaker. - But a twofold restriction is distinguished, namely purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is called properly mental; and broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from adjuncts.

I say 1st. A lie properly so called is certainly something intrinsically evil, but does not exceed venial sin if it is jocose, or even officious; but if it is harmful, it will be a light or grave sin according to the quantity of harm inflicted. The reason for the first is both because it is repugnant to right reason to use signs of speech against their natural end and institution, and to wish, as it were, to destroy the unity of man; and because, the liceity of lying having been admitted, the order of society, which rests upon mutual commerce and trust, would be altogether subverted. But the reason for the second is taken from the common consent of theologians, from the persuasion of the faithful, and from the very nature of that repugnance with right reason, which certainly does not appear grave. Finally, the reason for the third is that in a harmful lie, besides the virtue of truthfulness, justice is injured, which obliges under grave or light matter according to the harm that is inflicted. - Cf. St. Augustine, books On Lying and Against Lying. - St. Thomas, loc. cit., art. 3 and 4.

I say 2nd. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, because, as is clear from its definition, this would be simply to lie. But sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, that is improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; besides, for the good of society it is required that there be a licit means of hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is available besides broad or improperly mental restriction. I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would redound to the greatest harm of human society. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de secund. praec. Decal., nn. 151 and 152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. They certainly err who place the malice of a lie either solely or primarily in this, that the right of the hearers is injured. For from this it would be deduced that God, against whom properly we have no right, could sometimes lie, which would plainly destroy our faith. Cf. Mazella, de Virt. inf., n. 698.

2nd. Figurative, ironic, and hyperbolic expressions are not lies, which as such can easily be, and usually are, taken by hearers. Much less parables, which Christ himself so frequently used.

3rd. They do not lie who write fables, or from jest openly say false things, because then words are put forth and understood with another superadded signification, but one easily admitted by those conversing.

4th. He who uses broad mental restriction is not without fault: 1st. if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2nd. if the one asking has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 154.

5th. Yet all public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use restriction of this kind, such as secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has the office and reason of hiding some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from it in society.

6th. Likewise a servant, by order of the master, can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by usage to signify that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Attend nevertheless to the custom of places. Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 165.

7th. It is licit to add an oath to a broad and not strictly mental restriction, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 151.

Detraction is the unjust violation of reputation, or the blackening or diminution of the good estimation which others have concerning the life and morals of an absent neighbor. - It is said, of an absent neighbor, both because generally he who is detracted from is physically absent, and because if he is present, the words are not properly directed to him, and he is considered as if absent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if the violation of reputation follows from the attributing of a false crime. Each can be done in a twofold way: 1st. directly, if a false crime is imputed, if a true one is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister sense; 2nd. indirectly, namely by denying the good works of a neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly.

I say 1st. Every detraction is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to justice, which obliges under grave matter; and since the goods of reputation are better than goods of fortune, detraction of itself is a graver sin than theft. But the gravity or lightness of detraction is not to be measured precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor, but chiefly from the gravity of the harm which the neighbor can suffer from it. Wherefore, to know in a particular case the gravity of the sin, one must attend to the quality both of the person detracting and of the person injured. The reason is that greater or lesser trust will be given according to the greater or lesser authority of the one speaking, and greater or lesser detriment to reputation will follow according to the measure of the greater or lesser estimation which the injured person enjoys. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 967.

I say 2nd. Although in no case whatsoever is it ever licit to attribute a false crime to another, since a lie is something intrinsically evil, nevertheless, from a just cause, it is licit to manifest the hidden crime of another even with loss of his reputation; because circumstances can be present in which the right of the neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right, and then neither would charity urge, because it does not oblige with grave inconvenience, nor justice, because a right against a prevailing right is not given. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 968 and 972.

I say 3rd. The detractor is bound in justice, as far as can be done, both to repair the reputation unjustly taken away and to compensate all temporal harms arising from defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted by the violation of a strict right, which ought to be restored in full. But the reason for the second is that all harms arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as to their efficacious cause. Notice nevertheless that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal, but the obligation of repairing harms which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 991 and 996.

I say 4th. Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. For the calumniator is bound to retract what he said, and indeed in itself even with loss of his own reputation if reparation cannot otherwise be made; because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the latter ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is about to suffer on account of this. But the simple detractor cannot retract what he said, because thus he would lie; wherefore in another way, as far as is in him, he ought to restore the reputation, saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only do those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying, Prov. xiv, 22: "They err who work evil." But often that manner does not suffice among intelligent and astute persons, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, since it is not asserted openly to be false. Therefore then the detractor, being silent about what was said, when occasion is given, with dexterity and truth ought to praise and honor him from whom he detracted. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 992.

Question 1. Is it grave detraction to reveal to one prudent man some mortal sin of someone, which indeed greatly dishonors him, but does not have a special malice?

Response. Negatively, probably, and the reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost a good name only before one or another person. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 973.

Question 2. Do detractions differ in species in matters diverse in species?

Response. Negatively, probably, because although such detractions are distinguished materially in species, nevertheless morally they injure one reputation of a man, no otherwise than contumelies are of the same species on account of the unity of honor against which they tend. Wherefore the confessor ought not to inquire concerning what matters the penitent detracted about, not only because the obligation is not established, but also because from knowledge of the different matter of detraction he could easily come to knowledge of the very person who was detracted from, and thus the confession itself would not be immune from the vice of detraction. Indeed, because it is also probable that detractions concerning different matters, if they are not otherwise interrupted, are one sin in number, the confessor ought to abstain from inquiring not only what the matters of detraction were, but also whether they were many. - Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 265. - Baller., note (a), p. 429.

Question 3. Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, but living in the same place where the crime is already public?

Response. Affirmatively, at least without grave sin, because reputation lost in relation to the community in which one lives, through publicity of the crime, whether this is of law or of fact, can no longer have grave harm inflicted upon it. But if it is asked whether a crime already public in one place can be revealed where the crime is still unknown, the response is that there is much dispute among theologians; but according to St. Alphonsus and not a few others, probably it is not mortal, whether the crime is manifested where it will easily and shortly be made public, or whether it concerns places to which the divulgation either will never come or will not come except after a long time. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 974 and 975; and Hom. Ap., n. 12. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 14, sect. 5.

Question 4. What must be thought concerning the custom prevailing among us of divulging the whole life of those who are to be elected to the highest Magistracies or as Legislators?

Response. It is certainly licit, whether justice is considered or charity, to manifest those crimes which, even if hidden, render the candidate less fit for the office into which he is to be elected, both because the common good ought to prevail over the private, and because according to the mind of the Constitution by which we are governed and of universal custom, those candidates are judged to yield concerning their own right as soon as they consent to popular election. But in this matter there ought to be a limit, and accordingly those are to be condemned who, either from an itch of divulging everything or carried away by party zeal, touch upon even those crimes whose knowledge contributes nothing to the public good. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 10, n. 139.

Question 5. Does he sin gravely who reports grave and hidden sins of another only as heard from others, e.g., if he says: it is reported, they narrate, I have heard this or that about such a one?

Response. He certainly sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports these things in such a way that others will with reason believe them, e.g., if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of trust, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause for believing the evil; but otherwise if probably belief is not given to the words, because then no infamy will arise from them. But if he reports things heard before those who probably will believe them from levity or malice of their own, he does indeed sin against charity, because each person is bound under grave matter from charity to remove an occasion of harm to another when he easily can, but not against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the harm. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 977.

Question 6. How do those hearing detraction sin?

Response. Just as those who so listen that they add new stimuli to detractors contract the whole malice of detraction, and therefore injure justice, so those who, when they notice detraction, depart, cut off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, are altogether excused, according to that saying, Prov. xxv, 23: "A sad face dissipates a detracting tongue." - But, outside this twofold case, a distinction must be made between private persons and superiors. A private person for the most part is excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, from shame or fear or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided that he does not rejoice in it, nor that besides infamy another harm is added. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction will be of profit; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can rightly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. But a superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because there rests upon him a special obligation of correcting the detractor, or of obviating the harm of the defamed subject. But more probably he does not sin against justice, neither the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another who is not a subject; nor the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent upon him in justice to attend to the temporal good of a subject. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 979, 980 and 981.

Question 7. What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Response. The following are commonly admitted: 1st. if the offense which you revealed to one or more persons has become public by another way, or if the reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., by the sentence of a judge, etc.; 2nd. if it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been effaced by the passage of time or by oblivion; 3rd. if restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life, because life is a good of a higher order; likewise if the restitution of reputation is of much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honorable man and especially very useful to the public good or to religion; 4th. if the reparation is morally impossible on account of excessive distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction, e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preconceived opinion; 5th. if it is judged that belief was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens rather often when detraction is done in the heat of anger; 6th. if the defamed person has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal or harm either common or to his own, etc., e.g., if it concerns the infamy of a priest, magistrate, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 997 and 998.

Question 8. Is he who is only materially a calumniator, namely because he manifested a false crime which he had thought to be true, bound to restore reputation with danger of losing his own?

Response. A material calumniator, when the error has been discovered, is held to restitution, but not so strictly as he who made the calumny through formal injury: for the latter is held even with detriment to his own reputation, even equal detriment; the former not likewise, but only insofar as he can without his own notable inconvenience. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 993.

Question 9. Is there an obligation of restoring reputation from simple detraction only materially unjust, e.g., if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Response. Affirmatively, as soon as he adverts to the injustice, in the same way as one who sets fire to another's house without formal fault is held to extinguish the fire as soon as he adverts, if he conveniently can; otherwise the harm which follows from it will be imputed to him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 10. Is one who defames bound to restore reputation even before those who received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Response. Negatively, if he did not foresee, not even confusedly, the propagation of his detraction, and a fortiori if before or after the violation of reputation he demanded secrecy; for then he is not the true and unjust cause of the extension of the harm. - But otherwise it must be said if he detracted for this reason, that he might lead the hearers to repeat the infamy, because then they are to be judged as an instrumental cause which the detractor uses. - But if there was indeed foresight of the propagation, but not an express and positive intention of harming by the help of the hearers, according to St. Alphonsus, more truly he is held, because foresight alone suffices that the detractor be called the true cause of the whole harm. Nevertheless, he seems able to be excused from such a burden not only by reason of moral impossibility, which is often present, but also because after all the true cause of so great a harm is the action freely placed by the hearers. Besides, according to the testimony of Cardinal de Lugo, the practice of confessors is that such a burden is not imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 991. - Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 15, nn. 15 and 16.

Question 11. Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation, and does not wish to restore it?

Response. Many theologians deny, but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus; because you are not held to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 999.

Contumely is an unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and aware. But honor is the external testimony of estimation which is had internally concerning someone's excellence. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image and through something else in which he is represented in some way. Contumely can be done either negatively, through omission of honor due here and now; or positively, namely by words, deeds, or signs of contempt. When it is done by words, it receives various names, which often are used indiscriminately, yet differ somewhat among themselves. For it is called reviling if it casts up natural defects; contumely simply so called, if moral defects; reproach, if it objects neediness, baseness of lineage or condition. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 72, art. 1, ad 3.

To contumely are referred: 1st. mockery, by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2nd. derision, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; they differ from it because contumely intends to depress honor, but these intend to cause shame and embarrassment. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 75, art. 1.

I say. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus, and induces a strict obligation of reparation. The reason for the first is both because in the estimation of men honor is often reputed more than reputation, and accordingly contumely is a graver sin than detraction, and because it is said, Matth. v, 22: "Whoever shall say to his brother ... Fool, shall be guilty of Gehenna of fire." But the reason for the second is that an injured and reparable right ought to be repaired. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 966.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Honor publicly taken away by contumely must be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who asks pardon in the name of the dishonorer. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 984.

2nd. That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the offended person, and accordingly if the one who dishonored was a superior, it will suffice if he greets the dishonored person or shows benevolence to him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 986.

3rd. If the dishonored person has taken vengeance, e.g., by striking, wounding the other, etc., for the most part no further satisfaction is required for honor; because the former seems to accept vengeance as satisfaction, while the latter, by not resisting, seems to confess his own fault and his estimation concerning the other. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 989.

4th. In practice it is many times expedient that the confessor omit warning a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the warning will not be profitable; or if he thinks that the one who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be affected with greater shame, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 988.

Rash judgment is a firm assent formed from slight indications concerning some sin or defect of a neighbor; but rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of a neighbor from an insufficient reason, or is a begun assent by which someone judges from an insufficient reason that probably some foundation for thinking badly of a neighbor lies hidden. Finally, doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself to neither side concerning the honesty of a neighbor.

I say 1st. Rash judgment is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that each person has the right to good estimation of himself before individuals, nor ought he to be presumed evil until it is proved. - But for the gravity of rash judgment there is required: 1st. that it be firm, or without doubt; 2nd. that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3rd. that it be in a grave matter concerning a determined and known person; 4th. that it rest upon indications which are known as slight and unfit for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 962.

I say 2nd. Rash suspicion and doubt are venial only from their genus. The reason is that on account of a weak and easily movable adherence they ordinarily bring only slight harm to a neighbor, since they do not take away reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 963.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly concerning a neighbor if the judgment rests upon indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certitude and true probability are not so distant that it should be judged a grave injury to hold as almost certain what is very probable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 962.

2nd. He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not advert fully to the insufficiency of the motives, although he adverts that he judges less prudently, or if he admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.; and Hom. Ap., n. 1.

3rd. He does not sin gravely who judges rashly concerning someone indeterminate among many, e.g., of some gathering or community, or even concerning someone indeed determined but unknown to himself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

4th. Suspicion, or even plainly rash doubt, namely resting upon no reason, can be a mortal sin if it is concerned with very extraordinary sins and sins grave by reason of the condition of the persons whom it regards; because suspicion or doubt of this kind is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave sins. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 964.

5th. It is licit to guard against harms from fear that is not altogether imprudent; and thus, e.g., you can keep your things under guard lest they be stolen by a traveler staying in your house; because, even if you cannot positively judge that this or that one is a thief, nevertheless you can very well provide for yourself, since you know certainly that there are sometimes thieves among men, although they are thought to be alien from theft. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 60, art. 4, ad 3.

Here a secret is called whatever, either from its own nature or from a special contract, ought to be kept hidden. - A threefold secret is distinguished and is 1st. natural, if it is imposed by the very nature of the thing to be hidden, e.g., if you know something which you cannot manifest without grave injury to another either in estimation or in goods, etc.; 2nd. promised, if someone, hearing a secret from another or learning it by chance, promises that he will not reveal it; 3rd. committed, if someone manifests something to another and at the same time tacitly or expressly requires silence from him concerning it.

I say 1st. A natural secret in a grave matter obliges under grave matter, and indeed in justice, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that from revelation of the secret harm follows to the neighbor, who has the right not to be injured without reasonable cause.

I say 2nd. A promised secret, besides the obligation of a natural secret, which by reason of the matter it can sometimes bring with it, by force of the promise alone obliges gravely or lightly according to the intention of the one promising; lightly, if the one promising binds himself only from fidelity, as often happens; gravely in grave matter, if he wished to oblige himself in justice.

I say 3rd. A committed or communicated secret, which is also called rigorous, obliges under grave matter in justice, and indeed more strictly than a merely natural secret and also than a promised one; because besides the natural obligation there also presses an obligation from an onerous contract expressly or tacitly undertaken. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 970. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 440.

Question 1. What are the just causes of manifesting any secret whatsoever, even if it is committed?

Response. They are 1st. the rightly presumed consent of him whose interest it is that the secret be hidden; 2nd. divulgation of the matter arising from elsewhere; 3rd. harm that will follow from the secret to the commonwealth, or to innocent private persons, or to the one entrusting it, or even to him to whom the secret is committed. I said, that will follow, because if it concerns harm already inflicted, a committed secret cannot licitly be revealed as long as the one causing harm is not himself bound to betray himself, although a natural or promised secret can, indeed ought, to be manifested to a judge legitimately interrogating, so that the harm already inflicted may be redressed. The reason for the difference is that the obligation which affects a natural or promised secret is essentially conditioned, and as it were supervenes upon the pre-existing obligation of responding to a judge legitimately interrogating. But if the matter concerns a committed secret, a judge or superior cannot abrogate the right of nature, which requires that it ought to be kept, unless the matter is already known by another way. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 970 and 971. - Baller., note (a), p. 441.

Question 2. Can you reveal a secret if you promised to keep it even with loss of life?

Response. Affirmatively, if the common good requires it, because then a promise of this kind is invalid by its own nature. But otherwise one must answer if it concerns your own simply grave harm, because you expressly renounced your right, and it is not illicit to permit yourself to incur grave harm for keeping a promise. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 971.

Question 3. Does he sin gravely who reveals a secret to one or another upright man under the same secret?

Response. Negatively, probably of itself; because in this case grave injury against another does not seem to be committed, unless nevertheless it is revealed to a person from whom the one entrusting the secret to you is rightly presumed to have especially wished it to be concealed. - I said, of itself; because in practice, on account of the circumstances of the secret, the revelation will easily become grave, namely when you suppose too lightly that the persons to whom you commit the received secret are so discreet that they will certainly keep it. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 971.

Question 4. Does he sin gravely who opens or reads another's letters?

Response. Affirmatively, because by natural right and the right of nations there is present a grave obligation of preserving the secrets of letters inviolate; otherwise human commerce would be overthrown. Except, however, the following cases: 1st. if there is tacit or presumed consent of him who writes, or of him to whom the letters are sent; 2nd. if the letters are known or presumed to contain matters of slight moment; 3rd. if it is done from a just cause, e.g., for averting public or private harm, provided no more is read than is necessary for this end; 4th. if the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence. Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Peccatis, n. 70; and Hom. Ap., nn. 5 and 6.

Question 5. Can you ever use knowledge unjustly acquired for freeing yourself, for example?

Response. Affirmatively, in the case in which, if you had not had that information, you could, by your own right, in order to provide for yourself, have searched it out and inquired into the secret even by deceit; otherwise you cannot. Therefore this can be done 1st. when that possessor of the secret vexes you unjustly, since it is licit to repel force by force; 2nd. when he is held to reveal the secret, because then he does not have the right of retaining it; 3rd. when it is of interest to the commonwealth that it be manifested for the common safety. Yet you cannot use it on account of some good of yours resulting from the revelation, or some evil of your own to be avoided, nor on account of that evil for the sake of which you can reveal a justly acquired secret. But if that were permitted, a door and license would be opened of searching out, by right and wrong, the secrets of one's neighbor for our utility; letters would be intercepted and other frauds employed to the ruin of human commerce and public quiet. Such a person unjustly acquiring another's secret steals his good: nothing is more intimate to a man or more his own than the secret of the heart; it is a right belonging to him from intrinsic principles, which God protects by concealing it in such a way that not even angels penetrate the secrets of man. Against this right acts he who obtains a secret by fraud or deceit and communicates it to others. Hence there would be a violation of a most strict right if someone employed the new instrument which is commonly called a dictograph, against the peace of human society: e.g., while an advocate hears his clients, or such privileged persons receive most secret things, or officials communicate hidden things of government to one another. Thus Lugo, disp. 14, nn. 100 and following.

Question 1. Must impediments known under a secret, even a committed secret, be revealed?

Resp. Affirmatively, probably, even if an oath of not revealing them has been added. The reason is that a natural secret, even committed and sworn, does not oblige when grave damage threatens the community or a third person.

Question 2. Are you bound to reveal an impediment if you alone know it and cannot prove it?

Resp. Affirmatively, and the reason is that in matter of this kind the testimony of one person can suffice. Thus the most common and truer opinion, says S. Alphonsus, n. 995.

To Contumely and Detraction, of which we have spoken, are akin Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing; all of these are most hostile to Charity; and they inflict no small loss upon our neighbor: while the first forces him to part from a friend; the second suffuses him with shame; the third, finally, imprecates evil upon him. These three I shall treat in as many questions.

I undertake to handle the most difficult question that exists in all of theology, one which I feel unequal to my own strength to treat. For, having often trodden similar paths, and, indeed, the more turbulent the water always becomes for one who stirs it. Having this intention in mind, of following in similar footsteps, and, in fact, having prescribed for myself this method, to explain only those things which theologians commonly hand down concerning the deceitful, equivocal, amphibological oath, and mental restrictions... , I had brought the treatment nearly to the halfway point. But, when I came to the explanation of amphibologies, mental restrictions, and equivocations, I found myself at once surrounded on every side, as it were, by Scylla and Charybdis, and by rocks and shoals. For that locution which some theologians call a purely mental restriction, others call a not purely mental restriction; and that speech which is, to me, a lie, is, to a good many more recent writers, merely amphibological. All this, however, I judge to be the origin of all the reefs, and of the difficulties: for, since there can be no room for right disputation, unless certain and clear notions of equivocations, amphibologies, and mental restrictions are established beforehand, and this cannot be done, given the distinctions, evasions, and technicalities of more recent writers, which render this matter exceedingly entangled, I resolved, in order to avoid these circuitous paths, to break off the course I had begun, and to unravel the web; and I took this counsel: that I should first of all begin a discourse concerning lying, and take up the whole controversy afresh. For it has proved of no small advantage to me, in the treatment of this controversy already conducted, that I have discovered nothing put forward by more recent theologians in favor of the licit use of amphibologies which had not already, before them, been employed by certain ancient Philosophers, and even by some of the Fathers, in patronage of lies. Nor does any other difference occur to me, weighing the foundations of each, than that the ancients, with candid sincerity, called those locutions "lies" which not a few more recent theologians call "equivocal," and "material," and "amphibological."

To prove this, and to open for myself an approach to resolving the questions concerning the deceitful oath, I have judged it worthwhile to preface a historical narration of the disputes concerning lying among the ancients, both Philosophers and Fathers. Indeed, an occasion for demonstrating this is furnished by the war which, twelve years ago, several literary men of our own Italy waged over the controversies concerning lies and amphibologies. Occasion for this fierce contest was given by Fr. Carlo Ambrogio Cattaneo, who, in Vol. I of his own Lectures, which he delivered from the pulpit to the people at Milan, and published in print, in Lecture 44, devised a new method of concealing the truth, whenever its manifestation would inflict some grave harm. For he says that Christians ought not to be at all anxious, nor ought they to rack their brains, so as to construct an amphibological, or equivocal, speech by an artful arrangement and disposition of words; but he encourages them to deny outright, with open brow and unblushing countenance, all pretense set aside, that they know the matter, or that they know the truth, which, if they revealed it, would subject them to grave harm. For, he says, that word "know" loses its own signification in such circumstances, and signifies nothing more than that name "know."

This most false doctrine Fr. Giuseppe Agostino Orsi undertook to attack — a man, moreover, of the human commonwealth, and of profound genius, endowed with exquisite erudition, and to whom, in writing, I have seen no equal, even in the most difficult questions, for facility and elegance. At present Secretary of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, after many published volumes distinguished for doctrine and erudition, he is writing a universal Ecclesiastical History, received with the applause of the learned. This most learned man, then, published a DOGMATIC-MORAL DISSERTATION, which was the beginning of a long war. For it produced for itself several adversaries, and also several comrades in arms, who all, joining battle with one another, sharpened their pens, wearied the presses, and, with several published volumes, filled all Italy. How well the die was cast in this literary conflict, with what abundance of arguments, with what erudition of every kind, with what elegance of style, and with what eloquence each pleaded his own cause, it is not my concern to make manifest — since their books speak for themselves, and report the sum of their doctrine. This one thing I confess: that I have profited not a little in this rugged controversy from his most learned works, and have borrowed from him certain things which contribute to a historical knowledge of lies. But, lest I detain the reader too long at the threshold, I proceed to the matter.

I. So manifest from God is the depravity, and perniciousness, of lies, that not one of the wise can be found who has not proscribed liars as enemies of human society. The dispute has only been, both among the ancient Philosophers and among the Fathers, whether, to conceal a truth of the highest moment, whose manifestation would redound to the harm of the public good, lies are to be lawfully employed. Plato, easily the prince of all Philosophers, in his ten books On the Republic, or in the Dialogues On the Just, teaches in many places that, an exceedingly grave cause pressing, truth is lawfully to be concealed by a lie. I will here transcribe a few things out of many, following the version of Jean de Serres. In Book, or Dialogue, II, near the end, he writes this: "And so a true lie, which consists in this — that the mind is in error, thinking wrongly of some matter — is held in hatred not only by the gods, but also by men; but that lie which is expressed in words is useful only in this case, and does not seem worthy of hatred, if we use it against enemies, or even with those who are called friends, when, seized by madness, or some other kind of derangement, they attempt to do some evil — so that we may divert them from the deed, taking it up as a useful remedy." In Book III, a little after the beginning, he takes away the use of lying from private citizens, but grants it to magistrates, and to physicians: "For if it was rightly said a little before, that among the gods there is no place for lying, but that among men it is, as a kind of remedy, to be employed as useful — it is clear that this matter is to be granted to physicians, but taken away from the rest who do not profess that art; so that, furthermore, it may be lawful for Princes, if for any, to lie, whether for the sake of enemies, or of citizens, for the advantage of the state; but all others must abstain entirely from lying." He has similar things in Book V, and in other places. Plato is said to have drawn this error from Timaeus of Locri, and from Sophocles. He had very many followers, not only among the pagans, but even among worshippers of the true God, who upheld the licit use of lies.

II. The first among Catholic Doctors who wrote less cautiously concerning lying was Clement of Alexandria, who, in Bk. VII of the Stromata, has certain things which seem to favor lying.

III. Clement of Alexandria had as his disciple Origen, who did not obscurely, but openly, patronized lying, as his own Master had done. St. Jerome (Bk. I, Against Rufinus) reports his words, transcribed from Bk. VI of the Stromata, where he has this: "We ought not to say whatever comes into our mind to our neighbor... A Philosopher would cautiously say that a lie is sometimes useful to men, as a kind of medicine. But consider how God himself is sometimes to be thought, when it profits the hearer, to speak in ambiguous words, and to declare what he wishes through enigmas; so that both the dignity of truth may be preserved with him, and, if something harmful might result, were it to be brought forth naked before the common people, it may be covered with some veil, lest it be brought forth. But man, upon whom the necessity of lying rests, should diligently take care so to use a lie at times, in the manner of a condiment, or a medicine, that he keep its measure, lest, by using it too often, he lose the credit of his own honesty. Judith, too, made use of this against Holofernes, having long concealed the truth of her people, correcting it; and, above all, the Patriarch Jacob — of whom we read the blessings which he obtained from his father by a cunning device — unless we have lied in such a way that some great good may be sought thereby for ourselves, we are to be judged, as it were, enemies of him who says, 'I am the truth.'"

IV. Origen was followed by Hilary, in his commentaries on Psalm 14. "For a lie," he says, "is often necessary, and sometimes falsehood is useful — as when we lie about a hidden matter to a persecutor, or defraud one who threatens, of testimony against one in peril, or deceive concerning the difficulty of a sick man's cure; and it behooves us, according to the Apostle's teaching, to season our speech with salt, and to do our neighbor no harm, so that the crime of lying be reckoned by another's inconvenience." His Commentary on this Psalm, however, along with various considerations which the most learned Benedictine Editors prefix to this Psalm in their annotations, is defended, after much dispute, as being truly St. Hilary's. The occasion of St. Hilary's error was Origen, whose commentaries on the Psalms he translated from Greek into Latin.

V. St. John Chrysostom, no less than Hilary, seems to have embraced Origen's opinion not obscurely, Vol. II, Homily 7 on Penance, where he commends the lie by which Rahab withdrew the spies from the fury of their pursuers, in these words: "Worthy of all praise, then, is Rahab, an image of the Church. For when messengers were sent by the King to seek out the spies, if there were any who had entered her house, she said to them: If men have entered in to thee, respond..." 'No.' For if they had at first said 'no,' she would have provoked those who had come to a search. But she said, 'They have entered in to thee, and they have gone out this way: pursue, and you will overtake them.' O beautiful lie! O beautiful deceit — not betraying, but guarding, piety!"* I could adduce many other things, but I pass over them. Nor let anyone hold it against me that I assert a most celebrated holy Doctor of the Church not to be free of this blemish. Since, to establish this, no other path lies open to my own feebleness than that I flatter myself I can prevail over the applause and acumen of those who strive to defend Chrysostom's teaching as untainted by this light stain. Let them note, however, this much: that they gather water in a sieve, while they strive to show that Chrysostom does not patronize lying, on the grounds that in several other places he condemns lying by design, and expressly disowns it. For all writers, to a man, absolutely detest lying, and prove its malice by every kind of argument. The question turns on this: whether, urgent necessity of avoiding some most grave evil pressing — such as the death of men — a lie is lawful. Chrysostom affirms this, as I indeed judge. Whoever shall demonstrate the opposite will be, to me, a great Apollo.

VI. A disciple of St. John Chrysostom was John Cassian, who, whether he drank in this error from his own teacher, or from Origen, defended it more ardently than all his predecessors. Not incidentally, but with a deliberate pen, he treats this controversy in Collation XVII, ch. 17 and following, through fifteen chapters. From these many chapters I will glean a few things. What, he says, is to be thought of lying, and how it is to be used, is such that it has in its nature something of hellebore, which, if taken when death impends from disease, is salutary, but otherwise, without the utmost peril, is deadly. Thus we read that even holy men, and men of God, made use of a lie, as Rahab did, and others. When, then, some grave danger concerning the confession of truth is imminent, then recourse to lies is to be taken up. Ch. 20 speaks of a distinction, forgivable, in a confession of truth. From the examples of principal Princes, chief among God's own, he seems to give a commendation of lies. And ch. 19: this is nearly the perception of imminent death. He draws forth many authorities and examples, both from the Old and from the New Testament, from most approved men, adducing the necessity of it. By these, he says, the learned Apostle Paul is exhorted to descend, out of necessity, to feigned pretenses of the weak, and forgivably to acquiesce. For then a detriment of lying is to be undertaken, when, as we have said, a greater loss of confessing the truth is imminent, and the utility which is conferred by truth does not prevail to compensate for the harm which such things generate for us. Ch. 21 brings forth several testimonies from the Gospel itself, by which he contends that the use of lying is not only lawful, but even necessary. Ch. 22, 23, and 24 allege examples of several most holy Monks and Abbots, who lied because they judged it to belong to a more sublime virtue, to conceal their own continence by a humble lie, than to reveal it to superb human judgment. Ch. 25 again reviews, from several books of Scripture, countless examples of most holy Patriarchs and Saints collected, so as to confirm more strongly his opinion concerning the licit and necessary use of lies, as a kind of remedy. "It is impossible for us," he says, "to enumerate all — for who would suffice to run briefly through the whole? — how the Patriarchs, and innumerable Saints of God, some for the desire of a blessing, some for the safeguarding of life, some for the concealment of some mystery, some out of zeal for God, some for the examination of truth, took up, so to speak, the patronage of lying?"

These few arguments, which more recent theologians thrust upon us in favor of the licit use of equivocations, I have adduced to show that Cassian, in many instances, has touched upon and drawn out all of these, so as to show that lies are necessarily and honorably to be employed.

VII. Two other authors I recount, lest I be too prolix, who have patronized lying in this manner. John Climacus, on the twelfth rung of his Ladder, writes this: "When we have felt ourselves free from every vanity of lying, both in place and in habitual use, then at last, though not without fear, we may sometimes, cautiously, allow a lie to enter in." Martin of Braga (Bk. On the Four Cardinal Virtues, ch. 4) says: "Do not use lying, but where an honorable cause exists, you may be redeemed by a lie. Let the just man guard the secrets of fidelity, not by uttering falsehood, but by keeping guard over truth; and if perchance you are compelled, you will rather be excused than convicted of lying, since he who speaks does not betray what should be kept silent; but what should be spoken, he speaks."

VIII. More authors favoring lying I could recount, but, lest excessive prolixity beget disgust in the reader, I will close this chapter with the words of Augustine, who attests that in his own time it was the common opinion which held that it was lawful to lie for the salvation of men. He has this (q. 68, on Leviticus): "This is to be held, that no one's authority, wherever a thing is decreed in Scripture, is of any account. But the ancient Fathers, while they lied, will be no occasion for the ignorant and heterodox to seize an opportunity for lying — for such audacious imposture has already many times been refuted. For that some of the holy Fathers, at times, in some most difficult controversy which in their time had not yet been discussed with due dignity, fell into some slip, no one denies; but the Fathers, while no one is harmed, are to be excused, as they pass by in passing."

IX. Hence it must not be inferred, that they are to be held of little account, or to be calumniated, and to be deceived, because with unanimous consent they defend some doctrine. But of this, elsewhere a fuller discourse.

I. Aristotle, Plato's disciple, rejected his master's error concerning lying (Bk. IV, Ethics, ch. 7), where he writes that a lie, by its own nature, is depraved, and detestable; truth, good, and worthy of praise. But, setting aside the pagans, I will bring forward Christian Doctors of our own profession.

II. First of the whole chorus will be Lactantius, who, in Bk. VI of the Divine Institutes, openly attacks lying, in these words: "The other things which a worshipper of God ought to observe are easy, being comprehended in these virtues: that he never deceive anyone, nor lie, for the sake of harming. For it is a wicked thing for one zealous for truth to depart, in any matter, from the truth he follows, whether to deceive, or to harm. In this path of justice, and of all the virtues, there is no place for lying." Wherefore that wayfarer, both true and just, will judge that Lucilius's saying — 'It is not mine to lie to a friend' — does not befit him, but rather he will hold it to be his own not to lie to an enemy either, familiar, or unknown, and will never allow that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the sense and thought within.

I do not deny that Lactantius does not speak absolutely of the controversy chiefly... concerning whether, to preserve human life, or to conceal secrets of the highest moment, it is lawful to lie. For the rest, I assert at the same time that Lactantius lays down principles which proscribe the use of any officious lie whatsoever, and condemn it — since he holds that one must lie neither to a friend nor to an enemy, and that it must never be permitted that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the thought within; and, finally, on this path of justice, that there is never room for a lie: he certainly excludes every case in which a lie could be lawful.

III. Similar things are taught by Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Basil, in his Shorter Rules, St. Prosper, in his book Against Cassian, where, ch. 9, he says: "You deceive us with two, and twin, depravities, mixing justices, as you understand them, by dividing them. By this rule you will be able to preach that they err equally who say that one must always deceive, and who determine that one must never deceive. But, that in neither should there be sin, as an evil cannot be made a good by dividing it between two — this is altogether an error of yours: falsity is not always to be shunned, nor truth always to be followed." St. Prosper here refutes two errors of Cassian: one, that he attributed the beginnings of grace sometimes to good works, sometimes to nature; the other, that he taught that one must sometimes use falsehood, sometimes truth.

IV. Ferrandus, Deacon of the Church of Carthage, in his letter to Count Reginus, has this: "Let your speech be, at least, 'yea, yea; no, no' — with an oath either intervening, or absent, let us strive to remain most certain in truth. For as we recall concerning charity that John said, 'He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him' — thus, likewise, if we wish to speak concerning truth, we shall find it stated similarly: for divine truth says, 'I am the truth.' Whence very truly it may be said: he who abides in truth, abides in God, and God in him. We do not lie, then, who abides in truth, and God in him abides. Let us, therefore, prefer truth to all temporal advantages, and we shall be found rightly to have preferred divine things to human ones."

V. St. Gregory the Great (Bk. XVIII, Morals, ch. 3): "Every lie is iniquity... for every iniquity is a lie, because assuredly whatever departs from truth departs from equity... Every lie is to be shunned with the utmost care; although sometimes some kind of lie is of lighter fault, if someone, by lying, tries to procure for another some advantage of life or of body — since it is written, 'The mouth that lieth killeth the soul'; 'Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.' This kind of lie, too, perfect men avoid with the utmost care, so that no one's life is defended by their deceit, lest they harm their own soul while they strive to render another's life secure. Some, indeed, by the deceit of midwives, attempt to affirm this kind of lie not to be sin — for it is written, 'because the Lord built them houses'; that in this recompense it may the better be recognized what the fault of lying deserves. For that reward of theirs, which could have been repaid to them in eternal life for their kindness, was, on account of the admixed fault of lying, diverted to an earthly recompense — so that, in this life, which they wished to preserve by lying, they might receive the good things they had done, and might not further have the reward of their merit to expect. Indeed, if carefully weighed, they lied out of love of the present life, not out of intention of reward. For, by sparing the life of the infants, they contrived to cover their own by lying."

I will point out three others, since all subsequent writers have detested all lies. Ambertus, Bk. IX on the Apocalypse, explaining those words, "And to all liars their portion shall be in the pool burning with fire," having cited the authorities of Gregory and Augustine against lying, thus concludes: "One thing we must firmly hold: that no kind of lie remains unpunished, which is not here atoned for by penance, or by some work of piety." St. Gregory VII (Bk. IX, Epistle 21, to Alfonso, King of the Spains) says: "You are not ignorant, in your prudence, that lying is a sin, of which an account must be rendered even for an idle word in the strict examination. But not even a lie which is told for peace, with a pious intention, can be proven altogether free of fault." This I have touched upon beforehand, so that, since in the rest, without doubt, you may not hesitate to hold that to be a sin. Alexander III, in the chapter "Super eo," Extra, on abuses, prohibits, as it were a sacrilege, that among priests one should lie for another's life.

I. We have already indicated, in the preceding chapter, that, before Augustine's time, several authors defended as licit the use of lying in extreme necessity, for the preservation of human life, or the warding off of some other grave harm. Cassian, above all others, left no stone unturned to fortify this opinion with the authority of Scripture. St. Augustine, on the contrary, snatched the palm from all the impugners of lying. He proposes to himself all the arguments, or cases, of his adversaries, and, with the utmost acuteness of his own genius, discusses and turns them over, so that nothing is left untouched, nothing unresolved. Indeed, he himself devised all those objections, all those events, paradoxes, and sophisms, which more recent theologians treat, so as to show that lying can be favored, and all those same difficulties, lest he pass over anything. And, since I have judged it worth the effort to set before the eyes of readers the disputation of so great a Father, so that they may gather from this how far Augustine's teaching differs from more recent inventions — Augustine wrote this Book on Lying around the year 395, as the Benedictine Fathers observe. All, then, that is contained in this Book I will transcribe here, reduced to a compendium with such brevity as I am able. The proem of this Book begins with these words:

II. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions — lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason." Then (ch. 1), the state of the controversy having been set forth, and jesting words, whose signification is plain to all, being excluded (ch. 2) from the present question, he observes (ch. 3) that neither does one who asserts something false always lie, nor is one who states something true always free of a lie. For one is not guilty of lying who, uttering a falsehood, reckons it to be true. On the contrary, he is held a liar who speaks the truth, thinking it false. Wherefore he lies who, having something else in his mind, states, in words, or by whatever signification, what he reckons false. Ch. 4 inquires what act it behooves the whole Book to treat: namely, whether he who lies ought always to have the intention of deceiving; he there discusses other difficulties as well. Ch. 5 asks whether one may sometimes lie. Those who defend this oppose the examples of Sarah, of Jacob, and of the Egyptian midwives. They add the most grave inconveniences which sometimes follow upon the manifestation of some truth — such as death, and the affliction of the sick, who cannot be freed except by a lie — relying on which words, and on those examples adduced from the Old Testament, they answer that it is unlawful for anyone who thinks well [of a matter] to be manifested. On the contrary, those who hold that the ancient Fathers did not lie argue more forcibly from divine examples, that in every event to lie...

[several lines here in the source are too faint to reliably transcribe; the discussion continues concerning whether examples like Abraham's servant provide precedent for lying]

...examples are found which provoke to the imitation of lying. But the dissimulation of Peter, and of Barnabas, was not only not commended, but even censured, and corrected. From the guilt of this dissimulation he shows Paul to be immune, when he circumcised Timothy — where he brings forward much in Paul's defense.

III. The inconveniences, moreover, which they object would follow from the revelation of truth (ch. 6), the impugners of lying count as nothing. For, directing their mind to the divine Scripture, which threatens, "The mouth that lieth killeth the soul," they reckon it a perversion of order, to destroy one's own soul, so that another may live bodily. Nor does charity urge this, which bids us to love our neighbor as ourselves, not more than ourselves. For if he departs from the right order who seeks temporal death for another's bodily life, how much more does he exceed the rule of sound doctrine, who loses his own eternal life for another's temporal one? Those, however, who rage and are indignant, if someone is unwilling to destroy his own soul by a lie, so that another may live longer in the flesh — what if it be by our own theft, what if by adultery, that another might be freed from death? Is anyone bound to corrupt his own soul by a lie, so that another may live in the body? It is absurd. Therefore neither theft nor adultery is to be committed, however much it might free someone from death. What, if a man bears a noose, that another may be strangled, unless it is granted to him what he seeks — must one assent to it? What, if a ravisher demands debauchery, affirming that he will kill a man, unless it is conceded to him — will he then be a nefarious murderer? Therefore, in this question, nothing is to be attended to, except whether lying is, by its own nature, iniquitous. Since this has already been shown above, it will be the same as to ask whether, for another's salvation, one ought to be unjust, as if one were to ask whether, for another's soul's health, which cannot be preserved except by equity, one ought oneself to be unjust. But if he rejects this, so that not only another's, but even our own, temporal welfare we must prefer to it — who could call it into doubt that one must never lie at all?

IV. Since, however (ch. 7), chastity of body is itself more precious than life, it can be asked whether a man may rightly use a lie, by which he might avoid the loss of chastity — as if a ravisher should rush in, who might be avoided by a lie. It is easily answered that there is no chastity of body, unless it depends on integrity of mind; which being disrupted, the former must necessarily fall, even if it seems untouched. In no way, then, does the mind corrupt itself by a lie for the sake of its body, which it knows remains incorrupt, if incorruption does not depart from the mind itself. For what the body suffers by violence, without preceding lust, is to be called vexation rather than corruption. Not every corruption is shameful; but there is corruption there, if lust has consented. But, however excellent the mind is above the body, so much the more wickedly is it corrupted. Chastity, then, can be preserved wherever no voluntary corruption of the mind can occur, unless someone has procured it, or consented to it. For certainly, if a ravisher has assailed a body which can be resisted neither by force, nor avoided by any counsel, or lie, it must be confessed that chastity is not violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no one doubts that the soul is better than the body, integrity of mind is to be preferred to integrity of body, which can be preserved in eternity. But who would say that the mind of a liar is integral? For lust itself is rightly defined as an appetite of the mind by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal ones. No one, then, can prove that one must ever lie, unless he can show that some eternal good can be obtained by a lie. But since each one departs from eternity as much as he departs from truth, and it is most absurd to say that one who lies, departing from truth, can, by so departing, arrive at some good — or, if there is such a good, whatever was not fulfilled will not be true, and therefore not good either, since it is false. Just as, then, mind is to be preferred to body, so too is truth to mind, since the mind ought to desire it not only more than the body, but even more than itself. If, however, Lot, being so just that he deserved even to receive Angels as guests, offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites, so that the bodies of women rather than of men might be corrupted by them — how much more diligently, and constantly, ought chastity of mind be preserved in truth, since the male body is truly to be preferred to the female body?

V. Hence anyone may gather that one ought not to lie even with the intention of attaining eternal salvation; indeed he adds (ch. 8) that the door of eternal salvation is closed, if an entrance is opened by a lie. For the first foundation of salvation is faith. This surely wavers, if it is once granted that it is lawful for good men to lie. For how is one to be believed who thinks that one must sometimes lie? For he can lie even then, when he bids himself to be believed. For how can it be known whether he then also has some cause, as he himself thinks, for a false narration by way of officious lying — and this in such a way that even a man terrified could be restrained from lust by this means, or must be believed even in spiritual matters, judging that he consults his own interest by lying? Wherefore, either it is not to be believed that good men lie sometimes, or it is not to be believed that they are good, of whom we believe that they must sometimes lie. Of these three, the first is pernicious, the second foolish. It remains, then, that good men never lie.

VI. Thus this question (ch. 9), considered and treated from both sides, is nonetheless not a judgment easily to be rendered; but those are still to be diligently heard who say that nothing is so ill done that it must not be done in avoidance of something worse. Now it pertains to the deeds of men not only whatever they do, but also whatever, with consent, they suffer. Whence, if a case arose that a Christian man should choose to burn incense to idols, rather than consent to debauchery, which the persecutor threatened him with unless he did so — they seem rightly to ask why he should not likewise avoid the latter turpitude. That consent, by which he preferred to suffer debauchery rather than burn incense to idols, they say is not a passion but a deed: for, that he might not do this, he chose to burn incense. He answers, that if such consent is to be reckoned a deed, then those too are murderers who preferred to be killed rather than to bear false witness. Consent, therefore, is not to be called such, whenever we do not approve what is done to us; indeed, so far as it is in us, we forbid it to be done. He, then, erred, who, to prevent others from sinning against his body, burned incense to idols. But they reply: How is it not done with them, if, had they not done this, you would have done that? Augustine answers, that in this way we would be said to break down the door along with the housebreakers, if, by not shutting it, we did not prevent them from breaking it down. He proposes the question more precisely: ought he, then, to have suffered debauchery rather than burn incense? If you ask what he ought to have done, he ought to have done neither. For if I say he ought to have done one of these, I would approve one of them, whereas I condemn both. But if it is asked which of these he ought rather to have avoided, since he could not avoid both, but could avoid one or the other, I will answer: his own sin, rather [than to avoid another's]. Indeed, his own lighter sin is to be avoided rather than another's grave one. Finally, he concludes that the knot of the question turns on this: namely, whether a lie ceases to be a sin, when someone uses it to guard bodily chastity.

VII. If the discourse concerns pernicious lies, which injure another's reputation, Augustine answers (ch. 10) that it is never lawful for us to obscure another's good name, so as to prevent, whether of our own or of another's body, a rape, or other such evils, or graver ones, to be avoided — just as it is likewise never lawful to lie in a matter of religion. Indeed, one must not lie even in the doctrine of religion, so that someone might be more easily led to it. For, once the authority of truth is broken, or even lightly diminished, all things will remain in doubt — which, unless believed true, cannot be held as certain.

VIII. This being firmly established, the discussion concerning other lies proceeds more safely (ch. 11). And so all lies which unjustly harm someone are to be removed, just as also those which, although they do not harm another, nonetheless profit no one, not even the liars themselves. Finally, those lies too are to be avoided which are called jesting, which liars therefore employ, so that they may please men, and render human conversation more pleasant.

IX. These kinds having been condemned without any doubt, the discourse (ch. 12) returns to officious lies, which harm no one, but profit someone. Concerning this kind of lie the whole controversy turns on this: namely, whether these lies harm him who utters them, so that they may profit another; and whether the harm which the liar suffers is compensated by the good which the lie obtains. He answers that a lie is never lawful, even if it harms no one, and profits someone: otherwise it would be lawful to steal a measure of wheat from a rich man, abounding in superfluous wealth, to give to a poor man, who would experience great advantage, since the rich man would feel no detriment; it would then also be lawful to bear false witness to conceal the poor man's theft. What could be said more perverse than this? But since it could be replied that this lie is therefore unlawful, because by it another's sin is concealed, it is consequently asked whether it is lawful to lie, when the lie harms no one, benefits someone, and conceals no sin. He answers: If, for this reason, we do not sin in lying, because we harm no one, and benefit someone, why do we not, on the same principle, examine the sin of lying itself when we say a false thing to conceal someone's sin, and thereby benefit and harm no one? Is it not lawful to conceal a sin? Where it is written, "Thou shalt not steal," is it not also written there, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"? Is it, then, lawful to conceal a sin, and yet not lawful to commit one? Or perhaps it is not false witness, except when someone lies in such a way as either to fabricate a crime against someone, or to conceal someone's crime, or in some way to oppress someone in judgment? If this is so, what then, if a murderer takes refuge with a Christian, or that Christian sees where he takes refuge, and is questioned about this matter by one who, seeking the man for punishment, is the slain man's avenger — must one lie? Or is it evil to lie to conceal another's sin, but not evil to lie to conceal the sinner? What, if, led before a judge concerning the very place where he is hiding, or where you know he is hiding, you are questioned? Will you say: I do not know, and I did not see what you know, and did see? You will, then, bear false witness, and destroy your own soul, so that the murderer not be destroyed. Should you, then, being led to death, being innocent, where you know a murderer to be hiding, knowingly answer to a judge who, though commanded by a greater power to seize him for death, yet is only the executor of the law, not its author? Will it not be false witness, because you lie for the innocent, since it is not the judge, but the executor of the law, who asks? What, if the lawgiver himself asks, or some other unjust judge, seeking an innocent man for punishment? What will you do? A false witness, or will you be a betrayer? Or will you remain doubtful between the crime of false witness and of betrayal? How much more strongly, then, how much more excellently, will you say: I will not betray, nor will I lie. This a certain Bishop of the Church of Tagaste, named Firmus, once did — firmer still in will than in name. Why should not we do the same, both before a judge, and outside judgment, that we may fulfill what is written: "Thou shalt not bear false witness," and avoid that punishment: "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie"? Sometimes, however, we are asked, not where he is, but whether he is, or is not, concealed in that place. Where, if we know he is, by keeping silent we betray him; or even if we testify that we will by no means say whether he is there or not, we equally betray him, as if we pointed to him with a finger. In this article, then, you ought to answer thus: He knows where he is; I will never show it; I will not lie here. This alone is a fitting response to distract the mind of the questioner elsewhere, and to turn it away from the place where the innocent man lies concealed. Then, indeed, whatever you suffer, so as not to betray him, will be shown to be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.

X. This much has been said, so that (ch. 14) it is plain that seven kinds of lying have thus far been sufficiently discussed. It remains now to speak of the eighth, and last, kind. This lie, he says, is when we lie to protect our chastity of body from another's violence. But before he renders judgment on this kind of lie, he undertakes to unfold, with a more severe examination, the testimonies of Scripture which condemn such lies. This is mature, and severe. He begins this discussion at ch. 15, and carries it on to ch. 19. He weighs the various interpretations by which the defenders of each opinion accommodated the texts of the divine Scriptures to their own opinion. From all these, weighed with the utmost diligence, he gathers this: that no one can show, from the divine Scriptures, that any lie is found which either ought to be loved, or ought not to be held in hatred, but is sometimes to be done, as something which you hate (ch. 18), so that what is more to be detested may be avoided. But men err in this, that they set precious things beneath baser ones. For, when you have granted that some evil is to be admitted, lest another, graver, be committed — not by the rule of truth, but by his own desire and custom, does each one measure the evil, and reckons that graver which he himself more shrinks from, not that which is truly more to be fled. This whole vice is born from a perversity of love. For since there are two lives of ours — one everlasting, which is divinely promised to us; the other temporal, in which we now live — when anyone begins to love this temporal life more than that everlasting one, he thinks no sins graver than those which take away this life, or take away from it some advantage unjustly, or wholly deprive one of life by death. And so men hate thieves, and robbers, more than the lascivious, the drunken, the luxurious, the abusive, and torturers, and murderers, if these inflict no injury upon them. But against all these are set opposite rules, which truth prescribes for us to be kept. This teaches us bravely and prudently to endure those sins which take away from us the goods of the body, and are not impeded from eternal life; for those alone sin who take them away, and those who suffer the loss of them scarcely sin at all. But whatever things are preserved for the sake of sanctity and religion, when those who wish to do injury attempt to violate them, are to be retained even at the cost of lesser sins — not, however, of injuries to others — if a condition is proposed, and the opportunity given. And then those sins already cease to be sins, which are undertaken for the avoidance of graver ones.

XI. Moreover, these are the things (ch. 19) which ought to be preserved by our free consent, for the sake of sanctity: chastity of body, chastity of mind, truth of doctrine. Chastity of body is not violated without our consent. For whatever happens to our body against our will, a greater force prevailing, is no impurity; and there can be some reason for permitting it, but none for consenting to it. Chastity of mind, however, consists in a sincere delight, which is not corrupted, except when we love, and desire, what truth teaches ought not to be loved, and desired. A sincere love of God, and of neighbor, is therefore to be guarded: for in this, chastity of mind is sanctified. But the truth of doctrine, of religion, and of piety, is not violated by a lie. The truth of doctrine, then, is to be guarded with the utmost care from lying, so that, if chastity of mind should be violated, it may have a source from which it can be repaired: since, once the authority of doctrine is corrupted, there can be no course, or recourse, to chastity of mind.

XII. Chastity of mind is guarded by sincerity of speech: which, even if it is less violated, when someone lies to guard chastity of body, is nonetheless violated, and that which is to be preserved in the chastity and sanctity of the mind is also violated. Whence we are compelled to know beforehand, not by the opinion of men, which is generally in error, but by truth itself, which is most invincible, that the sincerity, fidelity, or truthful speech of the mind excels above the chastity of the body, and is united with it. Chastity of mind is an ordered love, not subjecting greater things to lesser ones. For less can be violated in the body than whatever can be violated in the mind. When someone does violence to your body, you see that it is not your own, but another's, lust that breaks in. Beware, nonetheless, lest, by consenting, you become a participant: for bodily chastity is in no way corrupted, unless it is violated in... the mind, which not consenting, in no way is bodily chastity corrupted, whatever has been perpetrated on the body by another's lust. Wherefore, so far as it is in us, both are to be fortified and hedged about with holy morals, and wisdom, lest they be violated from without. But when both cannot be kept, but one or the other is subject to the danger of loss, no one fails to see that, in matters of sin, chastity of mind is to be preferred to chastity of body, and one's own fault is to be avoided rather than another's.

XIII. Let it be asked, then (ch. 21), whether, all the testimonies of Scripture having been discussed, it remains established that one must never, absolutely, lie at all. Since no examples of lies worthy of imitation will be found in the morals and deeds of the Saints, so far as it concerns those Scriptures which are historical narratives referred to no figurative signification, such as are the deeds recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. All the words and deeds of the Lord in the Gospel, which to the less experienced seem to be lies, are figurative significations. Never, then, is one to lie — since, of the eight kinds of lies already recounted, not one is licit. Whoever, however, shall think that some kind of lying is not a sin, will shamefully deceive himself, since he will consider himself an honest deceiver of others.

I. In addition to the compendious narration of the Book on Lying, I have resolved to add a few observations of a similar kind, no diverting digression interposed, but to sketch, as it were, an image of each Book, so that readers may explore, with a single glance, St. Augustine's mind. Then I shall add a few observations to each Book. And, before I come to the matter, it is worth inquiring why St. Augustine entitled the Book which we treated in the preceding chapter "On Lying," while he entitled this one, which I now undertake to transcribe in compendium, "Against Lying." The reason for the different inscription Augustine himself sets forth (Bk. I, Retractations, last chapter): "The title of the latter is 'Against Lying,' but of the former, 'On Lying' — because through the latter the whole attack against lying is open; the former, however, is occupied for the most part in the disputation of inquiry." For, so that he might exhaust the controversy to its depths, in the former Book he disputed, as it were, problematically on lying: he brought forward the adversaries' reasons, not incidentally, but professedly, into the open, and set them in full light; he also gave responses, and showed whatever lies to be unlawful. In the present Book, however, Against Lying, he attacked the matter at close quarters, and undertook to rout all lies with a united hand. Occasion for publishing this Book was furnished to Augustine by the Priscillianists, whose more pernicious error was that it is lawful for a man, by lies, indeed even by perjuries, to conceal the profession of his own religion. Hence, feigning the religion of Catholics externally, they entered into commerce with Catholics, and, more securely under such a mask, waged war against evangelical truth. And since it was most difficult to drive these wolves, clothed in sheep's skins, from Christ's fold, certain Catholics, less prudent, so as to drive out one nail with another, feigned themselves Priscillianists, so that they might more easily detect the impious dogmas of these same men. To rout these errors, Augustine published his Book Against Lying.

II. And first he established (ch. 1) that neither are lies to be exterminated by lies, nor thefts by thefts, nor adulteries by adulteries. This is the impious opinion of the Priscillianists (ch. 2), which dishonors the holy Martyrs; indeed it takes away entirely their altogether holy martyrdoms. There are many kinds of lies (ch. 3), all of which we ought universally to hate, since none can be found which is not opposed to truth, just as darkness is opposed to light, iniquity to piety, and sickness to health. This opinion of lying once admitted, all human society is removed from the midst. For if the Priscillianists should suspect that we speak Catholic dogmas deceitfully, in order that we might catch them at something — I know not what — this I did then for this reason, that I might see whether even now he does so, lest I tolerate it. But what will he answer to one saying: whence, then, do I know that Priscillianists do not lie (ch. 5) in comparison with us? For the Priscillianist speaks thus, because he so believes, so that he does not lie; but the Catholic does not so believe, though he speak thus. Never, therefore, let us conceal what we think is true; certainly he would say such things to one so suspecting him: although one blasphemes unknowingly, the other knowingly. One must not lie, then (ch. 6). For if lies were lawful in a matter of religion, with the intention of enlightening heretics, adulteries too, committed with the same intention, could be considered chaste. It matters much, indeed (ch. 7), for what cause, for what end, with what intention someone acts; but those things which are agreed to be sins are to be done for no good end, under no pretext, however good the cause, as it were, nor with any good intention. A good intention can indeed sometimes diminish the malice of a sin (ch. 8), but it can in no way bring it about that a sin which by its own nature is a sin should not be one.

III. But, it must be confessed, human minds are so disturbed by a certain compensatory reckoning of sins, that some things are even thought (ch. 9) to deserve praise, and are rather called well done. For who would doubt that fornication is a great sin! And yet if there existed a cause for which Lot thought he ought to prostitute his own daughters to the fornications of the impious! What shall we say here? If we open this path, and commit lesser evils, lest others perpetrate greater ones, by a wide, indeed by no, boundary, all crimes will reign. But this error prevails chiefly then (ch. 10), when the discussion is of lies. For they reckon that those are not lies which are uttered for another's benefit, and they contend to demonstrate this by examples of Scripture. Which, however (ch. 11), are either not lies, or are mysteries; or, if they are lies, are in no way worthy of imitation. For if the sayings and deeds of the Prophets and Patriarchs are referred to those things which they were meant to signify (ch. 12), even certain sayings, or deeds, of the Savior himself in the Gospel, since he too deigned to become a Prophet of the Prophets, are found to have truthful significations. Very many of his sayings (ch. 13) have a figurative signification. But whoever says (ch. 14) that some lies are just must equally assert that some sins are just. What could be said more absurd than this (ch. 15)? For those things which are against the law cannot be just. But it is said, "Thy law is truth." That, then, which is against truth cannot be just. But who would doubt that every lie is against truth? Nor does the example of the Egyptian midwives, or of Rahab, help the defenders of lying (ch. 16). Since it was not the iniquity of the lying tongue, but the disposition of a merciful mind, that merited a temporal compensation.

IV. But someone will say: would not the midwives, and Rahab, have done better (ch. 17) by refusing to lie, showing no mercy at all? On the contrary, if those Hebrew women, that is, had shown no mercy, they would have obtained thereby, you say, an eternal reward, incomparably ampler than those houses which they made for themselves. And, you will say, even had they themselves died, they would have obtained the eternal Kingdom. But what is to be said of the woman of Jericho? Could she not have said to those asking: I know where they are, but I fear God, and will not betray them? Could she have said this to the Israelites, so that there was no deceit in it, since it would have been true, insofar as by God's mercy she was passing over to the city of God? But, you will say, they, having heard this, would have killed her, and searched her house, and would have found the hidden guests, whom she had carefully concealed. Would she not, by lying, have betrayed the guests hidden within, just as she would have by telling the truth? But would it necessarily have followed that, by telling the truth... , they would also have found those whom she had so carefully hidden? For that most cautious woman had foreseen, and had made provision, that they should freely refuse to entrust the little ones to the men of Jerusalem, nor did she lie by this. But see what would have happened, had she, without lying, said where they could hide, even though she would herself have been killed by her own fellow-citizens: her life would have had to end for the sake of a merciful deed, precious in the sight of the Lord, and his benefit toward them would not have been in vain. But you will say: what if, having come to that place where she had hidden them, they, by searching everything, had reached them — not only through the lie, but even through the perjury, of the most vile and shameful woman, of those who sought them? It can be said, in like manner: what, if they had refused to believe her when she lied out of fear? They would surely have obtained by that lie what she feared. And where, then, do we place the will, and power, of God? For by whom could they have been guarded, after the woman's lie, if, had she not lied, they could not have been guarded by him? Unless perhaps we have forgotten that this same thing happened at Sodom, where the males, inflamed with unspeakable lust toward males, could not even find the door of the house in which those they sought were hiding — since the just man, in a case altogether similar, refused to lie for the sake of his guests, whom he did not know to be Angels. And certainly that woman of Jericho could have given such an answer to those questioning her, as the just man gave in Sodom. But the just man refused to stain his soul with a lie for the bodies of his guests, for whose sake he was willing that the bodies of his daughters should suffer violence from an alien iniquity of lust.

V. The holy Doctor, however, warns that Lot is not to be imitated in that he offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites. Whence it is established that not everything which we read to have been done by the Saints ought we to transfer into our own morals, or hold as just, ch. 9 of this Book. Let man do, then (Augustine continues, ch. 17), what he can, even for the temporal safety of men, so long as he does not sin — and when he comes to this point, where he cannot look after such safety without sinning, let him already reckon that he has nothing left to do, when he perceives that what remains to him is not to do rightly.

VI. "But, since we are men, and live among men, and I confess myself to be among the number of those whom compensatory sins (ch. 18) do not yet trouble, human feeling often prevails over me even in these matters, nor am I able to resist it, when I am told: 'Behold, a sick man is in danger from a grave illness, whose strength can no longer bear it, if the death of his dearest son, most beloved, is announced to him; if he asks whether he lives — whose death you know — what will you answer, when, whatever else you say besides one of three things — namely, that he is dead, or that he lives, or that you do not know — he understands nothing else than that you are unwilling to say that he is dead? It will avail just as much, even if in every way you keep silent. But of those three, two are false: that he lives, and that you do not know; these you can say only by lying. But the one true thing — namely, that he is dead — if you say it, and the death of the troubled man follows, it will be cried out that he was slain by you.' And who could bear that men, exaggerating how great an evil is thereby avoided, prefer a salutary lie, and call truth a murderer? (Or, that truth, which confers life, should be preferred to a murderous lie.) I am moved by these objections vehemently, but it would be a marvel if I were also moved wisely. For when I set before the eyes of my heart, however dim, that intelligible beauty from whose mouth nothing false has proceeded, although the more that truth shines forth radiantly and ever more clearly, the more my own weakness, trembling, is beaten back by it — nonetheless I am so inflamed with love of so great a beauty, that I despise, in comparison, all the human considerations that call me back from it. But it is much for that affection to persevere so far, that its effect does not fail in the moment of temptation. Nor let it delay me, as I contemplate that luminous good, in which there are no shadows of lying, that truth should be called a murderer of men — because, on account of our unwillingness to lie, and their dying upon hearing the truth. For if an impudent woman awaits debauchery, and, with you not consenting, dies, disturbed by a savage passion — will chastity be called a murderer in every place, and everywhere? Or, because we read, 'We are the good odor of Christ in every place, and in them that are saved, and in them that perish; to some indeed the odor of life unto life, but to others the odor of death unto death' — shall we also pronounce the odor of Christ a murderer? But since we are men, and, in such questions and contradictions, human feeling grows weary, therefore it soon..."

Here it is worth adding what follows. There approaches, then, of his own weakness, and gradually, imperceptibly, he insensibly slips into it — as one who admits, for the sake of safety, that a lie could sometimes be said, is led on, little by little, and bit by bit, by such increments, that he can no longer be entirely on guard against so great a pestilence, growing immensely from the smallest additions. Whence it is written: "He that contemneth small things, shall fall by little and little"; "And who is sufficient for these things?" (2 Corinthians 2:16). It is to be lamented, that this evil, by such brief approaches, and by degrees, so often more miserably leads to so great a heap of wicked lies — where, he adds, most providently it is written: "He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little." What of the fact that such lovers of this life, so as not to doubt to prefer it to truth, wish us, so that man may not die — or rather, so that man, who is one day to die, may die a little later — not only to lie, but even to perjure ourselves, so that, forsooth, the vain safety of man may not pass a little sooner, and we take the name of our God in vain? And there are, among them, learned men, who even fix rules, and set limits, of when one ought, and when one ought not, to perjure oneself. O, where is that saying: 'Whither shall we go, and whither shall we hide ourselves from the wrath of thy face?' And what shall we do — if we not only readily commit such lies, but even dare, besides, to teach perjuries? Let the assertors, and defenders of lying, themselves see what kind, or kinds, of lying delights them to justify. At least let them grant that one must not lie in a matter of God; at least let them keep themselves from perjuries, and blasphemies. At least, where the name of God, where God as witness, where the sacrament of God is interposed, where the discourse is of divine religion, or is conferred — let no one lie, let no one praise it, let no one teach or command it, let no one say that a lie is just. As for the other kinds of lying, let each choose for himself what he thinks the mildest, and most innocent, kind of lying, in which it pleases him to lie. This I know: that even he who teaches that one ought to lie wishes himself to seem to teach the truth. For if what he teaches is false, teaching it he deceives, and deceiving he is deceived, knowing it! But if he wishes to be at pains, when he teaches falsely, so that he may find a pupil, he asserts that he teaches truth, where the discourse concerns doctrine — how, then, will it be a lie, if he teaches that lying is to be done? For if it is false that one must lie, how will any lie be from truth, the Apostle John crying out against it: 'Every lie is not of the truth'?"*

VII. "It is not true, then (ch. 19), that one must sometimes lie; and what is not true is to be persuaded to no one at all. But infirmity plays its own part, and, where it contradicts, proclaims that it has a case winnable with sympathetic crowds. But how, among men, who without doubt, if they are deceived, are turned aside from ruin, whether another's or their own, doth human feeling, when men are helped in their peril, not incline toward lying? If the crowd of my mortality would patiently hear me, I would respond something on behalf of the cause of truth. Certainly pious, true, holy chastity is only from truth: and whoever acts against it, assuredly acts against truth. Why, then, even if those in peril cannot otherwise be helped, do I not commit debauchery — which is therefore contrary to truth, because contrary to chastity — and, that one in peril may be helped, speak a lie, which is itself most openly contrary to truth? What has earned so great a favor with us, and offense, that chastity of body should so please, and truth offend — when all chastity is from truth?" But someone will say, this is for the perfect; solid food. "For many things are relaxed to weakness by way of pardon, although they do not please; and let chastity be not of the body, but of the mind, and let truth dwell in the mind, just as most sincere chastity." Let him say this, whoever does not fear the consequences that are to be feared, if lies of any kind are in any way admitted. "In no way, however, are they to be permitted to ascend so far that they arrive at perjuries and blasphemies; nor ought any cause whatsoever to be alleged for why one ought to perjure oneself, or, what is more execrable, why God ought to be blasphemed. For it is not the case that, because blasphemy occurs through a lie, therefore it is not blasphemy. For it can likewise be said, in this manner, that one does not perjure oneself, because one perjures oneself through a lie." Whoever, then, says that, for the sake of a man in danger, even..."*

VIII. "But sometimes it is objected (ch. 20) that one ought to lie, even for our own temporal safety, when it is loudly proclaimed that eternal salvation is thereby also endangered by our lie, if it cannot otherwise be repelled — as, if someone, wishing to be baptized, is placed in the power of impious and unbelieving men, to whom access cannot be had, so that he may be washed in the laver of regeneration, unless the guards are deceived by a lie. From this most invidious outcry, by which we are compelled ... to lie for a man's eternal salvation, whither shall I flee? And chastity, too, is set before me by you. For why, if the guards, unless deceived, would admit us to baptize the man, but could be enticed into debauchery — do we not act contrary to chastity? And, if they can be deceived by a lie, do we not act contrary to truth, unless truth does not command it, since no chastity would be lovable to anyone at all, unless truth prescribed it? Accordingly, in order that a man might be baptized, if the guards be deceived by a lie — if truth so commands. But how would truth command that a man be lied for, in order to be baptized, if chastity does not command that a man be committed adultery with, in order to be baptized? But why does chastity not command this, except because truth does not teach it? If, then, we ought to do nothing except what truth teaches; since truth teaches that we ought not to do what is contrary to chastity, even for the sake of a man's baptism — how will it teach us to do, for the sake of a man's baptism, what is itself contrary to truth? But just as eyes too weak to gaze upon the sun nonetheless gladly look upon things illumined by it, so souls, already able to be delighted by the beauty of chastity, are yet not altogether able to consider truth by itself, whence the light of chastity shines — so that, when it comes to doing something contrary to truth, they shrink back and shudder, just as they flee from, and shudder at, doing something contrary to chastity. But the son who obeys the word that proceeds from his mouth will be so far from all falsehood, and there will be such signs, that, in order to help a man, he reckons no path closed to him through a lie, rather than that he should be compelled to pass through debauchery. And the Father hears him praying, that he may be able, without a lie, to snatch a man from ruin, that man whom the Father himself wills to be helped, by inscrutable ... Such a son, then, observes as much abstinence from lying as from sin. For the name of lying is sometimes used in the place of the name of sin."

IX. "Lies, then, are either to be avoided (ch. 21, or 22) by right acting, or to be confessed by repentance; but they are not to be increased by unhappily abounding in them, and by teaching them. But let him who thinks this the way choose it, whence he may help one in danger, of whatever sort of lies, and by whatever perjuries, provided that any kind of salvation for the man may be obtained — nonetheless, even among such men, let no cause lead us to perjury, and, if we shall have obtained this much at least, we shall judge these crimes at least equal to, or certainly not less than, debaucheries. For it must very often be considered that men provoke their wives, of whose adultery they are suspicious, to swear an oath — which assuredly they would not do, unless they believed that even those women who did not fear to commit adultery would fear to commit perjury. For indeed some unchaste women, who did not fear to deceive their husbands by a stealthy union, feared to deceive God, whom they had employed deceitfully as a false witness to the very husbands they had deceived... And if infirmity so far usurps for itself, that something is venially permitted to it which truth disapproves; nonetheless, so that you may inconcussedly maintain, in the divine religion, that one must never, absolutely, lie, hold fast — just as neither are adulterers to be sought out through adulteries, nor murderers through murders, nor sorcerers through sorceries, nor liars through lies, nor blasphemers to be sought through blasphemies — according to those things which we have disputed at such length in this volume, that we have scarcely arrived at that limit which we set for that place."

I. So that anyone may most easily perceive how opportunely I have prefixed Augustine's teaching against lying, before entering upon the most difficult controversy concerning the deceitful oath, it is worth setting forth beforehand certain general propositions, which are gathered, as it were, in summary, from St. Augustine's teaching, so that I may set them before the readers' eyes by a simple narration. Once I have explained these propositions, in comparison with the teaching of more recent authors, the discourse will return to them below.

II. All the difficulties which more recent writers turn over in their Books concerning equivocations and mental restrictions, and all the cases relevant to practice, St. Augustine brings under examination, both in his Book On Lying, and in that Against Lying. For, at the very beginning of the disputation, he attests that he wishes to institute a discourse concerning those expressions which greatly disturb the mind in daily speech; and he indicates the two chief purposes of his treatment: one, lest anyone wrongly condemn as a lie what is not a lie; the other, lest a lie be ever held lawful. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions; lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason" (Book on Lying, ch. 1).

III. The hinge of Augustine's disputation, in the two Books cited above chiefly, turns on this: that reasons be given for the concealment of truth in matters of the highest moment, such as for the preservation of life, of chastity, and for the keeping of secrets. And Augustine himself, with his own divine genius, could find no remedies beyond these which follow. The first is silence: "For most often," he says (Book Against Lying, ch. 10), "we conceal true things, not by lying, but by keeping silent." The other is an open and unconcealed signification, by which someone protests that he knows the truth, but is unwilling to reveal it: "I fear God, I do not betray them. I will neither betray, nor will I lie." No other way of concealing truth did Augustine recognize — not internal restrictions, not material locutions, not amphibologies of words, not other inventions of more recent authors, wherever they may be found.

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.

Lucius, a physician, asked a confessor what was to be done by him in these circumstances. Caius, a workman employed by Titius, had charge of a certain machine full of danger. One day Caius carelessly applied his mouth to a valve in the machine which he ought to have touched only with the instrument given for this purpose. A violent explosion followed and inflicted a grave wound upon Caius, so that he soon died. Before death he disclosed the cause of the explosion to Lucius alone, lest the insurance company hear of it and deny to his wife, destitute of other means of support, the sum of one thousand pounds for which his life had been insured. This in fact happened; for, because it suspected that some negligence of Caius had intervened, it refused to pay the money, and, when the wife of Caius brought an action against the company in a civil court, the company summoned Lucius as a witness. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a contract of insurance?

2. Can an entrusted secret be revealed, and when can or must it be revealed?

3. When questioned in courts, is a sole witness bound to disclose what he alone knows?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the contract of insurance?

In a contract of life insurance, with which we are here concerned, the insurer undertakes to pay a given sum to another upon the happening of a particular event contingent upon the duration of human life in consideration of the immediate payment of a smaller sum or certain equivalent periodical payments.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 554.

2. May a professional secret be revealed, or ought it to be revealed, and when?

Professional secrets may and ought to be revealed when this is necessary to avert serious harm to the public weal, and also when the person whose secret is in question is abusing it to cause serious harm to an innocent person.²

2 The same work, p. 472.

3. Is an only witness who is examined in court bound to give evidence on what he alone knows?

In canon law the axiom held—Testis unus testis nullus. However, in English law, as in most modern systems, a solitary witness is admitted as sufficient evidence of a fact, and so an only witness, if interrogated, will be obliged to give evidence, unless there is some reason to the contrary.³

3 The same work, p. 595.

4. The case. If Lucius knew how the accident happened from other sources than from Caius himself, as, e.g., from his examination of Caius’ wounds, or from other informants, he will be bound to state it when required in court to do so. If the only source of his knowledge was the communication made under secrecy by Caius himself, he should say that he does not know how the accident happened, if he is asked about it. It would then be a professional secret, which he is not bound to reveal in the circumstances of the case before us. Caius was not guilty of fraud; he was only thoughtless, and his wife may take the insurance money if she can get it.

Titius, a religious, is not rarely occupied in preaching the word of God and in giving missions to the people. Having returned to the monastery, he is accustomed to relate to the brethren marvelous things concerning what was seen and heard by him while he was outside the monastery. Almost all of them, however, are entirely fictitious, devised and uttered by Titius in order to increase the esteem of himself among the brethren and to delight them. Without scruple he also invents excusing causes in order that he may remain longer outside the monastery, and with them appeases the superior. He strongly maintains that he does not lie in acting thus, since he harms no one and the essence of a lie consists in the violation of another’s right to the truth. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a lie, and how many kinds are there?

2. In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a lie, and how many sorts of lies are there?

A lie is a speech against one’s mind. Lies are divided into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 464.

2. In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

Some would put the malice of lying in the denial to others of that to which they have a right. Others would say that it lies in the deceit practised on others. The common Catholic teaching follows St. Thomas in putting it in the disorder which is intrinsically in saying that which is known to be false. We have from nature the power of communicating our thoughts to our fellow men, and this power is necessary for a social being like man. Those thoughts which are to be communicated to others should be communicated truthfully, and there is a perversion of right order, if this is not done; the virtue of veracity is violated. As lying is intrinsically inordinate and wrong, it is never allowed to tell a lie.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 465.

3. The case. Titius, a Religious, frequently goes out of the monastery to preach. On his return he has wonderful things to tell the brethren, but for the most part, they are pure fabrications, invented to amuse his brethren and to add to his own reputation. He says he does nobody any harm by these tales, and that therefore he does not lie. Titius is wrong. Hurtful lies are not the only species; there are also jocose and officious lies, and Titius is guilty of jocose and officious lying. He says what he knows to be false, and he says it with the intention of deceiving others, or else there would be no prospect of his lies adding to his reputation. Much more is this the case when he invents reasons to be laid before the superior in order to excuse himself for making a longer stay than necessary out of the monastery. In this he is guilty of officious lying. He is also imperceptibly lessening his own estimation of the virtue of truth, and accustoming himself to trifle with it.

Titius, a Catholic advocate, asked a confessor in the sacred tribunal whether he was bound to reveal an occult impediment to marriage in these circumstances. The banns were recently proclaimed concerning the marriage soon to be entered into between Julius and Julia. Titius, however, had recently been consulted by Julius concerning the sum of money to be assigned for the support of his offspring begotten from secret fornication with the sister of Julia. Hence the confessor asks:

1. What is a secret, and how many kinds are there?

2. Is it lawful to reveal secrets, and for what cause?

3. What kind of obligation does the proclamation of banns introduce?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a secret, and how many sorts of secrets are there?

A secret is some hidden matter concerning another, which can not be made known without causing him injury or displeasure. Besides the secret of the seal of confession, which is treated of elsewhere, divines distinguish three kinds of secret: the natural secret, the promised secret, and the secret which is communicated under an express or implied contract of secrecy.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 470.

2. May secrets be revealed sometimes, and for what cause?

Natural and promised secrets may be revealed when the public good requires it, or when an innocent person can not otherwise be defended. Even professional secrets may be revealed when the public weal would otherwise suffer seriously, and when he whose secret is in question abuses the privilege of secrecy to do harm to an innocent person.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 471 and following.

3. What sort of obligation is imposed by the proclamation of banns?

A grave obligation is imposed of disclosing to the priest any known impediment of the marriage. Even if the impediment be known under natural or promised secrecy, the obligation to disclose it will arise. It will not arise usually if the secret be of the third and stricter kind.²

2 The same work, p. 265.

4. The case. Titius, a Catholic lawyer, wishes to know whether he is bound to make known to the parish priest the diriment impediment of affinity in the first degree in the collateral line which in his professional capacity he has learned exists between Julius and Julia, who are going to be married. No; he should not tell the parish priest, as the matter is a professional secret, but he should take an opportunity to warn Julius about the impediment, if Julius does not know of it, so that a dispensation may be applied for in time before the marriage.

Some years ago “Whole-time medical officer of health” wrote to the British Medical Journal, asking what he was to do in the following case: “A medical practitioner has consulted me under the following circumstances: He is attending a railway signalman for asthma. The attacks come on suddenly and are so severe that the patient falls on the floor, struggling for breath, and is totally incapacitated for an hour or longer. He has not yet had an attack in his signal-box, where he is on duty alone, sometimes for many hours at a time. The man declines to inform the railway company of his illness, thinking it would result in his discharge, or at least reduction of wages. The doctor is afraid that if he reports the case to the railway company who are not his employers, and therefore not entitled to a report from him, he will have to stand an action for damages brought against him by the patient. On the other hand, he fears that unless he breaks the seal of professional secrecy, there will probably be a railway accident, possibly on a large scale, as many London and other expresses traverse the line.”

We must take the facts of the case as stated. The signalman's complaint might at any time make him incapable of attending to his duties, and in the doctor's opinion there would probably be a big accident. The signalman had no right to continue at his post to the public danger; under the circumstances he was unfit to hold the post, as he could not, with reasonable certainty, guarantee that he would be able to fulfil its duties. His refusal to tell his employers threatened injury to them and to the public. In such a case the obligation to preserve even professional secrets ceases, and charity obliges anyone who is acquainted with the facts to make them known in the proper quarter. The doctor should therefore inform the company that the man is unfit to be left alone at his post. The rights of the public must be safeguarded, even at the expense of the individual.

Titius had entered into an engagement with Caia; when Julius, the physician of both families and a most intimate friend of the father of Caia, heard this, he was tormented by doubts of conscience. For under the secrecy of consultation he knew that Titius suffered from a syphilitic disease which would most certainly infect his future wife; hence he was uncertain whether he could or ought to disclose the condition of Titius to the father of Caia or not. Therefore, being a good Catholic, he approached a confessor to seek counsel. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and under what obligation is it to be concealed?

2. Is it lawful to reveal a secret, and when is it lawful or even obligatory?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This first question is answered on p. 337.

1. Honour is the attestation of another's excellence. Reputation is the opinion of many touching another's life and conduct. Honour is paid to a man to his face, whereas his reputation is bruited behind his back. Honour is taken away by insult, reputation by detraction. If the detraction involve a falsehood, it is called calumny or slander. The name backbiting, given to detraction, points to the absence of the person spoken of. But no one meets with an insult except where he is present, either in person or by his representative.

2. Both honour and reputation are goods that a man can call his own, and has a right to, but on different titles. Honour, some honour at least, appertains to a man simply for his being a man: reputation is won by deeds. Honour is primarily a connatural right: reputation is acquired. An entire stranger has no reputation, but a certain honour is his due to start with.

3. As there is a right to honour and a right to reputation, so insult and detraction are sins, not against charity, but against commutative justice, calling for restitution. (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 106.) We must tender an apology for an insult, and labour to restore the good name that our detracting tongue has taken away.

4. Calumny is a double sin, one sin against truth, and another sin, the heavier of the two, against justice. If the blackening tale be true, the first sin is absent, but the second is there. The truth of the story is no justification for our publishing it. Though it is wrong to lie, it is not always right to blurt out the truth, especially when we are not asked for it. There are unprofitable disclosures, unseasonable, harmful, and wrongful. But, it will be said, does not a man forego his right to reputation by doing the evil that belies his fair fame? No, his right remains, unless the evil that he does, either of its own proper working or by the scandal that it gives, be subversive of social order. If he has committed a crime against society, he is to be denounced to the authorities who have charge of society: they will judge him, and, finding him guilty, they will punish him and brand him with infamy. If, again, he does evil, though not immediately against society, yet in the face of society and before the sun; he shocks the public conscience and rends his own reputation. But the evil private and proper to himself that any man works in secret, is not society's care, nor affects his social standing, nor brings any rightful diminution to his good name. If all our secret and personal offences are liable to be made public by any observer, which of us shall abide it? Our character is our public character; and that is not forfeit except for some manner of public sin.

5. Suppose a veteran, long retired, has made a name for military prowess by boasting of battles wherein he never came into danger, is the one old comrade who remembers him for a skulker and a runaway, justified in showing him up? No, for that reputation, however mendaciously got together, is still truly a good possession: it is not a fruit of injustice, therefore it is no matter of restitution: nor is it any instrument of injustice, which the holder is bound to drop: thus, as he is not bound to forego it, now that he has got it, so his neighbour may not rightfully take it from him.

Reading.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 73, art. 1.

A recent work on "Social Diseases and Marriage" (Prince A. Morrow, M.D.) quotes the following case: "The father of a young woman asks information relative to the health of a young man (your patient) who is engaged to his daughter. 'I wish to ask, under the seal of secrecy, certain details as to his malady. I beg you to say whether I can or can not accept him as a son-in-law. I hope that you will take into consideration the embarrassment of a father placed between the desire to give to his daughter the husband of her choice and the fear of the results the marriage may have, if the hints that have been given me are unfortunately true.' In the case given above should the physician, entrenching himself behind the Hippocratic oath and the proscriptions of the law, guard an absolute silence, or, only interrogating his conscience, should he make it the judge of the secret confided to him, to divulge it, or be silent, according to circumstances?"

Answer.—Secrets committed to professional men, v. g., physicians, lawyers, etc., by reason of their profession are known in theology as "secreta commissa rigoroso." They impose an obligation, arising from strict justice, ex stricta justitia, and, therefore, in a grave matter they bind under pain of mortal sin. They impose a graver obligation than "secreta naturalia," or "secreta promissa." These latter are binding, ordinarily, "ex fidelitate tantum." The "secretum commissum rigorosum" binds under circumstances where otherwise the secret would have to be revealed, because the good of the public demands that the secret be kept inviolate. And, therefore, even though a judge in a court of law or other superior should lawfully ask for information that would involve the betrayal of a "secretum commissum," it would not be right to answer, and if there were no other means of guarding the secret, the physician or lawyer, etc., may and must answer by a flat denial of any knowledge of the subject. Of course the laws of civilized countries protect professional men in the keeping of professional secrets. In the work mentioned above the author quotes the opinions of a number of medical men, bearing on the case he cites, which it may be interesting to quote in this connection, as showing the attitude of the medical fraternity toward the duty of a physician to guard under any and all circumstances the medical secret. Dr. Langlebert, from whom the above case is cited, indicates the physician's duty in the circumstances as it appears to him as follows: He would answer the young woman's father, who wished to learn from him the condition of health of his prospective son-in-law, thus: "I regret that I can not give the information you ask. The best you can do, if you intend to carry out this project of marriage, is to inform the young man of the warnings you have received, or have him come with you, or send me a writing by which he authorizes me without restriction to say whether he can or can not espouse your daughter." The physician ought to interdict all kinds of information as to the health of a patient on the occasion of marriage; as a professional principle, an invariable rule of conduct, he should take refuge behind the proscriptions of the law. The alternative is cruel. It requires a certain courage in such cases for the physician to remain master of himself and faithful to his duty. If it be a misfortune to society, it would be a much greater damage to permit the enfeeblement of the tutelary principle of the medical secret, which is one of the necessities even of the social order.

Dr. Gaide, commenting on this case, says: "If a client affected with constitutional syphilis, which resists all treatment, does not fear to solicit the hand of a pure young woman, who is the joy of her family; if the father of this young woman comes to demand of me in confidence, if he can in all security give her to this man, who would soil her by his first contact and leave her as her only consolation children affected by his malady, shall we respond with a silence which may be misunderstood, and thus render ourselves accomplices of a marriage, the fruits of which will be so deplorable? Never would I have the courage to obey the law under such circumstances. My conscience would speak higher than it, and without hesitation I would say, 'No, do not give your daughter to this man,' and I would not add another word."

Juhel Renoy maintains that it is not only lawful, but even compulsory for any doctor who is a man of honor and courage, to oppose and even denounce any criminal projects his patients might entertain in regard to marriage. He cites two instances in which he had undertaken the cause of young girls who were about to fall into a trap of this kind, and as his patients were without conscience, he refused to listen to the moral reason he adduced, he declared that he did not feel bound to secrecy toward them any longer, and that he would either go or send to the parents of the young women and warn them. Under this threat one of these marriages was broken off, but a more direct interference was required in the other case. He sent for the girl's father by one of his confreres, and replied without hesitation to the question put to him, "No, sir, do not marry your daughter to Mr. X," with so much emphasis that the marriage was broken off.

Commenting on this action of Renoy, Dr. Jullien says: "If the result was fortunate, the method employed was detestable. It was treason, perpetrated with the best intentions, but still treason, for it is all very well to say the patients were warned, but it was not until they were no longer masters of their secret, which would no doubt not have been revealed if they had known what use there was to be made of it. Strict duty would have required that before receiving this confidence our confrere should have warned the parties interested, that he would publish the information if he saw fit."

Dr. Morrow, from whose excellent work these extracts have been made, expresses his own opinion on this subject in the following words: "While the obligation of the medical secret is in the general interest of the social order, and should be maintained as a fixed principle of professional conduct, it may be admitted that a situation of a peculiarly aggravating character may present itself when the patient shows himself an exceptional sort of brute by the obstinacy with which he adheres to his criminal purposes after he is assured that he will almost certainly infect his wife—in such a case the physician, knowing all the circumstances and fully appreciating the tragic significance of such a step, must be guided by his own lights and conscience. If he should consider the criminal intent of this monster as entirely without the pale of professional protection, and refuse to stifle his own feelings as a man of heart and conscience, who shall condemn him? Such a man is far more likely to prove loyal to the highest ideals of ethical duty in his relations with his patients in general than the man who views these social catastrophes with a cold-blooded indifference, disclaiming all personal responsibility, and considers that in guarding the dissolute secret of his patient he is doing his whole professional duty."

It is clear from these extracts, and from the opinions of many other medical men which might be quoted, that the medical fraternity is not at all united as to the ethics of revealing the medical secret, even in an extreme case, like the one we give. The subject indeed is fraught with much difficulty. Those who hold that it is never allowed to betray the medical secret, not even to prevent the commission of a crime, maintain that the social welfare would suffer more, eventually, by the revelation of the secret than by its keeping. For the very ones who have most need of confiding in a physician are the very ones who would be most deterred from such confidence, by the knowledge that the physician might under certain circumstances lawfully betray their secret. And it was in this conviction, they say, that the laws of many countries make it a crime for the physician to reveal his patient's secret for any purpose whatsoever, even to protect the innocent or to prevent the commission of a crime. Thus the French Penal Code, art. 378, decrees that "physicians, surgeons and other officers of health, also pharmacists, midwives and all other persons, the depositaries, by their state or profession, of secrets which have been confided to them, outside of cases where the law obliges them to denounce, who shall reveal their secrets shall be punished with imprisonment from one to six months, and by a fine of from one hundred to five hundred francs." And recently in England, the House of Lords sustained the decree of the lower court, punishing an eminent physician by an enormous fine for having revealed to the wife, to protect her from contamination, the medical secret of her husband, who was one of his patients.

A German court, on the other hand, decided in 1903 that the obligation to secrecy on part of the physician ceases when a higher moral obligation urges him to divulge the truth. In the instance of husband and wife the court considers the physician as permitted} and even in duty bound, even against the expressed will of the sick partner, to apprise the other of a danger of infection. The court adds that such higher moral obligation may well be present also in instances other than between husband and wife.

In the case before us it must always be kept in mind that the patient, who has committed his secret to the physician, is going to commit a crime, a moral, if not a legal crime, most odious in its nature and most far-reaching and destructive in its effects. The physician is the only one who can prevent the commission of the crime, because he alone knows the secret. All his pleading, all his admonitions, all his denunciations to the patient in private are of no avail. The crime will be committed, unless the physician breaks his professional silence and reveals the secret of his patient. Does strict justice toward the patient oblige the doctor to secrecy under these circumstances? Does the welfare of the social order demand that even in this extreme case the secret of the criminal shall be guarded inviolate, though he is about to perpetrate a great wrong? The theologians are unanimous that in a case like this neither justice toward the patient nor the interests of the social order require of a physician that he keep inviolate the secret of a patient who is determined to commit a crime, the cause of which crime or the incentive to it is contained in the secret.

This is the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (de oct. praec. 971): “An entrusted secret may be disclosed for a just cause, namely, if keeping the secret would result in common harm, or harm to another innocent person, or even harm to the person who entrusted it, because then the order of charity demands that it be revealed.”

Salmanticenses (tr. xiii., de restitut. cap. 4, n. 82): “Likewise, even an entrusted secret must be revealed whenever its observance tends toward common harm or the harm of some innocent person, because a secret cannot bind against the charity owed to another; rather, from charity we must ward off harm to the community and to the innocent person.”

Lugo (de Just. et J. disp. 14, n. 142): “Even an entrusted secret has no place in those cases in which the very person who entrusted the secret unjustly harasses the commonwealth or another innocent person and is unwilling to desist from the injury; for then, insofar as it is necessary to avert the injury, you may reveal the entrusted secret, even if you had promised and bound yourself to endure death and any evils whatsoever for keeping the secret. For this does not prevent one afterward from repelling force with force.”

This is the doctrine also of modern moralists, v. g., Lehmkuhl, Konings, Genicot, Noldin, etc., as will appear from a consultation of their treatises on the eighth commandment. It can scarcely be maintained with any good show of reason that the interests of society demand that a criminal be shielded, while committing a crime, by guarding his secret. It will not interfere with the free and confidential relations between physician and patient if it is understood by the patient that his secret may be revealed if such revelation be necessary to prevent him committing a crime. The physician's duty toward society and toward an innocent third party outweighs and ought to outweigh his duty toward a patient contemplating a crime against the community at large or an innocent private citizen. It would make for immorality to close the mouth of a physician in such circumstances. Of course, the physician must endeavor by every other legitimate means in his power to dissuade the patient from committing the crime before it becomes lawful for him to have recourse to the extreme measure of revealing his secret. But it can be no part of the contract entered into by patient and physician, that the physician shall be silent when his silence becomes immoral, as it does when it aids and abets the commission of crime.

To this line of reasoning it may be objected that it calls into question the morality of the laws of many civilized nations, prohibiting the revelation of the medical secret even in as extreme a case as the one under discussion. To this we answer in the words of the author quoted above:

"It is worthy of note that in Europe there is manifest a growing dissatisfaction upon the part of many medical men, amounting in some instances to an active protest, against the intangibility of the medical secret, especially its inflexible application in cases where the question of marriage is concerned. As indicating the drift of professional sentiment in this direction, in the discussion upon the 'Sanitary Guarantees of Marriage,' before the Societe Franchise de Prophylaxie Sanitaire et Morale, July, 1903, many authoritative voices were raised against the dogma of the professional secret in the matter of marriage. M. Forin demanded 'that the law authorize the physician to no longer respect the professional secret, when it comes to a project of marriage.' In the opinion of M. Crequy 'the medical secret ought to have exceptions which in the superior interest of the race, should also apply to venereal maladies.' MM. Cruet and Valentino presented essays demanding the relaxation of the medical secret in cases where the interests of the individual protected were opposed to the general interests. M. Valentino declares that professional secrecy is the most powerful obstacle to all real hygienic progress, as by keeping concealed all morbid conditions, it impedes the efforts of the social forces against the spread of disease, renders ineffective the law for the compulsory notification of infectious diseases, and prevents the sanitary protection of marriage."

It is hardly necessary to remark that the physician is bound toward the innocent third party only "ex caritate." Toward his patients he is bound "ex justitia"; toward others "ex caritate." Now charity does not bind "cum tanto incommodo." Consequently wherever the physician would incur serious risk, as legal prosecution, or loss of practice, etc., he is not obliged to protect an innocent third party from injury, by revealing the medical secret.

N. B.—What is said here about the medical secret, applies to all secrets committed to priests outside of Confession, to lawyers, midwives, nurses, druggists, dentists, in short, all professional men who by reason of their profession are made the guardians of the secrets of others.

A young unmarried girl is criminally with child. Her mother sends her to a lying-in hospital in a distant city before anything is known by the neighbors of her condition. The mother pretends to her other children and to the neighbors that her daughter is employed in a store in New York. She tells them frankly that she is. After the birth of the daughter’s baby and before her return home, the mother tells the neighbors that her daughter does not like New York and is coming home. Finally the daughter arrives home and continues the deception, giving many details of her “store experience” in New York and what she thought of the city. Of course she had not been in New York at all. Is it lawful for the mother and daughter to say these things which they know are untrue, and to deceive others, even though their object in practising this deception is quite good and praiseworthy? Is it not making the end justify the means and doing evil that good ‘may come from it?

Answer.—A writer in the review Ami du Clergé some years ago said well: There is no matter in moral theology so involved and so headsplitting as the theory of lying. “Il nest pas des matieres en morale aussi embrouillées, aussi casse-téte que la théorte du mensonge.” The source of all the difficulty seems to be the definition of a lie, as generally accepted by the theologians. That definition was first given by St. Augustine and from him has been adopted by practically all Catholic theologians. St. Augustine defines a lie as locutio contra mentem. This definition, I say, has been adopted by the Latin fathers and by Catholic theologians generally. Cardinal Newman says: “The Greek fathers thought that, when there was a justa causa an untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with great misgiving; and whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that there can be no just cause of untruth.” (Apologia, Note G.) The principle that it is never allowed to tell a lie, seems to be deep seated in the human conscience and to be admitted by all, just as it is universally admitted that it is not allowed to steal, or to murder. There can be no quarrel about the principle. It is only when we come to define a lie that the trouble begins. If it be admitted that all lying is sinful, and if we accept St. Augustine’s definition of a lie, as Catholic moralists generally do, locutio contra mentem ad decipiendum prolata, then it follows that every time we speak contrary to what is in our mind for the purpose of deceiving others, we lie and, therefore, we commit sin. But it is admitted, on the other hand, by all moralists that there are cases when it is permitted to say the thing that is not in our mind, even with the intention of deceiving others, and according to the definition just given, that would be a lie. For instance, there are times when it is impossible to keep a secret that must be kept at all hazards, except by saying the thing that is not in our mind. Of course the theologians were perfectly cognizant of this all the while, but still the definition of a lie, borrowed from St. Augustine, had taken such deep root in Catholic theology that it could not easily be retouched or revised. On the one hand they admitted that the definition made all speaking contrary to what was in the speaker’s mind, a lie; but on the other hand they could not deny that there were cases when it was lawful to say the thing that was not in one’s mind. To save the definition, and at the same time to save the truth, the theologians were compelled to invent the artificial theory of mental reservations. Though elaborated with great skill and ingenuity, the theory is quite artificial and invented solely for the purpose of permitting one to do that which one was Clearly bound to do, but which the doctrine of lying, as generally expounded, seemed to condemn. “Jn these later times,’ says Card. Newman, “this doctrine (of St. Augustine) has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely taught that though all untruths are lies, yet that certain equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.”

Archbishop Kenrick says: “It is confessed by all Catholics that in the common intercourse of life all ambiguity of language is to be avoided; but it is debated whether such ambiguity is ever lawful. Most theologians answer in the affirmative, supposing a grave cause urges, and the true mind of the speaker can be collected from the adjuncts, though in fact it be not collected.”

To use mental reservations or equivocations without a just and sufficient cause is sinful. But when it becomes necessary to dissemble or to mislead in order to keep a secret or to repel an impertinent inquirer, or when dealing with children, it is lawful to equivocate, or rather to play upon words or to use evasions. This is the ordinary doctrine given in the text-books of moral theology. Objection has been made to the whole theory of mental reservation on the ground that it is an artificial system, suited only to the learned and the cultivated, but of no avail for the simple minded and the ignorant. Thus, while the learned and the ignorant speak the same thing, the learned and quick-witted save themselves from the sin of lying by using a mental reservation, while the simple and ignorant, not versed in the theory of mental reservation, find themselves in the necessity of telling a lie.

Fr. Genicot says that we need not find fault if the simple minded and uneducated call a lawful lie what the theologians call abroad mental reservation (Moral I, p. 378). Of course the difficulty remains that these same simple minded and uneducated people don’t know that there are lawful lies. They think every lie is a sin, and still they feel compelled sometimes to tell lies or untruths as the only means left them for concealing the truth or for keeping a secret.

Fr. Berardi has this to say on the subject: “The theologians seem to have experienced an excessive fear of these condemnations (three propositions regarding lying condemned by Pope Innocent XI, 1679), and introduced into this matter incredible confusion. They first of all taught that a strict mental reservation could never, for no object whatever, become lawful, because it is always a lie and intrinsically evil. They say that a mental reservation in a strict or narrow sense is one whose meaning can not, morally speaking, be detected, as for example, if one, when asked if Peter is alive, should answer: “No, he is dead,” meaning civilly dead, either by reason of some crime or because he has entered a religious order. But then they admit that it would not be making use of a strict mental reservation if an adulteress should maintain that she was innocent of adultery when questioned about it (meaning that she had been made innocent by sacramental confession!), or that she had never committed adultery (meaning by adultery, idolatry!) (S. Alf. Ill, 162). How does this square with the definition of a pure mental reservation, just given, which the theologians say is never allowed? If they had said that the woman could deny her sin, at the same time using the reservation “that I should tell you,’ I would not find fault. But that they should deny that a pure mental reservation, or one whose sense can not be divined, is sufficient to excuse a lie and a sin, and nevertheless concede that these same reservations are no longer purely or strictly mental, but intelligible, that is something that I can not understand” (Praxis Conf. I, 1092).

If a theologian as competent as Berardi finds difficulty in applying practically the theory of mental reservation, it will be readily understood how the simple and ignorant are quite unable to use it as a means of concealing a truth or keeping a secret from those who have no right to know it. In the face of this insurmountable difficulty many moralists think that the definition of a lie, as commonly given in the text-book ought to be revised; that is to say, it ought to be made to read something like this: A lie consists in speaking contrary to one’s mind, with the intention of deceiving one who has a right to the truth. If the person has no right to the truth it ought not to be called a lie if the truth is concealed from him by saying the thing that is not in one’s mind.

Such speaking against one’s mind might be called an untruth, but not a lie. Not every taking of human life is murder, and not every taking of another’s goods is stealing, and, therefore, not every speaking contrary to one’s mind ought to be called lying. As there is taking of human life that is justifiable, and, therefore, not sinful, and as there is taking of another’s property that is not stealing, and, therefore, not a sin, so there must be untruths that are not lies and, therefore, not sinful. There are many occasions when a person has no right to know the truth and to deny the truth to such a person is justifiable and, therefore, not sinful.

Of course there is a difficulty here in the case of exceptions to the rule of veracity, and it is “that very little external help is given us in drawing the line as to when untruths are allowable and when not; whereas that sort of killing which is not murder is most definitely marked off by legal enactments, so that it can not possibly be mistaken for such killing as is murder. On the other hand the cases of exemption from the rule of veracity are left to the private judgment of the individual, and he may easily be led on from acts which are allowable to acts which are not.... If I had my own way I would oblige society, that is, its great men, its lawyers, its divines, its literature, publicly to acknowledge as such, those instances of untruth which are not lies, as for instance, untruths in war; and then there could be no perplexity to the individual Catholic, for he would not be taking the law into his own hands” (Card. Newman).

If this woman and her daughter thought that it was lawful for them, under the circumstances, to say something that was not true, in order to hide the truth from those who had no right to know it, then we would say that they told an untruth, but not a lie, or if a lie, then only a material lie. Murder is the formal transgression of the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” but accidental homicide is the material transgression. The matter of the act is the same in both cases; but in the homicide there is nothing more than the act; whereas in murder there must be the intention, which constitutes the formal sin. So a man who simply to keep himself from starving takes a loaf that is not his own commits only the material, and not the formal, act of stealing, that is, he does not commit a sin.

So we say, that if a person says something that is not true in order to keep a secret that must be kept, then such a person commits the material, but not the formal, act of lying. “If I allow of silence, why not of the method of material lying, since half of a truth is often a lie? And, again, if all killing be not murder, nor all taking from another stealing, why must all untruths be lies? Now I will say freely that I think it difficult to answer this question, whether it be urged by St. Clement or by Milton” (Card. Newman, Apol., Note G).

Colius has, in a fit of jealousy, murdered a young man, and in order to divert suspicion from himself, has left in the neighborhood of the corpse the hat and knife of his friend Florus, who had been living in enmity with the murdered man. The police discovered these articles and arrested Florus. The latter is finally found guilty and sentenced to death. Then Colius, in troubled conscience, hastens to his confessor, Father Clemens, who absolves him without hesitation, with the remark that no one is obliged to accuse himself. With little faith in this explanation Colius turned to another confessor, Father Severus. This priest refused absolution until Colius would, even with danger to his own life, free by self-accusation the innocent Florus from his unfortunate position. Colius is now perplexed. Which confessor must be obeyed, and why?

1. In the case of Colius there are present all conditions that establish the strict obligation of restitution. He is guilty of having caused the misfortune of Florus. The remarks of the first confessor that no one is obliged to accuse himself is, in this sense, and especially in application to this case, palpably incorrect. If there is merely question of one’s own punishment, then it is true that no one is obliged to accuse himself. If, on the contrary, self-accusation is the necessary and only adequate means to make good a wrong committed, such as in our case, then it may become a strict obligation.

2. With far more apparent justification it might be said that Colius, by depositing hat and knife of his friend, became merely the occasion (occasio), but not actually the cause (causa efficiens) of the latter’s conviction. Lehmkuhl says (Theol. mor. I. 997): If someone by positive fraud turns suspicion of a crime upon another, it must be considered whether that fraud could reasonably have moved them to regard and punish the other as guilty. If it did, the arousing of suspicion was the effective cause of the harm; but if others rashly condemned the other person, we have only an occasion of the harm.

Then he cites the case of a thief who throws some of the stolen coins before the door of another, who finds the same, takes them, and in the subsequent investigation is held and punished as the thief. In this case, the author explains, the real thief’s action is merely the occasio, not the causa efficiens of the resulting conviction. And rightly so, for although I may possess coins that another has stolen, there is no sufficient reason to hold me as the thief. I may have obtained possession of these coins in a perfectly innocent way. How, then, about Colius’s action? He left hat and knife of Florus beside the murdered man. Was the presence of these articles near the corpse sufficient reason for considering Florus to be the perpetrator, and to condemn him to death? One may doubt this. The possibility of the true state of facts will not be overlooked by a deliberate judge, because the trick of throwing suspicion upon others is not unusual with criminals, and Florus will certainly have stated that hat and knife had been stolen from him. If it is remembered that Florus had lived in enmity with the murdered man, the presence of these articles might well lead to a verdict of guilty against Florus, without justifying a charge of bias against jury or judge. Colius, while not responsible for the additional motive for suspicion, has nevertheless made use of it intentionally, to divert more surely suspicion from himself; he knew that because of this circumstance his act could more surely draw down upon Florus bad results. He who gives to a sick person a poison that would not kill a healthy person, is guilty of murder nevertheless, if he knew beforehand the fatal effects of the poison, and yet gave it.

Colius could and did know that by leaving hat and knife of a man who had lived at enmity with the murdered man he might easily bring about his conviction. Hence he is all the more the moral cause of it, and is obliged to avert the threatened danger from Florus, even though he must assume it himself. Colius was conscious of this heavy responsibility; for this reason he was not satisfied with the decision of the first confessor. For this reason also it will be relatively easy to induce him to the actual fulfilment of his duty. It is not necessary that Colius should give himself up and expose himself to punishment; it suffices if he declares the matter before competent, credible witnesses, and lets them take further action while he puts his own person in safety. Jacob Linden, S.J.

Case.—William, a native of New England, moved to Canada in order to live down the stigma of illegitimate birth. Here he was successful in business and finally married a lady of good family, concealing from her the condition of his birth. A few years later, James, a friend of his, traveling through Canada and hearing of William’s marriage, intending no harm, divulged the hidden facts to a distant relative of William’s wife, who, of course, immediately reported the matter to her. Hereupon the expected happened. James, conscience-stricken, hurried to Confession, only to be told that he had fallen into mortal sin.

Question.—Was James guilty of mortal sin?

Solution.—This is a case of detraction, and a grave case. Every man, by the law of God, has a right to his reputation. His good name is worth more to him than his bank account and, therefore, No one may steal this valuable asset, any more than he may steal his neighbor’s purse, without falling into serious sin. The reason for this is evident. Grave and often irremediable harm is done, and this unjustly, in depriving one of his good name. In the present case we have a forceful exemplification of this. William’s wife’s parents would never have given their daughter to him in marriage, had they been aware of the defect which stigmatized William when he came into this world. For it is a fact that spurious children are frequently looked down upon, and treated as outcasts, though the curse that comes upon them is none of their own doing.

Secondly, the knowledge of the existence of this blot often interferes with the good of the marriage, affecting at times the primary as well as the secondary end of the union. It is a widely accepted theory that children of ill-gotten parents receive as an inheritance a disposition which early shows tendencies to various evils, especially to that of lust; and though this be by no means universal, it occurs frequently enough to create a feeling of aversion to a marriage of legitimate with illegitimate offspring. This feeling of moral infection, with its partiality towards moral degeneration of the family tree, naturally causes parents to throw every impediment in the way of marriage between their children and the spurious.

From this we can see what a shock the revelation of the defect in William’s birthright brought to his wife and her relations. To realize that they had been deceived by him was cause plenty for grief; but add to this the feeling that their family escutcheon had been dishonored, and the purity of their blood tarnished, and we face a condition well calculated to destroy all harmony—all peace in that family. Here then is another and serious result of James’s garrulousness.

He has succeeded then in lowering William in the eyes of his wife and her relatives, if not in the eyes of his own children; he has put enmity between husband and wife, which frequently leads to the divorce court; he belittles William in his own estimation, and thus, in robbing him of what was most precious, he certainly has committed a very serious mortal sin. The fact that he did not intend the harm does not acquit him; he must have foreseen the effect that would necessarily follow from his revelation; hence, he must accept the responsibility entailed by that revelation.

Case.—Rusticus grievously calumniated the deceased Strigonius in a newspaper article, and this article found many believers; it can not be said that the calumny has been forgotten; with many at least this is not the case. Rusticus had had few scruples about his action, as the honor and good name of the dead had been to him a matter of indifference; on his death-bed, however, he was much disturbed about the matter and told his confessor about it. The latter insists that the defamatory article be retracted, and that this take place publicly, because the calumny was a public one, and has not yet passed into oblivion; he grants, however, that this retraction may be so made as not to put the retractor in a bad light, if this can be done. Rusticus opines that it cannot be done without hurting his honor; and since in cases where they clash, the love of self, ceteris paribus, has precedence over the love of the neighbor, it appears here that restitution is a moral impossibility. In order however to do everything morally possible, Rusticus begged forgiveness of the son and the heirs of Strigonius, asking them at the same time to release him from formal retraction. All this was agreed to by the son of Strigonius.

152. Duties to others founded on the mutual relationship of our minds are violated by all falsehood and, particularly, by the propagation of false principles. Duties arising from the relationship of our wills are violated by bad example or scandal, which tends to deprave the wills of others.

153. A falsehood, or lie, is speech contrary to one's mind. By a falsehood, a contradiction is willfully established between a person's thoughts and the received expression of those thoughts. For this reason, a falsehood contains a moral disorder and is essentially wrong.

Lying must be distinguished from equivocation and mental reservation.

154. Equivocation consists in using an expression readily susceptible of two meanings, one false, the other true, which the listener or reader can, and often will, understand wrongly. Thus we read (Gen. xii. 13), that, on entering Egypt, Abraham instructed Sarai to call herself his sister, the Hebrew word for sister being often used to denote a near female relative. He did this because his life would not have been safe if she were known to be his wife. In the matter of liceity, equivocation is generally classed with mental reservation which is not purely mental.

155. "Mental reservation is the unexpressed qualification of a statement affecting or entirely altering its meaning as understood by the person addressed, generally so that the uttered statement is untrue, though with the qualification it is true." (Standard Dictionary, 1894.)

It consists, therefore, in withholding a circumstance by which a statement is qualified in such a manner that the statement is false as it stands, although it is true if joined to the qualifying circumstance. When it is strictly mental, i. e., when there is nothing either in the words or in the circumstances that can prevent the hearer from being deceived, it is equivalent to a lie and therefore essentially wrong. But when the reservation is not strictly mental, it may be allowed at times; yet not without weighty reasons, else speech would become unreliable and social confidence would be impaired. If, however, reservation were never lawful, the common good or great private good would often have to be sacrificed without sufficient reason, for it may often happen that important secrets cannot be protected without mental reservation. One example will suffice: a man to whom an official secret has been intrusted may answer, if interrogated on the subject, that he does not know, meaning thereby that he does not know the matter in such a way as to be able to communicate it.

The objection may be raised that mental reservation is always wrong because it leads others into error, and, consequently, inflicts an injury upon them. We answer that he who uses a mental reservation, as an unavoidable means, intends directly to save a private person or the public from injury; and that, in so doing, he is not the cause but the justifiable occasion of error in the mind of the rash questioner.

156. Thesis VIII. A lie is intrinsically evil.

Proof 1. It is intrinsically evil to use a thing contrary to its natural end. But the natural end of speech is to communicate our thoughts to our fellow-men, and a lie is the contrary of the thoughts of him who utters it. Therefore, a lie is contrary to the natural end of speech and is intrinsically evil.

Proof 2. The universal shame attached to lying is an evident sign that, by the common consent of mankind, it is held to be wrong in itself. This is made clearer by the application of the simple text, "Do not do unto others, etc." Does any person wish to be deceived? Lying, then, is an evil to the intellect which no one wishes to suffer, for no one wishes to be deceived.

Proof 3. Man is by nature a social being; hence it is the will of the Author of Nature that he shall live in society. Therefore, whatever tends to subvert human society is intrinsically wrong. But lying tends to do this, because it weakens mutual confidence, which is essential for human society.

157. Objections.

1. That cannot be wrong which all civilized nations allow in their courts of justice; but they allow the guilty to plead "not guilty." Answer. "Not guilty," pleaded in a criminal court, is an accepted technicality meaning "not proved guilty."

2. That is not wrong which is related by Holy Scripture concerning virtuous men; but it is there related that Jacob said, "I am Esau, thy first-born" (Gen. xxvii. 19). Answer. Jacob regarded himself, after purchasing Esau's right of primogeniture, as legally Esau the first-born. Besides, Holy Scripture does not approve all the deeds which it chronicles of good men.

3. Our Blessed Saviour Himself declared that He was not going up to Jerusalem, and yet eventually He went thither (John vii. 8). Answer. Our Lord did not go up to Jerusalem on that particular festival day of which He was speaking at the time, but He went up on the third or fourth day afterwards.

4. But He denied that He knew when the end of the world should come (Mark xiii. 32). Answer. Our Lord spoke mystically as man and not as God; so He was understood by His disciples, as in other like passages, e. g., "My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me."

165. Honor is the esteem in which a man is held by his fellow-men. Considered radically, or in its cause, it is a man's real excellence. Since all men have naturally, as beings endowed with rational faculties and destined for an exalted end, a certain high excellence, all men are naturally entitled to a certain honor. Still, as all men are not gifted with equal excellence, they are not all entitled to equal honor. A person may lose some of his claims to be honored or respected by others. It may be necessary for the common good, or even for some considerable private good, that the vices of an individual be exposed and his honor thus lessened.

Honor is unjustly impaired by: 1. Insult, or contumely, consisting in open, deliberate expressions of contempt; 2. Calumny, or false accusation; 3. Detraction, or the disclosure of another's secret faults to any one who has not a right to know them. The last two faults are still further specified as offenses against another's good name.

166. Thesis XII. It is unlawful to impair another's honor, and necessary to make amends for its violation.

Proof. We are obliged to love others as we love ourselves; but to lessen another's honor is not to love him as we love ourselves, for we would not have others do this unto us. We wish our honor to be respected, (a) as something valuable for its own sake and prized as such by noble minds; (b) as a protection of our rights, for a man in bad repute is more apt to suffer wrong and has little if any influence towards conciliating favor.

A man is obliged to make good the damage or loss which he has caused to another's honor or good name. Since justice demands that every one shall have his due, the honor unjustly taken away is due to him from whom it has been taken and must, as far as is possible, be restored.

167. Duelling, a practice handed down from the paganism of northern Europe, was once extensively used as a means for protecting or recovering personal honor. Happily, it has fallen into contempt and consequent disuse.

168. Thesis XIV. Duelling is opposed to the natural law.

Proof. A duel is a fight between two parties with murderous weapons, undertaken by private authority and according to previous appointment. Now, such an act is intrinsically wrong, and therefore opposed to the natural law. The act is intrinsically wrong, because it has the malice both of suicide and of murder. 1. A principal in a duel exposes his life without a just and reasonable cause, and he does this deliberately and by pre-arrangement. 2. He deliberately seeks the life of a fellow-man on his own private authority and without being forced by necessary self-defense.

169. Objections.

1. David is praised for his duel with Goliath. Answer. A single combat, authorized by the civil power as a means of warfare, is not a duel in the sense here attached to the word.

2. A duel may be necessary to avoid the imputation of cowardice. Answer. It would be moral cowardice to do a wrong action through human respect.

3. It is lawful to slay the unjust assailant of a man's honor, since many value honor more highly than life. Answer. Life can sometimes be defended only by striking down the unjust aggressor; but this is not true of a man's honor or good name. Moreover, the esteem in which one man is held by others is not more precious than life, though this is true of honor considered radically or in its cause, i. e., personal excellence and virtue.

4. According to the general opinion, a woman may kill the assailant of her honor, or virtue, if there be no other means of escape. Answer. Honor in this case means more than a good name; it means bodily chastity, which its owner has a right to defend as a priceless possession (No. 163, i).