Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Comprising all that concerns charity in itself
[Charity is also called love. Love is an inclination toward good. For the good proposed to the appetite moves and inclines it toward itself like a weight, according to the most famous saying of Augustine, book XIII of the Confess., ch. 9, n. 10 : « My weight is my love ; by it I am carried wherever I am carried. » This inclination of the appetite toward good is called love or complacency. If it is with the election of one good over another, it is called dilection. If it is of a good that is esteemed at a great price, it is called charity. If finally it is with mutual affection, it is called friendship. Love therefore extends more widely than dilection, charity and friendship.
[Charitas dicitur etiam amor. Amor est inclinatio in bonum. Bonum enim propositum appetitui, quasi pondus ipsum movet et inclinat ad se, secundum notissimum Augustini effatum, lib. XIII Confess., c. 9, n. 10 : « Pondus meum amor meus ; eo feror quocumque feror. » Ista inclinatio appetitus in bonum dicitur amor seu complacentia. Si sit cum electione unius boni prae alio, dicitur dilectio. Si sit boni quod magno pretio aestimatur, dicitur charitas. Si tandem sit cum redamatione, dicitur amicitia. Amor igitur latius patet quam dilectio, charitas et amicitia.
Love is threefold : 1° natural, by which each thing, even non-cognitive, appetites the good suitable to itself; thus a heavy body is said to love the center. 2° animal or sensitive, which follows the apprehension of the senses, and is found also in brutes. 3° rational, which follows the apprehension of the intellect, and this again is twofold, namely of concupiscence, which tends to the object that is loved; and of benevolence, which tends to the person for whom it is loved, and if in addition there be a return of affection on the part of the person loved, it will be the love of friendship. What is loved with the love of benevolence is loved simply and in itself; but what is loved with the love of concupiscence is not loved simply and in itself, but is loved for another. Hence the love of benevolence is love simply, and the love of concupiscence is love in a certain respect.]
Amor est triplex : 1° naturalis, quo unaquaeque res etiam non cognoscitiva appetit bonum sibi conveniens, ut grave dicitur amare centrum. 2° animalis seu sensitivus, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensuum, et est etiam in brutis. 3° rationalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem intellectus, et est iterum duplex, scilicet concupiscentiae, qui tendit in obiectum quod amatur; benevolentiae, qui tendit in personam cui amatur, et in hoc ultimo si quae sit redamatio ex parte personae amatae, erit amor amicitiae. Quod amatur amore benevolentiae, simpliciter et per se amatur; quod autem amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Unde amor benevolentiae est amor simpliciter, et amor concupiscentiae est amor secundum quid. Quaestio est hic de charitate habituali.]
Habitual charity is usually defined thus : « A virtue divinely infused, by which God is loved for Himself and the neighbor for God. »
Charitas habitualis definiri solet : « Virtus divinitus infusa, qua Deus propter se et proximus propter Deum diligitur. »
You will ask 1° whether charity is properly called friendship with God.
Petes 1° utrum charitas sit proprie dicta amicitia cum Deo.
I answer. Charity is true and properly called friendship between God and man123 123 Here q. 23, a. 1, o.
Resp. Charitas est vera et proprie dicta amicitia inter Deum et hominem123 123 Hic q. 23, a. 1, o.
Proof. 1° from Scripture124 : Christ, John, XV, 14 et 15, says to the Apostles : You are my friends, and : I will no longer call you servants. But I have called you friends. James, II, 23 : Abraham was called the friend of God. Ps., CXXXVIII, 17 : Exceedingly magnified are thy friends, O God. Now nothing can be assigned whereby men are the friends of God except charity. 124 Ibid., o.
Prob. 1° ex Scriptura124 : Christus, Ioann., XV, 14 et 15, dicit Apostolis : Vos amici mei estis, et : Iam non dicam vos servos. Vos autem dixi amicos. Iacob., II, 23 : Abraham amicus Dei appellatus est. Psal., CXXXVIII, 17 : Nimis honorificati sunt amici tui, Deus. Nihil autem assignari potest quo homines sint Dei amici, nisi charitas. 124 Ibid., o.
Proof. 2° For true and properly so-called friendship three conditions are commonly required125 : first, that the love be of benevolence, whereby we wish good to someone for his sake; not of concupiscence, whereby we wish good for our own sake. The second condition is that the love be mutual; for a friend is a friend to his friend, and is called as it were one who loves back (amicatus), so that such love is as it were a bond between two. The third condition is that this mutual love be founded on some sharing; for those who share in nothing have no union with one another. Now these three conditions are found in the love of charity. Therefore. 125 Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.
Prob. 2° Ad veram et proprie dictam amicitiam tres conditiones communiter requiruntur125 : prima, quod amor sit benevolentiae, quo volumus alicui bonum propter ipsum; non concupiscentiae, quo volumus bonum propter nos. Secunda conditio est, ut amor sit mutuus; amicus enim est amico amicus, et dicitur quasi amicatus, ita ut talis amor sit quasi nexus inter duos. Tertia conditio est, quod ille amor mutuus fundetur in aliqua communicatione; qui enim in nullo communicant, nullam inter se habent coniunctionem. Atqui hae tres conditiones reperiuntur in amore charitatis. Ergo. 125 Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.
It is proved 1° By charity man loves God for Himself as last end, and God loves man for his sake, not as for His last end, but for his benefit, or as for the subject to whom He wills eternal beatitude, and thus on both sides it is love of benevolence. 2° It is mutual love; for by charity we love him who loves us, according to that text, Prov., VIII, 17 : I love them that love me, and, John, XIV, 21 : He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him. 3° There is a communication of beatitude here through grace in right and in hope, in heaven in fact. Therefore.
Probatur 1° Per charitatem homo diligit Deum propter se ut ultimum finem, et Deus diligit hominem propter se, non tamquam propter finem ultimum, sed propter eius utilitatem, seu tamquam propter subiectum cui vult aeternam beatitudinem, et sic utrinque est amor benevolentiae. 2° Est amor mutuus; diligimus enim per charitatem eum qui nos diligit, iuxta illud Proverb., VIII, 17 : Ego diligentes me diligo, et, Ioann., XIV, 21 : Qui diligit me, diligitur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum. 3° Est communicatio beatitudinis hic per gratiam in iure et in spe, in patria in re. Ergo.
I answer. 1° It is certain that God is the thing loved by charity, that is, its material, principal and primary object, and in this respect its formal object quo. For by charity we understand nothing else than the dilection of God, according to that text, Matt., XXII, 37 et 38 : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.... This is the first and greatest commandment. Likewise it is certain that the neighbor is the secondary material object of charity; because charity is, as we said, the friendship of man with God. But the law of friendship requires that we love not only the friend, but all who specially belong to him. Hence that text, ibid., 39 : Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
Resp. 1° Certum est Deum esse rem amatam a charitate, seu eius obiectum materiale, principale et primarium, et hac ratione obiectum eius formale quo. Per charitatem enim nihil aliud intelligimus quam dilectionem Dei, iuxta illud, Matth., XXII, 37 et 38 : Diliges Dominum Deum tuum... Hoc est primum et maximum mandatum. Pariter certum est quod proximus sit obiectum charitatis materiale secundarium; quia charitas est, ut diximus, amicitia hominis cum Deo. Lex autem amicitiae postulat ut non tantum diligamus amicum, sed etiam omnes qui ad illum specialiter pertinent. Unde illud, ibid., 39 : Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum.
I answer. 2° The formal object quo, or the motivating formal reason of charity, is uncreated goodness as lovable in itself and for itself, knowable in the supernatural light126 126 Here q. 23, a. 5, o and ad 2 ; q. 25, a. 1, o.
Resp. 2° Obiectum formale quo, seu ratio formalis motiva charitatis, est bonitas increata ut est in se et propter se amabilis, lumine supernaturali cognoscibilis126 126 Hic q. 23, a. 5, o et ad 2 ; q. 25, a. 1, o.
Proof. Charity 1° is love. But love is not of anything except under the reason of good. 2° It is love of God. Therefore it is of God under the reason of divine good. 3° It is love, not of concupiscence, which generates hope ; but of benevolence. Therefore under the reason of divine good, not as advantageous to us, but as it is in itself and lovable for itself.
Prob. Charitas 1° est amor. Amor autem non est de aliquo, nisi sub ratione boni. 2° Est amor Dei. Ergo est de Deo sub ratione boni divini. 3° Est amor, non concupiscentiae, quae generat spem ; sed benevolentiae. Ergo sub ratione boni divini, non ut nobis commodi, sed ut est in se et propter se amabilis.
I said : « Knowable in the supernatural light ; » because to love God for his goodness as known by the natural light would be natural love, not supernatural, such as charity is.
Dixi : « Lumine supernaturali cognoscibilis ; » quia diligere Deum propter eius bonitatem naturali lumine cognoscibilem, esset amor naturalis, non supernaturalis, qualis est charitas.
You will ask 3° whether God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species.
Petes 3° utrum eadem specie charitatis diligatur Deus et proximus.
I answer. God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species : God for Himself, the neighbor for God127 127 Here q. 25, a. 1, o.
Resp. Eadem specie charitatis diligitur Deus et proximus : Deus propter seipsum, proximus propter Deum127 127 Hic q. 25, a. 1, o.
Proof. The act whereby God is loved for Himself and the act whereby the neighbor is loved for God are of the same species128. Therefore the habit of charity is of the same species. — The consequence is plain, because habits are specified by acts. — Proof of antecedent. The act which bears on the reason of an object and the act which bears on an object under such a reason are of the same species : just as the vision whereby light is seen and the vision whereby color is seen are of the same species; for the species of the act is taken from the object according to its formal reason. Now the formal reason for loving the neighbor is God; for this is what we must love in the neighbor, that God may be in him, that he may cling to Him as to the last end, and thence God may be loved, praised and glorified for His infinite goodness and perfection : and thus it is plain that the formal reason for loving the neighbor is the infinite goodness of God, lovable in itself and for itself. Therefore. 128 Ibid.
Prob. Idem est specie actus quo diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum128. Ergo idem specie habitus charitatis. — Patet conseq., quia habitus specificantur ab actibus. — Prob. ant. Idem est specie actus qui fertur in rationem obiecti et qui fertur in obiectum sub tali ratione : sicut eadem est specie visio qua videtur lumen, et qua videtur color; species enim actus sumitur ex obiecto secundum rationem formalem ipsius. Atqui ratio formalis diligendi proximum Deus est; hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere, ut in Deo sit, ut illi tamquam fini ultimo haereat, indeque Deus ametur, laudetur et glorificetur propter infinitam eius bonitatem et perfectionem : sicque patet quod ratio formalis diligendi proximum sit infinita Dei bonitas in se et propter se amabilis. Ergo. 128 Ibid.
You will conclude 1° that to love the neighbor from another motive, say for benefits received, for his outstanding qualities, whether natural or supernatural, inasmuch as they are his perfections, is not the love of charity; because he is not thus formally loved in reason of the divine goodness : but it is natural love. Nor does it matter that perhaps they are supernatural qualities; for supernaturality there plays a material role, if the reason for loving is not supernatural : thus e. g., the impenitent sinner, who knows heaven by the light of faith, loves it with natural love.
Colliges 1° quod amare proximum ex alio motivo, puta propter beneficia accepta, propter egregias eius qualitates, sive naturales, sive supernaturales, quatenus sunt ipsius perfectiones, non sit amor charitatis; quia sic non amatur formaliter ratione bonitatis divinae : sed est amor naturalis. Nec refert quod forte sint qualitates supernaturales; supernaturalitas enim ibi se habet materialiter, si ratio amandi non sit supernaturalis : sic v. g., peccator impoenitens, qui per lumen fidei cognoscit paradisum, illum amat amore naturali.
I said : « Inasmuch as they are his perfections ; » because, if they are considered as participations of the divine perfection, it seems that they are even thus loved with the love of charity; for, although they are infinitely distant from the infinite perfection of God, yet it is not so much he himself as the very perfection of God in them that is loved : just as in an image the prototype is loved, who is the whole reason for loving the image.
Dixi : « Quatenus sunt eius perfectiones ; » quia, si considerentur ut participationes divinae perfectionis, videtur quod etiam sic amentur amore charitatis; quia, licet in infinitum distent ab infinita Dei perfectione, tamen non tam ipse quam ipsa Dei perfectionis in illis amatur : sicut in imagine amatur prototypus, qui est tota ratio amandi imaginem.
You will conclude 2° that charity is one virtue whole in species129; because, if from any head it were divided into several species, especially from this head, that it is concerned with God and the neighbor. But from this head it is not diversified, as has been proved. Therefore. 129 Here q. 23, a. 5, o.
Colliges 2° charitatem esse unam virtutem specie totam129; quia, si ex aliquo capite divideretur in plures species, maxime ex eo quod versetur circa Deum et proximum. Atqui ex eo capite non diversificatur, ut probatum est. Ergo. 129 Hic q. 23, a. 5, o.
You will ask 4° how charity stands in relation to the other virtues.
Petes 4° quomodo charitas se habeat ad alias virtutes.
I answer. 1° Charity is more excellent than the other virtues.
Resp. 1° Charitas est excellentior aliis virtutibus.
Proof. 1° from the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 13 : And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greater of these is charity. 2° Faith and hope are compatible with sin, charity is not. 3° Hope and faith involve imperfection : hope, one's own advantage; faith, obscurity; neither of these is in charity of itself.
Prob. 1° ex Apost., I Cor., XIII, 13 : Nunc autem manent fides, spes, charitas, tria haec. Maior autem horum est charitas. 2° Fides et spes compatiuntur peccatum, charitas non. 3° Spes et fides involvunt imperfectionem : spes proprium commodum, fides obscuritatem; nihil horum charitas ex se.
I answer. 2° Without charity there can be true virtue, but imperfect130; because without charity there can be a good quality which is a steadfast principle of a good act, consequently true virtue. But because without charity it does not order to the last end, nor make one act meritoriously for eternal life, it is not perfect virtue. See the treatise on the Virtues, dissert. II, a. 4, § 3, where we treated this matter ex professo. 130 Ibid., a. 8, o.
Resp. 2° Sine charitate potest esse vera virtus, sed imperfecta130; quia sine charitate potest esse bona qualitas quae sit constanter principium boni actus, consequenter vera virtus. Sed, quia sine charitate non ordinat ad ultimum finem, neque facit operari meritorie ad vitam aeternam, non est perfecta virtus. Vide tract. de Virtutibus, dissert. II, a. 4, § 3, ubi hanc materiam ex professo tractavimus. 130 Ibid., a. 8, o.
I answer. 3° Charity is the form of the other virtues, not intrinsically and essentially, otherwise all virtues would be of the same species; but extrinsically and accidentally, inasmuch as by it they are referred to the supernatural last end, by which as it were by an ornament they are formed in the supernatural order.
Resp. 3° Charitas est forma aliarum virtutum, non intrinseca et essentialis, alias omnes virtutes essent eiusdem speciei; sed extrinseca et accidentalis, quatenus per eam referuntur ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, quo veluti ornamento formantur in ordine supernaturali.
That charity is distinguished from grace we proved in many ways in the treatise on Grace, dissert. IV, a. 1, You will ask 4°. Let the reader consult it.
Charitatem distingui a gratia multis probavimus in tract. de Gratia, dissert. IV, a. 1, Petes 4°. Adeat lector.