Whether human law can command or forbid internal acts?

[Note that there is a twofold power in the Church, one of the internal or conscience forum, the other of the external forum, which St. Thomas in IV Sentent., dist. 18, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3, distinguishes thus, that in the internal forum is treated the cause between God and man, but in the external forum is treated the cause of man with man. The former chiefly concerns internal acts, because by them man is ordered to God above all, and through them salvation, for which it was first given, is promoted most closely. The latter, however, insofar as it is governing of the community of believers as such, has also matter proportioned to itself, namely external acts, looking to conversation and outward direction; and to this order the legislative power of the Church is referred. For although the laws of the Church are ordered to a supernatural end and the spiritual good of souls, they do not work that immediately, but through the honesty of exterior acts. But this legislative power is called spiritual, both by reason of origin, as being immediately from God; and by reason of its mediated end, which is spiritual salvation of souls; and by reason of matter, not because it concerns merely spiritual and internal acts, but because whatever it commands or forbids outwardly, as fasts, feasts, etc., is apt to conduct man to the progress of the soul spiritually; and by all these things it is distinguished from civil power. Therefore]

I SAY 1° : It is more probable that human law cannot command or forbid acts merely internal, which have no connection with externals, such as are, v. g., simple intellection, simple volition, simple act of faith, hope, charity, etc.¹. ¹ Here q. 91, a. 4, c.; q. 100, a. 9, c.

It is proved 1° from law. Cap. Tua nos, de simonia, Innocent III says : « To us it is given to judge only of manifest things. » And cap. Sicut tuis, same title : « The Church judges not of hidden things. »

It is proved by reason taken from the Author, places cited. Law cannot command or forbid that to do or avoid which it cannot compel; otherwise it would be useless and inefficacious for attaining the effect, since men, especially the evil, are moved neither by words alone nor by penalties distant in another life, or invisible and insensible, but by things present and sensible. But human law cannot compel to doing or avoiding acts merely internal. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Man cannot compel to that of which he cannot judge; for coercion is through fear of penalty, and penalty is inflicted only from judgment. But man cannot judge of things merely internal. Therefore.

(Whence the Angelic, here q. 91, a. 4, ad 3 : « Of those things can man make law of which he can judge. But judgment of man cannot be of interior motions which lie hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear; and yet unto perfection of virtue it is required that in both acts man stand upright. And therefore human law could not restrain and order sufficiently interior acts, but divine law needed to supervene for this purpose.»]

It is proved by another reason. Human legislative power is one of jurisdiction and tending per se primo to external and common government. But acts merely internal are not apt matter for government of this kind. Therefore. — Proof of the major. The republic, both ecclesiastical and civil, is a visible and external body. Therefore its legislative power is per se primo directed to external government.

[You will say : The Church ought to have received from Christ power to command whatever conduces to the end for which she was instituted. But acts merely internal of the virtues conduce most of all to eternal salvation, which is the proper and necessary end of the Church. Therefore the Church received from Christ power to command acts merely internal of the virtues.

Answer. I distinguish the major. That whatsoever immediately conduces to her proximate end the Church ought to have received from Christ, I concede; whatsoever conduces to her ultimate end, even those things also of which she cannot judge and whose execution she can urge in no manner, I deny. For the proximate end of ecclesiastical law is not eternal life, but peace and order of the Christian republic, these obtained, virtues are cultivated, merits acquired, and thus eternal salvation is mediately promoted. These goods, since they are external, the Church can provide for immediately through her laws, commanding whatever is born to procure them, forbidding what can impede them, and compelling the disobedient through spiritual and even temporal penalties. As to acts merely internal, however, even though the Church should invite them by her precepts, she cannot imperate them, since efficacious means of obtaining such effects avail not herself. Whence St. Thomas says, IIa 2ae, q. 104, a. 5, ad 3 : « In those things which pertain to the interior motion of the will, man is held to obey not man, but God alone. But man is held to obey man in those things which must be done outwardly through the body. »

You will insist : The Council of Trent, in the proem of session VI, « more strictly forbids that anyone henceforth presume otherwise to believe, preach, or teach than is enacted and declared in the present decree » concerning justification; Clement XI in the constitution Vineam Domini Sabaoth defines everyone bound to reject the sense condemned of the five propositions of Jansenius, not with the mouth only, but with heart and inwardly. Pius IX, at the conclusion of the bull Ineffabilis Deus, pronounces them who presumed otherwise than was defined by him concerning the

Immaculate Conception of B. M. V. to think in heart,... fallen away from the unity of the Church. » But to believe, to reject something in heart, and to think in heart are acts merely internal. Therefore.

Answer. I deny the consequence. For, as to these internal acts, since already forbidden or commanded by divine law, the Church declares this in the name of Christ. As to external profession however, indeed with authority of Christ, but also in her own name she forbids or commands under established penalties.]

I SAY 2° : Human law can command or forbid internal acts which are necessarily required in order that externals be constituted in the genus or a certain species of morality.

It is proved. Whoever has right to command something has right to command everything without which it cannot exist; otherwise it would be a chimerical potency. But human law has right to command several exterior acts which require interior acts for their moral integrity in a certain species. Thus, v. g., the law of the Church commands the recitation of the Hours as prayer, unto which internal attention is necessarily required; it commands confession of sins as sacramental, which does not occur without internal grief; paschal communion as refreshment of soul, which is not had through sacrilegious communion. So likewise civil law commands oath, which does not stand without intention of swearing; contract, which does not subsist without will of binding oneself. Therefore.

Hence Alexander VII deservedly condemned this proposition, n. 14 : « He who makes voluntary confession none satisfies the precept of the Church. » And Innocent XI this one, n. 55 : « The precept of annual communion is sufficiently satisfied by sacrilegious manducation of the Lord. »

I say 3° : It is more probable that human law can command or forbid an internal act joined to the external, as its cause, per accidens only.

It is proved 1° from the first Clementine de statu monach., lib. III, tit. 10. A monk betaking himself to the curia with mind of accusing a prelate is excommunicated. But mind of accusing a prelate is joined, as cause, per accidens only, to access to the curia; for this access could proceed from another cause.

It is proved 2°. An interior act which is cause, albeit per accidens, of the exterior proceeds to the outside, and becomes per se manifest by reason of its effect, with which it constitutes one act in genus of morality, and one sin, although per accidens it be occult, because its influx into the act is unknown; as an exterior act done without witnesses is per se manifest, because done outwardly, although per accidens occult, because it is unknown to have been done outwardly. Therefore, as this latter can be subjected to law on account of the existence it has outwardly, so the former on account of the causality it has outwardly.

[The contrary hold St. Liguori, lib. I, n. 100, and many others.

Proof 1°. That cannot be commanded by the Church without which the end of the law is obtained. But the end of the law is obtained without the interior act joined per accidens only to the exterior being commanded. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The end of law is attained through that which by reason of itself conduces to this end. But the interior act joined per accidens only to the exterior act pertains not to the character of the act which conduces to the end of law, since it holds no true connection with it, and between both there is mere concomitance only. Therefore,

2° Since the interior act joined per accidens to the exterior act commanded holds no natural connection with it, it could be commanded not by reason of the other act and indirectly, but by reason of itself it would be commanded, that is insofar as it is interior. But this is against the first conclusion demonstrated above. Therefore.

It must be granted that this opinion lacks great probability, and that it is rather consonant with those things said above.

You will ask whether exterior acts altogether occult can be forbidden by human law.

Answer affirmatively. The reason is, because such acts, although per accidens their existence cannot be proved, are from within sensible and manifest, and as such fall under law. St. Thomas teaches this, Quodlib. 4, a. 14.)