Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether faith can rest upon what is false?
The sense of the question is twofold. First : Can God reveal falsehood, or lie ? Second : Can one elicit from divine faith a false assent, or believe something to be true and revealed by God which is not true nor revealed by God ?
Quaestionis sensus est duplex. Primus : An Deus possit revelare falsum, seu mentiri ? Secundus : An quis possit ex fide divina elicere assensum falsum, seu credere aliquid esse verum et a Deo revelatum, quod non est verum nec a Deo revelatum ?
I say 1° : God cannot absolutely lie, or say what is false6, according to that saying of the Apostle, Hebr., VI, 18 : It is impossible for God to lie. 6 Ibid., a. 3, o.
Dico 1° : Deus non potest absolute mentiri, seu dicere falsum6, iuxta illud Apostoli, Hebr., VI, 18 : Impossibile est mentiri Deum. 6 Ibid., a. 3, o.
It is proved. It is absolutely impossible for the first and essential truth to lie. But God is the first and essential truth. Therefore. — Proof of the major. To lie is to fall short of the truth. But it involves a contradiction for the first and essential truth to fall short of the truth ; otherwise it would fall short of itself, and thus would not be the first, essential, and unfailing truth.
Probatur. Est absolute impossibile primam et essentialem veritatem mentiri. Atqui Deus est prima et essentialis veritas. Ergo. — Prob. mai. Mentiri est deficere a veritate. Atqui implicat primam et essentialem veritatem a veritate deficere ; alias deficeret a seipsa, sicque non esset prima, essentialis et indeficiens veritas.
Confirmed 1°. If God could absolutely lie, our whole faith would waver. For whence should we know that He had not lied ? From revelation ? But about this very revelation there would be the same difficulty, the same doubt, whether He does not lie.
Confirmatur 1°. Si Deus posset absolute mentiri, tota fides nostra nutaret. Unde enim sciremus non mentitum fuisse ? Ex revelatione ? Sed de hac revelatione foret eadem difficultas, idem dubium, an non mentiatur.
Confirmed 2°. A lie is intrinsically evil and a sin. Therefore it cannot be absolutely from God.
Confirmatur 2°. Mendacium est intrinsece malum et peccatum. Ergo non potest esse absolute a Deo.
I say 2° : Falsehood cannot be subject to faith on the part of the believer7, that is, faith cannot incline toward a false assent, nor elicit it. 7 Ibid.
Dico 2° : Fidei non potest subesse falsum ex parte credentis7, id est, fides non potest inclinare ad assensum falsum, nec illum elicere. 7 Ibid.
It is proved. 1° Nothing is subject to a power or a habit, or even to an act, except through the formal reason of its object : just as color cannot be seen except through light, nor can a conclusion be drawn except through the middle term of a demonstration. But the formal reason of faith is the first truth in speaking, which, as we were just saying, cannot reveal falsehood. Therefore.
Probatur. 1° Nihil subest alicui potentiae vel habitui, aut etiam actui, nisi mediante ratione formali sui obiecti : sicut color non potest videri, nisi per lucem, neque conclusio fieri potest, nisi per medium demonstrationis. Atqui ratio formalis fidei est prima veritas in dicendo, quae, ut modo dicebamus, non potest revelare falsum. Ergo.
2° An intellectual virtue cannot be the principle of a false assent, just as the virtue of the rational appetite cannot be the principle of a vicious act. But faith is an intellectual virtue. Therefore. — Proof of the major. Every virtue is a good disposition and perfection of a power in relation to its object. But the object of the intellect is the true. Therefore.
2° Virtus intellectualis non potest esse principium assensus falsi, sicut virtus appetitus rationalis non potest esse principium actus vitiosi. Atqui fides est virtus intellectualis. Ergo. — Prob. mai. Omnis virtus est bona dispositio ac perfectio potentiae in ordine ad suum obiectum. Atqui obiectum intellectus est verum. Ergo.
Against the first conclusion certain apparent lies referred to in the Scriptures could be objected. But you have them abundantly solved in our larger Work, tract. de Relig., dissert. IX, a. 2, where mental restriction is treated, of which we shall also speak below at the place cited.
Contra primam conclusionem opponi possent quaedam apparentia mendacia quae referuntur in Scripturis. Verum ea abunde soluta habes in maiori nostro Opere, tract. de Relig., dissert. IX, a. 2, ubi de restrictionibus mentalibus, de quibus etiam dicemus infra loco cit.