On inadvertence to sin

Note 1°. Inadvertence differs from ignorance, in that ignorance is the privation of habitual knowledge or cognition, inadvertence the privation of actual cognition. Whence, wherever there is ignorance, there is inadvertence, but not conversely; for he who knows habitually may not actually advert, from natural distraction, or from elsewhere.

Note 2°. There can be inadvertence both to the act and to the malice, as in a drunkard or one sleeping. There can also be inadvertence to the act and

^{1 1} This definition was related above, dissert. 4, art. 2.

inadvertence to the act without inadvertence to the malice, as in one who knowing that today is a fast day, eats meat, adverting indeed to the eating of meat, but not adverting to the fast day or prohibition; and of this inadvertence is the present question.

Note 3°. As whatever invincible ignorance excuses from sin, because it makes the involuntary; so, for the same reason, whatever invincible inadvertence excuses from sin.

All these things rest on what has been said of ignorance, and in this all theologians agree, that for sinning formally it is required that one be able and ought to advert to the malice, consequently that the inadvertence be vincible; but the difficulty is, when someone is held to be able thus to advert, that his inadvertence be called vincible and not excusing from sin. A question made celebrated from the rise of philosophical sin. Some require an actual thought, at least confused, of the malice of the act, situated in some doubt, or scruple or suspicion of malice. Others will that it suffice if he advert to the act; because thence, they say, he can advert to the malice. We judge both opinions, generally understood, less true, and between these extremes we hold the middle way which we held above, when treating of the notion of invincible ignorance; for the same reason seems to us to hold of invincible inadvertence. Whence I say 1°: That inadvertence to the malice of the act be held vincible and not excusing from formal sin, an actual scruple is not always required, whether doubt or suspicion of the malice of the act.

It is clear 1° in those who sin from vincibly ignorant; these certainly have no actual scruple, doubt or suspicion of the malice of their act, since they are ignorant of it, and yet their inadvertence is vincible, like the very ignorance from which it proceeds. And under this head sins of ignorance are often so called in Scripture and the Fathers.

It is clear 2° in those who, although perhaps they know habitually, yet voluntarily place elsewhere the cause of inadvertence, namely through depraved habits which they foster, through passions to which they give themselves wholly, through supine carelessness of salvation, and similar ways, whereby it comes about that they have sins as it were innate, and are blind about their malice, and do not advert to it at all; for that these impious, worldly, hardened, blinded men, and such like, whenever they are carried away by the motions of the passions, are always struck by an actual scruple, doubt, suspicion of the malice of their acts, or by some pious thought, is utterly alien from experience and reason. For who would believe this of Tiberius, Nero, Caligula, Heliogabalus and similar monsters of men? Yet nevertheless their inadvertence is vincible and voluntary, not excusing from formal sin. Therefore. — The minor is proved. 1° Because otherwise the crimes and abominations of most lost men would have to be excused, which no one grants. 2° Because an evil effect following upon a voluntarily posited cause in which it was foreseen, or could easily have been foreseen, is voluntary and culpable, as we have more than once said elsewhere. But those of whom here is the question voluntarily place the causes of inadvertence and blindness concerning the malice of their acts, and either foresee that this inadvertence and blindness will follow from these causes, or can easily foresee it. Therefore.

I say 2°: Outside these cases of the first conclusion, that is, as to those who do not voluntarily place the cause from which they foresee, or can easily foresee, that inadvertence will follow concerning the malice of their acts, but suffer such inadvertence either from oblivion or natural distraction, or from another inculpable cause: that this inadvertence be held vincible and voluntary and not excusing from sin, there is required, if not a determinate actual scruple, doubt or suspicion of malice, at least some thought or cognition, whether of danger, or of the obligation to inquire, or any other whatsoever, which, were it not neglected, would of itself lead to the knowledge of the malice.

It is proved, because, outside the cases of the first conclusion, nothing assignable exists besides cognition of this kind in which anyone could be said to be able to advert, and with this posited he can advert. — This latter is clear. — The former is proved: 1° Because, since on the one hand our intellect is a necessary power, it does not determine itself to considering or knowing something, but is determined by the object or by other powers, especially by the will. The will, on the other hand, cannot determine the intellect to consider except from some previous cognition which is not voluntary, because it precedes the first volition; for the will is not borne toward the unknown, whether in itself or in its cause; whence that saying: « Of the unknown there is no desire. » Therefore in those who do not voluntarily place the cause of inadvertence, but suffer it either from oblivion or natural distraction, or from another inculpable cause, and do not advert to the malice, nothing is assignable in which they are said to be able to advert besides the said thought. 2° If our intellect were of itself proximately and morally apt for inquiring into and driving away inadvertence, there would never be any invincible and involuntary inadvertence, as is clear. But the consequence is false, as experience shows and all confess. For the upright man who, knowing well that he is bound today to fast, eats meat from natural oblivion, is excused by all on account of invincible inadvertence. Compare what I said of invincible ignorance.

You will say: By the very fact that one adverts to the act, he can advert to the malice. Therefore, if he does not advert, his is the fault, and the inadvertence is vincible.

I answer. First, that the falsity of the antecedent, generally understood, appears in the example soon brought forward. I distinguish therefore this antecedent. By the very fact that one adverts to the act, he can advert to the malice in external sins which are against the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law, I concede the antecedent; because they of themselves and easily impress their malice, and therefore, just as there is no invincible ignorance of them, so neither invincible inadvertence. In sins which are against positive precepts, or even remote natural ones of the third class, I deny the antecedent; because these, since they are obscure and of more difficult consideration, do not of themselves impress knowledge of their malice: whence, just as invincible ignorance of them is given, so also invincible inadvertence.

I said: « In external sins against the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law, » such as thefts, homicides, adulteries, etc.; because as to internal motions about the same, it seems altogether to be conceded that invincible and involuntary inadvertence can be given, because far less than external acts do they impress their malice. Whence often those who are of timid conscience are obstinately vexed by motions of concupiscence, vengeance, rash judgment, etc., which indeed they feel [should read sentiant?] and advert to, without reflecting upon the malice; which as soon as they advert to it, they reject with horror and detest.

You will ask: Aug., book I of the Retract., c. 15, n. 3, teaches that for sin there is not required « the will of sinning, » but that « the will of the deed » suffices. But he who adverts to the act, even if he does not advert to the malice, has the will of the deed. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Augustine teaches that for material sin the will of the deed suffices, I concede; for formal sin, I deny.