Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether the natural law can suffer dispensation?
Note. Dispensation is twofold, properly and improperly so called. Dispensation properly so called is a relaxation of the law or of its obligation in some particular, made by one having the power, the matter of the law remaining so unchanged that its obligation would remain if the authority of the dispenser did not intervene. Whence, although dispensation supposes some interpretation of the law, it differs from it, in that for interpretation authority is not required, but prudence and knowledge suffice.
Nota. Dispensatio est duplex, proprie et improprie dicta. Dispensatio proprie dicta est relaxatio legis seu ejus obligationis in aliquo particulari, facta ab habente potestatem, manente materia legis, sic immutata, ut ejus obligatio remaneret, si non accederet authoritas dispensantis. Unde, quamvis dispensatio supponat aliquam legis interpretationem, ab ea tamen differt, quod ad interpretationem non requiratur authoritas, sed sufficit prudentia et scientia.
Dispensation improperly so called is when the legislator or another so changes the matter of the law that it ceases to be comprehended under the law.
Dispensatio improprie dicta est quando legislator vel alter sic mutat materiam legis, ut desinat comprehendi sub lege.
Hence dispensation properly belongs to the legislator or superior; but improper dispensation belongs to the lord of the matter, whether he be legislator and superior or not: thus God, granting the spoils of the Egyptians to the Israelites, acted as lord, not as legislator; thus a private person who remits to me a debt of one hundred florins acts as lord of that debt, not as superior. On the contrary, if God or the Pope exempted someone from the law of fasting or of the sanctification of the Sabbath, he would act as superior and legislator. And thence follows another distinction, that proper dispensation falls directly upon the law, but improper directly upon the matter or debt: so that he who is dispensed properly, e.g., from fasting, is no longer bound by the law of fasting, as others are bound; but he who is dispensed improperly, e.g., in the repayment of a debt which is remitted, or in the taking of another's property which is granted to him by its owner, is always bound, like all others, by the natural law against stealing, or of paying debts; and if here and now he licitly takes another's property or does not pay a debt, it is not because he is exempted from those laws, but because there no longer remains what is another's or a debt, nor consequently the matter of the law. These things, if well weighed, remove the equivocations by which many are deceived in this matter.
Hinc dispensatio proprie spectat legislatorem seu superiorem; dispensatio autem impropria spectat dominum materiae, sive sit legislator et superior, sive non : sic Deus, concedendo spolia Aegyptiorum Israelitis, egit ut dominus, non ut legislator; sic privatus qui remittit mihi debitum centum florenorum, agit ut dominus istius debiti, non ut superior. E contra, si Deus aut Papa eximeret aliquem a lege jejunii vel sanctificationis sabbati, ageret ut superior et legislator. Et inde sequitur aliud discrimen, quod dispensatio propria directe cadat supra legem, impropria autem directe cadat supra materiam seu debitum : ita ut qui dispensatur proprie, v. g., in jejunio, non teneatur amplius lege jejunandi, sicut tenentur alii; qui vero dispensatur improprie, v. g., in redditione debiti quod remittitur, vel in ablatione alieni quod ipsi conceditur a domino, semper tenetur, sicut omnes alii, lege naturali non furandi, aut solvendi debita; quod si hic et nunc licite aut alienum auferat, aut debitum non solvat, non est quia eximitur ab istis legibus, sed quia non remanet vel alienum, vel debitum, nec consequenter legis materia. Haec si bene perpendantur, tollunt aequivocationes quibus multi decipiuntur in hac materia.
I say : Neither can God himself dispensate properly in the natural law absolutely speaking, but well improperly1. 1 Here q. 100, a. 8, o. et ad 3.
Dico : Neque Deus ipse absolute potest dispensare proprie in lege naturali, bene tamen improprie1. 1 Hic q. 100, a. 8, o. et ad 3.
This is the more common opinion with the Author [St. Thomas], against the Scotists, who hold with their master that God can dispense in the precepts of the second table alone, excepting the precept against lying.
Est communior cum Authore contra Scotistas, qui cum suo duce tenent, Deum dispensare posse in praeceptis secunda tabula tantum, excepto praecepto de mendacio.
It is proved 1°. God cannot bring it about that things prohibited by natural right, e.g., hatred of God, perjury, homicide, theft, adultery, pollution, sodomy, bestiality, etc., should be licit, honest and not discordant from reason, nor that things commanded, such as the duties of religion, justice, etc., should not be honest and due in their place and time, the matter of the law remaining unchanged. Therefore he cannot dispense properly in the natural law. The consequence is evident from the given notion of dispensation properly so called, which is a relaxation of the obligation of the law, its matter remaining unchanged, so that what before was prohibited, dishonest and illicit, without change of its matter becomes by dispensation honest and licit. — Prob. ant. These enumerated acts and similar ones prohibited by the natural law are intrinsically and by their nature, independently of the will of God, base, evil and discordant from reason. Acts commanded by the natural law are likewise by their nature intrinsically, independently of the will of God, honest and due in their place and time. But God cannot bring it about that what is such of itself, remaining unaltered, should not be such, just as he cannot bring it about that man, remaining man, should not be a rational animal; that fire, remaining fire, should not have heat fitting to it; for he cannot change the natures of things. Therefore.
Probatur 1°. Deus non potest efficere ut ea quae prohibentur jure natura, v. g., odium Dei, perjurium, homicidium, furtum, adulterium, pollutio, sodomia, bestialitas, etc., sint licita, honesta et non rationi dissona, neque quae praecipiuntur, ut sunt officia religionis, justitiae, etc., pro loco et tempore non sint honesta et debita, manente materia legis immutata. Ergo non potest dispensare proprie in lege naturali. Patet consequentia ex notione data dispensationis proprie, quae est relaxatio obligationis legis, ejus materia manente immutata, ita ut quod prius erat prohibitum, inhonestum et illicitum, absque ejus mutatione materiae fiat per dispensationem honestum et licitum. — Prob. ant. Hi actus enumerati et similes prohibiti lege naturali sunt intrinsece et ex natura sua, independenter a voluntate Dei, turpes, mali et rationi dissoni. Actus praecepti lege naturali sunt pariter et natura sua intrinsece, independenter a voluntate Dei, honesti et debiti pro loco et tempore. Atqui Deus non potest efficere quod id quod est ex se tale, manens invariatum, non sit tale, sicut non potest efficere quod homo, manens homo, non sit animal rationale; quod igni, manente igne, non sit conveniens calor; non enim potest mutare naturas rerum. Ergo.
It is proved 2° from concessions made by the adversaries. 1° They concede that God cannot dispense in the negative precepts of the first table, nor in lying; because, says Franc. de Victoria « ... to dispense, he could do this...; for he could bring it about that someone licitly hate God, commit perjury, blaspheme, worship idols, which are so evil from their intrinsic nature that, whether God wills or not, they always remain evil, inasmuch as they are such independently of his will. » So the praised theologian, disp. I on Law, q. 5, a. 1, concl. 2. — I subsume. But that whole argumentation of theirs is ours for the precepts of the second table, and proves equally for them as for the precepts of the first table; for those, just as these, are so evil from their intrinsic nature that, whether God wills or not, they always remain evil, "inasmuch as [note] they are such independently of his will;" for they are prohibited because evil, and not evil because prohibited. Therefore.
Probatur 2° ex concessis ab adversariis. 1° Concedunt Deum non posse dispensare in praeceptis negativis primae tabulae, neque in mendacio; quia, inquit Franc. de Victoria « ... dispensare, hoc facere posset...; quia facere posset ut quis licite Deum odio haberet, pejeraret, blasphemaret, idola coleret, quae ita sunt ex suis intrinsecis mala, ut, velit nolit Deus, semper maneant mala, quandoquidem sint talia independenter ab ejus voluntate. » Ita laudatus theologus, disp. I de Leg., q. 5, a. 1, concl. 2. — Subsumo. Atqui tota ista argumentatio nostra est pro praeceptis secundae tabulae, et aeque probat pro illis ac pro praeceptis primae tabulae; sunt enim illa, sicut ista, ita ex suis intrinsecis mala, ut, velit nolit Deus, semper maneant mala, « quandoquidem [nota] sint talia independenter ab ejus voluntate; » sunt enim prohibita quia mala, et non mala quia prohibita. Ergo.