Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
How restitution is to be made by a possessor in good faith
[The possessor in good faith is he who invincibly does not know that the thing possessed by him belongs to another. In civil law, he is called a possessor in good faith who possesses as if he were owner, under a title translative of ownership, whose defects he does not know. Whence his good faith ceases as soon as the defects of the title are uncovered359 . — It is evident that such a possessor injures the right of the true owner only by an injustice merely material, but not formal.] 359 Ibid., art. 550.
[Possessor bonae fidei est ille qui invincibiliter ignorat rem a se possessam esse alienam. In iure civili, dicitur possessor bonae fidei ille qui possidet tamquam proprietarius, ex titulo proprietatis translativo, cuius vitia ignorat. Unde eius bona fides cessat statim ac vitia tituli detegit359. — Patet talem possessorem ius veri domini non laedere nisi per iniustitiam mere materialem, non autem formalem.] 359 Ibid., art. 550.
Note 1° for the present and following articles that, when we come to the part of restitution, not only the thing received but also the fruits of the thing are distinguished (but a fruit is the utility gathered from a thing, after expenses have been deducted), into fruits of four kinds, namely merely natural, merely industrial, mixed, and civil.
Nota 1° pro praesenti et sequentibus articulis, quod, cum in partem restitutionis veniant, non solum res accepta, sed etiam fructus rei (fructus autem est utilitas quae colligitur ex re, deductis expensis), distinguantur fructus quadruplicis generis, scilicet mere naturales, mere industriales, mixti et civiles.
Merely natural fruits are those which nature bears spontaneously, with no human labor cooperating, or at least only light labor, such as the grass of meadows, the fruits of trees, the offspring of animals, etc. Merely industrial fruits are, on the contrary, those which the labor or industry of men alone produces, not the nature of the thing, although the latter can concur as an instrument of the working and industrious man. Such is the gain from trafficking in money, wine, grain and similar things sterile of themselves; likewise a work of art wrought with another's instrument is reckoned the fruit of industry, not of the instrument.
Fructus mere naturales sunt quos sponte fert natura, nullo aut saltem levi hominum labore cooperante, ut sunt herbae pratorum, fructus arborum, foetus animalium, etc. Fructus mere industriales sunt, e contra, quos solus hominum labor vel industria profert, non rei natura, licet concurrere possit ut instrumentum hominis laborantis et industrii. Tale est lucrum ex negotiatione pecuniae, vini, frumenti et similium rerum de se sterilium ; similiter opus artificiosum instrumento alieno elaboratum, non instrumenti, sed industriae fructus censetur.
Mixed fruits are those for producing which the nature of the thing and the industry of man concur equally, or nearly equally; for here what differs little seems to differ nothing, such as crops, wine, oil, butter, cheese, etc.
Fructus mixti sunt ad quos producendos natura rei et hominis industria concurrunt aequaliter, vel fere aequaliter ; hic enim quod parum distat, nihil distare videtur, ut sunt segetes, vinum, oleum, butyrum, caseus, etc.
Civil fruits are so called not because they are properly fruits, but because in law they are reckoned after the manner of fruits. Such are the prices of things let out, as houses, ships, beasts of burden, fisheries, hunts, etc. They can be reduced to mixed fruits, because to those there concurs not only industry, but the thing itself, horse, house, etc. Where there is doubt of what kind fruits are, recourse must be had to the judgment of the judge or of a prudent and learned man.
Fructus civiles sic dicuntur, non quod sint proprie fructus, sed quia in iure ad instar fructuum reputantur. Tales sunt pretia rerum elocatarum, ut domorum, navium, iumentorum, piscationis, venationis, etc. Possunt revocari ad fructus mixtos, quia ad illos non solum concurrit industria, sed res ipsa, equus, domus, etc. Ubi dubium est cuius generis sint fructus, standum est arbitrio iudicis vel viri prudentis et docti.
Note 2°. But, since in the restitution of fruits the expenses are usually deducted (for fruit, as I already said, is the utility from a thing after expenses deducted), expenses must be distinguished of three kinds. Some are necessary, without which the thing would either have perished or become worse : as the repair of a falling building, food for animals, etc. Certain ones are useful, which although they are not necessary for the conservation of the thing, nevertheless conduce to its betterment and increase its return, as plantings of trees, conduits of water, the addition of a mill, etc. Others are voluptuary or voluntary, which do not increase the fruit, but adorn its appearance only, as fountains, marblings, paintings, statues, etc. On account of these the thing indeed may be valued at more, yet because it does not yield more fruits, therefore they are called voluptuary or voluntary expenses. Under the character of expense, however, must be understood the labor and industry of the possessor.
Nota 2°. Sed, quia in restitutione fructuum solent deduci expensae (fructus enim, ut iam dixi, est utilitas ex re, deductis expensis), distinguendae sunt triplicis generis expensae. Aliae sunt necessariae, sine quibus res aut periisset, aut deterior evasisset : ut reparatio aedificii ruentis, alimenta animalium, etc. Quaedam sunt utiles, quae licet non sint necessariae rei conservationi, conducunt tamen ad eius meliorationem etreditum eius augent, ut plantationes arborum, aquarum adductiones, adiectio pistrini, etc. Aliae sunt voluptuariae seu voluntariae, quae fructum non augent, sed speciem tantum exornant, ut aqua salientes, incrustationes, pictura, statuae, etc. Ex quibus licet res pluris aestimetur, quia tamen non reddit plures fructus, ideo dicuntur expensae voluptuariae seu voluntariae. Sub ratione autem expensae intelligendus est labor et industria possidentis.
Note 3°. Finally improvement, like deterioration, is twofold : one intrinsic, as when the thing changed in itself becomes better or worse, v. g., if a colt become a horse, if a lean ox become fat, or on the contrary a fat one become lean; extrinsic, when the thing unchanged in itself is nevertheless valued at more or less, on account of the abundance or scarcity of buyers or goods, or by authority of law, v. g., grain which yesterday was worth three today is worth four, or on the contrary.
Nota 3°. Tandem melioratio, sicut et deterioratio, est duplex : una intrinseca, ut dum res in se mutata fit melior vel deterior, v. g., si pullus evadat equus, bos macer fiat pinguis, aut e contra pinguis fiat macer ; extrinseca, dum res in se immutata pluris tamen vel minoris aestimatur, ob emptorum vel mercium multitudinem aut inopiam, sive ex authoritate legis, v. g., frumentum quod heri valebat tria, hodie valet quatuor, vel e contra.
[Principles. 1° A possessor in good faith ought not to grow rich from the thing of another. So all say360 . — Excepted is the case where the thing has already been legitimately prescribed : in which case he does not grow rich from the thing of another, but from a thing which by force of law has been made his own. 360 S. Lig., lib. IV, n. 607.
[Principia. 1° Possessor bonae fidei non debet ex re aliena ditescere. Ita omnes360. — Excipitur si res iam fuerit legitime praescripta : quo in casu non ditescit ex re aliena, sed ex re quâ vi legis facta est sua. 360 S. Lig., lib. IV, n. 607.
2° A possessor in good faith ought, per se, to be kept unharmed, that is, as he can acquire nothing from the thing of another, so he ought to lose nothing, because he is not at fault. — I said, « per se, » because, in a case of conflict between possessor and owner, the owner of the existing thing is stronger in right; laws however, on account of the common good, sometimes favor the owner of the thing, sometimes the possessor.]
2° Possessor bonae fidei debet, per se, servari indemnis, id est, sicut ex re aliena nihil potest acquirere, ita nihil debet amittere, quia non est in culpa. — Dixi, « per se, » quia, in casu conflictus inter possessorem et dominum, dominus rei exstantis est potior iure ; leges autem, ob bonum commune, quandoque domino rei, quandoque possessori favent.]
I say 1° : The possessor in good faith is held to restore insofar as he possesses from the thing of another and its fruits or profit : so that the quantity of the thing possessed and of its existing fruits, or of the profit thence arising, be the measure of the restitution to be made; because this is required and suffices for restoring equality according to the form of commutative justice. From this general assertion and rule I deduce the following conclusions, first concerning the thing, then concerning the fruits. Whence
Dico 1° : Possessor bonae fidei in tantum tenetur restituere, in quantum possidet de re aliena et eius fructibus seu emolumento : ita quod quantitas rei possessae et eius fructuum exstantium aut emolumenti inde provenientis sit mensura restitutionis faciendae ; quia id requiritur et sufficit ad restaurandam aequalitatem secundum formam iustitiae commutativae. Ex hac generali assertione et regula deduco sequentes conclusiones, primo circa rem, deinde circa fructus. Unde
I say 2° : The possessor in good faith, as soon as he understands that the thing he possesses belongs to another, is held to restore it while it still exists, in whole or in part, unless perchance he has prescribed it within legitimate time.
Dico 2° : Possessor bonae fidei, statim ac intelligit rem quam possidet esse alienam, tenetur eam adhuc exstantem in toto vel in parte restituere, nisi forte eam legitimo tempore praescripserit.
The reason is plain, because he who has beyond what is his own ought to be deprived of it and it given to him who lacks it; otherwise justice is not saved, and he becomes an unjust detainer361 . 361 Here q. 62, a. 6, c.
Ratio patet, quia qui habet ultra quod suum est, debet ei subtrahi et dari cui deest ; alioquin non salvatur iustitia, et fit iniquus detentor361. 361 Hic q. 62, a. 6, c.
But if he consumed the thing, or it perished by chance or even through his fault, he is held to restore nothing, except that by which he was made richer by it. — The first part is plain, because he is not bound by reason of a thing received, which he no longer has, nor by reason of an unjust acquisition or alienation, because he possessed in good faith. And although perhaps he sinned by squandering it prodigally or otherwise, he did not nevertheless sin against commutative justice, since he disposed of a thing which he invincibly thought was his own. — The second part is also plain; because that by which he was made richer succeeds in place of the thing, and it is against natural law that anyone grow rich with injury to another, according to this rule of law 48, in 6° : « No one ought to be enriched with the injustice or loss of another. » Hence
Quod si rem consumpserit, vel casu aut etiam eius culpa perierit, non tenetur quidquam restituere, nisi id in quo ex ea factus est ditior. — Patet prima pars, quia non tenetur ratione rei acceptae, qua amplius non est, neque ratione iniustae acceptionis aut distractionis, quia bona fide possidebat. Et quamvis forte peccaverit eam prodige aut aliter dissipando, non tamen peccavit contra iustitiam commutativam, cum disposuerit de re quam invincibiliter putabat esse suam. — Patet etiam secunda pars ; quia id in quo factus est ditior succedit loco rei, et contra ius naturale est quod quis ditescat cum alterius iniuria, iuxta hanc regulam iuris 48, in 6° : « Locupletari non debet aliquis cum alterius iniuria vel iactura. » Hinc
I say 3° : The possessor in good faith is held to restore all natural, mixed and civil fruits still existing, unless perchance he has prescribed them, however, with the necessary and useful expenses deducted, and with the estimation of the industry and labor.
Dico 3° : Possessor bonae fidei tenetur restituere omnes fructus naturales, mixtos et civiles adhuc exstantes, nisi forte eos praescripserit, deductis tamen expensis necessariis et utilibus, atque aestimatione industriae et laboris.
The reason is that they are fruits of the thing; but the thing fructifies to its own owner.
Ratio est, quia sunt fructus rei ; res autem fructificat domino suo.
Nor does it stand in the way that mixed and civil fruits are not merely fruits of the thing; for by the very fact that the part corresponding to the expenses and the estimation of labor and industry is deducted, the whole that remains over is fruit of the thing. Nor again does it stand in the way that perhaps the thing would not have so fructified with the owner; for that pertains to the good fortune of the owner, because wherever the thing fructifies, it fructifies to its owner.
Neque obstat quod fructus mixti et civiles non sint mere fructus rei ; hoc ipso enim quod deducitur pars correspondens expensis et aestimationi laboris et industriae, totum quod superest, est fructus rei. Neque etiam obstat quod res forte non ita fructificasset apud dominum ; id enim pertinet ad bonam fortunam domini, quia, ubicumque res fructificat, domino fructificat.
[Indeed, attending to natural law alone, all fruits of the thing, except industrial ones, ought to be rendered to the owner, because the thing, wherever it may be, fructifies to its owner. Nevertheless, if positive law decree otherwise, it can more probably be stood upon; for it must reasonably be presumed that such is the force of the law, that it transfers the dominion of the fruits to the possessor, on account of the public good, that it may remove from the midst the inextricable difficulties and complaints which would very frequently be raised concerning the nature and quantity of the fruits which the owner would claim362 . Furthermore Gallican law decrees that the fruits pertain indiscriminately to the possessor in good faith363 . So likewise Austrian, Italian and Prussian law364 . Therefore. 362 Carrière, n. 1054 ; Gousset, n. 931 ; Gury, n. 636, 4°, et ali non pauci. 363 Cod. civ., art. 549. 364 Cod. Austriac., art. 330 ; Ital., art. 703 ; Boruss., I, 7, § 189.
[Equidem, attento solo iure naturali, omnes fructus rei, exceptis industrialibus, domino reddi debent, quia res, ubicumque sit, fructificat domino. Attamen, si ius positivum aliter decernat, ei probabilius stari potest ; quia rationabiliter praesumendum est talem esse vim legis, ut dominium fructuum ad possessorem transferat, propter bonum publicum, ut de medio tollat inextricabiles difficultates et querelas quae frequentissime moverentur circa naturam et quantitatem fructuum quos dominus repeteret362. Porro ius Gallicum statuit fructus indiscriminatim ad possessorem bonae fidei pertinere363. Ita etiam ius Austriacum, Italicum et Borussicum364. Ergo. 362 Carrière, n. 1054 ; Gousset, n. 931 ; Gury, n. 636, 4°, et ali non pauci. 363 Cod. civ., art. 549. 364 Cod. Austriac., art. 330 ; Ital., art. 703 ; Boruss., I, 7, § 189.
Except the case where, by some legal disposition, the ceasing profit would have to be compensated to the owner. Thus by Austrian law
Exeipe casum quo, ex aliqua legali dispositione, compensandum esset domino lucrum cessans. Sic ex iure
the finder of a lost thing not yet prescribed owes the owner appearing, besides the thing or its price, also to pay back the profit received thence365 . 365 Cod. Austriac., art. 392.
Austriaco inventor rei amissae et nondum praescriptae debet domino comparenti, praeter rem vel eius pretium, etiam lucrum inde perceptum refundere365. 365 Cod. Austriac., art. 392.
But if the fruits no longer exist, consumed in any way whatever, he is held only to that by which he was made richer, as is plain from the first conclusion and is found in law, L. Item veniunt, § Propter haec, ff de petitione haereditatis, lib. V, tit. 3.
Quod si fructus non amplius exstent, quovis modo absumpti fuerint, tenetur tantum ad id in quo factus est ditior, ut patet ex prima conclusione et habetur in iure, L. Item veniunt, § Proter haec, ff de petitione haereditatis, lib. V, tit. 3.
I said : « With the necessary and useful expenses deducted, and the estimation of labor and industry, » namely necessary and useful. Otherwise the owner would have more than he ought to have, and would grow rich from another's. And it is found in law, L. Fructus, ff Soluto matrimonio, where it is said : « Fruits are not understood, unless the outlays have been deducted. »
Dixi : « Deductis expensis necessariis et utilibus, atque aestimatione laboris et industriae, » necessariae scilicet et utiles. Alioquin dominus haberet plus quam debet habere, et ditesceret ex alieno. Et habetur in iure, L. Fructus, ff Soluto matrimonio, ubi dicitur : « Fructus non intelliguntur, nisi deductis impendiis. »
Moreover it is to be noted concerning useful expenses, which plainly make the thing better and more useful, that the owner of the thing is not held to pay back to the possessor in good faith the value of the improvement itself, but only of the expenses, provided however they do not exceed the value of the improvement. So L. In fundo, ff de rei vindic. lib. III, tit. 1.
Caeterum notandum circa expensas utiles, quae nimirum rem meliorem et utiliorem efficiunt, dominum rei non teneri refundere possessori bonae fidei ipsius meliorationis valorem, sed expensarum tantum, si tamen valorem meliorationis non excedant. Ita L. In fundo, ff de rei vindic. lib. III, tit. 1.
As to voluptuary expenses or improvements, authors agree that they can be removed by the possessor in good faith, if they can be separated from the thing without its destruction or deterioration, such as clocks, pictures, doors, windows, etc.; or if they have not come onto the ground by implantation, as trees (and this is also true of the possessor in bad faith). But if they cannot be removed without deterioration of the thing, or have accrued to the ground by implantation, it seems more probable that the owner of the thing is not held to those expenses, at least in the forum of conscience; for it does not seem equitable that he pay expenses which he would not have wished to make and which bring him no utility. And L. Ex duobus 27, ff de negotiis gestis, lib. III, tit. 5 favors this.
Quantum ad expensas seu meliorationes voluptuarias, convenit inter authores eas a possessore bona fidei posse auferri, si separari possint a re absque eius destructione aut deterioratione, ut sunt horologia, pictura, porta, fenestra, etc. ; vel si non accesserint fundo per implantationem, ut arbores (et hoc etiam verum est de possessore malae fidei). Quod si auferri non possint absque rei deterioratione, aut per implantationem fundo accreverint, videtur probabilius dominum rei ad eas expensas non teneri, saltem in foro conscientiae ; non enim aequum videtur quod solvat expensas quas noluisset facere et quae ipsi nullam utilitatem afferunt. Favetque L. Ex duobus 27, ff de negotiis gestis, lib. III, tit. 5.
I say 4° : As to merely industrial fruits, the possessor in good faith is held to restore nothing whatever of them (which is also true of the possessor in bad faith), even if he was made richer thereby. This is common opinion. The reason is that the fruits belong to him to whom belongs the fruitful cause. Yet the thing of another, being sterile, as is supposed, is not the cause of these fruits, but the industry of the possessor alone. Therefore. — So all say.
Dico 4° : Quantum ad fructus mere industriales, nihil quidquam ex eis tenetur restituere possessor bonae fidei (quod etiam verum est de possessore malae fidei), etiamsi inde factus sit ditior. Est communis. Ratio est, quia fructus ad eum pertinent ad quem pertinet causa fructifera. Atqui res aliena, utpote sterilis, ut supponitur, non est causa horum fructuum, sed sola possessoris industria. Ergo. — Ita omnes.
[You will ask 1° to what the possessor in good faith is bound, if he has given away the thing of another to someone.
[Petes 1° ad quid teneatur possessor bonae fidei, si rem alienam alteri donaverit.
I answer. He is bound to nothing, if he was in no way made richer from the thing; otherwise he ought to restore to the owner that by which he was enriched. This twofold solution is drawn from the principles enunciated above. But once the error is detected, the donor of the thing of another is bound, if he can easily do so, either to admonish the donee, that he render the thing to its owner, or the owner, that he may be able to reclaim his thing. This obligation arises from the general precept of charity, and moreover, as it seems, from the law of commutative justice, since the author of an injustice, even merely material, is held to repair it if he can do so without his own notable inconvenience.
Resp. Ad nihil tenetur, si ex re minime ditior factus fuerit; secus restituere debet domino id ex quo ditatus fuit. Haec duplex solutio eruitur ex principiis supra enuntiatis. Errore vero detecto, tenetur donator rei alienae admonere, si facile id facere possit, vel donatarium, ut rem domino reddat, vel dominum, ut rem suam repetere possit. Haec obligatio oritur ex generali praecepto charitatis, et insuper, ut videtur, ex lege iustitiae commutativae, cum author iniustitia etiam mere materialis teneatur eam reparare, si possit sine proprio et notabili incommodo.
You will ask 2° to what the possessor in good faith is bound, if he has sold gratuitously accepted property belonging to another.
Petes 2° ad quid teneatur possessor bonae fidei, si rem alienam gratuito acceptam alteri vendiderit.
I answer 1° In case of eviction, he is bound to pay back the price to the buyer; otherwise he would grow rich from the thing of another.
Resp. 1° In casu evictionis, tenetur emptori pretium refundere; alioquin ex re aliena ditesceret.
2° Outside the case of eviction, namely when the thing cannot be recovered by the owner, whether because the last possessor consumed it, or because he no longer appears, the seller, according to the common opinion, owes the whole price received from the buyer back to the owner. The reason is that from the whole of that price he was truly made richer, and the owner unjustly despoiled of his thing suffered an equivalent damage. Furthermore equity does not tolerate that one man, with the loss of another, be enriched from his goods. Whence the owner must be made whole from the profit which the seller received and to which he had no right.
2° Extra casum evictionis, quando scilicet res a domino recuperari nequit, sive quia ultimus possessor eam consumpsit, sive quia amplius iste non comparet, venditor, iuxta communem sententiam, totum pretium ab emptore receptum domino refundere debet. Ratio est, quia ex toto illo pretio vere ditior factus est, et dominus re sua iniuste spoliatus damnum aequivalens passus est. Porro aequitas non tolerat quod unus, cum alterius iactura, ex rebus eius locupletetur. Unde dominus indemnis faciendus est ex lucro quod venditor percepit et ad quod nullum ius habebat.
Certain ones nevertheless entirely free the seller, because against him the owner has no recourse. But this does not seem true; for the seller would grow rich from the thing of another. it would not be safe, in this case, to depart from the common opinion 366. 366 Ita Gousset, n. 930. Gury, n. 639.
Quidam tamen venditorem omnino liberant, quia in eum nullum recursum habet dominus. Sed hoc non videtur verum; venditor enim ex re aliena ditesceret. non esset tutum, in hoc casu, a sententia communi recedere 366. 366 Ita Gousset, n. 930. Gury, n. 639.
You will ask 3° to what the possessor in good faith is bound who sold the thing of another, which afterward perished in the hands of the buyer.
Petes 3° ad quid teneatur possessor bonae fidei qui vendidit rem alienam, quae postea in manibus emptoris periit.
I answer 1° If he had the thing under an onerous title, v. g., because he bought it, it is more probable he is bound to nothing. For indeed : 1° he is not bound by reason of the thing, since he no longer has it; 2° nor by reason of the damage, since he is not the cause why the thing perished.
Resp. 1° Si rem habuerit ex titulo oneroso, v. g., quia eam emit, probabilius ad nihil tenetur. Etenim: 1° non tenetur ratione rei, cum illam iam non habeat; 2° non ratione damni, cum non sit causa cur res perierit.
2° If he had the thing under a gratuitous title, he is held to restore the price by which he was made richer through the sale. This is the common opinion. But, to whom is it to be restored? The theologians disagree. Some probably say it is to be restored to the buyer: both because the thing perishes to its owner; and because the sale, being of the thing of another, was invalid, and therefore the buyer in good faith has a right to recover his money. Others, more probably, because more equitably, as it seems to us, teach that it is to be restored to the owner: both because the thing did not perish absolutely, but exists equivalently in the price received; and because the sale, which was null, the thing perishing, harms the buyer no more than a valid sale. But since the former opinion is not lacking in probability, the seller would not need to be disturbed if he had paid back the price to the buyer. — It is to be noted that, if positive law determines to whom the restoration is to be made, the law is to be stood upon, because it validly determines the dominion, lest difficulties arise thence 367. 367 Cfr. Marc., Instit. mor.; Alphons., n. 939; Gury, n. 641.
2° Si rem habuerit ex titulo gratuito, tenetur restituere pretium ex quo per venditionem factus est ditior. Est communis sententia. Sed, cuinam est restituendum? Dissident theologi. Alii probabiliter dicunt restituendum esse emptori: tum quia res perit domino; tum quia venditio, utpote rei alienae, fuit invalida, adeoque emptor bonae fidei habet ius ad suam pecuniam recuperandam. Alii probabilius, quia aequius, ut nobis videtur, docent restituendum esse domino: tum quia res non periit absolute, sed existit aequivalenter in pretio accepto; tum quia venditio, quae fuit nulla, re pereunte, non magis nocet emptori quam venditio valida. Cum vero prior sententia probabilitate non destituatur, venditor non inquietandus esset, si pretium emptori refudisset. — Notandum quod, si ius positivum statuat cui restitutio sit facienda, legi standum est, quia valide dominium determinat, ut difficultates inde oriturae tollantur 367. 367 Cfr. Marc., Instit. mor.; Alphons., n. 939; Gury, n. 641.
You will ask 4° what is to be done if, after it is recognized that the thing belongs to another, the owner cannot be found.
Petes 4° quid agendum, si, postquam agnoscitur rem esse alienam, dominus reperiri non possit.
I answer this case is to be solved from the principles enunciated above concerning a thing found. You received, v. g., through blameless error, more than was owed, from one you know not. If you could not find the owner, the money given beyond what is owed must be held as a thing abandoned, and its dominion is acquired by the first occupant.
Resp. hunc casum solvendum esse ex principiis supra enuntiatis de re inventa. Recepisti, v. g., ex errore inculpabili, maius debito, et a quo nescis. Si dominum reperire nequiveris, pecunia supererogata ut res derelicta habenda est, eiusque dominium a primo occupante acquiritur.
Note that, if the possessor in good faith be culpably in delay of restoring, he is constituted in bad faith, and therefore is held to compensate the damage ensuing from the delay.]
Nota quod, si possessor bonae fidei sit in mora culpabili restituendi, in mala fide constituitur, ideoque tenetur compensare damnum ex mora secutum.]