On the obscurity in the object of faith and the evidence in the one attesting

You will ask 1° whether the object of faith is necessarily obscure and unevident.

I answer. In the affirmative⁸. ⁸ Ibid., a. 4, o.

It is proved 1° from the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1, who says that faith is the evidence of things that appear not; and from Augustine, tract. xi, on John: « Faith is to believe what you do not see. »

It is proved 2° by reason⁹. Those things are said to be seen which of themselves move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them, such as the first principles and conclusions evidently deduced from them, or sensible things duly presented to the senses. But the object of faith cannot of itself move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of itself, since it is not like the first principles, which become known from their very terms; nor like a conclusion, which is deduced from principles by an evident consequence; nor anything sensible, which is perceived by the senses. Therefore. ⁹ Ibid.

You will ask 2° how obscurity stands with respect to the object of faith.

I answer. Obscurity in the object of faith does not belong to the formal reason under which there is faith, but is only a condition sine qua non.

It is proved. The formal reason under which there is faith is the motive and reason for assenting to the things that are believed. But the motive and reason why we assent to the things of faith is the first truth in speaking, as we said above, not obscurity; for I do not believe God to be triune because I do not see it, but because God, who is truthful, has revealed it — just as I do not believe Rome exists because I do not see it, but because a trustworthy man told me. Therefore.

It remains, therefore, that obscurity or unevidentness be required for the object of faith, just as the approach of fire for burning, the existence of a cause for causing, the apprehension of an end for moving the will.

You will ask 3° whether at least the evidence in attesting is compossible with faith.

By evidence in attesting we understand the evidence, not of God revealing, nor of the thing revealed, but of the revelation itself, so that it be clearly established for me that it is from God, even though neither God nor the thing revealed is evident to me. Now this evidence can be considered in two ways: 1° alone, without any adjunct; 2° joined with this twofold cognition equally evident, that God cannot absolutely say what is false, and that he speaks in a natural sense, not metaphorical.

I suppose that evidence in attesting, taken alone, can stand with faith; because, however evident it may be to me that God reveals something, yet if it is not evident that he cannot say what is false, or that he does not speak in the literal sense, it will not be evident to me that things are so as God says, and thus the place of faith remains. Hence the question concerns evidence in attesting with the twofold cognition mentioned.

I answer. Evidence in attesting, with its adjuncts, is compossible with faith.

It is proved. That thing we believe by faith, to which we assent while it is unknown in itself on account of the sole authority of God attesting; for in this faith is distinguished from science and vision. But evidence in attesting, with its adjuncts, leaves the thing revealed unknown in itself; for it does not demonstrate the connection of the predicate with the subject, but only that it is revealed evidently, and as such to be certain. Therefore.