Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
When do human laws oblige under mortal sin?
I say: That human law may bind under mortal sin, two things are required together, namely grave matter and in the legislator intention of binding under mortal sin, so that if either be wanting the law does not bind under mortal sin. But when the legislator commands or prohibits matter grave in itself or with circumstances taken into account, not otherwise explaining his intention, the law ordinarily binds under mortal sin.
Dico : Ut lex humana obliget sub mortali, duo simul requiruntur, scilicet materia gravis et in legislatore intentio obligandi sub mortali, ita ut, si alterutrum desit, lex non obliget sub mortali. Quando autem legislator praecipit aut prohibet materiam secundum se aut attentis circumstantiis gravem, non explicando aliter suam intentionem, lex ordinarie obligat sub mortali.
The 1st part is proved. 1° Human law is derived from eternal and natural law. Ergo also its force of binding. Yet eternal and natural laws do not bind under mortal sin in light matter. Ergo. 2° Light matter is not capable of grave obligation. 3° A human law which would command or prohibit a thing altogether light under penalty of temporal death would be unjust, ridiculous and harmful to the common good. Ergo, a fortiori, if it should command or prohibit under penalty of eternal death.
Probatur 1a pars. 1° Lex humana derivatur a lege aeterna et naturali. Ergo et vis ejus obligandi. Atqui lex aeterna et naturalis non obligant sub mortali in materia levi. Ergo. 2° Materia levis non est capax gravis obligationis. 3° Lex humana quae rem omnino levem praeciperet aut prohiberet sub poena mortis temporalis, esset injusta, ridicula et noxia bono communi. Ergo, a fortiori, si praecipiat aut prohibeat sub poena mortis aeternae.
Understand the thing absolutely and light on every side; because, if it be light in itself but grave from circumstances, it can be matter of a law binding under mortal sin.
Intellige rem absolute et ex omni parte levem; quia, si sit secundum se levis, sed ex circumstantiis gravis, potest esse materia legis obligantis sub mortali.
The 2ª part is proved, concerning which is the greater difficulty. Law is an act of the legislator, and obligation the effect of that act. Yet, according to the principle commonly received L. Non omnis, ff, Si certum petatur, in moral acts the acts of agents do not transcend their intention. Ergo law does not bind beyond the intention of the legislator. Yet in this matter, though grave, the legislator intends to bind only under venial. Ergo.
Probatur 2ª pars, de qua est major difficultas. Lex est actus legislatoris, et obligatio effectus istius actus. Atqui, juxta principium communiter receptum L. Non omnis, ff, Si certum petatur, in moralibus actus agentium non transcendunt intentionem eorum. Ergo lex non obligat ultra intentionem legislatoris. Atqui legislator non intendit in hac materia, etsi gravi, obligare nisi sub veniali. Ergo.
The adversaries respond that this principle is true in those things which hang upon free will of agents. But, they say, as binding simply does not depend upon the free will of the legislator willing to enact a true law, but follows from the nature of the law itself; so the quantity of obligation does not depend upon his free will, but by the very fact he wills to enact the law, the quantity of obligation results from the nature of the thing and condition of the matter. This is the chief foundation of the adverse opinion.
Respondent adversarii, istud principium esse verum in his quae pendent ex libera voluntate agentium. Ast, inquiunt, sicut obligare simpliciter non pendet a libera voluntate legislatoris veram legem ferre volentis, sed sequitur ex natura ipsius legis; sic quantitas obligationis non pendet ex ejus libera voluntate, sed hoc ipso quo vult ferre legem, quantitas obligationis ex natura rei et conditione materiae resultat. Hoc est praecipuum adversae sententiae fundamentum.
But against, and at the same time is confirmed the preceding reason and conclusion. 1° Although binding simply be essential to every law, nevertheless binding so much or only thus much is not essential to law, but merely accidental; nor will the adversaries ever prove the contrary. Ergo, although it be not free for the legislator to will to found a true law which does not bind, yet it is free for him to found such a one as binds more or less, according as he willed. 2° The matter of human law is not necessary, but free. The legislator is free to propose it either under counsel or under obligation to penalty only; for from him is the whole obligation of law. Why should he not also be free to propose it under obligation to venial guilt, especially since nothing can be assigned that compels him to fulfill the whole capacity of the matter.
Sed contra et simul confirmatur praecedens ratio et conclusio. 1° Quamvis obligare simpliciter sit essentiale omni legi, attamen obligare tantum vel tantum, non est legi essentiale, sed mere accidentale, nec contrarium unquam evincent adversarii. Ergo, quamvis non sit liberum legislatori velle condere veram legem quae non obliget, est tamen illi liberum condere talem quae plus vel minus obliget, secundum quod voluerit. 2° Materia legis humanae non est necessaria, sed libera. Legislator est liber ut eam proponat, vel sub consilio, vel sub obligatione ad poenam tantum; ab ipso enim est tota legis obligatio. Quidni etiam liber ut illam proponat sub obligatione ad culpam venialem, maxime cum nihil possit assignari quod ipsum cogat implere totam capacitatem materiae.
Finally, either obligation of law under venial in grave matter is possible, or not. If the first, we have our intent; if the second, ergo there is no obligation, no law, since the legislator, on whom obligation depends, does not will to bind otherwise.
Tandem, vel obligatio legis sub veniali in materia gravi est possibilis, vel non. Si primum, habemus intentum; si secundum, ergo nulla est obligatio, nulla lex, cum legislator, a quo dependet obligatio, non velit aliter obligare.
You will ask 1° whence gravity of matter and the gravely binding intention of the legislator can be discerned.
Petes 1° unde dignosci possit gravitas materiae et intentio legislatoris graviter obligans.
I answer. and let it be the first rule: That matter is reckoned grave which conduces much to the grave end of the law. Whence, if the end of the law be light, or if it be grave but the thing commanded conduce not much to it, the matter must be reckoned light.
Resp. et sit prima regula. Illa materia censetur gravis, quae multum conducit ad gravem finem legis. Unde, si finis legis sit levis, aut si sit gravis, sed res praecepta non multum conducat ad illum, levis est censenda materia.
Second rule. When the legislator in enacting a law uses words gravely minatory, e.g.: « Under threat of divine judgment, under indignation of God or the saints, in virtue of holy obedience, » and the like; likewise, when he commands or prohibits something under grave penalty: the matter is reckoned grave and the intention of the legislator gravely binding.
Secunda regula. Quando legislator in ferenda lege utitur verbis graviter comminatoriis, v. g. : « Sub interminatione divini judicii, sub indignatione Dei vel sanctorum, in virtute sancta obedientia, » et similibus; item, quando aliquid praecipit aut prohibet sub gravi poena : censetur materia gravis et intentio legislatoris graviter obligans.
[But if the legislator use these words: « It behooves, it must be done, let them do, do, beware, abstain, » and the like, the thing is ambiguous; because these formulas of speaking sometimes import true precept, sometimes mere exhortation: whence from the manner of speaking and the circumstances, the quantity of matter weighed, judgment must be made about the mind of the legislator. If thence his mind cannot be drawn out, or there be no certain agreement about gravity of matter, let
[Si vero legislator utatur his verbis : « Oportet, debet fieri, faciant, facite, caveant, abstineant, » et similibus, res est ambigua; quia hae loquendi formulae quandoque important verum praeceptum, quandoque solam exhortationem : unde ex modo loquendi et circumstantiis, attentâ quantitate materiae, judicandum est de mente legislatoris. Quod si inde mens ejus non possit erui, aut non certo constet de gravitate materiae, sit
Third rule. When, notwithstanding the rules laid down, doubt remains either about gravity of matter or about the mind of the legislator, recourse must be had either to custom, which is the best interpreter of laws, or to the judgment of prudent and wise men, whose office it is to interpret laws in emerging doubts. If their opinions disagree so that the law remain truly and seriously doubtful, it can be held as non-existent and non-binding, as was resolved above in the question on Probabilism.
Tertia regula. Quando, non obstantibus regulis positis, remanet dubium, vel de gravitate materiae, vel de mente legislatoris, recurrendum est vel ad consuetudinem, quae est optima legum interpres, vel ad judicium prudentium et sapientium, quorum est in dubiis emergentibus leges interpretari. Quod si eorum sententiae ita discordent, ut lex vere et serio dubia maneat, haberi potest ut non existens et non obligans, sicut supra fuit resolutum in quaestione de Probabilismo.
You will ask 2° whether per accidens one can sin mortally against human law in light matter.
Petes 2° utrum per accidens mortaliter peccari possit contra legem humanam in materia levi.
I answer. affirmatively, namely if the law be violated with grave scandal foreseen, or from formal contempt perfected. Formal contempt perfected probably is only when someone refuses entirely to subject himself to a superior.]
Resp. affirmative, nempe si lex violetur cum scandalo gravi praeviso, aut ex contemptu formali perfecto. Contemptus formalis perfectus probabiliter non est nisi quando quis ex toto renuit subjici superiori.]