Whether fallen man can do or will any good without grace?

(That supernatural good cannot be done without supernatural help is evident from the preceding article and from the terms. For this very fact that it is supernatural, it surpasses the powers of nature; consequently it needs a help superadded to the powers of nature. The question therefore concerns the moral good of the natural order, concerning which there is a threefold difficulty to be discussed here. First: whether without justifying grace and charity any morally good work can be done? Second: whether without faith? Third: whether without special actual grace?

§ I. Whether in this state a morally good work can be done without sanctifying grace and charity?

I say: In this state a morally good work can be done without sanctifying grace and charity, and consequently not all the works of sinners are sins!

The conclusion is decided of faith against the heretics of our time ¹. ¹ I, 2ae, q. 65, a. 2 et 4, c; 2. 2a 2ae, q. 10, a. 4, c; de Malo, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.

It was established 1° in the Council of Constance, session XV, against Wyclif and John Hus, whose article condemned is this: « From the principles of faith it is per se known that whatever man does in mortal sin, he sins mortally. » 2° In the Council of Trent, against Luther and Calvin, session VI, canon 7: « If anyone says that all works done before justification, by whatever reason they are done, are truly sins, or merit the hatred of God, or that the more vehemently anyone strives to dispose himself to grace, the more gravely he sins: let him be anathema. » And canon 8: « If anyone says that the fear of gehenna, through which we take refuge grieving for our sins to the mercy of God, or abstain from sinning, is itself a sin, or makes sinners worse; let him be anathema. » And session XIV on the sacrament of Penance, chapter 4, defines attrition as « not only making a man a hypocrite and more a sinner, but truly a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed dwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent helped prepares a way for himself to justice... and disposes to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance. » And canon 5, under anathema it condemns him who shall have said that that contrition « ...is not true and useful sorrow, nor prepares for grace, but makes a man a hypocrite and more a sinner. » 3° By the supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V, Gregory XIII and Urban VIII, who condemned the following propositions of Michael Baius: « Everything that the sinner or servant of sin does is a sin. » It is 35. « Every love of rational creature is either a vicious cupidity by which the world is loved, which John forbids, or that laudable charity by which, diffused through the heart by the Holy Spirit, God is loved. » It is 38. « In all his acts the sinner serves dominating cupidity. » It is 40. Likewise by Clement XI, who condemned the following propositions of Quesnel: « There are only two loves, whence all our volitions and actions are born: the love of God, which does all things for God, and which God rewards, and the love with which we love ourselves and the world, which refers not to God what ought to be referred to him, and by that very fact becomes evil. » It is 44. « The love of God is not granted in the heart of sinners; it is a new judgment upon them. » It is 59. Many other propositions of the same author infected with the same error were fastened with the same condemnation.

Before all these St. Thomas went, especially q. 2 de Malo, a. 5, ad 7, where among other things he resolved authoritatively, « that it is simply false that every act which is not from a will informed by charity is demeritorious. Otherwise those who are in mortal sin would sin in every act of theirs, nor would it be counselled them that meanwhile they do whatever good they can; nor would the works done by them which are of the genus of goods dispose them to grace: all which things are false. »

It is proved by another reason. An evil principle in the agent does not infect his action unless he acts from it, just as a good principle does not dignify his action unless he acts from it. But the sinner does not always act from the evil principle of cupidity, just as the just man does not always act from the good principle of charity, as when he sins venially. Therefore.

From these you will infer that, although no medium is given between charity and cupidity with respect to the person — for man is either just or a sinner — nevertheless with respect to his action a medium is given, inasmuch as it proceeds from the good principle of nature, which is neither charity nor cupidity.

Can any morally good work be done without faith?

I say: Man without the grace of faith can do some morally good work ¹. Whence not all the works of infidels are sins. ¹ 2a 2ae, q. 10, a. 4, c.

It is against Jansenius, lib. III de Statu naturae lapsae, and against Baius, whose proposition 25 is this: « All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. » It was condemned by the supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V, Gregory XIII and Urban VIII.

It is proved 1° by Scripture, which exhorts infidels to good works. Thus Daniel, chapter IV, 24, addressing king Nabuchodonosor, says: My counsel be pleasing to thee, and redeem thou thy sins with alms. But Scripture does not exhort to doing evil, nor are sins redeemed by sins.

Likewise Scripture praises certain deeds of infidels and testifies that they were rewarded by God. Thus Exodi, I, 17-21, praises the kindness of the Egyptian midwives, who refused to kill the children of the Hebrews according to the iniquitous command of Pharao, for which cause, God dealt well with the midwives, and because they feared God, he built them houses, that is, granted them abundant offspring. Josue II and vi, the hospitality of Rahab the harlot, who refused to betray the men sent by Josue, is praised and rewarded. But God neither praises nor rewards sins, but punishes. Therefore.

It is proved 2° from Augustine, whose mind the holy Doctor discusses, de Spiritu et littera, chapter 27, n. 47, says: « Yet certain deeds [of infidels] we either read, or know, or hear, which according to the rule of justice we cannot not only vituperate, but even deservedly and rightly praise: although, if they be examined with what end they are done, scarcely are found such as deserve the due praise and defense of justice. » It is plain that Augustine in these words acknowledges in infidels certain good works, not only from the object, as Jansenius contends, but also with the end considered; for he who says « scarcely are found, » grants that sometimes they are found, albeit rarely. Nor does Augustine only assert this, but even proves it. « Because, he says, the image of God in the human soul is not so far worn away by the defilement of earthly defects that no last lineaments remain in it, whence it could deservedly be said that even in the very impiety of her life she does some things of the law or understands them. »

It is proved 3° by the reasoning of both holy Doctors Augustine and Thomas. He [the infidel] can do something of natural good, in which the good of nature is not fully extinguished. But the good of nature, namely the natural inclination to the good of reason, the principles of synderesis and of natural equity, or, as Augustine says, the image of God, although attenuated and obscured in infidels, is nevertheless not totally destroyed, or utterly swallowed up by consummate malice, as in demons. Therefore.

It is confirmed 1°. A faithful just man, still on the way, not yet confirmed in good, does not always act from the dominant habit of faith and justice, but sometimes sins in lighter matters. Therefore likewise the infidel, still on the way, not yet confirmed in evil, does not always act from the dominant habit of infidelity, but can at times do well in lighter matters. — The consequence is evident; because thus stands the will of the infidel toward evil, as the will of the faithful just man toward good.

It is confirmed 2°. Every sin merits punishment, and thereby man becomes worse. But the infidel who honors his parents from natural piety, or pays his debts from natural equity, does not merit punishment, nor thereby become worse. Therefore.

§ III. Whether fallen man can do some moral good of the natural order without special actual grace?

I say: Fallen man, with the sole general concourse, without any other superadded help of grace, can do some morally good work of the natural order ¹. This general concourse however can and ought to be called in some sense a special help of grace. ¹ Here q. 109, a. 2, c.

The first part is proved ². Human nature is not totally corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived of the whole good of nature. Therefore it can, by the virtue remaining to its nature, under the general concourse of God, easily do some morally good work; just as a sick man can by himself have some motion, but cannot be moved perfectly unless healed. ² Ibid.

The second part is proved and explained. According to what I said art. 1 of this dissert., n. 8, this concourse or motion of God general can be considered in two ways: 1° respectively to nature in itself; 2° respectively to this or that individual of this nature, to whom it is given before another.

Considered respectively to nature in itself, it ought not to be called a special nor gratuitous help, but general, whereby God moves each one according to its mode. For since the good of reason in nature is not totally corrupted, nor is the will confirmed in evil, as in demons, but only attenuated and convertible to good and evil, it does not require the common influx whereby it is always moved to evil, but sometimes to good conformable to reason. And therefore that it is sometimes moved to good is not a merely gratuitous help, because it is in a manner owed; nor special, because it is not from a special grace and providence, but according to the laws of common providence, which sometimes moves natures defectible and convertible to good and evil to the good of their nature, sometimes permits them to fail.

But considered respectively to the individual to whom it is given before another, it ought to be called a special and gratuitous help; because, although it be owed to nature that it be sometimes moved to good, yet that this man be moved here and now to good before another is not owed to him rather than to the other who is permitted to fail, just as he himself could fail. Whence it is to him gratuitous, because not owed, and special, because from a special benevolence and providence.

This distinction being posited, the discord of the Thomists in this part is reconciled, which can be only about a name.

Likewise various texts of Scripture, of councils, of the holy Fathers, especially apparently contrary ones of St. Thomas, are reconciled, so that it would be superfluous to expound them. And thence we have that it was truly said by councils and Fathers, singularly by Augustine, that whatsoever good things are done, whether by infidels, or by the faithful, or by sinners, or by the just, as great as small, as supernatural as natural, are gifts of God, and are to be referred to his special and gratuitous help; consequently necessity of prayer and thanksgiving has place in all these, and of all can be truly said with the Apostle, I Cor., IV, 7: Who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received?

You will ask why this proposition of Baius, n. 27, was condemned: « Free will without the help of the grace of God avails only to sin, » while this other one: « No one has of himself except sin and lying, » was asserted by the second Council of Orange, canon 22, since both seem to have the same meaning.

I answer. I deny that both propositions have the same meaning; for the proposition of the council extends more widely than the proposition of Baius. The sense of the proposition of the council is, that no one has of himself, evidently thus, that in no way has he received from God, not even as first mover, except sin and lying. And this is true; for man is said to have of himself that which is so proper to him and has from himself, that in no way has he from God; and therefore this title was prefixed to the cited canon: « Of those things which are proper to men. » Thus however man has only sin, which is so much from man, but not from God. But the proposition of Baius extends less widely, especially in the sense of Baius, not only because by the name of grace simply and properly so called he understands supernatural grace given through Christ, but especially because Baius by grace understood sanctifying grace. The sense therefore of the Baian proposition is: Free will without grace properly so called, yea without sanctifying grace, avails only to sin. Which is false, as we have seen.