In what sense sufficient grace must be admitted?

I say : Sufficient grace must be admitted in the Thomistic sense, and not otherwise.

It is proved. Sufficient grace, in the Thomistic sense, is that which confers on man the faculty of acting well; beyond which, in order that he may act well, or use this faculty well, another stronger assist is required, namely the efficacious. But sufficient grace in this sense must be admitted. Therefore. — The minor, as to the first part, namely that grace must be admitted which gives the power of doing good even to those who do not do it, remains proved from the preceding article. — The second part is proved. Good action is something distinct from the power of acting well, something nobler and more perfect than it, and what is principal in the work of salvation. But God is the first and immediate cause of salvation and of every salutary act. Therefore, as by sufficient grace there is constituted the first and immediate cause of the power of acting well, so by efficacious grace distinct from the sufficient there ought to be constituted the first and immediate cause of the salutary act.

It is confirmed. Sufficient grace cannot be admitted in the sense of Molina or of the Congruists. Therefore it must be admitted in the sense of the Thomists. — The antecedent is proved. According to Molina, the good use of sufficient grace, or the consent which man gives to it, is not from God as from the first cause giving it, but God expects it from the created will; and at most it is from God as concause through simultaneous concurrence; which cannot be admitted. The same must be said of congruous grace; for this, its Congruist defenders being judges, has nothing more in the order of physical entity and of assist than the grace of Molina. Therefore. These few things for now; for whatever proves the necessity of grace efficacious of itself, of which below, proves this conclusion.

Obj. 1° : This grace is not sufficient, beyond which another is required. But beyond grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense another is required. Therefore. — The major is evident; because sufficient is that beyond which nothing is required.

I answer. I distinguish the major. This grace is not sufficient on every side and in every genus, beyond which another is required, I concede the major; it is not sufficient in its own genus, I deny the major. To make plain its sense I distinguish the minor. But, beyond grace sufficient in the Thomistic manner, another is required in a diverse genus, I concede the minor; in the same genus, I deny the minor. Whence to the proof of the major I similarly distinguish. That is sufficient beyond which nothing else is required in any other genus whatever, I subdivide. Only this is said to be sufficient, I deny; and moreover that is said to be sufficient beyond which nothing else is required in its own genus, although something else be required in a diverse genus, I concede.

We say therefore that grace, which so gives man the faculty of acting well that, if he do not act, this is not because he cannot, but because he wills not: we say, I say, that such grace, in its proper and natural sense and according to the common mode of speaking, is and is called sufficient, although for actual action another efficacious grace be required. For indeed it is not sufficient in every genus and order, since another of another genus and order is required; but it is sufficient in its own genus and order. And we say that to speak thus is to speak in the proper sense and as we commonly speak. For daily we say that fire is sufficient for burning, although moreover it must be applied to the combustible subject; that bread is sufficient for nourishing, although besides it must be chewed, swallowed and digested; that the intellect is sufficient for understanding, although it never understands unless further intelligible species be employed and the object applied by a further motion; that the passion of Christ is sufficient for saving us, even if it never save us, unless his merits be applied to us from elsewhere; and six hundred other things: thus, I say, we speak in common speech. So speaks St. Thomas, bringing forward the same examples here I^a, q. 109, a. 1, c, and III^a p., q. 61, a. 1, ad 3.

Therefore just as, when we say that fire is sufficient for burning, the intellect for understanding, bread for nourishing, the passion of Christ for saving us, these phrases do not signify, in the proper sense and common mode of speaking, that for burning, understanding, nourishing, saving us, de facto nothing else is required in any other genus besides fire, or intellect, or bread, or the passion of Christ; but only that, as to the power of burning, understanding, nourishing, saving us, no other power is required than that of fire, or intellect, or bread, or of the passion of Christ: so, when we say that grace is sufficient for acting well, this phrase, in the proper sense and according to the common mode of speaking, does not signify that, for actual action, nothing else is required in any other genus; but only that, without any other power of the same order, it confers on us the sufficient faculty of acting well, if we will. Wherefore it is unskillfully objected to us that we abuse terms, and that we teach a sufficient grace which does not suffice.

You will ask: Passing over the question of the name, and granting that grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense can be called sufficient with sound sense, inasmuch as it gives sufficiently the power: at least it is truly insufficient for actually operating, or for actually observing the commandment. But for this it ought to be sufficient, because God does not command us that we may be able to observe the commandments, but that we observe them de facto. Therefore. — The major is proved. That grace is insufficient for actually observing the commandment, to which something is wanting for its actual observance which is not in our power. But efficacious grace, which the Thomists require for actual observance, is wanting, and is not in our power. Therefore. So Honoratus Tournely, quest. VII on Grace, a. 4, concl. 3.

I answer. I deny the major. To the proof I distinguish the minor. Efficacious grace is not in our power, as an effect subsisting under it, I concede; as a cause by which it is made ready for it, I deny. For God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give efficacious grace to all who have sufficient grace, nor does he deny it to anyone except on account of fault, which at least in order and nature precedes the subtraction of efficacious grace. You have this difficulty drawn out at greater length in the treatise on God, dissert. IX, a. 4, § 3. See.

Obj. 2°: Grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense is utterly useless.

Therefore it is not to be admitted. — The antecedent is proved. That grace is useless which no one ever uses. But with grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense no one ever uses. Therefore.

I answer. With our Goudin, I distinguish the antecedent. Grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense is useless of itself, I deny; per accidens, through man's defect, I concede. For it gives of itself true power, which is useful; and if man use it not, the fault is man's, not grace's. But God, as in nature, so in grace bestows many things useful of themselves which, through our defect, lack their effect.

To what is added, that with grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense no one ever uses, I distinguish. No one uses grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense, reduplicatively as merely sufficient, I concede; specificatively as giving the faculty of good, I deny. Sufficient grace can be considered in two ways, which, as the praised Goudin observes, most people do not sufficiently advert to: 1° as it is merely sufficient, under which notion it connotes God's permission that man fail it and resist it; and in this sense it is true that no one uses that grace well. 2° It can be considered as to its proper entity and its own precise effect, which is to give the power of good; and in this sense it is false that no one uses it well; for most, considering it thus, use it well and act well, although this very thing, that they use it well, is an effect of efficacious grace. Therefore as the power of bearing fruit in plants is not in vain, although in most, on account of accidental defects, it remain without effect, because in others it bears fruit; so, in like manner, in our case.