On the necessity of grace for the natural love of God above all things, affective as well as effective, and for avoiding sins

The question is not of natural innate love, which is like a natural weight toward the good proper to each, nor of elicited necessary love, such as is found even in brutes, nor of free inefficacious love, which is only complacence in the goodness of God, not bringing forward means to please God, nor removing impediments of sins; but of free and amicable efficacious natural love: and this is twofold, effective and affective. Love efficacious affectively only is a simple act of the will whereby man refers himself and all things to God as last end, with the resolve of pleasing him in all things and removing all things that displease him; which is to love God above all things appreciatively. Love efficacious effectively is not a single act, but the execution of the said resolve, or actual observance of the natural commandments: if of all, it is called effective simply; if of some only, effective secundum quid.

I say 1°: Fallen man cannot by the sole forces of nature, without repairing grace, love God above all things with affective efficacious love ¹. ¹ Here q. 109, a. 3, c.

It is proved ². A faculty infirm, corrupted and curved toward its own good contrary to the divine, cannot exercise toward God the most excellent act of a sound faculty unless healed. But the will of fallen man is infirm and curved toward its own good contrary to the divine; and to love God above all things with efficacious affective love is the most excellent act of a sound faculty; for it contains virtually the fulfillment of the whole natural law, and makes the will right concerning every appetible thing. Therefore. ² Ibid.

I say 2°: Fallen man cannot without repairing grace love God with efficacious effective love, that is, fulfill the whole natural law as to substance ¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 4, c.

It is proved from the principles laid down. 1° A sick man cannot of himself perform the most excellent work of a sound man unless healed. But to fulfill the whole natural law is the most excellent work of a sound man. Therefore.

2° The will averted from the end cannot be right concerning all the means; for the order of means depends upon the order to the end. But the will of sinful man is averted from the end, namely from God as natural author. Therefore.

3° There are certain precepts which fallen man cannot keep without grace, as the first and greatest commandment of the love of God above all things, as is evident from the preceding conclusion: likewise the confession of faith amid the most atrocious torments.

I say 3°: Fallen man, existing in mortal sin, without a special grace of God superadded, cannot long avoid all mortal sins against the natural law, nor overcome all temptations ². ² Ibid., a. 8, c.

The Author seems to have held the opposite in II Sentent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 2, c. Some interpret him of physical power; but, the text attentively inspected, it is said more truly with others that he retracted himself here in his Summa, which, as being his last work, is to be followed.

The conclusion follows from the preceding conclusion; because, as was said, fallen man cannot without grace observe all precepts. Therefore neither avoid all mortal sins; for mortal sin is nothing else than transgression of a precept. But moreover besides.

It is proved ¹. That man may long avoid all mortal sins and overcome all temptations, he ought to have his heart converted to the last end, namely God, and adhering to him so firmly that he wills to be separated from him for no good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided. But man existing in sin not only has not his heart firmly adhering to God, but is averted from him, and converted to changeable good as to an end. Therefore. ¹ Ibid.

I say 4°: The just man with the ordinary helps of grace, without special privilege, can avoid each venial sin; he cannot however long avoid all ². ² Ibid.

The first part is certain ³; because, if man could not avoid each venial sin without special privilege, which is neither given nor offered, those sins would not have the account of voluntary, nor of sin, or man would be bound to the impossible. ³ Ibid.

The second part is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 23: « If anyone says that a man once justified... can throughout the whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin: let him be anathema. »

It is proved ⁴ 2°. Although sanctifying grace heals man as to the mind, there remains nevertheless the corruption of the sensitive appetite, whence disordinate motions against reason very frequently arise. But reason, although it can repress individual motions (whence they have, as was said, the account of sin and voluntary), cannot nevertheless repress all, because while it strives to resist one, very often another arises; nor can reason be always vigilant to avoid and curb motions of this kind. Therefore. ⁴ Ibid.

If therefore any venial sin whatever be considered severally and in itself, man can avoid it with the ordinary helps of grace; and when thus they occur to be avoided, of them thus to be avoided the precept is given. But, if one after another be considered, and so continued long, and at the same time there be attended to, on the one side, the force, multitude and frequency of temptations, on the other side, the infirmity of the natural powers which are wearied by continual combat, it cannot be done, morally speaking, but that man fail in some indeterminate matter; for this continuation imports the greatest difficulty, to overcome which there is required a most special grace whereby the instability of free choice is confirmed, the infirmity healed, the fatigue refreshed and the distaste mitigated. And because this impotence regards no determinate sin, but something indeterminate and in confusion, it is said that man can avoid all things divisively, that is, each one considered in itself and separately, not all collectively, that is, one after another, continuing unto the last. From these the arguments from reason are solved.

You will say: If man cannot avoid all venial sins without a special privilege, which God is not prepared to give, then he is necessitated to commit some. Therefore, committing it, he does not sin; for no one sins in what he cannot avoid, as Augustine says, lib. III de Lib. arbit., c. 18, n. 50 ¹. ¹ There Augustine put the question: « Is there so great a fallacy that it can by no means be guarded against? If it is so, there are no sins; for who sins in what can by no mode be avoided? » He answers: « But sin is committed; therefore it can be guarded against. » Which is to be understood of each sin, even venial.

I answer. I distinguish the first consequent. Therefore to the commission of some venial sin vaguely and indeterminately he is necessitated — I concede; to some particular and determinate one — I deny. Whence likewise I deny the second consequent. For that sin be imputed to man, it suffices that he can avoid each one determinately in itself and as it offers itself here and now, although he be necessitated to some vague and indeterminate one, or, as it is commonly said, although he cannot avoid all collectively. Thus Christ said, Matth., XVIII, 7: It is necessary that scandals come; but, because this necessity is vague, nor affects anyone determinately, deservedly is blamed he who gives scandal ². ² Whence there is added: Nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal comes!

You will insist 1°: God commands to avoid all venial sins. Therefore man can avoid all.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. God commands all venial sins to be avoided by a precept indistinct from the precepts of individuals — I concede; by a distinct precept — I deny. For since all do not occur together, nor are all avoided except by avoiding individuals, in vain would the precept of avoiding all be employed, distinct from the precepts of avoiding individuals.

You will ask whether and to whom has been granted a special privilege of immunity from every sin, even venial.

I answer. Certainly it was granted to Blessed Mary the Virgin, and more probably to no other.

The first part is proved 1° from the Council of Trent cited above, where, after it was defined « that a man once justified cannot throughout the whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, » there is added: « As the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin. » Therefore.

2° From Augustine lib. de Natura et Gratia, chapter 36, n. 42, saying: « Excepting the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, on account of the honor of the Lord, I will have no question whatsoever raised when sin is treated of. »

3° By reason. Sin, even venial, arises from the fomes of sin born of original sin. But, since Blessed Mary the Virgin was preserved immune from original sin in her very conception, in her the fomes of sin was altogether extinguished. Therefore.

The second part is at least urged. 1° Because without sufficient foundation no one ought to be excepted from the general rule of Sacred Scripture affirming in many places that there is no man who does not sin. But we have no foundation, neither in the Fathers, nor in councils, nor in Sacred Scripture, for excepting anyone from this general rule, besides the Blessed Virgin. Therefore.

2° Augustine, answering Pelagius asserting that several men and women whom he named had been altogether without sin, among whom he counted Joseph the spouse of Mary, after the words just cited adds: « This Virgin therefore excepted, if we could gather together all those holy men and women while they lived here and interrogate them whether they were without sin, what think we they would have answered? Whether this which he [Pelagius] says, or that which John the apostle? I ask you, of whatsoever excellence of sanctity they were in this body, if this could have been asked, would they not with one voice have cried out, I. Ioann., I, 8: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us? Or would they perhaps have answered that more humbly than more truly? But this [which he says] now pleases him [Pelagius], and rightly pleases, « to place the praise of humility in part, not falsity. » Therefore, if they said this truly, they would have sin; which because they confessed humbly, truth would be in them. But if they lied about this, nevertheless they would have sin, because truth would not be in them. » Since indeed nothing has been defined concerning this or that saint, e.g., concerning John the Baptist or Joseph spouse of the Blessed Virgin, negatively or affirmatively, as to total immunity from sin, the same Doctor, lib. de Spiritu et littera, after again expounding his opinion, proceeds: « Nay, even if there is no one, or was, or will be, who is perfected in such purity — which rather I believe — and yet that there is, or was, or will be such a one is defended and thought, as far as I can judge, not much error, nor perniciously is anyone deceived with a certain benevolence: provided that he who thinks this, think not himself to be such, unless he has truly and clearly perceived himself to be such. »)